Brookings: Experts - Justin Vaïsse

Europe's Foreign Policy: Emerging from the Crisis

Tue, 12 Feb 2013 11:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 12, 2013
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Brookings Institution recently released the 2013 edition of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard, an annual assessment of Europe's performance in dealing with the rest of the world, in particular China, Russia, the U.S. and the Middle East. The systematic report, conducted by a team of more than 35 researchers, has been described by Foreign Affairs as "a pioneering experiment in foreign policy analysis." In spite of the euro crisis, this edition of the Scorecard shows timid signs of stabilization and even resilience in Europe's foreign policy over the last year. From greater assertiveness vis-à-vis Russia on energy issues to the slow but steady development of the European External Action Service, Europe fared better externally than internally. Massive challenges remain, however, before Europe reaches the role it aspires to, and its internal divisions—including a possible exit by the United Kingdom—put these results in question for the future.

On February 12, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings and the Heinrich Boell Foundation hosted a discussion of the results of the latest Scorecard and Europe's place in the world. Panelists included Kristen Silverberg, former U.S. ambassador to the European Union; Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations; and Ana Palacio, former foreign minister of Spain. Senior Fellow Justin Vaïsse, CUSE director of research, presented the findings. Senior Fellow Fiona Hill, director of CUSE, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013

Justin Vaïsse, Susi Dennison and Hans Kundnani — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The European Foreign Policy Scorecard is an in-depth annual assessment of the performance of EU member states and EU institutions in meeting foreign policy challenges and promoting European interests, ideas and ideals abroad. Published by the European Council of Foreign Relations and led by Brookings Senior Fellow Justin Vaisse and ECFR fellows Susi Dennison and Hans Kundnani, the Scorecard is the result of the collective work of more than 35 researchers. It is divided in six chapters: relations with China, Russia, the US, Wider Europe, Middle East/North Africa, and performance in multilateral issues and crisis management. Within these geographic and functional areas, European performance is evaluated on 79 specific foreign policy issues. The authors ask three basic questions to assign a grade. Two are about policies (Were Europeans united around clear objectives, and did they devote adequate resources to meeting these objectives?) and one is about results (Did the outcome conform to the objectives?).

The 2013 edition of the Scorecard examines the implications of issues such as:
• The continuing euro crisis and efforts to contain it;
• The sustained leadership of the UK in many policy fields, despite emergence of strong eurosceptic sentiments in Britain and the distinct possibility of a "Brexit";
• The less dynamic Franco-German motor;
• And the increasing efforts by smaller member states to contribute to the common efforts.

Download » (PDF)

Introduction

In the introduction to the first edition of the Scorecard, we wrote that in 2010 Europe had been distracted by the euro crisis. In the introduction to the second edition, we wrote that in 2011 Europe had been diminished by the crisis. By the end of 2012, the crisis had become less acute but still not been solved – far from it. In fact, for the third year in a row, European leaders continued to devote more time to worrying about Europe’s financial health than its geopolitical role. Europe’s image and soft power continued to fade around the world (though this is difficult to quantify), while its resources for defence and international affairs kept eroding. But European foreign policy did not unravel in 2012. In fact, the EU managed to preserve the essence of its acquis diplomatique as the EEAS, which did not even exist two years earlier, continued to develop and consolidate its role.

The Scorecard’s granular assessment of European foreign-policy performance in 2012 shows timid signs of stabilisation and resilience. Across the range of issues that the Scorecard assesses, Europeans generally performed better than the previous year (see Figure 1). Europe improved its score in relation to Russia (from C+ to B-) and to China (from C to C+), and continued to perform solidly in other areas (United States (B-) and Multilateral issues (B), and adequately in the Wider Europe (C+) and the Middle East and North Africa (C+). Thus, although the EU had no high-profile successes comparable to the military intervention in Libya in 2011, it put in a respectable performance in its external relations – especially given the deep crisis with which it continued to struggle. In particular, it seemed to perform better when it continued to implement policies for which the foundations had been laid in previous years.

Figure 1: European Performance on the six issues in 2012

ISSUE IN 2012	SCORE	GRADE	IN 2011	IN 2010
Relations with China	9.7	C+	8.5 C	9 C+
Relations with Russia	11	B-	10 C+	9.5 C+
Relations with the US	11.7	B-	11 B-	11 B-
Relations with Wider Europe	10.3	C+	9.5 C+	9.5 C+
Relations with the Middle East and North Africa	10.3	C+	10 C+	-
Multilateral issues and crisis management	12.6	B	13 B	14/11 B+ (Multilateral issues) /B- (crisis management)

Clearly, whether the EU can turn a positive year against the odds into an upward trend in foreign-policy performance will depend to a large extent on whether it can overcome the crisis and restore growth and therefore increase its economic power. In that sense, European leaders are right to focus on solving the crisis even at the expense of a focus on foreign-policy issues. But it will also depend on whether Europeans can overcome their internal divisions and improve coordination and coherence in foreign policy. In particular, it will depend on whether Europe can turn the EEAS into an effective diplomatic service as envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty that is able to convert the EU’s huge resources into power.

The eurozone, the EU, and the neighbourhood

In 2012, the eurozone was stabilised. In June, following an inconclusive election a month earlier, the Greek people elected Antonis Samaras as prime minister. Mario Draghi showed bold leadership after he succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as ECB president at the end of 2011. The new Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) programme he launched as soon as he took over – in effect, an injection of liquidity to European banks – went a long way to reassuring markets about their solvency. The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme he initiated in the summer – a promise by the ECB to step in and buy unlimited quantities of certain bonds on the secondary market – turned the ECB into the kind of lender of last resort for which many in Europe and beyond had been calling. In late June, European leaders also agreed on the creation of a banking union, which they confirmed in December – a further positive step in guaranteeing European banks. Thus the crisis became less acute in the second half of 2012 than it was in 2011.

However, while positive, these steps taken in 2012 do not yet go far enough to solve the crisis. As the crisis became less acute, European leaders – including German Chancellor Angela Merkel – seemed to become less determined to create a genuine economic and political union and even watered down proposals for a banking union. Moreover, it is not clear that even the limited steps that the eurozone has taken are sustainable. In particular, while OMT was seen as a breakthrough by many in Europe and elsewhere in the world, it was seen as a defeat in Germany. Since the June summit, there has been a backlash, expressed most powerfully by Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, who even implicitly compared Draghi to the devil in a remarkable speech in Frankfurt in September. Germany may now have reached the limits of debt mutualisation under its existing constitution. In order to move further towards economic and political union, as the eurozone must, a referendum may be needed in Germany as well as in other member states. The steps taken in 2012 to stabilise the euro crisis may therefore have produced a temporary respite, with further turmoil to come, rather than a lasting solution to the crisis.

Furthermore, in the process of stabilising the eurozone in 2012, the EU itself now faces difficult questions. A three-tier Europe consisting of the inner core of the eurozone, pre-ins such as Poland, and outs such as the UK is emerging from the crisis. This raises huge institutional questions for the EU, which may take years and require treaty change to resolve, though European leaders are understandably reluctant to create the further uncertainty that would involve. In addition, a British withdrawal from the EU looks increasingly possible. If 2011 was the year of the “German question” – that is, the debate about Germany’s role in and commitment to the EU – 2012 was the year that the “British question” emerged. Whether or not the UK decides to leave the EU – a step that we think would be disastrous for both Britain itself and for the EU as a whole – the emergence of a three-tier Europe will have huge consequences for the single market and for European foreign policy.

Meanwhile, as Europe struggled with these complex problems, its neighbourhood also remained challenging in 2012. Though an Israeli military strike against Iran did not materialise ahead of the US presidential election in November, there remains the possibility of such a strike in 2013. The conflict in Syria became the focal point of a broader regional struggle for influence along a sectarian Shia–Sunni faultline. In November, as tensions with Gaza increased, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defence. Meanwhile, the transitions in post-revolutionary North Africa remained fragile and renewed protests late in the year in Egypt forced President Mohammed Morsi to annul a decree granting himself new powers ahead of a constitutional vote. Although enlargement continued as Croatia was set to become the twenty-eighth member of the EU and Serbia became a candidate, the environment in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood was difficult, especially in the Western Balkans.

A surprisingly good year

However, against this background of a challenging internal and external environment, Europe performed surprisingly well in its foreign policy in 2012. Russia was a case in point. Relations with Moscow deteriorated, but Europe’s unity and the coherence of its policies towards Russia improved. The EU did not depart from its cooperative attitude, having been instrumental in getting Russia into the WTO, which it formally joined in August. But it was more attentive to protecting its interests and norms, and more assertive – threatening, for example, to use the WTO dispute-settlement system when Moscow announced new protectionist measures in late 2012. The European Commission launched an antitrust probe against Gazprom, while continuing to orchestrate efforts at enhancing gas interconnections so as to decrease Europe’s energy dependency on Moscow. Europeans did not shy away from criticising human-rights abuses during the crackdown on demonstrations that accompanied the election season and the re-election of Vladimir Putin as president in March.

There were also signs of modest improvement in relations with China, even though unity among member states continued to be in short supply, thereby undermining European leverage. Germany, which accounts for nearly half of European exports to China, seemed at times to speak for Europe in China. But even if Berlin does not want to replace the EU, its voice is naturally louder than others, and Beijing has become adept at cultivating it. In some respects, Germany was a leader on China in 2012, but Merkel also undermined the European Commission when it launched an anti-dumping case against Chinese solar-panel manufacturers. Still, Europeans in general became more assertive overall in their trade disputes with Beijing and in their criticism of human-rights violations. The panicked approach of 2011, when Europe was both hoping for and fearing massive Chinese investment in the continent to relieve the euro crisis, was replaced by a more restrained and balanced relationship.

Europeans also slightly improved their performance on the United States, especially in their cooperation with Washington on regional and global issues, which helped them further their own goals while having the US respect their red lines – for example, in sanctions on Iran. Finally, the only issue on which Europe performed worse in 2012 than in 2011 was multilateral issues and crisis management (the overall score out of 20 went down from 13 to 12.5, or a B). New CSDP missions were launched – something that had not happened in the last two years – and European policy towards Somalia grew more coherent. But the EU was rebuffed by Russia and China in the UNSC with two vetoes on Syria and by the United States on the arms-trade treaty; they failed to make an impact on the UN vote on Palestine; and the G20 was still dominated by the euro crisis as in 2011.

In the eastern neighbourhood, European performance was mixed. Europeans continued to struggle in the Western Balkans in 2012 (B, the same grade as in 2011), with political instability and economic difficulties from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro, although the EEAS managed to make good progress on relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU also got mixed results in the Eastern Partnership countries (C+). Its results were good in Moldova, and to some extent in Georgia, and it had a firm, coherent approach towards Belarus, but Europeans struggled to pursue a united approach to Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Lastly, Europeans continued to struggle on Turkey (C), with a muddled situation on bilateral relations and frustrating developments on foreign policy.

Europe’s southern neighbourhood was dominated by the conflict in Syria. Europeans could not break the frustrating diplomatic gridlock or prevent the bloody tragedy that worsened as the year went on. Europe’s overall performance in the region remained fairly constant (the overall score was 10.1 last year and 10.3 this year, or a C+). Member states were generally united in their initiatives towards Iran and North Africa but, beset by the economic crisis, they couldn’t move beyond limited programmatic support to the transitions and struggled to make a positive political impact with governments and to construct collective relations with newly politically engaged parts of society in the region. They were still split on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, though to a lesser degree than in previous years, as demonstrated by the November UNGA vote on upgrading Palestinian membership.

We gave Europe four A grades – the same number as last year – for its performance on specific components of European foreign policy (see Figure 2). Overall, it appears that, where the EU made progress in 2012 – in particular, in regions such as China and Russia, on enlargement in its neighbourhood, and on the E3+3 process with Iran – it was where a policy had been developed in previous years and member states worked together with the EU institutions to implement it. In these cases, there was less need for innovation than in some other cases such as Syria, but a strong demand for member-state unity behind a pre-agreed strategy. On these types of areas, the euro crisis did not seem to undermine European performance.

Figure 2: Most successful policies in 2012

MOST SUCCESSFUL POLICIES FOR 2012	UNITY	RESOURCES	OUTCOME	TOTAL	GRADE
37 - Relations with the US on Iran and weapons proliferation	4	5	8	17	A-
35 - Relations with the US on the Syrian conflict	4	4	8	16	A-
41 – Kosovo	4	4	8	16	A-
48 - Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on trade	4	5	7	16	A-
12 – Relations with China on climate change	4	5	6	15	B+
27 – Relations with the US on trade and investment	4	4	7	15	B+
55 – Tunisia	4	4	7	15	B+
69 – European policy on human rights at the UN	4	4	7	15	B+
74– Drought in the Sahel	4	4	7	15	B+
78 – Somalia	4	4	7	15	B+
13 – Trade liberalisation with Russia	5	4	5	14	B+
33 - Relations with the US on the Arab transitions	4	4	6	14	B+
39 - Overall progress of enlargement in the Western Balkans	4	4	6	14	B+
60 – Lebanon	4	3	7	14	B+
70 - European policy on the ICC and international tribunals	4	3	7	14	B+

Figure 3: Least successful policies in 2012

LEAST SUCCESFUL POLICIES FOR 2012	UNITY	RESOURCES	OUTCOME	TOTAL	GRADE
54 - Security sector reform	2	1	2	5	D+
11 – Relations with China on reforming global governance	2	2	2	6	C-
7 – Relations with China on the Dalai Lama and Tibet	2	3	2	7	C-
26– Reciprocity on visa procedures with the US	2	2	3	7	C-
34 – Relations with the US on the Middle East Peace Process	2	3	2	7	C-
43 – Bilateral relations with Turkey	3	2	2	7	C-
44 - Rule of law, democracy, and human rights in Turkey	3	2	2	7	C-
45 - Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question	3	2	2	7	C-
58 – Algeria and Morocco	2	2	3	7	C-
66 – UN reform	2	2	3	7	C-

Figure 4: European performance on cross-cutting themes

CROSS-CUTTING THEMES* IN 2012	SCORE OUT OF 20	GRADE	2011	2010
Trade liberalisation, standards and norms – "low politics"	14	B+	12.5 B	13 B
Iran and proliferation	13	B	13 B	16 A-
Energy policy	12.5	B	12 B-	10 C+
Relations with Asia	12.5	B	N/A	N/A
Climate change	12	B	14 B+	12 B-
Balkans	12	B-	13 B	12 B-
Afghanistan	12	B-	10 C+	10 C+
Issues of war and peace – "high politics"	12	B-	11 B-	11 B-
Arab transitions	11	B-	12 B-	N/A
Visa policy	10	C+	10 C+	12 B-
Euro crisis	10	C+	8.5 C	N/A
Israel/Palestine	10	C+	8.5 C	9 C+
Protracted conflicts	9.5	C+	8 C	10 C+
Human rights	9	C+	9 C+	8 C
Relations with Turkey	8	C	N/A	N/A

An analysis of European performance on “cross-cutting themes” (see Figure 4) illustrates the type of issues on which Europeans did well in 2012 and those on which they did less well. It appears that Europeans tended to do well in those components of foreign policy in which the EEAS or the European Commission plays a strong coordinating role, for example on trade issues, in negotiations with Iran, and in the Balkans. However, this pattern should not be overstated: Europeans also performed relatively well in 2012 on components relating to the euro crisis and Afghanistan – issues on which member states are to a large extent in the lead.

The big three and “coalitions of the willing”

In the last edition of the Scorecard, we identified a trend towards the “renationalisation” of European foreign policy in 2011. Perhaps the most striking finding in our categorisation of member states in 2012 was the drop in the leadership by the big three: Germany, France, and the UK. In 2011, Germany led Europe in 19 components of European foreign policy, France in 18, and the UK in 17. In 2012, Germany led only 12 times, and France and the UK 11 times (see Figure 5). In 2011, Sweden also emerged as one of the most frequent leaders in European foreign policy, particularly on multilateral issues and crisis management. Although in 2012 it led on 10 components of European foreign policy compared to 11 in 2011, this time that made it almost as much of a leader as the big three. Like France and Germany, Sweden was categorised as a leader in at least one aspect of each of the chapters of the Scorecard, which indicates that it is engaged across the spectrum of European foreign policy and not simply in regions of specific interest. The Netherlands also punched above its weight.

Figure 5: “Leaders” and “slackers” among EU member states

TOP 'LEADERS'	TOP 'SLACKERS'
Germany (on 12 components)	Greece (on 5 components)
France (11)	Latvia (5)
United Kingdom (11)	Romania (5)
Sweden (10)	Spain (5)
Netherlands (8)	Lithuania (4)
Poland (5)	Portugal (4)
Czech Republic (4)	Cyprus (3)
Denmark (4)	Slovenia (3)
Finland (4)	Austria (2)
Ireland (4)	Bulgaria (2)
Austria (3)	Czech Republic (2)
Belgium (3)	Estonia (2)
Estonia (3)	France (2)
Italy (3)	Germany (2)
Bulgaria (2)	Italy (2)
Hungary (2)	Malta (2)
Luxembourg (2)	Belgium (1)
Spain (2)	Denmark (1)
Latvia (1)	Hungary (1)
Lithuania (1)	Luxembourg (1)
Romania (1)	Netherlands (1)
Slovakia (1)	Poland (1)
Cyprus (0)	Slovakia (1)
Greece (0)	UK (1)
Malta (0)	Finland (0)
Portugal (0)	Ireland (0)
Slovenia (0)	Sweden (0)

In 2012, the UK’s relationship with the EU made headlines as Eurosceptic sentiment within the UK grew and a withdrawal from the EU became a real possibility. Prime Minister David Cameron came under increasing pressure from the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and, at the beginning of 2013, promised an “in/out” referendum on British membership of the EU by 2018. However, the Scorecard shows that, even as it was marginalised within the EU, the UK continued to play a constructive role in European foreign policy – often by example-setting. In particular, the UK played a leading role in the UN context – for example, in the debates on a post-Millennium Development Goals framework for development aid – and in smaller coalitions such as the E3+3 process on Iran. Even where it did not lead, it was broadly supportive of the development of EU foreign policymaking, and was a “slacker” only once in 2012 (on an EU–China investment treaty to enable reciprocity in access to public procurement).

Of the big three member states, France underwent the most obvious change in 2012 after François Hollande took over from Nicolas Sarkozy as president. In some areas, such as a reframing of the relationship with “Françafrique” in political terms, there was a conscious effort to mark a departure from the previous administration’s policy. In particular, the Hollande government was much more active in the second half of the year in efforts to gather international support for an African-led intervention in northern Mali and, as the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013 showed, this will clearly continue to be a priority as the year progresses. On other issues, such as the early indication of support for the Palestinian bid for observer status at the UNGA in November, the new government followed a similar line to its predecessor. France and the UK have both played leading roles in developing contacts with and supporting the Syrian opposition, although this does not appear to have been closely coordinated either with each other or with other EU partners.

Within Europe, the political affinity between Merkel and Sarkozy was replaced by a more difficult Hollande–Merkel relationship. Together with Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, Hollande pushed for greater emphasis on growth in solutions to tackle the euro crisis. As a result, Merkel sometimes found herself in a minority in the eurozone in 2012 – something that had not happened in 2011. Germany was also criticised on foreign policy – in particular in relation to the emerging “special relationship” between China and Germany. However, Germany also frequently led Europe in foreign policy – in particular through a new assertive approach towards Russia. Overall, Germany was again the most prolific leader in European foreign policy. It led on 12 components, often by taking initiative, and was also often an active supporter – that is, a cheerleader rather than a bystander.

However, what is clear from the Scorecard’s findings is that the Franco-German axis did not operate as a central driver for foreign-policy initiatives in 2012. With the exceptions of the E3+3 process on Iran and efforts to persuade Russia to take a tougher line on Syria at the UN (both of which were part of more formal processes), none of the significant smaller “coalitions of the willing” in European foreign policy this year included both Germany and France as leaders. Where Germany and France did work together as leaders, usually as part of much broader coalitions, this was often as sponsors, for example on tackling the food crisis and drought in the Sahel and on financial support to the MENA region, rather than as initiative takers.

However, there was also a drop in the number of “slackers”, which suggests that member states were not quite as disruptive of coherent collective action as they were in 2011. The top “slackers” were Greece (which we identified as a “slacker” two times less than in 2011), Latvia (once more than in 2011), and Romania and Spain (the same number of times as in 2011). Cyprus (which held the rotating presidency in the second half of 2011), Italy, and Poland were “slackers” four times less than last year. (In the case of Italy, this suggests that Monti and his foreign minister, Giulio Terzi, were successful in re-launching Italy’s international engagement.) This trend towards greater cooperation is particularly clear on Russia, where we found no “slackers” (and in fact very few leaders apart from Germany). In other words, member states did not invest heavily but were supportive of the overall EU effort.

The challenge for the EEAS: technocratic Europe and power Europe

Whether the trend towards the renationalisation of European foreign policy that began with the euro crisis will continue in the years ahead will depend in part on whether the overall machinery of European foreign policy becomes more efficient – in other words, to what extent Europeans are able to apply the various instruments that they have at their disposal. In particular, it was hoped that the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS would help Europe become more effective in bringing together in a coherent way the economic, diplomatic, and military resources of the member states on classical foreign-policy issues and the external competences of the European Commission on issues such as trade and aid. Reconciling these two Europes that interact with the world – the “technocratic Europe” and the “power Europe” – is the main challenge for the EEAS. The official review of its development that will be carried out in 2013 will offer an opportunity to test its record in this regard.

As the Scorecard illustrates, the EEAS plays very different roles in different policy areas. It interacts with national diplomacies in various ways, from full responsibility to shared competence or sometimes marginalisation – usually high-level UN diplomacy or military crises such as Libya in 2011 or Syria in 2012. But the EEAS can also support the big member states, for example by directly negotiating with Iranians on the nuclear issue. It can help deliver strong European policies, for example by helping to convince reluctant member states to diversify their energy supplies in preparation for sanctions against Iran or by minimising disagreement in order to avoid paralysis, as in the Kosovo–Serbia negotiations (five EU member states do not recognise Kosovo). It can powerfully represent Europe’s collective decisions, as it did with the opening of an office in Burma in 2012 – a prelude to the opening of a full-fledged EU delegation in 2013.

In other cases, the EEAS is able to be more assertive in exercising EU leverage, for example in visa policy towards Russia and the Western Balkans. It can also take initiative independently of, but coordinated with, national diplomacies, as it has done in developing policy towards and organising financial support for the transition states in North Africa and coordinating it with the United States. But for all the progress on this front, European foreign policy still functions most effectively when there are engines – often the EU3 or “coalitions of the willing” including other member states such as Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Poland. The role the EEAS plays is also different in different parts of the world: in Washington, the EU delegation finds itself working with more powerful and often much larger embassies from all 27 member states; in countries where the EU gives out large amounts of aid, the EU delegation is often de facto the most important Western diplomatic representation.

Thus assessing the performance of the EEAS is a complex task. The Scorecard suggests that, after a difficult first two years marked by high expectations, the euro crisis, and the Arab Awakening, the EEAS began to function better in 2012, although it is far from having reached its full potential. It is undoubtedly still preoccupied by organisational problems, Indeed, one of the main objectives that High Representative Catherine Ashton has given herself is to establish a full-fledged and functioning diplomatic corps during the course of her five-year term in office. But the EEAS is structurally slowed down by the fundamental imperative of coordination between the 27 member states, which imposes a heavy constraint on its agility (even when it succeeds). Whether in Brussels or in the major EU delegations, the EEAS is all about coordination, while modern diplomacy in the digital age requires ever-greater responsiveness and velocity.

Within these constraints, the diplomatic culture of the EEAS seems gradually to be changing for the better. Initially, it was mostly staffed by EU civil servants working for the European Commission, with a culture of implementing programmes and managing only certain issues such as trade and the environment. However, the substantial infusion of diplomats from member states has brought a culture of power relations, emergency, and crisis management – in short, a diplomatic culture. As a result, relations with member states, including between EU delegations and embassies across the world, have improved markedly. A positive change in attitudes towards the EEAS in the large machineries of the biggest member states is also taking place as diplomats realise they will have to serve in it at some point in their careers.

The Scorecard suggests that the lack of a consensus among member states does not necessarily prevent the EEAS from playing a useful role on a given issue, even if it means that it must play a different and reduced role than it can when there is consensus. But the danger is that the “technocratic Europe”, largely led by the European Commission, will be increasingly cut off from the “power Europe” of member states. In the Middle East and North Africa, EU task forces were created to help bridge this gap. Unfortunately, a lack of clarity across the EU about the objectives of this policy tool meant that, while they were successful as investment conferences and in developing lines of communication with broader sections of society than classic government-to-government relations allowed, they did not succeed as an EU initiative to support political reform in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia.

As the EEAS develops and feels more confident that it has the backing of the member states’ diplomatic services, it may begin to innovate more and develop effective mechanisms, diplomatic practices, and policy itself. There were some examples of this in 2012, such as the joint visits by the Bulgarian, Polish, and Swedish foreign ministers to Lebanon and Iraq, and the inclusion of an EEAS representative in the Danish foreign ministry’s team for a visit by a senior Chinese delegation. Spanish diplomats were also housed by the EU delegation in Syria and Yemen after the Spanish embassies were closed and the EEAS represented Bulgarian citizens sentenced to death in Malaysia in October. However, many member states are still expanding their bilateral representation and continue to take the EU presidency very seriously. While the EEAS became a much more significant actor in 2012, member states are a long way from investing in it to the extent that it is able to realise the full potential range of roles that it could play and from reconciling “technocratic Europe” and “power Europe”.

Internal and external challenges

The near horizon is marked by serious challenges – any one of which could undermine the modest recovery in European foreign-policy performance in 2012. There are already indications from key strategic partners that they are beginning to see the euro crisis as the “new normal” – in other words, that they are planning for a future in which European power continues to decrease. Europe’s lack of a collective defence strategy, and its declining investment in its defence capacity, is also a serious obstacle to continuing global influence as a security actor. This makes it even more important that the EEAS is able to bring together CSDP with wider foreign-policy efforts. These matters are daunting enough with the EU’s current structure. But the impact of a British withdrawal from the EU on these and numerous other questions would be potentially huge.

Europe will also have to deal with these challenges at a time when the United States is increasingly becoming what Michael Mandelbaum has called a “frugal superpower” and is “pivoting” towards Asia. In January 2012, President Barack Obama outlined a new defence strategy based on the idea of a “leaner” military and a shift of focus towards Asia. In the future, as this strategic rebalancing becomes a reality, the US presence in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood may become more intermittent and low-cost. As it supplies its own energy needs, it may also have less of an automatic interest in the southern neighbourhood and aim instead to “lead from behind” in the Middle East. Although the US will not leave Europe altogether – in particular, Iran and Syria may continue to pull the US back in 2013 – it is likely to work with others as well as Europeans as part of what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called a “multi-partner” strategy.

This long-term shift in US foreign policy will further increase the pressure on Europe to deal with its own neighbourhood. Although the EU has become more effective towards Russia this year, tensions have, if anything, grown and may continue to do so in 2013. Insecurity in the Sahel, which was already a growing concern in 2012, has in the first month of 2013 led one EU member state to go to war in a region not far off the EU’s doorstep. Europeans are likely to be dealing with the fallout of the attempted takeover of Mali by Islamist rebel groups this time next year and feeling the consequences for years to come. Despite the euro crisis, the EU foreign policymaking machine has continued to function in 2012 and indeed has been moderately successful. But getting by for a second year is unlikely to be enough to deal with the challenges that 2013 looks set to present.

Downloads

Download the report

Authors

Justin Vaïsse
Susi Dennison
Hans Kundnani

Publication: The Brookings Institution and the European Council on Foreign Relations

Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities

Wed, 06 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 6, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

France’s recent military intervention in Mali and the hostage crisis in Algeria have brought international attention to continuing instability in West and North Africa. The crisis has renewed focus not just on the region, but also on Europe’s approach toward Africa, American policies to combat extremism and the complex history and relationships that shape modern dynamics in the Sahel.

On February 6th, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the crisis in Mali and explore how current affairs and priorities in France, the U.S., and West and North Africa have influenced recent events and the trajectory of the conflict going forward. Panelists included: Brookings Senior Fellow and Daniel L. Byman, research director of the Saban Center; Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi S. Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative; Todd Moss, vice president for programs and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development; and Brookings Senior Fellow Justin Vaisse, director of research for the Center on the United States and Europe. Margaret Brennan, State Department correspondent for CBS News, moderated the discussion.

Video

Audio

Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130206_crisis_in_mali_transcript

Eurozoned Out

Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The euro crisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But risk of failure still remains and in turn could be devastating to the U.S. economy. Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How can the United States shape EU fiscal policies without being a member?
Why should the United States encourage the U.K. to remain a member of the EU?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Justin Vaïsse and Thomas Wright

The Eurocrisis has been ongoing for three years and the European Union is beginning to get its act together to build a sustainable monetary union. But, the euro is not out of the woods yet. Real dangers remain. The underlying causes of the crisis have not been addressed. The politics are pulling in a different direction from that required for a solution. Populations on the periphery are suffering from austerity measures and see no end in sight. Those in the so-called core (Germany, Northern Europe) feel exploited. The Eurozone is building new structures but they may not be sufficient to protect it against a future major crisis.

As long as an optimal solution remains elusive, the risks of failure will remain. If failure occurs, it could be devastating to the U.S. economy, surpassing the crisis of 2008. Some estimates project that the collapse of the euro would cause an immediate 10 percent loss of GDP for the global economy, with unemployment in the European Union reaching 20 percent and spiraling inflation on the EU’s periphery. The United States and European Union are the two largest economies in the world and they are inextricably linked with each other through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial markets. For instance, 50 percent of U.S. FDI abroad goes to the European Union while 62 percent of FDI into the United States originates in the European Union. The rest of the world would also be adversely affected, particularly the Middle East and China, the world’s second largest national economy, both of which require robust growth to maintain domestic political stability.

A secondary but related danger is that the construction of a new Eurozone could lead to the fracturing of the European Union through a British withdrawal. The United Kingdom is extremely concerned that further integration in the Eurozone will damage its interests as an E.U. member. Public opinion also favors a renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership even though such a renegotiation would be strewn with difficulty and would likely fail. In this scenario, the Eurocrisis would remove America’s most reliable European ally from the EU and lead to a weakening of Europe’s capacity to act as a coherent unit in world affairs.

Recommendation:

The United States can neither compel the Eurozone to adopt particular structures nor do much to protect the Eurozone from a political backlash in austerity-stricken countries. However, the United States can perform an important service in two respects. You should task your administration with analyzing the risks associated with the EU’s plans for financial and fiscal integration and share these assessments in confidence with the EU’s leaders. If necessary, senior administration officials could go public to shape opinion in the financial markets and in European states. In the 1990s, Europeans built a flawed monetary union. Eurozone 2.0 may have new structural weaknesses that will be exposed by the next crisis, whenever that occurs. These weaknesses will undoubtedly be the result of political constraints in the member states. The United States has an important role in raising awareness of these risks so Eurozone 2.0 is as effective and robust as possible.

Second, you should take a position opposing the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. The United States can work with the United Kingdom and other members of the European Union to head off this possibility. Most importantly, the United States should emphasize the importance it places on having the United Kingdom inside the European Union, acting as a transatlantic bridge and strengthening Europe’s voice in world affairs. You should avoid any statements or policies that lead Britons to believe that an exit would result in a closer relationship with the United States that would offset any loss in influence. You should also consult closely with your European counterparts to ensure that the appropriate steps are taken to encourage the United Kingdom to remain a full member of the European Union.

If the black swan of a collapse of the Eurozone does occur, the risk of contagion in the global economy will be extremely high and it will be necessary to return to full crisis mode, as experienced in the fall of 2008, to do what is necessary to protect the financial system. This will be even more difficult than after the fall of Lehman Brothers because the collapse of the euro would create a shock of much greater scale and because the U.S. Congress may be reluctant to help foreign governments, even though it would be necessary to protect the U.S. financial system. Nevertheless, it will be your only viable option.

Background:

To understand the risks of a Eurozone collapse in the next four years, it is necessary to distinguish between the first phase of the crisis that concluded in 2012 and the second phase that has just begun. In the first phase, European governments had to decide whether to keep the euro intact or not. The key question amid market turbulence was whether the Eurozone would construct the mechanisms necessary to keep the periphery four (P4) — Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain — inside the single currency. These mechanisms were expensive and politically difficult. But, this is exactly what the Eurozone decided to do. With bailout mechanisms like the European Stability Mechanism and the Stability Treaty and bold action by the European Central Bank under the leadership of Mario Draghi, the Eurozone mitigated the most destabilizing elements of the crisis. This happened for a simple reason—every leader calculated that the risks of a fragmentation of the Eurozone massively outweighed any benefits.

The second phase of the crisis is different. The question of whether EU leaders want the Euro to remain intact has been settled. But, they now face two crucial challenges. First is the danger that political and economic accidents related to the current crisis will threaten the survival of the Euro. It will take some time to build a new Eurozone. During this period, much of the European Union will be in recession or experience stagnation. Member states will disagree strongly about the future course of action. Elections are likely to be fought on these issues and they could bring to power radical parties with rejectionist policies. The result may be a political crisis that leads to an inadvertent fracturing of the Eurozone followed by contagion and a disorderly collapse.

The issue of UK membership is a related component of this first challenge. Although it is not in the Eurozone, the United Kingdom feels threatened by further European integration. Both of the U.K.’s leading parties, the Conservatives and Labour, appear on track to offer the British people an inor- out referendum, following an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership.

The second challenge is that the Eurozone’s new structures may be insufficient to cope with a future crisis. European integration is the art of what is politically possible. But economies are not rewarded for trying hard. Their institutions need to function effectively under conditions of extreme duress. Monetary union without fiscal union was justified as the best that could be done given the political constraints and we know where that led. New structures bring new risk of design flaws, particularly in banking union, but also with respect to the perceived legitimacy of European institutions. A lack of democracy and accountability could lead to a political crisis down the road, especially if parts of the Eurozone are stagnant.

Conclusion:

A healthy global economy is a core interest of the United States. A stable and prosperous European economy is integral to that interest. For three years now, you have lived with the possibility that the collapse of the Eurozone could wreak havoc with the U.S. economy. You have also had to live with the fact that the United States has few options and no silver bullets. Quiet diplomacy and support has been your hallmark and it has been reasonably effective. You should not radically depart from this path but you should ensure it evolves to cope with the second phase of the crisis as outlined above. You should direct your administration to identify the potential vulnerabilities of reform proposals and to work with European governments, and others if necessary (public diplomacy aimed at the markets, multilateral efforts through the G-20), to prevent new failures of design. You should also use American influence to ensure that the United Kingdom remains within the European Union. These actions will reduce the probability of a black swan in Europe.

Downloads

Authors

Image Source: © Francois Lenoir / Reuters

Free Trade Game Changer

Mireya Solís and Justin Vaïsse — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Over the next four years, President Obama should advocate forcefully for ambitious free trade agreements with our partners in Asia and Europe. Mireya Solís and Justin Vaïsse wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

Can President Obama overcome erosion of support for free trade agreements in Congress and among the American public?
How will China react to the Trans-Pacific Partnership?
What are the benefits of a new free trade agreement with the European Union?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Mireya Solís and Justin Vaïsse

Pursuing and signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with both the Asia-Pacific region and Europe during your second administration will yield considerable economic and political benefits. World trade is expected to have stalled at a mere 2.5 percent growth in 2012, down from 13.8 percent in 2010. Protectionism is on the rise everywhere, especially in the form of non-tariff barriers. The Doha Round is essentially dead. At the same time, the United States and Europe need to stimulate their economies without resorting to fiscal spending. Furthermore, the United States needs to establish a broader and deeper economic presence in Asia, the world’s most dynamic economic region. Achieving both a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) is the most realistic way to reclaim U.S. economic leadership and make progress towards your promised goal of doubling U.S. exports. Moreover, signing both the TPP and TAFTA would have deep strategic implications. Both deals would reaffirm liberal norms and a leading U.S. role in setting the global rules of the road. The TPP would help define the standard for economic integration in Asia, without necessarily antagonizing China. TAFTA would give American and European businesses an edge in setting industrial standards for tomorrow’s global economy.

Recommendation:

• Pursue both TPP and TAFTA simultaneously. Conclude negotiations in close succession to gain momentum in international bargaining, reap the benefits of emulation (through setting rules and standards of global applicability), and increase your leverage domestically;

• Start the process to secure Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) early in 2013 by reaching out to Congressional leaders in unison with an aggressive public awareness campaign on the benefits of free trade, led by the White House, which seeks to allay some of the concerns about opening U.S. markets.

• Set October 2013, the time of the next APEC leaders’ meeting in Bali, Indonesia, for the conclusion of negotiations. This will provide a focal point for leaders of TPP countries to bridge differences at the negotiating table;

• Launch TAFTA talks as early as possible in 2013 after the U.S.-EU high-level working group makes it recommendations, with the objective of concluding negotiations before the next U.S. midterm elections in 2014.

Background:

Free trade was not a priority in your first administration. It is, however, an indispensable component of a long-term growth strategy to rebound from the 2008-2012 recession. It is also a necessary part of the response to the significant redistribution of power in the international system. The pivot to Asia and to the emerging world in general cannot be based on political and military initiatives alone. It needs to be backed by rejuvenated American leadership in trade and investment.

While the time has come to launch new initiatives in these spheres, the erosion of support for FTAs in Congress and among the public is likely to hamper this effort. Contrast, for example, the fact that Congress continuously renewed fast-track authority between 1975 and 1994, but in the post-NAFTA years it was only extended during the 2002-2007 period. Public skepticism of the value of FTAs is also on the rise, according to polls. It will fall on you, Mr. President, to advocate forcefully for these ambitious agreements.

TPP

The TPP is the most ambitious trade initiative currently under negotiation. In essence, it promises to do what no other FTA has done before: to liberalize without exemptions and to tackle systematically vexing non-tariff barriers by generating trade disciplines in areas such as intellectual property, regulatory convergence, and state-owned enterprises. With the TPP, your administration can shape an Asia-Pacific economic integration platform with the potential to generate substantial economic and political payoffs. According to reliable estimates, a TPP 13 (one that includes Japan and South Korea) would generate annual income gains for the United States in the neighborhood of $78 billion dollars. Furthermore, an expansive TPP can also achieve the important political benefit of disseminating highquality trade and investment rules through a ratcheting-up effect. Other trade initiatives will then feel compelled to raise their standards to remain competitive (e.g. ASEAN’s Regional Economic Partnership) and more countries will seek TPP membership, perhaps even China in the future. Indeed, you should explain to your Chinese counterparts that this is by no means the economic equivalent of a containment strategy; it is rather an enticement strategy that recognizes the benefits of a strong Chinese economy in an interdependent world, and aims to codify best practices on international trade and investment rules that could help China deepen its market reforms.

TAFTA

TAFTA is equally ambitious. If achieved, it would offer the United States and the European Union a new opportunity to define the industrial standards and norms of tomorrow’s economy, especially vis-à-vis the Asian giants, rather than competing against one another. EU leaders seem very eager to move forward. American labor and environmental activists will have fewer objections to a deal with Europe than with other regions, given the generally higher standards prevalent there. Tariffs between the two sides of the Atlantic are already low (around 2-3 percent on average), but the scale of the potential payoff makes an investment in this initiative worthwhile. The volume of trade and investment between the United States and Europe is huge – much larger than that with China. The benefits of an agreement for both sides would be substantial if common standards and norms can be adopted and regulations harmonized in crucial sectors like pharmaceuticals, electric cars and cloud computing. Sweden’s National Board of Trade predicts that trade of goods and services between the United States and the European Union could jump 20 percent, or more than $200 billion annually, and the American Chamber of Commerce estimates that growth on both sides of the Atlantic could be boosted by 1.5 percent annually.

There are potential obstacles and pitfalls:

• Negotiation failure: TPP nations have not yet overcome differences in important areas of the market access negotiations (e.g. sugar, dairy, textiles) and in the rule codification effort (e.g. intellectual property and the state-investor dispute settlement). In the case of TAFTA, major problems will arise on the EU side concerning agricultural and food standards(e.g. Europe’s ban on genetically-modified organisms or the use of artificial growth hormones in beef production). On the U.S. side, there might be problems involving access to public markets by EU firms because American states have legislative authority on this issue and often have “buy American” rules.

• Ratification failure: The lack of TPA, the divisive public debate on the benefits of free trade, and the unprecedented scope of these trade agreements augur at best an arduous ratification fight.

• Parochialism: There is a danger that negotiations on each FTA will yield idiosyncratic rules that fail to generate global standards, and instead compartmentalize the world economy.

• Polarization: Depending on the geopolitical climate, there is the risk that the TPP could antagonize China and polarize the Asia-Pacific region further rather than promote its integration.

Conclusion:

The benefits of these two FTAs make the effort required to secure them worthwhile. Your administration can avoid potential pitfalls with creative solutions and political investments. You should shore up U.S. negotiating credibility by securing TPA, strike the right balance between ambition and flexibility at the negotiating table, advocate global rules and norms, and reassure China of the benefits of a deeper economic relationship based on higher trade and investment standards.

Downloads

Authors

Image Source: © Carlos Barria / Reuters

The Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress

Justin Vaïsse and Douglas J. Elliott — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

For the last two years, the world has closely watched an economic crisis unfold in the Eurozone. In a new Brookings interactive examining the Eurozone crisis, 14 Brookings scholars closely analyze the EU’s stabilization efforts and make their own recommendations for a stronger union going forward. Senior Fellow Justin Vaïsse and Fellow Douglas Elliott summarize the findings of the Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress.

Video

The Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress

Authors

Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress

Justin Vaïsse, Douglas J. Elliott, Domenico Lombardi and Thomas Wright — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 13:26:00 -0500

Downloads

Notes and methodology

Video

The Brookings Survey on Eurozone Progress

Authors

Europe through War and Peace: A Nobel Prize and an Uncertain Future

Fri, 07 Dec 2012 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 7, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On December 10, the Norwegian Nobel Committee will award its 2012 Peace Prize to the European Union (EU) for its contributions in transforming Europe “from a continent of war to a continent of peace.” After centuries of generating internal and external conflicts, Europe is now a force for global stability, especially through its peacekeeping, development aid and the strengthening of global governance. However, critics have claimed that human rights activists around the world are more deserving, and the American military presence in Europe after World War II should get the real credit for making reconciliation and unification in Europe possible. Moreover, the EU is currently gripped by an economic crisis that threatens its social and political stability.

On December 7, the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion on the European Union’s Nobel Prize, and war and peace on the European continent featuring Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and EU Ambassador João Vale de Almeida. Brookings Senior Fellow and CUSE Director of Research Justin Vaïsse moderated the discussion.

Video

Audio

Europe through War and Peace: A Nobel Prize and an Uncertain Future

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121207_nobel_peace_europe

The Coming Multi-Tiered Europe

Thu, 29 Nov 2012 16:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 29, 2012
4:30 PM - 6:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Under the pressure of the financial crisis, eurozone countries have been forced to move toward much deeper political and fiscal integration. While the European Union (EU) has always accommodated a degree of internal diversity, this development could relegate member states that do not use the euro—most notably the United Kingdom—to the sidelines of the EU, and lead them to renegotiate the terms of their membership or perhaps even opt out altogether. More generally, the EU seems poised to become a multi-tier construction, with a high degree of integration in the core and a variable geometry of association in the periphery. However, differentiated European integration presents critical challenges to the common market and the economic fate of the continent, as well as its geopolitical might, especially in its eastern and southern neighborhoods.

On November 29, the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion on the possible future configurations of the European Union and their impact on transatlantic relations. Panelists included; Steven Erlanger, Paris bureau chief for The New York Times; Charles Grant, director of the London-based Center for European Reform; and Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). CUSE Director and Senior Fellow Fiona Hill provided introductory remarks, and CUSE Research Director and Senior Fellow Justin Vaïsse moderated the discussion.

Audio

The Coming Multi-Tiered Europe

The Upside of the Euro Crisis

Justin Vaïsse — Wed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published by The Financialist.

Since the beginning of the European debt crisis, most economists have focused on the potential consequences of a breakup of the euro zone. It’s easy to understand why. Although unlikely, a euro-zone breakup would be a potentially cataclysmic event that would leave the world economy in tatters. Economist Milton Friedman famously predicted the euro zone would fail when confronted with its first systemic crisis because it was a fair-weather construction.

The “countdown to apocalypse” frame of mind, however, misses the most important part of the story – specifically, the progress European leaders have made since the crisis started, nearly five years ago, in reshaping EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union) into a more viable currency union. Therein lies the under-reported, and more significant, story of the European debt crisis.

The strengthening of EMU into a cohesive monetary union would have been impossible to imagine in the benign context of the 1990s when the euro zone was created and its economies were growing at relatively healthy clips. The current crisis has changed the economic and political environment in Europe and provided the incentive to make progress on taboo topics, including painful abandonments of sovereignty by member states. This doesn’t mean that the euro zone has to become another US-style federal union.

As Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, declared, “those who claim only a full federation can be sustainable set the bar too high.” Rather, what’s emerging is what leaders like EU Monetary Affairs and Finance Commissioner Olli Rehn call “euro zone 2.0” The new euro zone will be an in-between, sui generis institution built on six pillars. Let’s examine the progress made on each of those pillars since the beginning of the crisis and see what remains to be done.

Firstly, the euro zone needs a deeper fiscal union with stricter budget discipline from its member states and regulatory agencies with effective surveillance and enforcement powers. Such a structure would be necessary to support debt mutualization and a dose of fiscal transfers, most probably through a common euro-zone budget. Since the beginning of the crisis, European leaders have made some real progress on budget discipline, with the European Semester for economic coordination and the so-called Six-Pack measures. But these developments remain insufficient to convince Germany to accede to a regime of debt mutualization.

This leads us to the second pillar – a political union. Since abandonments of sovereignty are required from all member states, new governance and accountability mechanisms at the level of the euro zone must be created. On the financial front, to ensure financial stability, Germany and other creditor countries, which have contributed most to the region’s sovereign bailouts, will have to relinquish control of part of their own budget by consenting to at least a dose of automatic transfers as part of their ongoing financial support of debtor countries. On the political front, debtor countries, like Spain or Portugal, will need to give up their control over core spending functions. Angela Merkel has been calling for deeper political integration, but France’s François Hollande is more cautious, and progress on this front has been very limited so far.

The third pillar supporting a stronger euro zone involves a banking union, which is crucial to breaking the vicious circle of sovereign debt crises and bank failures. The decision to build such a union, with zone-wide regulation and bank supervision by the ECB, was actually taken by the European summit of June 2012. It could be operational as early as 2013.

The fourth pillar is the provision of liquidity to the financial system in times of stress. The ECB has committed to more monetary action, and in doing so, more closely resembles traditional central banks like the US Fed or the Bank of England.

Similarly, European leaders have made good progress in creating crisis management tools for current and future sovereign debt crises, the fifth necessary pillar of a euro zone 2.0. The “no-bailout clause” of the treaties has been de facto abolished, and replaced not only by the two successive emergency funds guaranteed by all member states (EFSF and ESM, or European Stability Mechanism). One can also add to the mix the open market bond purchases by the ECB as part of Draghi’s commitment to defeat speculative attacks against weaker countries.

Progress on the sixth and last pillar – improving competitiveness and economic adjustment between euro-zone member states – has, like greater fiscal and political integration, been more modest. Labor mobility has improved somewhat, with well-educated Spaniards and Greeks migrating to higher-paying work in Germany. Germany’s higher wages have helped other countries – including Spain, Portugal or even Ireland – regain competitiveness. However, it is unclear if structural reforms, rather than the economic recession, have contributed to these improvements.

The bottom line is that the euro-zone “crisis” has already generated a lot of euro-zone “progress,” and today the monetary union is much more solid than it was at its birth. In some respects, it is hard to recognize it. What observers should monitor over the next few months is whether European leaders make good on creating the banking union and, more crucially, how they manage to crack the toughest nut, achieving much stronger fiscal union accompanied by a deeper political union.

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: The Financialist

Image Source: © Vincent Kessler / Reuters

Direction of U.S. Foreign Policy

Justin Vaïsse — Mon, 19 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

In an interview with France24, Justin Vaisse looks forward to potential foreign policy developments in President Barack Obama’s second term.

France24: Presidents in their second mandates tend to try to make some changes in their foreign policies, trying to burnish their legacy maybe. Do you think this will be the case with Barack Obama?

Justin Vaïsse: Yes and at least for two reasons. The first one is that obviously he has freer hands without the prospective of reelection and the end of his mandate and without the heavy burden of the campaign and fundraising and all that goes with it and of course the political constraint also he has freer hands. And the second reason is foreign policy offers presidents especially in their second mandate an opportunity to escape from the intricacies and the tensions and the constant bargaining with Congress in Washington because foreign policy is an area where the president has significantly more power vis-à-vis internal constraints and domestic policy and that’s why generally presidents do pretty well in foreign policy during the second mandate, think Ronald Reagan and all the initiatives he took with Mikhail Gorbachev in the 80s, think Bill Clinton and others, they are just more successful and so I expect Obama to launch a series of initiatives to as you say try to burnish his legacy.

France24: First of all, there might be some personnel changes, we’ve seen already the CIA director leave because of extramarital affairs, there’s talk of Hilary Clinton leaving as secretary of state, Mr. Panetta secretary of defense. First of all he will have to reorganize his national security slash foreign policy team.

Justin Vaïsse: Yes, however it’s part of the Washington jockeying and horseracing, who will go where and it’s interesting and I would say it’s relevant to some extent to know who will be the next secretary of state for example. However remember that the lesson of the first mandate is that the first advisor to Barack Obama is Barack Obama himself. He’s been the decider-in-chief; he’s been the strategic mind thinking in the White House, so the decisions were really concentrated in the White House like under Nixon or Carter for example. However the difference is that Barack Obama did not have Kissinger or Muskie to help him. He was his own man and he was making the decisions both at a general level like Bush did, but also at a more precise and concrete level. He was really in charge and so you want to sort of predict what the second mandate would look like, it’s less useful to know who will be secretary of state than to try to understand how Barack Obama works, how he sees the world, and what he wants to accomplish.

France24: What do you see him trying to accomplish in his second mandate, you mentioned initiatives, what do you think is in his mind right now?

Justin Vaïsse: Well you know I think his first priority would be most probably to try to finish what he calls the pivot. Not only the pivot to Asia, but more generally trying to get away from the wars, the land wars in Asia so Iraq is finished, he’s drawing down in Afghanistan, so I think he wants to see that finished for good in order to redistribute assets vis-à-vis the emerging world, towards the emerging world, towards Asia in particular. I think that’s the grand idea of his mandate. Remember that Obama is first and foremost a pragmatist, he’s as (Ryan Liesma?) wrote a consequentialist. So he decides based on the merits of the case not out of a set of fixed principles or an ideology. He’s the ultimate pragmatist, he has a grand idea which is that you need to reconfigure US leadership after Bush in order to adapt it to the new world, a world that is made of India, Brazil, China, and hence the idea of the pivot and the idea of redistributing assets from Middle East land wars to Asia. And that I think he will place an emphasis on and try to see through in his second mandate.

Watch the complete interview here »

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: France 24

Image Source: © Andrew Winning / Reuters

The Next U.S. President and Europe: Thriving Together or Withering Apart?

Thu, 08 Nov 2012 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 8, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

When Barack Obama takes his second oath of office in January 2013, he will find both perils and promises in the old continent. On the one hand, the eurozone crisis may bring about a variably integrated “multi-speed” Europe, with the United Kingdom and perhaps others distancing themselves from their European Union (EU) partners. A reconfigured Europe could complicate the NATO alliance and make the U.S. economic recovery more difficult, given the interdependence of the transatlantic economies. On the other hand, the prospect of a major free-trade agreement with the EU could jolt growth on both sides of the Atlantic. More importantly, European allies remain indispensable partners in tackling global challenges including terrorism in the Sahel, the Iranian nuclear program, civil war in Syria, tensions with Russia and more.

On November 8, the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion on transatlantic relations over the next four years. Panelists included Clive Crook of Bloomberg View, Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University, Andrew Moravcsik of Princeton University, and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director of Research Justin Vaïsse. CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion.

Video

Audio

The Next U.S. President and Europe: Thriving Together or Withering Apart?

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121108_us_europe_transcript

The American Presidential Election and Europe (Entretien avec Justin Vaïsse sur l'élection présidentielle américaine)

Justin Vaïsse — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview with France’s Robert Schuman Foundation, Justin Vaïsse observes that the 2012 presidential election has been dominated by the economy and the so-called fiscal cliff, and that those issues have overshadowed all others. On the transatlantic dimension, Europe has been largely seen as a problem that the U.S. can do nothing to solve. In looking to the future, however, a free-trade area agreement that set to be discussed in 2013 may be a solution to boosting both the U.S. and European economies. The interview is also available in French.

1. The American elections will take place on November. Can you tell us what the most important issues are?

This election is about the size, place and role that the Federal government should occupy in the economy and in society. Because of this, the fiscal issue dominates all others including important questions such as immigration and, in an amusing paradox, healthcare reform – that's because neither Mitt Romney, who passed a reform closely resembling "Obamacare" in Massachusetts in 2006, nor Obama, who knows that his reform is not very popular, have much interest in insisting on this. Even the culture wars that dominated American electoral campaigns from the 1970's to the 2000's have been partially eclipsed. Sure, there are discussions about abortion and gay marriage, but these subjects have not taken center stage. The reason is obvious: with a budget deficit that has gone well beyond 1,000 billion dollars every fiscal year since 2009 and a debt that is continually rising, the situation is becoming somewhat worrying – it is worse, for example, than the average in the euro zone. Unsurprisingly both campaigns have focused on reducing the deficit and the debt, reviving the economy and creating jobs (the official unemployment rate has dropped to 7.8% but in fact this figure masks a situation that is significantly worse). Voters can chose between two starkly contrasted political cultures as far as the role of government is concerned. Mitt Romney envisions a modest State, which takes a significant step back so as to leave the country's revival in the hands of entrepreneurial driving forces. Barack Obama sees the government not only as the guarantor of solidarity but more importantly as the only agent able to restore American infrastructures (from education to the transport and energy networks) so that America can become competitive once more in a multi-polar world.

2. In the second debate devoted to the economy Mitt Romney accused Barack Obama of having doubled the national debt, due to reach 16,000 billion dollars, and of leading the country on the "path as Greece". The agreement between the Democrats and the Republicans on reducing the debt of the USA will end on December 31st. Do you think that a new agreement can be reached before (or after) this date? What will it comprise? Major budgetary cuts?

At the end of this year, the US will inexorably be moving towards the famous fiscal cliff, an expression describing the sharp automatic increase in taxes or, more precisely, the end of the tax cuts granted by George W Bush in 2001 and 2003, and extended by Obama to protect economic growth over the last few years, as well as other measures to stimulate the economy. If Democrats and Republicans do reach an agreement, roughly 500 billion dollars will be taken out of the economy every year starting in 2013, thus cutting the deficit by half. That would benefit long-term growth, but will be disastrous for growth and employment in the short term; hence the desire not to jump off the cliff and to find a compromise to alleviate the effects of these tax increases. Moreover, in terms of spending, the "sequestration" which was negotiated as a compromise to the crisis over the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011 will enter into force. There will be 1,200 billion dollars in automatic cuts, half of which will apply to the defence budget. Again the recessive effect (plus the impact on social programmes and military capabilities) would be such that Congress and the White House will look for an agreement in order to diminish it.

3. How does the USA view the management of the euro zone crisis and the solutions implemented by the Europeans to overcome it?

With irritation and impotence. The general feeling, shared by other regions in the world at the IMF, is that Europeans are wealthy enough to settle the crisis but that they are not determined enough to do it. They are particularly harsh when they see that recent measures, such as the ECB's support of sovereign debts, could have eased matters a long time ago. From this point of view, there is real disagreement with Germany on one hand, and proximity with France under both Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, as well as with the Southern European countries, on the other. What observers in Washington still don't quite grasp are the political and legal constraints that weigh on Angela Merkel, and also her strategy to use to the crisis to put pressure on countries in the South. But at the end of the day, the US cannot do much: their budgetary margins for manoeuvre are extremely slim and even an increase in support through the IMF would face Republican opposition in the House of Representatives. They are therefore reduced to discreet consultations, discussions and pressure, and to unfailing rhetorical support in order to avoid worrying the markets.

4. Does the USA really want the euro zone to move towards budgetary and banking federalism?

From the U.S. standpoint, anything that can revive the euro zone's economy and ensure its viability in the long term is a good thing. Remember that for America, the stakes in terms of economic and financial investments are enormous. Of course, a spectacular euro zone recovery in 2014 or 2015 could potentially become a problem for America, if it has not put its fiscal house in order, and if its debt and deficit levels remain high. We would then see pressure on the financing of the American economy, notably on Treasury Bonds, especially if they are competing with comparable European instruments (as Herman van Rompuy suggests would be the case in his interim report). I am confident that in such a competition some will see the logical start of a vast American conspiracy to prevent the Euro zone from moving towards greater union. This would be wrong, however. In reality, although some observers might anticipate the potential danger of an resurgent euro zone, we should remember that at this stage, it is above all the fear of collapse or of a period of prolonged weakness that dominates collective perceptions here.

5. In 2008 even before he was elected, Barack Obama was extremely popular in Europe. But Europe was seen as being the major absentee from foreign policy issues addressed during the debates between Obama and Romney. Is this because of a re-direction of foreign policy priorities on the part of the American administration towards the Pacific, known as the "pivot", and which comprises redeploying a share of its diplomatic and military means from Europe to the Pacific?

It is a well known fact: Washington is only concerned with regions and players in the international system that cause problems or offer solutions. At the start of Obama's term in office, this was not really the case with Europe. Gradually the American president lost his initial hopes (or became disillusioned) about forming new partnerships with the emerging world. China, Brazil and India were not really ready for prime time, and the misunderstandings multiplied; with China, for example, concerning long-standing sensitive questions, or with Brazil and Turkey over Iran's nuclear ambitions. At the same time, Europeans proved that in spite of their limits or reticence they would loyally remain by the USA's side in Afghanistan, and most crucially in Iran. Then came the Arab Spring and the intervention in Libya, a high point in transatlantic cooperation. In short, Obama turned his attention back to Europe, especially as in the meantime Europe became a problem again due to the euro crisis. As for the pivot towards Asia, it is a reality, but accomplished at the expense of the Middle East rather than of Europe – at least that is what Obama would like – since he finds himself, against his will, constantly sucked into developments in the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Arab transitions, Israeli-Palestinian issues, etc ...) which prevent him from devoting himself to his grand idea – the repositioning of American leadership in the emerging world and Asia-Pacific in particular.

6. The American military budget represents half of the world's defence spending whilst the EU is disarming and is devoting barely 1.7% of its wealth to its armed forces. To what extent does each of the candidates support the organisation of a European defence policy? How do they see their cooperation in future military operations (eg intervention in Libya, undertaken by the UK and France with the logistic support of the USA) in Mali for example?

There is no difference between Obama and Romney on this issue, subject to an established bipartisan consensus: Europeans must spend more and respect the 2% of GDP target, as set by NATO. Since the mid 2000's under George W. Bush, the old and almost theological battle which started in the 1990's between NATO and European Defence has faded, with unreserved support placed in the latter, providing it encourages the old continent to spend more and be more effective from a military point of view. In other words, the question of capabilities became more important than the issue of potential competition. But on this point the Americans were disappointed: the decline in European defence budgets is stark and even the British ally is no longer seen as it was ten years ago, due to the extent of lost capabilities. In short, there is a great deal of concern and in the few areas of real cooperation as in Libya and Mali, the level of operations has remained modest. If there were an intervention in Syria or the Gulf, not to speak of Asia, the Americans know that Europeans would again become extremely "junior" military partners.

7. After 2012 what might we seriously envisage for transatlantic relations? What impact will the re-election of Obama or the election of Romney have on relations either side of the Atlantic in an increasingly multi-polar world?

I am not sure that the election of one over the other would profoundly change things. Even if Europeans feel instinctively closer to Obama's international positions, we should recall that the president who broke with years of transatlantic tension under George W. Bush was Bush himself, and that the relationship was mostly good under his second term in office. What is certain is that there is still great potential for cooperation, which is further justified by increasing multipolarity. I am thinking in particular of the transatlantic free-trade area which is to be discussed starting in 2013. If it can become a reality, it would provide great impetus to both sides of the Atlantic and might increase their leadership over other spheres (in terms of standards and norms, or innovation, for example). Furthermore, challenges will still exist. There are challenges in Europe itself, where the political and institutional landscape will necessarily develop under the effects of the euro zone crisis and which will notably have a negative effect on the single market, as illustrated by Sébastien Dullien [2]. But there are challenges in the world, in the Middle East and in Asia, which will inevitably pop up and cause the US, at one point or another, to turn to Europe.

[1] http://www.odilejacob.fr/catalogue/histoire-et-geopolitique/...
[2] http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/why_the_euro_crisis_threatens_t...

Entretien avec Justin Vaïsse sur l'élection présidentielle américaine

1. Les élections américaines se tiendront le 6 novembre 2012 prochain. Pouvez-vous nous dire quels en sont les enjeux décisifs?

C'est une élection qui se joue sur la question du rôle, de la place et de la taille de l'Etat fédéral dans l'économie et la société. Le dossier fiscal domine donc tous les autres, y compris des sujets cruciaux comme l'immigration ou même, paradoxe amusant, la réforme de la santé – il faut dire que ni Mitt Romney, qui avait passé une réforme semblable au "Obamacare" dans le Massachusetts en 2006, ni Obama, qui sait que sa réforme n'est pas très populaire, n'ont intérêt à trop y insister. Il n'est pas jusqu'aux guerres culturelles, qui ont dominé les campagnes électorales américaines des années 1970 aux années 2000, qui n'aient reflué dans l'ordre des priorités. On parle bien d'avortement et de mariage gay, mais sans que ces sujets s'imposent sur le devant de la scène. Il faut dire qu'avec un déficit budgétaire qui dépasse allégrement les 1 000 milliards de dollars chaque année depuis 2009, et une dette qui augmente sans cesse, la situation devient préoccupante – elle est pire que dans la moyenne de la zone euro. Sans surprise, la campagne a donc tourné autour de la réduction du déficit et de la dette, de la relance de l'économie et de la création d'emplois (le taux officiel de chômage est descendu à 7,8%, mais ce chiffre cache en réalité une situation plus mauvaise), et elle a vu s'affronter deux cultures politiques quant au rôle de l'Etat. Celle de Mitt Romney envisage un Etat modeste, qui s'efface pour laisser les forces vives des entrepreneurs redresser le pays. Celle de Barack Obama assigne à l'Etat un rôle de solidarité et surtout de restauration des infrastructures américaines (de l'éducation aux réseaux de transport et d'énergie) pour permettre à l'Amérique de redevenir compétitive dans le monde multipolaire.

2. Lors du deuxième débat consacré à l'économie, Mitt Romney a accusé Barack Obama d'avoir doublé la dette nationale qui atteindrait 16 000 milliards de dollars et de mener le pays sur " le chemin de la Grèce ". L'accord entre démocrates et républicains sur la réduction de la dette des Etats-Unis arrivera à échéance le 31 décembre prochain. Pensez-vous qu'un nouvel accord puisse intervenir avant (ou après) cette date ? Et que contiendrait-il ? Des coupes budgétaires importantes?

A la fin de l'année, les Etats-Unis avanceront inéluctablement vers la fameuse "falaise fiscale" (fiscal cliff), expression qui désigne la brutale hausse automatique des recettes fiscales, ou plus précisément l'expiration prévue des réductions d'impôt accordées par George W. Bush en 2001 et 2003, prorogées par Obama pour préserver la croissance économique ces dernières années, ainsi que d'autres mesures de stimulation de l'économie. Si démocrates et républicains ne se mettent pas d'accord, ce sont plus de 500 milliards de dollars qui seront prélevés sur l'économie chaque année à partir de 2013: de quoi réduire le déficit de moitié. Ce sera bénéfique pour la croissance à long terme et désastreux pour la croissance et l'emploi à court terme, d'où la volonté de ne pas se jeter du haut de la falaise et de trouver un compromis pour atténuer les effets de ces hausses d'impôts. Par ailleurs, du côté des dépenses, la "séquestration" décidée à l'issue de la crise sur le plafond de la dette à l'été 2011 entrera en vigueur : 1 200 milliards de dollars de coupes automatiques, dont la moitié pour le budget de la défense. Là encore, l'effet récessif (mais aussi l'impact sur les programmes sociaux et les capacités militaires) serait tel que le Congrès et la Maison blanche chercheront un accord pour l'atténuer.

3. Quel regard les Etats-Unis portent-ils sur la gestion de la crise de la zone euro et sur les solutions mises en œuvre par les Européens pour l'enrayer?

Un regard d'agacement et d'impuissance. L'impression d'ensemble, partagée avec les autres régions du monde au FMI, c'est que les Européens sont assez riches pour régler la crise mais qu'ils ne se décident pas à le faire. Ils sont particulièrement sévères quand ils constatent que les mesures prises récemment, comme le soutien de la BCE aux dettes souveraines, auraient permis d'apaiser les choses il y a longtemps déjà. De ce point de vue, il existe un véritable désaccord avec l'Allemagne, et une proximité avec la France de Nicolas Sarkozy comme celle de François Hollande et les pays du Sud. Ce que les observateurs à Washington ne voient pas toujours, ce sont les contraintes politiques et juridiques qui pèsent sur Angela Merkel, et sa stratégie d'utiliser la crise pour faire pression sur les pays du Sud. Mais au bout du compte, les Etats-Unis ne peuvent pas faire grand-chose : leurs marges budgétaires sont très réduites, et même une augmentation du soutien à travers le FMI se heurte à l'opposition des républicains à la Chambre des représentants. Ils en sont donc réduits à des consultations, discussions et pressions discrètes et à un soutien rhétorique sans faille, pour ne pas inquiéter les marchés.

4. L'évolution de la zone euro vers le fédéralisme budgétaire et bancaire est-elle réellement souhaitée par les Etats-Unis?

Tout ce qui peut faire repartir l'économie de la zone euro et garantir sa viabilité à long terme est bon à prendre : pour l'Amérique, les enjeux en termes d'investissement économiques et financiers sont gigantesques. Bien sûr, une zone euro qui rebondirait de façon spectaculaire en 2014 ou 2015 pourrait mettre en difficulté l'Amérique si elle n'a pas mis d'ordre dans ses comptes publics, si ses niveaux de dette et de déficit restent élevés. On verrait alors une pression sur le financement de l'économie américaine, sur les bons du Trésor notamment, surtout si ceux-ci sont mis en concurrence avec des instruments européens comparables (comme Herman van Rompuy le suggère dans son rapport intérimaire). Je suis confiant que, dans cette concurrence, certains verront le point de départ logique d'une vaste conspiration américaine pour empêcher la marche de l'Eurozone vers davantage d'union. Ce ne sera pas très sérieux. En réalité, si certains observateurs peuvent anticiper le danger potentiel d'une Eurozone gonflée à bloc, souvenons-nous qu'à ce stade, c'est surtout la crainte d'un effondrement ou d'une période de faiblesse prolongée qui domine les perceptions.

5. En 2008, avant même son élection, Barack Obama a bénéficié d'une grande popularité en Europe. Mais l'Europe a été présentée comme la grande absente des sujets de politique étrangère abordés pendant les débats entre Obama et Romney. Cela découle-t-il de la réorientation des priorités de politique extérieure de l'administration américaine vers le Pacifique, connue sous le nom de " pivot ", et qui consiste à redéployer une partie de ses moyens diplomatiques et militaires de l'Europe vers le Pacifique?

Le constat est bien connu : Washington ne s'intéresse qu'aux régions et acteurs du système international qui posent des problèmes ou offrent des solutions. Au début du mandat Obama, ce n'était pas vraiment le cas de l'Europe. Puis peu à peu le président américain est revenu de ses espoirs (ou illusions) du début, lorsqu'il pensait pouvoir former de nouveaux partenariats avec le monde émergent. La Chine, le Brésil ou l'Inde n'étaient pas vraiment prêts pour ce rôle, et les malentendus se sont multipliés, par exemple avec la Chine sur les dossiers sensibles traditionnels, ou avec le Brésil et la Turquie sur le nucléaire iranien. Parallèlement, les Européens ont prouvé qu'en dépit de leurs limites et réticences, ils se tenaient fidèlement aux côtés des Etats-Unis, en Afghanistan ou en Iran notamment. Puis sont venus le printemps arabe et l'intervention en Libye, un point haut de la coopération transatlantique. Bref, Obama est plutôt revenu vers l'Europe, d'autant que l'Europe est, pendant ce temps, redevenue un problème, avec la crise de la zone euro. Quant au pivot vers l'Asie, il est bien réel, mais se fait aux dépens du Moyen-Orient plus que de l'Europe – ou tout au moins, c'est ce que souhaiterait Obama, qui se trouve sans arrêt aspiré contre son gré par les développements au Moyen-Orient (Iran, Syrie, transitions arabes, dossier israélo-palestinien, etc.) qui l'empêchent de se consacrer pleinement à sa grande idée, celle d'un repositionnement du leadership américain vers le monde émergent et l'Asie-Pacifique en particulier.

6. Le budget militaire américain représente la moitié des dépenses de défense dans le monde alors que l'Union européenne désarme et ne consacre à ses forces armées qu'à peine 1,7% de sa richesse. Dans quelle mesure chacun des deux candidats soutient-il l'organisation d'une politique de défense européenne ? Comment envisagent-t-ils leur coopération dans des opérations militaires futures (exemple du cas de l'intervention en Libye, mené par le Royaume-Uni et la France, soutenue logistiquement par les Etats-Unis), par exemple, au Mali?

Il n'existe pas de différence entre Obama et Romney sur cette question, qui fait l'objet d'un consensus bipartisan déjà ancien : les Européens doivent dépenser plus et respecter l'objectif de 2% du PIB fixé au sein de l'OTAN. Depuis le milieu des années 2000 environ, sous George W. Bush, la vieille lutte presque théologique démarrée dans les années 1990 entre OTAN et défense européenne s'est effacée au profit d'un soutien sans réserve à cette dernière, pour peu qu'elle encourage le vieux continent à dépenser plus et à être plus efficace militairement. Autrement dit, la question des capacités a fait oublier celle de la concurrence potentielle entre organisations. Mais sur ce point, les Américains ont été déçus : la chute des budgets de défense côté européen est très forte, et même l'allié britannique n'est plus vu de la même façon qu'il y a dix ans, tant la perte capacitaire est sensible. Bref, l'inquiétude est grande, et les quelques domaines de coopération concrète, comme la Libye et le Mali, restent des opérations modestes. Qu'une intervention ait lieu en Syrie ou dans le Golfe, sans parler de l'Asie, et les Américains savent que les Européens redeviendraient des partenaires très "juniors".

7. Après 2012, quel scenario peut-on sérieusement envisager pour les relations transatlantiques ? Quel impact la réélection d'Obama ou l'élection de Romney aurait-elle sur les relations entre les deux rives de l'Atlantique dans un monde de plus en plus multipolaire?

Je ne suis pas sûr que l'élection de l'un plutôt que l'autre changerait les choses en profondeur. Même si les Européens sont spontanément plus proches des positions internationales d'Obama, rappelons-nous que le président qui a rompu avec les années de tensions transatlantiques sous George W. Bush, c'est George W. Bush lui-même, et que la relation était bonne sous son deuxième mandat. Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'il reste un potentiel de coopération énorme que le monde multipolaire vient justifier encore davantage. Je pense notamment à la zone de libre-échange transatlantique qui devrait être discutée à partir de 2013. Si elle peut voir le jour, cela donnerait une grande bouffée d'oxygène aux deux rives de l'Atlantique, et pourrait accroître leur leadership sur les autres régions (en matière de standards et de normes ou d'innovation par exemple). Par ailleurs, les défis ne vont pas manquer. Des défis en Europe même, où le paysage politique et institutionnel va forcément évoluer sous l'effet de la crise de la zone euro, qui devrait notamment avoir un effet négatif sur le marché unique, comme l'a montré Sébastien Dullien [2]. Mais aussi des défis dans le monde, au Moyen Orient et en Asie, pour lesquels l'Amérique se tournera forcément, à un moment ou un autre, vers l'Europe.

[1] http://www.odilejacob.fr/catalogue/histoire-et-geopolitique/...
[2] http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/why_the_euro_crisis_threatens_t...

Downloads

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: Robert Schuman Foundation

L'Amérique dans le monde sous Obama

Justin Vaïsse — Sat, 03 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with Ouest France, Justin Vaïsse comments on Obama’s foreign policy during his first four years in office. Obama’s big idea, he says, was a focus on emerging powers, but the Arab Spring kept the US engaged in the Middle East. Overall, the priorities of his Administration confirmed the idea that the US is only interested in other regions when they cause problems or offer solutions. Read an excerpt below.

Ouest France: Quelle empreinte Obama a-t-il donné à la politique étrangère américaine?

Justin Vaïsse: Quand Obama arrive au pouvoir, il trouve une situation de crise sur plusieurs fronts. Crise financière, l’économie américaine est en chute libre. Crise de l’image des Etats-Unis après deux mandats de Bush, la guerre en Irak, la torture, Guantanamo. Crise de sur-extension militaire, avec deux guerres en cours. Sa grande idée est sur le long terme. Son propos, c’est de faire en sorte que l’Amérique se tourne vers ce qui compte vraiment. Pendant huit ans, elle a été complètement focalisée sur le contre terrorisme et les questions de sécurité. Or, un monde nouveau a émergé, avec la montée en puissance de la Chine et des autres pays émergents : l’Inde, le Brésil, etc. Ce monde-là, Obama estime que Bush l’a ignoré. Donc, sa grande idée, c’est celle du pivot. Ce sont ses termes, il faut faire pivoter le leadership américain vers les problèmes diplomatiques globaux, des puissances anciennes vers les puissances émergentes. Plus généralement du Moyen Orient vers l’Asie.

Ouest France: Mais n’est-ce pas un habile maquillage pour masquer une perte de puissance?

Vaïsse: Pas seulement. C’est aussi un redéploiement. Il faut d’une part sortir d’une mauvaise situation, se retirer des guerres au sol en cours, et en même temps il manifeste sa volonté de s’investir plus vers l’Asie Pacifique.

Read the full interview in French at ouest-france.fr »

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: Ouest France

The Foreign Policy Debate: Key Issues and Omissions

Tue, 23 Oct 2012 10:30:00 -0400

On October 22, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney met in the last presidential debate of 2012, this time focusing on foreign policy. Read the reactions to the debate by Brookings Foreign Policy experts: Justin Vaïsse looks at Romney’s caution regarding military interventions and what the debate reveals about the foreign policy mood of American public opinion; Feng Wang analyzes current U.S.-China relations and the candidates’ statements on trade and political dialogue with China; Steven Pifer examines the U.S.-Russia relationship and how each candidate plans to approach Russia if elected; Tanvi Madan comments on the omission of India from the debate, and the importance of addressing the U.S.-India relationship in the future. Diana Negroponte evaluates Romney’s statements on Iran and Afghanistan.

It's Official: Come Home, America
Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy

The striking thing about Republican nominee Mitt Romney's position in this third presidential debate was how much he retreated from the military assertiveness he seemed to have embraced so far. Of course, he reaffirmed his support for a strong military and for increasing the defense budget. But consider this:

Romney did not call for a no-fly zone in Syria, as many hawks like Max Boot have suggested. He did not call for Congress to pre-authorize military action in Iran, as some of his neoconservative advisers like Elliott Abrams have advocated. He didn't criticize Obama for relying excessively on drone strikes instead of human operations, a choice that hampers the collection of intelligence by obliterating sources of information, as many critics of the president like Charles Krauthammer have rightly charged. He didn't qualify his endorsement of the 2014 deadline in Afghanistan by saying that he would consider the situation on the ground and ask the generals, like he had before.

Instead, Romney insisted that America's purpose "is to make sure the world is peaceful. We want a peaceful planet... I want to see peace... We don't want another Iraq. We don't want another Afghanistan." As for military action, it is "the last resort. It is something one would only, only consider if all of the other avenues had been tried to their full extent."

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Beyond Trade with China
Feng Wang, Director, Brookings-Tsinghua Center and Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center

In their last presidential election debate on October 22^nd, both President Obama and Governor Romney acknowledged that China as a partner, and put economics on the top of their agenda for their China policy. For relations between the world’s largest and the second largest economies, such a stand from both candidates is assuring.

When asked about his plan to designate China the status of currency manipulator on day one of his administration, Governor Romney stood by his promise and also explained why he believed that China might not want to enter into a trade war with the United States: the trade disparity between the U.S. and China. China exports much more to the U.S. than vice versa, and China therefore needs the U.S. market more than the U.S. does.

Whether China chooses to have a trade war with the U.S. may depend more than the economic calculations Governor Romney laid out, as economic decisions are rarely made on economic considerations alone. A designation of the currency manipulator status, after the Chinese RMB has appreciated substantially over the last few years, will not only set the new tone of the U.S.-China relations, should Governor Romney enter the White House in January 2013, it could well have ramifications that can cloud the U.S.-China relations for an extended time period, a year or more, which will not help a recovering U.S. economy.

As with the U.S., China is under a leadership transition. A new Chinese leadership will be fully in place by March 2013, with the transition beginning in public two days after the U.S. presidential election, on November 8^th in Beijing, when the Chinese Communist Party begins its 18^th National Congress. The emerging Chinese leadership would not want to appear "soft" when faced with a gesture from a new U.S. administration that is seen as not fully justified and overtly hostile. Domestic politics here in China, hence, will almost certainly affect any decisions that the new Chinese leadership will make. If there is any doubt about such a prospect, the recent chilling of Sino-Japanese economic relations resulting from the island territory dispute is a fresh reminder.

Governor Romney and Russia as America’s Geopolitical Foe
Steven Pifer, Director, Arms Control Initiative and Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

In last night’s debate with President Obama, Governor Romney again reiterated that Russia is America’s major geopolitical foe. To be sure, the U.S.-Russia relationship faces tough issues; Vladimir Putin will not be easy to deal with and has taken Russia backwards on democracy. But the bilateral relationship is more complex than the governor suggests. U.S. and Russian interests converge on certain issues, and cooperation on those questions makes eminent good sense.

One explanation for the governor’s view may be a political calculation that taking a strong stance against Russia plays well with a segment of the American electorate. Both countries seem to suffer something of a lingering Cold War hangover. Indeed, during his presidential campaign late last year and early this year, Mr. Putin played the anti-U.S. card in a thinly veiled appeal to the conservative part of his Russian constituency.

But the fact remains: whoever sits in the Oval Office in 2013, he will seek Moscow’s help on key questions. Take Afghanistan. Russia the past three years has permitted the United States and NATO to move manpower and supplies—including lethal military equipment—through Russia and Russian airspace to Afghanistan. Washington will want to ensure that it continues to have that access, or is Mr. Romney prepared to depend solely on the Pakistanis, who cut the supply routes to Afghanistan last year following the killing of Osama bin Laden?

Moscow has not come as far as Washington would like in pressuring Tehran, but it has come further than anyone would have predicted a few years ago. The Russians in the UN Security Council supported stronger sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, including an embargo on all arms sales. That came at a price for them; they ended up cancelling a previously concluded sale of sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran. Planners in the U.S. and Israeli air forces, which could be called upon to carry out strikes against Iran, undoubtedly appreciate that they would not have to contend with the S-300. Would Mr. Romney be prepared to see that Russia cooperation unravel?

The Obama administration’s "reset" in Russia policy was based on a calculation that showing a readiness to take account of some Russian concerns, for example, with regards to nuclear arms control, could produce Russian support on questions such as Afghanistan and Iran. Maintaining Russian help on these questions, which will be at the top of the White House in box next year, will be important.

Managing the complex U.S.-Russia agenda has never been easy. The governor has criticized the reset and called for showing more backbone and less flexibility in dealing with Moscow. That might make for good campaign rhetoric, but as with most international relationships, Washington must take account of at least some of the other country’s interests if it seeks that country’s support. The challenge is to find a balance between cooperation where interests converge while defending U.S. positions where positions differ. Simply reiterating time and again that Russia is America’s geopolitical foe does not appear to recognize that complexity.

Just Breathe: Why Sometimes Not Being Mentioned in a Debate is a Good Thing
Tanvi Madan, Director and Fellow, The India Project

Following the foreign policy debate between President Obama and Governor Romney last night, there was much comment about the omission of a number of countries and issues. Among the Indian Twitterati – as well as others in the Twitterverse – there was some consternation about the fact that neither candidate mentioned India. Laments followed about what this said about the state of the U.S.-India relationship and about the importance of India. Viewed through a different prism, however, India should probably be glad that it was left out of the discussion last night.

Consider the countries that did get mentioned the most (leaving aside Mali): Afghanistan, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Syria. They are either countries (a) on which the two candidates disagree, (b) considered to be in crisis or a threat to U.S. national security, and/or (c) seen as important to mention because they are perceived by the candidates as resonating in crucial swing states like Ohio (China) and Florida (Israel).

Seen in this context, Indians and advocates of India might want to breathe a sigh of relief that it was not mentioned. For one, there aren't major disagreements between the candidates on India: if anything when India has come up in this campaign cycle, it has been mostly in the context of who has done more (or less) to maintain and further support the U.S.-India relationship. Second, it is a good sign for India that it is not seen as being in crisis. To remember what that was like, think about the time when it was most often brought up in discussion as being part of the "most dangerous place in the world." India is also not seen as a threat. China was the large Asian country that was portrayed as threatening—either to U.S. jobs at home or to American economic and security interests around the world. Advocates of India and U.S.-India relations should probably be glad that, unlike the rise of China, India’s rise was not mentioned by the moderator just before he asked, "What do you believe is the greatest future threat to the national security of this country?" Finally, in previous campaigns when India has come up as a political issue, it has been in the negative (think outsourcing and the Obama campaign labeling then-Senator Clinton as the Democratic senator from Punjab in the 2008 primaries). Indian-Americans, while more and more politically active and seen by both parties as increasingly important to court, have not reached the stage where they are seen to mean the difference between a swing state being in the D column or the R column. So, positive shout-outs to India in the political context weren’t likely to be high on the priority list of either candidate. Advocates of U.S.-India relations should be thankful that India at least did not come up in the negative, with China instead taking the heat on outsourcing.

Overall, there were some other omissions that were more surprising – the Eurozone crisis and the pivot/rebalancing towards Asia among others. In a debate where a country like China was only mentioned 10-15 minutes before the debate was scheduled to end, the lack of mention of India was hardly a surprise. One can debate the overall quality and range of the foreign policy discussion yesterday, but the omission of India from the discussion should not spark another round of doubt and hand-wringing about the U.S.-India relationship. There’s a broader case to be made that India needs to think about what it needs to do to maintain its importance to the U.S. and that it can’t take this importance for granted. Even if it had been a critical or long-term ally, however, this would not have guaranteed a mention. After all, think about how much—or rather how little—countries like Australia, Britain, Japan and South Korea came up.

New Realism Emerges in the Third Presidential Debate
Diana Villiers Negroponte, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Latin America Initiative

Much of what the candidates debated last night was “old hat.” We knew ahead of time of foreign policy positions long held, as well as those which had evolved. But there were two pieces of news:

First, Governor Romney supported bilateral talks with the Iranians. Our mission in Iran “is to dissuade Iran from having a nuclear weapon through peaceful and diplomatic means.” He welcomed “potentially having bilateral discussions with the Iranians to end their nuclear program.” The exchange indicated that such a dialogue maybe underway, although President Obama denied newspaper reports of such talks. Romney reiterated his call for tighter sanctions, diplomatic isolation and called for the international community to indict Ahmadinejad for his genocidal rhetoric against Israel. What he did not discuss was his support for, or objection to, the International Criminal Court in which such an indictment might be presented. Romney’s support for bilateral negotiations indicates awareness of the need to counter Iran through a wider range of options.

Second, Governor Romney stated that he would leave no U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. “I will bring our troops out by the end of 2014…our troops will come home at that point.” No longer would Romney wait to hear from senior military advisors. Now, he supports President Obama’s decision to withdraw combat troops in 2014. What remains uncertain is whether a residual force of trainers and logisticians would remain under a Status of Forces agreement that is still to be negotiated.

Both news items indicate that the realism which should accompany a potential Commander in Chief has settled upon Romney’s shoulders. Both candidates are conscious of the global role that the U.S. assumes. Neither candidate shared U.S. national security interests with multilateral institutions, or allies. Neither was isolationist. Instead, we saw two robust men project U.S. power in a way that may disturb our friends because it indicated that the U.S. is ready to act unilaterally when necessary.

Authors

Obama a freiné le déclin américain

Justin Vaïsse — Mon, 22 Oct 2012 16:42:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Libération before the third and final U.S. presidential debate, Justin Vaïsse examines the differences and similarities between the two candidates' foreign policy platforms.

Libération: Le point de départ de votre livre, c'est bien le déclin américain?

Justin Vaïsse: A son arrivée début 2009, c'est le constat qu'Obama est bien forcé de faire. Il y a eu un déclin relatif, du fait de la simple élévation des autres puissances. Avec une croissance économique de plus de 10% (ou même de 7,5% cette année) en Chine et de 1 à 3% aux Etats-Unis, il est mathématique que l’Amérique décline, en termes relatifs encore une fois. Toute la question est de savoir si le déclin sur le plan de la puissance internationale a été accéléré ou ralenti par les politiques suivies. Sous Bush, le phénomène a été précipité par de mauvais choix de politique étrangère. Sous Obama, le phénomène s’est plutôt ralenti : tout en dépensant moins, il a réussi à repositionner l'Amérique et à freiner cette érosion de la puissance.

Libération: Que ce soit face à l’Iran, à Israël ou surtout en Syrie, l’impression dominante que donne aujourd’hui la diplomatie américaine n’est-elle pas l’impuissance ?

Vaïsse: Oui et non. Si nous étions dans les années 1990, au pic de leur puissance, nous pourrions aussi parler de l'impuissance des Etats-Unis à régler les problèmes des Balkans ou le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. Il y a un an, à l’issue de l’opération en Libye, on aurait pu souligner que les Etats-Unis avaient encore de beaux restes. Pour ce qui est de la Syrie, il faut plutôt comprendre pourquoi Obama n’a pas voulu intervenir. Plusieurs facteurs sont entrés en ligne de compte, y compris des calculs électoraux et la volonté de ne pas se laisser à nouveau happer par une guerre au Moyen Orient pour se consacrer à d'autres régions (c'est le fameux "pivot" vers l'Asie"). L'idée à l'époque était que les forces anti-Assad allaient de toutes façons l’emporter. Le constat a été fait que l'intervention serait dangereuse et coûteuse politiquement, pour un résultat qui serait plus ou moins le même. Il y a donc eu une décision pensée de ne pas intervenir, dont on vit aujourd’hui les conséquences désastreuses... sans qu'on puisse dire qu'une intervention aurait forcément conduit à des conséquences heureuses.

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: Libération

L'Amérique n'a plus la puissance nécessaire pour une politique hégémonique

Justin Vaïsse — Mon, 22 Oct 2012 16:33:00 -0400

Editor's note: In an interview with Les Echos, Justin Vaïsse talks about the decline in American power abroad and how this has impacted U.S. foreign policy. Read an excerpt below.

Les Echos: Y a-t-il une doctrine Obama ?

Justin Vaïsse: Au sens étroit, oui : elle consiste à réduire l'empreinte militaire des Etats-Unis, notamment au Moyen-Orient. Aux interventions terrestres lourdes, le président substitue les instruments de guerre nouveaux : cyberattaques, drones et raids des forces spéciales, moins coûteux financièrement et politiquement. Cette approche reflète le fait que, à son arrivée au pouvoir, les Etats-Unis s'étaient concentrés depuis huit ans sur les questions de sécurité et avaient engagé deux guerres coûteuses au Moyen-Orient, au détriment du reste de leur politique étrangère. Or, pendant cette période, Washington a raté la naissance d'un monde nouveau : montée en puissance des pays émergents, et en particulier de ce géant qu'est la Chine, et diminution de la puissance relative des Etats-Unis. Il lui faut donc pivoter.

Les Echos: Pivoter de quelle façon ?

Vaïsse: De plusieurs manières : des guerres au sol vers des modalités d'intervention militaire plus légères, des questions de sécurité vers les questions diplomatiques globales et les dossiers économiques, enfin du Moyen-Orient vers le monde en émergence et en particulier la région Asie-Pacifique, négligée par Bush. Ce rééquilibrage, c'est la grande idée d'Obama. Elle a été contrariée par le printemps arabe, qui l'a forcé à se réinvestir dans la région, et par l'Iran. La guerre en Libye confirme ce pivot : elle n'a coûté qu'environ 900 millions de dollars, et a largement reposé sur les alliés européens.

Authors

Justin Vaïsse

Publication: Les Echos

Qui sont les néoconservateurs?

Justin Vaïsse — Fri, 12 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In a November-December 2012 special issue of Sciences Humaines titled Pensées américaines, Justin Vaïsse recounts the history of neoconservative ideology, which dates back to the 1960s. A staple of the Republican Party’s foreign policy, it has fallen out of favor during the Obama administration. Yet, neoconservative ideas will eventually make a come-back, not least because they are founded on traditional American values, such as exceptionalism, patriotism, and nationalism.

C’est à l’occasion de la guerre d’Irak de 2003 qu’ils ont contribué à lancer que les néoconservateurs américains ont attiré l’attention du monde et sont devenus partie intégrante du paysage des relations internationales. Pourtant, ils étaient apparus longtemps auparavant sur la scène politique américaine. Leur histoire remonte à la guerre froide, et elle passablement complexe. D’abord actifs sur les questions de politique intérieure, les néoconservateurs se sont tournés vers les questions de politique étrangère dans les années 1970 et surtout 1980. Parce qu’ils continuent à jouer un rôle important dans le débat américain, et conservent notamment une influence appréciable au sein du parti républicain, c’est une histoire en trois temps qu’il convient de comprendre.

Au départ, dans les années 1960, les néoconservateurs sont de banals « libéraux de guerre froide », c'est-à-dire des activistes et intellectuels qui appartiennent au consensus libéral (au sens américain, donc de gauche), et fortement anticommunistes – certains ayant même flirté avec le trotskisme dans leur jeunesse. Ils n’ont alors rien de commun avec le mouvement conservateur américain moderne, né en 1955 autour de William Buckley et du journal National Review, qui commence à animer le parti républicain (rejet de l’intervention étatique, mise en avant de la responsabilité individuelle et des valeurs morales). À ce moment, les futurs néoconservateurs voient ce mouvement comme une excentricité étrangère à leur univers politique: enfants de la crise des années 1930 et du New Deal, ils considèrent que l’Etat fédéral a un rôle important à jouer dans l’économie et la société.

Ce qui va les faire évoluer, c’est le grand chambardement des années 1960 et le tournant à gauche de l’idéologie libérale : la révolte étudiante, les émeutes urbaines, le nationalisme noir qui remplace la lutte pour les droits civiques (qu’ils ont soutenue). Les néoconservateurs se distinguent en rejetant la direction que les autres libéraux veulent faire prendre au libéralisme, à savoir, d’une part, le remplacement des thèmes traditionnels de progrès social concret par les nouvelles questions d’identité (orientation sexuelle et libération des mœurs, minorités, quotas et discrimination positive, usage des drogues, etc.), d’autre part l’utilisation de l’État fédéral non plus pour promouvoir ce progrès social à la façon du New Deal mais pour abolir la pauvreté et faire advenir l’égalité coûte que coûte par de vastes programmes utopiques – bref, l’ingénierie sociale.

Ceux qui, au tournant des années 1960 et 1970, sont stigmatisés par leurs pairs comme étant de «nouveaux conservateurs», des « néoconservateurs », sont des intellectuels de centre gauche, pour la plupart sociologues et politologues new-yorkais (Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Pat Moynihan, Norman Podhoretz, etc.), notamment autour de la revue The Public Interest. C’est alors le premier âge du mouvement néoconservateur. Ces intellectuels ne rejettent pas l’État providence par principe comme le font les conservateurs, mais mettent en avant la nécessité de la prudence dans les politiques sociales. Ils pointent par exemple la loi des conséquences inattendues des politiques publiques, selon laquelle les effets non anticipés et indésirables des programmes sociaux sont plus importants que leurs effets recherchés – par exemple les allocations données aux mères célibataires pauvres deviennent un outil d’émancipation précoce des adolescentes vis-à-vis de leur famille et aggravent le problème de la précarité au lieu de le régler.

Tandis que ces néoconservateurs originaux évoluent progressivement vers la droite (eux rétorquent que c’est le libéralisme qui dérive vers la gauche), un deuxième âge du mouvement apparaît. Celui-ci se développe non plus dans des cercles intellectuels new-yorkais, mais à Washington, chez les activistes démocrates qui réagissent à la prise du pouvoir au sein du parti par la Nouvelle Gauche, avec la nomination de George McGovern comme candidat en 1972. Le parti se déchire entre une «aile McGovern», aux tendances gauchistes et isolationnistes, qui semble ne s’intéresser qu’aux minorités (Noirs, Latinos, femmes, jeunes…) et une aile centriste, qui tient à maintenir le lien traditionnel avec la classe ouvrière blanche (la majorité silencieuse), et dont le héros est le sénateur Henry Scoop Jackson. Ces «Scoop Jackson Democrats», ou néoconservateurs du deuxième âge, refusent la gauchisation de leur parti, sa tentation isolationniste, et la politique de détente avec l’URSS qui l’accompagne, et prêchent un retour à la tradition de Franklin Roosevelt, et surtout Harry Truman ou John Kennedy : progrès social concret à l’intérieur, anticommunisme musclé à l’extérieur.

Peu à peu, c’est ce dernier aspect qui va prendre la place la plus importante dans le mouvement, à mesure notamment que l’Amérique semble décliner et l’URSS s’enhardir, dans la deuxième moitié des années 1970. Les néoconservateurs attaquent sans relâche tous ceux qui prêchent une politique d’accommodation et de détente avec l’URSS, stigmatisant leur manque de foi dans les Etats-Unis, et alertent l’Amérique sur le danger croissant qui la menace, réclamant une hausse du budget militaire ainsi que la fin des accords de limitation des armements nucléaires. La mission de l’Amérique, disent-ils, est de défendre les démocraties (notamment Israël), ou les régimes alliés qui, sans être démocratiques, contribuent à la lutte contre le totalitarisme soviétique (Taiwan, Corée du Sud, Turquie, etc.). Et pour vaincre l’URSS, il ne faut pas négocier, encore moins marchander, puisque cela n’aboutit qu’à légitimer «l’empire du mal» aux yeux du monde et à prolonger son existence – par des transferts de technologies, des ventes de céréales, etc. – mais adopter au contraire une attitude dure, visant à accentuer les contradictions du régime afin de le changer. Cette idée de changement de régime, plutôt que d’accommodation, sera reprise par les néoconservateurs des années 1990 et 2000 pour les petits «empires du mal» (Irak, Iran, Corée du Nord, etc.).

Ces néoconservateurs du deuxième âge finissent par désespérer du Parti démocrate : ils avaient cru que le président Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981) serait leur homme, mais celui-ci se révèle bien trop mou face à l’URSS et, au cours de l’été 1980, la plupart d’entre eux se rallient à Ronald Reagan, à qui ils vont fournir son inspiration idéologique – les freedom fighters (combattants de la liberté) de la doctrine Reagan en Amérique centrale ou en Afghanistan, « l’empire du mal », la création du National Endowment for Democracy visant à soutenir les processus de démocratisation à l’étranger, etc. Les démocrates Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Max Kampelman, Carl Gershman et bien d’autres y travaillent. Les démocrates néoconservateurs sont enfin au pouvoir, mais, ironie de l’histoire, pour servir un président républicain! Du reste, une certaine convergence s’observe entre les néoconservateurs du premier âge, ceux du deuxième âge (autour de la revue Commentary notamment), et le mouvement conservateur dans son ensemble – même si chacun conserve son identité idéologique.

Quant aux néoconservateurs contemporains, ceux du troisième âge, ils sont les héritiers directs du deuxième âge. Après une traversée du désert consécutive à la chute du mur de Berlin, et plusieurs avis de décès prématurés au milieu des années 1990, un nouvel avatar du néoconservatisme apparaît à partir de 1995 autour de l’hebdomadaire The Weekly Standard, cette fois clairement à droite, côté républicain, et presque exclusivement centré sur la politique étrangère. Les néoconservateurs des années 1990 à 2012 veulent une Amérique interventionniste, de façon unilatérale s’il le faut, qui façonne le système international plutôt que de laisser d’autres forces, éventuellement malveillantes, le faire, une Amérique qui favorise la démocratie contre la tyrannie, certes pour des raisons morales, mais aussi parce que c’est le seul régime qui assure la paix et la sécurité sur le long terme (les démocraties ne se font pas la guerre entre elles). Pour cela, l’Amérique doit rester forte militairement : dans leur vision du monde, le hard power reste la clé des relations internationales, et l’Amérique ne doit pas laisser s’éroder sa marge de supériorité, ni contre la Chine, ni contre d’autres puissances.

Ce «wilsonisme botté» (selon l’expression de Pierre Hassner) trouve une partie de son inspiration dans l’exceptionnalisme américain et l’esprit patriotique et missionnaire. En ce sens, les néoconservateurs du troisième âge – de Robert Kagan à William Kristol (fils d’Irving), de Paul Wolfowitz à Doug Feith, Max Boot et Elliott Abrams – n’ont rien de très « conservateur » et se placent aux antipodes à la fois de la prudence pragmatique des autres républicains, ceux de l’école réaliste (Richard Nixon et Henry Kissinger, George Bush père et ses conseillers Brent Scowcroft et James Baker, Colin Powell, etc.) et du scepticisme des néoconservateurs originaux, les intellectuels new-yorkais, à l’égard des grands schémas politiques volontaristes. C’est ce que démontre évidemment leur campagne en faveur d’une intervention en Irak, après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 qui offrent un contexte politique propice à leur vision. Leur influence est l’un des facteurs qui ont pesé dans la décision de G.W. Bush en 2003, même si les néoconservateurs, en impérialistes assumés, bien décidés à réussir la stabilisation de l’Irak, ont constamment réclamé plus de moyens en soldats et en matériel, s’opposant en ceci à Donald Rumsfeld, le secrétaire à la Défense.

Ce qui leur permet d’ailleurs de dégager leur responsabilité. Alors que nombre d’observateurs ont pronostiqué la fin du néoconservatisme en raison du fiasco irakien, les néoconservateurs demeurent très présents dans le débat à Washington. Bien sûr, ils n’ont aucune influence sur l’Administration de Barack Obama. Mais ils constituent la principale force de politique étrangère au sein du parti républicain, à tel point que les courants de pensée concurrents – le réalisme et l’isolationnisme – semblent avoir disparu. L’entourage et le programme du candidat John McCain, en 2008, étaient essentiellement néoconservateurs, et il en va de même de ceux du candidat Mitt Romney en 2012. Celui-ci a promis une augmentation du budget de la défense malgré l’ampleur du déficit, et a adopté une ligne dure vis-à-vis de la Russie et de la Chine, accusant Obama de s’être excusé de par le monde pour la puissance américaine.

Les néoconservateurs jouent par ailleurs un rôle notable dans le débat de politique étrangère de Washington, au-delà des cercles républicains. Ainsi au moment du « printemps de Téhéran » en juin 2010, puis surtout du printemps arabe en 2011, plusieurs d’entre eux (Robert Kagan, Elliott Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz notamment) ont été les premiers à appeler à un soutien aux soulèvements démocratiques du Moyen-Orient. Ce n’était d’ailleurs pas une affaire entendue, compte tenu des liens de certains d’entre eux avec les Israéliens, lesquels ont été très méfiants, et pour l’essentiel hostiles, au printemps arabe. Mais l’idée selon laquelle, sur le long terme, l’Amérique pourrait bénéficier de la démocratisation de la région a pris le dessus, et leurs appels à une action résolue en Egypte ou en Libye ont été largement entendus.

Certes, le monde semble se prêter de moins en moins à l’approche néoconservatrice. Contrairement aux années 1990 et 2000, le poids relatif des Etats-Unis décline par rapport aux puissances émergentes, et l’Amérique souffre de plusieurs maux sérieux, notamment son endettement. Pourtant, il ne faut pas s’attendre à une disparition du mouvement. De par sa nature cyclique, le rapport de l’Amérique au monde repassera un jour ou l’autre par une phase d’extraversion, d’affirmation et d’interventionnisme. Ce jour-là, les néoconservateurs redeviendront influents et pèseront sur le destin des États-Unis et celui du monde comme ils l’ont fait au début des années 1980 et au début des années 2000. Car si l’idéologie néoconservatrice est historiquement datée, elle exprime aussi des courants profonds de l’âme américaine – exceptionnalisme, wilsonisme, nationalisme – et s’appuie sur une infrastructure – des hommes, des revues, des institutions – qui ne sont pas prêts de disparaître.

Authors

Justin Vaïsse