Brookings: Experts - Tarik Yousef

@ Brookings Podcast: The U.S. Role in Supporting the Libyan Rebels

Tarik Yousef — Fri, 22 Apr 2011 09:38:00 -0400

As observers warn of stalemate between the rebel forces and dictator Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, expert Tarik Yousef says the United States has a responsibility to aid the cause of democracy in the region, and can speak with greater authority in North Africa than the former colonial powers of Europe. Yousef, a Libyan-born scholar, discusses the surprising spirit with which the rebels have launched their revolt after 42 years of iron rule.

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Aiding the Cause of Democracy in Libya

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@ Brookings Podcast: The U.S. Role in Supporting the Libyan Rebels

2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tue, 12 Apr 2011 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 12-14, 2011

Washington
DC

On April 12-14, 2011, the Government of Qatar, the Brookings Institution and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted the eighth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, convening for the first time in Washington, D.C. at this critical moment in Middle Eastern political history.

The U.S.-Islamic World Forum is a platform for dialogue at the highest level featuring leading U.S. and Muslim public officials, business leaders, scholars, journalists and commentators. Long seen as the world’s premier policy event for leaders with stakes in the global Muslim community, the Forum has a history of fostering unique, positive relationships between policymakers, business, cultural and religious leaders from across the Muslim World and the United States.

This year’s discussions focused on the rapid, turbulent change in the Middle East and implications for Muslims around the world.

There were five plenary sessions on topics such as civil society, the Libyan crisis, and the media.
Watch videos and read more about the plenaries »

Ten rountables held discussions on the Middle East peace process, the role of youth in the Arab Spring, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and many other issues.
Watch videos and read more about the roundtables »

Five working groups were convened to discuss and recommend action on issues in U.S. relations with the Islamic world, which were summarized in a paper published by the Brookings Institution. They are as follows:

Muslim-Majority and Muslim-Minority Communities in a Global Context
Humera Khan, Executive Director, Muflehun
Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America

Disconnected Narratives Between the United States and Global Muslim Communities
Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, Senior Vice President, APCO Worldwide
Anne Hagood, Managing Editor, The Layalina Review and The Chronicle, Layalina Productions

Higher Education Reform in the Arab World
Katherine Wilkins, Vice President for Communications, AMIDEAST

Building Capacity and Developing Leadership among American Muslims and Their Organizations
Brie Loskota, Managing Director, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, University of Southern California
Nadia Roumani, Co-Founder and Director, American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute, University of Southern California

The Role of Entrepreneurship and Job Creation in U.S.-Muslim Relations
Ahmed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, and Director of Strategic Partnerships and Communications, Silatech
Mohamed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies

Forum Highlights:

Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton » (state.gov)

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks at the 2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Washington, D.C.

Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, and Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu.

Time Magazine Editor and CNN host Fareed Zakaria moderates a panel with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Judeh, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey Ibrahim Kalin, and U.S. Senator John Kerry.

(images courtesy of Paul Morse)

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Event Materials

Is the Arab Authoritarian Bargain Collapsing?

Raj M. Desai, Anders Olofsgård and Tarik Yousef — Wed, 09 Feb 2011 16:56:00 -0500

Last week, we saw several Arab rulers embark on limited political reforms in order to “preserve and not to overthrow” their rule. After days of protests, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak announced he would step down at the end of his term, as did Ali Saleh of Yemen. In Jordan, King Abdullah fired his cabinet and appointed a new prime minister. Even Syria’s Bashar al-Assad agreed to allow local elections in order to pre-empt similar events.

However, dictators cannot stay in power by repression alone. In the Middle East and North Africa, governments have relied on an “authoritarian bargain”—an implicit contract between ruling elites and citizens whereby citizens relinquished political influence in exchange for economic benefits. But, this contract has been under stress for over two decades and is now collapsing.

Middle Eastern economies have historically allowed rulers to secure the loyalty of their subjects because of two reasons: government jobs and a generous welfare state. In return for these things, Arab citizens were willing to tolerate political restrictions on civic associations, access and representation in government, and the ability to participate in democratic life.

In times of distress and inability to fulfill the economic side of the bargain, Middle Eastern rulers have occasionally turned to partial political liberalization. Facing falling oil prices in the 1990s, for example, several countries permitted greater freedom in electioneering, and took steps to allow opposition figures to campaign freely, as long as they did not threaten the regime itself. At the same time, they attempted to increase salaries or subsidies for key constituencies, like the military.

For decades, citizens willingly accepted this bargain. It is hard to imagine now, but in the 1960s and 1970s Middle East economies were among the fastest growing in the world—alongside the East Asian “tigers.” Unemployment was low and household incomes were expanding rapidly. Middle Easterners easily found high-wage work, both at home and especially in the booming Gulf oil fields. University-educated citizens were guaranteed jobs in the public sector.

Oil revenues played a pivotal role in sustaining the social contract in the Arab states. For oil-producing countries, oil revenues permitted the creation of vast welfare states. For non-oil producers, remittances boosted household consumption, especially in rural areas. Loans and other forms of assistance from oil-producing states to non-oil producers boosted government revenues and sustained redistributive commitments. At the peak of the oil boom in the early 1980s, some 3.5 million Arab migrant workers were employed in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Job opportunities grew so fast that Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria were reporting labor shortages. However, today in these same countries jobs have disappeared, particularly for young people. These economies now suffer some of the highest unemployment rates in the world and standards of living are now declining and in some cases stagnant.

How did the Arab economies fall so far? First, Middle Eastern governments failed to reform their economies after oil prices fell in the 1980s. Declining oil prices forced drastic reductions in welfare, while many of these governments accumulated debt in order to meet their public wage bills. At the same time—particularly in North Africa—business environments influenced by Arab-socialist policies discouraged private investment, reduced opportunities for trade and impeded the development of competitive industry. While most governments launched some form of economic adjustment program in response, these reforms tended to be tentative, incomplete or uneven.

Second, failure to reform after the oil bust left the region ill-equipped to deal with the large-scale entrance of youth into the job market in the 2000s. Rapid fertility increases between the 1960s and 1990s, combined with plummeting mortality rates, left the countries with some of the highest percentages of youth populations in the world. While earlier generations of youth benefited from free education, job guarantees and other entitlements, those born after 1980 were no longer guaranteed these same institutions and high living standards. As a result, frustrations from the new generation of Middle East youth have been building for over a decade. Images of well-educated but unemployed youth have defined the Middle East and North Africa for many years now. The 5 percent growth rates that some economies, such as Egypt and Tunisia, have been posting cannot absorb all the young people entering the workplace. In fact, Gallup has reported that feelings of “well-being” in the Middle East have been plummeting even as GDP has been rising.

Arab leaders now face more difficult choices. They must revive their countries’ non-oil private sectors, which have been paralyzed by trade barriers, red tape, bribes and nepotism. Arab states need to reform their educational systems to emphasize greater decentralization, expanded access, higher achievement, and the development of skills to be a globally competitive. Finally, Arab states must restructure the top-down, rigid and centralized institutions of their governments. These countries remain saddled with institutions designed to support interventionist policies and face enormous difficulties in adapting to new tasks, policy demands and regulatory environments. Such instruments are necessary to promote socially equitable, market-oriented job growth.

In the past, when economic pressures mounted, Middle Eastern regimes have opened some limited political “breathing room” to buy time. But the scenes from Tunis to Cairo to Sana’a suggest that the strategies used by Arab leaders to maintain power may have run their course. Partial political liberalization may not be enough at this point to make up for the current inability to deliver economic security and prosperity, spelling the final demise of Arab authoritarian bargain.

Authors

Raj M. Desai
Anders Olofsgård
Tarik Yousef

Image Source: © Yannis Behrakis / Reuters

Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship: From Words to Action in the Middle East and Muslim World

Tarik Yousef — Mon, 26 Apr 2010 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Tarik Yousef appeared on BBC World News America to speak with chief anchor Matt Frei about the recent Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship and how economic ties and entrepreneurial innovation can become a foundation for strengthening relations between the U.S. and Muslim world. Yousef is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Youth Initiative, which just released a report on social entrepreneurship in the Middle East.

Matt Frei: I’m now joined by Tarik Yousef, dean of the Dubai School of Government and senior fellow at the Middle East Youth Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Great to have you on the program, Tarik. The point of this conference isn’t just to try to see how people might make money in the Middle East, it’s also to try and bring democracy – the marriage between freedom and entrepreneurship, between business and democracy. Is that a link that’s pie in the sky, or do you think it might actually happen?

Tarik Yousef: It might actually happen. Incidentally, the word democracy was used perhaps only once or twice in the entire two days of deliberations.

Frei: Why do you think that is?

Yousef: Because I think people were cognizant on both sides of the legacy of the previous administration and how the rhetoric of democratization and the practice of foreign policy behind it had created so much distrust.

Frei: So democracy, in an American context, is a dirty word in the Middle East?

Yousef: I would say it carries excess baggage and it reminds people of what happened post-9/11 during two terms for President Bush. What was emphasized in the last two days was economic opportunity, individual opportunity, freedom, partnership, civic engagement – a new sort of a beginning between the Muslim world and the United States of America based on mutual respect and mutual trust. I thought by the end of two days of this, people were beginning to buy into the notion that this could very well be a new beginning. After all, the administration was full force there; everyone committed themselves to the idea of a partnership.

Watch the program (BBC News Web site) »

Authors

Tarik Yousef

Publication: BBC World News America, BBC World News

Dubai: Back to Business As Usual?

Tarik Yousef — Tue, 15 Dec 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: Tarik Yousef appeared as a guest on the Riz Khan show to discuss Dubai's financial future following the Emirate's recent debt troubles and the announcement by Abu Dhabi that it would lend 10 billion USD to help Dubai World, the state-owned conglomerate, repay some of its creditors.

Riz Khan: Tarik Yousef, in Dubai, how much damage could there be? There is still some more to come; there is still a bit more sweating to be done with a fair amount of debt still outstanding. What is being said there, on the ground in Dubai, among the power circles about how things might pan out in the coming months?

Tarik Yousef: I think there is still a bit of anxiety in Dubai and the UAE about the future of the next six months, and especially what happens after six months from now. There was quite a bit of euphoria in the last 24 hours, following the announcement of Abu Dhabi’s injection of funds and the introduction of what looks like a reasonably transparent framework for bankruptcy and restructuring that was specifically introduced to help and aid Dubai World. So, market sentiment has dramatically changed in the last 24 hours on account of this announcement. But given what happened in the last few weeks, much remains to be seen in the next few months, and questions are being asked today as to what lies ahead. I think it is correct to perceive the action being taken yesterday as one with the UAE as a country: it has taken matters in its own hands, it is wresting back initiative from international media, from international investors, and it is trying to gain the upper hand in setting the tone for moving forward.

Khan: To what degree is this situation, this having to be bailed out, going to manacle Dubai and perhaps curb its ability to be able to move forward with the kind of vision that certainly the leadership, Sheikh Mohammed [bin Rashid al Maktoum], had?

Yousef: I think when the dust settles, Dubai will emerge and remain the preferred hub for much of the business that flows through this region – and by this region, I don’t just mean the Arab world, or the Gulf, or the large Middle East, but the frontiers of Asia. These are some of the important fundamentals that will serve Dubai in the long term. Some of the reputational cost issues at present, some of the image problems that may have been damaged on account of recent actions, will have an effect. But, if the fundamentals are there – and there is almost a consensus, I would say, among observers especially in the region that Dubai will retain its premier place as the hub for much of the important, not just local and regional business, but international business. I think moving forward, Dubai will be able to survive on account of this, and regain much of the lost ground of the last couple weeks.

Watch part 1 of the program (Al Jazeera English website) »

Watch part 2 of the program (YouTube) »

Authors

Tarik Yousef

Publication: The Riz Khan show, Al Jazeera English

The Middle East and the New Global Economy: Exploring Green Models for Sustainable Growth

Jad Chaaban and Tarik Yousef — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In our new series, "The Middle East and the New Global Economy: The Drive for Competitiveness, Skills and Innovation," the Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI) turns once again to our network of scholars to ask how the region is faring. Have chronic unemployment challenges in the region been exacerbated by the economic slowdown? Has the global crisis forced a rethinking of development strategies in the region? Have ambitious programs been put on hold due to declining revenues from commodities, investment, exports and tourism?

Part 4: Exploring Green Models for Sustainable Growth

Tarik Yousef: Jad, much of your work focuses on agriculture and food security. In the past, we have talked about how sustainable development – in the agriculture sector, agrobusiness, alternative energy and water management – could lead to more jobs for young people in the broader Middle East. You gave some examples of policies that could encourage investment in these areas. Have you seen any promising initiatives in the region to date that are directing resources toward these sectors?

Jad Chaaban: What I have seen are investments by big companies, like Almarai in Saudi Arabia or other companies in Egypt where cornfields are planted for ethanol production. However, we do not yet have a clear strategy from governments for entering the green economy and alternative energy markets, or even [a strategy for] water management. Unfortunately, all of these projects are still driven by donor support [such as] World Bank loans. In many cases they are good projects, but they are piecemeal and they do not fall within a global strategy where each country prioritizes these sectors, especially water management and a decreased dependency on fossil fuels. There have been some small-scale initiatives, most of them guided by donors, but we have not seen yet a massive adoption of policies or projects that would indicate that we are moving in that direction.

Yousef: Besides investment in sustainable development, part of the challenge is bringing young people into these careers through education and training. How can we encourage more young people to go into innovative sectors that will contribute to sustainable development?

Chaaban: Some years ago, the environment and sustainable development were seen as nice diplomas to [receive]. I know from the American University of Beirut here that there was a demand [for] the environmental sciences and majors in sustainable development. But this was just a trend where some parents would decide with their children to send them to these programs. Unfortunately the trend still, in private universities and public universities across the Arab world, is to study social sciences, business and related fields, and not to go into more scientific fields related to agriculture, energy and environmental management...

Read the full interview »

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Authors

Jad Chaaban
Tarik Yousef

The Middle East and the New Global Economy: Economic Recovery and a New Government in Lebanon

Jad Chaaban and Tarik Yousef — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 09:24:00 -0500

Part 3: Economic Recovery and a New Government in Lebanon

Tarik Yousef: In May of this year, you spoke with MEYI [Middle East Youth Initiative] Director Navtej Dhillon and gave an initial assessment of how Lebanon was faring in the midst of the global economic slowdown. You indicated that Lebanon’s strong and heavily regulated financial sector was mostly shielded from the crisis, but predicted that the real economy might see a decline in remittances, which would in turn affect real estate investments and Lebanon’s important construction and telecommunications sectors. Recently, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] published a note entitled "Resilient Lebanon Defies Odds In Face of Global Crisis" projecting that Lebanon could grow faster in 2009 than previously predicted. What is your current assessment of how Lebanon has fared in weathering the crisis so far, and what are its future macroeconomic prospects?

Jad Chaaban: As you mention, growth in Lebanon [in 2009] is predicted by the IMF and several other institutions, such as private banks working in Lebanon, to be between 6 and 7 percent. That is a pretty good number for this year, especially since we are still in a global financial crisis.

There are many reasons why Lebanon is still faring pretty well compared to other countries. The one essential factor this year was that there has been some kind of stability in political terms and also on the security front. We had a very good tourist season with a lot of Lebanese immigrants and international visitors coming in: about 2 million visitors in 2009 compared to 1.3 million in 2008.

You also have to add that, due to the stable financial system and the stable banking system in Lebanon, we still have very good inflows coming in... The balance of payments surplus now is almost $3.3 billion for the first seven months of the year. This is double the surplus posted in the same period last year. This mostly comes from petrodollar-rich Gulf countries, where many Gulf investors are still looking to Lebanon as a destination for their investments. Unfortunately most of this is still going to real estate investments and major real estate compounds; although they are good for the Lebanese economy, in the long run they create a certain crowding out of other activities like agriculture and industry.

Read the full interview »

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Authors

Jad Chaaban
Tarik Yousef

Generation in Waiting : The Unfulfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East

Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef, eds. — Sun, 01 Nov 2009 12:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2009 280pp.

Young people in the Middle East (15--29 years old) constitute about one-third of the region's population. Growth rates for this age group trail only sub-Saharan Africa. This presents the region with an historic opportunity to build a lasting foundation for prosperity by harnessing the full potential of its young population. Yet young people in the Middle East face severe economic and social exclusion due to substandard education, high unemployment, and poverty. Thus the inclusion of youth is the most critical development challenge facing the Middle East today.

Generation in Waiting portrays the plight of young people, urging greater investment designed to improve the lives of this critical group. It brings together perspectives from the Maghreb to the Levant. Each chapter addresses the complex challenges facing young people in many areas of their lives: access to decent education, opportunities for quality employment, availability of housing and credit, and transitioning to marriage and family formation. This volume presents policy implications and sets an agenda for economic development, creating a more hopeful future for this and future generations in the Middle East.

Selected contributors include Ragui Assaad (University of Minnesota), Brahim Boudarbat (University of Montreal), Jad Chaaban (American University in Beirut), Nader Kabbani (Syria Trust for Development), Taher Kanaan (Jordan Center for Public Policy Research and Dialogue), Djavad Salehi-Isfahani (Wolfensohn Center for Development and Virginia Tech), and Edward Sayre (University of Southern Mississippi).

FACT SHEET: See the Generation in Waiting fact sheet for an overview, key findings, and ways to learn more.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Navtej Dhillon

Tarik Yousef

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{9ABF977A-E4A6-41C8-B030-0FD655E07DBF}, 978-0-8157-0314-3, $28.95 Order
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The Middle East and the New Global Economy: Development and Diversification in Saudi Arabia

Hassan Hakimian and Tarik Yousef — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 12:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In our new series, "The Middle East and the New Global Economy: The Drive for Competitiveness, Skills and Innovation," the Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI) turns once again to our network of scholars to ask how the region is faring. Have chronic unemployment challenges in the region been exacerbated by the economic slowdown? Has the global crisis forced a rethinking of development strategies in the region? Have ambitious programs been put on hold due to declining revenues from commodities, investment, exports and tourism?

Part 2: Diversification and Development in Saudi Arabia

Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI): The leaders of the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations are convening at a summit in Pittsburgh September 24 and 25. Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country represented in the G-20. What issues do you think are at the top of the agenda for the Saudi government going into this summit?

The leaders of the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations are convening at a summit in Pittsburgh September 24 and 25. Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country represented in the G-20. What issues do you think are at the top of the agenda for the Saudi government going into this summit?

Hassan Hakimian: Saudi Arabia’s presence at the G-20 economic summit indicates how the balance of economic and financial power has been gradually moving eastward: toward China, India, and also the major Gulf oil-producers. Saudi Arabia has been important for a number of years: it is the largest oil-exporting country in the world, it is the largest OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] member, and naturally it is a country which has immense regional – and increasing international – significance. The economic performance of Saudi Arabia is also an important factor in any possible global recovery.

From the point of view of Saudi Arabia, attending the G-20 economic summit is important in at least two respects, both indicating Saudi Arabia’s inexorably rising ties with the international economy. First, of course, is oil prices – the prospect for oil price recovery is tied with the prospect for global growth and international economic recovery. Second, considering that Saudi Arabia’s currency is pegged to the dollar, the position of the dollar as an international reserve currency is of considerable importance to Saudi Arabia and its monetary stability. We should also remember that a significant part of the Kingdom’s vast foreign assets, topping about $500 billion, is denominated in low yield but safer U.S. Treasury bills. So, for at least these two reasons, what goes on in the wider international community will be of immediate interest to Saudi Arabia.

Read the full interview »

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Authors

Hassan Hakimian
Tarik Yousef

The Middle East and the New Global Economy: Revisiting Egypt in the Wake of the Downturn

Ragui Assaad and Tarik Yousef — Tue, 22 Sep 2009 12:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In our new series, “The Middle East and the New Global Economy: The Drive for Competitiveness, Skills and Innovation,” the Middle East Youth Initiative (MEYI) turns once again to our network of scholars to ask how the region is faring. Have chronic unemployment challenges in the region been exacerbated by the economic slowdown? Has the global crisis forced a rethinking of development strategies in the region? Have ambitious programs been put on hold due to declining revenues from commodities, investment, exports and tourism?

Part 1: Revisiting Egypt in the Wake of the Downturn

Tarik Yousef: Ragui, thank you for joining us for the series again. When we spoke to you in October of last year, we had discussed Egypt’s position going into the global economic slowdown. You predicted that Egypt would feel the effects of the global downturn in its real economy insofar as tourism, trade, remittances, and foreign direct investment (FDI) would decline. Now, as the rhetoric shifts from “global slowdown” to “global recovery,” where would you say that Egypt stands?

Ragui Assaad : My initial point was that Egypt was not going to be strongly affected by the financial side of the crisis in terms of capital flows, portfolio investments, and asset prices going down. That turned out to be pretty much true: Egypt is not heavily incorporated into the world financial system, so the effects of the crisis have been fairly mild from the financial point of view. On the real economy side – which is where trade and tourism come in – there has been an effect, but this effect has been relatively mild, at least from what I can tell from the growth rates. Real GDP growth rates went down from around 7 percent in 2008 to about 4 percent in 2009, whereas in many countries they declined into negative territory in 2009.^{^[1]}

Therefore, Egypt has been spared the worse effects of the crisis. However, the crisis arrived at a time when the country already faced a pretty dire unemployment situation, compounded by the effects of an increase of food and fuel prices. This was creating a lot of pain through vulnerability to inflation. The crisis came on top of all of these things and resulted in a slowdown in the economy. This actually had one positive effect: the price escalation that had been occurring before the crisis was mitigated to some extent and there was a slowdown in the inflation of food prices and construction materials. On the other hand, the crisis had a relatively negative effect on demand for labor in some of the more internationally connected sectors like tourism.

Read the full interview »

[1] The IMF projects 3.0 percent real GDP growth for Egypt in 2010. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009.

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Authors

Ragui Assaad
Tarik Yousef

Missed by the Boom, Hurt by the Bust: Making Markets Work for Young People in the Middle East

Thu, 14 May 2009 12:00:00 -0400

In Missed by the Boom, Hurt by the Bust: Making Markets Work for Young People in the Middle East, the Middle East Youth Initiative cautions that a new jobs crisis may damage future prospects for the region's young people. For Middle Eastern economies, the global downturn coincides with a historically high share of 15- to 29-year-olds in the total population. This report shows that, even during the “boom” years of 2002 to 2008, young people in the Middle East did not benefit from high quality education and struggled to find decent jobs. Now, with labor markets already under pressure to generate employment for record numbers of graduates, the region faces a new set of challenges due to the global downturn and its affects on oil prices, exports, remittances, and foreign investment. For Middle Eastern economies to emerge stronger, policies forged during the downturn must be consistent with long-term goals of cultivating a skilled workforce, expanding the role of the private sector, and reducing the appeal of government employment.

Download the full report »

Download the fact sheet »

View individual sections of the report:

Introduction » (PDF)

The Boom Times: How Did the Young Fare? » (PDF)

Stalled Transitions: How Institutions Are Failing Young People » (PDF)

New Economic Crisis, New Risks for Young People » (PDF)

A New Policy Agenda » (PDF)

Emerging Stronger After the Downturn: The Imperative of Regional Cooperation » (PDF)

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Authors

Amina Fahmy
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Mary Kraetsch
Navtej Dhillon
Paul Dyer
Tarik Yousef

The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains

Anders Olofsgård, Raj M. Desai and Tarik Yousef — Mon, 23 Mar 2009 12:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

How do authoritarian regimes stay in power? Repression – the classic answer– is not enough, because repression also creates the ‘‘dictator’s dilemma’’ by which citizens feign support for the ruler even as they collude to rebel, increasing the degree of insecurity a dictator faces (Tullock, 1987; Wintrobe, 2007). More likely, some form of redistribution to citizens is necessary to secure and maintain their loyalty. Dictatorial regimes are therefore said to rely on an ‘‘authoritarian bargain,’’ or an implicit arrangement between ruling elites and citizens whereby citizens relinquish political influence in exchange for public spending.

Much of the rationale explaining the persistence of such bargains has been induced from regional or case studies of policy making in dictatorships and of authoritarian withdrawal. In addition, econometric studies of public spending or of democratization in dictatorial regimes examine the two sides of the ‘‘bargain’’ separately. By contrast, we aim to develop a framework that may be used to test the generality of the claim that political influence and public spending are substitutes in non-democratic states across these countries and over time.

We proceed in two steps. We first develop a simple model of an authoritarian bargain based on the presumption that non-democratic rulers secure regime support through the allocation of two substitutable ‘‘goods’’ to the public: economic transfers and the ability to influence policy making. The former consists of explicit and implicit transfers, subsidies, protections, and regulations that guarantee profits, employment, or consumption above what would otherwise prevail. The latter consists of partial political liberalization or of expanding citizen participation in governmental decisionmaking,
leading to policy choices that are closer to citizen preferences. The central purpose of the model is not to highlight a single causal mechanism. Rather, it is to identify, based on certain a priori principles, a set of relationships between variables that then form the basis for our empirical specification.

In a second step, we test some implications of this model. Using crossnational, time-series data from 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 we test a system of equations with welfare expenditures and political rights on the left-hand side and a set of covariates derived from the theoretical model. The results are generally consistent with the predictions of the model and identify certain factors that influence welfare expenditures and political rights in the same direction, as well as those factors that influence them in opposite directions. We also find that this bargain tends to break down in military and highly repressive dictatorships.

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Authors

Anders Olofsgård
Raj M. Desai
Tarik Yousef

Publication: Economics and Politics, Vol. 21

President Obama's Speech: An Appraisal from the Middle East

Tarik Yousef — Wed, 21 Jan 2009 12:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: On January 21, 2009, BBC Arabic interviewed Tarik Yousef, Nonresident Senior Fellow, on a radio broadcast covering reactions to President Obama’s inauguration speech and expectations for the new administration from the Arab and Muslim world. Yousef highlights the importance of the new President’s symbolic changes in rhetoric and discusses the tests that the new administration will face in the region, from the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process to the relationship with Iran. What will beckon the administration first, however, are a pressing set of domestic policy challenges. An edited translation of his remarks follow.

Listen to the interviews in Arabic » Part I (mp3), Part II (mp3)

Part I

Roula al-Ayoubi (Host): Dr. Tarik Yousef, Dean of the Dubai School of Government, joins us now. Dr. Tarik, in your opinion, what was the impact of President Obama’s speech yesterday, especially given that the policies of this administration are not yet clear? Still, was there a clear message and a major change from the speech or speeches adopted by President George Bush?

Tarik Yousef: Actually, if this speech was given one month back it would have had more of a positive impact on the Arab and Muslim world.

Al-Ayoubi: Are you referring to Gaza?

Yousef: Yes, before the Israeli invasion on Gaza. Because, in President Obama’s speech, we can clearly see there’s a new trend in the relations between the United States and the Arab and Muslim world: a relationship that President Obama wants to build on mutual respect and common interests. This tone is clear and fresh and gives the impression that there will be a change in the main principles adopted by the new U.S. administration. There is a change in many concepts that former President George Bush articulated regarding the war on terror, or the war on fundamentalist organizations, or hostility toward certain countries in the region.

Al-Ayoubi: It seems that Dr. Asali objects to this. Can you please clarify Dr. Asali?

Ziad Asali: The president has identified that the primary enemy in the world today is the network of people associated with terrorism: he too considers the issue of terrorism to be the strategic enemy of America.

Yousef: Yes, but he did not use the same terms or the same expressions. The term “war on terror” was not used in the speech given yesterday. Therefore, in my opinion, if this speech was given one month ago it would have had a more positive impact, at least when compared to what the Arab and Muslim world would have expected out of a speech given by former President George Bush.

Al-Ayoubi: If we elaborate on this point, why in your opinion didn’t he use the term “war on terror?” What was the significance of that?

Yousef: In my personal opinion, I think that there is great significance, the “war on terror” was used in the intellectual and political circles and by the United States government to such an extent that it seemed like a Quranic verse [i.e. a heavenly commandment], and not referring to this term in President Obama’s speech or avoiding it shows his keenness on ensuring mutual respect and interests between the Muslim world and the United States. In my opinion this is a great and difficult step, and least to say, it clearly indicates that this man intends to adopt a new approach when dealing with the Arab and Muslim world. The only problem is, as I referred to above, in the light of the recent events in Gaza, in the opinion of many people and leaders of the Arab and Muslim world this speech or new approach did not give a clear or sufficient message on the Arab-Israeli conflict. And, certainly the absence of the Palestinian issue in the president’s speech yesterday and the fact that he did not refer to the subject of “peace in the region” were not positive indications. It seems that, at the end, he decided to forward a vague message to the Arab and Muslim world, and stressed the importance of opening a new page of cooperation.

Part II

Roula al-Ayoubi (Host): Welcome back again to this radio broadcast of “Talk of the Hour.” This is your host, Roula Al-Ayoubi. First, I would like to begin by referring to the speech of President Barack Obama, who was sworn in yesterday as the first African-American President of the United States of America. My guests with me today are: Dr. Tarik Yousef, Dean of the Dubai School of Government and researcher at the Brookings Institution in the United States, and Dr. Ghassan Al Atia from Iraq, Head of the Iraqi Institute for Development and Democracy in London. We will also be joined shortly by other guests.

Dr. Yousef, we were talking about both your optimistic and pessimistic views as a person who helped prepare recommendations for new policies for President Barack Obama’s administration in the Middle East, and would like to further understand this: why the optimism and why the pessimism?

Tarik Yousef: Optimism, because a man like Barack Obama has successfully managed to hold the position he holds today, and insists through his new ideas on the importance of changing America’s policy in dealing with a number of economic, political, social, and internal issues, and the importance of changing America’s approach toward the Arab and Muslim world, as referred to in his speech. But this optimism toward President Obama’s speech and new approach must be viewed realistically, especially in the light of the current internal challenges faced by the United States. The economic, financial, social and political challenges will definitely take a lot of this man’s time and effort and that of his administration, and he might succeed or he might not. Some indications show that the United States is about to face an extremely complicated and challenging period internally.

Al-Ayoubi: Dr. Yousef, but we must not forget that President Obama possesses a number of positive tools that will enable him to implement his ideas. First, majorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives are on his side. Second, he has the support of most of the American people; more than 80 percent of the American people support this president. Don’t you see this as an indication that proves he can do a lot?

Yousef: Of course he has the capability of doing a great deal. But, the volume of issues have increased these past few months and are now more complicated, which means that priorities will be given to internal matters first. I have no doubt whatsoever of the ability of this man or his team to achieve a great deal, especially if we compare him to the previous administration. But the problem right now is that the Arab world, or the Middle East in particular, is very complicated on both local and regional levels: there is the Palestinian issue, the Lebanese issue, the relations with Iran, the security issue in the GCC and African continent, which all require tremendous efforts and concentration that might require prioritization. These issues will not exceed the priority of dealing with internal issues first or the relations with Europe on one hand and relations with China and Russia on the other. In my personal opinion, I think we should realize that priorities will be given to these matters first, to avoid feeling disappointed. We must give this new administration enough time to stand on its feet and identify priorities for dealing with urgent internal issues, and then give it a chance to obtain credibility in dealing with Middle East issues as referred to by the President in his speech yesterday, where he stressed upon the importance of mutual exchange, mutual interests, and mutual respect in America’s relations with the Islamic world.

Al-Ayoubi: Dr. Yousef, very briefly, what is the view from the Gulf of President Obama’s speech? Can you give us a brief idea?

Yousef: The Gulf shares the same opinion as the rest of the Arab and Muslim world. There is a lot of optimism, a great desire for a genuine partnership between the Gulf States and the United States based on interests, not just security or military, but a partnership based on economic and financial interests, trade exchange, and coordinated steps for future relations with respect to other regional issues. There is optimism amongst the Gulf countries, and I think that the Gulf countries in particular will be more open to interacting with new ideas and proposals put forward by the new U. S. administration.

Al-Ayoubi: Dr. Tarik Yousef, Dean of the Dubai School of Government, thank you very much for participating in this program.

Authors

Tarik Yousef

Publication: BBC Arabic

Middle East’s Economic Paradox

Jad Chaaban, Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 12:00:00 -0400

The Middle East is experiencing its best economic performance in three decades, with the price of oil hovering at more than $130 a barrel. Even non-oil producing countries are powering record GDP growth. Yet even in today’s expanding economy, millions of young men and women are largely excluded from productive employment, imposing serious economic costs to society.

Our new research – the first of its kind in the Middle East – attempts to quantify the economic costs of youth exclusion. Our calculations show that the combined costs of youth unemployment for 11 countries reaches $25 billion a year, or 2.3% of the region’s GDP. Countries bearing the most costs include Morocco ($7.7 billon), Algeria ($5.6 billon), Egypt ($4.6 billon) and Saudi Arabia ($3.2 billion).

The research reports significant differences across countries on male versus female costs of unemployment. In Egypt, female costs of unemployment ($2.6 billion) are higher than male ($1.9 billion) costs of unemployment. This is because female youth unemployment rate is almost six times higher than the male one. In other countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, West Bank and Gaza, female costs of unemployment are considerably lower to male costs of unemployment. This is because in some countries females have a much lower rate of labor force participation. The female costs of unemployment highlight the different gender challenges facing the Middle East. In some countries where more and more women want to work, the labor markets need to absorb an expanding pool of female workers. In other countries, where female labor force participation rates remain very low, economic, social and cultural barriers continue to inhibit women from considering employment.

The study also quantifies several costs related to joblessness, school dropouts, adolescent pregnancies and migration, which when added show staggering annual losses. From these areas, Egypt loses $53 billion or 17.4% of its GDP – this is equivalent to the total value-added of the country’s agricultural sector. Jordan loses $1.5 billion or 7.3% of its GDP annually to youth exclusion. These calculated costs are purely economic, measuring the depletion of human and social capital and lost productivity because of limited work opportunities. As such, they do not capture the wide-ranging social costs or psychological costs associated with exclusion. Thus the true costs of youth exclusion in the Middle East may be much higher.

These costs represent a call to action since delaying reforms in institutions and programs which tackle youth concerns is no longer sustainable. While the costs of youth exclusion may paint a somewhat gloomy picture for the Middle East, in fact they show what the region could gain – not lose – if the full power of young persons is incorporated into their societies. By quantifying the costs of their exclusion, this study makes the case for investing in youth as an economically sound approach for Middle Eastern governments to take. In order to build lasting economic success, Middle Eastern policymakers should act now to capitalize on the opportunities inherent in their young populations.

Please submit your comments on this opinion piece on the Middle East Youth Initiative Web site.

Authors

From Oil Boom to Youth Boon: Tapping the Middle East Demographic Gift

Mon, 07 Jan 2008 14:30:00 -0500

Event Information

January 7, 2008
2:30 PM - 5:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

There are currently 100 million young people between the ages of 15 and 29 in the Middle East, the largest proportion of youth in the region’s history. Rather than being perceived as a problem and source of social and economic pressure, this youth bulge can and should be recognized as a demographic gift. With the right policies and enabling environment, young people in the region can be source of economic prosperity as well as positive social change.

On January 7, the Middle East Youth Initiative, a joint partnership of the Wolfensohn Center for Development at Brookings and the Dubai School of Government, presented recent research on how to improve the economic landscape for youth in the Middle East. New working papers on social exclusion, economics of marriage and the state of youth in Egypt, Iran and Syria were presenteded by a distinguished panel of experts, who also discussed the role of institutions in the Middle East and policy recommendations for how the region can leverage its large youth population.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20080107_youth

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Ragui Assaad

Regional Director, West Asia and North Africa at Population Council

Djavad Salehi Isfahani

Professor of Economics at Virginia Tech; Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Nader Kabbani

Director of Research, The Syria Trust

Hilary Silver

Associate Professor of Sociology, Brown University

Diane Singerman

Associate Professor at the Department of Government, American University

Too Poor for Peace?

Tue, 05 Jun 2007 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 5, 2007
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

In a world where borders are blurred and seemingly distant threats can grow quickly, the battle against global poverty has become a fight of necessity. Just as poverty leads to insecurity, the reverse is true. Yet what causes the damaging relationship between poverty and insecurity and what concrete steps can policy-makers take to help end the cycle and ensure security?

The Global Economy and Development program hosted a discussion of these issues with a discussion of a new book: "Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century." Leading foreign policy and development experts discussed the issues and explored working solutions to the challenge of global poverty and security. Lael Brainard, vice president and director of Global Economy and Development, introduced and moderated the forum. Panelists included: Jane Nelson, senior fellow and director of the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and nonresident senior fellow at Brookings; Susan Rice, senior fellow at Brookings; Tarik Yousef, dean of the Dubai School of Government and nonresident senior fellow at Brookings; and Jennifer Windsor, executive director of Freedom House.

View the related book >>

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20070605

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Jennifer Windsor

Executive Director, Freedom House

The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains: A Test of a Structural Model

Anders Olofsgard, Raj M. Desai and Tarik Yousef — Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an "authoritarian bargain" by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined.

We conceptualize this bargain as a simple, repeated game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic benefits and political rights are simultaneously determined according to the opportunity costs the regime faces in providing these "goods." Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising over 45 non-democratic states between 1984 and 1999 confirm the generality of the authoritarian-bargain thesis. The bargain, however, tends to break down in military or in highly-repressive dictatorships.

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Authors

Anders Olofsgard
Raj M. Desai
Tarik Yousef