Brookings: Projects - Latin America Initiative

What Is the Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation?

Andrés Rozental — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The decision by the Peña Nieto administration to channel the U.S.-Mexico security agenda through the Interior Ministry is not designed to negatively affect the close ties established over the past years in intelligence sharing and cooperation. Rather, it is the result of the Mexican government's decision to bring all the official agencies involved with that agenda domestically under a single umbrella.

The previous Public Safety Ministry and Federal Police are now coordinated from the Interior Ministry, so it is logical to have counterpart U.S. agencies use that same channel. There is no reason to believe that this change will negatively affect the bilateral relationship on security or drug trafficking issues since President Obama clearly concurred with this new approach during his visit to Mexico and during conversations with Mexico's president and his cabinet.

Aside from the security agenda, which is still an important element in the relationship, the two presidents indicated that other priorities will characterize the agenda going forward, especially economic ties, business facilitation, border infrastructure and educational exchanges. This is a positive development in my view as it moves the U.S.-Mexico agenda back to the issues that have historically brought our two countries together and de-emphasizes the monothematic nature of the relationship over the past six years.

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Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Obama in Costa Rica: Seeking Consensus Among Central America’s Leaders

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 03 May 2013 09:20:00 -0400

Editor’s note: In the second of a three-part series on Obama’s trip to Mexico and Costa Rica, Diana Negroponte outlines the challenges President Obama will face in seeking consensus among Central America’s leaders. Negroponte reviewed what is at stake for the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship on May 1. She will preview Obama’s visit with Central American business leaders on May 3.

On May 3 and 4, President Obama has two meetings with Central American political and business leaders in San Jose, Costa Rica. The first meeting is with the seven Central American presidents plus President Danilo Medina of the Dominican Republic (DR). Developing consensus among the eight leaders on both the agenda and the desired goals is difficult and a watered down consensus document is likely to emerge, which will disappoint all participants.

The basis for skepticism regarding this meeting is the disparate objectives of the eight leaders. Although the overt purpose is for the Central American and DR leaders to engage with the U.S. president under the auspices of the Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integración Inter-Americana or SICA), that multilateral organization relies upon the political will of the member states to implement their far reaching plans. Despite its foundation in 1991, SICA faces a continual challenge to harmonize its regional plans. In the absence of a common Central American plan of action to which all nations have committed resources and political will, the individual presidents will seek to pursue their own national goals:

El Salvador will seek faster disbursement of U.S. government funds appropriated under the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI);
Guatemala will ask for additional numbers for permanent non-agricultural EB-3 workers;
Honduras seeks additional funds for addressing extreme poverty;
Belize seeks additional funds with which to combat emerging youth gangs, as well as assistance in monitoring its intricate coastline and dense forests;
Nicaragua will focus on investment in its major infrastructure projects;
The Dominican Republic will focus on immigration issues for its citizens within the 2013 Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act (S744)
Panama seeks further training in counteracting money laundering; and
Host Costa Rica will focus on strategic policies for the region, as well as investment in green energy.

All these countries seek to confirm their commercial and political ties with Washington in the face of growing instability in Venezuela. The task is to harmonize these distinct objectives into a single agenda; a most challenging enterprise.

President Obama does not come to this summit empty handed. His government has a successful track record since CARSI was founded in 2008. To date $496.5 million has been appropriated for security and violence prevention projects in Central America. (The Dominican Republic participates in a separate security program for the Caribbean nations.) In FY 2012, the State Department requested $100 million for CARSI, but succeeded in raising that sum to $135 million thanks to the recognition that Central Americas’ problems were serious and impacted the United States. This year, State requested $107.5 million but, after a full review of projects, expects that amount to rise to between $150 and $160 million. In addition, USAID has received $146 million between FY2008 to FY2013, and in FY2012 alone, USAID implemented projects worth $50 million.

The U.S. Congress has agreed with State that Central America is geographically caught in the transshipment corridor between cocaine producers in South America and the North American market. Until such time as the nations of Central American – in particular the three northern nations of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – strengthen their rule of law and law enforcement institutions, they will remain vulnerable to drug traffickers and international criminal organizations. Belize, a nation of 350,000 people is also affected by smugglers who use the coastal bays and forest tracks to transport drugs, people and wildlife to the U.S and European markets.

Beyond overall dollar figures, President Obama must demonstrate the impact of CARSI, as well as USAID projects. Since 2008, USAID has committed $132 million to support justice sector reform, municipal crime prevention and services for at-risk youth. In FY 2012, USAID implemented $46.5 million in projects to support social prevention and citizen security. These included working with local mayors and stakeholders in Central American municipalities to develop their own crime prevention plans. Also, outreach centers have emerged in high-risk communities to provide vocational training for at-risk youth. Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Guillermo Céspedes is working in El Salvador to adapt Los Angeles’ Youth Services Eligibility Tool (YSET) to the context of this and, in future, other countries of the region. The intent is to show a decrease in the number of youth joining the gangs and an increase in the number who stay in school, or join technical training programs. Measuring success can be subjective, but Vanderbilt University’s three-year impact evaluation study has demonstrated -- at its mid-point -- lower crime rates and improved public perception of security in communities receiving USAID programs.

In addition to sharing the positive news of U.S investments in law enforcement and socio-economic projects, Obama will have to listen to complaints. This is a tiresome exercise, but it fulfills the cultural need of national leaders in Central America to articulate their demands before the U.S. president. We must hope that the chair will limit the time allotted to each Central American leader, but Obama must recognize that each leader is writing the headline in his or her national media. Should the meeting be off the record, we can expect less public pontification, but equal quantity of gripe about unmet needs.

So how does President Obama emerge from the meeting with a constructive way forward? He has listened, he will digest and he will seek ways to accommodate through current legislative debate on immigration and maybe on gun control. He can seek to increase CARSI funds from the requested $107.5 million, but he should ask the recipients to share effectively in implementing the projects and measuring impact. He might also ask them to contribute a larger amount of tax revenue to education, skills training and housing programs. The United States can assist the Central American nations in responding to public security threats, but the prime responsibility for strengthening democratic institutions must lie with the nations themselves. The hegemonic age is over and the people of Central America and the DR have the capacity to strengthen the rule of law through regional and national efforts. SICA is the vehicle through which they constructed regional plans. With the roadmap in place, it is now up to each nation to implement the programs.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

President Obama's Trip to Mexico Emphasizes America's Future Economic Prosperity and Security

Diana Villiers Negroponte and Ted Piccone — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Mexico and the U.S. are mutually dependent on one another for their collective and respective economic and national security interests. President Obama’s meetings with Mexico’s new president Enrique Pena Nieto will certainly cover border security issues, weapons, drug trafficking and immigration, but these two leaders will want to find ways to further cement the economic relationship between the two countries. Earlier this week, Senior Fellows Ted Piccone and Diana Negroponte sat down together to examine the importance of these talks.

Video

President Obama's Trip to Mexico Emphasizes America's Future Economic Prosperity and Security

Authors

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 02 May 2013 09:00:00 -0400

President Obama recognizes that security is a pervasive problem in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. But in his April 30 press conference prior to setting out for Mexico, Obama highlighted the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship:

“A lot of the focus is going to be on economics. We’ve spent so much time on security issues between the United States and Mexico that sometimes I think we forget this is a massive trading partner responsible for huge amounts of commerce and huge numbers of jobs on both sides of the border. We want to see how we can deepen that, how we can improve that and maintain that economic dialogue over a long period of time.”

Beyond the statistics of expanding trade, what more should the presidents discuss?

Total two-way trade reached $494 billion in 2012, which according to Mexican Ambassador Medina-Mora means more than $1.3 billion per day; almost $1 million dollars per minute. In absolute terms, Mexico is America’s third largest trading partner, and in 2012 U.S. exports to Mexico were $216.3 billion. According to Medina-Mora this is more than the combination of U.S. exports to all the countries with which the United States has a trade agreement in place – except for Canada. Surprisingly, it is more than U.S. exports to Japan and China combined, that is $180.6 billion.

We agree that exports to Mexico both maintain and create jobs in the United States. The U.S. government estimates that each additional billion dollars in new exports supports more than 6,000 new jobs. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, almost 6 million U.S. jobs rely on trade with Mexico, the consequence of which is the potential creation of 107,000 new U.S. jobs.

Furthermore, individual states benefit from exports to Mexico such as Arizona, California and Texas which hold Mexico as their main export destination. Mexico is also the second destination for exports from 20 other states and is ranked among the top five export destinations for 34 states.

Investment flows are also mutually beneficial. According to the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, sales of services in Mexico by majority U.S. owned affiliates were $34.4 billion in 2010. Sales of services in the United States by majority Mexico-owned firms were $4.8 billion. According to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, the United States currently provides 41 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico, benefiting more than 21,139 companies.

Beyond the numbers, the reality of trade and investment is that the United States and Mexico compete together in the global economy. Production and supply chains in North America are deeply integrated with the U.S. content of Mexico exports to the United States estimated at 40 cents on the dollar. This compares to 25 cents for Canadian exports to the United States and 4 cents for China and 2 cents for the European Union, according to a Wilson Center report. In short, there exists a growing integrated manufacturing platform that takes advantage of geography, time zones and cultural affinity.

The challenge ahead is how to build on that integration for the forthcoming Trans Atlantic Trade and Investment talks with the European Union. The development of common standards and regulations will impact both Mexican and Canadian industry. Therefore, they need to be either at the table, or close to the negotiations. How close will the consultations with the Mexican trade delegation be? Ideally, the Mexicans would like to be at the negotiating table, but that is improbable. More likely is a commitment from President Obama to consult closely with the Mexican delegation. This could include both pre-talks and post-talk briefings, reinforcing Obama’s call “to maintain the economic dialogue over a long period of time.” On the European side, Turkey wishes to have a close consultative arrangement with the EU negotiators. This creates a balanced need for consultations with immediate trading partners.

Related to the growth in two-way trade is the need to facilitate movement of trucks across the U.S.-Mexico border. Despite an increased use of pre-clearance procedures, Mexican trucks must line up several kilometers from the border while they wait their turn to reach the fast lane that leads up to and through the U.S. border. Public-private partnerships are needed to construct the access roads some 10 kilometers from the border so that pre-cleared vehicles can move rapidly through the border zone. Currently, GPS vehicle trackers are used to link the sending and receiving manufacturers with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). Before the truck even reaches the border post, CBP will know the content and value of the merchandise, as well as specifications on the cab and its driver. Only if tampering is detected will CBP stop the truck for secondary inspection, otherwise the truck sails through the border and onto its final destination. The Mexican private sector has demonstrated interest in constructing those access roads, but it needs presidential mandates from both governments to support the projects, as well as Mexican government purchase of necessary land.

Increasingly, the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico depend upon each other. There is much for the presidents to discuss and many challenges lie ahead, including productivity and education in both our countries. As President Obama begins his second term, it is constructive for him to put energy and political will into deepening that economic relationship.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Venezuela’s new president Nicolas Maduro takes office under a cloud of controversy and with significant challenges to address. His razor thin victory over the opposition has spawned questions and protests. Still, Maduro will assume leadership of the country once headed by the late Hugo Chavez. These are challenging times in Venezuela; its economy is weak, its national debt is high and the populace is in doubt. Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Negroponte says Venezuela is a country in turmoil.

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Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Maduro as President of Venezuela: What to Expect

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 15:27:00 -0400

On April 15, the Comisión Nacional Electoral (CNE) confirmed Nicolás Maduro as the next president of Venezuela, following the death of Hugo Chavez on March 5 and presidential election on April 14. The Organization of American States and the U.S. government have both asked for a 100-percent recount “necessary to ensure than all Venezuelans have confidence in the results” (as White House Press Secretary Jay Carney explained). However, this is unlikely to occur.

What happens next and what should we expect from President Nicolas Maduro? The opposition, led by Governor of Miranda state Henrique Capriles Radonski, called for a recount and gathered his supporters to bang their pots and pans during the night of Monday April 15 in protest the CNE’s definitive result. The cazerolazos (pot bangers) would let Venezuelans and citizens throughout the hemisphere know of their call for a recount through non-violent protest. Thousands responded, reflective of the 49.07% of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition party, Mesa Unidad Democrática (MUD); they lost by only 262,000 out of 14.9 million votes. There are 3,200 formal claims of electoral fraud, as well as countless claims of intimidation, but they are unlikely to change the CNE’s decision because 4 out of the 5 commissioners were appointed by Hugo Chavez and are members of his political party, the PSUV.

Beyond pot banging, it is unlikely that the opposition’s protest will turn violent or endure. Maduro will be sworn into office on April 19 and will have to confront serious problems. Inflation has increased from 20 percent year-on-year in December 2012 to 23 percent in February 2013. Furthermore, the currency is overvalued, despite a recent 32 percent devaluation and stable oil prices. Consequently, slower economic performance is expected in the 2013-2014 period. Nevertheless, Maduro is expected to continue social spending for housing, education and health in order to demonstrate that Chavismo, the philosophy of the late Hugo Chavez, is not dead. Scotiabank has also warned its customers that interventionist public policies will continue. In the last year these policies resulted in shortages of basic foods and medicines for all Venezuelans.

With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank (CDB), Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He could approach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools of the U.S. “empire.”

Maduro’s supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro has two options: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21 percent of Venezuela’s debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is critical.

Discussions with officials from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since 2007, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) have gained large stakes in Venezuela’s oil industry after Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition that more effective management be put in place at Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additional Chinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.

Sun Hongbo from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences saw great benefit to China from a “strategic partnership based on long term complementarity.” The CNPC relies upon 800,000 bpd which Venezuela promised in 2007 as collateral for its $14 billion loan under the China Venezuela Joint Fund. We should therefore anticipate increased Chinese influence within Venezuela, as well as demands for greater efficiency both within PDVSA and the delivery of social services. However, payment on the Chinese loans implies lesser revenues from oil sales on the open market. Therefore, Maduro may seek to reduce the amount of subsidized oil that Venezuela provides the Caribbean nations and Nicaragua. Cuba will be an exception with its reliance on 90,000 bpd.

Given the reliance on China to keep the Venezuelan economy afloat, what else might we expect? Politically, the poor showing of the PSUV in this April election reflects the diminution of the Chavez’ aura. Maduro waged his campaign as “son of Chavez,” but it was not good enough to ensure a clear victory. He is now alone to run the country, but he has competitors. According to the Venezuelan constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, should have assumed office pending elections when Hugo Chavez failed to assume office on the constitutionally determined date of January 10. The Supreme Court decided in favor of continuity backing Vice President Nicolas Maduro, but Diosdado now claims through his Twitter account that he would have been more successful in last Sunday’s presidential election. The rivalry between the two men will become more evident throughout the six-year term that Maduro begins this week.

What does this mean for Venezuela? Maduro’s authority to lead the country will be contested. Based on the 3,200 claims of electoral fraud, his legitimacy as president has already been challenged. Without the compelling charisma that Hugo Chavez exuded and without plentiful resources, Maduro will come to rely on authoritarian means. Opposition political figures and student leaders may find themselves in pre-trial detention for varying lengths sufficient to scare them from open protest. Current criminal inmates of Venezuelan jails are reputed to be violent, using rape and threats of murder to control the penitentiaries. Most political opponents will probably choose to shut up or seek exile rather than face jail terms.

Under these circumstances, what should the U.S. government do? I anticipate that President Obama will recognize Maduro as president in the near future, and cannot prevent growing Chinese influence. However, Washington should not accept the abuse of human rights and the denial of the rule of law. Together with the democratic countries in the hemisphere, it should use the weight of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its effective court system to protect Venezuelan citizens and prevent the consolidation of authoritarian rule in the hemisphere.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

In Venezuela, Will 'Chavismo' Last Without Hugo Chavez?

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 11:54:00 -0400

Editor's note: In a collection of opinions by several experts in a PBS Newshour article on “Chavismo” after President Hugo Chavez’s death, Diana Negroponte looks at the responsibility Vice President Maduro has inherited and the future of U.S. relations with Venezuela.

"Chavismo" is based on the theory that an intrinsic relationship exists between the state and the citizen through the person of Hugo Chavez: he is both state and citizen. The state remains dedicated to advance the interests of its citizens and citizens commit to advancing the interests of the state. With the death of Hugo Chavez, who can provide the means to ensure this interlocking relationship between state and citizen?

Vice President Maduro inherited Chavez's mantle and he understands the philosophy of Chavismo. With plentiful resources, Maduro could continue the intrinsic relationship. But without those resources -- current economic problems will decrease disposable state expenditures -- Maduro will have to borrow money. Who will bankroll him?

The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) seeks to maintain the flow of Venezuelan crude and the stability of the Venezuelan government. Would the CNPC be willing to renegotiate its loans to ensure that both continued oil production and political stability continue? Probably. However, CNPC may impose limitations on Maduro's use of that "borrowed money". Maduro will have to accept a degree of austerity and further Chinese management and manpower in the Chinese housing, agriculture and energy projects. The nature of this "new reality" may be difficult for the Venezuelans to accept.

We should, therefore, expect Maduro to face growing domestic restlessness as he fails to deliver the promises of Chavismo. Maduro will seek to shift the blame onto others, including the United States. I anticipate deteriorating relations with Washington and raucous calls for the Bolivarian Alliance, known by its Spanish acronym ALBA, to intensify its anti-Yankee rhetoric. U.S. companies may find increasing restrictions on their activities, if not court cases such as the Chevron case in Ecuador. In the end, without sufficient resources ALBA will wither and Maduro will be a one-term president.

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Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Publication: PBS Newshour

Image Source: © Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Reuters

The Obama-Peña Nieto Meeting: Critical Issues in the Upcoming U.S.-Mexico Talks

Thu, 11 Apr 2013 16:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 11, 2013
4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Next month, President Barack Obama will meet with Mexico’s newly elected President Enrique Peña Nieto. While the two leaders met briefly last November, this meeting—Obama’s first in Latin America since his own re-election—will address major issues of concern to both nations including trade and investment, energy, border security and infrastructure, illicit drug trafficking and public safety. With significant political and economic consequences at stake, the Obama-Peña Nieto meeting will take place as both leaders face complex and contentious domestic challenges that have a direct impact on the bilateral relationship.

On April 11, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the critical issues that will dominate the Obama- Peña Nieto meeting. Arturo Sarukhan, Brookings distinguished affiliate and former ambassador of Mexico to the United States, provided opening remarks on the larger political context for the bilateral meeting. A panel discussion followed featuring contributors to the forthcoming book, The End of Nostalgia: Mexico Confronts the Challenges of Global Competition (Brookings, May 2013). Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Villiers Negroponte moderated the discussion.

The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:20:00 -0400

A high wire act played out over a 12-hour session of the General Assembly last week at the Organization of American States (OAS): Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out unless their demands were met. Considerable tensions existed within the Hall of the Americas as the foreign ministers witnessed another threat to the organization’s integrity. This time, the contest was over the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).

Since 1959, the IACHR has taken up and defended the rights of children, of women, of indigenous communities, of sexual minorities, persons deprived of liberty, afro-descendents, people with disabilities, migrants, defenders of human rights: in short, people in vulnerable situations. The IAHCR and its judicial arm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have continued to denounce and sanction violations of human rights. Throughout the Chilean, Argentinean and Brazilian military dictatorships of the 1970s and early 1980s, the commission and the court played key roles in making visible the victims of abuse. Despite perennial criticisms of the OAS for its failure to defend democratic institutions, the IACHR and the court are considered to be the main collective achievements in defending the rights of individual citizens in the Western Hemisphere.

On September 11, 2001, at the same time as the United States suffered critical attacks, the OAS General Assembly reaffirmed that the promotion and protection of human rights is a basic prerequisite for the existence of a democratic society. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed on this historic day in U.S. history. In its Article 8 it gave the right to “any person who consider that his or her human rights have been violated may lodge a complaint or petition before the inter-American system for protection and promotion of human rights.” Individual citizens were recognized as legitimate actors in the consolidation of democracy.

It was therefore disturbing when in 2010, Ecuador and Venezuela raised three complaints about the IACHR: the budget should be limited to contributions from member states and not from observer nations and civil society; the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression should receive less funds and no more than the amount granted to other OAS rapporteurs; and, third, the headquarters for the IACHR should move out of Washington, preferably to Argentina.

The demands of Ecuador and Venezuela were discussed for over 22 months and through 37 meetings of IACHR and 29 working groups, the presentation of 98 documents from civil society, five academic meetings, three hemispheric audiences and one Extraordinary Session of the OAS. When the sought-for reforms were raised at the 44th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly last week, Ecuador and Venezuela threatened to walk out if their demands were not addressed.

Ecuador and Venezuela – with Bolivian and Nicaraguan support – called to limit the IACHR budget. This was an effort both to limit outside influences on the human rights commission as well as to reduce, even further its effectiveness. Currently, 55 percent of the IACHR’s budget comes from the OAS, the remaining 45 percent comes from member countries, observer nations and civil society. In 2012, the IACHR had an annual budget of $10 million with which to pay rapporteurs, attorneys and staff. With only 34 attorneys for 35 member countries and 31 other staff members, the work of investigating the 448 complaints submitted in 2012 is already inadequate because it enables consideration of only 10 percent of the complaints. Rather than reduce further the IACHR budget, the commission has requested doubling its budget to $20 million in order to hire more attorneys and consider more complaints.

The second complaint was more serious, namely a reduction in the budget for Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. The work of this office is dedicated to preserving “the right to seek, receive, and disseminate information and opinions freely.” (Declaration of Principles on the Right to Freedom of Expression). The call to reduce the budget for this office was a demand to limit, if not curtail its effectiveness. In both Ecuador and Venezuela, the press has been censured, and in certain cases closed, because of stories critical of the government.

The third complaint requesting that the IACHR move out of Washington did not receive the same objection. Both Costa Rica and Peru offered to host the commission, should it have to leave the OAS building and support structure thereof.

It is noteworthy that Mexico, which has received more complaints before the IACHR in the last two years than any other nation within the OAS, rejected the demands of Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombia, which during its civil war with the FARC had been the object of criticism from numerous, alleged victims of human rights, also rejected the demands. While Bolivia and Nicaragua joined in the Ecuadoran demand, the Caribbean members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (known by its Spanish acronym ALBA) did not do so; nor did Peru, Costa Rica, Brazil, Canada and the United States. The four ALBA continental nations were marginalized and on this occasion failed to modify the rules and process of the OAS. Only Argentina prevented the walk-out of Ecuador and Venezuela by presenting a motion that enabled the OAS to continue debating the three reforms.

The contest will continue and Ecuador will seek to lead its ALBA allies in rejecting liberal democratic concepts, such as human rights and press freedom. The significance of the 44th Extraordinary General Assemblyof the OAS is that the ALBA countries failed to undermine the democratic principles of the Inter-American system. If anything, the criticism has strengthened the resolve of the Western Hemisphere to retain its ideals and maintain a process by which individuals can bring complaints before an international body that accepts the sovereignty of the people, not the governors.

Authors

Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: © Juan Carlos Ulate / Reuters

What Will the Proposed Telecom Overhaul Mean for Mexico?

Andrés Rozental — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 13:17:00 -0400

In his first 100 days in office, President Peña Nieto has successfully garnered widespread political support for various reform packages that had been pending from previous administrations. Education and labor reforms were the first to be approved by Congress and in the case of the former is now constitutionally law.

The telecommunications reform package has won approval in the lower house of Congress and now must pass the Senate and be ratified by the states before becoming part of the Constitution. Rather than being specifically targeted at any individual company, the reform is designed to open the sector to competition and to guarantee Mexicans access to services that up to now have been expensive and oligopolistic in nature. Measures such as opening up national television to additional channels, wider broadband coverage and a stricter regulatory regime are all designed to fundamentally change Mexico's telecoms structure. When finally approved, these changes will greatly benefit the Mexican economy by generating competition and additional players in the sector.

All indications are that this reform package will be approved, perhaps with congressional modifications. Although there has been opposition by some in the PAN to parts of the proposal, the other parties are agreed on the majority of the changes. This augurs well for further proposals that Peña Nieto plans to send to Congress in the coming months, especially the energy and fiscal reforms that are so necessary for Mexico to guarantee future growth and prosperity.

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Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Image Source: © Edgard Garrido / Reuters

Time to Bet on Cuba

Ted Piccone — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Cuba’s efforts to “update” its socialist system through a series of economic reforms just got more complicated. The death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, its principal benefactor, could seriously disrupt what is already a precarious process of maintaining top-down political control while liberalizing elements of the economy. Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will step down in five years and the emergence of younger leaders born after the 1959 revolution add further uncertainty to the island’s future.

These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.

Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.

Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.

The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state.

Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests.

In his second term, the president can (and should):

Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.
Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.
Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.
Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.
Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.

This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.

The trend toward reform in Cuba is evident and suggests that an inflection point is approaching. Now is the time to employ a new paradigm by opening a long overdue direct dialogue with our next-door neighbor and thereby test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively, including on the case of U.S. citizen Alan Gross. By invoking his executive authority to expand trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people, Obama can continue to help them make the transition from subjects to citizens. The moment has come to rise above historical grievances and extend that outstretched hand he so eloquently promised just four years ago.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Publication: The Hill

Image Source: © Enrique de la Osa / Reuters

The Death of Hugo Chavez and What it Means for the Future of Venezuela

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The time is ripe for change in Venezuela, notes Nonresident Senior Fellow Diana Negroponte. Following the death of its president, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has two objectives. It must elect new leadership and it must get its economy back on track. Despite its rich oil reserves, Venezuela is mired in a deep economic crisis shaped by its devalued currency and rising inflation. Vice President Nicolas Maduro has alarmed some onlookers with recent questionable tactics.

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The Death of Hugo Chavez and What it Means for the Future of Venezuela

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Chavez's Death and a Forthcoming Political Battle in Venezuela

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Hugo Chavez's supporters poured into the streets, crying and mourning the loss of a man whom many considered a saint. They may explain the shortages in the stores, the soaring inflation and the failure to deliver government services to Chavez's illness, but the cause of the economic woes began long before December 2012 when Chavez left Venezuela for a hospital in Cuba.

Nicolás Maduro is the chosen heir. As vice president, the constitution empowers him to run the country while elections are organized and held within 30 days. This timeline may well be adjusted; shortening the time to capitalize on the emotional outpouring or lengthening the time due to "turbulencia" (unrest) in the country. Whichever, the opposition party that gathered together for presidential elections in October 2012 will have a hard time winning this election.

Governor Enrique Capriles Radonski is the leader of a coalition, known as MUD (mesa de la unidad democratica). The government's political tactics of last October—limited access to the nationally controlled airways, overwhelming distribution of public goods—will probably be repeated in this forthcoming election. The MUD faces an uphill campaign, and is unlikely to succeed.

However, the economy is in shambles and the blame will be posted firmly on the government's door. Whoever wins the forthcoming presidential election will have to confront an overvalued currency, despite the most recent 32 percent devaluation, the need to reinvest revenues from the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, in maintenance and parts, and 20% inflation. Once the election is over, economic austerity will have to begin. Venezuela's president will have to undertake unpopular, but necessary economic policies. Fortunately, oil continues to flow but much of it is already committed to pay off international creditors. Venezuela may now need the help of the multilateral institutions. Contemptuously treated over the last few years, they are the bankers of last resort.

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Image Source: Reuters

Chavez Is Dead. Chavismo Lives On.

Ted Piccone — Wed, 06 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The death of Hugo Chavez will have little short-term impact on Venezuela's current trajectory of "Boliviarian socialism" or on its relations with the United States. His long illness and resounding re-election victory last October gave his cohorts both the time and the legitimacy to project an image of continuity and stability. This, combined with the ongoing social welfare benefits meted out to Chavez's core followers, will ensure a victory for Chavez's anointed successor, Vice President Nicolás Maduro, in snap elections to be held next month. Maduro will have some serious economic challenges to tackle, including rising food prices, the highest inflation rate in the hemisphere and mounting debt. The recent decision to devalue its currency, however, demonstrates that the Chavistas are willing to make some hard decisions. Those are likely to be put on hold, however, until after the next round of elections.

In foreign policy, Maduro is unlikely to veer from Chavez's tested formula of demonizing the United States, at least rhetorically, a tactic he has already deployed in accusing Washington of somehow instigating Chavez's illness and expelling two U.S. military attachés.

The longstanding close relationship between Chavez and the Castros in Havana is likely to continue under new leadership in Venezuela, at least for the short to medium term. Cuba has carefully inserted itself into the transition planning process in Caracas and both sides benefit from continuity in terms of oil subsidies, medical and education services, security and intelligence cooperation and ideological and anti-U.S. solidarity.

Washington should bide its time and quietly wait out what should be a relatively smooth transition to a post-Chavez leadership and then remount its earlier efforts to turn a page away from the antagonism of the Chavez era toward a more pragmatic relationship of mutual interests. If Maduro concludes, however, that he has more to gain parroting the Chavez line of virulent anti-Americanism, it will be difficult to turn the other cheek for another six years.

Authors

Ted Piccone

Hugo Chavez's Death an Opportunity for More Pragmatic Relationship with U.S.

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 19:13:00 -0500

The death of Hugo Chavez presents an opportunity for the new Venezuelan leadership to tone down the rhetoric of anti-Americanism and put our bilateral relations on a pragmatic basis.

The U.S. remains the principal purchaser of Venezuelan oil which is refined in Gulf Coast refineries for later export to China and other markets. Food and pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, spare parts and electrical equipment are bought from the U.S. although payment for these goods is delayed and consumers must wait 4 to 5 months for the new inventory to arrive at Venezuelan ports.

Venezuela is in the midst of an economic crisis with shortages of U.S. dollars, a devaluation of 32 percent and the prospect of searing inflation. Furthermore, Venezuela needs foreign direct investment, technical expertise and spare parts from the U.S.

Rather than demonizing Washington, an opportunity exists for Caracas to reframe the relationship to a realistic mode.

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

How Well Has Peña Nieto Performed in His First 100 Days?

Andrés Rozental — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Peña Nieto's first 100 days have been marked by a great deal of activity and a feeling of high expectation among most Mexicans. The president's closest team of officials has been working hard on various aspects of his electoral promises and the 95 commitments contained in the 'Pact for Mexico.' The same is true for the PRI leadership in Congress and the 19 state governors that represent the ruling political party.

While there appears to be a decision to delay presenting urgent energy and fiscal reform packages to Congress, there is nonetheless a flurry of activity on many other fronts. Education and telecommunications reform are among the highest priorities, but there has also been progress on judicial reform with important changes to the 'amparo' regulations already approved by an overwhelming majority of the lower house of Congress, a renewed push for those jurisdictions to implement oral trials to do so well before the 2015 deadline, a national campaign to fight hunger, a gubernatorial commitment to implement unified state police forces and several high-profile administrative changes that do not need congressional approval. Peña Nieto apparently believes that addressing low-hanging fruit first will make it easier for the more difficult energy and fiscal reforms to be successfully approved in the second half of the year.

While the 'Pact for Mexico' has so far been a cohesionary force among the three main political parties, the true test of its strength will come when the administration presents its energy and fiscal reform proposals. Internal divisions in the PAN and PRD might well interfere with the government's ability to hold the various factions together for the two thirds majority it needs to pass constitutional changes.

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Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Has the U.S. "Militarized the Battle" Against Illegal Drugs?

Andrés Rozental — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The whole issue of how the United States and other countries continue to spend these huge amounts of money to ensure that the fight against drug trafficking remains outside the United States needs to be re-considered, not only because the existing interdiction policy has been an abysmal failure, but also because the sale of large quantities of arms and other military hardware to governments in Latin America and the Caribbean has only made their own security and public safety situation worse. The amounts mentioned by the Associated Press are only a small portion of the total budgets spent on unsuccessfully trying to stop drugs from entering the United States.

The only smart solution to the illicit narcotics market is to face the unpalatable, but nonetheless real, fact that drugs—like alcohol, tobacco and other stimulants—are an integral part of social behavior in most countries and that they need to be differentiated, decriminalized, taxed and regulated just like prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes and the rest. Until that happens, the shameful waste of resources being spent on a 'mission impossible' only fuels the criminal elements involved in the business and raises the associated social, economic and political costs being borne by producing, consuming and transit nations. This relates both to military as well as civilian spending associated with the drug trafficking phenomenon and in my opinion applies equally to the public and private sectors.

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Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime

Vanda Felbab-Brown — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 16:30:00 -0500

Mexico’s new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, has a tough year ahead of him. After six years of extraordinarily high homicide levels and gruesome brutality in Mexico, he has promised to prioritize social and economic issues and to refocus Mexico’s security policy on reducing violence. During its first months in office, his administration has eschewed talking about drug-related deaths or arrests. The Mexican public is exhausted by the bewildering intensity and violence of crime as well as by the state’s blunt assault on the drug trafficking groups. It expects the new president to deliver greater public safety, including from abuses committed by the Mexican military, which Mexico’s previous president, Felipe Calderón, deployed to the streets to tackle the drug cartels.

Seeking to bring violent crime down is the right priority for Mexico, and indeed, should be a key goal for law enforcement in any country. The United States should wholeheartedly support that objective in Mexico. But achieving violence reduction will not be easy, major questions remain about the outlines of the security strategy Peña Nieto has sketched, and some approaches to reducing violence would come with highly negative side-effects.

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Vanda Felbab-Brown

Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?

Andrés Rozental — Fri, 01 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Mexico-U.S. relationship won't substantially change; there are too many ongoing issues to expect any major shift in what has become a very close and cooperative bilateral partnership in economic, security and social aspects. There will be a change of emphasis from the Mexican side as far as the security relationship goes, with Peña Nieto's declared intention to focus much more on the economy and public safety. He has already moved away from the constant statements made by his predecessor extolling the number of criminals apprehended and 'successes' in the fight against organized crime. The change of message comes as a relief to many Mexicans tired of hearing about violence and crime on a daily basis.

There are two issues on the bilateral agenda, however, that portend significant changes if President Obama is able to fulfill his latest commitments: gun control and immigration reform. The latter seems to be headed toward a bipartisan agreement that might fundamentally change the situation for the thousands of Mexicans who are in the United States without proper documents. If Congress passes a comprehensive reform that allows them to normalize their situation and have a path to legal residency and eventual citizenship, it would have a huge positive impact on the relationship. As for gun control, Mexico would obviously favor a total ban on the sale and possession of assault weapons as the best way to prevent them from crossing the border, but even universal background checks and limits on the number and type of weapons an individual can purchase would be a welcome development. On trade ties, Mexico reached a quarter trillion dollars of total exports and imports in 2012 — a hefty portion of that unprecedented amount was with the United States. As Mexico becomes an increasingly important part of the global supply chain and U.S. companies continue to invest heavily south of the border, the economic relationship has nowhere to go but up. And if Peña Nieto is able to fundamentally reform the country's energy sector, there promises to be even more investment.

Authors

Andrés Rozental

Publication: Inter-American Dialogue's Latin America Advisor

Summitry between Europe and Latin America

Diana Villiers Negroponte — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

After decades, if not centuries, of relative distance from Latin America, the leadership of the European Union (EU), as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Spanish President Mariano Rajoy, French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, Portugese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, senior ministers from Ireland and the U.K. will participate this weekend in a summit between European leaders and the presidents of Chile, Mexico and Colombia and their respective delegations in Santiago, Chile. Their counterpart in this summit is the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC). Both the United States and Canada will be observers at this meeting because neither is a member of CELAC. What is the significance of this meeting and what might be achieved? Should the United States be concerned at finding itself excluded?

First, this meeting is the first time that European leaders fly to South America with the specific intent of "doing business" in the western hemisphere. Instead of heading up the mountain to the World Economic Forum at Davos, the leaders fly westward. After decades of focus on European challenges, the leadership has recognized the potential of the western hemisphere, with its 575 million people and $6.8 trillion GDP, for trade and investment. They recognize that Latin America has changed significantly since the 1980s when protectionist trade policies and rigid exchange rates made this hemisphere a less attractive place to do business. Sound macro-economic policies, strong reserves, flexible exchange regime and invitations to invest in energy, communications and infrastructure have radically changed the perspective of foreign traders. Nearly all countries in the western hemisphere are now “open for business.” Therefore, accompanying government leaders is a delegation of European CEOs representing GDF Suez, Endesa, InterEnergy Holding, KGHM Polska Miedz, among others.

Apart from the final Summit Declaration on January 27, which we should expect to commit to future summitry, close collaboration on climate change and the need to strengthen financial security, the discussions between business leaders over specific investment projects present real opportunities for joint ventures. Electrical grids will be designed, machinery will be purchased, communications equipment and software will be developed on both sides of the Atlantic. European business is wide awake to the potential for business in South America, as well as Mexico.

Should Washington care? Yes. This is a wake up call from entrepreneurs who compete with U.S. manufacturers, scientists and engineers. The Europeans have not arrived at the CELAC meeting to buy primary commodities. They have flown over to explore ways in which to combine their management skills and funds with the opportunities presented by energetic entrepreneurs, known as “multi-latinos.” They will find governments, such as the Mexico’s and Colombia’s, who understand fully the value of foreign direct investment, scientific and technological expertise. They will communicate in languages and cultures that are compatible with South American values.

U.S. business needs to play a leadership role and not wait for Washington to organize the next delegation. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, the Council of the Americas can stimulate their members to visit Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil with a view to doing business. Medium size businesses in the United States can access the support of the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service to find partners in the hemisphere. There is plenty of business opportunities for both the Europeans and the North Americans, but we must get off the couch and develop alliances and joint ventures. Otherwise, the Europeans might eat our lunch!

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Diana Villiers Negroponte

Brookings: Projects - Latin America Initiative

What Is the Future of U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation?

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President Obama's Trip to Mexico Emphasizes America's Future Economic Prosperity and Security

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Obama’s Mexico Trip: Putting Trade and Investment at the Top of the Agenda

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Nicolas Maduro: Venezuela's Next President

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Maduro as President of Venezuela: What to Expect

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In Venezuela, Will 'Chavismo' Last Without Hugo Chavez?

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The Obama-Peña Nieto Meeting: Critical Issues in the Upcoming U.S.-Mexico Talks

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The Organization of American States Preserves Democratic Charter–For Now!

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What Will the Proposed Telecom Overhaul Mean for Mexico?

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Time to Bet on Cuba

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The Death of Hugo Chavez and What it Means for the Future of Venezuela

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Chavez's Death and a Forthcoming Political Battle in Venezuela

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Chavez Is Dead. Chavismo Lives On.

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Hugo Chavez's Death an Opportunity for More Pragmatic Relationship with U.S.

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How Well Has Peña Nieto Performed in His First 100 Days?

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Has the U.S. "Militarized the Battle" Against Illegal Drugs?

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Peña Nieto’s Piñata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime

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Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?

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Summitry between Europe and Latin America

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