Brookings: Experts - Benjamin Wittes

President Obama's Guantanamo Comments

Benjamin Wittes — Wed, 01 May 2013 09:37:00 -0400

I confess myself mystified by President Obama’s comments about Guantanamo this morning. Here is what the President said—with the parts I find confusing bolded:

QUESTION: Mr. President, as you’re probably aware, there’s a growing hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay among prisoners there. Is it any surprise, really, that they would prefer death, rather than have no end in sight to their confinement?

OBAMA: Well, it is not a surprise to me that we’ve got problems in Guantanamo, which is why when I was campaigning in 2007 and 2008 and when I was elected in 2008, I said we need to close Guantanamo.

I continue to believe that we’ve got to close Guantanamo. I think, well, you know, I think it is critical for us to understand that Guantanamo is not necessary to keep America safe. It is expensive. It is inefficient. It hurts us, in terms of our international standing. It lessens cooperation with our allies on counter-terrorism efforts. It is a recruitment tool for extremists. It needs to be closed.

Now, Congress determined that they would not let us close it. And despite the fact that there are a number of the folks who are currently in Guantanamo, who the courts have said could be returned to their country of origin or potentially a third country, I’m gonna go back at this. I’ve asked my team to review everything that’s currently being done in Guantanamo, everything that we can do administratively, and I’m gonna reengage with Congress to try to make the case that this is not something that’s in the best interest of the American people.

And it’s not sustainable. I mean, the notion that we’re going to continue to keep over 100 individuals in a no-man’s land in perpetuity, even at a time when we’ve wound down the war in Iraq, we’re winding down the war in Afghanistan, and we’re having success defeating Al Qaida core, we’ve kept the pressure up on all these trans-national terrorist networks.

When we transfer detention authority in Afghanistan, the idea that we would still maintain forever a group of individuals who have not been tried, that is contrary to who we are. It is contrary to our interests and it needs to stop.

Now, it’s a hard case to make because, you know, I think for a lot of Americans the notion is “out of sight, out of mind.” And it’s easy to demagogue the issue. That’s what happened the first time this came up. I’m going to go back at it because I think it’s important.

QUESTION: Meanwhile, you continue to force-feed (inaudible).

No, I don’t — I don’t want these individuals to die. Obviously, the Pentagon is — is trying to manage the situation as best as they can. But I think all of us should reflect on why exactly are we doing this. Why are we doing this? I mean, we’ve got a whole bunch of individuals who have been tried who are currently in maximum security prisons around the country. Nothing’s happened to them. Justice has been served. It’s been done in a way that’s consistent with our Constitution; consistent with due process; consistent with rule of law; consistent with our traditions.

The — the individual who attempted to bomb Times Square, in prison serving a life sentence. Individual who tried to bomb planes in Detroit, in prison serving a life sentence. A Somali who was part of al-Shabaab who we captured, in prison.

So we can handle this.

And I understand that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, with the traumas that had taken place, why for a lot of Americans the notion was somehow that we had to create a special facility like Guantanamo and we couldn’t handle this in a normal, conventional fashion. I understand that reaction. But we’re now over a decade out. We should be wiser. We should have more experience in how we prosecute terrorists. And this is a lingering, you know, problem that is not gonna get better. It’s gonna get worse. It’s gonna fester.

And so I’m gonna, as I said before, we’re — examine every option that we have administratively to try to deal with this issue, but ultimately we’re also gonna need some help from Congress. And I’m gonna ask some — some folks over there who, you know, care about fighting terrorism, but also care about who we are as a people to — to step up and help me on it.

The President’s comments are bewildering because his own policies give rise to the vast majority of the concerns about which he so earnestly delivered himself in these remarks.

Remember that Obama himself has imposed a moratorium on repatriating people to Yemen. And Obama himself has insisted that nearly 50 detainees cannot either be tried or transferred.

True, he would hold such people in a domestic facility, rather than at Guantanamo Bay. But so what? does the President not understand when he frets about “the notion that we’re going to continue to keep over 100 individuals in a no-man’s land in perpetuity” that if Congress let him do exactly as he wished, he would still be doing exactly that—except that the number might not reach 100 and the location would not be at Guantanamo? Does he not understand his own policy proposals—to maintain a residual group of detainees indefinitely—when he worries that “When we transfer detention authority in Afghanistan, the idea that we would still maintain forever a group of individuals who have not been tried, that is contrary to who we are. It is contrary to our interests and it needs to stop”? Does he not understand when he intones that we are wiser now than we were after 9/11 and no longer need a site like Guantanamo to hold non-criminal terrorist detainees that he is proposing to build a new one?

Pardon me, but I don’t get it.

This was reposted from the Lawfare Blog »

Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Publication: Lawfare

Four Reasons Sens. Graham and McCain are Wrong about Military Detention for Dzhokar Tsarnaev

Benjamin Wittes — Sat, 20 Apr 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Sens. Lindsey Graham and John McCain were quick out of the box last night in declaring that the Obama administration should hold Dzhokar Tsarnaev in military detention for his role in the Boston bombing:

Now that the suspect is in custody, the last thing we should want is for him to remain silent. It is absolutely vital the suspect be questioned for intelligence gathering purposes. We need to know about any possible future attacks which could take additional American lives. The least of our worries is a criminal trial which will likely be held years from now.

Under the Law of War we can hold this suspect as a potential enemy combatant not entitled to Miranda warnings or the appointment of counsel. Our goal at this critical juncture should be to gather intelligence and protect our nation from further attacks.

We remain under threat from radical Islam and we hope the Obama Administration will seriously consider the enemy combatant option.

We will stand behind the Administration if they decide to hold this suspect as an enemy combatant.

Bobby quickly explained why this is both unnecessary and a bad idea; this very fine Wall Street Journal blog sketches out why it would pose legal problems as well. But the idea has had legs on Twitter, so I want to bring together in one place and explain the several distinct but overlapping reasons why it would be not merely ill-advised but absolutely nuts to try to treat Tsarnaev as an enemy combatant.

Broadly speaking, there are four reasons:

First and most important, Tsarnaev may not be an enemy combatant. Graham and McCain warn that “The accused perpetrators of these acts were not common criminals attempting to profit from a criminal enterprise, but terrorists trying to injure, maim, and kill innocent Americans.” That’s certainly true. But not every terrorist with a bomb is an enemy combatant whose military detention is authorized by law. Some are just killers with bombs. Under the AUMF as interpreted by the courts, and under the NDAA as passed by Congress, the administration is authorized to hold in military detention only those who are “part of” or “substantially supporting” Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Nothing that has come to light publicly has shown that Tsarnaev was operating as part of any group covered by the AUMF. Unless and until such evidence arises, military detention is not merely a bad idea. It is simply not legally available. Particularly for those of us who support military detention in appropriate circumstances and have argued for its propriety and legality, it is absolutely essential to reject it where the facts do not support it. Military detention does not flow legally from the fact of someone’s being more than just a common criminal. It flows from the fact of someone’s being a part of a military enemy’s fighting cadre. Calling for detention of people who don’t meet—or may not meet—that threshold comes perilously close to calling for a roving power to lock up nasty people.

Second, assuming for a moment that the facts as they emerge would support an enemy combatant designation, there’s the small matter of Tsarnaev’s citizenship. Tsarnaev is reportedly a naturalized American citizen, and the government’s appetite for the detention of American citizens under the laws of war has waned—and rightly so. This began under the Bush administration, which tried twice—in the early cases of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla—to detain U.S. citizens under the laws of war and ultimately backed down both times. The question of whether such detention is legally appropriate for a U.S. citizen captured by law enforcement remains an open one. But it’s an open question that no sane executive would want to test in the presence of a viable alternative—like, say, an open-and-shut prosecution in federal court. As a matter of policy, it was informally off the table long ago, and the Obama administration made that informal policy formal. John Brennan, in a speech at Harvard Law School, declared:

when it comes to U.S. citizens involved in terrorist-related activity, whether they are captured overseas or at home, we will prosecute them in our criminal justice system. There is bipartisan agreement that U.S. citizens should not be tried by military commission.

Third, even if the reports of Tsarnaev’s citizenship prove erroneous, he was certainly captured in the United States, and the military detention of domestic captures is problematic for many of the same reasons that the detention of the citizen poses difficulties. Again, whether it is or is not legally available is an open question of law; this was the issue in the Al Marri case. But this is not a question of law that any administration should be eager to test. And just as it has adopted a policy of not testing the citizen detention question, the Obama administration has taken military detention off the table for domestic captures. As Brennan put it,

it is the firm position of the Obama Administration that suspected terrorists arrested inside the United States will—in keeping with long-standing tradition—be processed through our Article III courts. As they should be. Our military does not patrol our streets or enforce our laws—nor should it.

Fourth, even if all of these legal and policy problems could be overcome, as Bobby explained last night, military detention offers no clear advantages in this case and has several big disadvantages. The public safety exception to Miranda means the FBI has a considerable degree of flexibility in conducting this interrogation, so there’s no particular reason to expect the Bureau will be unable to glean from Tsarnaev the answers to the critical questions at stake right now: Are there accomplices still at large, and to what extent was the bombing the work of any foreign group? On the other hand, military detention would gravely complicate the longer-term interest in punishment and in Tsarnaev’s legitimate long-term incarceration. In the Hamdi and Padilla and Al Marri cases, the consequence of military detention was a substantially shorter sentence than the suspect’s conduct would have supported.

In short, there is simply no case for military detention here. By pushing for it, Sens. Graham and McCain risk bringing into disrepute the one avenue realistically open to those who want answers and justice.

***

This was reposted from Lawfare, where Wittes and others have been following the situation surrounding the Boston bombing. You can read more on the Lawfare Blog »

Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Image Source: © Lucas Jackson / Reuters

The Unfolding Situation with the Boston Marathon Bombing Suspects

Benjamin Wittes — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 10:35:00 -0400

One quick thought on the unfolding situation in the Boston suburbs...where one of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects is dead and the other is on murderous rampage: It is very important that the remaining suspect be taken alive.

The New York Times has identified the two suspects as Chechen brothers, Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev, 19, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 26—the latter of whom is apparently dead. The most important thing, of course, is to apprehend and stop the remaining suspect before anyone else is killed or hurt. That may require the use of lethal force, and the state and federal law enforcement officers who are dealing with this situation will use their best judgment as to how to protect the public—and themselves.

But it is critically important to understand what, if any, connection these suspects have both to overseas terrorist groups and to domestic folks not yet tied to the bombing, and that project will be far easier if the surviving Mr. Tsarnaev is not killed. The question is important both for obvious reasons—if some group is attacking the United States, we need to understand with maximum precision who that is and who is involved—and for less obvious legal reasons: Is this a home-grown terrorist problem that’s purely a matter of criminal law? Is this a feature of the US’s existing armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its associated forces? Or is this some new overseas terrorist threat—an extra-AUMF threat—against the United States playing out in the streets of Cambridge and Watertown? Or is this an example of a blurry line between categories? The chance to interrogate a Mr. Tsarnaev who can still talk is the quickest and easiest way to answer these questions.

***

This was reposted from Lawfare, where Ben Wittes is following the situation in the Boston suburbs. You can read more on the Lawfare Blog »

Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Publication: Lawfare

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?

Benjamin Wittes — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: On February 27, 2013, Benjamin Wittes testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary on the topic of drones and the war or terror.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me to testify on the question of when the United States may lawfully target alleged American terrorists overseas. I am a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. I co-founded and am Editor in Chief of the Lawfare Blog, a website devoted to balanced and sober discussion of "Hard National Security Choices." I also serve on the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. I am the author or editor of several books on subjects related to law and national security: Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo (2011), Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (2008), and Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform (2009). I have written extensively about the legal underpinnings of U.S. targeted killing operations. Currently, I am co-authoring a book with Professor Kenneth Anderson of American University’s Washington College of Law, entitled Speaking the Law: The Obama Administration’s Addresses on National Security Law, from which this testimony is partially adapted. The views I am expressing here also reflect those of Professor Anderson—but not those of any other person or entity.

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In this testimony I want to explain the essential legal rationale underlying the administration’s position with respect to the lethal targeting of an American citizen abroad who is believed to be a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or associated forces. I also intend to address some of the misreadings of the administration’s view, which have cast it in a far more menacing light than its rather restrained reality justifies. In fact, as I will explain, there is nothing extraordinary about the administration’s position, which actually claims very little in the way of power to target Americans. The exact contours of the administration’s thinking remain somewhat clouded by its refusal to release the legal memoranda that underlie both its public statements and the leaked “White Paper” that has recently garnered so much attention. What’s more, the precise legal theory may vary somewhat depending on whether military or covert forces do the targeting.

That said, enough is public to draw the following conclusion: No significant aspect of the administration’s position on this subject ought to give rise to concern that it is claiming undue power.

Read the full testimony » (PDF)

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Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Publication: House Committee on the Judiciary

Image Source: Chris Maddaloni

Just Calm Down About that DOJ White Paper

Benjamin Wittes and Susan Hennessey — Tue, 05 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared on Lawfare.

Okay, everyone, take a deep breath. Chill out. The DOJ’s “White Paper” on targeted killing is no big deal. Really.

You wouldn’t know this from reading the somewhat breathless press coverage of the document, much of which offers a reasonable reader some confusion as to what the White Paper actually is.

The more responsible reporters have been reasonably careful. Michael Isikoff’s original story for NBC News calls the document a “confidential Justice Department memo,” and a “confidential Justice Department ‘white paper.’” Isikoff goes one to say that, “Although not an official legal memo, the white paper was represented by administration officials as a policy document that closely mirrors the arguments of classified memos on targeted killings by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.” Isikoff then says, rather more tendentiously, that the document authorizes the killing of U.S. citizens who are top operational Al Qaeda figures “even if there is no intelligence indicating they are engaged in an active plot to attack the U.S.” This latter point is, to put it mildly, a stretch.

Charlie Savage and Scott Shane in the New York Times refer to the document as “[t]he unsigned and undated Justice Department ‘white paper.’” They note that,

The paper is not the classified memorandum in which the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel signed off on the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric who was born in New Mexico and who died in an American drone strike in Yemen in September 2011. But its legal analysis—citing a national right to self-defense as well as the laws of war—closely tracks the rationale in that document, as described to The New York Times in October 2011 by people who had read it.

The document, they write, “appears to be a briefing paper that was derived from the real legal memorandum in late 2011 and provided to some members of Congress.”

But to read some of the other stories on the subject, you might think that the Obama administration had crafted and released to the Hill a “White Paper” that staked out bold new ground on killing Americans. It hasn’t. What has happened, rather, is that a document has been leaked that tracks closely previous public statements by the administration and that adds marginal flesh to those statements in some respects.

Let’s start by clearing up what this document is and isn’t. In the wake of the Al Aulaqi strike, there were widespread calls for the release of the OLC memo proclaiming the strike legal. This produced, inside the administration, a discussion regarding what the administration could and could not release about that memo. There were, loosely speaking four possibilities: (1) say nothing, (2) give a speech, (3) release a white paper, and (4) release a redacted version of the memo itself. The interagency process being what it is, the real debate was between the second and third options. And ultimately, the speech idea prevailed. In a speech at Northwestern University last March, Attorney General Eric Holder laid out the case that the killing of a person like Al Aulaqi (though he did not address the case specifically) would be lawful under both international law and the U.S. Constitution—and that it would not violate the targeted person’s due process rights.

The White Paper, however, had been drafted, and while it was never released publicly, it was apparently given to people on the Hill. Like Holder’s speech, it tracks the OLC memo—and it goes into somewhat more detail on certain points than Holder did. But here’s the thing: It’s the same argument. Nobody who has read and understood Holder’s Northwestern speech can reasonably be surprised by anything about this document. The argument is old hat—and we have known for almost a year that this was the administration’s view.

Both Holder and the White Paper set forth three essential conditions for targeting a U.S. citizen in a foreign country, when that individual is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or its associated forces. Both Holder and the White Paper make clear that there may be other circumstances under which targeting of citizens would be lawful and appropriate. But both argue that targeting is lawful at least if these three conditions are met. Holder elaborates less on each of these conditions, but his speech and the new document track very closely.

First, both Holder and the White Paper argue, the individual must pose an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. Second, capture must not be feasible. And third, the operation must be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.

So what does the White Paper really add to Holder’s speech? The short answer is not all that much, a little bit of flesh on some bones here and there, but nothing—and we mean nothing—that fundamentally changes the argument.

Here’s what’s new:

Holder’s speech, as we noted, includes the condition that “capture is not feasible.” He notes that feasibility is a “fact-specific” and “time-sensitive” question. And according to Holder, the inquiry into feasibility is guided by assessing the window of opportunity to effectuate a capture before a terrorist attack takes place and the ability to do so without “undue risk to civilians or U.S. personnel.” The White Paper elaborates a little bit. It says that “capture would not be feasible if it could not be physically effectuated during the relevant window of opportunity or if the relevant country were to decline to consent to a capture operation” (emphasis added). The White Paper also adds a feature to this condition, noting not only that “capture [must be] infeasible” for a strike to be lawful, but that “the United States [must] continue[] to monitor whether capture becomes feasible.” In other words, capture must not be feasible in the immediate moment, and there must be some ongoing assessment of the potential for capture as time goes on. Later, in discussion of the applicable laws of war, the White Paper also states that the United States would be “required to accept a surrender if it was feasible to do so.” So there’s a little added texture on the feasibility of capture question.

The White Paper adds a little more to Holder’s speech on the imminence requirement. This section of the paper has generated a lot of criticism from commentators like Kevin Jon Heller and Jameel Jaffer. But whether one agrees with these critics or not, the White Paper’s position should, again, come as no surprise. Holder, after all, said back in March:

The evaluation of whether an individual presents an “imminent threat” incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United States. As we learned on 9/11, al Qaeda has demonstrated the ability to strike with little or no notice—and to cause devastating casualties. Its leaders are continually planning attacks against the United States, and they do not behave like a traditional military—wearing uniforms, carrying arms openly, or massing forces in preparation for an attack. Given these facts, the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning—when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear.

This clearly suggests a more relaxed conception of “imminence” than the immediate temporal implications of the word itself might suggest. And that was well understood at the time Holder gave his speech, both by critics and by defenders of the administration’s position. The White Paper fleshes out this point a little, stating clearly that “imminent threat” includes the operational leader who is “continually planning attacks”:

By its nature, therefore, the threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate. In this context, imminence must incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks on Americans. Thus, a decision maker determining whether an al-Qa’ida operational leader presents an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States must take into account that certain members of al Qa’ida (including any potential target of lethal force) are continually plotting attacks against the United States; that al-Qa’ida would engage in such attacks regularly to the extent it were able to do so; that the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qaida plots as they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur; and that, in light of these predicates, the nation may have a limited window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood of success and reduces the probability of American casualties.

Given this reality, the White Paper concludes, an operational leader of Al Qaeda may be considered to pose an imminent threat if he,

is personally continually involved in planning terrorist attacks against the United States. Moreover, where the al-Qa’ida member in question has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that member’s involvement in al-Qa’ida’s continuing terrorist campaign against the United States would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.

This is hardly a revolutionary advance over March. Indeed, it’s exactly what a reasonable person would have understood the government’s position to be based on Holder’s speech.

What else is new in the White Paper? Holder’s speech does not go into the War Crimes Act or 18 U.S.C. § 1119(b), forbidding the killing of U.S. nationals abroad. The White Paper devotes a section to each, explaining why the targeting of an American citizen who is an operational leader of Al Qaeda would not violate either. Moreover, Holder doesn’t spend time on the Fourth Amendment issues targeting killing might be said to raise—which the White Paper also treats. And while he talks in broad terms about due process, he does not go into the Matthews v. Eldridge analysis that the White Paper undertakes and that Steve critiqued earlier this evening.

But these are not the issues on which the press, or the administration’s critics, are focusing on. And the truth is that the issues that have grabbed all the headlines over the past 24 hours—the claimed authority to kill U.S. citizens under a very narrow set of circumstances—involve only the most incremental advances over what the administration has previously said.

Authors

Benjamin Wittes
Susan Hennessey

Separating Facts from Fiction In Zero Dark Thirty, Hollywood’s Take on the Death of Osama bin Laden

Benjamin Wittes — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

After nearly ten years of diligent CIA intelligence work, U.S. Navy SEALs tracked 9-11 mastermind, Osama bin Laden to his compound in Pakistan and killed him. It was an attack that resonated around the world and is now portrayed in the movie, Zero-Dark-Thirty. Senior Fellow Benjamin Wittes discusses the facts and the myths in Hollywood’s telling of the fateful events leading to the death of the notorious al Qaeda leader.

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Separating Facts from Fiction In Zero Dark Thirty

Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Flowchart: How the Government Handles a Terrorist Threat

Benjamin Wittes and Daniel L. Byman — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 10:59:00 -0500

Authors

How to Handle a Citizen Terrorist? We Have an App for That

Benjamin Wittes and Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 03 Jan 2013 17:22:00 -0500

Ever caught a U.S. citizen you suspected of terrorism, and not known what to do with him? We have an app for you. Sorry, you can’t yet download it for your iPhone—yet—but our Disposition Matrix App is now live over at The Atlantic. [see it on our site here.]

For the past several months, we have been working on a very interesting—and surprisingly complicated—project, trying to think through all of the many iterations of what people mean when they speak of domestic jihadist terrorism. Neither our legal system nor our scholarship offers much in the way of consistency on the subject. So we have been trying to break out all of the different ways these cases present themselves and analyze them separately. Which ones are we really afraid of? Which ones do our laws handle well? Which types of cases really challenge our existing institutions?

As an initial matter, we have been studying the cases in which American citizens have gone abroad to fight against their country. In the course of our work, the Washington Post published its famous “disposition matrix” series. So we thought it would be interesting to reverse-engineer a crude kind of disposition matrix flowchart based on the citizen cases we had examined. That is, faced with a citizen suspected of allying himself with al Qaeda, what are the questions that would lead authorities to, say, an extradition request, a federal court indictment, or the launching of a Hellfire missile?

The convoluted nature of the flowchart gives, we think, some visual sense of why consistency across these cases is so difficult. The true disposition matrix is, of course, prospective, not reverse-engineered, and it’s not just about citizens either. And it’s way more complicated than this one. But the complexity of even this flowchart gives a sense of the many moving pieces in these cases—that is, why they are so hard.

(Many thanks, by the way, to Christopher Ingraham, Brookings’ data visualization guru—who turned our notes into something you might actually want on your iPhone.)

Editor's Note: This post was originally posted on Lawfare.

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Publication: Lawfare

Image Source: JEFFREY S. VIANO

The Internationalization of Law

Tue, 18 Dec 2012 17:30:00 -0500

Event Information

December 18, 2012
5:30 PM - 7:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Ninth Annual Raymond Aron Lecture Featuring Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty and Justice Stephen Breyer

On December 18, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty to deliver the ninth annual Raymond Aron Lecture. A leading French legal scholar, Dr. Delmas-Marty is professor emeritus at the Collège de France and a member of France's Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. After a prestigious career in academia, including visiting professorships in major universities from the Americas to Asia, and advising the French government on constitutional and legal reform, Dr. Delmas-Marty has focused her work at the Collège de France on the internationalization of law.

Dr. Delmas-Marty delivered remarks on how national bodies of law are increasingly being reshaped by transnational forces, including universal human rights norms, economic integration, and global risks, and the challenges this presents in terms of accountability, legitimacy and predictability. She discussed how direct dialogue among the world’s top jurisdictions, such as the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, has also changed conceptions of self-contained national legal systems; and suggest how cross-country comparisons and understanding the evolving nature of international law can help make sense of the rapidly changing legal landscape.

Following Dr. Delmas-Marty's remarks, U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer offered a response. Justice Breyer was nominated to the Supreme Court by President Clinton and took his seat in 1994. A former law clerk to Justice Arthur Goldberg, he held many prominent offices in both the executive and the judicial branches of the federal government, and was also a professor of Law at Harvard University, a visiting professor in various universities, and the author of numerous books and articles.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and Brookings Senior Fellow Benjamin Wittes moderated the discussion. After the program, panelists took audience questions. The Raymond Aron lecture series, named after the renowned scholar of post-war France, annually features leading French and American scholars and statesmen speaking on critical issues affecting the transatlantic relationship.

Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?

Wed, 07 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 7, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings hosted a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results could affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists discussed the approach of the second Obama term, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.

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Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?

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Transcript (.pdf)

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20121107_election_day

Campaign 2012: The Global Economy and China

Tue, 09 Oct 2012 13:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 9, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

United States-China relations have been at the forefront of domestic and foreign policy discussions throughout this campaign season. Since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s economy has been established as a major player in the global economy and continues to grow. The country’s rise has significant implications for U.S. trade and defense policies, particularly on contentious issues like the global financial crisis, nuclear proliferation, military operations in nearby waters and air space and intellectual property rights. As both nations face daunting political and economic challenges, how can the next president improve relations with China while ensuring America’s success in the global economy?

On October 9, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on the global economy and China, the last in a series of forums that have identified and addressed the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. Campaign 2012 Project Director Benjamin Wittes moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Kenneth Lieberthal, Jonathan Pollack, Richard Bush, and Joshua Meltzer, who presented recommendations for the next president.

Participants may follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #BIChina.

Download papers from the event:

Establishing Credibility and Trust, by Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Jonathan Pollack
Continue Progress on an Key Trade Relationship, by Joshua Meltzer
Thoughts on China and American Elections, by Richard Bush

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Campaign 2012: The Global Economy and China

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Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening

Tue, 25 Sep 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 25, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Following the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the death of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, the United States is weighing its position and policies in the post-Arab Spring Middle East. More than a year after the initial Arab uprisings, the United States is questioning the state of its relations with the nascent Arab democracies and the emerging Islamist regimes. As the second anniversary of the Arab revolutions approaches, political and economic instability persists alongside growing anti-American sentiment, forcing the United States to adapt its policies to the evolving landscape in the Middle East. With the U.S. election just over six weeks away, many American voters are questioning the presidential candidates’ foreign policy strategies toward the region and wondering how the volatility in the Middle East and North Africa will affect the United States in the months and years ahead.

On September 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on the Arab Awakening, the tenth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. POLITICO Pro defense reporter Stephanie Gaskell moderated a panel discussion where Brookings experts Tamara Cofman Wittes, Shadi Hamid and Raj Desai presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BIArabAwakening.

Download papers from the event:

Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-Orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East, by Shadi Hamid
Three Key Challenges in Confronting the Arab Awakening, by Tamara Cofman Wittes
The Challenge of a Reform Endowment, by Raj M. Desai

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Campaign 2012: Arab Awakening

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Event Materials

The Lawfare Drone Smackdown

Benjamin Wittes — Mon, 24 Sep 2012 17:38:00 -0400

The Lawfare Drone Smackdown started as a kind of joke—a fake grudge match with a friend, in which we both agreed to build drones and hold a dogfight between them. The event—which we decided to publicize on the Lawfare Blog and to which we invited others to join—had a serious side. It was an effort to highlight the proliferation of cheap, powerful robotic technologies to the consumer, technologies that are certain in the not-so-long-run to have important policy implications in areas from privacy to security to aviation safety.

The Smackdown grew; we eventually had five contestants. And after someone else’s drone went missing over Washington, it actually attracted the attention of the Federal Aviation Administration—which asked us to move it out of town.

But in the end, the Smackdown—which finally took place Sunday—came down to cybersecurity. I won it when two children helped me hack my opponents’ drones and ground them.

The video of the event is amusing to watch, but there’s a real lesson in it: Networked computers are vulnerable, and if we depend on something—anything—driven by computers, we ignore the security of its computer systems at our enormous peril. The hacks we used in this instance were elementary—simple enough that children can execute them in real time. They targeted both the on-board computer of the drone itself and the communications channel by which the drone communicates with its controller. I detail all three of them in this post, which also includes these videos—in which I and my youthful accomplices explain each of our attacks:

People tend to think of drones, especially armed drones, as the stuff of government weapons and surveillance systems—tools of foreign policy and military might. That’s right, but it’s incomplete. The Smackdown was a light-hearted way of drawing attention to a facet of the drones debate that gets less attention: We can all have our own personal drone program too, and it doesn’t cost all that much. Prices of hardware are plummeting. Power is increasing. Automation is increasing. Payloads are increasing. We live in a world of distributed threats—one in which you can buy a drone from gadget catalog and control it with your iPhone.

Look at a website called DIYDrones (not a joke), and you’ll see a remarkable number of impressively inexpensive projects of equally impressive power. It is only a matter of time before we have security issues associated with the individual use and development of this sort of technology. And it’s only a matter of time before we come to depend on robotic technologies in a fashion that will make the security of their computer systems enormously important.

The Parrot AR.Drone 2.0—which we all were flying at the Smackdown—is a toy, whose security is unimportant. But the Smackdown is a reminder that we are in the dawn of an era of consumer robotics. And when the robots come, they will make us all more powerful and dangerous. And if we don’t secure them, they will also make us all more vulnerable at the same time.

Authors

Benjamin Wittes

Two Parties, One Policy: Washington's New Consensus on Terrorism

Ritika Singh and Benjamin Wittes — Fri, 14 Sep 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Political parties in the United States, like a spatting couple in a bad marriage, have been fighting over the law of counterterrorism for more than a decade. And like the spatting couple, they have developed an almost rote script for their fight. The script has a logic of its own. It is a comfortable one for both spouses—and the fight is soothing in its own way. Republicans and Democrats alike wrap up some portion of their party’s identity and self-image in the conflict over national-security policy. The fight gives each side the impression—and the confidence—that the other endangers America. And it gives each side something to tell voters about why they should vote one way rather than another.

You already know the script: Democrats see themselves as the rule-of-law party, concerned to restore America’s moral standing in the eyes of the world and to curtail the excesses of the Bush administration. In their rhetorical world, they defend human rights and compliance with international law from the dangerous unilateralists of the right. While the other side is full of cowboys, Democrats work through multilateral institutions. They believe in federal courts. They don’t shred the Constitution. Conversely, Republicans see themselves as the party of security, committed to the law-of-war paradigm and to muscular uses of American power in pursuit of it. In their rhetorical world, trying terrorists in federal courts—even showing basic solicitude for detainees—makes America less safe and reveals a weak-kneed willingness to return to a pre-9/11 law-enforcement mentality. They believe in interrogating the enemy. They don’t do habeas corpus.

The script, at this point, is largely nonsense, masking a remarkable common ground between the parties on the legal and policy issues surrounding terrorism. Like the couple that bickers over trivial matters while sharing attitudes on nearly all the important issues facing their family, the two major political parties have converged on the substance of many of the key questions while continuing to speak in the public domain as though a great gulf separates them.

This is not to say there are no differences between the parties on these issues. There are. But the differences have become subtle—even as the rhetoric has not. Issues that deeply divided the country as recently as four years ago have become matters of consensus, if not in the country at large, certainly in those parts of both political parties that will control the federal government under either Barack Obama or Mitt Romney.

Read the full piece at Commonweal Magazine »

Authors

Ritika Singh
Benjamin Wittes

Publication: Commonweal

Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism

Mon, 10 Sep 2012 15:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 10, 2012
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN3 and online at C-SPAN.org.

With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?

On September 10th, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.

Download papers from the event:

Keeping on Offense: The Next President Should Keep After al Qaeda but Mend Relations with Congress on Terrorism, by Daniel L. Byman and Benjamin Wittes
An Opening for a New Narrative in U.S.-Muslim World Relations, by Stephen R. Grand
What Focusing on Drones and Detention Misses, by Kevin Watkins and Rebecca Winthrop

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Iran’s Challenge for the Next President

Suzanne Maloney and Benjamin Wittes — Mon, 20 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Follow @BICampaign2012
Despite negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program, the diplomatic approach has continued to result in stalemate. Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney and Campaign 2012 director Benjamin Wittes discuss how the next president should handle a defiant Iran.

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Economic Growth and the Presidential Election

Martin Neil Baily and Benjamin Wittes — Mon, 13 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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The economy is shaping up to be the focal point of the 2012 election. Federal government efforts to jumpstart the economy started at the end of the Bush administration, and many of the same policies continued in the Obama administration, which also added a multi-billion dollar package of tax cuts and stimulus spending. Senior Fellow Martin Baily and Campaign 2012 Project Director Benjamin Wittes discuss Obama’s policies, whether they worked, what could have been done differently, and what Mitt Romney might do differently, if he wins the race.

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Counterterrorism a Strong Suit for Obama in Reelection Bid?

Daniel L. Byman and Benjamin Wittes — Mon, 06 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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A soft economy has cemented the focus of the 2012 presidential election on economic issues, with little attention paid to national security, a topic often considered a Republican strength. But with Osama bin Laden dead and no new terror attacks during his term, President Barack Obama isn’t seen as weak on the war on terror. Dan Byman, a senior fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, and Campaign 2012 Project Director Benjamin Wittes break down Obama's counterterrorism record in his first term, and how it will be characterized in the election.

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Campaign 2012: Political and Institutional Reform

Tue, 24 Jul 2012 13:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 24, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Amid hyper-partisan political debate on Capitol Hill and heated arguments over the right size and role of government agencies, policy-making for the federal government has slowed to a crawl. Government officials are hamstrung in their ability to deal with complex policy issues like job growth, immigration and health care in a climate of increasing polarization and a lack of accountability. What kinds of solutions in Congress, the executive branch and the conduct of political campaigns might effectively cut through the gridlock and reform our political structures?

On July 24, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on political and institutional reform, the eighth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. Congressional editor Martin Kady of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts William Galston, Russ Whitehurst and Sarah Binder, who presented recommendations to the next president.

After the program, panelists took questions from the audience.

You can follow the conversation on this event on Twitter using the hashtag #BIPoliticalReform or on our @BICampaign2012 Twitter feed.

Download papers from the event:

Reforming Institutions: The Next President Should Not Miss This Moment to Make Government Work, by William A Galston
Political Realities of Bold Reforms of the U.S. Government, by Grover J. "Russ" Whitehurst
The Depressing Logic of Reform's Bad Prospects, by Sarah A. Binder

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.