Brookings: Projects - Managing Global Order

Europe on a Slippery Slope

Thomas Wright — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the International Herald Tribune.

Throughout the euro crisis, observers have been asking if the euro zone will disintegrate — as if it is a decision that will be made by its leaders at some point in the future. This holds out the prospect of a great historic choice: Europeans can choose to properly unite and overcome their crisis or they can choose dissolution. We wait with bated breath for the next summit or the latest “most crucial month in the euro’s history,” which now seems to come several times a year.

But, this may be the wrong way of looking at the euro crisis. Integration and disintegration are not just the products of deliberate decisions. They are both processes, set in motion by actions regardless of the stated intentions of leaders. Once underway, each process takes several election cycles — probably a decade or so — to reach completion. Only one will prevail in the end, but it is possible that in the early stages these two processes can coexist even as each vies for supremacy.

Looked at this way, the euro zone is in serious trouble. The events of the past six months are consistent with a process of disintegration, while the process of integration has steadily weakened. The question is no longer, “Will Europe unravel?” We should be asking, “Can European disintegration be reversed?”

The trigger that brought integration to a halt and set disintegration in motion is surprising. In July 2012, the European Central Bank chief, Mario Draghi, declared that he would do whatever it takes to save the euro, and in August he kept his promise by introducing a program of Outright Monetary Transactions to finance troubled member states, thus bringing down the price of sovereign debt. The temporary lull led José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, to confidently declare that “the existential threat against the euro has essentially been overcome.”

But Barroso could not have been more mistaken. The E.C.B.’s actions, while welcome, had a major unintended consequence. European governments became complacent and stopped pushing the policies needed to save the euro. The German government now believes that a quantum leap toward deeper fiscal and political integration through treaty change (the only way it could be done) is no longer necessary. At the December summit meeting, it was taken off the table. Instead, the Germans will push for incremental steps to increase coordination. Banking union has been watered down to the point where it is grossly insufficient. The euro zone is proposing a common supervisory mechanism, but banking debt will remain primarily a national concern.

The optimists say that the small steps the euro zone has taken are the first in a long journey, but this assumes that it will be easier to accomplish extraordinarily difficult goals later. Unfortunately, European politics are becoming polarized in a way that makes further progress unlikely. The core member states have run out of patience with the periphery and do not want to take on new commitments, such as a real banking union. Voters in the periphery are turning toward politicians who will say no to German austerity, as Italians recently demonstrated.

As integration stalled, the euro zone experienced its first major act of disintegration. The spectacularly botched rescue of Cyprus formally created a two-tier euro zone. Deposits are safer in Germany than in the periphery and this has enormous implications. We should expect large-scale capital flight if markets fear that other states will need a bailout. With capital controls in place, Cyprus itself is half in and half out of the single currency.

The next decisive moment may be when a member state on the periphery elects a government with a cast iron mandate to say no to a German government that has a cast iron mandate not to buckle. This almost happened in Greece in June of 2012, and it may yet happen in Italy in a couple of months. This could cause a withdrawal of E.C.B. support and an escalation that will lead to new acts of disintegration.

Winston Churchill once said: “It is not enough that we do our best; sometimes we have to do what’s required.” All European leaders should have this advice engraved onto a plaque and then affix it to their desks. Throughout the euro crisis, they have sought credit for good intentions and effort. They continually point out that the euro zone has moved far further and faster than anyone could have imagined before the crisis.

They are right, but it is completely irrelevant.

There are other forces at work and at the moment they are prevailing. Europe’s leaders need to be honest about the steps necessary to reverse a long spiral of disintegration. If they can’t do that, they need to ask how they can manage the process in the least damaging way possible.

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Image Source: © Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters

Democracy, Human Rights and the Emerging Global Order

Ted Piccone — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:12:00 -0400

The Brookings Institution’s Managing Global Order project convened a two-day workshop to discuss emerging trends in international support for democracy and human rights and the increasingly complex drivers shaping foreign policies. Bringing together policy makers and experts from emerging and established democratic powers at Greentree, the workshop identified areas of convergence and divergence in foreign policy priorities, methods, and discourse, and extrapolated implications for the evolving global order.

On the first day, participants explored the concepts of democracy and human rights and their promotion within the context of competing national interests. On the second day, the focus shifted to international cooperation on issues of democracy and human rights, especially as seen through the lens of the Arab uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the politics that guide the foreign policies of democracies. The discussions, which were held on the basis of the Chatham House rule of non-attribution to specific speakers, are summarized here.

The conversation was predicated on a working definition of democracy as a liberal, representative political system as articulated in various international instruments like the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/96 of 2001, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. While recognizing that it takes different forms in different contexts, democracy in this sense reflects such core principles as the separation of powers with checks and balances, civil and political rights, freedom of the press, universal suffrage in free and fair elections, and civilian control of the military. Although participants disagreed to what extent social and economic rights should be emphasized in the expression of democracy, they agreed that all human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing and deserve protection.

Global Governance

In an era when the gap between the demand for and the supply of global governance is growing, it is increasingly urgent that established and emerging democracies find common ground on norms and delivery of global public goods, especially on democracy and human rights issues. There is cause for optimism: Rising democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey are embracing democracy and human rights at home and to varying degrees promoting them in their neighborhoods. But they are not yet stepping up to address the gap on these and other issues in global governance internationally.

Simultaneously, the rules-based system under which international relations take place is in flux, providing an opportunity to reshape and redirect the global order. Emerging powers emphasize the importance of democratization both domestically, where they are grappling with their own internal processes of reform, and multilaterally, where they question whether actions of established powers are commensurate with their principles, argue for universal application of rules and norms, and insist on a greater voice at the decision-making table. They have the opportunity to shape the future of global governance as leaders and are proving themselves important players in global affairs, but this shift has been more marked at the level of regions and neighborhoods. The results of multipolarity in the global sphere have been more ambiguous and it remains to be seen whether the liberal world order persists or a new framework emerges with rising powers at the helm of a more elastic set of norms. While it appears certain that human rights will remain a durable legacy of the era of Western hegemony, the cause of enlarging democracy stands on less solid footing.

The Democracy Advantage and its Place in Defining National Interests

In the modern era, peace generally reigns amongst democracies. Democracies also perform better than non-democracies at economic development, and democracy, economic development, and regional integration work hand-in-hand to promote peace and stability. Non-democracies are more likely to be failed states spawning internal or external conflict. It would be expected, therefore, that democracies would identify the spread of democracy as in their national interests and would partner on certain issues, such as support for democratic transitions, human rights and rule of law. A state’s designation as a democracy or non-democracy, however, is not necessarily a good predictor of foreign policy alignment. While there is strong convergence on the fundamental principles of human rights, emerging and established democracies favor very different methodologies for addressing threats to such core values, resulting in divergence of policy, politicization and stalemate, as in the case of Syria.

There was consensus that democracy cannot be imposed by external actors, but rather must be pursued organically by a population. It is a path, not a destination. Similarly, countries formulate and express democracy differently based on their unique histories; there is no single model of democracy. Aspiring democratic countries seeking advice from other democracies are increasingly turning to states that have undertaken their own transitions more recently, and they, in turn, are responding positively if and when asked to assist. In fact, the “twinning” model of pairing newer democracies with transitioning states is being prototyped by the Community of Democracies through its project pairing Poland with Moldova, and Slovakia with Tunisia. The G8 has arranged similar pairings through the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, which links leaders in aspiring democracies with G8 partners to build institutional capacity, promote knowledge sharing, and strengthen accountability and good-governance practices. In addition, rising democracies like Indonesia and South Africa have been key players in establishing and utilizing multilateral fora like the Bali Democracy Forum and the African Peer Review mechanism to share experiences and best practices in this domain.

Although participants agreed that democracy must be demand driven, disagreement emerged regarding the universality of democracy promotion. Some felt strongly that countries on the path of democracy have a responsibility to assist those who seek the same path. Others noted the negative connotations associated with democracy promotion and its perceived application as a post-hoc, faux justification for military intervention aimed at regime change, as with U.S. involvement in Iraq. Some also pointed to its selective application, especially when energy security interests take precedence over influencing, punishing, or removing repressive regimes, as with U.S. passivity in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Some in the global South interpret democracy promotion as a U.S. agenda rather than a universal aspiration and wish to construct a unique brand of support for democracy in contrast to the U.S. and E.U. model. Rising democracies seek their own identity (also referred to as strategic autonomy) in an effort to avoid being seen as tools of more established powers. In one respect, this attitude has prompted emerging powers to act timidly with regards to democracy promotion, hiding behind the fig leaves of sovereignty and non-intervention when asked by the international community to act outside their neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, such powers have actively promoted democracy in their regions through both bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Indonesia, for example, was a key player in leveraging ASEAN to encourage Myanmar to undertake political change and in drafting the first ever ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights. However, emerging powers have been as complacent as established powers in indirectly suppressing democracy when other national interests take precedence, as with India’s less than decisive response to the political crisis in the Maldives, or Brazil’s uncritical support for Cuba. In response to the Arab Spring, rising democracies are for the first time being expected to grapple with the notion of democracy promotion beyond their own regions, an expectation many find difficult to fulfill. The prevalence of extremist ideologies and xenophobia, the increased threat of the tyranny of the majority, and the free and fair election of leaders the international community may dislike all posed significant red flags for emerging (and established) democracies and reinforced their reticence regarding democracy promotion. Other national interests like trade relations, energy dependence, migration and diaspora population concerns present roadblocks to greater international engagement on this issue.

The emergence of other domestic political and economic actors with their own interests and values plays an important role in shaping national interests, especially in emerging democratic powers. Some disagreement concerned which actors had the most influence over the definition of national interests. In Brazil, for example, the private sector may be notably more influential than other domestic players, which complicates a truly national definition of priorities. Parliament plays an uneven and unpredictable role in formulating foreign policy, although legislators in emerging powers have begun taking greater interest. For example, Brazilian congressmen and senators recently joined a coalition with NGOs to hold the foreign minister accountable on human rights issues. While recognizing the important role legislators can play in inserting human rights into foreign policy, some acknowledged that their contribution could also be a mixed blessing due to nationalist, religious or ethnic political motivations.

Much conversation also involved the balancing of interests that sometimes conflict with human rights, such as national security and the economy. Some argued that human rights and democracy support must be managed in a way that does not jeopardize other national interests or relations with key trading partners like China. In this respect, constant calibration between interests and values is vital. Rising democracies will continue to define their own pace of democratization at home and support for democracy and human rights abroad, leading many observers to predict a continued period of inertia and inaction in responding to or preventing democratic breakdowns or mass human rights violations. The international community is thus tasked to advance a mutually respectful collaborative approach that appeals to both emerging and established powers and that achieves results. To successfully reach such a compromise, it must identify approaches the global South feels comfortable employing and develop strategies to bring those tools to bear in new and challenging contexts.

The Arab Uprisings and the Responsibility to Protect

Although the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is embraced as within democratic principles, its primary purpose is not democracy promotion. R2P’s mission is atrocity prevention, though it is difficult to operationalize the concept. The application of R2P in Libya through military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council and the subsequent failure to exercise it in Syria as of yet has revealed many challenges inherent in current understandings of R2P. It also provided an important venue for conversation between established and emerging powers about humanitarian intervention. It is clear that a fundamental shift has taken place regarding humanitarian intervention and that more and more states embrace the broad values expressed by R2P. For example, most of the 118 states that mentioned Syria at the UN General Assembly in 2012 expressed concern about the population, up from less than a third who invoked Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. In addition, the IBSA Dialogue Forum sent a delegation to Syria, as did Turkey, a new rallying of emerging powers to address threats to human rights both inside and outside their own neighborhoods. This level of attention and the unprecedented advocacy of a policy of intervention by rising powers can be attributed at least in part to the improved quality of democracy in the rising democracies.

With the support of emerging powers like South Africa, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force in Libya, but elicited rancor from some parties when it resulted in the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi. Suspicions were voiced that Resolution 1973 had acted as cover for regime change, and because it was couched in the language of R2P, states began questioning the concept. In response to this breakdown in consensus, Brazil proposed the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) principle, which emphasized the sequencing of measures to ensure all options were exhausted before using force, and called for greater accountability and reporting to the Security Council. Participants disagreed as to whether RWP served as a useful basis for conversation between the North and South, or if it represented a counterproductive Brazilian political move that merely inflamed rhetoric. Some of the good will engendered by RWP has begun to disintegrate as the situation in Syria continues to fester with no coordinated international response.

Admittedly, Libya and Syria are very different countries, especially in terms of the roles they play in the strategic interests of key actors. Nevertheless, the application of R2P in Libya but not in Syria highlights the phenomenon of selectivity, a topic of debate throughout the workshop. Participants agreed that crisis situations should be examined on a case-by-case basis, but at the same time many reinforced the global responsibility to support all states that are unable to adequately prevent mass atrocities. Some suggested that selectivity is the principled application of R2P but called for transparency in decision making to better understand a state’s motivations for supporting or denouncing intervention as an option. Others argued that universalizing the concept to make responsibility an obligation at all times in all cases is a fundamental challenge that the international community should pursue. At the very least, discourse must recognize that all states engage in some form of selectivity in order to advance the conversation.

It was pointed out that international responses to the Arab uprisings have been uneven not only in atrocity prevention but also democracy support. Emerging powers hesitate to lend support to the application of R2P in Syria lest it be used as a mask for regime change, as some perceive to have been in the case in Libya. However, established and emerging powers alike have not exercised leadership in universally supporting calls for democracy in countries of the Middle East because of overarching security concerns like energy and relations with Israel. And although emerging and established powers share an interest in energy security, they still differ on methodologies; a country may have leverage in a situation short of intervening militarily which might result in strategies that are most cost effective in money and lives. For example, South Africa resisted intervening militarily in Zimbabwe in response to democracy and human rights crises, despite international calls to do so, but was able, in their view, to improve elections there through alternative means. Likewise, it refused to intervene militarily in Sudan, instead employing a triangulation strategy that led to secession. Similarly, Turkey initially prioritized dialogue and consultation with the Assad regime, relying on the relationship it had cultivated with Syria over the last ten years to exhaust all potential peaceful solutions. IBSA also sent a high-level diplomatic mission to Syria to try to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict and thereby ward off military intervention.

The Arab uprisings have fundamentally challenged the Western idea of the separation of church and state, and Arab democracy demands a redefinition of secularism that allows religious values, but not rules and regulations, to take root in society. Discussants will continue to have to confront this new reality as the conversation continues regarding democratization in the Arab world.

Current understandings of preventive diplomacy tools like R2P – especially how they relate to and affect emerging democracies – must be improved. The discussion prompted by the Brazilian proposal of RWP highlights the need for further conversation or clarification about R2P as a tool. There is still fear that R2P provides a blank check to pursue national interests rather than prevent atrocities. Therefore, a refocusing on R2P’s purpose and intentions is needed, and may reduce objections to its proper application. In addition, a multilateral coalition must be built and maintained to address mass atrocities such as in Syria. This requires ongoing messaging with all partners and the public to maintain support and communicate expectations and mission objectives.

Tools for International Cooperation on Democracy and Human Rights

Recent events show a clear incapacity of international mechanisms to effectively address major threats to democracy and human rights. While established democracies are quicker to pursue coercive tactics and emerging democracies strongly prefer dialogue and reconciliation, a variety of tools are available and being tested on the world stage. Indonesia seeks to make democracy and human rights foundational concerns at existing institutions like ASEAN, its new Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), and the G20. Indonesia’s leadership in the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights and the establishment of the Bali Democracy Forum underscore this commitment. The Community of Democracies creates issue-based working groups to involve government and civil society and maximizes technology through the LEND network, connecting key leaders in transitioning countries with those in transitioned countries.

Another key tool touted by many participants is reliance on regional bodies as antenna in noting potential problems and as early movers in response to crises. The AU and SADC both have provisions to suspend any country that experiences an unconstitutional interruption, ECOWAS recently suspended Mali’s membership in response to a coup, and UNASUR recently exercised a similar provision against Paraguay. These and other multilateral mechanisms are critical because they reflect regional ownership without the presence of Northern powers and because such a coalition is less likely than a single nation to create further problems or receive pushback from local actors.

Participants discussed in depth the merits of democracy-inclusive forums and democracy-exclusive forums for discussion of important transnational issues. For example, the Community of Democracies reformed its invitation and governing council selection process in 2010 to ensure leadership consists of staunchly committed democracies while expanding participation at ministerial meetings to include countries at incipient stages of democracy. The Bali Democracy Forum, however, invites a broader base of participants, including China and Vietnam, in an effort to establish a conversation with more parties. While it was agreed that both style of forums are necessary and beneficial, participants lacked consensus as to when democracies should and should not include others in policy conversations.

Most participants with a global South view asserted that for any country to retain credibility in international cooperation on human rights and democracy, a strong human rights record at home is a vital requisite. Otherwise, the rules-based system that governs behavior is weakened by the perception that great powers write the rules but are not necessarily committed to following them. In this respect, emerging powers emphasize the importance of addressing human rights challenges domestically. For example, Brazil recently established a truth commission to investigate human rights abuses under the military dictatorship and passed a freedom of information law to increase transparency. It has also engaged in international efforts to combat violence against women and encourage open government initiatives, key concerns within Brazil and essential to advancing its own democracy. No consensus was reached on the means by which accountability can be increased on the global level, although the need was clearly articulated. Emerging democratic powers are increasingly held to account by vibrant civil society organizations and media that feature voices from victims of violations and question government’s actions abroad. Decision makers have noted this democratization of foreign policy and it continues to shape their processes and actions.

Words of caution tend to outweigh prescriptive solutions in discussing tools for international cooperation. According to some participants, limiting discussions on transnational issues to an exclusive club of democracies is a false dichotomy that discourse must move past. Engaging with imperfect democracies (like Venezuela and Bolivia) is crucial to encourage their continued development on the path of democracy. The regional dimension of democracy and human rights support should also be strengthened so that neighbors hold each other accountable for advancing democratic practices. Trade and regional economic integration can also be considered as a potentially effective tool for promoting values. States should also leverage their private sectors, which engage in new and different ways with civil society when investigating potential investment opportunities abroad, to take advantage of new avenues for dialogue. In addition, they should encourage business leaders to prioritize their obligations to protect human rights and sustainable development. Finally, the international community must better coordinate its efforts to avoid overwhelming target populations, as has occurred with countries rushing to Tunisia’s aid in its transition. It must also ensure that such aid is voluntary and in no way coercive.

The Politics of Foreign Policy in Democracies: The Human Rights Dimension

In the last session, participants articulated the tactics that facilitate action at the global level and the factors preventing further progress, with suggestions for improvement. Agreements at the UN Human Rights Council and other similar international fora are often reached by isolating extremists and working effectively with the middle. Diplomats are also successful when they can effectively navigate their governments in capital to alter a country’s position on an issue. Therefore, personalities of the diplomats at the UN, the Human Rights Council, and other relevant bodies can play important roles in shaping the course of negotiations. Similarly, personal priorities of government leaders can influence how much importance is placed on human rights. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton has prioritized women’s human rights and LGBT human rights, but Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, is a technocrat who prioritizes economic growth and social protections. The foreign policies of the countries reflect these priorities.

Many factors, including the realpolitik interests of emerging powers, resource constraints, political dynamics, personalities and what is politically and procedurally possible at international bodies all combine to explain why more action is not taken on human rights issues at the global level. For example, to highlight the importance of human rights in foreign policy, one European expert shared that the human rights section of the foreign ministry receives the highest number of parliamentary questions on foreign policy, while about half of the daily statements from the ministry spokesperson pertain to human rights. However, budget constraints and the current state of the economy prevent more robust action at this time. Another participant from an established democracy shared that internal bureaucratic politics limited the policy options available to diplomats which slowed action at the Human Rights Council and limited that country’s opportunities to lead. Conversely, domestic politics forced India to change its vote at the Human Rights Council regarding a resolution calling on Sri Lanka to address human rights abuses. India had long resisted such resolutions, but thanks to overt pressure from a coalition partner, it became more active. This represents an unusual but important example of domestic politics prompting rather than impeding action on human rights at the international level.

Emerging democracies face major challenges in addressing their own human rights deficits at home. They largely lack a domestic constituency for a more human rights-oriented foreign policy, meaning the few NGOs advocating for these issues have a small pool of support on which to draw. As a result, economic growth and private interests are usually prioritized over accountability. In Brazil, much of civil society has not been actively engaged on these issues, and in Indonesia, the discussion has traditionally been dominated by think tanks. This has begun to shift and influence on foreign policy has begun to diversify, but in many of the emerging powers this change is still in the nascent phases. In some cases, emerging democracies still struggle to maintain a high-quality representative system. The process of decentralization in Indonesia has led to a growing oligarchy which threatens the protection of minority rights – especially religious minorities but also women. Turkey has experienced serious backsliding regarding freedom of the press while continuing to wrestle with its own minority rights challenges. Overall, civil society engagement on foreign policy in emerging democracies has been limited but is improving. Attention should be paid to framing the discussion on a case-by-case basis to bring these issues into the public consciousness in the relevant countries.

Despite these challenges, most participants agreed that civil society and NGOs have an enormous role to play in shaping foreign policy regarding human rights. When governments refuse to act on important issues, civil society can apply pressure to prompt action. For example, when South Africa hesitated to broach LGBT rights at the Human Rights Council, South African civil society held the government accountable by bringing public attention to the prioritization of human rights codified in the 1994 constitution. This shamed South Africa into leading on this issue. However, many participants asserted that civil society and NGOs must be more creative in approaching governments. While the foreign ministry is often the lead on foreign policy regarding human rights, many other ministries have equity in these crosscutting issues and shape (or block) the debate. Civil society and NGOs should approach other ministries – ministries concerned with the economy, education, and security, for example – to apply pressure and enact change. In addition, they can call upon leaders in the executive branch with a personal interest in democracy and human rights matters to apply pressure. For example, in Brazil, NGOs approached an attorney general who had previously worked in the human rights field to question the foreign ministry about an upcoming vote on North Korea. By invoking Article IV of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which codifies a commitment to human rights, the attorney general and NGOs were able to elicit a change in Brazil’s vote.

While these recommendations may help civil society and NGOs bolster their impact, they must be prepared for pushback from governments. While governments in the global North revert to funding constraints and domestic pressure as motivations for their action or inaction, governments in the global South might rely on arguments that South-South cooperation should be emphasized over naming and shaming tactics and that the system operates under a double standard. Civil society and NGOs should accept and support South-South cooperation, but not complacency. They must demand leadership from their governments to ensure the safeguarding of the global democracy and human rights order.

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Authors

Ted Piccone

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

How The Hague Courts and Tribunals Protect Human Rights

Thu, 04 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 4, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the last twenty years, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has given a voice to victims as it prosecuted those accused of grave human rights abuses in the Yugoslav conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established just over ten years ago, also plays a vital role in holding violators responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. These anniversaries provide a valuable opportunity to reflect on the past and look to the future of international courts and tribunals and how they promote and protect human rights globally.

On April 4, the Managing Global Order Project at Brookings and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hosted a discussion to take stock of the ability of the ICTY, the ICC, and other international and regional justice mechanisms to hold leaders accountable for grave human rights abuses. Panelists included: Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court; Theodor Meron, president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its successor the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals; and Ambassador Stephen Rapp, ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks. Abiodun Williams, president of The Hague Institute for Global Justice, moderated the discussion.

UK's Euroscepticism Could Cost Britain Power

Thomas Wright — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The idea that Britain should use its influence to remake the European Union is not an unreasonable one. There is a strong argument that the EU is on an unsustainable path — the eurocrisis is creating a dangerous divide between the periphery and core, the eurozone is encroaching upon the EU, there is a yawning gap between the people and their leaders, and Europe has much to do if it is to be competitive in a world dominated by the US and China. Britain is a country with the diplomatic skill and heft to move the EU in the right direction.

Unfortunately, this idea is not on the table. What prime minister David Cameron has offered is a referendum that strikes many international observers as diplomatically irrational.

Regardless of the pros and cons of membership, the four-year wait till a vote is held creates immense uncertainty about the British economy and Britain's role in the world. Investment decisions, diplomatic engagements and countless other initiatives will be placed on hold as long as it is unclear whether Britain will be in or out.

However, there is an even greater risk with the prime minister's approach. It is much more likely to lead to an exit than his publicly stated position suggests. Cameron has promised a vote if he renegotiates the terms of Britain's membership with the European Union. This way, he can have it both ways — rail against the status quo, but claim he is in favour of membership.

By implication, he has not promised a vote if he is unable to renegotiate the terms of membership. This is a rather gaping loophole. From the perspective of the rest of the EU, the easiest path is to refuse to renegotiate — hence, no referendum and no risk of Britain leaving. And it appears as if this is exactly what is happening.

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Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Politics.co.uk

Image Source: © Reuters TV / Reuters

U.S.-China Study Group on G-20 Reform

Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:34:00 -0500

The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the Center for American Progress, and the Stanley Foundation formed a study group in late 2011 to evaluate the role of the G-20 in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and the influence of the relationship on the G-20 and to propose recommendations that could improve the efficacy of this important body. The Chinese and American experts listed below held two conferences over the course of 2012, in Santa Monica, in February and in Beijing in October. At the end of these meetings, participants in the group agreed to 20 recommendations.

Read the U.S.-China Study Group's recommendations » (PDF)

Participants in the G-20 Study Group

Tim Adams, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and former Sherpa and Undersecretary of the Treasury under President George W. Bush

Sabina Dewan, Director of Globalization and International Development, Center for American Progress

DU Yanjun, Director of the Department of International Exchanges, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)

Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Matthew Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Director for International Economics in the Obama White House

Nina Hachigian, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Adam Hersh, Economist, Center for American Progress

HUANG Ying, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of World Economic Studies

Bruce Jones, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order (MGO) project at the Brookings Institution and Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University

LI Zheng, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

LIN Hongyu, Director of the Department of International Politics at the China University of International Relations

LIU Bo, Deputy Director of the Department of International Exchanges, CICIR

Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations

Keith Porter, Director of Policy and Outreach, the Stanley Foundation

QIAN Liwei, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

David Shorr, Program Officer, the Stanley Foundation

Randy Schriver, Armitage International

WANG Wenfeng, Deputy Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

YUAN Peng, Assistant President, CICIR and Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHAI Kun, Director of the CICIR Institute of World Political Studies

ZHANG Wenzong, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHU Feng, Deputy Director, Center for International & Strategic Studies, Peking University

ZHU Liqun, Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University

Publication: Center for American Progress, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and The Stanley Foundation

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Neocons Versus Realists Is So 2008

Thomas Wright — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama may not say so explicitly in his State of the Union address, but his administration's foreign policy is poised to shift significantly in his second term. The shift is the result of an ongoing debate between two camps that I call "restrainers" and "shapers." Restrainers and shapers sharply disagree about the threats to the United States and this leads to very different views about how to engage the world -- and it may well lead to a division within the Democratic Party.

Restrainers see a crumbling infrastructure, the budget deficit, a subpar education system, and a sluggish economy as much more threatening than events elsewhere in the world. Democrats of this stripe call for "nation-building at home," to use President Obama's phrase, and want to prioritize these tasks at the expense of international commitments, which they see as a drain or a distraction. Republicans have their restrainers too. They eschew the notion of an activist government but also want to concentrate on the domestic tasks of reducing the deficit and restoring growth.

The shapers have a starkly different view. They agree that domestic challenges are important -- and should be the subject of a strong domestic policy agenda -- but they don't believe international difficulties are on the wane. The U.S. economy is in a slump largely because of a crisis prone international economic order. A new foreign economic policy that advances new free trade agreements and a more stable international structure is crucial but thus far lacking. On security, the United States is a global power and detrimental developments in the Middle East, East Asia, or Europe will severely damage U.S. interests. For instance, war between China and Japan would likely spark a new economic crisis and create the conditions for decades of instability in a crucial region. Any notion that the United States can take a sabbatical to tend to the home front is mistaken, the shapers argue.

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Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Cameron’s Speech Raises More Questions Than Answers

Thomas Wright — Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:00:00 -0500

British Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on the future of Europe promised a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union but it left more questions than answers.

Cameron says the referendum will take place after a renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership and that he will lead the yes campaign. But, this leaves a rather gaping loophole. If the renegotiation fails to deliver a satisfactory result, will he hold a referendum anyway and campaign for an exit? Such a promise was missing from the speech. If he does not intend to hold a referendum if renegotiation fails, then the rest of Europe is heavily incentivized to do nothing. After all, refusing to renegotiate means no referendum whereas renegotiating means a vote with a chance of British exit. In the coming months this will become increasingly apparent and Cameron will be under pressure to commit to leading an exit campaign if the renegotiation fails. Promising to lead an Exit Campaign if his demands are not met will significantly up the ante.
British leverage in the renegotiation comes from the prospect of exit. The uncertainty gives Britain bargaining power. Therefore, the Cameron government has an incentive to make exit a credible threat and to deliberately increase uncertainty. He will have to develop real and substantive plans for a British withdrawal. He may also have to mobilize public opinion against the status quo. If he avoids these steps, how does he propose to gain leverage in the negotiations? How will investors react to a strategy designed to unleash Euroskepticism and can the genie be put back in the bottle after a messy compromise?
Cameron’s speech ensures that Britain’s efforts will be dedicated to repatriating powers rather than shaping the next steps of European integration. Britain has traditionally been a powerful voice in favor of markets, competitiveness, and a strong alliance with the United States. How will Britain’s absence from the debate on further integration affect the direction Europe takes? The repercussions could be felt on everything from a Tobin Tax to the arms embargo on China. A related question pertains to Britain’s legitimate interest in protecting itself from the risk that Eurozone integration will damage the single market. It remains to be seen if this interest will be advanced or damaged by his referendum promise.
Cameron intends to fight the next election on his referendum promise. Will Labour take him up on his offer or, if Cameron’s position proves popular, will its leader Ed Milliband move closer to the Conservatives and promise a referendum of his own? Press reports over the past 24 hours suggest that Labour is divided and has not yet made up its mind. If Labour is backed into a corner and promises a referendum of its own, the conservatives are highly likely to end up on the exit campaign, thus exponentially increasing the risk of Britain leaving the European Union.
How will the United States react? In recent weeks, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Philip Gordon has made clear that the Obama administration favors Britain remaining in the European Union. Will the Obama administration go a step further and show that a British exit would damage the special relationship? Will it put some pressure on Germany and France to meet the British halfway? Finally, the British referendum may occur after President Obama leaves office. Republicans have traditionally been much more skeptical of the European Union. Some Republicans, like John Bolton, have openly rooted for the collapse of the Eurozone. If a Republican succeeds Obama, will he or she seek to give Britain a lifeline outside of the European Union, thereby increasing the likelihood of an exit?

David Cameron’s much heralded speech was somewhat half-baked. It raises new questions and it is not clear Cameron has the answers. He will come under pressure to clarify his position. Others also find themselves in the spotlight. The answers provided in coming months could dramatically escalate the standoff that now threatens to define European politics for the next four years.

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Thomas Wright

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An Obama Doctrine on New Rules of War

Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Obama administration has an opportunity — perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use tactics such as drones and cyber attacks. Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What are the key strategic goals and ethics that should drive development of drones and cyber systems?
When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification?
How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright

Over the past four years, your administration worked hard to rollback one of the signature weapons of the 20th century, the nuclear bomb, which was one of the reasons why you were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet during this same period, the United States broke new ground in the use of new and revolutionary military technologies that may well become signature weapons of the 21st century.

There has been a game change in weaponry over the last several years, with a new generation of advanced technology that moves the point of critical human decision, both geographically off the battlefield and also, increasingly, chronologically away from the time of kinetic action. These encompass both physical systems, like unmanned aircraft (a.k.a. “drones”), and a new class of virtual weaponry, malware that can conduct a cyber attack with real world consequences.

The United States has been a leader in driving this revolution. Its military unmanned systems now number more than 8,000 in the air and 12,000 on the ground and are used daily in Afghanistan. The U.S. Cyber Command became operational in 2010 and military spending on cyber operations now measures in the billions of dollars.

At the same time, civilian intelligence agencies are increasingly using these technologies in a series of not-so-covert operations and so-called “secret wars” that have leaked into the press. There have been over 400 drone strikes into places like Pakistan and Yemen. The United States also deployed Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear development, the world’s first known use of a specially designed cyber weapon.

Such weapons seem advanced, but represent just the beginning. Technologies currently under development are far more effective and more autonomous, and capable of operating in a wider set of circumstances. We are at the onset of a decades-long technological revolution in warfare, comparable to the introduction of mechanization and airpower onto the battlefield or the advent of the atomic bomb.

Recommendation:

You now have an opportunity — and perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use these weapons. The goal should be to establish a framework for how the United States believes the evolution of these revolutionary new technologies should proceed. The effort to set the terms of the future debate and create a doctrine for guidance should draw upon past lessons from comparable situations and culminate in a major presidential speech.

Background:

These new weapons have become a hallmark of this administration’s foreign policy for good reason. They offered new options for action that have proven more accurate and proportionate, and less risky than previously-available alternatives. They have repeatedly been used in successful operations that have saved soldiers’ lives, eliminated key terrorist leaders, and offered a much-sought-after third way to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the situation surrounding these once science-fiction, then highly covert weapons has changed. First, there has been a global proliferation. The United States is leading the way, but many follow. At the end of 2012, 76 other countries have military robotics programs and over 100 have cyberwar capabilities.

Second, the international discourse and debate over them has risen significantly, increasing external pressure on U.S. policy interests. These range from international controversy over the drone strike campaign and the appointment of a U.N. special rapporteur to new NGO campaigns to preemptively ban the next generation of technologies under development.

Finally, after years of silence, the U.S. government has started to make efforts to establish policies and engage in the growing debate. These range from speeches by your aides finally acknowledging the use of such technologies in a counter-terrorism context to lesser noticed workinglevel documents, such as an attempt to establish the policy for the next, far more autonomous generation. These have been very good starts but they have been disjointed and preliminary. Most importantly, they are missing the stamp of your voice and authority, which is essential to turn tentative first steps into established goals and policy. Much remains to be done, and, more importantly, said out in the open.

What Would the Big Bet Entail?

Armed with a new revolutionary weapon in the 1940s and 1950s, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations engaged in a series of comprehensive reviews to understand better the technology, its best doctrine of use, and likely impact on geopolitics and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. These doctrines were not binding for all time. Nor did they solve all the problems of the nuclear age. But, the efforts proved valuable. Setting nuclear doctrine in public molded the strategic environment for the better, not just against adversaries, but also in relationships with allies. The discussions also helped set the terms of the discussion both internationally and domestically, helping to introduce Congress and the American public to a world of powerful new technology and important new responsibilities.

Today, the United States should embark upon a similar effort around the new generation of weaponry. This endeavor should answer where it stands on the key questions emerging now and soon to become central, including:

• What are the key strategic goals and ethical guidelines that should drive development of these new technologies? Are there any limitations that should be established or areas of the technology that should be preemptively banned?

• Is current international law sufficient to cover the development and use of these new technologies, or are there emerging gaps that should be filled?

• What is the dividing line between the military vs. civilian intelligence agency use of such technologies? What distinguishes a covert action using these technologies from an act of war?

• What is the proper role for Congress vs. the Executive Branch? When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification? Does the War Powers Resolution apply even in situations where no U.S. personnel are in harm’s way?

• Are there any key criteria for how the U.S. will similarly evaluate other nations’ use of the technology, including by potential adversaries?

• How does the United States plan to coordinate development and use doctrines with major U.S. allies?

• How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

There is a need to be realistic about what is possible. Much as with the early doctrines on nuclear weapons, the answers to these questions will not be set in stone. Rather, the goal is to set out a presidential level vision that will fill today’s gaps in the discourse and guide tomorrow’s policy.

Accessing the Downside:

There is a counterargument that it is better to say nothing, for fear of tipping off rivals, unilaterally tying U.S. hands, or that no initiative will work unless all other countries sign on, which they won’t.

That is a mistake. The less you say, the more that vacuum will be filled by others, in harmful ways. Having already used the technologies, but without proper elucidation, the precedents the United States sets may be exploited. Other states and non-state actors will use these technologies in far more crude and non-discriminatory ways, but claim to be merely following in U.S. footsteps. Finally, the debate will not stop simply because the United States is not part of it. International organizations will push ahead with investigations and propose new treaties, which, while likely ineffective, will nevertheless isolate the United States and drain our soft power. And on the home front, the original foundations of congressional and public support for many of the covert uses of these technologies could erode as the United States moves further away from 9/11. Indeed, the administration recently won a court case to maintain the veil of semi-silence that surrounds the drone strike program, but the judge described continuing the policy of denial as having an “Alice in Wonderland” feel.

Conclusion:

Beginning this discussion is a modest step with no budget costs, but entails a big bet with enormous advantages over the alternative of remaining silent. You would lay out your vision, helping both to guide internal policy development across multiple agencies as well as assuage genuine concerns at home and abroad. Most importantly, the voice of a respected commander in chief, with a strong expertise in the law, would create the foundations of an international norm, allowing the United States to build a large coalition of the like-minded on these issues, making it easier to identify and isolate those who depart from this norm. It will help maintain U.S. influence over the future of these technologies, even as they proliferate and evolve beyond our control.

By speaking out now, you will not just set the terms of the debate but steer it towards more positive ends. It’s the kind of effort for which leaders win Nobel Peace Prizes, again.

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Eurozoned Out

Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The euro crisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But risk of failure still remains and in turn could be devastating to the U.S. economy. Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How can the United States shape EU fiscal policies without being a member?
Why should the United States encourage the U.K. to remain a member of the EU?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright

The Eurocrisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But, the euro is not out of the woods yet. Real dangers remain. The underlying causes of the crisis have not been addressed. The politics are pulling in a different direction from that required for a solution. Populations on the periphery are suffering from austerity measures and see no end in sight. Those in the so-called core (Germany, Northern Europe) feel exploited. The Eurozone is building new structures but they may not be sufficient to protect it against a future major crisis.

As long as an optimal solution remains elusive, the risks of failure will remain. If failure occurs, it could be devastating to the U.S. economy, surpassing the crisis of 2008. Some estimates project that the collapse of the euro would cause an immediate 10 percent loss of GDP for the global economy, with unemployment in the European Union reaching 20 percent and spiraling inflation on the EU’s periphery. The United States and European Union are the two largest economies in the world and they are inextricably linked with each other through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial markets. For instance, 50 percent of U.S. FDI abroad goes to the European Union while 62 percent of FDI into the United States originates in the European Union. The rest of the world would also be adversely affected, particularly the Middle East and China, the world’s second largest national economy, both of which require robust growth to maintain domestic political stability.

A secondary but related danger is that the construction of a new Eurozone could lead to the fracturing of the European Union through a British withdrawal. The United Kingdom is extremely concerned that further integration in the Eurozone will damage its interests as an E.U. member. Public opinion also favors a renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership even though such a renegotiation would be strewn with difficulty and would likely fail. In this scenario, the Eurocrisis would remove America’s most reliable European ally from the EU and lead to a weakening of Europe’s capacity to act as a coherent unit in world affairs.

Recommendation:

The United States can neither compel the Eurozone to adopt particular structures nor do much to protect the Eurozone from a political backlash in austerity-stricken countries. However, the United States can perform an important service in two respects. You should task your administration with analyzing the risks associated with the EU’s plans for financial and fiscal integration and share these assessments in confidence with the EU’s leaders. If necessary, senior administration officials could go public to shape opinion in the financial markets and in European states. In the 1990s, Europeans built a flawed monetary union. Eurozone 2.0 may have new structural weaknesses that will be exposed by the next crisis, whenever that occurs. These weaknesses will undoubtedly be the result of political constraints in the member states. The United States has an important role in raising awareness of these risks so Eurozone 2.0 is as effective and robust as possible.

Second, you should take a position opposing the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. The United States can work with the United Kingdom and other members of the European Union to head off this possibility. Most importantly, the United States should emphasize the importance it places on having the United Kingdom inside the European Union, acting as a transatlantic bridge and strengthening Europe’s voice in world affairs. You should avoid any statements or policies that lead Britons to believe that an exit would result in a closer relationship with the United States that would offset any loss in influence. You should also consult closely with your European counterparts to ensure that the appropriate steps are taken to encourage the United Kingdom to remain a full member of the European Union.

If the black swan of a collapse of the Eurozone does occur, the risk of contagion in the global economy will be extremely high and it will be necessary to return to full crisis mode, as experienced in the fall of 2008, to do what is necessary to protect the financial system. This will be even more difficult than after the fall of Lehman Brothers because the collapse of the euro would create a shock of much greater scale and because the U.S. Congress may be reluctant to help foreign governments, even though it would be necessary to protect the U.S. financial system. Nevertheless, it will be your only viable option.

Background:

To understand the risks of a Eurozone collapse in the next four years, it is necessary to distinguish between the first phase of the crisis that concluded in 2012 and the second phase that has just begun. In the first phase, European governments had to decide whether to keep the euro intact or not. The key question amid market turbulence was whether the Eurozone would construct the mechanisms necessary to keep the periphery four (P4) — Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain — inside the single currency. These mechanisms were expensive and politically difficult. But, this is exactly what the Eurozone decided to do. With bailout mechanisms like the European Stability Mechanism and the Stability Treaty and bold action by the European Central Bank under the leadership of Mario Draghi, the Eurozone mitigated the most destabilizing elements of the crisis. This happened for a simple reason—every leader calculated that the risks of a fragmentation of the Eurozone massively outweighed any benefits.

The second phase of the crisis is different. The question of whether EU leaders want the Euro to remain intact has been settled. But, they now face two crucial challenges. First is the danger that political and economic accidents related to the current crisis will threaten the survival of the Euro. It will take some time to build a new Eurozone. During this period, much of the European Union will be in recession or experience stagnation. Member states will disagree strongly about the future course of action. Elections are likely to be fought on these issues and they could bring to power radical parties with rejectionist policies. The result may be a political crisis that leads to an inadvertent fracturing of the Eurozone followed by contagion and a disorderly collapse.

The issue of UK membership is a related component of this first challenge. Although it is not in the Eurozone, the United Kingdom feels threatened by further European integration. Both of the U.K.’s leading parties, the Conservatives and Labour, appear on track to offer the British people an inor- out referendum, following an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership.

The second challenge is that the Eurozone’s new structures may be insufficient to cope with a future crisis. European integration is the art of what is politically possible. But economies are not rewarded for trying hard. Their institutions need to function effectively under conditions of extreme duress. Monetary union without fiscal union was justified as the best that could be done given the political constraints and we know where that led. New structures bring new risk of design flaws, particularly in banking union, but also with respect to the perceived legitimacy of European institutions. A lack of democracy and accountability could lead to a political crisis down the road, especially if parts of the Eurozone are stagnant.

Conclusion:

A healthy global economy is a core interest of the United States. A stable and prosperous European economy is integral to that interest. For three years now, you have lived with the possibility that the collapse of the Eurozone could wreak havoc with the U.S. economy. You have also had to live with the fact that the United States has few options and no silver bullets. Quiet diplomacy and support has been your hallmark and it has been reasonably effective. You should not radically depart from this path but you should ensure it evolves to cope with the second phase of the crisis as outlined above. You should direct your administration to identify the potential vulnerabilities of reform proposals and to work with European governments, and others if necessary (public diplomacy aimed at the markets, multilateral efforts through the G-20), to prevent new failures of design. You should also use American influence to ensure that the United Kingdom remains within the European Union. These actions will reduce the probability of a black swan in Europe.

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Maritime Security: Calming the Eastern Seas

Richard C. Bush III, Bruce Jones and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia that is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for resources is destabilizing the maritime domain in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What should the U.S. do to encourage China, Japan, and others to avoid conflict?
How can agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War serve as a guide for regulating interaction at sea?
How can cooperation in the Arctic serve as a model for multilateral cooperation in East Asia?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack

Maritime East Asia is becoming increasingly dangerous. The past 12 months have seen a series of crises and spats in the East China Sea and South China Sea that threaten to spiral out of control. The twin sources of danger are 1) how regional actors conduct maritime operations to assert and/or defend claims to territory and natural resources’ rights; and 2) their weak capacity to conduct crisis management under domestic nationalistic pressures. The United States risks becoming entangled in conflicts among countries that are its friends and partners.

Recommendation:

You have the opportunity to mitigate the danger of future physical clashes by mounting a concerted diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned jointly to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms in the near term and to promote more institutionalized risk-reduction measures in the medium term. This will both serve U.S. interests in avoiding unnecessary entrapment and foster an environment conducive to cooperative exploitation of resources.

This could be pursued both at the regional and international levels. During the Cold War, the United States concluded risk-reduction agreements with the Soviet Union to regulate the interactions of its naval ships and air force planes. There has been recent work by the United Arab Emirates, Australia and India to foster better exchange of lessons, build private and public sector capacity, and share information about crisis-mitigation tools at the international level; diplomatic efforts to build on this could provide useful context to regional efforts and minimize a sense that China is being singled out.

Background:

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for hydrocarbon, mineral and fishery resources among regional actors is destabilizing the maritime domain. For resource reasons, China, Taiwan and Japan each claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands northeast of Taiwan while China, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian countries claim various land forms in the South China Sea. Conflicts have become more intense in recent years because China is acquiring the seaborne capabilities to assert its own claims and challenge those of others. Growing nationalist sentiment in all countries pressures leaders to take strong stands and eschew compromise. Physical clashes have occurred, which have illustrated the weak crisis management capacity of the countries concerned. In this environment, the prospect for mutually-beneficial cooperation in the exploitation of resources is low (international energy companies, for example, are reluctant to undertake major projects in contested areas).

The United States takes no position on which country owns which land form. But Washington has strongly advocated the freedom of navigation for all countries, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and using international law in addressing questions of sovereignty and resource exploitation. China’s recent and more assertive behavior in defining and advancing its claims — still non-violent but decidedly coercive — has been contrary to those U.S. interests.

In addition, treaty obligations threaten to entangle the United States in specific ways. The U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty applies to all territories under Japan’s administrative control, which includes the Senkaku Islands. According to the long-standing American position, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines does not apply to land forms in the South China Sea, but it does apply to “Philippine vessels.” At a minimum, these legal commitments create the potential for a “tail wags the dog” situation. In a crisis, they entail the fundamental credibility of the United States to stand by allies.

The proximate source of the current danger is the physical clashes and standoffs between vessels of the claimant countries, which are growing more common. Although none has crossed the threshold of loss of life, that may be only a matter of time. Clashes at any level are not in the U.S. interest, because they force the United States to choose among countries with which it seeks good relations. Trying to mediate the underlying territorial disputes would be a fool’s errand, and your administration should not try. Nor should you try to facilitate resource-sharing agreements among the claimant countries as long as the current fevered environment continues.

But the United States has both the need and the opportunity to facilitate a reduction in the probability of physical clashes and the attendant tensions — to the benefit of all. Your administration should continue to counsel restraint among the contenders (China has deservedly become the main target of such demarches). In the near term, it should mount a diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms jointly. In the medium term, it should promote more institutionalized riskreduction measures to regulate the operations of their maritime agencies.

The United States created such mechanisms with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to regulate interaction at sea and in the skies over Berlin. Current and retired U.S. naval and air force officers are a repository of experience on how to conduct conflict-avoidance and risk-reduction measures. The United States should also explore ways to root these efforts in a global framework, drawing on lessons from the management of the Arctic, which has been something of a good news story for international cooperation in recent years.

At this juncture, Japan is quietly willing to develop a conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime for the East China Sea. The ASEAN states are committed to concluding a binding code of conduct with China for the South China Sea for that same purpose. But China has been reluctant and has erected obstacles to a cooperative and stabilizing solution. Beijing has insisted that it will not talk to Japan until Tokyo is prepared to acknowledge that a territorial dispute over the Senkakus exists (Japan is reluctant to do so because it fears that such acknowledgment will be followed by a Chinese demand for negotiations). Concerning the South China Sea, China has used its close ties with Cambodia to delay and deflect any action on a binding code.

Your administration can play a behind-the-scenes role in breaking these logjams. You should start with engaging Beijing’s new leader and stressing to them that China should have little interest in suffering the reputational effects of its coercive behavior or the problems that come with a true crisis. Instead, it is in China’s interests to step back from these conflicts and focus on what is really important. A conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime is a low-cost, face-saving way to do that. Second, as an inducement to China and in return for strongly supporting Japan on such a regime, you should urge Tokyo to bifurcate its position on the Senkakus: retain its de jure position that the islands are Japan’s (so no dispute exists), but acknowledge that de facto other states have their own positions which they are free to present in the course of negotiations on other issues. Concerning a South China Sea code of conduct, you should first firm up support among claimant and other like-minded countries for a code of conduct that is strong enough actually to avoid conflict and reduce risk. Next, with their concurrence, you should suggest to China that if it continues to block a code by splitting ASEAN, the claimant countries and others that support a strong code will, with the support of the United States and others, have no choice but to negotiate with China as a “coalition of the willing.”

Conclusion:

The United States has absolutely no interest in going to war to protect the honor of friends and allies over small rocks and islands. Should it become necessary to contend with China to protect U.S. interests in East Asia and to buoy the confidence of American friends, it should be over a more consequential issue. With a modest yet concrete effort, you have the opportunity to reduce the salience and danger of an issue that will only inflict more headaches. Stabilizing the situation in East Asian waters will mitigate the danger of future clashes and also foster an environment in which cooperative exploitation of resources is more likely.

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President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 17, 2013
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

President Barack Obama begins his second term at a critical moment in world affairs, facing the many challenges that an unstable world—much of it in turmoil—presents. In response to these many challenges, Brookings Foreign Policy scholars have prepared a Presidential Briefing Book with memos to President Obama that detail the “Big Bets” that he should place in foreign policy, and the “Black Swans”—low probability, high impact events— that could unexpectedly dominate President Obama’s second term. The “Big Bets” include: a nuclear deal with Iran; a new approach to China; securing free trade agreements with Asia and Europe; outlining an Obama doctrine for the use and deployment of drones and cyberweapons; and establishing the United States as a leading energy exporter. The “Black Swans” include: a U.S.-China confrontation over Korea; revolution and war in China; the collapse of the House of Saud; the unraveling of the eurozone; the unraveling of the Palestinian Authority; and the impact of rising seas and climate change-related migration.

On January 17, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of “Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.” The first panel focused on the transformational policies that could shape a new global order. The second panel focused on the low probability, high impact events that might derail the president’s second term agenda. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. David Gregory, host of NBC’s Meet the Press, moderated both panel discussions.

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Susan Rice and 21st Century Diplomacy

Bruce Jones — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 10:55:00 -0500

Susan Rice’s decision to withdraw her name for consideration for the position of Secretary of State was characteristic: putting country and loyalty to the president first. It’s America’s loss.

For the past two months, Susan Rice has been the subject of a sustained and plainly political attack over her comments about Benghazi. Because I have personal ties to her[1], I felt compelled, uncomfortably, to stay silent. But I can certainly comment on her qualifications to serve this country. For four years, I've had courtside seats as Susan Rice has served her country as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations – an institution I've worked with and watched for nearing two decades.

What’s striking about the debate about Rice’s credentials, is how little of it drew on her work over the past four years. That’s strange, because the who, the what, and the how of her experience at the U.N. is centrally relevant to U.S. foreign policy.

First, the who. America sometimes doesn't pay much attention to the U.N., but the rest of the world does, and they send highly talented people there to fight their corner, often with close ties to their chief executives. To navigate an issue to conclusion at the U.N., you have simultaneously to handle Russia and China, and an array of actors whose influence is rising on the global stage. That doesn't only include the likes of Brazil and India who each had a two-year elected stint on the U.N. Security Council during Rice’s tenure, but also key American partners like South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Singapore, and Australia. Rice used her Africa experience effectively too; Africa matters at the U.N., as they do in a growing number of economic and global negotiations – few Americans would focus on this fact, but Africa’s combined middle class is larger than China’s, and America has critical energy and security interests on the continent. Rice has also forged close and effective relations with core U.S. allies who also invest considerable political capital at the U.N., including Canada, the U.K. and Israel.

Second, the what. Odd as it may seem to some in Washington, many of America’s top security issues flow through or around the U.N. Security Council. That’s especially true where the Security Council has been directly engaged on sanctions or interventions (Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Syria debates). Because Rice was simultaneously a member of President Obama’s national security cabinet, she actively participated in decision-making around these issues, beyond just their Security Council dimension. Then there are also core interests in places where the U.N. has mediation, elections, peacekeeping or humanitarian roles, from Myanmar to Lebanon to Somalia to Afghanistan. And there are the ‘global’ issues: climate change; development; human rights. These issues are growing in significance in U.S. diplomacy, because they matter to the U.S. economy and to U.S. values, and because they matter to U.S. allies as well as the emerging powers – if very differently.

That takes us to the how of the U.N. Now, quite a bit of what the U.N. does, especially at the General Assembly, is simply incomprehensible: interminable debates about issues of modest consequence conducted by countries with no ability to affect the outcome. Rice has wisely stayed away from much of that part of the U.N., and concentrated her efforts in those areas where U.N. decisions do matter or where countries that matter to the U.S. have chosen the U.N. to pursue an important agenda. In those arenas, there’s a lot of talking and meetings involved, along with large doses of patience. That Rice has been able to muster that patience again and again shows how far the reality of her performance is from the caricature of her personality.

There’s a broader point here too, about multilateral engagement. Before he left office, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg concluded that the business of building and management the tools for collective action have gone from a side business to the core of American foreign policy. Diplomats who ply their trade in multilateral arenas like to joke that they play chess while their bilateral colleagues play checkers. For all its warts, the U.N. requires the discipline of corralling and cajoling allies and others into collective action – and pushing hard to get people out of the way when deference to a false consensus would impede results.

The defining element of Rice’s worldview is that America should be able to use its power in all its forms to protect its interests and to defend core values. Pundits have said that she strongly defends the president’s vision, and that’s true; but she’s shaped it as well, bringing him to a more effective vision of how to marry American power to leadership in a changing world. Between her role at the U.N. and in the cabinet Rice has had four years of demonstrating how to marry American diplomacy with the tools of hard power to effect outcomes.

In the debate over her qualifications, the argument that she’s unqualified is trivial, and she’s proven to have the character for modern diplomacy. As a testing ground for the diplomacy of a changing world, it would be hard to design a better four-year tour. I can imagine her in a wide range of other national security and Cabinet positions in the near future. For now she’ll continue to serve in a vital way as ambassador to the U.N., putting country first. Would that her critics had had the character to do the same.

1. Susan Rice is a family friend; a former colleague at Brookings; and my wife has worked for her at USUN for the past four years.

Authors

Bruce Jones

Syria, Human Rights and the United Nations

Ted Piccone — Sun, 09 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

As the world's leaders head to New York for their annual gathering at the United Nations General Assembly, much of the world's attention will be focused on the bloodletting in Syria and the ongoing stalemate that has prevented the world body from taking collective action. While Lakhdar Brahimi's mission on behalf of the U.N. Security Council and the Arab League to facilitate peace is admirable, he inherits a mandate that utterly failed, and conditions for peace have only gotten worse.

Despite the Assad regime's efforts to block and manipulate information about the conflict, we have reliable information that tells us he will go to the mat to outlast his opponents, both armed and unarmed. From the stream of refugees crossing borders into Turkey and Jordan, brave journalists who are risking their lives on the frontlines, everyday citizens armed with nothing more than a cellphone and a Skype connection, and U.N. monitors deployed to the field, the evidence is clear that civil war has been declared, and civilians are caught on the crossfire. The outcome of that war, it appears, will depend on which side is able to force a settlement that results in either the departure of Assad, or his retention of power for years to come. Hopes are dim, however, that the U.N. Security Council will do much given the continued intransigence of Russia and China and ambivalence of rising democracies like Brazil and India.

One U.N. body that appears to be doing the job it's supposed to do on Syria is the Human Rights Council. From the outbreak of the conflict in March 2011, the Council's members have decided to shine a spotlight on the human rights violations underway in Syria. It has convened multiple special sessions examining the situation and appointed a special commission of inquiry, led by Brazilian human rights expert Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, to scrutinize the available information and assign responsibility.

The commission's latest report (PDF), which will be debated at the next Human Rights Council session on Sept. 17, concluded that the Syrian government, as a matter of state policy, has perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture, gross violations of human rights and sexual violence. The report also found that more brutal tactics and new military capabilities have been employed in recent months by both government forces and armed opposition groups. While rebel forces have also allegedly committed war crimes, including murder and torture, the commission observed that these violations are not of the same gravity, frequency and scale as those committed by government forces and its militia, the Shabbiha. A confidential list of individuals and units believed to be responsible for these crimes will be submitted to High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay later this month. This in turn will create pressure on the Security Council to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court.

The Human Rights Council has taken up not only Syria, but other urgent cases as well. Its emergency session on Libya after Muammar Gaddafi signaled all-out war against civilians led immediately to its dismissal from the Council. It also helped establish the case for the Security Council's invocation of the responsibility to protect doctrine, an important breakthrough in operationalizing a concept that has protection of civilians at its core. It has created special rapporteurs to investigate human rights abuses committed by the governments of Eritrea, Belarus and Iran. It is putting pressure on states to improve their records across a whole range of human rights issues including freedom of association, attacks against human rights defenders and rights for lesbians and gays. And its new mechanism to examine the human rights record of every U.N. member state is winning plaudits from activists from countries like Venezuela, Zimbabwe, India and Brazil, as I heard during meetings of the CIVICUS World Assembly in Montreal last week.

The Council is moving forward on addressing these matters even though difficult states like China and Russia are members of the Council. While some politicians like to seize on every opportunity to dismiss the Council in toto because of its mixed membership, the facts tell another story: that with determined leadership from the United States and other democracies, along with an organized global human rights community, greater dissemination of the Council's work through the Internet, and the valuable contribution of the Council's independent experts, human rights is rising on the agenda of the international community and leading to surprising, albeit slow, progress. That's why I voted, on the recent Foreign Policy magazine survey of UN experts, for the Human Rights Council as the leading example of the Obama Administration's success with its relations with the U.N.

We will know how the rest of the world feels about Washington's role at the Human Rights Council on Nov. 17, when the U.N. elects members to the Council, a list that will not include, at least this year, states like Cuba, China and Sudan.

Come January, regardless of the state of affairs in Syria, we will also know if the United States will continue down the path of engaged, pro-active and effective relations with the United Nations, or set out on a different track of hostility, parsimony and withdrawal from the world body, as advocated by the likes of John Bolton and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, close advisers and friends of Mitt Romney. The global movement for human rights hangs in the balance.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Publication: The Huffington Post

Image Source: Reuters

Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting"

Thomas Wright — Wed, 29 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Last week I attended a workshop in Rio de Janeiro on the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), a Brazilian concept introduced in late 2011 to curb what it perceives as the excesses of the Responsibility to Protect. Over the course of the workshop, I had the opportunity to hear and interact with senior foreign policy officials and experts from Brazil, South Africa, India, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Here are some observations on the RWP concept (a subsequent post will discuss Brazilian foreign policy more generally).

The IBSA countries—India, Brazil, and South Africa—feel betrayed by the Western interpretation of the mandate it received under UNSC resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya. They realized it meant an initial series of strikes against Libyan air defenses but wanted the West to consider a settlement with Gaddafi after the initial strikes. They claimed to be shocked by the extension of the campaign into one of regime change. The West views Libya as a success of sorts, but IBSA sees it as a dramatic failure and warning.

IBSA officials complained, in particular, that their diplomats were treated dismissively throughout the operation and were left uninformed. This sense of personal humiliation at the hands of the P3 (the US, France, and the UK) appears to be the most significant proximate cause of RWP (although the official reason is the path of the intervention in Libya). The IBSA countries made it clear that they would be extremely reluctant to support any new R2P action in light of the Libyan experience.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

Outlaw of the Sea: The Senate Republicans' UNCLOS Blunder

Thomas Wright — Tue, 07 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

When U.S. Senators Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), both vice presidential hopefuls, recently declared their opposition to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, they virtually guaranteed that it would be dead on arrival if it were sent to the Senate. A group of 34 senators, including Ayotte and Portman and led by Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), is now on the record promising to vote against UNCLOS, which is enough to make getting the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification impossible.

UNCLOS was first negotiated 30 years ago. But back then, U.S. President Ronald Reagan objected to it because, he argued, it would jeopardize U.S. national and business interests, most notably with respect to seabed mining. A major renegotiation in 1994 addressed his concerns, and the United States signed. Now, the U.S. Navy and business community are among UNCLOS' strongest supporters. So, too, was the George W. Bush administration, which tried to get the treaty ratified in 2007 but failed due to Republican opposition in the Senate.

Today's opponents, including Ayotte, DeMint, and Portman, focus on two issues. First, they argue, the treaty is an unacceptable encroachment on U.S. sovereignty; it empowers an international organization -- the International Seabed Authority -- to regulate commercial activity and distribute revenue from that activity. Yet sovereignty is not a problem: During the 1994 renegotiation, the United States ensured that it would have a veto over how the ISA distributes funds if it ever ratified the treaty. As written, UNCLOS would actually increase the United States' economic and resource jurisdiction. In fact, Ayotte, DeMint, and Portman's worst fears are more likely to come to pass if the United States does not ratify the treaty. If the country abdicates its leadership role in the ISA, others will be able to shape it to their own liking and to the United States' disadvantage.

Read the full article at foreignaffairs.com »

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Affairs

Image Source: Reuters

What if Europe Fails?

Thomas Wright — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in Summer 2012 issue of The Washington Quarterly.

The European Union is engaged in a ferocious political, diplomatic, and economic struggle to preserve the future of the single currency, the euro, and the viability of what has become known simply as ‘‘the project,’’ namely the process of integration that has been the bedrock of Western European politics for over half a century. It is distinctly possible that its members’ efforts may fail, either in the short or long term, and give way to an era of disintegration. Some have sounded the alarm: German Chancellor Angela Merkel famously remarked, ‘‘If the euro fails, Europe fails.’’ Former president Nicolas Sarkozy of France predicted, ‘‘If the euro explodes, Europe would explode. It’s the guarantee of peace in a continent where there were terrible wars.’’ Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski warned the euro’s collapse could cause an ‘‘apocalyptic’’ crisis. Harvard economist Dani Rodrik cautioned ‘‘the nightmare scenario would…be a 1930’s-style victory for political extremism.’’ After all, ‘‘fascism, Nazism, and communism were children of a backlash against globalization.’’ The erosion of democracy in Hungary and the rise in support for populist parties in Greece, the Netherlands, Finland, and France appears to some to be the beginning of the end.

Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger, but even if this moment passes, it will remain a significant risk for some time to come.

Would the failure of the euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the disintegration of the European Union or the eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world politics in the coming decade?

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Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: The Washington Quarterly

Image Source: Sebastien Pirlet / Reuters

Translating Human Rights into Practice: A Conversation on the United Nations Human Rights Council

Wed, 11 Jul 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 11, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Created in 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council has established a variety of mechanisms to support its mission of protecting and advancing human rights globally. However, critics and supporters alike have questioned its efficacy on the ground. With the dawn of the Arab Awakening, critical consideration of the Council’s contributions is now more vital than ever. As the Council’s 20th session wraps up with a full agenda covering Syria, Belarus, women’s rights and freedom of expression, it is time to re-assess what contribution the Council is making toward defending human rights at the national level where rights meet realities.

On July 11, the Managing Global Order project at Brookings and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs hosted a conversation on the UN Human Rights Council and its wider impact, especially the means by which events in Geneva translate into tangible action on the ground. Panelists include: Ambassador Alexandre Fasel, special representative of Switzerland to the Human Rights Council; Ambassador Mark Lagon, chair for international relations and security in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program at Georgetown University; and Paula Schriefer, deputy assistant secretary for international organization affairs at the U.S. Department of State. They discussed how the Council, including its body of independent experts, supports human rights defenders in their daily struggle to protect human rights. Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory comments focused on the key findings of his new book, Catalysts for Change: How the UN’s Independent Experts Promote Human Rights (Brookings, 2012).

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Translating Human Rights into Practice: A Conversation on the United Nations Human Rights Council

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Event Materials

20120711_un_human_rights

UN Human Rights Council: An Effective Mechanism for Protecting Human Rights

Ted Piccone — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Human rights are challenged or violated in every corner of the world, every day. The abuses are often horrific. One of the most effective mechanisms for protecting human rights is through the work of the United Nations Human Rights Council. In the years since the HRC was established, its independent investigators have circled the globe to assess problems, to help prevent abuses and to offer solutions. In his new book, Catalysts for Change, Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, explains how they make a difference on behalf of the HRC.

Video

UN Human Rights Council: An Effective Mechanism for Protecting Human Rights

Authors

Ted Piccone

Getting Real on Human Rights at the UN

Ted Piccone — Fri, 06 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This opinion originally appeared on the Huffington Post Blog.

In the past several days, sound and fury again erupted in Geneva, with allegations of hypocrisy leveled against the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In testimony before the Council, Thor Halvorssen argued that allowing Venezuela and other bad guys seats on the Council prevents it from promoting human rights. I agree that states with egregious human rights records should not be elected to the Council and I have campaigned with others (successfully) to deny seats to states like Belarus, Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan and Iran. But Halvorssen and other like-minded critics miss an essential point: governments care enough about their public image to take corrective action when the Council shines a global spotlight on their rights violations.

Despite its flaws, the Council gives advocates a chance to bring violators to the court of world opinion, and, in many cases, creates leverage that makes a difference for victims on the ground. Governments willing to reform use the UN’s scrutiny and assistance to improve their human rights records, while those against change are exposed as emperors with no clothes. To ensure this dynamic continues, the United States and other democracies must remain fully engaged.

Since the UN created a special political body to promote and protect the principles established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1946, a remarkable beehive of activity has grown around it. Twenty international human rights treaties have been adopted governing a wide range of rights, including most recently for the disabled. The High Commissioner for Human Rights and her staff of over 900 personnel monitor rights and assist governments and victims across the globe. A peer review system, established in 2006 with the creation of the more elevated Human Rights Council, ensures that all 193 member states take public account of their performance. Civil society organizations, academic experts and the media use this platform to contribute evidence, ideas and visibility to our incessant global clamoring for more and better defense of human rights.

But at the end of the day, the fight for human rights in our current system of nation states matters most on the home front.

But at the end of the day, the fight for human rights in our current system of nation states matters most on the home front. The trick, then, is to connect the universal aspirations and commitments for more and better rights to the realities of distinct cultures, forms of government and legal systems.

This challenge is met in large part by the UN’s system of independent human rights experts and special rapporteurs assigned by governments to gather facts, identify problems and make recommendations for addressing them. First created in 1967 to monitor the situation in southern Africa, the system of independent experts has mushroomed to cover over forty themes from violence against women to freedom of expression; an additional ten experts are mandated to cover specific countries like North Korea, Iran and Sudan. The unique combination of independent expertise deployed under the banner of the UN’s blue flag makes them the Council’s most effective tool for catalyzing change at the local level.

It is difficult at first glance to understand how one individual, assigned to address such complex issues as freedom of religion, modern slavery, internal displacement or arbitrary detention could have any impact on getting governments to do the right thing. Governments, indeed, grant them minimal resources to do their work and often block them from visiting their countries and disregard their allegations of abuses. Yet an exhaustive review of the record reveals that their interventions have sparked reforms and even saved lives:

Shortly after a special rapporteur visited a prisoner accused of “counterrevolution” in China, his sentence was reduced.
When a special rapporteur revealed that security forces were involved in violations against internally displaced persons in the Central African Republic, the government removed the personnel in question from the camps.
Laws criminalizing defamation in Cambodia and the Maldives and blasphemy in the United Kingdom were repealed in response to direct appeals by special rapporteurs.
The highest authorities in Jordan issued clear instructions to end torture and abuse of prisoners and increase penalties for violations on the recommendation of a special rapporteur.
Lawyers for a political activist in Vietnam won a case before the UN working group on arbitrary detention, adding greater legitimacy to their claim and eventually leading to the prisoner’s release.
In response to an urgent appeal by a special rapporteur, a plane carrying a detainee at risk of execution in his country of origin was stopped on the tarmac in Australia and his deportation was reversed.

These, and hundreds of other documented examples, are the unheralded achievements of a UN human rights body that is too quickly dismissed as useless because a majority of the UN’s members have elected a minority of authoritarian regimes to the chamber. Spoilers on the Council undoubtedly do the system harm when they harass independent experts and NGOs, or defend egregious human rights abusers. The Council’s failure to remove the bias created by its standing item on Israel’s occupation of Palestine is particularly damaging. Myopic focus on these shortcomings, however, is a disservice to those victims and defenders who benefit from the Council’s lifesaving tools. The remedy to the body’s deficits must not be to throw our hands up and walk away, as the Bush administration did, but to strengthen the tools that are proven effective.

The only real solution is to roll up our sleeves and get to work. That is precisely what the Obama administration has done since it took up a seat on the Council in 2009, forging coalitions with a range of democracies to create new mandates to monitor Syria, Iran and Cote d’Ivoire as well as on freedom of association and discrimination against women. Its leadership and record of success prove that smart strategy and deft execution can make a difference, not only in Geneva but, more importantly, for human rights defenders on the frontlines.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Publication: The Huffington Post

Image Source: Denis Balibouse / Reuters

@ Brookings Podcast: The Arctic as an Emerging Market

Bruce Jones — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Climate change and the search for resources have turned the Arctic into an emerging market and an important trade route. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project, says that the top of the world poses possibilities for international tensions among interested nations claiming sovereignty, but at least so far, no serious conflicts have emerged.

Video

Bruce Jones: Arctic Region’s Importance for Trade, Transit and Energy Is Increasing

Authors

Bruce Jones