Brookings: Experts - Thomas Wright

Europe on a Slippery Slope

Thomas Wright — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the International Herald Tribune.

Throughout the euro crisis, observers have been asking if the euro zone will disintegrate — as if it is a decision that will be made by its leaders at some point in the future. This holds out the prospect of a great historic choice: Europeans can choose to properly unite and overcome their crisis or they can choose dissolution. We wait with bated breath for the next summit or the latest “most crucial month in the euro’s history,” which now seems to come several times a year.

But, this may be the wrong way of looking at the euro crisis. Integration and disintegration are not just the products of deliberate decisions. They are both processes, set in motion by actions regardless of the stated intentions of leaders. Once underway, each process takes several election cycles — probably a decade or so — to reach completion. Only one will prevail in the end, but it is possible that in the early stages these two processes can coexist even as each vies for supremacy.

Looked at this way, the euro zone is in serious trouble. The events of the past six months are consistent with a process of disintegration, while the process of integration has steadily weakened. The question is no longer, “Will Europe unravel?” We should be asking, “Can European disintegration be reversed?”

The trigger that brought integration to a halt and set disintegration in motion is surprising. In July 2012, the European Central Bank chief, Mario Draghi, declared that he would do whatever it takes to save the euro, and in August he kept his promise by introducing a program of Outright Monetary Transactions to finance troubled member states, thus bringing down the price of sovereign debt. The temporary lull led José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, to confidently declare that “the existential threat against the euro has essentially been overcome.”

But Barroso could not have been more mistaken. The E.C.B.’s actions, while welcome, had a major unintended consequence. European governments became complacent and stopped pushing the policies needed to save the euro. The German government now believes that a quantum leap toward deeper fiscal and political integration through treaty change (the only way it could be done) is no longer necessary. At the December summit meeting, it was taken off the table. Instead, the Germans will push for incremental steps to increase coordination. Banking union has been watered down to the point where it is grossly insufficient. The euro zone is proposing a common supervisory mechanism, but banking debt will remain primarily a national concern.

The optimists say that the small steps the euro zone has taken are the first in a long journey, but this assumes that it will be easier to accomplish extraordinarily difficult goals later. Unfortunately, European politics are becoming polarized in a way that makes further progress unlikely. The core member states have run out of patience with the periphery and do not want to take on new commitments, such as a real banking union. Voters in the periphery are turning toward politicians who will say no to German austerity, as Italians recently demonstrated.

As integration stalled, the euro zone experienced its first major act of disintegration. The spectacularly botched rescue of Cyprus formally created a two-tier euro zone. Deposits are safer in Germany than in the periphery and this has enormous implications. We should expect large-scale capital flight if markets fear that other states will need a bailout. With capital controls in place, Cyprus itself is half in and half out of the single currency.

The next decisive moment may be when a member state on the periphery elects a government with a cast iron mandate to say no to a German government that has a cast iron mandate not to buckle. This almost happened in Greece in June of 2012, and it may yet happen in Italy in a couple of months. This could cause a withdrawal of E.C.B. support and an escalation that will lead to new acts of disintegration.

Winston Churchill once said: “It is not enough that we do our best; sometimes we have to do what’s required.” All European leaders should have this advice engraved onto a plaque and then affix it to their desks. Throughout the euro crisis, they have sought credit for good intentions and effort. They continually point out that the euro zone has moved far further and faster than anyone could have imagined before the crisis.

They are right, but it is completely irrelevant.

There are other forces at work and at the moment they are prevailing. Europe’s leaders need to be honest about the steps necessary to reverse a long spiral of disintegration. If they can’t do that, they need to ask how they can manage the process in the least damaging way possible.

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Image Source: © Kai Pfaffenbach / Reuters

UK's Euroscepticism Could Cost Britain Power

Thomas Wright — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The idea that Britain should use its influence to remake the European Union is not an unreasonable one. There is a strong argument that the EU is on an unsustainable path — the eurocrisis is creating a dangerous divide between the periphery and core, the eurozone is encroaching upon the EU, there is a yawning gap between the people and their leaders, and Europe has much to do if it is to be competitive in a world dominated by the US and China. Britain is a country with the diplomatic skill and heft to move the EU in the right direction.

Unfortunately, this idea is not on the table. What prime minister David Cameron has offered is a referendum that strikes many international observers as diplomatically irrational.

Regardless of the pros and cons of membership, the four-year wait till a vote is held creates immense uncertainty about the British economy and Britain's role in the world. Investment decisions, diplomatic engagements and countless other initiatives will be placed on hold as long as it is unclear whether Britain will be in or out.

However, there is an even greater risk with the prime minister's approach. It is much more likely to lead to an exit than his publicly stated position suggests. Cameron has promised a vote if he renegotiates the terms of Britain's membership with the European Union. This way, he can have it both ways — rail against the status quo, but claim he is in favour of membership.

By implication, he has not promised a vote if he is unable to renegotiate the terms of membership. This is a rather gaping loophole. From the perspective of the rest of the EU, the easiest path is to refuse to renegotiate — hence, no referendum and no risk of Britain leaving. And it appears as if this is exactly what is happening.

Read the full article »

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Thomas Wright

Publication: Politics.co.uk

Image Source: © Reuters TV / Reuters

Obama, Own Your Secret Wars

Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright — Sun, 17 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Irony pervades President Obama’s place in foreign policy today. He won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to roll back the nuclear bomb, the signature weapon of the 20th century, but he has also broken new ground in the use of revolutionary military technologies — from the armed drone to cyber weaponry — that may well become the signature weapons of the 21st century.

As the controversy continues about secret drone strikes and leaked legal documents, Obama promised in his State of the Union address last week to work with Congress to make the drone program, now shrouded in secret, more transparent.

But the problem is that a tipping point has already been reached, and it’s not just a matter of playing nice with Congress. A veil of official semi-silence surrounds these new technologies, the policy that guides them and their growing use in what can only be described as not-so-covert operations. When crucial information does come out, it’s most often through leaks to the press.

It is time for a new approach. And all that is required of the President is to do the thing that he does perhaps best of all: to speak.

Obama has a unique opportunity — in fact, an urgent obligation — to create a new doctrine, unveiled in a major presidential speech, for the use and deployment of these new tools of war.

Read the entire opinion piece at nydailynews.com >>

Authors

Publication: New York Daily News

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Neocons Versus Realists Is So 2008

Thomas Wright — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama may not say so explicitly in his State of the Union address, but his administration's foreign policy is poised to shift significantly in his second term. The shift is the result of an ongoing debate between two camps that I call "restrainers" and "shapers." Restrainers and shapers sharply disagree about the threats to the United States and this leads to very different views about how to engage the world -- and it may well lead to a division within the Democratic Party.

Restrainers see a crumbling infrastructure, the budget deficit, a subpar education system, and a sluggish economy as much more threatening than events elsewhere in the world. Democrats of this stripe call for "nation-building at home," to use President Obama's phrase, and want to prioritize these tasks at the expense of international commitments, which they see as a drain or a distraction. Republicans have their restrainers too. They eschew the notion of an activist government but also want to concentrate on the domestic tasks of reducing the deficit and restoring growth.

The shapers have a starkly different view. They agree that domestic challenges are important -- and should be the subject of a strong domestic policy agenda -- but they don't believe international difficulties are on the wane. The U.S. economy is in a slump largely because of a crisis prone international economic order. A new foreign economic policy that advances new free trade agreements and a more stable international structure is crucial but thus far lacking. On security, the United States is a global power and detrimental developments in the Middle East, East Asia, or Europe will severely damage U.S. interests. For instance, war between China and Japan would likely spark a new economic crisis and create the conditions for decades of instability in a crucial region. Any notion that the United States can take a sabbatical to tend to the home front is mistaken, the shapers argue.

Read the full article »

Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Cameron’s Speech Raises More Questions Than Answers

Thomas Wright — Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:00:00 -0500

British Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on the future of Europe promised a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union but it left more questions than answers.

Cameron says the referendum will take place after a renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership and that he will lead the yes campaign. But, this leaves a rather gaping loophole. If the renegotiation fails to deliver a satisfactory result, will he hold a referendum anyway and campaign for an exit? Such a promise was missing from the speech. If he does not intend to hold a referendum if renegotiation fails, then the rest of Europe is heavily incentivized to do nothing. After all, refusing to renegotiate means no referendum whereas renegotiating means a vote with a chance of British exit. In the coming months this will become increasingly apparent and Cameron will be under pressure to commit to leading an exit campaign if the renegotiation fails. Promising to lead an Exit Campaign if his demands are not met will significantly up the ante.
British leverage in the renegotiation comes from the prospect of exit. The uncertainty gives Britain bargaining power. Therefore, the Cameron government has an incentive to make exit a credible threat and to deliberately increase uncertainty. He will have to develop real and substantive plans for a British withdrawal. He may also have to mobilize public opinion against the status quo. If he avoids these steps, how does he propose to gain leverage in the negotiations? How will investors react to a strategy designed to unleash Euroskepticism and can the genie be put back in the bottle after a messy compromise?
Cameron’s speech ensures that Britain’s efforts will be dedicated to repatriating powers rather than shaping the next steps of European integration. Britain has traditionally been a powerful voice in favor of markets, competitiveness, and a strong alliance with the United States. How will Britain’s absence from the debate on further integration affect the direction Europe takes? The repercussions could be felt on everything from a Tobin Tax to the arms embargo on China. A related question pertains to Britain’s legitimate interest in protecting itself from the risk that Eurozone integration will damage the single market. It remains to be seen if this interest will be advanced or damaged by his referendum promise.
Cameron intends to fight the next election on his referendum promise. Will Labour take him up on his offer or, if Cameron’s position proves popular, will its leader Ed Milliband move closer to the Conservatives and promise a referendum of his own? Press reports over the past 24 hours suggest that Labour is divided and has not yet made up its mind. If Labour is backed into a corner and promises a referendum of its own, the conservatives are highly likely to end up on the exit campaign, thus exponentially increasing the risk of Britain leaving the European Union.
How will the United States react? In recent weeks, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Philip Gordon has made clear that the Obama administration favors Britain remaining in the European Union. Will the Obama administration go a step further and show that a British exit would damage the special relationship? Will it put some pressure on Germany and France to meet the British halfway? Finally, the British referendum may occur after President Obama leaves office. Republicans have traditionally been much more skeptical of the European Union. Some Republicans, like John Bolton, have openly rooted for the collapse of the Eurozone. If a Republican succeeds Obama, will he or she seek to give Britain a lifeline outside of the European Union, thereby increasing the likelihood of an exit?

David Cameron’s much heralded speech was somewhat half-baked. It raises new questions and it is not clear Cameron has the answers. He will come under pressure to clarify his position. Others also find themselves in the spotlight. The answers provided in coming months could dramatically escalate the standoff that now threatens to define European politics for the next four years.

Authors

Thomas Wright

Image Source: © Pascal Lauener / Reuters

An Obama Doctrine on New Rules of War

Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Obama administration has an opportunity — perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use tactics such as drones and cyber attacks. Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What are the key strategic goals and ethics that should drive development of drones and cyber systems?
When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification?
How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Peter W. Singer and Thomas Wright

Over the past four years, your administration worked hard to rollback one of the signature weapons of the 20th century, the nuclear bomb, which was one of the reasons why you were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet during this same period, the United States broke new ground in the use of new and revolutionary military technologies that may well become signature weapons of the 21st century.

There has been a game change in weaponry over the last several years, with a new generation of advanced technology that moves the point of critical human decision, both geographically off the battlefield and also, increasingly, chronologically away from the time of kinetic action. These encompass both physical systems, like unmanned aircraft (a.k.a. “drones”), and a new class of virtual weaponry, malware that can conduct a cyber attack with real world consequences.

The United States has been a leader in driving this revolution. Its military unmanned systems now number more than 8,000 in the air and 12,000 on the ground and are used daily in Afghanistan. The U.S. Cyber Command became operational in 2010 and military spending on cyber operations now measures in the billions of dollars.

At the same time, civilian intelligence agencies are increasingly using these technologies in a series of not-so-covert operations and so-called “secret wars” that have leaked into the press. There have been over 400 drone strikes into places like Pakistan and Yemen. The United States also deployed Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear development, the world’s first known use of a specially designed cyber weapon.

Such weapons seem advanced, but represent just the beginning. Technologies currently under development are far more effective and more autonomous, and capable of operating in a wider set of circumstances. We are at the onset of a decades-long technological revolution in warfare, comparable to the introduction of mechanization and airpower onto the battlefield or the advent of the atomic bomb.

Recommendation:

You now have an opportunity — and perhaps an obligation — to outline a doctrine that lays out criteria by which the United States will develop, deploy and use these weapons. The goal should be to establish a framework for how the United States believes the evolution of these revolutionary new technologies should proceed. The effort to set the terms of the future debate and create a doctrine for guidance should draw upon past lessons from comparable situations and culminate in a major presidential speech.

Background:

These new weapons have become a hallmark of this administration’s foreign policy for good reason. They offered new options for action that have proven more accurate and proportionate, and less risky than previously-available alternatives. They have repeatedly been used in successful operations that have saved soldiers’ lives, eliminated key terrorist leaders, and offered a much-sought-after third way to deal with Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the situation surrounding these once science-fiction, then highly covert weapons has changed. First, there has been a global proliferation. The United States is leading the way, but many follow. At the end of 2012, 76 other countries have military robotics programs and over 100 have cyberwar capabilities.

Second, the international discourse and debate over them has risen significantly, increasing external pressure on U.S. policy interests. These range from international controversy over the drone strike campaign and the appointment of a U.N. special rapporteur to new NGO campaigns to preemptively ban the next generation of technologies under development.

Finally, after years of silence, the U.S. government has started to make efforts to establish policies and engage in the growing debate. These range from speeches by your aides finally acknowledging the use of such technologies in a counter-terrorism context to lesser noticed workinglevel documents, such as an attempt to establish the policy for the next, far more autonomous generation. These have been very good starts but they have been disjointed and preliminary. Most importantly, they are missing the stamp of your voice and authority, which is essential to turn tentative first steps into established goals and policy. Much remains to be done, and, more importantly, said out in the open.

What Would the Big Bet Entail?

Armed with a new revolutionary weapon in the 1940s and 1950s, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations engaged in a series of comprehensive reviews to understand better the technology, its best doctrine of use, and likely impact on geopolitics and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. These doctrines were not binding for all time. Nor did they solve all the problems of the nuclear age. But, the efforts proved valuable. Setting nuclear doctrine in public molded the strategic environment for the better, not just against adversaries, but also in relationships with allies. The discussions also helped set the terms of the discussion both internationally and domestically, helping to introduce Congress and the American public to a world of powerful new technology and important new responsibilities.

Today, the United States should embark upon a similar effort around the new generation of weaponry. This endeavor should answer where it stands on the key questions emerging now and soon to become central, including:

• What are the key strategic goals and ethical guidelines that should drive development of these new technologies? Are there any limitations that should be established or areas of the technology that should be preemptively banned?

• Is current international law sufficient to cover the development and use of these new technologies, or are there emerging gaps that should be filled?

• What is the dividing line between the military vs. civilian intelligence agency use of such technologies? What distinguishes a covert action using these technologies from an act of war?

• What is the proper role for Congress vs. the Executive Branch? When is authorization required for the operational deployment of such technologies versus notification? Does the War Powers Resolution apply even in situations where no U.S. personnel are in harm’s way?

• Are there any key criteria for how the U.S. will similarly evaluate other nations’ use of the technology, including by potential adversaries?

• How does the United States plan to coordinate development and use doctrines with major U.S. allies?

• How does the United States ensure that technologies that limit physical risk to the operator do not numb us to the political consequences of their use?

There is a need to be realistic about what is possible. Much as with the early doctrines on nuclear weapons, the answers to these questions will not be set in stone. Rather, the goal is to set out a presidential level vision that will fill today’s gaps in the discourse and guide tomorrow’s policy.

Accessing the Downside:

There is a counterargument that it is better to say nothing, for fear of tipping off rivals, unilaterally tying U.S. hands, or that no initiative will work unless all other countries sign on, which they won’t.

That is a mistake. The less you say, the more that vacuum will be filled by others, in harmful ways. Having already used the technologies, but without proper elucidation, the precedents the United States sets may be exploited. Other states and non-state actors will use these technologies in far more crude and non-discriminatory ways, but claim to be merely following in U.S. footsteps. Finally, the debate will not stop simply because the United States is not part of it. International organizations will push ahead with investigations and propose new treaties, which, while likely ineffective, will nevertheless isolate the United States and drain our soft power. And on the home front, the original foundations of congressional and public support for many of the covert uses of these technologies could erode as the United States moves further away from 9/11. Indeed, the administration recently won a court case to maintain the veil of semi-silence that surrounds the drone strike program, but the judge described continuing the policy of denial as having an “Alice in Wonderland” feel.

Conclusion:

Beginning this discussion is a modest step with no budget costs, but entails a big bet with enormous advantages over the alternative of remaining silent. You would lay out your vision, helping both to guide internal policy development across multiple agencies as well as assuage genuine concerns at home and abroad. Most importantly, the voice of a respected commander in chief, with a strong expertise in the law, would create the foundations of an international norm, allowing the United States to build a large coalition of the like-minded on these issues, making it easier to identify and isolate those who depart from this norm. It will help maintain U.S. influence over the future of these technologies, even as they proliferate and evolve beyond our control.

By speaking out now, you will not just set the terms of the debate but steer it towards more positive ends. It’s the kind of effort for which leaders win Nobel Peace Prizes, again.

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The Big Bet: New Rules of War

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The Big Bet: New Rules of War

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Eurozoned Out

Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The euro crisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But risk of failure still remains and in turn could be devastating to the U.S. economy. Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How can the United States shape EU fiscal policies without being a member?
Why should the United States encourage the U.K. to remain a member of the EU?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright

The Eurocrisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But, the euro is not out of the woods yet. Real dangers remain. The underlying causes of the crisis have not been addressed. The politics are pulling in a different direction from that required for a solution. Populations on the periphery are suffering from austerity measures and see no end in sight. Those in the so-called core (Germany, Northern Europe) feel exploited. The Eurozone is building new structures but they may not be sufficient to protect it against a future major crisis.

As long as an optimal solution remains elusive, the risks of failure will remain. If failure occurs, it could be devastating to the U.S. economy, surpassing the crisis of 2008. Some estimates project that the collapse of the euro would cause an immediate 10 percent loss of GDP for the global economy, with unemployment in the European Union reaching 20 percent and spiraling inflation on the EU’s periphery. The United States and European Union are the two largest economies in the world and they are inextricably linked with each other through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial markets. For instance, 50 percent of U.S. FDI abroad goes to the European Union while 62 percent of FDI into the United States originates in the European Union. The rest of the world would also be adversely affected, particularly the Middle East and China, the world’s second largest national economy, both of which require robust growth to maintain domestic political stability.

A secondary but related danger is that the construction of a new Eurozone could lead to the fracturing of the European Union through a British withdrawal. The United Kingdom is extremely concerned that further integration in the Eurozone will damage its interests as an E.U. member. Public opinion also favors a renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership even though such a renegotiation would be strewn with difficulty and would likely fail. In this scenario, the Eurocrisis would remove America’s most reliable European ally from the EU and lead to a weakening of Europe’s capacity to act as a coherent unit in world affairs.

Recommendation:

The United States can neither compel the Eurozone to adopt particular structures nor do much to protect the Eurozone from a political backlash in austerity-stricken countries. However, the United States can perform an important service in two respects. You should task your administration with analyzing the risks associated with the EU’s plans for financial and fiscal integration and share these assessments in confidence with the EU’s leaders. If necessary, senior administration officials could go public to shape opinion in the financial markets and in European states. In the 1990s, Europeans built a flawed monetary union. Eurozone 2.0 may have new structural weaknesses that will be exposed by the next crisis, whenever that occurs. These weaknesses will undoubtedly be the result of political constraints in the member states. The United States has an important role in raising awareness of these risks so Eurozone 2.0 is as effective and robust as possible.

Second, you should take a position opposing the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. The United States can work with the United Kingdom and other members of the European Union to head off this possibility. Most importantly, the United States should emphasize the importance it places on having the United Kingdom inside the European Union, acting as a transatlantic bridge and strengthening Europe’s voice in world affairs. You should avoid any statements or policies that lead Britons to believe that an exit would result in a closer relationship with the United States that would offset any loss in influence. You should also consult closely with your European counterparts to ensure that the appropriate steps are taken to encourage the United Kingdom to remain a full member of the European Union.

If the black swan of a collapse of the Eurozone does occur, the risk of contagion in the global economy will be extremely high and it will be necessary to return to full crisis mode, as experienced in the fall of 2008, to do what is necessary to protect the financial system. This will be even more difficult than after the fall of Lehman Brothers because the collapse of the euro would create a shock of much greater scale and because the U.S. Congress may be reluctant to help foreign governments, even though it would be necessary to protect the U.S. financial system. Nevertheless, it will be your only viable option.

Background:

To understand the risks of a Eurozone collapse in the next four years, it is necessary to distinguish between the first phase of the crisis that concluded in 2012 and the second phase that has just begun. In the first phase, European governments had to decide whether to keep the euro intact or not. The key question amid market turbulence was whether the Eurozone would construct the mechanisms necessary to keep the periphery four (P4) — Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain — inside the single currency. These mechanisms were expensive and politically difficult. But, this is exactly what the Eurozone decided to do. With bailout mechanisms like the European Stability Mechanism and the Stability Treaty and bold action by the European Central Bank under the leadership of Mario Draghi, the Eurozone mitigated the most destabilizing elements of the crisis. This happened for a simple reason—every leader calculated that the risks of a fragmentation of the Eurozone massively outweighed any benefits.

The second phase of the crisis is different. The question of whether EU leaders want the Euro to remain intact has been settled. But, they now face two crucial challenges. First is the danger that political and economic accidents related to the current crisis will threaten the survival of the Euro. It will take some time to build a new Eurozone. During this period, much of the European Union will be in recession or experience stagnation. Member states will disagree strongly about the future course of action. Elections are likely to be fought on these issues and they could bring to power radical parties with rejectionist policies. The result may be a political crisis that leads to an inadvertent fracturing of the Eurozone followed by contagion and a disorderly collapse.

The issue of UK membership is a related component of this first challenge. Although it is not in the Eurozone, the United Kingdom feels threatened by further European integration. Both of the U.K.’s leading parties, the Conservatives and Labour, appear on track to offer the British people an inor- out referendum, following an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership.

The second challenge is that the Eurozone’s new structures may be insufficient to cope with a future crisis. European integration is the art of what is politically possible. But economies are not rewarded for trying hard. Their institutions need to function effectively under conditions of extreme duress. Monetary union without fiscal union was justified as the best that could be done given the political constraints and we know where that led. New structures bring new risk of design flaws, particularly in banking union, but also with respect to the perceived legitimacy of European institutions. A lack of democracy and accountability could lead to a political crisis down the road, especially if parts of the Eurozone are stagnant.

Conclusion:

A healthy global economy is a core interest of the United States. A stable and prosperous European economy is integral to that interest. For three years now, you have lived with the possibility that the collapse of the Eurozone could wreak havoc with the U.S. economy. You have also had to live with the fact that the United States has few options and no silver bullets. Quiet diplomacy and support has been your hallmark and it has been reasonably effective. You should not radically depart from this path but you should ensure it evolves to cope with the second phase of the crisis as outlined above. You should direct your administration to identify the potential vulnerabilities of reform proposals and to work with European governments, and others if necessary (public diplomacy aimed at the markets, multilateral efforts through the G-20), to prevent new failures of design. You should also use American influence to ensure that the United Kingdom remains within the European Union. These actions will reduce the probability of a black swan in Europe.

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President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 17, 2013
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

President Barack Obama begins his second term at a critical moment in world affairs, facing the many challenges that an unstable world—much of it in turmoil—presents. In response to these many challenges, Brookings Foreign Policy scholars have prepared a Presidential Briefing Book with memos to President Obama that detail the “Big Bets” that he should place in foreign policy, and the “Black Swans”—low probability, high impact events— that could unexpectedly dominate President Obama’s second term. The “Big Bets” include: a nuclear deal with Iran; a new approach to China; securing free trade agreements with Asia and Europe; outlining an Obama doctrine for the use and deployment of drones and cyberweapons; and establishing the United States as a leading energy exporter. The “Black Swans” include: a U.S.-China confrontation over Korea; revolution and war in China; the collapse of the House of Saud; the unraveling of the eurozone; the unraveling of the Palestinian Authority; and the impact of rising seas and climate change-related migration.

On January 17, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of “Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.” The first panel focused on the transformational policies that could shape a new global order. The second panel focused on the low probability, high impact events that might derail the president’s second term agenda. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. David Gregory, host of NBC’s Meet the Press, moderated both panel discussions.

Visit the Big Bets & Black Swans interactive map »

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President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

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Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress

Justin Vaïsse, Douglas J. Elliott, Domenico Lombardi and Thomas Wright — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 13:26:00 -0500

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Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting"

Thomas Wright — Wed, 29 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Last week I attended a workshop in Rio de Janeiro on the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), a Brazilian concept introduced in late 2011 to curb what it perceives as the excesses of the Responsibility to Protect. Over the course of the workshop, I had the opportunity to hear and interact with senior foreign policy officials and experts from Brazil, South Africa, India, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Here are some observations on the RWP concept (a subsequent post will discuss Brazilian foreign policy more generally).

The IBSA countries—India, Brazil, and South Africa—feel betrayed by the Western interpretation of the mandate it received under UNSC resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya. They realized it meant an initial series of strikes against Libyan air defenses but wanted the West to consider a settlement with Gaddafi after the initial strikes. They claimed to be shocked by the extension of the campaign into one of regime change. The West views Libya as a success of sorts, but IBSA sees it as a dramatic failure and warning.

IBSA officials complained, in particular, that their diplomats were treated dismissively throughout the operation and were left uninformed. This sense of personal humiliation at the hands of the P3 (the US, France, and the UK) appears to be the most significant proximate cause of RWP (although the official reason is the path of the intervention in Libya). The IBSA countries made it clear that they would be extremely reluctant to support any new R2P action in light of the Libyan experience.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

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Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Ho New / Reuters

Outlaw of the Sea: The Senate Republicans' UNCLOS Blunder

Thomas Wright — Tue, 07 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

When U.S. Senators Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.) and Rob Portman (R-Ohio), both vice presidential hopefuls, recently declared their opposition to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, they virtually guaranteed that it would be dead on arrival if it were sent to the Senate. A group of 34 senators, including Ayotte and Portman and led by Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), is now on the record promising to vote against UNCLOS, which is enough to make getting the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification impossible.

UNCLOS was first negotiated 30 years ago. But back then, U.S. President Ronald Reagan objected to it because, he argued, it would jeopardize U.S. national and business interests, most notably with respect to seabed mining. A major renegotiation in 1994 addressed his concerns, and the United States signed. Now, the U.S. Navy and business community are among UNCLOS' strongest supporters. So, too, was the George W. Bush administration, which tried to get the treaty ratified in 2007 but failed due to Republican opposition in the Senate.

Today's opponents, including Ayotte, DeMint, and Portman, focus on two issues. First, they argue, the treaty is an unacceptable encroachment on U.S. sovereignty; it empowers an international organization -- the International Seabed Authority -- to regulate commercial activity and distribute revenue from that activity. Yet sovereignty is not a problem: During the 1994 renegotiation, the United States ensured that it would have a veto over how the ISA distributes funds if it ever ratified the treaty. As written, UNCLOS would actually increase the United States' economic and resource jurisdiction. In fact, Ayotte, DeMint, and Portman's worst fears are more likely to come to pass if the United States does not ratify the treaty. If the country abdicates its leadership role in the ISA, others will be able to shape it to their own liking and to the United States' disadvantage.

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Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Affairs

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What if Europe Fails?

Thomas Wright — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in Summer 2012 issue of The Washington Quarterly.

The European Union is engaged in a ferocious political, diplomatic, and economic struggle to preserve the future of the single currency, the euro, and the viability of what has become known simply as ‘‘the project,’’ namely the process of integration that has been the bedrock of Western European politics for over half a century. It is distinctly possible that its members’ efforts may fail, either in the short or long term, and give way to an era of disintegration. Some have sounded the alarm: German Chancellor Angela Merkel famously remarked, ‘‘If the euro fails, Europe fails.’’ Former president Nicolas Sarkozy of France predicted, ‘‘If the euro explodes, Europe would explode. It’s the guarantee of peace in a continent where there were terrible wars.’’ Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski warned the euro’s collapse could cause an ‘‘apocalyptic’’ crisis. Harvard economist Dani Rodrik cautioned ‘‘the nightmare scenario would…be a 1930’s-style victory for political extremism.’’ After all, ‘‘fascism, Nazism, and communism were children of a backlash against globalization.’’ The erosion of democracy in Hungary and the rise in support for populist parties in Greece, the Netherlands, Finland, and France appears to some to be the beginning of the end.

Yet, verbal warnings from nervous leaders and economists aside, there has been remarkably little analysis of what the end of European integration might mean for Europe and the rest of the world. This article does not predict that failure will occur it only seeks to explain the geopolitical implications if it does. The severity and trajectory of the crisis since 2008 suggest that failure is a high-impact event with a non-trivial probability. It may not occur, but it certainly merits serious analysis. Failure is widely seen as an imminent danger, but even if this moment passes, it will remain a significant risk for some time to come.

Would the failure of the euro really mean the beginning of the end of democracy in Europe? Could the global economy survive without a vibrant European economy? What would European architecture look like after the end of European integration? What are the implications for the United States, China, and the Middle East? Since the international order has been primarily a Western construction, with Europe as a key pillar, would the disintegration of the European Union or the eurozone have lasting and deleterious effects on world politics in the coming decade?

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Thomas Wright

Publication: The Washington Quarterly

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The Greek Election and the Future of the Euro

Thu, 14 Jun 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 14, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Greek voters will soon head to the polls for the second time in six weeks after the May elections resulted in political gridlock. The fate of the eurozone is widely perceived to hang in the balance. Syriza, now the second largest party, is vying with New Democracy for first place and has promised to reject the terms of Greece’s EU bailout if it forms the next government. Germany has sent clear signals that it will require Greece to keep its international obligations. As a result, markets are bracing for turbulence after the new elections on June 17. The U.S. and European economies are so interdependent that a “Grexit” from the euro would have serious implications for the United States, potentially pushing it back into recession.

On June 14, Brookings hosted a discussion previewing the legislative elections and their implications on the eurocrisis. Panelists included: Vice President Kemal Derviş, director of Global Economy and Development at Brookings; Brookings Fellow Douglas Elliott; Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Daniel Speckhard, a former U.S. ambassador to Greece; and Desmond Lachman, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Brookings Fellow Thomas Wright moderated the discussion.

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Winning the 21st Century

Thomas Wright — Wed, 13 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Hardly a month goes by without another book or article on whether this century will be Chinese, American, or a free for all. It is a frustrating debate. These arguments all rely heavily on past performance and future projections—especially crude metrics like GDP growth and military spending. They often predict how other states will behave decades into the future when we know from history that intentions can change both from the bottom up and top down.

There is a pre-season mentality to much of this debate. In the pre-season, sports fans and pundits look at past performance and recent trades to predict who will win the Superbowl or the World Series. It’s an entertaining exercise but the favorites usually lose. The season is too long, too contingent upon performance, tactics, and strategy, to be determined by a few basic metrics. One thing is certain: it would be a foolish manager who accepted the pre-season noise as truth.

Accurate long-term predictions about geopolitics are impossible. We have no idea if the 21st century will see the continuation of the American era, a Chinese century, or a multipolar balance of power. All of these scenarios are plausible but it is a mistake to argue that they are inevitable or even likely. The 20th century is proof that geopolitics is inherently surprising. Its outcome was contingent upon strategic decisions, ideas, accidents, and personalities. In 1912, it was not obvious that the next eight decades would be an age of extremes, dominated by ideological movements, punctuated by vast industrial wars, and ultimately constrained by the threat of complete and mutual destruction. Nor was it obvious that the United States, a growing power whose people had little desire to seek global hegemony, would make the century American. There is no reason to believe that the human capacity for foresight has improved over time.

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Thomas Wright

Publication: Global Trends 2030

Greece's MAD Strategy

Thomas Wright — Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

On June 17, Greece faces its second national elections in six weeks. Alexis Tsipras, the 37-year-old leader of Syriza who wants to reject the terms of the EU bailout while remaining in the euro, has a serious shot of topping the polls. To some observers, defaulting on debt while staying in the Euro is a contradiction, but there is a clear strategic logic to Tsipras's position.

Tsipras believes his trump card is that Greece is too big to fail. So, rather than touting a graceful way out of the euro, he wants the prospect of a Greek exit to be as horrific and contagious as possible -- an economic cataclysm that would drag everyone else down, as well. Essentially, he is arguing that Greece and Germany exist in a state of Mutual Assured Destruction: Germany will never pull the plug on Greece regardless of what it does because the risk to itself is just too high. And if Tsipras can convince the Greek people of this, they may vote him in -- they'd get to have their cake and eat it too.

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Thomas Wright

Publication: Foreign Policy

Reviving American Leadership

Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright and Jane Esberg — Fri, 25 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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Editor's Note: The following is a Campaign 2012 policy brief by Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright and Jane Esberg proposing ideas for the next president on America’s role in the world. Strobe Talbott and John-Michael Arnold prepared a response arguing that political polarization in America is preventing the federal government from taking much-needed action on critical issues such as climate change and international security. Homi Kharas also prepared a response arguing that stark ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats mean the 2012 presidential election could have far-reaching impacts on America’s role in the world.

In April 2009 President Barack Obama announced: “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that Brits believe in British exceptionalism, and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism. . . . I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships.” Though Obama meant it as an endorsement of burden sharing, Republican candidates in 2012 have latched on to this comment, arguing loudly and often that not only is America special, but that conservatives believe this more than the president does.

In the eyes of former Republican candidate Rick Perry, “the exceptionalism of America . . . makes it the last best hope for mankind.” For Ron Paul, this “exceptional country” sets the example that “others will emulate.” Likewise, Herman Cain, Michele Bachmann, and Jon Huntsman have all remarked that America is an “exceptional nation.” Mitt Romney put it most cuttingly when he said that Obama “went around the world and apologized for America.”

While such rhetoric captures the headlines, what should be of greater concern is the likely effect of the 2012 election on U.S. foreign policy and the future of the U.S.-led international order. The next president—whatever his party—will face a series of domestic and international constraints that will press for the continuity of Obama’s policy, rather than significant change. In fact, there is already broad agreement on three principles concerning reform of the international order, advocacy for human rights, and the use of military force. Bipartisan support for these principles should be fostered and communicated to allies, enemies, and “swing states” alike. Building on that foundation, the next administration should

Concentrate on economic diplomacy designed to preserve economic openness, promote international trade, and correct financial imbalances that make the order crisis prone.
Foster a more just and stable international order. Where feasible, that means relying less on nondemocratic regimes and building ties with communities inside authoritarian states and states newly transitioning toward democracy.
Broaden and intensify efforts to form creative new multilateral arrangements in which emerging powers take on responsible roles, and efforts to enhance the credibility and efficacy of existing instruments.
Retain the option for credible use of force, but make more effective use of diplomacy, civilian engagement, and other forms of power and influence, so as to minimize the times and circumstances in which force is necessary. The new administration should therefore avoid cuts to the State Department’s budget and ensure that savings in the Defense Department are linked to a strategy designed to deal with future threats and challenges, with some burden sharing from new and old allies, where possible.
Strengthen and deepen America’s traditional alliances in Asia and Europe and develop new strategic partnerships.

The Progression in Obama’s Foreign Policy

When Barack Obama took office, he outlined three major foreign policy goals: “reestablish America’s standing in the world; create dialogue with friends, partners, and adversaries based on mutual respect; and work together in building partnerships.” Yet arguably the greatest foreign policy successes of the ensuing three years—the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki and the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi—rested not on American soft power but on the uses of hard power, applied unilaterally in two of the three cases. Moreover, two of the acts probably violated some elements of international law. This does not mean that his focus on engagement has been replaced, but that increasingly it has been balanced by overt and covert military action, coercive diplomacy, and a deepening of alliance commitments.

Such changes reflect a shift in Obama’s foreign policy vision resulting from the experience that just as American power is limited so too is the willingness of other states to cooperate. At the same time, Obama still seems open to forging an international order in which emerging powers take on greater responsibility, but as yet those powers do not seem ready for prime time.

Obama’s campaign platform of peace through diplomatic engagement and military restraint played off the post-Bush distaste for war. Just before announcing his candidacy, Obama called for a “strategy no longer driven by ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground and our interests.” Pragmatism also drove his policies of high-level engagement with allies and adversaries alike, including rogue regimes like those of Iran and North Korea. Thus high-level dialogue aimed at constraining and reasoning with governments meant in part tacitly supporting rogue or dictatorial regimes.

During the Green Revolution, for example, Obama avoided showing direct support for protestors for fear that it would backfire. In a 2007 debate, he called China “neither our enemy or our friend. . . . But we have to make sure that we have enough military-to-military contact and forge enough of a relationship with them that we can stabilize the region.” To promote dialogue, Obama publicly supported the One China initiative and postponed a visit with the Dalai Lama. He also called for “direct and aggressive diplomacy” to address the North Korean nuclear program. He was wary of using military force outside of addressing a direct national interest, saying in 2007 that he would not leave troops in Iraq even in the event of genocide: “if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now.” Thus above all else, stability and peace drove Obama’s foreign policy rhetoric.

By the early months of 2011, however, Obama’s goal of engagement with adversaries had shifted. The discovery of a secret nuclear facility in Qom, Iran’s refusal to negotiate, and the regime’s crackdown on the Green Revolution persuaded Obama to seek UN Security Council authorization for sweeping sanctions. These passed, even though the move alienated Brazil and Turkey, which were negotiating a fuel-swap deal with Iran. In the same period, China became increasingly assertive in the South China Sea, submitting claims to vast amounts of the maritime territory and harassing U.S. naval vessels on a surveillance mission. It also proved intransigent on discussions of nuclear weapons reductions. These moves would eventually result in Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia” in the winter of 2011. Engagement also failed to mend relations with North Korea, which unveiled an advanced uranium enrichment facility and began provocations against South Korea that included sinking its navy corvette Cheonan and shelling the coast. High-level talks seemed most effective in Russia, where Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) discussions created a new strategic reduction treaty and American concessions on missile defenses bought Russian support for sanctions on Iran and the cancellation of S-300 missile sales to Iran. Ironically, when discussing Russia during the campaign, Obama had supported “pushing for more democracy, transparency, and accountability” and called a “resurgent” and “aggressive” Russia “a threat to peace and stability.”

What changed was not Obama’s belief in America’s special role in the world but his understanding of how that must manifest itself, given that other states were not always willing to cooperate and differed from the United States in their perception of threats. As a result, Obama’s foreign policy shifted in three respects: it showed greater readiness to use America’s military reach, put greater emphasis on the United States leading the way in the design of new institutions, and intensified the focus on human rights and democracy abroad. Thus Obama sent troops into Pakistan without permission, in violation of Pakistani sovereignty, to conduct the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. He agreed to the assassination of al-Awlaki, an American citizen and al Qaeda operative, in Yemen. Iran’s nuclear timeline was delayed in large part because of likely U.S. or Israeli covert actions, such as use of the Stuxnet computer virus and probable assassinations of Iranian scientists and engineers. To reorient American power toward the Asia-Pacific, the United States announced that marines on rotation would operate from a base in Darwin, Australia, and that Washington would provide new littoral battleships to Singapore and naval support for the Philippines. To promote cooperation on issues of American interest, Obama spearheaded the creation of new global arrangements, including the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and the Open Government Partnership (OGP), and he also announced the creation of a U.S.-led economic framework for Asia. In addition, during Hu Jintao’s January 2011 visit, Obama twice referred to the need for China to improve its human rights record, and he repeated the sentiment in his speech to Australia’s parliament.

The deployment of resources to the Asia-Pacific and the use of drones has been called a form of “offshore balancing,” which in this context means greater reliance on air, sea, and naval power, a reduction in major troop presences in the greater Middle East, and fostering strategic regional alliances. The logic is that a step back from costly land-based commitments will provide the United States with additional options to achieve its geopolitical objectives. This position is hardly new. With intellectual roots in the cold war, Obama’s policies in many ways represent a return to tradition. What is novel about Obama’s version of offshore balancing is its moral dimension, which centers on America’s exceptionalism—including its respect for human rights—rather than just its hegemony. Although Libya was, after all, an exercise in U.S. and allied airpower, the strict realist interpretation of offshore balancing considers it a means to undermine any potential challengers. By contrast, Obama’s version also stresses ethical responsibility: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.” Even the development of new global arrangements like the NSS, GCTF, and OGP can be seen as a form of diplomatic offshore balancing, ensuring American interests while indirectly pressuring other governments to fall in line by building partnerships and setting global norms.

In this regard, the foreign policy actor that Obama most closely resembles may be James Baker, secretary of state to George H. W. Bush. Initially using traditional offshore balancing through deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia to protect Kuwait, Baker also pushed for direct Western intervention in the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis: “The only way to solve [the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina] is selective bombing of Serbian targets.” However, he balked at unilateral action, stating that the United States “cannot be the world’s policeman.” Baker effectively balanced American power, alliances, and international institutions to achieve national interests, and Obama has followed suit.

The Republican 2012 Debates

Despite ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan, tensions with Iran, regime transition in North Korea, the Arab Spring, the Eurocrisis, and America’s tense relationship with China, foreign policy has been a minor theme of the Republican primary debates. In fact, it was hardly mentioned in the numerous debates in the summer and fall of 2011. Even when several conservatives expressed concern about the exclusion of international issues from the contest and candidates held two national security debates in response, one received only an hour of live televised time and was relatively lackluster, while the other concentrated on Iran and terrorism-related issues. The second debate also veered throughout into domestic politics—such as entitlement reform and immigration—and had no discussion of Asia or the European crisis. Despite Egypt’s second wave of protests in Tahrir Square, which coincided with the first round of its elections, the Arab Spring was only touched on at the very end.

The debates reflected the substance and style of the primary campaign as a whole. Whenever foreign policy realities—the Arab Spring, Libya, Europe—intruded, the candidates’ positions were underdeveloped and subject to change. One candidate, Herman Cain, managed to dominate the news cycle for several weeks despite committing several major foreign policy gaffes, including not knowing that China had nuclear weapons, promising to release all prisoners in Guantánamo in exchange for U.S. prisoners held by the Taliban or al Qaeda, and being unable to offer a view about the Libya intervention. This was less significant for what it said about Cain than about primary voters’ lack of interest in a candidate’s foreign policy views. Of all the candidates, only Mitt Romney ever had anything approaching a foreign policy infrastructure similar in size and scope to that of John McCain or the two top Democratic contenders of 2008.

In the absence of a substantive debate or conversation on foreign policy, the candidates engaged the issues of national security and foreign policy rhetorically and by invoking themes that resonate with the base—notably that of American exceptionalism and Obama’s penchant for underplaying it. When a May 2011 article in the New Yorker by Ryan Lizza included a quotation from an unnamed White House official describing the president’s strategy on Libya as “leading from behind,” GOP candidates immediately jumped on this statement and returned to the theme in the fall. Issues that seem compatible with the narrative of Obama the naïve appeaser (on Iran and Russia) are embraced, and inconvenient facts (such as covert activities against Iran) are ignored. Issues that do not lend themselves to the narrative—such as Obama’s Asia strategy of balancing China—are avoided entirely. The harsh criticism is of a general nature and fails to provide substantive arguments on major issues such as the Arab Spring, counterterrorism, the European crisis, or the intervention in Libya.

When the Republican candidates have focused on foreign policy, they have conceived it narrowly and in 2004 terms, focusing on terrorism, Iran’s nuclear weapons, and sovereignty. America’s broader role in the world—particularly in such regions as Asia and Europe—has been given short shrift. For example, Romney’s foreign policy speech made no mention of any of America’s Asian allies, even though it emphasized a commitment to alliances. Only Israel and the United Kingdom made the cut. Not only have the candidates not offered policies to deal with the international dimension of the financial crisis, they have shown little sign of understanding it at all. On other transnational issues, such as climate change and foreign aid, the Republican position has weakened since the Bush administration, as made clear during the second GOP foreign policy debate when Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense during the Bush administration and a leading hawk, implicitly admonished the candidates for proposing to cut aid to Africa. Grand strategy appears to have contracted as well. Bush made the promotion of democracy and freedom the central pillar of his worldview, but with the exception of Rick Santorum, no candidate for 2012 has taken up his banner. Indeed, the Republican notion of the national interest and security has shrunk considerably since George W. Bush left office.

What is more, though seemingly united in their criticisms of Obama, the Republican Party is sharply divided on its view of America’s role in the world. Henry Kissinger once wrote, “It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day.” While accusing Obama of Wilsonianism, the Republican foreign policy line itself has proved confused, split between three separate—and often contradictory—strains of thought: machoism, isolationism, and engagement. These correspond very roughly to the Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, and Hamiltonian foreign policy traditions. Most candidates incorporate at least two such concepts into their rhetoric, though all reveal a different vision of what it means for America to be exceptional.

Perhaps the clearest offshoot of exceptionalism is American machoism, which implies that by grace of its strength the United States can shape the rest of the world into what it wants. Saber-rattling on Iran has been its most overt sign in the debates, as well as in Romney’s call for increased military spending. However, this current machoism is more expansive than its Jacksonian roots: while similarly uncompromising and lacking a moral dimension, it has developed a cockiness about the nation’s ability to promote its interests short of force. Newt Gingrich, for example, stated that the United States needs to start “taking back” the United Nations and to refuse engagement with the “terrorist” Palestinian Authority. Romney denounced the “reset” of relations with Russia as “caving in” to demands on Iran. Such comments essentially argue that the United States can have its way in any scenario—and that President Obama simply hasn’t been demanding forcefully enough.

If this machoistic rhetoric seems like a natural extension of exceptionalism, it is also reminiscent of Bush’s policies, so the candidates have almost universally tempered it. To avoid the appearance of warmongering, they have balanced it with a Jeffersonian emphasis on avoiding “entangling alliances.” Current Republican isolationism rests on two beliefs: first, that America is “exceptionally” self-sufficient and thus does not need to engage extensively to preserve its own security; and second, that engagement weakens America by draining its resources. Foreign aid in particular rankles isolationists. Rick Perry promised to drop all aid to zero and to reevaluate whether recipients “deserve” it, a proposition with which Gingrich agreed. He also promised a “very serious discussion of defunding the United Nations.” Gingrich called for the suspension of UN funding in response to the vote on Palestinian statehood. None of the candidates espousing such arguments have explained how this foreign policy vision takes into account the realities of an interconnected global economy.

However, some Republicans favor a Hamiltonian emphasis on engagement to promote American interests, in close alignment with Obama’s foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, Jon Huntsman became the symbol for this strand of Republican thought, supporting talks with China, Pakistan, and other key states in the interest of U.S. security. Romney, too, thinks the United States should “employ all tools of statecraft” and “exercise leadership in multilateral organizations.” Though recently critical of the United Nations, even Gingrich encouraged the United States to increase funding for certain UN programs when cochairing a 2005 task force on UN reform for the United States Institute of Peace. In the debates, Michele Bachmann and Rick Santorum stated that staying engaged with Pakistan is of vital importance to U.S. security.

Most candidates avoided embracing any single policy strain fully: machoism too closely aligns with Bush’s Iraq invasion, isolationism too clearly ignores the transnational threats the United States still faces, and engagement too closely echoes Obama. With the exception of Ron Paul and Jon Huntsman, the candidates have pieced together parts of multiple lines, with somewhat schizophrenic results. In one breath, Romney states the United States should “embrace the challenge . . . not to crawl into an isolationist shell,” in another that it “ought to get the Chinese to take care of the people [in need of humanitarian aid].” That is to say, America—strong as ever—should lead, but why not let someone else do it. Such competing policies are highly suggestive of an actual Republican administration’s stance.

Facing Reality

The Republicans have strived to differentiate themselves from Obama, but part of the reason for the inconsistencies in their foreign policy line lies in the evolution of his thinking. Defining an “Obama Doctrine” is a challenge. He is not an interventionist (in Sudan and Congo), except where he is (in Libya and in Uganda in a small way). He addresses threats cooperatively (in the Nuclear Security Summit), except when he doesn’t (in the bin Laden raid and allegedly in the case of the Stuxnet attack on Iran). He calls for democracy (in the Middle East), except when he by and large stays silent (on Russia). He does not fit neatly into a realist or an idealist box. Obama has evolved to a position that might be termed ethical offshore balancing. While, as Walter Russell Mead has argued, he campaigned on Wilsonian-Jeffersonian ideals, he has developed a hybrid Wilsonian-Hamiltonian foreign policy.

Any candidate will face a number of foreign policy challenges and have limited policy options to manage them. China’s growth and influence are a fact of life: hard containment is at odds with the reality of U.S.--Chinese economic entanglement, but allowing China unfettered dominance of Asia is hardly a viable or desirable option either. Obama’s balancing effort contains most of the right notes, and it is hard to see how any Republican president might differ substantially from Obama’s eventual position on this. Brazil and India are playing an increasingly important role in the global order, and the United States must find ways to engage them or else risk alienating important regional players and leaving their potential contributions to a stable order on the table. But equally, no American president in the foreseeable future is going to offer these countries anything like a veto over American foreign policy programs (or a veto in the UN Security Council). The shaky economic foundations of the global financial system need urgent attention, and it is striking to recall that it was George W. Bush—hardly America’s greatest multilateralist—who authorized the most important expansion of International Monetary Fund (IMF) powers in recent times to deal with the global financial crisis. Obama has continued strengthening the IMF, and although no Republican candidate has mentioned the IMF explicitly, Gingrich’s and Romney’s foreign policies seem unlikely to radically change the stance at the IMF or in the G20. Neither isolationism nor machoism addresses the reality that the United States has clear and important stakes in the global economy that make it vulnerable to the actions and behaviors of other nations. Similarly, transnational threats mean isolationism is not an option.

Hints of the same basic policies can already be seen in the Republican field. The most developed foreign policy statement of any of the Republican campaigns came in a Romney speech, and its parallels with Obama’s foreign policy are striking. On major doctrinal matters—including the use of military force, advocating for human rights, and reforming the international order—the positions are similar.

Indeed, many on both sides of the aisle believe that a healthy global economy is integral to a functioning and effective international order. The next administration should intensify its economic diplomacy to preserve economic openness, foster international trade, and correct financial imbalances that invite crisis. Many would also agree that the United States has a unique role both in fostering a stable international order and in promoting justice and dignity. As mentioned earlier, America should rely less on autocratic regimes and more on building ties with communities inside authoritarian states and those moving toward democracy. These are better achieved through quiet policy than declarative rhetoric, given the inevitable reality that there will be important exceptions—as in the case of Saudi Arabia.

Equally important, U.S. power and security need to be embedded in multilateral institutions and alliances. The next administration should intensify U.S. efforts to foster such arrangements and encourage emerging powers to take on responsible roles, and to enhance the credibility and efficacy of existing instruments.

As also mentioned earlier, the credible use of force must remain an option, although the emphasis should be on more effective use of diplomacy, civilian engagement, and other forms of power and influence. It is therefore vital to keep the State Department budget at its current level and to ensure that savings to the Defense Department’s budget are linked to strategies to deal with future threats and challenges and to make sure that allies and partners will share some of the burden, where possible. In its relations with China, the next administration should aim to retain a judicious blend of efforts to balance and efforts to engage. As a new generation of leadership takes over in Beijing, it will be important to communicate the resolve to balance China’s regional muscle and a desire to see China succeed at economic growth, social development, and gradual political liberalization.

For now, the Republican candidates tend to favor continuity in their general worldview, although some may diverge on climate change and arms control. Whichever party finds itself occupying the White House in January 2013, America’s international order strategy seems likely to be shaped not by minor differences between the two parties but by the twin realities governing present times: American reliance on the global economy and global reliance on American power.

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Meet the GUTS: The Rise of Germany, the United States, Turkey, and South Korea

Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Friday's G-8 summit at Camp David may seem something of an oddity -- an archaic reminder of a time before the rise of the BRICs and the supposed decline of the Western powers. But the West is still very much alive and kicking -- and, driven by its most dynamic members, has a chance of remaining on the top of the heap for the foreseeable future.

The West is not in decline, at least not in its entirety. Rather, the financial crisis has created a two-speed West. Four large countries -- Germany, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States -- are actually increasing their international influence, while the others are stuck in a rut.

Ironically, America's obituary as a great power has repeatedly been written over the past three years even as it has grown stronger on multiple fronts. U.S. influence in Asia has risen at a rapid clip since 2008, driven largely by regional anxiety about Chinese assertiveness. The United States deepened its traditional alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. It developed strategic partnerships, including with the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in ways that were previously unthinkable. Paradoxically, Chinese economic growth has weakened its own geopolitical position and benefited the United States. Such are the ways of world politics.

The United States is rising in other areas too. On national security, the U.S. position is also stronger than it has been in many years. The U.S. military and intelligence services have shown impressive dynamism in bringing al Qaeda to the brink of total defeat, something many analysts believed unlikely only a few years ago. The Pentagon has been at the forefront of the drone and robotics revolution, which may give it an edge in 21st-century conflicts. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats have developed innovative new means of international cooperation, notably with the Nuclear Security Summit and the Open Government Partnership.

America's greatest vulnerability remains its weak economy. Significant challenges lie ahead, but it is worth noting that the United States has significantly outperformed the eurozone and has better prospects for growth than most other Western states. It remains a hub of innovation: Just consider the rise of social media and the technology-driven exploration for shale gas. Over the long term, the fiscal challenges confronting the United States must be weighed against the very real -- and very underestimated -- internal strains on the Chinese and Indian economies.

It's not just the United States that is propping up the West. Germany stands apart as a rising power amidst a weakened Europe. Its unemployment rate is at a post-Cold War low and its timely market reforms have allowed it to export its way out of the recession. The euro crisis is Germany's greatest challenge but, ironically, it has also made Germany the continent's preeminent diplomatic and geoeconomic power: For better or worse, Chancellor Angela Merkel's government has won argument after argument about the future direction of the EU, often despite deep reservations from other member states. Francois Hollande's election in France will complicate but not erode Merkel's position. And even if she loses power next year -- an unlikely prospect despite her recent setbacks in regional elections -- a different German leader will continue to profit from Germany's economic strength within Europe.

In East Asia, South Korea's strong economic performance since the financial crisis led some analysts to argue it should be added to the BRICs, but as one of America's oldest and most reliable allies, it belongs in the West's column. It has become a powerhouse of high-end manufacturing and is on course to become richer than Japan in per capita terms within the next five years. Internationally, South Korea responded robustly and responsibly to North Korea's aggression by strengthening the alliance with the United States and embarking upon controversial defense cooperation with its old enemy, Japan. It has also taken an active role in upholding the international order, hosting the G-20 summit in 2010 and the nuclear security summit in March.

Turkey, a longstanding U.S. ally and NATO member, is the fourth member of the rising West. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed Turkey into a regional powerhouse -- its economy has more than tripled under his watch, registering growth rates on par with China. After years of eschewing its Muslim identity, Turkey is emerging as a model, albeit an imperfect one, for Islamic democrats in the Arab world. Turkish assistance is indispensable in dealing with the Syrian crisis, and its diplomats play a pivotal role in mediating international negotiations with Iran. Yes, the new Turkey has a tendency to chart its own path -- but even if Erdogan is often at odds with other NATO members, Turkey represents a bridge from the West rather than an island apart from it.

But even as these four countries have expanded their influence, the West is also hobbled by four countries that have yet to recover from the financial crisis: Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. All suffer from lower growth rates than the rising West and, unlike the United States, they have not compensated for economic weakness with bold advances in other areas. Britain and France tried to take the initiative with the Libya intervention, but the war merely illustrated their yawning technological shortcomings, and showed how heavily NATO allies rely on U.S. airpower.

Britain has the best chance to join the rising West if it can turn its economy around. Its leadership of the G-8 next year offers an opportunity to demonstrate some of its old flair for global leadership, especially if it takes creative steps to reach out to dynamic new players like Turkey and Indonesia. Another state, Australia, is between the two Wests -- it avoided a recession after the fall of Lehman Brothers but has not had the impact of a rising power in recent years. However, its geographical position, close security relationship with the United States, and vast energy supplies means it is likely to become more influential in global politics.

The rising West is a force to be reckoned with. It is no coincidence that U.S. President Barack Obama has been closer to the leaders of his fellow rising Western states than to the leaders of the rest; he named South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and Erdogan as two of his closest international allies. (He appears not to be as close personally to Merkel but Germany's centrality in the euro crisis means he is in constant contact with her.)

So don't write off the West yet. The rising powers in the developed world will not always agree, but when they do they will be hard to resist. And they will be important interlocutors for the BRICS as they engage the Western order. Unfortunately, Friday's G-8 summit is unlikely to harness their power -- Turkey and South Korea's leaders are at home.

Perhaps these rising powers need an acronym if they are to be taken seriously. Is it time for the BRICS to meet the GUTS of the West

Authors

Why the Tea Party Is in the European Mainstream

Thomas Wright — Tue, 21 Feb 2012 15:02:00 -0500

Europe is the punching bag of the Republican primary campaign. No one has punched it harder and more frequently than Mitt Romney, the favourite for the party’s presidential nomination, who said in his victory speech after the Florida primary that this White House reflects “the worst of what Europe has become.” For Mr. Romney, the presidential election will pit a candidate who fervently agrees with European governments against one who is adamantly opposed to them.

Mr. Romney was only wrong on one thing—the identity of the party that lines up with Europe. The new transatlantic divide cuts along unfamiliar lines.

Europeans like President Barack Obama personally, support a state role in healthcare and are more at ease with Democrats culturally. However, on the major international issues of the day, Europe’s most powerful leaders are now aligned with the Republicans.

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Authors

Thomas Wright

Publication: Financial Times