<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" media="screen" href="/~d/styles/rss2full.xsl"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" media="screen" href="http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~d/styles/itemcontent.css"?><rss xmlns:a10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:feedburner="http://rssnamespace.org/feedburner/ext/1.0" version="2.0"><channel xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><title>Brookings: Experts - Richard Williamson</title><link>http://www.brookings.edu/experts/williamsonr?rssid=williamsonr</link><description>Brookings Experts Feed</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2012 10:00:00 -0500</lastBuildDate><a10:id>http://www.brookings.edu/rss/experts?feed=williamsonr</a10:id><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 09:40:16 -0400</pubDate><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr" /><feedburner:info uri="brookingsrss/experts/williamsonr" /><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="hub" href="http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/" /><feedburner:emailServiceId>BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr</feedburner:emailServiceId><feedburner:feedburnerHostname>http://feedburner.google.com</feedburner:feedburnerHostname><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{06502822-86E8-4017-AD5C-CE6217A7253C}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/xIl7InC7XEI/09-international-responsibility</link><title>International Responsibility After Libya</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/09%20international%20responsibility/libya_mourner001_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Information
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;January 9, 2012&lt;br /&gt;10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saul/Zilkha Rooms&lt;br/&gt;The Brookings Institution&lt;br/&gt;1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW&lt;br/&gt;Washington, DC 20036&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cvent.com/d/kcqkn6/4W"&gt;Register for the Event&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;The question of international responsibility for protecting civilians at risk has long been a topic of heated debate within the global community. From the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates to the principle of “responsibility to protect,” the international community has grappled with the question of its role in protecting people when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The NATO-led operation to prevent Muammar Qaddafi’s forces from inflicting mass atrocities on Libyan civilians was the first United Nations-authorized military intervention which explicitly invoked the “responsibility to protect” principle as grounds for action.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On January 9, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement hosted a discussion on what the Libyan intervention means for future international efforts to protect civilians. Panelists included Edward Luck, the United Nations special advisor on the responsibility to protect; Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Williamson; and&amp;nbsp;Jared Genser, an international human rights lawyer; Genser&amp;nbsp;is co-editor with Irwin Cotler&amp;nbsp;of &lt;em&gt;The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Times&lt;/em&gt; (Oxford University Press, 2011). Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
After the program, panelists&amp;nbsp;took audience questions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Audio
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://brightcove.vo.llnwd.net/e1/uds/pd/102148458001/102148458001_1377499518001_20120109-international-responsibility-64k-itunes.mp3"&gt;International Responsibility After Libya&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Transcript
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="/~/media/events/2012/1/09-international-responsibility/20120109_international_libya"&gt;Transcript (.pdf)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Materials
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/09-international-responsibility/20120109_international_libya"&gt;20120109_international_libya&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Participants
	&lt;/h4&gt;Panelists&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Irwin Cotler&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Member of Parliament&lt;br/&gt;Canadian House of Commons&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Jared Genser&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Managing Director&lt;br/&gt;Perseus Strategies, LLC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Edward Luck&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect&lt;br/&gt;United Nations&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/xIl7InC7XEI" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2012 10:00:00 -0500</pubDate><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/01/09-international-responsibility?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{A3D2F7AA-D79E-4FC3-9F9F-A16718165871}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/EVywgMMVlFQ/11-atrocity-crimes-williamson</link><title>Obama Takes Steps to Stop Atrocity Crimes</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;I have held foreign policy positions in the last three Republican administrations. Therefore, it is not surprising that I am a skeptic of President Obama&amp;rsquo;s foreign policy and, on occasion, have been a critic. Nonetheless, I am an enthusiastic supporter of the President&amp;rsquo;s recent initiatives to address the scourge of atrocity crimes.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The past 100 years have seen a numbing number of innocents victimized by vicious violence, genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Armenian genocide, Stalin&amp;rsquo;s extermination of tens of millions of his own people, the Nazi Holocaust, Mao&amp;rsquo;s Cultural Revolution, the Cambodian Killing Fields, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, the eastern Congo and the genocide in slow motion in Darfur are only the most horrific. There are many more places less well known where innocents have been the victims of devastating deeds, terrible crimes and systematic cruelty. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
While President Bush&amp;rsquo;s Special Envoy to Sudan, I often visited internally displaced persons in Darfur. I would hear the stories of unspeakable sorrow told by innocent victims. They told me about fire from the sky as Sudan Armed Force Antonov aircrafts and attack helicopters would drop bombs and 55 gallon drums of burning oil down upon villages, followed by army soldiers on the back of flatbed trucks rushing through the village shooting AK 47s indiscriminately. This would be followed by the Arab Jangaweed militias, the so called Devils on horseback and camels, riding into their village burning homes, destroying crops, poisoning wells, killing males &amp;ndash; young boys to old men &amp;ndash; and then raping women and branding them on their thighs with burning hot knives so they could never escape their shame. They would tell me about gathering their surviving children and walking into the desert for days with little water or food to get to camps where they now live in desperate conditions. These poor souls had their homes, their loved ones and their dreams ripped out and destroyed by indiscriminate violence. They struggle to survive. They dare not hope. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
And these atrocities continue. Just last month I was in the eastern Congo where, in the past 15 years, 3 million have died due to conflict and 4 million have been displaced. Some experts estimate that one in every three women has been raped in the eastern Congo. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
In June, the Government of Sudan began an ethnically targeted military campaign in South Kordofan, an area on its southern border. Their planes dropped bombs. There are reports that Sudan Internal Security forces are going door to door committing summary executions based on ethnicity and political affiliation, including how black you are. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Moreover, the grisly sights of the Syrian government&amp;rsquo;s brutal crackdown on innocent demonstrators in Hama and elsewhere in that country crowd our television and newspapers daily. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
It is a mistake to conclude that these atrocity crimes are the result of ancient tribal rivalries or ethnic divisions and therefore inevitable, unstoppable or unpreventable. It is true that such circumstances can be dry kindling for the fire to ignite. But these awful events are invariably the result of powerful people willing to exploit those divisions, to wreak havoc and destruction, to target innocents in order to secure or retain power. Someone, some ones, consciously with clear malice aforethought decided to open the gates of hell. There is planning, organization, usually prepositioning, and often rhetorical conditioning for the atrocities to come. It is unconscionable. It is horrific. But it is not unintentional. It is not spontaneous. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Therefore, there are things that can be done to prevent these crimes before their onslaught. The only options are not benign neglect or military intervention to stop the slaughter of innocents already unleashed. We can and should be on the lookout for these gathering storms and act to derail the chain of events that will lead to massive murder, misery and mayhem. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
After World War II when the full horrors of the Holocaust became known, the civilized world pledged Never Again. Then came the Cambodian Killing Fields, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, the eastern Congo and Darfur. The casualties of innocents mounted, the ravages of rape, dismemberment and other forms of torture continued, the rivers of innocent blood overflowed. When will we give meaning to the pledge Never Again? Do we not have some responsibility to protect these innocents? &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
After 800,000 Tutsis were killed, mostly by machetes, in Rwanda in just 100 days of carnage, President Clinton did act in Bosnia and Kosovo to end ethnic killing. President George W. Bush led in getting a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan. The United Nations deployed former Secretary General Kofi Annan to Kenya in 2008 to negotiate a power sharing arrangement to end the outbreak of ethnic violence following a flawed election. President Obama provided a diplomatic surge to help keep the Referendum for South Sudan&amp;rsquo;s independence on time and peaceful. He also supported the recent UN actions in Cote d&amp;rsquo;Ivoire to stop a breakout of ethnic killing following President Gbango&amp;rsquo;s reluctance to accept his defeat at the polls. These actions deserve praise. But they are episodic, personality driven and set guardrails against atrocity crimes that remain weak and unreliable. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
With added appreciation of the ravages of atrocity crimes and a gathering political will to be more proactive to prevent and mitigate such horrors, it is important to move beyond personality driven actions and reactions to gathering storms. It is important to begin to institutionalize early warning systems, develop doctrines and capacities to respond diplomatically and more robustly when needed, and have an institutional focal point and mechanism to consider intelligence, develop options, and present emerging issues to decision makers. This was the message of an important group headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen in 2008. Their Anti-Genocide Task Force report outlines a number of important specific steps the United States Government could take to deal with these most difficult issues. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
President Obama deserves praise for taking this issue seriously and initiating work for implementation of many of the Task Force&amp;rsquo;s recommendations. For example, he appointed David Pressman as director for war crimes and atrocities within the National Security Council as a focal point for this issue and created a Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations initiative at the Department of Defense. Furthermore, the Obama Administration has given rhetorical support for Genocide prevention in U.S. doctrine and planning documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and supported a recent non-binding resolution passed by the Senate that states that genocide prevention is in the national security interest of the United States. And earlier this month he took further actions that have been too little heralded. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
On August 4th, President Obama directed new steps to prevent mass atrocities and impose new restrictions on serious human rights violators. He created a standing interagency Atrocities Prevention Board to develop prevention strategies and to insure gathering storms in this area are elevated for senior decision-making. This should help identify places of growing concern and provide more time to work with allies and partners to respond and prevent potential atrocities. He also issued a proclamation explicitly barring entry into the United States of any persons who organize or participate in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of human rights. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Will these steps stop atrocity crimes? Will they ensure our pledge of Never Again finally is fulfilled? Unfortunately, surely the answer is no. Tragically man&amp;rsquo;s inhumanity to man and powerful people willing to open the gates of Hell and sponsor horrific actions to gain or keep power will continue. But these concrete steps are important and deserve recognition and support. They will better prepare the United States to anticipate and deal with these horrific crimes, and therefore undoubtedly help prevent some situations from roaring out of control and temper or stop some already inflamed. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
These efforts to imbed combating atrocity crimes into America&amp;rsquo;s foreign policy and to institutionalize various bureaucratic mechanisms for early warning of gathering storms and developing broad ranges of response options are consequential. They are steps in the right direction. And the lives of some innocents will be saved. For this, notwithstanding whatever other differences one might have with the administration, President Obama deserves praise and support.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/williamsonr?view=bio"&gt;Richard Williamson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/EVywgMMVlFQ" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2011 16:40:00 -0400</pubDate><dc:creator>Richard Williamson</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/08/11-atrocity-crimes-williamson?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{BE4F494D-F27A-4D7A-941D-F92B21ED6432}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/zsT_1gYaL4g/16-libya-responsibility</link><title>Libya and the Responsibility to Protect</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/6/16%20libya%20responsibility/libya_mourner001_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Information
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;June 16, 2011&lt;br /&gt;1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saul/Zilkha Rooms&lt;br/&gt;The Brookings Institution&lt;br/&gt;1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW&lt;br/&gt;Washington, DC 20036&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Libyan crisis has brought focus to the critical and complex issue of the &amp;ldquo;responsibility to protect&amp;rdquo; populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In Libya and beyond, the international community is faced with urgent tests of a hotly debated doctrine about when, where and how nations should respond to populations threatened with the gravest international crimes. Now more than ever, real world events are being discussed in terms of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, or R2P, which was adopted by all the world&amp;rsquo;s governments in 2005 and appeared explicitly in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized force in Libya, also invoked the responsibility to protect as part of its argument for action.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On June 16, the Brookings Institution, in cooperation with the United States Institute of Peace, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Humanity United,&amp;nbsp;hosted a discussion exploring the responsibility to protect and the ongoing crisis and NATO intervention in Libya. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Williamson discussed the dilemmas and imperatives that U.S. policymakers face in the Libyan crisis. Sarah Sewall, the founder and faculty director of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations project,&amp;nbsp;addressed issues related to military preparedness and strategy for civilian protection, and Manal Omar, director of Iraq and Iran programs at the United States Institute of Peace, reported on her recent trip to Benghazi and on how international debates about R2P relate to the situation on the ground. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Mike Abramowitz, director of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum&amp;rsquo;s Committee on Conscience,&amp;nbsp;moderated&amp;nbsp;the discussion. Humanity United&amp;rsquo;s Peter Rundlet provided introductory remarks. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
After the program, the speakers&amp;nbsp;took audience questions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Audio
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://brightcove.vo.llnwd.net/e1/uds/pd/102148458001/102148458001_1000299106001_20110616-libya-responsibility-64k-itunes.mp3"&gt;Libya and the Responsibility to Protect&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Transcript
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="/~/media/events/2011/6/16-libya-responsibility/20110616_libya_responsibility"&gt;Transcript (.pdf)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Materials
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/6/16-libya-responsibility/20110616_libya_responsibility"&gt;20110616_libya_responsibility&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Participants
	&lt;/h4&gt;Moderator&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Mike Abramowitz&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Director, Committee on Conscience&lt;br/&gt;United States Holocaust Memorial Museum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;Panelists&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Peter Rundlet&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Vice President&lt;br/&gt;Humanity United&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Manal Omar&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Director, Iraq and Iran Program&lt;br/&gt;United States Institute of Peace&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Sarah Sewall&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Lecturer in Public Policy and Faculty Director, Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project&lt;br/&gt;Harvard University Kennedy School of Government&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/zsT_1gYaL4g" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2011 13:00:00 -0400</pubDate><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/06/16-libya-responsibility?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{6D87C707-5F99-4FED-8356-969773B0423D}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/lMG4cUlknCU/18-sudan-williamson</link><title>The Sudan Referendum: A Moment, Not An End</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ambassador Richard Williamson offers remarks on the January 2011 Sudan Referendum in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is a pleasure to be here to share my views about the situation in Sudan, the recent plebiscite in Southern Sudan and the many challenges ahead. However, first let me congratulate Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen on her recent election to chair the House Committee on Foreign Relations. And let me thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman Howard Berman for inviting me to appear before the Committee and share my perspectives. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Currently I am a principal in the consulting firm of Salisbury Strategies, LLP, senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. It&amp;rsquo;s been my honor and pleasure to serve in a number of government positions, among them was service in three ambassadorships, assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs, and most recently serving as President George W. Bush&amp;rsquo;s special envoy to Sudan where I worked to alleviate the humanitarian suffering in Darfur and for the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;THE VOTE&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From January 9th through January 16th millions of south Sudanese went to the polls to exercise their right of self determination. This right, recognized in the United Nations Charter and in the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, finally came to the long suffering people as a stipulation of the CPA. While during the recent vote there was violence, with a number of tragic deaths, and there were some technical and other difficulties, overall the vote went well.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a moment of satisfaction, even celebration, over the south Sudanese people overcoming decades of death, destruction and despair during which vicious violence and horrendous atrocities were too common afflictions on innocent people. It is a moment in which we should recognize the struggle, stamina and strength of these extraordinary people. The progress is ultimately their hard won achievement. It is the people of south &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan, those living there and those driven from their homes, who seized this opportunity to make their world anew. It is these people who have never given up on their dream to overcome a history of marginalization and violence who we should celebrate: their courage, their commitment, their character. It also is a moment in which we should note the contribution of many remarkable Sudanese leaders such as Dr. John Garang and President Salva Kiir who demonstrated vision, wisdom, political skill and patient guidance. And, notwithstanding their role in the atrocities, their use of proxy militias and their failures to live up to so many of the commitments made in the CPA, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the government of &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan, however reluctantly, allowed the vote to go forward.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Furthermore, the broader International Community has been deeply engaged in assisting this process. The IGAD member states of east Africa and the Troika of the United States, Norway and Great Britain played very useful roles in nurturing discussions and ultimately helping broker agreements that ended the long Sudan North/South Civil War, the longest in Africa which claimed over 2 million lives and displaced over 4 &amp;frac12; million south Sudanese.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;President George W. Bush and his first Special Envoy to &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;Sudan, Senator Jack Danforth, deserve special recognition for the critical, indeed indispensable role played by the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;United States in achieving this peace agreement. And the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;United States has continued to be deeply engaged in nurturing the implementation of the CPA. It is a great example of the power and influence and resources of the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;United States harnessed to good purpose in realizing a major diplomatic achievement and contributing to a more peaceful world. It has been a cause in which there has been common purpose of President Bush and, now, President Obama, and the United States Congress; of Republicans and Democrats.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In spite of that common cause, I was sorely disappointed in the Obama Administration&amp;rsquo;s policies and performance on Sudan during its first 20 months; a poor performance that witnessed a rise in violence and an increase in deaths in Darfur and southern Sudan, decreased flow of humanitarian assistance to the displaced people in Darfur struggling to survive in desperate conditions, multiple violations of commitments absent United States government rebuke and an erosion of the principle of accountability. However, and this is significant, President Obama&amp;rsquo;s personal involvement in Sudan policy and diplomacy since last September and a general United States diplomatic surge, undoubtedly have contributed to the vote going forward. &amp;nbsp;The administration deserves recognition and praise for its renewed focus.. I would like in particular to single out Ambassador Princeton Lyman, an able and experienced foreign service officer, who agreed to come back into government service when asked to do so and help this process the past four months.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More generally, the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;United States, the United Nations and many, many other donor countries have continued to assist the south Sudanese with significant humanitarian assistance and development aid, often coordinated through the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan donors consortium. And the United Nations peacekeepers (UNMIS) have helped crowd out the space for violence. Also, it is important to acknowledge the extraordinary efforts made by thousands of civilians in a large number of Sudanese and international non-governmental organizations who have labored tirelessly, often in very difficult conditions, to help the south Sudanese during this critical transition period. While serving as the President&amp;rsquo;s Special Envoy to &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;Sudan, I witnessed the good work of these dedicated people and visited with them in &lt;city&gt;&lt;/city&gt;Khartoum,
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Juba and in the camps. They are extraordinary individuals dedicated to a cause greater than themselves. They provide medical assistance, help supply basic needs, assist in helping improve governance and so many other activities crucial to the survival of so many Sudanese in need in the south, Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. Their continued efforts are necessary and require support if the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan people are to achieve a better future. Many are true heroes whose selfless work will not receive wide recognition but to whom all are indebted who hope for a better, more peaceful, more stable and more prosperous &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally I want to acknowledge the contribution of the dedicated advocacy community in the &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;United States and abroad who have kept a lasar focus on developments in &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan and sought to ring the bell and alert those in public office to developments and hold them accountable when they felt their leaders were falling short in their responsibilities. Yes, while I served as the President&amp;rsquo;s Special Envoy to Sudan I felt their heat from time to time, I felt its discomfort and often disagreed with their critiques; just as from time to time I heard constructive criticisms from some members of Congress; but I never questioned their motives, their commitment and, truth be told, they helped me do a better job. Similarly, I believe that community of dedicated humanitarians in their advocacy will continue to play a vital role going forward.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So I repeat, the voting that just ended is an extraordinary moment toward which many contributed; and for which the south Sudanese themselves deserve the lion&amp;rsquo;s share of the recognition and credit. It is appropriate to celebrate this moment just as it is appropriate also to recognize the contributions of so many others. But this is not the end of the story. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, this is not the end, however, it may be the beginning of the end. And the most perilous period lies yet ahead. To have travelled so far and through such costly and treacherous waters at such sacrifice of human life, it would be unconscionable now to not see this process to its successful conclusion. A sustainable peace is achievable, we can see that now; but it definitely is not inevitable. And the history, habits and heritage of &lt;country-region&gt;&lt;/country-region&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Sudan has been vicious violence; not conciliation, cooperation and compromise. The pattern and practice has been retribution, not renewal and rebirth.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes, note and applaud the achievement; but we cannot lose sight that the goal was not the vote but a sustainable peace where long marginalized people can live in dignity and seek their dreams in freedom. It is not a time for &amp;ldquo;gold stars and cookies;&amp;rdquo; it is time for robust diplomacy. There must be a combination of incentives and credible threats of coercive steps if negotiations are not in good faith, deals are broken or there is a resort to violence. As &lt;city&gt;&lt;/city&gt;
&lt;place&gt;&lt;/place&gt;Bismarck once said, diplomacy without the credible threat of force is like written music without instruments. To finish the job that has begun, we need incentives and we need steel.
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;OUTSTANDING ISSUES&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Extremely difficult problems, especially those that have been surrounded by a long history of marginalization, discrimination and injustice; violence and atrocities; mayhem and murder; and a path of broken promises and breached commitments are not resolved by agreements in principle, frameworks or promises to negotiate in good faith.&amp;nbsp; Detailed, specific and verifiable commitments must be reached.&amp;nbsp; As President Ronald Reagan used to say, &amp;ldquo;Trust but verify.&amp;rdquo;&amp;nbsp; And the outstanding issues between south and north Sudan are very difficult indeed.&amp;nbsp; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The five contested border areas, oil revenue sharing, the future of Abyei, popular consultations, citizenship, security, liabilities and currency are just some of the most urgent matters that must be resolved before a separation can occur with any chance of success.&amp;nbsp; None of these fundamental issues is new.&amp;nbsp; They have been long acknowledged.&amp;nbsp; The processes for resolution of many were stipulated in the CPA.&amp;nbsp; But as we meet today they are not resolved.&amp;nbsp; The uncertainty around their resolution adds to the tension and instability that lingers.&amp;nbsp; They create a haunting specter that darkens the path forward and puts at grave risk any chance of real, sustainable progress.&amp;nbsp; Left unresolved, it is hard to imagine the results of the Referendum being honored and a future without a return to the terrible times of terror and tragedy in the south.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;THE CONTEXT&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To set a successful strategy, one must examine the history, heritage and habits in Sudan. And one must be mindful of past performance; promises kept and promises broken. And especially in Sudan, it is prudent to be mindful of practices used to achieve goals; including how frequently there has been a resort to violence and the particularly brutal ways in which campaigns of violence have been prosecuted. In the case of north and south Sudan, it is not a pretty story. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Going back at least to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, Sudan has had a history of favoritism for a minority of Sudanese in the north who are Arab and Muslim, and severe marginalization of those in the periphery who are not. This discrimination permeated all areas of life. Power and privilege were reserved for the Arab Muslims of the north. Among the denial and discrimination of those on the periphery, such as the southerners, were in areas of education, health care, economic opportunities, political participation and justice. Tragically, this gross discrimination continued into the 20th century under the British. When Sudan achieved independence in 1956, the reins of power were handed over to the same minority that had held privileged positions in the colonial period. Unsurprisingly, the new government continued the discrimination. Of course, this fragmentation and marginalization have prevented the people from gaining any sense of shared community, common cause or nationhood. This has been accentuated by periodic efforts of the government to impose Islamist Sharia law upon the south. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
I once asked an old Sudan hand how the government could do such awful things to their own people. His reply was instructive. He said, &amp;ldquo;They don&amp;rsquo;t believe those people are their own.&amp;rdquo; &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
During the decades of war, the north armed Arab militias. They engaged in coordinated attacks of the Sudan Armed Forces and their Arab militia proxies in the south. They targeted innocent civilians. Fire fell from the sky and atrocities were committed. Over 2 million died. 4 &amp;frac12; million were displaced. And we should remember that rebel movements also on occasion committed terrible deeds. In Sudan there are no white hats but among the innocent civilians who have been and continue to be preyed upon. Nonetheless, there is a stark difference between those with the dusty brown hats and those with the darkest black hats on whose hands is the stain of so much innocent blood. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
As I have already noted, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a great diplomatic achievement that ended the worst violence. It charted a six year transition period in which a number of critical issues were to be resolved leading up to the plebiscite on separation just completed. It invited an effort by the north to make unity attractive. This was not an invitation acted upon, and the probable vote for separation is the consequence of the north&amp;rsquo;s inability or unwillingness to take steps to unify the country and forge a common identity of equality and respect and shared identity. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Let&amp;rsquo;s look at some of the agreements made in the CPA. The north agreed to disarm the Arab militias. It has not done so. Indeed, there are ample reports that during the past two years the north has supplied more arms to their Arab militia proxies in the south and other areas in anticipation of renewed large scale fighting. The north agreed to disband their proxy militias. They have not done so. The north and the south agreed to the creation of the Abyei Border Commission, a new independent international panel of experts, to study the history of the area and determine the border between the north and the south; and the north and the south both committed to accept the border determination of the Commission. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
That body was created, did substantial research and issued its determination of the appropriate border demarcation. Their decision was not precisely what either the south or the north had hoped for. As it had committed, the south accepted the Abyei Border Commission border decision. The north did not. The north and south agreed to an oil revenue sharing arrangement during the transition up to the Referendum. Integral to that agreement was the stipulation that the north ensure a transparent process and accounting for the ongoing implementation of the oil revenue sharing. The north has failed to be transparent. After the May, 2008, Abyei flair up during which Sudan Armed Forces stayed in their barracks while Misseriya Arabs burned the city to the ground displacing over 50,000 south Sudanese, the south and north agreed to the Abyei Road Map. Among the matters addressed was once again dealing with the contested border areas. Both parties agreed to submit the issue to the Permanent Arbitration Court in The Hague. The south and the north agreed to be bound by the Court&amp;rsquo;s decision. That determination was less favorable to the south than the Abyei Border Commission&amp;rsquo;s demarcation line. Nonetheless, the south lived up to its commitment and accepted the Court&amp;rsquo;s decision. The north did not. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Suffice it to say that there is a clear pattern. And that pattern does not suggest that it would be prudent to accept on faith any conceptual agreements, any deals in principle, nor even any specific detailed agreements unless and until they are monitored and verified. To do otherwise would be worse than being naive, it would be irresponsible. It would invite violations, disappointment, and, in all likelihood, it would invite a return to large scale violence in which more innocents will die. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Furthermore, it must be remembered that violence in the south increased in 2009 and increased further in 2010. Casualties rose in 2009 and rose further in 2010. Deaths increased. And there are reputable reports that the north had further armed some of their agents of destruction during this period. Indeed, just one week before the Referendum, the United Nations verified that Sudan Armed Force aircraft had dropped 18 bombs in the south. Compared to the scales of violence and the casualty rate during the war, this was low intensity violence. But that is little comfort to those who are dead or their loved ones left behind. And it suggests a willingness to return to violence as a legitimate instrument to pursue political objectives. This too should argue against any leap of faith for good intentions or rush to overstate progress in the slender hope of substantial progress. It suggests the requirement of specific, detailed commitments on all the critical matters and verification of each and every step with appropriate incentives and adequate sanction for nonperformance. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
The challenges in the coming months also include severe stress on both the Government of Sudan in Khartoum and the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba which must be taken into account. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
In the south, competing ambitions among various prominent political personalities, militia factions and tribes have been submerged to make a united cause against the north and move toward separation. As the votes are counted and the path traveled toward independence, we can expect that many of those ambitions will be unleashed. The jockeying for power will be robust. The stress on President Salva Kiir will be considerable. While the President&amp;rsquo;s Special Envoy to Sudan I came to appreciate Salva as the indispensible man to keep the competing interests within the south harnessed to the common cause of full CPA implementation and to restrain the considerable political pressure to lash out against the north for their misdeeds and agreement violations. But he will be seen by some natural competitors in the south as less indispensible as separation approaches. His room to maneuver and compromise on outstanding issues with the north will become increasingly circumscribed. The stress will grow and it will be inhospitable to being overly accommodating to the north&amp;rsquo;s demands. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
In the north, the government&amp;rsquo;s legitimacy will be challenged by some for having agreed to dismember Sudan. Already there are reports of various opposition leaders conspiring to unify to bring down the government. But then in Sudan &amp;ldquo;conspiracies&amp;rdquo; always seem to be a robust growth industry. Such rumors are not new. And it must be considered that some might overstate the vulnerability of the government to exact support for the north&amp;rsquo;s positions in negotiations or to exact benefits from the credulous outsiders. There might be further stress on the government from rebel movements in Darfur or other disaffected areas that sense vulnerability in Khartoum and want to seize the moment to advance their cause and address their grievances. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
A final note regarding the context is to review the past patterns and practices of all the parties in dealing with disputes. My experience is that the north is well practiced in the art of addressing critical issues that have achieved international attention and concern. They like to set up elaborate processes to address the outstanding issues. They like to deliberate, and discuss, and debate and delay; and then discuss and deliberate and delay some more. Meanwhile the process itself is a form of denial. The international community&amp;rsquo;s attention wonders to other pressing issues. The urgency seems to have passed. The circumstances have not changes, but the crisis atmosphere passes. Meanwhile, the south is too trusting and willing to hope for the good faith of their interlocutors. Surely this time Khartoum means what it says. But Khartoum does not. Should the United States encourage such a leap of faith? And as we approach the July date for separation, as the political pressure grows, the anticipation and risks, will Washington succumb to the temptation to pressure those we believe most responsive to our sway and coercion, the south, to accept more concessions to satisfy the north?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;THE PATH FORWARD&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is appropriate to celebrate this moment of a credible Referendum in Sudan as stipulated in the CPA. It is a considerable achievement in which the United States played a significant role, including the efforts of the Obama administration during the past 4 months. But it is only a moment. The heavy lifting remains to be done. The critical issues remain unresolved. The stakes are high. The time is short. And the cost of failure will be paid in innocent Sudanese blood. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Like Charlie Brown and Lucy every autumn, shouldn&amp;rsquo;t we expect that despite promises and commitments and pledges of good faith that once again as Charlie Brown runs up to the football and swings to kick it that Lucy, at the last moment, will pull the football away and Charlie Brown will swing his foot and land on his backside? &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
We should not put much stock in any agreements in principle or frameworks or agreements to negotiate to agree on any of these critical issues. We should not give &amp;ldquo;cookies and gold stars&amp;rdquo; in anticipation or hopes of progress. It is time to be realistic, keep our eyes wide open, be tough minded and demand specific verifiable agreements and the means to monitor performance. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
There should be some transparency on the pace and good faith efforts of all parties during the upcoming negotiations. The heat must be on both parties. Neither can be allowed to stall to gain last minute advantage. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Throughout the Bush administration, the United States Government engaged with all the parties in Sudan. During negotiations incentives were discussed and penalties stipulated. When commitments were breached and actions taken that violated innocent Sudanese, at the very least, vigorous public condemnations were expressed. And, under President Bush, the United States Government clearly supported the principle of accountability in Sudan and took steps to oppose impunity. In Sudan to offer incentives with no credible threat is neither smart nor effective. To provide rewards for past commitments haltingly and imperfectly lived up to is overpaying for obligations to which the parties have already subscribed and weakening your hand when the heavy lifting that lies yet ahead. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Finally, the north/south issues, including full implementation of the CPA, cannot and should not be dealt with in isolation to the continuing marginalization of the peripheries, and the genocide in slow motion in Darfur. Before the United States becomes too generous with various incentives, we must alleviate the humanitarian suffering and bring an end to the death, destruction and despair in Darfur. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Finally, regarding Sudan&amp;rsquo;s designation on the Terror List initiated by the Clinton administration. I am not current on the Government of Sudan&amp;rsquo;s activities with Hamas, a foreign terrorist organization, but we know there has been some past activities. Nor am I briefed on Khartoum&amp;rsquo;s current areas of cooperation with United States intelligence services. But we can agree that before the administration formally informs Congress of any intention to lift Sudan, or any other country, from the State Sponsor list that the case must be made on the merits and not tilted due to some other political considerations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CONCLUSION&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Sudanese people have suffered greatly. They have endured more than any people should ever endure. The Government of Sudan has a responsibility to protect the people living within their borders.&amp;nbsp;Instead of meeting this responsibility they have perpetuated atrocities and suffering on their own people.&amp;nbsp;Innocent people have been targeted due to ethnicity, race and region. The United States and others also have a responsibility, a responsibility which we have not met, to help the afflicted, the marginalized, the innocent victims.&amp;nbsp;At this moment when some progress has been made we must press on for a just resolution consistent with the CPA that will provide an opportunity for sustainable stability and renewal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/williamsonr?view=bio"&gt;Richard Williamson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Publication: House Committee on Foreign Relations 
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/lMG4cUlknCU" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 18 Jan 2011 00:00:00 -0500</pubDate><dc:creator>Richard Williamson</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/01/18-sudan-williamson?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{B4105C21-8CB2-4AF4-AA51-3CEDF7B65BAE}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/ZmqT3b7qr98/06-sudan</link><title>Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Prospects for Sudan’s Future</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/1/06%20sudan/sudan_southern001_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Information
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;January 6, 2011&lt;br /&gt;1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EST&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Falk Auditorium&lt;br/&gt;The Brookings Institution&lt;br/&gt;1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW&lt;br/&gt;Washington, DC&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://guest.cvent.com/d/fdqtqs/4W"&gt;Register for the Event&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;As Southern Sudan’s self-determination referendum approaches, the country faces one of the most important moments in its history. A culminating event of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the referendum, scheduled for January 9, 2011, will be important for the future of the country and the region.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On January 6, in advance of the referendum, the Managing Global Insecurity Project at Brookings hosted a discussion of the impact and implications of the referendum and the prospects for sustainable peace in the country. As Minister of International Development of Norway, Hilde F. Johnson played a pivotal role in the CPA negotiations. She discussed her new book &lt;em&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.sussex-academic.com/sa/titles/politics_ir/johnson.htm"&gt;Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/em&gt;(Sussex Academic Press, 2010), based on her experiences and her unique access to the parties and the talks. Johnson was joined by Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ), who commented on the potential outcomes of the referendum and Gayle Smith, National Security Council senior director for development and democracy, who discussed the regional implications of the referendum as well as her own personal experience working as a journalist in Africa. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Rich Williamson, who served as special envoy to Sudan during the Bush Administration, also joined the discussion.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Senior Fellow Michael O'Hanlon, director of research for Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. After the program, panelists took audience questions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Video
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_740819553001_20110106-smith.mp4"&gt;Political Capital Must be Invested in Sudan&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_740809885001_20110106-williamson.mp4"&gt;Centuries-Old Issues to Resolve&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_740809856001_20110106-hilde.mp4"&gt;Referendum May Spark Some Violence&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Audio
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_740769704001_20110106-sudan-referendum-64k-itunes.mp3"&gt;Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Prospects for Sudan’s Future&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Transcript
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="/~/media/events/2011/1/06-sudan/20110106_sudan"&gt;Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Materials
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/1/06-sudan/20110106_sudan"&gt;20110106_sudan&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Participants
	&lt;/h4&gt;Panelists&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Hilde F. Johnson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Deputy Executive Director&lt;br/&gt;UNICEF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;The Honorable Donald Payne (D-N.J.)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Committee on Foreign Relations&lt;br/&gt;U.S. House of Representatives&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Gayle Smith&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Development and Democracy&lt;br/&gt;National Security Council&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/ZmqT3b7qr98" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2011 13:00:00 -0500</pubDate><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/01/06-sudan?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{C0CC7544-D475-46D0-B3C3-561CFAB40E0F}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/lmtCSpUGQgg/30-sudan-divestment-williamson</link><title>The Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/images/s/su%20sz/sudan_protest001_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ambassador Richard Williamson discusses the importance of the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act in testimony before the U.S. House of Representives Subcommittee on International Monteary Policy and Trade on November 30, 2010. &lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I want to thank Chairman Meeks and Congressman Gary Miller and the other members of the Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade for holding this hearing on the Sudan Accountability and Investment Act (SADA) and for inviting me to testify today.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;During the past 30 years I have held a variety of diplomatic positions including three Ambassadorial posts, served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and most recently as President George W. Bush’s Special Envoy to Sudan.  I am now in the private sector where, among other things, I am a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute and I am a Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.  I also have written extensively about the sad situation in Sudan.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;This hearing to “review how SADA has been utilized and consider recommendations for improvements” is timely and important.  I hope my observations will constructively contribute to your ongoing deliberations.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;As a general rule, I am not an enthusiast for economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.  And I generally am a skeptic about investment divestiture policies.  Admittedly, often short of unacceptable robust actions, economic sanctions are the preferred available coercive diplomatic step.  And divestiture campaigns, on occasion, have proven successful.  The case of the divestment campaign against the apartheid regime in South Africa seems to be most frequently cited by proponents of this penalty.  But these are imperfect, blunt instruments.  Often the impact is difficult to quantify.  There is collateral damage to innocents, often the very people subjected to the repression of the oppressors targeted by these punitive measures.  Sometimes the intended target, a regime engaged in unacceptable behavior, displays the capacity to hunker down and endure.  And often these steps cause discomfort, dislocation, and even distress but are not decisive in deterring abhorrent behavior.  The act of applying these punitive measures meanwhile can give a sense of addressing an issue of concern without making substantive progress in resolving the real problems.  In sum, however well intended, these steps often fail to drive the change in behavior desired.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Not with standing my general concerns about these instruments of foreign policy, I strongly support the continued application of the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act.  Its application, among other things and along with other measures, brings into question the legitimacy of the Government of Sudan.  This challenge is appropriate so long as Khartoum engages in unacceptable behavior including its failure to live up to its Responsibility to Protect its own people.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;I am not before you today as an expert on the intricacies of the application of SADA nor can I authoritatively comment on its impact on the economy of Sudan and the consequent stress it may be creating for the Government of Sudan.  But I am intimately familiar with the tragic events on the ground in Sudan and the need to keep pressure on the regime in Khartoum, especially at this time during the run up to the Referendum stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement now scheduled for January 9, 2011, and while the horrific “genocide in slow motion” relentlessly continues in Darfur.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;
      &lt;strong&gt;North/South Conflict and the Referendum&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The North/South conflict in Sudan blighted this country from its independence from Britain in 1956.  Except for an interregnum from 1973 to 1983, this war raged on during which 2 million people, overwhelmingly innocent non-combatants,  perished and over 4 million were displaced. Finally a fragile peace was reached with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005.  The United States played a central role in hammering out this complex deal which dealt with a wide diversity of difficult issues.  Pivotal to the CPA was the provision to hold a referendum in 20ll that would allow Southern Sudanese to vote on unity or independence.  The date currently agreed to for this plebiscite is January 9, 2011.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;So far despite numerous breaches the CPA has held, but often by a very thin thread.  And the possibility for large-scale fighting disrupting the Referendum or soon thereafter to derail the will of the people is a clear and present danger.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Since signing the CPA, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum has continued to marginalize the South, denying full political participation and perpetuating economic and other forms of discrimination.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The North also has failed to live up to many of its other CPA commitments.  It did not disarm and demobilize the Arab militias it used as proxy warriors against the South.  It did not create the fully integrated North/South army and police units.  It did not hold national and local elections on time or in a free and fair manner.  It has not provided transparent accounting of oil revenue.  It did not live up to commitments to accept agreed-upon procedures to demarcate contested border areas: first by Abyei Boundaries Commission created by the CPA and then by the Permanent Court of Arbitration based in The Hague.  And the North has provided arms to Arab tribes and incited violence that last year claimed more than 1,000 more South Sudanese lives.  The list goes on.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Furthermore, the North has failed repeatedly to meet deadlines to arbitrate issues related to the referendum such as citizenship, freedom of movement, and treaties.  It was slow to form the referendum commission and failed to set up the machinery to hold the referendum on time.  Many observers believe current talks on these issues are part of a well-established pattern by Northern leaders of setting up elaborate and complicated forums for discussing, deliberating, and eventually denying commitments they never intended to honor in the first place.  Meanwhile, their leverage grows.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;As Francis Deng, former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Sudan, has written in his new book, &lt;em&gt;Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity&lt;/em&gt;, “It is easy to see that the North, which has dominated the unity framework as conventionally understood, would want to sustain that framework, with all it offers in terms of control over power, wealth, services, development opportunities, and the definition of the country as Arab and Islamic.”&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;For me watching the unfolding situations in Sudan is not an academic exercise nor are the casualties dry statistics.  I have listened to the victims of the violence tell their heart wrenching stories.  I have seen the carnage.  I have smelled the smoking wreckage of Abyei after it was burnt to the ground.  I have visited displaced persons in Agok living under plastic sheets during the rainy season trying to hold onto life in desperate conditions.  The murder, mayhem and misery are the daily reality for so many South Sudanese.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;In May 2008 Abyei, a large town in an area which remains contested between the North and South, suffered a terrible flash point of violence.  There were casualties and up to 50,000 people fled their homes.  I visited Abyei just days after the terrible destruction.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Where just days earlier thousands of families lived, laughed, and loved, there were only remnants of lives lost.  Moving down the dirt roads, except for three teenage soldiers carrying Kalashnikovs, there was no one.  As far as I could see were burnt out huts, here and there blackened metal bed frames and chairs, scattered fragments of clothes, burnt out 55 gallon water drums, the occasional charred skeleton of a truck , the contorted remnants of a child’s bicycle, smoke rising from smoldering remnants.  Tens of thousands instantly added to the casualty list of Sudan’s endless violence.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The violence is brutal and barbaric.  The stories of such death, destruction, devastation and deep despair are too common.  They are imbedded in the lives of the survivors.  Peace of mind is unknown.  Aspirations are fragile.  Hope seems unattainable.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The CPA offered a six year window for the North to make unity attractive.  It has failed to do so.  No observer familiar with the situation believes the Southerners will not vote for independence.  But major concerns remain unaddressed such as oil revenue and a final resolution of Abyei’ status.  The long history of broken promises, marginalization, and violence as acceptable instruments of power has led both the North and South to prepare for renewed war.   Tensions are high and rising.  The prospect of a peaceful, credible referendum is precarious.  &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Last week there were reports that the North engaged in an aerial attack on the South that wounded four Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army soldiers.  The SPLA said this was part of the North’s efforts to try “to drag Sudan back into war again and to disrupt or prevent the referendum.”&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The pro-government daily Akhir-Lahza reported that last week President Omar al-Bashir’s adviser for security affairs, Salah Gosh, delivered  a speech at a public rally at Karima town in which he “accused the SPLM of refusing to sign agreements relating to post-referendum arrangements under the influence of the United States.”  According to the Sudan Tribune, “The presidential adviser also claimed that the U.S. had asked the SPLM not to cede the central contested area of Abyei, saying that Washington has ‘hijacked’ the ex-Southern rebel group. … Gosh warned that Abyei would remain part of the north whether through a bilateral agreement, the referendum or through war and peace.”&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Concerned interested parties, including the United States, are offering incentives to the North if they follow through on the agreements they already have made and the referendum proceeds on schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Therefore, I think it is important to note that the Referendum voting to begin January 9, 2011 is not an end.  It may not even be the beginning of the end.  Yes, it will be a milestone.  But that plebiscite is only a step in a process scheduled to continue for at least six months in which a number of crucial issues will be negotiated regarding separation.  The South believes that July, 2011, is a firm deadline.  The North has said it is a soft target.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;The incentives tendered by President Special Envoy Gration, and more recently by Senator Kerry, have left unrealistic expectations in Khartoum.  However well intended, these promises may make the situation worse.  Failure to deliver promptly on these proffered benefits will add to the turmoil that may lead to tragedy.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;It is my experience of meeting and negotiating and dealing with all the leading personalities in Sudan that the Government of Sudan needs strict and specific and severe consequences tied to verifiable concrete steps to get progress on alleviating humanitarian suffering and living up to its commitments.  Engagement is important, but it is merely a beginning.  Incentives may be useful. But history shows they are insufficient.  Therefore, this is not time to ease SADA but to reaffirm a commitment to it and, if anything, to strengthen it.  &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;
      &lt;strong&gt;Darfur&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;It is important to recognize that Darfur is integrally intertwined with the ongoing Sudan North/South difficulties.  The root cause of conflict in both areas is a pattern, practice and precedent of marginalizing the peripheries by the powerful Arab Muslims at the center.  In Darfur, the vast majority of the people are not Arab and they are not Muslim.  &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Throughout the period of colonial subjection during the Ottoman Empire in the 19&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; century and then the British Empire up to 1956, the northern Arabs of Sudan along the Nile River were favored and all those outside this central area were marginalized.  It was a way to control this geographically large and enormously diverse country.  Just as the South was marginalized, so was Darfur disadvantaged economically and politically.  This gave rise to a modest revolt in 2003.  However, rather than a proportional response targeted at the rebels, Khartoum opened the gates of hell.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Similar to the manner in which they had prosecuted their wars against Southern Sudan, in Darfur the Government of Sudan armed Arab militias.  Then in coordinated attacks against the non-Arab African civilians of Darfur they bombarded villages from the sky with airplanes and attack helicopters, often dumping 55 gallon drums of burning oil on innocent people below.  Then Sudan Armed Forces riding on flatbed trucks would race through the village firing their guns in every direction.  They would be followed by waves of Janjaweed, the so-called devils on horseback and camel, who would swoop into the village burning crops, stealing livestock, destroying homes, poisoning wells, killing boys and men, and beating and gang raping small girls and women.  As both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have said, this has been genocide.  More recently, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for President al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide for the atrocities committed in Darfur.  &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;I have met with scores of internally displaced persons in IDP camps throughout  Darfur.  I have listened to the horrific stories of the fire from the sky that rained down on villages, the destruction, the brutality, the lose, the sorrow.  I have heard women tell me about the barbaric killings of their fathers, their husbands, and their sons. I have heard the heart ache of mothers telling me about children dying during the long walks across the desert seeking refuge.  I have seen the anguished faces of women who have been violated and, worse yet, witnessed the brutal beating and rape of their daughters.  I have seen the hopelessness in their eyes.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;It is true that in Darfur the worst atrocities took place in 2003 and 2004.  Today it is low intensity violence.  There are fewer targets of opportunity with 300,000 dead and over 2 million displaced.  But make no mistake, the genocide in slow motion grinds relentlessly on.  Humanitarian assistance for these people has declined in the past two years.  Millions are captives in these overcrowded, unsanitary camps where women still are beaten and raped as they go out to collect fire wood.  For many their ancestral land has been taken by Arabs so they not only have no shelter to which they can return and no land. Security has not been restored.  And there continue to be aerial bombings from the Sudan Armed Forces in violation of numerous agreements.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;Meanwhile, the Doha peace talks continue without resolution.  Qatar is to be commended for their leadership in organizing and facilitating these Darfur discussions.  Unfortunately, progress remains elusive. &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;I fear that if full scale conflict reignites between the North and the South any possibility of progress toward peace in Darfur will be lost.  And even if progress is made on that front, Khartoum may be even less accommodating to the desire of the people of Darfur for an end to their marginalization, their persecution, and their requirement for empowerment and some degree of autonomy.  As one senior Government of Sudan official said to me in a private meeting, “If we give up the South, then Darfur will want the same thing.  Where will the dismemberment end?  Eventually there will be no Sudan left.”&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;In working for progress in Darfur, as with the recent tragic situation between the North and South, engagement with the Government of Sudan has not produced positive results.  I do not believe that incentives alone can alleviate the suffering and lead to sustainable peace.  Disincentives are required.  Therefore SADA should be strengthened and kept in place.  Pressure is required.  Easing of those punitive actions can only be tied to specific, concrete, verifiable progress.  Anything less rigorous, I am afraid, will contribute to continuing the genocide in slow motion in Darfur.&lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;
      &lt;strong&gt;Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;
    &lt;/p&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;I applaud the Obama administration’s willingness to engage with all parties of the various conflicts in Sudan.  From personal experience, I know that progress is very difficult.  Patience, perseverance, and pragmatism need to be practiced.  The full foreign policy tool box is required to make progress.  That includes both coercive measures and incentives.  Experience demonstrates that incentives alone will not bend the trajectory of tragedy in Sudan.  Instruments such as the Sudan Accountability and Disinvestment Act are useful to achieving progress for the millions of innocent Sudanese who have suffered unimaginable horrors and continue to face a bleak future.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/williamsonr?view=bio"&gt;Richard Williamson&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Publication: U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Image Source: © Zohra Bensemra / Reuters
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/lmtCSpUGQgg" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2010 00:00:00 -0500</pubDate><dc:creator>Richard Williamson</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/11/30-sudan-divestment-williamson?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{77F7A2BA-0C4C-4B67-B949-66BCECB1E2FB}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/luyrk2KSWNk/19-un-human-rights</link><title>The United Nations Human Rights System: What Works at the National Level</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2010/10/19%20un%20human%20rights/united_nations003_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Information
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;October 19, 2010&lt;br /&gt;4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EDT&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Saul/Zilkha Rooms&lt;br/&gt;The Brookings Institution&lt;br/&gt;1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW&lt;br/&gt;Washington, DC 20036&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;Created in 2006, the U.N. Human Rights Council is approaching its first five-year review with a mixed record of success. The United States, which joined the council in 2009, recently worked through the council to secure continued investigations of violations in Sudan, Cambodia and Burundi, and established new mandates protecting freedom of association and women’s rights. Even with these steps, the council continues to face criticism for its political shortcomings. The ability of this body to promote and protect human rights at the national level remains an open question.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On October 19, the Managing Global Insecurity Project at Brookings hosted a conversation on the Human Rights Council’s mechanisms and its effectiveness, focusing in particular on the work of its independent experts.  Senior Fellow Ted Piccone, deputy director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, presented the findings from his new report "&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/10_human_rights_piccone.aspx"&gt;Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN’s Independent Experts on Human Rights&lt;/a&gt;." Piccone was joined by Esther Brimmer, assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, former U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar and Burundi; and Nonresident Senior Fellow Rich Williamson, a former U.S. special envoy to Sudan.  The panelists discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the council’s instruments at the national level as well as possible areas for improvement.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. After the program, the panelists took audience questions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Audio
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_648212753001_20101019-un-human-rights-64k.mp3"&gt;The United Nations Human Rights System&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Transcript
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="/~/media/events/2010/10/19-un-human-rights/20101019_un_human_rights"&gt;Transcript (.pdf)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Materials
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2010/10/19-un-human-rights/20101019_un_human_rights"&gt;20101019_un_human_rights&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Participants
	&lt;/h4&gt;Moderator&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;Panelists&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Esther Brimmer&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Paulo Sergio Pinheiro&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar and Burundi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/luyrk2KSWNk" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:00:00 -0400</pubDate><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/10/19-un-human-rights?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{91A308F2-9803-4F8C-AFE4-A0D0ACA9B4E1}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~3/rtTX6j-WLDM/13-sudan</link><title>The Sudan Referendum: Dangers and Possibilities</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2010/10/13%20sudan/sudan_soldier001_16x9.jpg?w=120" alt="" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Information
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;October 13, 2010&lt;br /&gt;11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Falk Auditorium&lt;br/&gt;The Brookings Institution&lt;br/&gt;1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW&lt;br/&gt;Washington, DC&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;a href="http://guest.cvent.com/d/qdq538/4W"&gt;Register for the Event&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sudan’s north-south civil war was the longest conflict in African history and claimed more than two million lives.  In 2005, the United States played a critical role in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending that conflict and setting forth a roadmap for sustainable peace.  Despite many lapses and some tragic violence, the agreement has held.  As stipulated in the CPA, on January 9, 2011, a referendum will take place, allowing the southern Sudanese to vote on whether to remain part of Sudan or to gain independence. Whether the scheduled referendum proceeds peacefully on schedule is important for Sudan’s southerners, for Darfuris and the region.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On October 13, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion of the prospects for the Sudan referendum featuring Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ).  Following the Congressman’s remarks, Mike Abramowitz, director of the Committee on Conscience at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum joined him in a discussion examining the possible dangers and outcomes of the southern Sudan vote.  Nonresident Senior Fellow Rich Williamson, President Bush’s special envoy to Sudan, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.
&lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
After the program, the panelists took audience questions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Video
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_647169126001_20101013-williams.mp4"&gt;Who Controls the Oil?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_646538154001_20101013-payne-feedroom.flv"&gt;Line in the Sand&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_646682928001_20101013-ambamowitz-feedroom.flv"&gt;More Violence to Come?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Audio
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://uds.ak.o.brightcove.com/102148458001/102148458001_647705063001_20101013-sudan-64k.mp3"&gt;The Sudan Referendum: Dangers and Possibilities&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Transcript
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="/~/media/events/2010/10/13-sudan/20101013_sudan"&gt;Transcript (.pdf)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Event Materials
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2010/10/13-sudan/20101013_sudan"&gt;20101013_sudan&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Participants
	&lt;/h4&gt;Moderator&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;Panelists&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;The Honorable Donald Payne (D-NJ)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States House of Representatives&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu"&gt;Mike Abramowitz&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;Director, Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/williamsonr/~4/rtTX6j-WLDM" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Wed, 13 Oct 2010 11:00:00 -0400</pubDate><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/10/13-sudan?rssid=williamsonr</feedburner:origLink></item></channel></rss>
