Brookings: Projects - U.S. Relations with the Islamic World

A Preview of the 2013 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 06 May 2013 12:35:00 -0400

We’re just a month away from the tenth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which will take place in Doha on June 9-11. The Forum will feature discussions of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relationship between political reform and economic development, and international responses to the crisis in Syria. We will also host sessions on the role of arts and culture in societies emerging from conflict, and the evolution of Arab identity.

As always, our Forum will include four expert working groups to consider some crucial issues: advancing women's political participation, the role of faith based leaders in diplomacy, freedom of speech within Muslim communities, and promoting inclusive development in Egypt and Tunisia.

If you won’t be with us in Doha, you can join our conversations online. To get an idea of what’s in store, please view our website— where there are findings and recommendations from our working groups last year—or watch our video highlights from last year’s forum entitled, “New Voices, New Directions,” below:

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U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

We recently engaged Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani in a conversation on the key questions about Qatar’s diplomatic, economic, and political role in the region. I invite you to listen to the discussion with Sheikh Hamad, moderated by Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk.

Keep checking this space for updates on the upcoming forum, as we post videos previewing the lively discussions to come. Follow us on Twitter or tweet your own ideas with the hashtag #usislam13.

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U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Image Source: Paul Morse

Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 19:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
7:30 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

On April 24, during an event honoring His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, Martin Indyk asked about Qatar's views on the Syrian crisis, the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the still unfolding Arab Awakening. The event marked Qatar's ten years of support for the Brookings Doha Center and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

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As Mubarak Sits in a Cage, Egyptians are Moving On

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National.

A few months after the beginning of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, I was in Washington DC, addressing a group of Egyptian expatriates on the situation in Egypt.

They asked me about the trial of Hosni Mubarak - a trial that I thought, at the time, might not even take place. When they asked me if it should happen, I paused, thought about some consequences that had little to do with the justice involved in such a trial, and replied "no".

The response was lively and engaging, as it would have been anywhere Egyptians gathered.

But this week, as a new trial started - and just as quickly stopped, with the presiding judge recusing himself - the most intriguing development is that very few people seem to care about it.

I answered "no" to the question in 2011 because I thought the powers that be would never let Mr Mubarak take the stand freely, for fear that he might spill the beans about many state and international secrets. I thought counter-revolutionary actors might start all sorts of trouble to forestall a trial, and that, I believed, would be counterproductive for Egypt.

A brutal autocratic dictator he may have been, but I did not think he was worth the trouble a trial would bring, particularly as he seemed likely - at 82 and sickly - to meet his maker soon in any case.

Two years later, Egypt has moved on from Mubarak. Most Egyptians, whether for him or against him, do not appear to be particularly engaged in the process of his new trial. They are being kept busy with other matters. If they are interested in politics, it will be in the failings of Mohammed Morsi's government, the inept nature of the opposition, the machinations of the "deep state" and its supporters or the inability of the revolutionary camp to translate lofty ideals into practical plans.

That last aspect of the political arena is probably the most striking when it comes to Mubarak. The revolutionaries fought, obviously, for his overthrow. But they also wanted the restructuring of the entire Egyptian state. Not only have they not seen that so far, but the revolution for which they continue to fight has been forgotten by many who initially supported it.

Indeed, for many, it is "politics as usual" - government versus opposition, and so on. Many who were in Tahrir Square in those brave days are now attacking revolutionaries who did not vote for Ahmad Shafiq in the presidential elections - the same Ahmad Shafiq whom Mubarak appointed prime minister at the height of the uprising.

That cannot be simply dismissed or swept under the rug. The reality is that many who dreamt that the revolution would bring about sweeping changes by now have been bitterly disappointed, and now consider that Mr Shafiq might have been the lesser evil after all.

It is difficult to square any support for the revolution with support for such a counter-revolutionary, who would have crushed the Tahrir uprising in its infancy if given the chance, and who calledMubarak his "role model" even after the revolt.

A year ago, at the Egyptian-American Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, Mr Shafiq said he would use executions to restore order to Egypt, and would provide Omar Suleiman, the infamous and brutal head of military intelligence, with a job if a suitable one could be found.

All of that is now forgotten - forgotten in large part because Mr Shafiq never had the opportunity to make good on any of those plans, and also in large part because the victor, Mr Morsi, has been an utter disappointment to the overwhelming majority of Egyptians.

A year after Mr Morsi's victory, the fact that Mr Shafiq represented a full return to Mubarak's system has been left by the wayside by many who fought against that system - because Mr Morsi's government has proven to be so unsatisfactory.

As I passed Mubarak's military hospital on the day his new trial was to have begun, I saw a small crowd of his supporters outside.

I found this demonstration ironic, considering that under Mubarak such a protest, in defence of someone so clearly unsupportive of the ruling regime, would never have been allowed.

More than that, however, it was to me downright bizarre that there was a crowd there - and that passers-by were waving in support. It was not support for Mubarak I sensed, but rather opposition to Mr Morsi, and to the desperate economic situation that Egyptians now find themselves living in.

There is another way to look at this, however. Perhaps the biggest irony is that a Morsi government is actually a strategic win for the revolution, in spite of Mr Morsi.

Had Mr Morsi not been elected, he would not be in power to show the Egyptian nation how utterly bankrupt the Muslim Brotherhood is. Under a Shafiq government, the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity would probably have broken all records by now.

Under Mr Morsi, Mr Shafiq's supporters do exist and may even increase in number. But really no non-Brotherhood leader could reveal the policy impoverishment of the Brotherhood project better than Mr Morsi is doing.

Mubarak may think he has been proven right (and judging by the smug grins in court this week, he does). But in the end it is he who is in a cage. Egyptians are now free to take on not only him and his system, but also the Brotherhood - a struggle that had to happen at some point, if only to show that Egypt has other options, better than either the Brotherhood or a return to dictatorship and autocracy.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The National

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters

U.S. Embassy Learns a Hard Lesson About Twitter

Cynthia P. Schneider — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Old and new diplomacy clashed in the flare-up between Egypt and the United States over the arrest and interrogation of Bassem Youssef -- considered the "Jon Stewart of Egypt" -- who skewers politicians of all stripes on his popular TV show, El Bernameg.

In the world of traditional diplomacy, governments had more control over what was said about them and by whom. As the Egyptian and U.S. governments discovered the hard way, that control is long gone in the world of 21st century diplomacy with its 24/7 social media and powerful nongovernmental voices.

When Youssef, accused of insulting President Mohamed Morsy and Islam, was summoned for questioning by the Morsy-appointed prosecutor general, this latest repressive action by the Muslim Brotherhood government sparked an international outcry.

The response from the United States came in two forms. First, the State Department expressed "concern" about Youssef's detention, citing it as "evidence of a disturbing trend of growing restrictions on the freedom of expression" in Egypt. Then, Jon Stewart mounted an eloquent -- and humorous -- defense of Bassem Youssef and freedom of expression through that well-known diplomatic channel, "The Daily Show."

Read the full article »

Authors

Cynthia P. Schneider

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

The Arab Spring Ain't Over

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

"...Stimulate that process of reawakening..."

(From the "About" section of the Arab webzine, TahrirSquared.com.)

"Despair is Treason"

(A slogan of the independent news outlet, the Egypt Independent.)

It has been two years since the start of the Arab uprisings. When they began, there was a lot of hope in this part of the world - the promise of a new dawn for the Arabs. There has been much disappointment thus far, and many within and without the region wonder: Is this the future? Or can that promise of that original spirit, which was launched in those powerful places of Tahrir Square and elsewhere, be realized? Is there still the potential of an "Arab promise" for a better future?

In the last few years, there has been much to be disappointed about. The media, and more broadly freedom of speech, have seen better days. Quality has not exactly increased, and in some countries, it has become more polarized. Censorship, by different means, still exists, and this was evident in a recent banning of a film called, Jews of Egypt. How can free societies emerge without less control on free speech? We have seen the rising to prominence of radical religious voices that are extreme, if not violent.

The radical voices are loud and have been pushing people forward in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Sectarianism between different religious groups shows up in the most unexpected places. Pro-revolutionary activists like Alaa Abdel-Fattah and Mona Seif in Egypt have, along with others, been summoned for investigation by the Egyptian prosecutor general in a move that is being interpreted by opposition figures as the Muslim Brotherhood government clamping down on dissent.

Yet, in the midst of all of these challenges, there are great signs to be optimistic about the future. The reality of the uprisings and revolutions is that they may have begun two years ago, but they are grappling with decades of trauma and turmoil. None of this should have been assumed to be easy, but the real success story is where in spite of these challenges, very powerful moves are taking place.

Read the full article »

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The Atlantic

Bassem Youssef: A Valuable Egyptian Voice That Will Not Be Silenced

H.A. Hellyer — Sat, 30 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article was published by Tahrir Squared.

Early on Saturday morning, I received a message that Bassem Youssef, the Arab world's answer to 'Jon Stewart', had been issued a compulsory summons and arrest warrant by the prosecutor-general. The prosecutor-general's office wanted to investigate two charges against him: 'insulting Islam' and 'insulting the president'. All I could do was smile -- because I knew that was exactly what Bassem would be doing as soon as he heard the same.

Almost a year ago, Egyptians went to the polls for their first free presidential election -- the first round delivered what was a nightmare of a result. A representative of the former regime, Ahmad Shafiq, which did nothing but signify a return to the status quo that existed during Hosni Mubarak – and a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that had shown little commitment to the Egyptian revolution, save as an opportunity to gain power. The day those results came out, I was in Bassem's office. Many of his team were simply stunned at the result. Bassem, on the other hand, just expressed slight surprise -- at all of us. As far as he was concerned, the result just meant one thing -- that they'd have a lot of material for political satire. And the revolution would go on.

That’s Bassem.

A few weeks later, we travelled across the United States together, as we prepared the new show, ‘America in Arabic’ -- the combination of a reality show looking at America through Arab-American and Arab immigrant eyes, and a political satire. There, I understood why Bassem was not so concerned about the presidential results – because for him, the revolution went beyond that. Several times, he was asked in public, ‘what will you do in the second round?’, which took place while we were actually in the U.S. on tour. He never replied directly. Instead, he said,’ I’m not sure, but it would be really difficult for me to vote for Ahmad Shafiq.’ Did that mean he’d vote Morsi? Or boycott? That’s something only Bassem can answer.

But none of that really mattered - what mattered was how he responded to the question. As soon as he confessed his reluctance to vote for a representative of the former regime, he would always follow up with two important points. The first was, ‘But I understand why people who will vote for Ahmad Shafiq will vote for him - and while I may disagree, I can understand it.’ That sort of generosity of spirit, with a clear commitment to the revolution that he himself had fought in, was what made, and makes, Bassem Youssef one of the most consistent, and principled, Egyptian public figures today.

The second thing he said, which comes from the same impetus that this very website was borne out of, was the following. “Whether Shafiq wins, or Morsi wins – the revolution continues. Whoever it is, or whoever else it could have been: the revolution continues.”

I’ve never forgotten he said that. Hearing him say that in crowds in San Francisco, Virginia, New York and Los Angeles, the effect of it was always the same – shivers. His commitment to the revolution of the 25th of January was unwavering – and I believe remains as such. That commitment wasn’t about a particular president, or lack thereof – it was about the changing of Egypt for the better. He understood, and understands, that Egypt’s struggle is still ongoing – and will continue for quite some time. For him, the revolution wasn’t about removing a political figure from power – or indeed, putting another one in place. The revolution was about changing Egypt – and that would take time, and effort.

For the life of me, I cannot really fathom the sense of summoning him to the prosecutor-general. But then, much of what has been applied by the Egyptian state in the past couple of years has been bizarre and peculiar. This government does not seem to understand one crucial point: Bassem Youssef, and all that he does, is actually completely in its benefit. The criticism that Bassem does is more valuable than every single laudatory article that comes out in Ikhwanophilic media – because it is genuine, and it is honest. If Bassem Youssef was to disappear from the airwaves, as it seems many supporters of the government desire, this government would not be stronger – it would be far, far weaker.

Bassem Youssef isn’t an enemy of the Egyptian presidency – he is simply an Egyptian patriot. For that, he ought to be congratulated by supporters of the government – not chastised. If tomorrow morning, when Bassem shows up at the courthouse, he is arrested by the Egyptian state, it will not be Bassem Youssef that loses out. It is going to be this government, and its supporters – because all it is really likely to do, in the final analysis, is give Bassem yet more material. Because one way or the other, he will walk out a free man – and his commitment to the 25th of January revolution will just be more intense.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Tahrir Squared

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

America's War on Terror Is Now a War Against Tribal Islam

Akbar Ahmed — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With the United States relying on the use of drones to target Islamic extremists, Nonresident Senior Fellow Akbar Ahmed writes in his new book, The Thistle and the Drone, that what began as the war on terror after the 9/11 attacks is now a war against tribal Islam. Ahmed explains that women are the innocent victims who suffer the most and argues that America must re-evaluate its war on terror and use proper methods to attack the right enemy.

The impact of the drones has been devastating and counterproductive.

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The Thistle and Drone is a Metaphor of Two Kinds of Society in the 21st Century

We are destroying an entire generation of human beings who are completely innocent.

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The Ordinary People Who Suffer the Most are Women

The enemy is not the ordinary tribesman. The enemy are the criminals.

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Tribalism and Ethnicity are Still Very Important in Traditional Societies

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Authors

Akbar Ahmed

How America’s War on Terror became a Global War on Tribal Islam

Thu, 14 Mar 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 14, 2013
3:00 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Along with the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, America’s global war on terror has been characterized by the use of drones. In his new book, The Thistle and the Drone (Brookings, 2013), Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Nonresident Senior Fellow Akbar Ahmed—the Ibn Khaldun chair of Islamic Studies at American University and former Pakistani high commissioner to the United Kingdom— examines the tribal societies on the borders between nations who are the drones' primary victims. He provides a fresh and unprecedented paradigm for understanding the war on terror, based in the broken relationship between these tribal societies and their central governments. Beginning with Waziristan in Pakistan and expanding to similar tribal societies in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe, Ahmed demonstrates how America's war on terror became a global war on tribal Islam. This is the third volume in his trilogy about relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world after 9/11 that includes Journey into Islam (Brookings, 2007) and Journey into America (Brookings, 2010).

On March 14, the Brookings Press hosted the launch of The Thistle and the Drone featuring a discussion on the regional, societal and humanitarian effects of the war on terrorism. Following Ahmed’s presentation, Mowahid Shah, a former Pakistani minister, and Sally Quinn, editor-in-chief of the Washington Post’s “On Faith,” joined the conversation. Khalid Aziz, a leading official from Pakistan, formerly in charge of Waziristan, offered recorded remarks via video.

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Audio

How America’s War on Terror became a Global War on Tribal Islam

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130314_thistle_drone_ahmed_transcript

No Fear: Morsi’s Rule of Law

H.A. Hellyer — Sun, 10 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Why should I respect the judges? My own president doesn’t.
[Protestor, Port Said]

As though anyone needed another reminder. As though anyone had not quite received the message when prisons were stormed in Port Said, after the judges pronounced a suspicious verdict. As though anyone had not realised that the institutions of Egypt are being weakened – and Egyptian citizens would pay the price if they were weakened further. Yet, after the Administrative Court of Egypt cancelled the parliamentary elections due to begin next month, it seems that many do indeed need that reminder. The question is – how many reminders will it take?

Under now deposed president Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian state had its pillars. One of them was brought down in the January 25th uprising – the ‘pillar of fear’. Regardless of the botched nature of this transition, the Egyptian revolution has accomplished at least one thing – it has ripped to shreds the curtain of fear.

That, no-one can deny, was a good thing. However, there is a corollary to consider here – if the ‘pillar of fear’ was so strong in Mubarak’s Egypt, then what has filled in the void that it used to occupy? Or did it not serve a purpose to begin with?

The reality is – it did serve a purpose, by creating a purpose. When a state apparatus is so absolute, and fear is so prevalent, it does ensure that individuals do not step out of certain predefined norms. In countries where such an apparatus does not exist, something else fills in that void. Civil society institutions; respect between the state and the citizen; a social contract; and so forth.

Filling the void

When the pillar disappeared, a void did emerge – and in the last two years, no one in Egypt’s ruling elite has tried to fill it. The military council that governed Egypt for 18 months was uninterested in doing so – it left it empty, and it left the other institutions alone. Neither was satisfactory – the state’s institutions needed to be reformed after the revolutionary uprising, not left to their own devices. This is particularly the case if fear, which animated so much of Egyptian society prior to the uprising, was no longer the tool of the state.

When the Muslim Brotherhood presidency began, it also did not try to fill in the void which fear had formerly occupied. However, it arguably did a worse job than the military council in that regard. While the military council had left other pillars, such as the ministry of the interior, the judiciary, and the media, alone, President Mursi’s government progressively managed to weaken them. The fight with the judiciary during the November presidential decree period managed to systematically damage the standing of the judiciary in the country, at a very critical time in Egypt’s transition.

Disrespecting the judiciary

When President Mursi gave his decree in the way he did, he was essentially telling the Egyptian public, “I am the president, and I have the right to suspend the rule of law, even though I just barely won the presidential election.” That in itself has consequences – consequences that supporters of the president argued were only theoretical, as President Mursi hadn’t used his supra-judicial powers (much). Port Said erupting, however, has put a question mark on how inconsequential his action was. How did Egyptian citizens see their president disrespect the institution of the judiciary, and not allow that to affect how they saw the same institution?

One would have hoped that the government might have realised that, indeed, Egypt needs all the strength its institutions can muster – and that any changes to them must be enacted carefully, and through the prism of consensus-based reform. In this highly polarised environment, this is hardly possible without a successful effort from the political ruling establishment to bridge the gaps.

Instead, however, it seems that the lesson has not yet been learned. When the Egyptian senate was proposing the election law, the constitutional court said it was legally flawed on a number of points. Judicial review of such a key legal tool demands that the court send such an assessment, and then also assess whether or not the legislature has fully complied. Instead, the senate changed the law, and assessed its own compliance. That is not how judicial oversight works – checks and balances in any normally functioning political system are precisely designed to ensure accountability of one branch by another. When one branch is given the ability to hold itself to account, without oversight, the system is brought one step closer to autocracy.

Political acumen?

The administrative court last week rejected the law, and in so doing, nullified the presidential decree to hold elections next month (based on the rejected elections law). The fact that the president’s office even issued such a decree calls into question the legal advice that his own advisors are providing, considering that this legal eventuality was easily foreseeable. None of that is good news for the presidency; the polarization in the country questions the political acumen of this presidency, and the ensuing economic trauma questions its financial expertise. With this latest debacle, the legal proficiency within the presidency cannot be taken for granted either.

The opponents of the presidency will likely take this as a sign that the judiciary is fighting back – and with so many of the opposition’s political forces agitating for an electoral boycott, it works neatly with their agenda. The supporters of the presidency will likely interpret it in the same fashion – a partisan move that is designed to weaken the president and strengthen the opposition. However, the fundamental reality of the court’s decision in this regard is that it was legally inevitable. Had the court not halted the electoral process, it would have essentially handed over judicial overview voluntarily – which only weakens Egypt’s institutions further.

It is a rather basic facet of modern political systems – the division between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. This is about the division of power – and the hope that these different parts of the governing structure will hold each other to account. At least, that is the idea – someone ought to remind the Egyptian political establishment of that. Egypt’s institution need to be strengthened through reform – not further weakened through partisanship or incompetence.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Al Arabiya

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

The Thistle and the Drone: The United States, Islam, and the War on Terror

Akbar Ahmed — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:03:00 -0500

“We will not tolerate more genocide of innocent tribesmen.”

This was the message of hundreds of tribesmen from Waziristan demonstrating in front of the Governor’s House in Peshawar, Pakistan on March 5, 2013. They were protesting the on-going drone campaign Pakistan which is almost exclusively targeting their home of Waziristan. Only 18 drone strikes in Pakistan have been outside of the two tribal agencies that comprise the region of Waziristan. These tribesmen were bringing attention to the fact that these drone strikes have traumatized entire tribal communities and resulted in the deaths of many innocent people, including women, children, and the elderly, in traditional meetings of councils of elders, inside mosques, and in residential homes.

As the debate about the drone and the war on terror in America emerges, these are the voices that are not heard—those of the victims and the targeted communities. They are lost in the din of the war on terror and the 24 hour media cycle in the United States. The debate is in fact no debate at all: only one position, that of America, is represented. The arguments swirl around the precision of drone technology, keeping American boots off the ground, and the legality of the strikes. Few are concerned with the moral implications of the drone’s use and the social and historical reasons why certain members of the targeted communities have resorted to violence, being merely cast aside as “Islamic terrorists,” “Islamists,” or “jihadists.”

My latest study with Brookings Press The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, the third book in my trilogy on relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world after 9/11, provides the missing part of the debate. The Thistle and the Drone explains an important correlation: the United States uses drones almost exclusively against Muslim tribes with strong codes of honor and revenge living on the borders between nations—the tribes on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Yemen, Somalia, the southern Philippines, Turkey, and Mali. For these communities, the deadly drone is a symbol for America’s war on terror. It is constantly hovering above unseen, operated by Americans on the other side of the world, and with the ability to strike at will. The thistle is a symbol of these fierce tribes, invoking Leo Tolstoy’s novel Hadji Murad in which he compares the Caucasian tribes battling the advancing Imperial Russian army in the 19th century with this prickly flower.

Many of these tribal communities had been fighting for decades in order to defend their identity, culture, and independence in the chaotic and often brutal modern states created after the departure of the European colonial powers. After the tragic events of 9/11, it was to the “ungoverned spaces” of these peripheral communities that the United States looked to in their hunt for al Qaeda. Many of their central governments found it convenient to ally themselves with the United States and become integrated in the globalized financial, military, information, and communication networks. The United States, dominated by ideas of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam, were quick to ascribe the retaliatory actions of the tribes as the work of al Qaeda or al Qaeda-linked militants as part of a “global jihad.” Once the specter of al Qaeda was invoked, the United States’ was fully committed to bolstering the military capabilities of its allies. U.S. involvement, especially the use of the drone, proved to exacerbate and expand these conflicts, each with their own social and historical context. The war on terror had thus become a global war on tribal Islam.

Amidst the anarchic violence, it is, however, the innocent men, women, and children of the periphery who suffer the most—children in a school, poverty-ridden families standing in line for food, or congregations at worship in a house of prayer. These communities are facing a massive humanitarian crisis yet their plight goes unrecognized under the din of America’s war on terror and the heavy fog of war. Pounded by drones and military strikes one day, suicide bombers the next, the people of the periphery cry out, “Everyday is like 9/11 for us.”

Relying upon forty case studies of tribal societies across the Muslim world, from Morocco to the southern Philippines, The Thistle and the Drone shows that the war on terror across the Muslim world is being fueled by the structural breakdown between the center and periphery rather than any compulsion within the Islamic faith. This study takes the reader into the heart of the war on terror—Waziristan—one of the most battered regions of the world by drones and where I served as the government administrator, or Political Agent, in the late 1970s. Using my own experiences in Waziristan, I describe how traditional tribal society functions and how to effectively administer them as a representative of government authority. I then show how the historical tension between the center and periphery spiraled out of control after 9/11, leading to one of its deadliest manifestation, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) based in the toughest clan of the toughest tribe of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, the Shabi Khel of the Mahsud.

Expanding to other tribal societies in Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern Europe, I establish a new frame for understanding the war on terror based in the historical conflict between the central government and tribal periphery, resulting in the mutation of the tribal code and increasingly deadly violence. I even discovered the catalyst for the war on terror—the 9/11 attacks—impossible to fully understand without knowledge of tribal society and this new paradigm for the war on terror. Of the 19 hijackers on 9/11, 18 of them, along with Osama bin Laden himself, were Yemeni tribesmen motivated by tribal codes. Of the 18 Yemeni hijackers, 10 were from the Yemeni tribes of the beleaguered Asir region on the southwest periphery of Saudi Arabia.

After over a decade, it is abundantly clear that the United States has been fighting the wrong war with the wrong methods against the wrong enemy. Only by recognizing the true source of the violence and the nature of the tribal society which produces it can the U.S. begin to provide lasting solutions. The Thistle and the Drone lays down this path to ending and winning the war on terror. In this age of globalization, we must be guided by the shibboleth tikkun olam—to go out and “heal a fractured world.” Peace is in everyone’s best interests.

Authors

Akbar Ahmed

Egypt's Military Back in Play

H.A. Hellyer — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has finally issued dates for the new parliamentary elections, due now to begin April, and end in July, over staggered rounds. Voices within the opposition have begun to splinter apart over participation; the presidential candidate that never was, Nobel Prize winner Mohammed ElBaradei, has already called for a boycott. Looming in the distance, however, is the key reality around what the country is going to look like in a few months time -- and if a civilian led Egypt is still a reality. Indeed, ElBaradei recently reminded the international community of the stakes in this regard, explicitly indicating that holding elections in April would risk placing the country into a state of "total chaos and instability," resulting in a military intervention. He said, "If Egypt is on the brink of default, if law and order is absent, [the army] have a national duty to intervene."

ElBaradei was not advocating the intervention of the military -- he was simply pointing that it may happen as a natural consequence. Nevertheless, a certain scenario has been making the rounds around some elements within the political elite in Egypt's opposition -- some, it should be noted, rather than all or most. It goes something like this:

Morsi has made a mess of the transition to democracy, and even though he was elected, he has failed in his duty. The political turmoil and polarization are proof enough of that -- the economic disaster that is about to fall upon Egypt will simply be the logical consequence of all of that, and will ensure that the military intervenes to save the country. When the military does so, the Muslim Brotherhood might put up a little bit of a struggle, but they'll fold pretty quickly in order to assure themselves a political future in Egypt. Alternatively, they might fight a little bit, but the military will make short shrift of them, and they will then be shunted underground, ending for once and for all this abysmal experiment of Islamist rule in Egypt. The military, having understood the mistakes it made during Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi's reign, will be far more suave this time around, and will set the stage for a new constitution, and a new presidential election, before it departs the scene. The international community will cluck, cluck, perhaps, but will quietly be satisfied, as they also never wanted an Islamist regime to emerge. The opposition will then provide an alternative leadership that can lead Egypt forward.

It is an interesting scenario, to say the least -- but it is not terribly realistic, let alone ethical. The military may indeed intervene, as it might under any regime that contributes to the instability of Egypt -- it did so under Mubarak, and it may do so again. However, Morsi is not Mubarak. The military intervened when it was clear the overwhelming majority of the country wanted Mubarak to go -- demonstrating in massive protests, in which millions of people over several weeks showed that they would not accept anything less than his departure. The same cannot be said for Morsi. He is certainly unpopular -- and with very good reason -- but the vast majority of Egyptians haven't shown they want him to have the same fate as Mubarak.

If the military were to intervene, moreover, no one should expect it to be a walk in the park. When Mubarak was forced to resign by the military, his own establishment, including those who had the arms, turned against him. The police force would not fight against the military, and that was that. In a scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood is forced from power -- a movement, living in an existential moment, that already feels the world is out to get it -- it is hard to see the MB not reacting with force. It would eventually lose against the combined forces of the military and the police -- but it would not be pretty. It would be a betrayal of the revolution of Tahrir forever, if any "revolutionaries" wanted such a bloodbath in order to put aside their political opponents.

If the military then takes control, the assumption that this leadership would be that much different from the previous Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is not certain, to say the least. The former SCAF under Tantawi, regardless of the media assertions to the contrary, was incredibly popular in Egypt. Among the political elite, whether opposition or MB, it had a varied reputation -- but across the country, the military's standing was solid. It may thus believe that there are actually not many errors to correct for, and another transitional phase may not prove to be all that much better than the last one. Of course, no one knows how it will behave -- only that in general, the military will look out for it's own interests, which include the stability of Egypt, as well as the fortification of military independence and autonomy.

To assume that the opposition leadership has the ability to provide a genuine alternative that can steer the country better may turn out to be wishful thinking -- in general, political leadership in Egypt has been indescribably lacking for the masses of Egyptians. This goes just as much for the opposition, which does not enjoy as much blame as the MB for the political turmoil, as it is not in power -- but is still hardly stellar by comparison.

What is generally true is that the international community would, in all likelihood, cluck, cluck, and let things unfold as it will -- as long as Egypt remains stable. The failure of Egypt is simply not an option, for broader political, economic, and security considerations.

All of this should not come as a surprise to any political force within Egypt -- whether the opposition or the MB. However, the uncomfortable truth is that the way to avoid this outcome is not in the opposition's court. Even if it were to disavow, and actively be against any military involvement in politics, its weight is negligible in that regard -- the military will come or not come according to its own calculus, not that of the opposition. The Egyptian presidency is what makes the difference in Egypt in terms of averting the realization of this scenario. The presidency must be aware that within the opposition, the broad majority would want to avoid any further turmoil in Egypt. They no longer need political allies who are simply willing to back up the government -- the presidency need partners who are willing to serve in a genuine national salvation government that resolves the political turmoil on the one hand, and sets into motion an economic recovery immediately. As the days go on, that all becomes more and more difficult -- and the likely scenarios become less and less palatable, for everyone.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Foreign Policy

Press Explosion in Egypt Brewing Trouble?

H.A. Hellyer — Sat, 23 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Since President Mohammed Mursi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, was elected last summer, there have been increasing concerns around the freedom of the press within Egypt. Those concerns suddenly became more pronounced over the last couple of weeks, raising new questions. Those questions go beyond, however, the freedom of the press in Egypt – they also raise other ones about its integrity, as well as its role in a revolutionary transition within this, the Arab world’s most populous country.

There have been concerns for quite some time around freedom of expression and freedom of the press in Egypt. The new constitution approved last year in an extremely tense vote created a new government press regulator, and reinforced the power of the state to close media outlets. Journalists across the state media have privately, and publicly, called attention to articles they believe were pulled due to being critical of the government. The upper house of parliament, the Shura Council, appointed political allies to the heads of media institutions, and in less than 9 months, the numbers of trials over “insulting the president” has exceeded all those that took place during Mubarak’s entire reign.

Too much to handle?

Generally, however, these have been measures that express more the inability and the ineffectual attempts of the new government in restricting the press, rather than actually being able to restrict it. Since the Jan. 25 revolution began, there has been an explosion of expression in Egypt, and while different institutions may try to limit it, it is simply too much for a government to handle. In the midst of that, the English language press in particular has escaped a great deal of attention – the powers that be were, for obvious reasons, more interested in focusing on the much wider read Arabic press. As such, the English language press was able to push the envelope a lot more.

In recent weeks, however, it has become clear that the English language press may not be the same for long. Some of this may be down to the political pressure – some of it down to the realities of print journalism in Egypt. In terms of the former, Hani Shukrallah, the famed editor of Ahram Online (and highly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood) recently wrote that he had been pushed out of his position. Others have reported that across the board, state media is becoming more and more cautious with regards to running stories that are critical of the government – in a way that was not even the case under the military’s reign. Of course, the government’s combined force against the erstwhile editor took a great deal of time and effort – it remains to be seen if they will be able to overcome the institution at large, which remains composed of some of the most determined journalists in Egypt.

Other English language mediums run the risk of being shut down – not because of editorial restrictions, but because of financial considerations. Egypt Independent, one of the more widely read sources for up to date news on Egypt, is in that category – it’s existence threatened more because of the overall financial situation in Egypt, and the limited, niche market that the English language press caters for. That niche market, however, has become particularly influential in terms of informing foreign governments as to the situation in Egypt, as far more international diplomatic staff can access information in English than in Arabic. That in itself has probably accounted for a lot of the increased attention given to it by the MB government’s supporters – which may cause tensions in the future. Again, nevertheless, the spirit of the Egyptian media remains defiant, even against market forces: the team of the newspaper have taken matters into their own hands, and have raised a subscription campaign to revitalize the financial prospects of the paper.

Neutrality

Beyond these legitimate concerns about the future of English language press in Egypt, however, there is a more core, basic issue that has yet to be discussed. For all of the positive sides of the English language press in Egypt, in one regard it is very similar to the Arabic language press – and that is in the area of neutrality. The worst of articles are often tabloid, bereft of original analysis, relying instead on thinly veiled bias. The best, however, are devoid of even an attempt to account for bias. A balanced view, in Egyptian commentary, is rare.

Many do not find this particularly troubling, arguing that in Egypt’s transitional phase, it is not only natural, but vital, that media be an agitation method for change. That media that considers itself to be supportive of the revolution should, indeed, consider itself be activism of another type. Others draw attention to the idea that media, in a successfully functioning pluralistic society, which the revolution calls for, ought to be responsible journalism that seeks to present all sides of view fairly.

It may be, actually, that everyone is right. Recently, a story broke out that a church in Fayoum, a small town not far out of Cairo, had been attacked due sectarian violence. An Egyptian English-language daily checked out the story – and found that actually, that wasn’t the case. After they reported as such, they were vilified – but they were telling the truth. It was simply that the truth was not convenient in terms of the current ‘battle’ of the revolution – the conflict with the MB. But the strength of the revolutionaries, as they continue to say, is not based on might – but on right. What can be right about upholding a false narrative?

MB and state media

After a successful transition, one might hope that all Egyptian state media would be wound up into a BBC-like institution – both in terms of numbers of mediums, as well as in style and approach. Egypt is a far way off from that, however. In the meantime, genuinely pro-revolutionary media probably should find space, somewhere, to be that equivalent of the BBC. A voice that represents all facets of Egyptian society – because no one else will do it. The MB media is not interested; nor is the state media. That, in itself, is actually a very revolutionary move – because it shows, by example, what ought to be the case. If the state can’t – or won’t – do their duty in this regard, pro-revolutionary mediums should take it up instead.

That is not to say that there should not be other types of independent, private voices in the media arena, that are deeply opinionated – on the contrary, at this stage in Egypt’s transition, perhaps most of all, there is a need for continued agitation. That can only happen with such incisive analysis and commentary, which should indeed be as partisan as the authors are. In such endeavors, nonetheless, an emphasis on truth, rather than political success, needs to be first and foremost.

If one can talk about “revolutionary success” when it comes to the media, it probably has two major elements to it. The first is the pre-eminent emphasis on relying only on the most truthful and trustworthy of sources – regardless of who that benefits or not. The second is fairness – something that probably the most revolutionary of writers, journalists and commentators in Egypt ought to seriously consider themselves as honor bound to uphold, at least until there is serious reform in the state media. Activist media is indeed an integral part of the revolution during its transition – and those two elements are, indeed, deeply embedded within the best kind of activist media.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Al Arabiya

Is there a Widening Sunni-Shia Schism?

Fri, 22 Feb 2013 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 22, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

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An upswing in sectarian violence in Pakistan, Bahrain and elsewhere in recent months highlights the historic tensions, and contemporary political importance of schisms between Sunni and Shia communities across the Muslim world. On February 22, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore the factors behind the worsening conflict between Sunni and Shia communities. Panelists included Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, and Geneive Abdo, fellow at the Middle East Program at the Stimson Center and author of a forthcoming paper examining sectarianism in the context of the Arab Awakening, to be published by the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. Durriya Badani, deputy director of the project, offered welcoming remarks. Brookings Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney moderated the discussion.

Riedel discussed the changing and complex Sunni-Shia relationship in Pakistan, a relationship that has been highlighted due to the rising number of sectarian attacks in 2011 and 2012. Riedel explained that in Pakistan, sectarian violence is not deeply rooted in the country’s history but instead was spurred in 1996 by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the group that launched the first suicide bombing in Pakistan against a Protestant church. Since 2011, Malik Mohammed’s release from prison (the senior official in the Defense Pakistan Council, a group that holds massive demonstrations criticizing the United States, India, Israel, and the Shia communities) has instigated the fresh series of attacks that especially target the vulnerable Afghani refugees in Baluchistan. Riedel did point out that although it is good news that for the first time in Pakistan's history an elected civilian government is going to complete its full term in office, upcoming elections will likely produce a new government that will tolerate additional Shia-targeted violence.

Genieve Abdo focused her comments on the sectarian dynamic in the Arab world, namely Bahrain and Lebanon, and the impact this has had on neighboring countries, including Syria. In Lebanon and Bahrain, Shias represent a significant, if not a majority, of the population. For this reason, movements for democratic reform have been viewed as part of a subversive Shia agenda. Sunni authoritarian rulers in the Gulf have come to view the Shia drive for democracy as a threat rather than a step toward modernity. In addition, the rise of Sunni Islamist governments in Egypt and Tunisia has alarmed Shias in the region. The Shia in Lebanon feel that the downfall of Bashar al-Asad and the rise of Sunni Islamists could cause sectarianism to take on a transnational nature, even in countries with little history of Sunni-Shia conflict.

Abdo went on to discuss the “proxy” war between Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on one side and Saudi Arabia, the United States and Turkey on the other and how that has impacted perceptions of the United State abroad. Riedel discussed that foregoing the U.S. Fifth Fleet might be worth it in order to avoid exacerbating sectarian tensions in Bahrain, for example. Moreover, even though some Shia elements might be historically affiliated with Iran, they have their own agenda (particularly Hezbollah in Iran and Asad in Syria) and are not puppets of any one foreign regime. Without a doubt, to simplify this as a Saudi-Iranian conflict is inaccurate and will lead policy experts to miss key issues that can potentially minimize sectarian violence going forward. That being said, Abdo did emphasize that the Iran-Saudi conflict will continue if for no other reason than the fact that this kind of conflict advances some of Iran's ambitions in the region as they are losing power in Iraq, Syria, and potentially Lebanon.

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Is there a Widening Sunni-Shia Schism?

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Tahrir Squared: The Discussion Continues

H.A. Hellyer — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In the last two years, a great deal has changed in the way we discuss Arab affairs, and yet, so much has stayed the same. As the revolutions continue to unfold, and the ‘Tahrir Effect’ is multiplied, a great deal more is likely to change, and those who fail to do so will likely find themselves becoming more and more irrelevant. Those initiatives that keep up with the times, however, are likely to be significant for many years to come.

If one was to survey the public discourse on the Arab world in 2010, it would be fairly easy to divide up the arenas of influence and discussion. There would be divisions on the basis of political belonging, geography, and language; all of those still exist. You still have clear distinctions between, for example, the writings of a left-winger in London, and the commentary of a right-wing neoconservative in Washington DC, let alone the analysis of liberals in Tunis writing in Arabic.

In the last two years, however, those distinctions and divisions have become more fluid, and as a result, the discourse itself is changing. Today, there are far more people in the West who access Arabic and/or reside in the region, and that impacts upon their perspective.

In the past, authoritative reportage and analysis could come from Americans and Britons who did not know Arabic at all. This is rarer in 2013, as many Americans and Britons take the time to study Arabic and spend time in the Arab world, and are unwilling to take a back seat to those who don’t.

Moreover, Arab writers and analysts are more and more involved in discussions that go far beyond their own countries; they are directly engaging with media, academia, and policy circles in DC and London. There used to be a small number of “gatekeepers” to understanding the “Arab street”, but that has widened out immensely, affecting the discourse.

Within the Arab world itself, the discussions that take place in English among the elite that know that language are becoming ever more precarious if they do not link directly to what is taking place in Arabic. Throw the impact of social media into the entire mix, and you can imagine the ramifications. A neo-conservative American in Washington DC can carry on a discussion with a liberal Palestinian in London, and both can argue with an Islamist Egyptian in Cairo – all at the same time.

As time goes on, a new set of boundaries are emerging because for many, the old frames are either irrelevant, or unknown. A liberal Egyptian pundit in Cairo, who generally wrote only in Arabic several years ago, might have been at loggerheads with a right-wing American activist in New York over the Iraq invasion.

Those same two individuals, even ignorant of each other’s previous stances, might find common cause over opposition to Assad in Syria today, but when the history of their respective stances becomes apparent, they may be in for a rude awakening. By the same token, within London, for example, political analysts who were deeply at odds over counter-terrorism strategies in 2005 might find themselves critiquing the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in much the same vein today. Those sorts of bedfellows will have to come to terms with their ideological differences, and that might make for new alliances entirely, based on an entirely new set of premises.

Ironically, other things can also happen where you can easily find policy discussions on the Arab world evolve in Washington DC, but where those discussions have almost nothing to do with what is actually happening in the Arab world. Instead, they have everything to do with old ideological formations in Washington DC.

It is a new world indeed, and new initiatives are coming up to try to make more sense of such varying perspectives in the public domain. One that I’ve been honoured to advise, called “Tahrir Squared”, takes as its starting point the energy of the original 18 days in Tahrir. That energy, what the site calls the “Tahrir Effect” is still sorely needed in the region, as recent weeks and months in Syria, Tunisia and Egypt have shown clearly.

That energy has affected a range of things, including how analysts, commentators and reporters relate to political and social developments in the region. Just as there were those who were considered to be “Cold War Warriors”, whose primary concerns related to the implementation of policies to maintain a strategic advantage during the “Cold War”, there are now a growing number of writers whose primary concerns relate to the complete success of the Arab revolutions. Their concerns are different in different countries, but their over-arching theme is clear: to empower the autonomy of the Arab individual and the Arab citizen in a spirit of respect and co-existence.

That is what many describe as something of a “tectonic shift”, and indeed, it is likely that in years to come, historians will consider 2010s as the decade of the “Arab revolutions”. It is quite probable that due to the speed, intensity and energy that have erupted in this region in this era, entirely new approaches in terms of political analysis, ideology and even political groupings will emerge.

The Arab world is, indeed, different today, as compared to two years ago, and it has never been more important to try to understand, to learn and promote more of the same. There is no stopping the train, and it is important to do all that is possible to try to get to the right destination, rather than just go faster.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: Daily News Egypt

Al Azhar's Shake-up Has Ramifications Far Beyond Egypt

H.A. Hellyer — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 16:39:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The National.

Last week, as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference hosted its summit in Cairo, media zeroed-in on the cordial welcome afforded the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, by Egypt's Mohammed Morsi. But in terms of domestic affairs, the more important greeting was the one Mr Ahmadinejad received at Al Azhar University.

Whereas Mr Morsi embraced the Iranian leader with a hug, Egypt's top cleric, the grand imam of Al Azhar, Ahmed Al Tayeb, called on Iran to stop interfering in the Arabian Gulf, and to stop encouraging the bloodshed in "brotherly Syria".

Al Azhar's independence is not entirely new, but its political positioning is nonetheless noteworthy. The university's place in politics could become even more prominent in the new Egypt as internal changes within the institution, and the broader Egyptian-Muslim religious establishment, come to fruition.

Al Azhar defines several things in 21st century Egypt: Al Azhar university itself, its alumni and a series of specific religious trends.

On the level of ideas, there are a handful of main trends within Al Azhar's alumni body. The first can be described as the "Azhari approach"; this trend is the mainstream of Sunni Muslim thinking worldwide, and informs institutions like the Tabah Foundation in the UAE, the Qarawiyyin in Morocco and the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia. It admits the existence of different approaches in scholastic theology, the main schools of Sunni jurisprudence and Sufism.

The second trend would be akin to the reformist trend of the early 20th century, the politicisation of which gave rise to yet a third trend: the Muslim Brotherhood.

And a fourth trend would be the purist Salafi trend, which emerges from Saudi Arabia.

For these and other reasons, Al Azhar is not only the key institution of religious education in Egypt, but home to the key personalities of the Egyptian Muslim religious establishment that have a profound effect on religion, and increasingly, politics.

The first of these key figures is the minister of religious endowments, the Awqaf, who is an Azhari graduate. He is also a Salafi; Talat Afifi was appointed by Mr Morsi last year.

The second figure is the grand imam of Al Azhar, currently Ahmed Al Tayeb, who heads the entire institution. While Sheikh Al Tayeb was appointed by the former president, his eventual successor is to be appointed by Al Azhar's Senior Scholars Council (SCC).

The third is the grand mufti, Ali Gomaa. He is due to be replaced next month by a relatively unknown scholar of jurisprudence, Shawqi Abdel Karim, newly nominated through an election by the SCC - a first in modern Egypt.

Dr Abdel Karim has a reputation of humility, non-partisan political leanings and sympathy for the Azhari scholastic trend; as such, the Azhari religious establishment has indicated it is generally pleased with the choice. Considering that until very recently, the SCC was privately indicating it did not know who to nominate, it seems that this choice was arranged with the nominee receiving key support.

Nevertheless, his selection came with some drama, amid rumours that a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau, Abdel Rahman Al Barr, was on a preliminary list of nominees. His selection was always unlikely, considering the scholars council is predominantly composed of scholars friendly to the current grand imam, himself known to be less than sympathetic towards the Brotherhood.

It's possible that Mr Morsi will refuse to approve Dr Abdel Karim as the new mufti, but in doing so he would be left with few choices. The SCC included in its recommendation to Mr Morsi that he consider renewing Dr Ali Gomaa's tenure - something that would be equally unlikely, considering that the mufti is viewed as hostile to the Brotherhood. As such, Mr Morsi will either put his stamp of approval on Dr Abdel Karim, or refuse to appoint anyone. The latter would signify he favours a more pliable candidate for political reasons.

The new mufti, if he is appointed, will have his job cut out for him. Dr Ali Gomaa was an influential figure before becoming mufti, and he increased the influence of the mufti's office regionally and internationally by sheer activity. That alone is a difficult act to follow.

Dr Abdel Karim, however, will also have to deal with a very different public arena, where he is not simply the mufti but the holder of a key religious post in a country that is deeply polarised between Islamist and non-Islamist forces. Dr Abdel Karim may not want to be more than a religious scholar issuing non-binding verdicts, as per his job description. But he may have no choice. His selection means the balance of power within Egypt's religious leadership is still beyond the Brotherhood's control - something it will be keenly aware of.

For many, the selection of the mufti and what appears to be a more politically assertive Al Azhar leadership hints at one thing: senior scholars of Al Azhar and the grand imam's position remain, for the time being, secure and independent from the Brotherhood's influence.

That is not something to be taken for granted. As Egypt's transition continues to unfold, the internal dynamic within the Azhar will likely be of increasing relevance.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The National

Egypt’s Dilemma: New Regime, Same Old State

H.A. Hellyer — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A week ago, Egypt’s revolution commemorated the second anniversary of its beginning. It hasn’t, however, been a week of celebrations – the day itself was considered by many Egyptian activists and political forces to be a reminder that after two years of transition, the revolution has not delivered on its potential. Moreover, violence has occupied the attention of the media, with civil unrest rocking cities such as Port Said, Suez and the centre of Cairo.

These are not disparate occurrences – they are inextricably linked. Two years ago, Egyptians did not rise up against a man – Hosni Mubarak – but against a system. The famous call during those 18 days of protests was clear: “the people want the fall of the regime.” In the two years since, however, that regime not only remains more or less intact – but the system within, which it operated, has taken a turn for the worse. Those who claim to support Egypt’s revolution have a lot more to do before it can be considered to have been completed.

While the regime within the institutions of the state has largely survived intact – despite many efforts of President Mohammed Morse to impose his own hegemonic regime – the institutions of the state have been weakened.

So, while the state and its institutions are not coming apart, cracks have formed – cracks that have been building not for days or nor weeks, but for many months. What we have seen over the past few days is the exploitation of those cracks as they are subjected to pressure through this crisis.

Since the beginning of this revolution, calls for reforming the institutions of the state have gone largely unheeded. Instead, the institutions have continued to deteriorate. During the transition, they have not been given the proper attention required to see them strengthen and function in a more just manner.

The ministry of interior, which governs the infamous Egyptian security services, for example, has certainly not been reformed and, as a result, is unable to carry out its responsibilities effectively. The violence over the last few days, which has cost the lives more than 60 Egyptians, is directly related to this continuing deterioration – and we should expect to see more cracks in the institution in the weeks and months ahead.

The responsibility for that deterioration can only lie with those who have been managing the Egyptian transition since Mr. Mubarak’s resignation – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and the presidency of Muslim Brotherhood member Mr. Morsi. It is their responsibility to reform and alter the institutions of the state to serve the Egyptian people more effectively, as well as fulfil the aims of the revolution. These two forces were the only ones who had the power to enact change. However, the SCAF did not take such steps, preferring to focus on other issues. When Mr. Morsi took office, changing the institutions was generally ignored in favour of steps that sought to impose a new hegemony sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Some supporters of the government point the finger of blame towards the opposition forces for the violence and the crisis – but the opposition has no competency or power to affect the institutions, and it is not responsible for the violence. To assume otherwise is to grant the opposition more clout than it actually possesses. If the opposition and the government were to stand together and urge an end to the violence sreets, it would be largely ignored.

The grievances being heard on the streets of Egypt’s cities are not political in any case – they are far more raw than that, and the violence will only continue if the core causes of those grievances are not addressed. The institutions of the state are not equipped to deal with the outbreak of a crisis when things break down. Egyptians will urgently need these institutions in the period ahead, most particularly because the worsening economic situation is colliding with popular discontent over Mr. Morsi’s government.

The last few days are an indictment of the opposition political leadership for many things – but not because of the outbreak of violence or the inability of the state to suitably manage that violence. Only the governing powers of the past two years can be held to account in that regard – the reforming and restructuring of the institutions of the state should have been the first priorities of any post-Mubarak regime.

They were not – and they should be held to account for that. It is unclear, however, whether they will be held to account; not unless the leadership of the opposition is able to organize effectively, in political terms, to ensure that.”

As such, it is likely that the state’s institutions will deteriorate further, until either a stronger political opposition can hold the government to account – or until a new president is elected into office. Neither appears likely for some time.

Authors

H.A. Hellyer

Publication: The Globe and Mail

The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

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The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk