Brookings: Experts - Tamara Cofman Wittes

Syria, the U.S., and Arming the Rebels: Assad’s Use of Chemical Weapons and Obama’s Red Line

Fri, 14 Jun 2013 18:30:00 -0400

Following confirmation that the Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria, the Obama administration may send small arms, ammunition and potentially anti-tank weapons to the Syrian rebels. As the United States weighs its options, Foreign Policy at Brookings experts assess the situation in Syria and the Obama administration’s options going forward.

Tamara Wittes
Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

“Having apparently made the decision to provide lethal support to the Syrian opposition, the Obama administration must still make clear its ultimate interests and objectives. If the goal is limited to addressing the military imbalance to make way for a negotiated settlement, I fear they may be disappointed. For Assad, this is an existential struggle and the fighting will likely intensify. In addition, the more the sectarian aspect of the conflict deepens, the more existential the fight will be for Syrians on all sides of the conflict. The likely and unintended result? Making a negotiated peace very hard to achieve and creating a situation where the post-conflict phase will demand an intensive international presence.”

Michael Doran
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

“President Obama has been extremely reluctant to get involved in Syria. But the combination of chemical weapons, pressure from allies, including the British and French, and the recent victories on the battlefield by Hezbollah have forced the president’s hand. In addition, there was a growing awareness in Washington that the Geneva II conference, the flagship of America’s Syria policy, would never take place without a greater commitment by the United States to strengthening the rebels.

“It remains to be seen, however, exactly what the United States has in mind when it says it will increase “the scope and scale” of aid. Leaks to the media suggest that this aid includes weapons, but as of yet we have no clear idea of exactly what the president has in mind. The provision of weapons alone is unlikely to drastically change the balance of power on the ground. What is needed, at a bare minimum, is a robust program of training and equipping the opposition, coupled with significant support in the areas of strategic planning, intelligence, and logistics. It is doubtful if at this stage the administration is considering such a broad package.”

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

“Regime change is the only way to end this conflict. And to go further, the United States wants this regime to fall. By comparison, regime change in Egypt was the right thing to support diplomatically and in terms of U.S. values, even though we were betraying an ally nonetheless. It was also a big strategic risk, but an important one to take. In the case of Syria, however, the U.S. would be undermining an enemy. The Obama administration has been slow to recognize that difference and has shown a preference for pursuing stability instead of making a full commitment to regime change.

“In addition, I increasingly worry that the opposition will turn on itself, should it ever start to truly triumph. Its inability to unify after over two years is staggering. At the height of the Libyan revolution, many in the U.S. administration complained about how poorly united the Libyan opposition was. Now Obama officials are saying, ‘if only the Syrians could be like the Libyans,’ reflecting how low the expectations have become for the opposition forces. If nothings else at this point, the U.S. needs to arm and train the Syrian rebels in order to create a stable post-Assad Syria. After Assad falls, there may be a fight among the opposition forces, and I would think the Obama administration would want someone who is not Jabhat al-Nusra to take power.

“It may be too little, too late in terms of really affecting the military balance or, for that matter, scoring points with the Syrian people who will wonder why it took 90,000 dead for the United States to become more involved in the conflict. And as in Libya, the administration seemed to have waited until the forces it is backing are losing before becoming directly involved. But only by becoming involved can the U.S. help manage spillover of the conflict in the wider region and enable the U.S. to deal with a post-Assad Syria.”

Shadi Hamid
Fellow and Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center

“By itself, arming the Syrian rebels is unlikely to tip the balance in their favor. It might have made a difference a year ago, but, today, the Assad regime - particularly after re-taking Qusayr - has the advantage. With that, it is no surprise that Assad seems as confident as ever and, put another way, that the rebels are losing. At this point, a much more concerted effort is required for the Syrian rebels to regain momentum. That effort likely now would have to include the use of surgical airstrikes and the establishment of no-fly and no-drive zones.

“It is worth putting the Obama administration's decision into perspective. The U.S. will provide small arms and ammunition but not the more advanced weaponry that the rebels have been practically begging for. So not only is this a half-measure, it's a particularly weak half-measure. I worry that the Obama administration is doing this largely because of domestic and international pressure, and not because there's any real strategic vision or a re-think of what its wants to accomplish in Syria.”

Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project
Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence

“The United States is about to start arming and training the Syrian rebels fighting to overthrow the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. If done well, this move can end a bloody civil war. If done poorly, it could lead to disaster. Will Obama and his team do the right thing?”

“It turns out Afghanistan of the 1980s is a terrific test case for how to handle the Syrian rebels. The Afghan mujahedin then and the Syrian rebels now both seem incapable of forming a broad national consensus or an effective united political and military organization. Both have a significant component of hard-core Islamist extremists in their midst who are fundamentally opposed to American interests. But both also have a legitimate cause that deserves our support. The issue is how to help wisely.”

Read Bruce Riedel's full op-ed on The Daily Beast website »

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Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

Unrest in Turkey: Assessing the Causes and Impact of the Protests

Thu, 06 Jun 2013 16:00:00 -0400

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June 6, 2013
4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EDT

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Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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Last week police in Istanbul raided the encampment of a group of activists opposed to the destruction of a well-liked public park and the construction a new shopping mall in its place. The police’s harsh assault on the demonstrators with tear gas and water cannons backfired, however, and ignited a rapidly-escalating, nationwide protest with calls for the resignation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The unprecedented expansion of the demonstrations and riots suggests that the outburst of anger and opposition is fueled by more than a simple determination to save a green space in central Istanbul. For many Turks, the unrest appears to be a reaction to the perceived autocratic leanings of the prime minister and resistance to the direction of Turkish democracy, freedom of expression, and the role of religion in society.

On June 6, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to assess the underlying causes of the recent protests and their likely impact on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. Panelists included Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci, Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taşpınar, Henri Barkey of Lehigh University, and Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center, moderated the discussion.

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Tunisia's Democratic Future: An Address by Rached Ghannouchi

Fri, 31 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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May 31, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

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Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
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In Tunisia, where the Arab awakening began, the move toward a more open society is experiencing growing pains. Economic pressures exacerbated by the revolution and the war next door in Libya, extremist violence, and the country's deep divisions over drafting its new constitution all present pressing challenges to Tunisia’s democratic transition. Will the country that kicked off the Arab revolutions continue to inspire the region's drive toward democracy? What can Tunisian approaches to resolving political conflicts and reconciling Islamism and democracy teach us about the prospects for successful transitions elsewhere in the Arab world?

On May 31, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Rached Ghannouchi, co-founder and president of Tunisia's Nahda Party, for a special address on the future of Tunisian democracy. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. Following Ghannouchi’s remarks, Saban Center Director and Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes moderated the discussion and included audience questions.

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Tunisia's Democratic Future: An Address by Rached Ghannouchi

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Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East

Thu, 23 May 2013 17:29:00 -0400

On August 28-29, 2012, the Saban Center at Brookings and the United States Central Command brought together analysts, officers, and policymakers to discuss the new and enduring challenges facing the United States in the Middle East.

The conference, Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East, explored security developments in key countries of the region, focusing on those issues where the risks and opportunities for the United States are the greatest.

General James N. Mattis, then CENTCOM’s commander, delivered opening remarks, and the Honorable Michèle Flournoy, formerly the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, deliver a keynote address. The conference also featured experts from the Middle East as well as senior American analysts and officials. Together, the speakers and conference participants offered insights that went well beyond conventional Washington wisdom and provided valuable lessons and ideas for the U.S. military and policy community.

The proceedings from this conference include summaries of the sessions and the full text of Dr. Flournoy’s keynote address.

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Beyond the Arab Awakening: A Strategic Assessment of the Middle East

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The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

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Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

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Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

A Preview of the 2013 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 06 May 2013 12:35:00 -0400

We’re just a month away from the tenth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which will take place in Doha on June 9-11. The Forum will feature discussions of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relationship between political reform and economic development, and international responses to the crisis in Syria. We will also host sessions on the role of arts and culture in societies emerging from conflict, and the evolution of Arab identity.

As always, our Forum will include four expert working groups to consider some crucial issues: advancing women's political participation, the role of faith based leaders in diplomacy, freedom of speech within Muslim communities, and promoting inclusive development in Egypt and Tunisia.

See a preview of this year's forum here:

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Preview of the 2013 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

If you won’t be with us in Doha, you can join our conversations online. To get an idea of what’s in store, please view our website— where there are findings and recommendations from our working groups last year—or watch our video highlights from last year’s forum entitled, “New Voices, New Directions,” below:

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U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

We recently engaged Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani in a conversation on the key questions about Qatar’s diplomatic, economic, and political role in the region. I invite you to listen to the discussion with Sheikh Hamad, moderated by Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk.

Keep checking this space for updates on the upcoming forum, as we post videos previewing the lively discussions to come. Follow us on Twitter or tweet your own ideas with the hashtag #usislam13.

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Women in a Changing Middle East: An Address by Under Secretary of State Tara Sonenshine

Thu, 04 Apr 2013 11:00:00 -0400

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April 4, 2013
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Click here to watch the event online at cspan.org.

As Arab citizens struggle to rewrite the rules defining their societies, the role and status of Arab women is a sharp focus of debate. Arab women have been at the forefront of change, but have also faced unprecedented challenges. How central is women’s empowerment to the success of Arab societies, and how important are women’s rights in the struggle for democracy? What is the U.S. doing to help Arab women (and men) to advance women and girls in their societies?

On April 4, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Tara Sonenshine for an address on women in the Middle East. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate a discussion with Under Secretary Sonenshine after her remarks.

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Women in a Changing Middle East: An Address by Under Secretary of State Tara Sonenshine

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Brookings Experts on Netanyahu’s New Coalition Government in Israel

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:59:00 -0400

Yesterday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled his new coalition government, seven weeks after his re-election. Following deadlocked negotiations, a slimmer government—with just 21 members—emerged and will be Israel’s first without ultra-Orthodox parties since 2005. Netanyahu’s announcement comes just days before President Obama is scheduled to visit the country. Martin Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, and Natan Sachs weigh in on the new coalition, and analyze the effect on the Middle East peace process.

Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Benjamin Netanyahu starts his new term as Prime Minister in a weakened position after he conceded essentially to all of Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid's demands (even yielding on education minister at the last minute) and still not getting an agreement for another week.

Lapid as finance minister, and Yesh Atid holding education and welfare, puts them in a strong position to fulfill campaign promises and position Lapid for greater gains in the next election. Indeed, the next election seems his primary concern. For Lapid, the peace process is not a priority issue.

Bayit Yehudi, for its part, received ministerial positions for Jerusalem, Diaspora, and religious services, all key for its constituency. A former head of the settler council, Uri Ariel, will run the ministry of housing and construction. No one expects this government to last a full term. Scenarios raised are either that it won't pass a budget or that Netanyahu will stymie Lapid so badly that it will drive him out of the coalition, allowing Netanyahu to bring in the religious parties and to shape the government he wanted all along. The latter could, I believe, only strengthen Lapid in new elections.

Aryeh Deri notwithstanding, the Haredis' attitudes on territorial compromise have changed. Netanyahu may not be comfortable with the status quo in Israel's relations with the Palestinians, given the price in international isolation and the harm to trade and relations with Europe. But beyond making some gestures, it's not clear how much he is willing to do. And with or without the Haredim, his coalition will not push him in a conciliatory direction.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

If the U.S. pushes Netanyahu on anything serious (not likely), then the coalition will fall, because Bennett will not be able to support. Which leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: you really need the ultra-Orthodox parties in the government to support serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues, because those parties give the government an extra margin of support.

I predict a short life for this coalition. This strikes me as a government in which everybody will be jockeying for position in the next election right away. The big issue will be Haredim in the military, and that will be very divisive.

Israelis love to complain about the Haredim, it's true, and everybody thinks they have gone too far. However, the secular-religious fight that is going to open up will be brutal. It's the biggest fault line in the society, and once the religious start hammering away at this government, I think we will see lots of cracks open up quickly—on lots of different issues.

The territorial questions are not central to the Haredim’s political identity and their participation in a government gives the prime minister more room to maneuver. They do not facilitate, and they have obstructionist tendencies, but they help to create an environment that is more propitious than what we get without them, which we see before us now. To me, it's a great irony of Israeli politics that I never contemplated before now.

Martin Indyk
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program

The Haredim issue will not divide the government, but I don't doubt it will divide society. However, the bark is always worse than the bite in Israeli politics.

The proposition that the ultra-Orthodox parties need to be in the government for it to be able to make serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues is unsupported by any evidence. The Haredim have been one of the enablers of the settlement movement, and they moved progressively to the right on peace issues while they were in the government. Now in the opposition they'll be in bed with Labor and the Arab parties. Maybe that will bring them back to where they were during the Yitzhak Rabin years, but even then they were unreliable peace partners.

The Haredim are out of this government, so drafting them into the army will not divide it or bring it down. On the contrary: Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett are united on this issue, Tzipi Livni supports them, and Avigdor Lieberman’s side of the Likud is at least as hard line on it as they are. The rest of the Likud are secularist settler sympathizers. And the Haredim won't get much comfort from Shelly Yacimovich and their new leftist-secularist parties allies in the opposition. We are about to see a reasonable sharing of the burden. Good news for Israeli society even if it's bad news for the peace process.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree that the Yair Lapid-Naftali Bennett alliance hides real differences between their parties, especially on issues of religion and foreign policy. In some respects, this is not a “natural” alliance; I'm actually very impressed by the discipline among the ranks of Bennett's Jewish Home party throughout these negotiations, sustaining the alliance with the secularist Yesh Atid. But the religious issues might not fracture the coalition in the short term; the main questions surrounding the Haredim have been agreed upon already and will be implemented before long, according the coalition agreement. In other words, that hurdle is largely passed. Now what remains is for Jewish Home to collect the benefits, in terms of jobs and influence within the religious community, from control over the religious affairs ministry and other positions of power. This they will be very happy to do.

One potential source of tension in the coalition is actually is the Bennett-John Kerry axis. If the United States pushes on the Palestinian issue, fissures can emerge between the core of the coalition and its far right. I agree completely that the Haredim are not a secure base for the Middle East peace process, but the Jewish Home is much less so. One of their central demands was to get the housing portfolio, with settlements in mind, and with the new, hawkish defense minister (Moshe Yaalon, from the Likud) there may be more activity on that front.

The potential silver lining for diplomacy is that some of the recent noises from the prime minister’s office are consistent with Tzipi Livni's more moderate approach. Even Yaakov Amidror, the national security advisor—probably as right wing as anyone—now reportedly sees the diplomatic price Israel pays over the settlements. The PMO's solution will likely be an attempt to garner support through talks--and through having Livni in place to lead them—whether or not these talks are meaningful or based on a true change in policy. But it's worth remembering that there is always discussion whether now—of all times—there is a change of heart in Netanyahu's circles on the Palestinian issue. This may well just be spin.

If and when the government falls, there could either be an alternative government, with the Haredim, or even new elections. A lot depends on whether Lapid sees an electoral opportunity and whether Livni is inclined to leave as well. If the center leaves en masse, Netanyahu will have a hard time, mathematically; the right + religious is likely too narrow for comfort. If Bennett's party leaves because of diplomatic developments, the Haredim may jump back in to get revenge on the Modern Orthodox, but if the mood is that Netanyahu is vulnerable, they may prefer elections to get their revenge on him too. In short, as is usually the case, the brand new government in Israel may not last its full term.

Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

It looks as though the new Israeli government intends to be quite active on the Palestinian issue after all—though not in the way most had hoped. With the appointment of Uri Ariel, former head of the settlers’ umbrella group known as the Yesha Council and himself a West Bank settler, to head the Ministry of Housing and Construction we can expect an even greater surge in settlement expansion in the occupied territories than we’ve seen in recent years. Ariel’s Bayit Yehudi party, the third pillar of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition and third biggest vote-getter in the Knesset, not only opposes territorial concessions to the Palestinians but openly rejects the two-state solution itself—sentiments shared by many in Netanyahu’s own Likud party. The strong pro-settlement bent of the new Israeli government is certain to alarm Palestinian leaders in Ramallah, who are sure to reiterate their message about the dangers posed by the settlements and the urgency of a two-state solution to President Obama directly on his upcoming visit to Israel and the occupied territories. Having withstood similar pleadings for much of the last four years, however, there is little reason to expect the administration to abandon its laissez faire attitude toward settlements or become more actively engaged in peacemaking any time soon.

Martin Indyk

In addition to settler control of the Housing Ministry, the Interior Ministry will be in the hands of Likud and the Defense Ministry also. So the three critical ministries for settlement activity will be in the hands of those most committed to the settlement cause.

Authors

What the U.S. Can Do for Egypt

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 13:56:00 -0500

Two years after the Police Day demonstrations that forced former President Hosni Mubarak from office, Egypt's political transformation has only just begun. The uncertainty that necessarily accompanies this change presents particular dilemmas for the United States, for whom partnership with Egypt has been a bedrock of regional policy for decades. Bedeviled by uncertainty and mutual mistrust, U.S.-Egyptian ties have been fraught since the revolution -- and on both sides there are those who say it's time to cut the cord. Yet these two countries still have many core interests in common and, as the November 2012 Gaza crisis proved, they can work together effectively to advance them.

For the United States, Egypt's revolution presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a more robust and reliable strategic partnership than was ever possible before, based on mutual interests with a government rooted in the consent of the Egyptian people and accountable to them. But realizing this opportunity will require an adroit, long-term approach, one that eschews transactional bargains with specific Egyptian actors in favor of a consistent commitment to supporting the emergence of a pluralistic Egyptian political system.

U.S. policy toward Egypt since the revolution has rested on two pillars: preserving Egyptian-Israeli peace and the security of their shared border, and trying to support and stabilize a teetering Egyptian economy. The first has led the U.S. government to keep U.S. military aid to Egypt and other security ties as unchanged as possible; the second has led to a diligent if ineffective effort to provide economic assistance (stymied by poor Egyptian decision making, as well as political and budgetary dysfunction in Washington).

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Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Egypt Two Years After the Revolution:Where Egypt Stands, What the United States Can Do

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for inviting me to share my views with you today.

US policy toward Egypt since the revolution has rested on two pillars: a relentless focus on preserving the Camp David peace treaty and the security of the Israel-Egypt-Gaza border, which has led the administration to prioritize keeping the military relationship (and the associated aid package) as much as possible unchanged; and a diligent if ineffective effort to provide economic assistance that could (working with others, and in combination with wise policy by the Egyptian government) help to stabilize the Egyptian macroeconomy and help a new democratic government deliver for its people. The theory has been that promoting security cooperation and economic stabilization would produce political stability in this large and important Arab country.

But like a stool with only two legs, this strategy is incomplete -- and it will not produce stability in Egypt. As my colleagues Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne wrote in last week’s Washington Post, "Egypt’s economy is struggling and disorder is rampant primarily because the country’s leaders for the past two years...have failed to build an inclusive political process." In Egypt, and in US-Egyptian relations, the central issue is not "the economy, stupid": it’s "politics, stupid." And the United States, which has so far been too reticent about Egypt’s dangerously devolving politics, needs to weigh in and press the president and his party -- as well as other relevant parties -- to make the necessary accommodations to put Egypt back on the path to a stable democratic transition.

The United States still has the capacity to influence political developments in Egypt -- although we certainly cannot dictate outcomes and should not try. Influence will not come through diktats and demands. It will require that the United States use diplomacy skillfully with government and non-government actors, and deploy its resources in careful coordination with others who share our interests: in Egypt, the region, and the international system. Fortunately, those others are not few in number.

There are those who argue that the United States cannot have any real impact on the mess that is Egyptian politics today. They say that Egyptians are too resentful of America’s long support for Mubarak, and that if we press our views too hard, the newly empowered Egyptian government will simply walk away and find friends elsewhere.

I disagree, for two reasons -- First, because we still have a lot to offer. While our budget constraints, our policy process, and our own political dysfunction have made us both less generous and less adroit in our response to the Arab Awakening than we should be, we do still have cards on the table, and cards to play – and those cards are not all related to assistance dollars. Second, because Egyptians both inside and outside government still care what we think and what we do about it. If they did not care, and they thought we couldn’t have any impact, they would not spend so much of their time trying to embroil us in their domestic arguments.

And because they do still care what we think, the leverage we have is probably best deployed as incentives, not as threats or arm-twisting. Our recognition, our investment, our good opinion, and our expressions of partnership all matter, along with our aid dollars. The Administration has reallocated resources to increase support for Egypt’s fragile economy and suffering citizens during this transition period. And the Administration has also proposed, in the FY2014 budget, to put more funds on offer for Egypt and other governments in the region if they pursue necessary reforms. With appropriate conditions and accountability, this type of additional assistance can be a useful tool to encourage good choices.

So while Egypt has changed in fundamental ways, making the work of securing US interests immeasurably more complex than it was a few years ago, that is no reason for us to throw up our hands -- indeed, that’s precisely what we cannot afford to do.

Egypt remains the most significant economic, political, and cultural force in the Arab world today. It is located at one of the world’s great geostrategic crossroads, an essential pathway for global commerce and for the United States’ global military reach. Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel is a cornerstone of regional stability that has saved three generations of Israelis and Arabs from the destruction of wars like those that came before Camp David.

Egypt’s majority, its young people, want to build a nation that offers them the opportunities for betterment that their parents were denied, and that leads the region once again in political influence, culture, and diplomacy. They want their nation to fulfill its potential to be an economic powerhouse in the region. And they know that in the twenty-first century, this will require Egypt to be tightly connected to the world -- and bound to the norms of international law, free markets, moderation and stability that all of us share.

Just as Egypt and Israel still have fundamental national interests in maintaining their peace treaty, Egypt and the United States still have fundamental common interests in regional security, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and Arab-Israeli peace.

Egyptians have suffered greatly from Islamist terrorism, and in polls they reject violence against civilians at a higher rate than any country in the world.

Egyptians have suffered greatly from war -- Arab-Israeli wars, but also other conflicts in their neighborhood. They know that The Camp David treaty has brought their people thirty-five years of peace, and they want the benefits that regional peace brings.

Egypt has been a stalwart opponent of nuclear proliferation. As the region and the world continue to confront the dangers of Iran’s nuclear program, we have a shared interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and countering Iran’s efforts to undermine regional stability.

These common interests, widely shared by Egyptians and Americans, have sustained our partnership over the years – not some crass quid pro quo. America’s interests still lie in a positive, cooperative relationship with Egypt. And the basic ingredients of a cooperative relationship are still in place -- as our swift and effective cooperation to resolve the Gaza crisis last November proved.

But the United States cannot afford to take a short-sighted approach to Egypt’s transition, neither one focused on a transactional relationship with the current rulers, nor one focused on other narrow, short-term goals. We must not assume that we know who will come out on top of this messy transition. At the heart of the Egyptian revolution, the deeper trends that produced it, and the aspiration of Egyptians for democracy, is a strategic opportunity for the United States -- to build a stronger, more reliable and more equitable partnership, with an Egyptian government that is rooted in the consent of the Egyptian people and is accountable to them. We can do so while holding firm to our principles and our interests. We must not lose this opportunity, which may be a once-in-a-generation event.

We must keep our focus on two, interlinked, long term goals:

● The first is building lasting stability in the Arab world’s most important country. As the Arab Awakening demonstrated clearly, such stability that will only come about through the establishment of more open, participatory, accountable government that treats its citizens with dignity and works diligently to offer them real opportunities. Whatever daunting economic and social problems they are facing, Egyptians have made clear that they want to solve those problems through decisions made by a democratic system. We should support that goal wholeheartedly and help them build the institutions and the social infrastructure that will help democracy emerge, thrive, and deliver for Egyptians.

Egypt’s democratic transition is important to us, and not only because Egypt’s stability is important to us. As you know well, where democracy and democratic freedoms are valued, the world also gains in security. Democracies give people a stake in their governance and weaken the appeal of those who call for violence. A democratic Egypt will be a stronger partner for the United States in advancing our shared interests in security, stability, and prosperity for the region and the world.

● The second goal is building a broad coalition in Egypt to support cooperative relations with the United States. We will never return to the days when Egypt’s interest were defined and pursued by a single man or a small coterie, out of the public eye and without regard to domestic opinion. For better or worse, Egypt’s foreign policy going forward will be influenced by its domestic politics. For that reason, it’s especially important that the United States not invest too much in any one relationship with any one Egyptian faction, and not be seen as having taken sides in Egypt’s fractious politics. Rather, we must reach across the political spectrum, and engage broadly with Egyptian society, to explain who we are, what we want, and what we can offer, and to make the case -- together with those Egyptians who feel similarly -- for a strong US-Egyptian partnership.

That said, it’s a tremendous challenge for the United States to engage effectively with the feisty new practitioners of politics in Egypt. Because of decades of repression, many have little experience in the give-and-take of democratic politics, and little acquaintance with the interests at the heart of US engagement in the country and the region. Political winners and losers are both appealing to Washington for support, and condemning American interference -- sometimes at the same time.

Looking at the outcomes of Egypt’s first two elections -- the parliamentary elections last spring and the presidential elections last summer -- anxiety is understandable. The winners produced in both cases include actors with questionable commitments to democracy, much less to the values and interests the United States holds dear. But just as democracy never guaranteed the triumph of the Arab world’s marginalized liberals, neither should Americans presuppose that these democratic elections now guarantee the long-term success of the Islamists.

We need to support a pluralist political system where the Egyptian people continue to have real choices, and where political parties can compete openly and speak freely. Free and fair elections can only occur where basic political rights are respected, including free speech, free assembly, and free association. The president and ruling party have no business restricting these rights, certainly not in the runup to the parliamentary elections. We also need to engage broadly with the full array of peaceful political actors -- to make clear through deeds and words that we have not anointed anyone as our chosen partner in Egypt. And we need to articulate our principles and interests for all parties to see: that we respect the outcomes of free and fair elections, and that we expect parties who claim to be democratic to hold firm to certain basic ideas: they must reject violence, commit to equal citizenship and equality under the law, and protect political pluralism. Also, that we want to know the clear stance of aspiring Egyptian leaders on the issues of keen interest to the United States -- Iran’s nuclear program, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the continuation of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

A year ago, I told this subcommittee that it was important for the United States to remain engaged with political actors across the spectrum in Egypt, including the newly elected parliamentarians from the Muslim Brotherhood. I said then, "From an American perspective, we should judge the Brotherhood and others in the new parliament by what they do, and so far there appears to be a basis for dialogue and a potential for constructive partnership."

Looking at the situation today, almost exactly a year later, I see some troubling indicators. Writing on Islamist parties in 2008, I laid out four key criteria by which to evaluate whether these groups could be constructive participants in a democratic process. Whether they rejected violence as a means to achieve their political goals, whether they accepted the equality of all citizens regardless of gender or religion, whether they accepted political pluralism and alternation of power, and whether they insisted on a role for religious authorities in overseeing the outcomes of a democratic political process.

By those lights, the Brotherhood today raises concern. The Brotherhood has proceeded in a manner that reveals real ambivalence about legal equality for all citizens; and a readiness to allow review of legislation by unelected religious officials -- though a resistance to mandatory review as proposed by Salafi parties. The constitution ultimately drafted largely by Brotherhood and Salafi representatives subsumes individual rights to state authority, is dangerously weak on the rights of women and girls, and distinguishes harmfully between religions receiving full recognition and protection, and others that are not considered so deserving. Most troubling of all, as documented by human rights groups during the December clashes at the presidential palace, and as reported in recent weeks, the Brotherhood and President Morsi have evidenced a willingness to condone and cover up the use of violence and torture by party cadres and by the internal security services against opposition activists and journalists – shockingly, the same tactics Mubarak used against the Brotherhood and other opponents of the old regime.

We can and should be concerned by these indicators of the Brotherhood’s violating basic expectations for parties that want to be recognized by the world as legitimate actors in a democratic system. We should communicate these concerns consistently and at the highest levels. But we must also recognize that with all their flaws, the Brotherhood won the freest and fairest elections in Egypt’s modern history. And they may well win the next elections. They are a sizeable force in Egyptian politics not only because they are well-funded and well-organized and well-disciplined, but because they appear to represent some significant constituency among Egyptian citizens. They may not win forever -- but we cannot ignore them or wish them away. What we can do is make clear that their electoral victory does not absolve them of these basic obligations to democratic rules and norms -- not if they want to be recognized, and they most certainly do, as democratically legitimate in Egypt and on the global stage.

This is our real leverage -- that the Brotherhood-led government wants our recognition, and seeks our partnership. We should continue to deal with Egypt’s elected leaders, even if we have profound disagreements with them -- we do that all over the world in pursuit of our interests. But we should also make clear that engagement does not mean endorsement. And we can support, with all the tools at our disposal, those in Egypt working to hold the elected government accountable, those supporting and defending human rights, and those working to build the strong institutions, vibrant civil society, and pluralistic political system that will ensure the Brotherhood will face real competition from other voices.

The Brotherhood has revealed a consistent preference for majoritarianism over pluralism -- that is, they believe that since they won elections, albeit narrowly, they should get to decide policy issues alone, regardless of others’ preferences. But as the constitutional crisis and the failure to achieve a deal with IMF shows, on policy issues of the greatest importance, a majority is not enough -- wider political consensus is necessary to ensure that decisions have enough support to stick, and provide a sound foundation on which to build the institutions of a new democracy. This is a bitter lesson for those who may feel that they have waited decades in the wilderness for their chance to rule.

But Egypt after the revolution will never again be a place where any party or president can rule unconstrained. The last two years has shown the vibrancy and diversity of Egyptians’ political views. With time, and in an environment where human rights are respected, this pluralism will be reflected in elections. The Brotherhood will either learn the art of the deal, or they will fail in the eyes of Egyptians, and the world.

The political opposition has lessons to learn as well. While they are rightly outraged by the Brotherhood’s heavy handed approach, and justly worried that the rushed constitution, the flawed electoral law, the degraded rights environment and the opaque electoral calendar will once again leave them out in the cold. Some call for a boycott of the parliamentary elections, some for street demonstrations to force President Morsi from office, some for a military coup.

If both sides continue to treat their political competition as a zero-sum game, both sides will lose -- and they may take Egypt over the cliff with them. As a balance of payments crisis drifts closer and closer, fuel and flour shortages mount, and public discontent boils into the streets where police now carry live ammunition and torture activists with impunity, we must worry about the impact of this mutual intransigence on Egypt’s basic stability.

A few farsighted voices, viewing the looming crisis, call for dialogue and compromise. This is the path we must support -- actively, not with wishful thinking and not by providing top cover for those who are sitting in the hot seat and avoiding tough decisions. The Egyptian leadership has enough people telling them to hold on, that international aid is coming and after the elections things will settle down. We need to be a friend to Egypt -- and that means we need to have enough respect and hope for friendship with Egypt’s leaders that we tell them the truth.

The truth is that President Morsi cannot make the tough economic decisions he needs to make to get an IMF loan, and to get access to billions of additional dollars in international assistance tied to that loan, unless he brings along some of his opposition. He needs their help to stabilize his country.

The truth is that elections that do not earn the trust and participation of the political opposition will not produce a parliament with broad enough support in Egyptian society to make authoritative laws for the new Egypt. The president and his party must work to make these elections meaningful for all Egyptian political parties. That may require them to amend the electoral laws and procedures. And Egypt’s political opposition must make sure they offer Egyptian voters a real choice and participate fully in the polls. A boycott would compound Egypt’s polarization and political crisis.

The truth is that a military takeover would be a disaster for Egypt’s nascent democratic transition, a disaster for Egyptian stability, and a disaster for Egypt’s military. It may look to some desperate people like the only way to forestall terrible chaos, but it would not. A resumption of military rule in Egypt would likely lead to massive street protests, compounding the existing instability and insecurity in Egypt’s cities. It would likely lead to even greater violations of human rights, as we saw more than 10,000 Egyptian citizens hauled before military courts during the last period of military rule. And of course it would upend the progress that has been made -- and despite the problems, progress has been made -- in Egypt’s hesitant transition to democracy. Furthermore, military rule would divert the attention and resources of the Egyptian military from crucial border security and counterterrorism functions, and undermine our ability to continue the military cooperation that is so valuable to both of us, especially as we face a drawdown from Afghanistan, continued security challenges in Gaza and Sinai, and the prospect of a confrontation with Iran.

In fact, the military has a lot of capacity to help stabilize Egypt and stave off a worse crisis -- but not by leaping back into governing. As it did in 2008, the military can help compensate for rapidly rising food prices and flour shortages by using its own supplies, bakeries and distribution chains to get bread to hungry Egyptians. To be sure, these roles carry political consequences. But if they are undertaken in support of a civilian government that is operating on the basis of political consensus, these measures can be stabilizing rather than threatening of Egypt’s emerging democracy.

In other words, distinguished members, I believe that Egypt’s transition is still in an early and uncertain phase, that the course of that transition matters deeply to the United States, and that the United States still has significant power to affect the trajectory. Egyptians want a relationship with the United States, but one based on equality – rooted in mutual interests and mutual respect. Ordinary Egyptians want for themselves a government that respects their rights and dignity, that answers to their priorities and that serves at their pleasure. They want secure borders, safety on their streets, stable neighbors, and peace in their region. That is what we want for them as well. Egypt’s leadership and its political elites will eventually hearken to these demands, or face continued protests and instability. We should wield our influence -- rooted in clear principles and interests, and in cooperation with others -- to support those in Egypt working to build sustainable democracy and a fruitful partnership with the United States.

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa

The United States, India and Pakistan: To the Brink and Back

Tue, 26 Feb 2013 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 26, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

India and Pakistan are among the most important countries in the 21st century. The two nations share a common heritage, but their relationship remains tenuous. The nuclear rivals have waged four wars against each other and have gone to the brink of war several times. While India is already the world’s largest democracy and will soon become the planet’s most populous nation, Pakistan has a troubled history of military coups and dictators, and has harbored terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. In his new book, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Brookings, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, director of Brookings Intelligence Project, clearly explains the challenge and importance of successfully managing America’s affairs with these two emerging powers while navigating their toxic relationship.

Based on extensive research and his experience advising four U.S. presidents on the region, Riedel reviews the history of American diplomacy in South Asia, the conflicts that have flared in recent years and the prospects for future crisis. Riedel provides an in-depth look at the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008—the worst terrorist outrage since 9/11—and concludes with authoritative analysis on what the future is likely to hold for the United States and South Asia, offering concrete recommendations for Washington’s policymakers.

On February 26, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted an event marking the release of Avoiding Armageddon. Bruce Riedel discussed the history and future of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and options for avoiding future conflagration in the region. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks, and Tina Brown, editor-in-chief of The Daily Beast and Newsweek, lead the discussion.

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The United States, India and Pakistan: To the Brink and Back

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?

Tue, 19 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 19, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

After several years of increasingly punishing sanctions against its economy, there is hope that Iran is now prepared to resume negotiations with the international community to reach a solution to the ongoing nuclear standoff. Many experts fear that Iran is quickly approaching the nuclear threshold, and that 2013 could be the last chance to avoid this outcome. If the international community cannot seize that opportunity, it may be left only with much worse alternatives.

On February 19, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine strategies for resolving the nuclear standoff. Panelists included former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, co-founder of The Iran Project, who presented the organization’s latest set of recommendations for addressing the nuclear issue, and Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Iran’s Nuclear Program: Is a Peaceful Solution Possible?

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John Kerry as Secretary of State

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In an interview with BBC Newshour, Tamara Cofman Wittes discusses John Kerry's role as the next secretary of state. Read an excerpt below or listen to the full audio.

BBC: So what is your take on the Kerry years that we’re going to see now? How do you think he will compare to Hillary Clinton?

Tamara Cofman Wittes: You know the personal style might be quite different, but I think this is someone with a long experience in foreign affairs, indeed a life time’s experience if you consider that he’s the son of a Foreign Service officer. But also, somebody with his own longstanding relationships with a lot of global leaders through his time on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I think because of that work, a keen appreciation of American interest’s, of our alliances abroad, and also of the limits and the changing nature of American power.

BBC: Everything you’ve just said suggests a period of management rather than change.

Wittes: Look, there are inevitably going to be crisis that flair, that demand intense focus. But I think the mood of the American public is one of management not of taking on ambitious new projects abroad. And I think that’s a mood that the White House is sensitive to as well as the new Secretary of State.

BBC: Righter, I could see that, that people don’t want any more foreign interventions. But maybe they would like a United States to be more assertive in the Middle-East, peace and that sort of thing, and would you expect him to deliver much of that?

Wittes: It’s interesting to me that we’ve already got information coming out about a Presidential trip to the Middle-East. I wouldn’t expect too much, by way of the Middle-East peace initiative out of that trip, but I think it’s an interesting choice given the administration’s clear desire to focus it’s energy abroad in places like East Asia where there is perhaps more of an economic gain for the United States to be found.

BBC: I saw an article you wrote the other day, saying that really women are now at the heart of the foreign policy establishment. Even if Hillary Clinton is gone, even if Condoleeza Rice is gone, that there are a lot of women in senior positions now, that is the case.

Wittes: Absolutely. We’ve seen a number of women taking senior portfolios, whether it’s Secretary Clinton, or Michèle Flournoy in the Defense Department, or others indeed scattered across the foreign policy agencies of the Executive Branch. But more than that I think we’ve seen a generation of women who have come into this field and really made a name for themselves so that it’s no longer the case that when you’re looking for a female face in the room you have to search. There’s really a plethora of female faces and female experts available to draw on.

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John Kerry as Secretary of State

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: BBC Newshour

Can Kerry Fill Clinton’s Shoes?

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

When I was in college studying politics, a senior male professor was my valued mentor. One piece of his advice, way back then, always stuck in my craw: Even if I wasn't interested in professional sports, he urged, I should learn a bit about it and read the sports page in the paper every day. Why? So that I would be able to join in the male chit-chat before the big meetings started.

I took his advice, for a while, and found that he was right: The big boys always did seem to talk about the football game before the meeting, and knowing something about sports gave me a way to join in. But it always felt forced, and a little risky, too -- after all, what if I said something ignorant? But though it was uncomfortable, it was what I had to do to make a place for myself in what was still, in the early 1990s, mostly a man's world.

As a younger scholar, I attended my share of meetings and conferences where I was the only woman in a room full of male experts. Although I saw more younger women entering graduate school, hoping to work in foreign policy and international affairs, not all of them made it out the other end of the pipeline. Too many female students and junior faculty I met were agonizing about whether they could afford to take time out for maternity leave before they got tenured. One older professor told me, when he learned I was pregnant, "A dissertation is a baby, too, you know." If that were true, then I produced three babies in three years (two delightful humans, one that "lives" on a shelf) -- while getting and holding a full-time job at a think tank.

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Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Publication: Foreign Policy

The Role of American Universities in the Post-Arab Spring World

Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 28, 2013
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EST

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

The gap between the demand of the labor market and the graduates of the current education systems in the Arab world bring into focus the issue of the quality of higher education programs in the region as well as the sustainability of the partnerships between American universities and their host countries. There are many questions surrounding these programs¬— whether or not host countries are creating enough incentives and job opportunities for students to study and remain in country post-graduation, and whether or not the social and legal codes of the host countries are impeding on academic freedom and institutional quality. A deeper assessment of the experiences and issues facing American university ventures in the Arab world and the results of the different models of partnership is necessary for training new citizens in the post-Arab Awakening era.

On January 28, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution organized a conversation with Brookings Non-Resident Senior Fellow Alisa Rubin, with welcoming remarks by Saban Center Director and Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, on the current higher education programs in the Arab world undertaken by American universities, with a specific focus on the Qatar and the U.A.E.

Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

Experts from Foreign Policy at Brookings — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:36:00 -0500

President Obama begins his second term in office facing a world in turmoil and a number of critical challenges to global security and stability.

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Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

In response to these and a host of other international crises, the president can choose to place some “Big Bets” that could define his foreign policy over the next four years. However, a number of “Black Swans” –low probability, but high-impact events –may derail President Obama’s second term foreign policy agenda. Brookings’s Foreign Policy experts have released a set of 20 memos to the president—Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book—offering innovative policy recommendations that the administration might pursue.

Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy; Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; and Tamara Wittes, Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy discuss some of these Big Bets and Black Swans, including turning Tehran away from nuclear weapons and a potential collapse of the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel.

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Big Bets and Black Swans: An Overview

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Experts from Foreign Policy at Brookings