THE PRESIDENT’s ADVISORS

On Jan. 14, 2017, the Obama White House hosted 30 incoming staff members of the Trump team for a role-playing scenario. A readout of the event said, “The exercise provided a high-level perspective on a series of challenges that the next administration may face and introduced the key authorities, policies, capabilities, and structures that are currently in place to respond to major domestic incidents.” One of these “domestic incidents” was a pandemic—addressing issues that are now familiar territory: travel bans, vaccines, and ventilator shortages. This transition exercise provided a unique opportunity for incoming presidential advisers to understand the “whole of government” approach that such a crisis requires.

Though recalling the details of a three-hour, table-top exercise roughly three years after it occurred is challenging, it is even more difficult when only 8 of the 30 Trump attendees are still working for the president. Perhaps more significantly, the transition exercise readout identified key White House offices involved in pandemic preparedness, and my research reveals the tremendous upheaval that has occurred in these pandemic-related offices.

While this list of pandemic-related offices could arguably serve as a blueprint for the Trump administration, what stands out immediately is that the chair of this exercise, the Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism, is a position that no longer exists. Initially Thomas Bossert, a veteran of the George W. Bush administration, was appointed Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Bossert was forced to resign in April 2018 when incoming National Security Advisor, John Bolton, eliminated the position and folded it into the National Security Council (NSC), renaming it “Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Adviser,” and demoting the position from the most senior commissioned title (Assistant to the President).

Apart from this significant staff restructuring, the other noteworthy aspect of these White House jobs is the overall amount of turnover compared to the two previous administrations. The table below indicates the number of occupants in pandemic-related positions for the Trump, Obama, and Bush administrations.

The numbers boldly illustrate the extraordinary amount of turnover across these pandemic-related White House jobs. Of these White House positions deemed central to “respond to major domestic incidents,” only the Director of the OSTP has had a single occupant, Kelvin Droegemeier. Though seemingly a standout within the Trump White House, it is also important to note that the position lacked a director until he was formally sworn in on February 2019, a little over two years after Donald J. Trump was inaugurated. Additionally, in less than three years in office, one office has had as many as six occupants, two units have had four occupants, three offices have had three occupants, and four offices have had two occupants (a more typical level of turnover). Turnover amongst the Trump pandemic team was double that of President George W. Bush’s team and more than a third greater than the Obama pandemic staff.

Conflicting and confusing presidential messages, test scarcity, uncertainty about ventilator availability and a task force that changed composition at least three times reflect a leadership vacuum that, in part, stems from staff turnover. Though there are many reasons why the administration bungled the nation’s response to the novel coronavirus, high turnover is one of the most compelling ones. Why does turnover matter? Stability, experience and relationships are three critical features of a high-functioning White House staff, and frequent turnover undermines every single one of those attributes.

Instability has been a problem throughout Trump’s entire first term, as demonstrated by record levels of turnover in the senior staff and Cabinet. High turnover correlates with inexperience. When leaders come and go frequently, acquiring some sort of institutional memory and expertise is impossible. In addition, high turnover makes it difficult to foster important relationships across the executive branch, within Congress and among state and local elected officials. Since the White House staff must act through agencies and departments, part of a White House staffer’s effectiveness is his or her ability to forge relationships across the government. White House staff need to have relationships in state governments as well as in the federal government. Frequent reports of state governors’ confusion and dissatisfaction suggest that turnover has undermined the White House’s ability to manage a coordinated response to COVID-19.

Admittedly even the best White House staff would have encountered challenges fighting a pandemic, but the fact that there was never a steady core of senior, experienced, advisors around the president for any meaningful period of time undermined the Trump administration’s capacity to respond.

Note: Since COVID-19 was first detected in mainland China in December of 2019, I use that date as the end point for determining prior turnover within pandemic-related White House jobs.

[*] Position eliminated under National Security Advisor Bolton folded into the National Security Council (NSC) at a lower rank. Those who succeeded Thomas Bossert and operated from the NSC (within the first 35 months) include Doug Fears and Peter Brown as Deputy Assistant to the President.

[**] Title changed under President Obama to “Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism” and then back to Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.

[***] On March 6, 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, President Trump replaced acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney with Mark Meadows, the fourth chief of staff since President Trump was inaugurated. Congressman Meadows resigned from Congress on March 30, 2020 enabling him to begin his first day as chief of staff on March 31, 2020. The chart above only indicates three chiefs of staff due to the 12/19 deadline for determining number of occupants.

[****] Identifying specific deputies was difficult because their roles are somewhat under the media radar. However, I did find that whenever there is a new Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism, they are typically accompanied by a new deputy, much like a National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Adviser. As such, I used the number of occupants for the Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism.

       

On April 29, Governance Studies at Brookings hosted a webinar to discuss how widespread federal vacancies affect government response and accountability during crises like the coronavirus pandemic.

       

Having tracked turnover for five presidents and closely following the churn in the Trump White House, it is clear that what is currently going on is far from normal. Less than a month after President Trump’s inauguration, National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was forced to resign, and this high-level departure marked the beginning of an avalanche that resulted in an additional 21 A Team departures over the course of that year. Compounding the first-year irregularity was the multiple firings, forced resignations, public humiliation of staff members (via Twitter), the onset of the Mueller investigation and the inability to fill high-level government jobs. From the beginning, A Team turnover in the Trump administration outpaced his five predecessors and not just by a small margin.

Composition of the A Team is based on successive National Journal editions that identify those deemed most influential or key “Decision Makers” in a new administration. (Click here for a detailed explanation of the study’s methodology.) Set out below is an historical overview of year-by-year A Team turnover since President Reagan.

Just 32 months into the Trump administration, the rate of turnover had exceeded his five predecessors’ full first terms. At the same time, Cabinet turnover was also breaking new records and the number of vacancies across Senate-confirmed positions in the nation’s federal departments was sky high. Not only had the Trump administration not nominated candidates for many of these positions, but some who had been confirmed were departing at the start of year two. While it is undeniable that the churn in the Trump White House is unlike anything that other presidents have experienced, it is worthwhile to analyze those A Team members who have managed to hold their job since January 2017. Set out below are the ten survivors of the original A Team.

I have divided these remaining staff members into three separate categories: those who have been in the inner circle since the presidential campaign, the policy experts, and those outside the public eye. It comes as no surprise that the president’s daughter and son-in-law have remained in place, and while Kellyanne Conway’s public-facing role has waxed and waned, she has remained a stalwart supporter. Despite some infamous Twitter imbroglios, President Trump has also stuck by his social media guru, Dan Scavino. Given the importance of immigration policy to the president’s base, and Stephen Miller’s steadfast adherence, he too has remained in place.

The second category consists of three policy experts. Richard Burkhauser, a low-profile academic, has held onto his position despite the departure of Kevin Hassett, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer has held onto his role in spite of the president’s fiery rhetoric toward U.S. trade partners and the frequent threat and imposition of tariffs. Peter Navarro is the only one of the three who came under scrutiny early on, when he was thought to have been sidelined by Gary Cohn, former Director of the National Economic Council. He has not won internal popularity contests with his hawkish stance toward China, fondness for tariffs, and sometimes combative nature, but these traits have not forced his resignation. In fact, he has outlasted many of his critics within the White House and recently assumed an additional role as Defense Production Coordinator. Perhaps news of his dire warnings to the president about the coronavirus might jeopardize his tenure, just as the president grew weary of intelligence reports from Dan Coats, Director of National Intelligence, who ultimately resigned in the face of mounting tension and pressure from the Oval Office.

The last category of survivors consists of two women, neither of whom worked on the presidential campaign but have nevertheless held the same jobs since entering the White House in 2017. Lisa Curtis hailed from the Heritage Foundation and has worked for four different National Security Advisors, lasting through the Mueller investigation and impeachment. These last two events are noteworthy largely because of the central role the NSC played and the subsequent “revenge” firings that occurred. In addition, the latest National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, has made sizeable staff cuts over the past several months and Curtis has remained unscathed. Amy Swonger, a senior member of the legislative affairs team, has solid establishment connections having worked for President George W. Bush and Senate leaders Mitch McConnell and Trent Lott. Establishment connections have worked against some Trump staffers, but she has managed to stay in the job despite a great deal of turnover, including three bosses: Marc Short, Shahira Knight and Eric Ueland. Her likely role in the impeachment process and other legislative battles may have bolstered her standing. Perhaps her prior connection to Senate Majority Leader McConnell and the stable support from Senate Republicans also contributed to her job security. Admittedly, she has had to put out more than a few fires and avoid blame on those rare occasions when Republican Senators have spoken out against the administration, but her ability to stay out of the line of fire has been impressive.

While there is no common denominator across these ten advisers, it is also true that there is no guarantee of continued employment in this White House. The random nature and frequency of staff shuffling is unprecedented.  While prior administrations have had their share of palace intrigue, this administration has more public back-biting, infighting, controversy and instability—the consequences of which are on full display as the administration bungles the nation’s response to the most formidable crisis since WWII. Personnel can be a president’s number one asset and this president has done little to recruit and retain the best and the brightest. Though the 10 A Team staff members remaining have demonstrated skills enviable of “Survivor” contestants, their small number tells you all you need to know about the chaos and instability in this administration.

       

The Trump administration’s first three years saw record-setting turnover at the most senior level of the White House staff and the Cabinet. There are also numerous vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions across the executive branch. As of September 22, 2019, the turnover rate among senior White House aides had reached 80 percent, a rate that exceeded President Trump’s five predecessors after their entire first terms in office. The frequent departure of senior staff has been one of the most noteworthy features of this administration.

My previous analysis examined the first instance of turnover on the president’s “A Team,” and includes 65 individuals in key White House offices e.g., Legislative Affairs, White House Counsel, as well as the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council (NSC) and smaller entities. Senior level departures were so frequent that I created a table that documents serial turnover (repeat instances of turnover in particular offices). As of January 2020, over 1/3 of the offices experiencing turnover had more than two occupants—in some cases, as many as six. The most upheaval has occurred in the NSC, a highly influential office that provides the president with advice on national security and foreign policy issues and coordinates these policies with other key departments and agencies, including State, Defense, Homeland Security and the CIA.

Within my “A Team” sample, I tracked eight senior NSC positions. By fall of 2019, seven of those eight positions had turned over at least once. The instability in the NSC began in the first month of the administration with the departure of three high level officials: National Security Adviser, Michael Flynn; Senior Director for Africa, Robin Townley; and Chief of Staff, Keith Kellogg (who changed jobs to become Acting National Security Adviser and eventually became Vice President Pence’s National Security Adviser). By August of 2017, Deputy National Security Adviser, KT McFarland and Senior Intelligence Director Ezra Cohen Watnick had departed—a total of five NSC staff changes within the first seven months of the administration.

The high-level departures continued through 2018 and 2019 with more senior members of the NSC departing and serial turnover across many of these positions: four National Security Advisoes, six Deputy National Security Advisers, three Chiefs of Staff and Executive Secretaries, three senior Intelligence Directors, three Senior Directors for Europe and Russia, three Senior Directors for Africa and three Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism advisers. (The position of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism was folded into the NSC during John Bolton’s tenure and is included in this study.) This turnover rate is simply off the charts—no prior president comes close to this level of NSC instability. In stark contrast, both Presidents Bush and President Clinton had single National Security Advisers throughout the first term; President Obama had two and President Reagan had three. Similarly, while the sixth Deputy National Security Adviser is serving for President Trump, Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush had one during the first term, Presidents Obama and George H.W. Bush had two and President Reagan had three.

Turnover Across Key Senior NSC Positions
January 2017- January 2020

* When H.R. McMaster became National Security Adviser in the spring of 2017, he appointed two Deputy National Security Advisers. Based on news accounts at the time, it was difficult to determine which of the two was more senior, so I have included both. Note also that these NSC positions are merely a subset of senior positions rather than a listing of all senior NSC positions. These positions come from a larger sample of Trump’s “A Team”. See January report by Kathryn Dunn Tenpas for a description of methodology.

** On Friday, January 17^, 2020, Andrew Peek was escorted from the White House grounds pending a security-related investigation. It may be that the NSC will soon be in search of a third Director of Europe and Russia in a single year and the fourth occupant overall.

This extraordinary rate of high-level turnover concomitantly causes a cascade of departures in less senior jobs, as incoming successors seek to staff their office with hand-picked associates. Put differently, the departure of a single National Security Adviser results in additional NSC departures—adding to the disarray, inhibiting performance, raising the anxiety levels, and decreasing the level of expertise (among other dysfunctions). In some instances, a new National Security Adviser will not only bring new staff into the office, but restructure the office in significant ways that add further disruption.

In addition to the unusually high levels of staff turnover, President Trump instructed his fourth National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, to make major staff cuts at the NSC in the fall of 2019. Within three months, roughly 40-45 NSC staff members (who were serving as detailees) moved back to their home agencies, representing about a 13 percent cut in size. News reports indicated that O’Brien has plans to cut the NSC by a total of one third (requiring an additional 20 percent cut). While reducing the size of a bloated NSC is a worthy goal, doing so late in the first term, without an apparent strategy and in an office that has had multiple leadership changes could very well undermine further the president’s ability to conduct the business of national security.

The combination of high turnover, major staff cuts, and new leadership have truly crippled the role of the NSC. Just the past five months have witnessed the significant role of senior NSC staff in the Ukrainian aid scandal and subsequent impeachment process. In addition, the recent killing of Iranian General Qasim Soleimani and bungled explanation have drawn even more attention to the role of the NSC. The inability to coordinate a consistent message, let alone a single message, for why the U.S. ordered the death demonstrates the absence of staff influential enough to have prepared for the aftermath of such a momentous and consequential action. Working at such a disadvantage alongside an impulsive president who consistently shows disdain for expertise, collaboration and debate poses a risk to the country at large.

       

Following Labor Secretary Alex Acosta’s resignation, Kathryn Dunn Tenpas updates her count of the Trump administration’s unprecedented levels of senior staff turnover and examines the effect leadership turmoil has on the ability of departments and agencies to govern.

Related material: 

• Tracking turnover in the Trump administration
• Why is Trump’s staff turnover higher than the 5 most recent presidents?

Listen to Brookings podcasts here or on Apple podcasts, send email feedback to bcp@brookings.edu, and follow us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

Thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo, Chris McKenna, Fred Dews, and Camilo Ramirez for their support.

The Current is part of the Brookings Podcast Network.

       

Last month, Kirstjen Nielsen, the former secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, became the 15^th Cabinet member to leave the Trump administration. By contrast, after three full years in office, President Obama had lost seven Cabinet members and President W. Bush had lost only four. Just as with the rate of White House staff turnover, President Trump’s level of Cabinet turnover is off the charts. But how does this turnover compare to other administrations of the past?

In an effort to provide more historical context for this trend, we recently decided to expand the Cabinet-level section of Brookings’s White House Turnover Tracker to include the Reagan and Bush administrations. This seemingly straightforward addition of a small amount of data seemed eminently manageable. In short order, however, we encountered challenges in our effort to define the composition of each president’s Cabinet. The problem arose not from the 15 Cabinet secretaries in the line of presidential succession, but in identifying the extraneous positions deemed Cabinet-level by each administration—positions like the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency or the director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Collecting a list of these Cabinet positions revealed that there was a great deal of variance across a number of authoritative sources. For instance, the Government Printing Office’s own U.S. Government Manual (the “official handbook of the U.S. Government”), an exhaustive article from the The New York Times, and even the presidential libraries themselves consistently offered up different listings for the same administrations. Purported to be a definitive resource for factual government data, we were startled to find that multiple editions of the U.S. Government Manual were riddled with errors. For example, the 2001 edition incorrectly listed appointees from the Clinton administration, even though George W. Bush was president. The manuals even directly contradicted The New York Times’s effort to list the Cabinet members: The manual omitted the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy while The New York Times included it.

Undaunted, we phoned presidential libraries, asking archivists for official listings of the president’s cabinet. These too were wildly contradictory to the U.S. Government Manual, muddying the waters further. Impressively, our list from the Clinton Presidential Library managed to differ from both The New York Times tracker and the manuals (nobody seems to know whether the position of FEMA director was granted Cabinet-level status). We even went so far as to ask a former White House Deputy Chief of Staff to clarify whether his boss had Cabinet status. He replied affirmatively, again contradicting our other “authoritative” sources.

These contradictions surprised us; indeed, many Americans might be surprised to learn that there is no definitive record of the positions included in each presidential Cabinet.

In search of an explanation for these discrepancies, we learned that the practice of elevating executive branch jobs to Cabinet-level positions began with President Eisenhower. According to political scientist Ronald Moe, “This special status is not recognized in law and is purely a presidential distinction that can be given and later withdrawn.” Fresh from election victory in 1952, Eisenhower appointed a helpful campaign aide and former U.S. Senator, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to be the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and a Cabinet member.

These ad hoc appointments (or “ersatz Cabinet members,” as my Brookings colleague Stephen Hess calls them), have become par for the course and can change across—or even within—administrations. After all, there are many possible reasons to elevate positions to the Cabinet: Such an appointment might aid an effort to curry favor with a key constituency, serve as a means of cajoling an individual to join the administration, or help highlight a presidential priority. In addition, these appointments can also be temporary, complicating the efforts of even the most conscientious researcher. Most recently, President Trump elevated the U.N. representative to the Cabinet, but after the departure of Nikki Haley, the position once again lost its Cabinet-level status.

Given the vagaries of Cabinet composition, we have created a new set of Cabinet turnover data that only includes those positions that are in the line of presidential succession (13 beginning with President Reagan, 14 with the addition of the Department of Veterans Affairs in 1989, and 15 with the addition of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003) and excludes other Cabinet-level appointees. We think that this research refinement provides an improved, standardized approach to analyzing Cabinet turnover. Looking at the data with our revised methodology, President W. Bush lost two Cabinet members in his first three years, President Obama lost three, and–three months into his third year—President Trump has lost eight cabinet members. Turnover in the Trump administration remains record setting, no matter how you slice the data.

Kobi Hackenburg contributed to this post.

       

Kirstjen Nielsen, the secretary of Homeland Security, submitted her resignation letter on Sunday, April 7, 2019, marking the 15th Cabinet-level departure in the Trump administration since January 2017. By contrast, President Obama had seven departures after three full years in office, and President George W. Bush had four departures after three full years. Cabinet turnover in the Trump administration has been and continues to be unprecedented compared to his five predecessors.

Nielsen’s departure also marks the first Cabinet position (in the line presidential succession) to turnover twice. Data going back to Ronald Reagan indicate that this is another first for the Trump administration: None of the past five presidents has appointed three departmental secretaries (to the same department) within the first 27 months of their administration.

Not surprisingly, this trend of exceedingly high cabinet turnover is also present in an analysis of the most senior White House advisers—currently 66% of President Trump’s “A-Team” have departed or been promoted—a rate of turnover that far exceeds presidents going back to Reagan. Newsworthy staff turnover has been a constant in this administration, beginning with National Security Adviser Michael Flynn’s sudden departure less than four weeks after inauguration. Ever since, there has been a steady stream of high-level departures often accompanied by critical presidential tweets and harsh responses from former staff. The consequences of such turnover are many, and fundamentally impede the president’s ability to fulfill his campaign promises.

Compounding the frequent departures of senior leadership are the existing vacancies that have yet to be filled. At this point, the Trump Cabinet has an acting chief of staff, acting Defense secretary, acting Interior secretary, acting director of the Office of Management and Budget, and now an acting secretary of Homeland Security. Of these “actings,” only acting Interior Secretary David Bernhardt has been nominated to assume the role on a permanent basis. In addition, many Senate-confirmed positions across the executive branch have remained vacant since inauguration. The Partnership for Public Service, which monitors federal vacancies, indicates that 140 Senate-confirmed positions have no nominee after 27 months in office. Put differently, the White House has original vacancies on top of recent vacancies—working in the Office of Presidential Personnel must be like drinking water from a fire hose.

A pattern in second-round picks?

One unique feature of recent cabinet turnover has been the Trump administration’s tendency to select successors with prior substantive expertise: Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar worked in that department during the George W. Bush administration; Attorney General Bill Barr served in the same job during the George H.W. Bush administration; the second Veterans Affairs secretary, Robert Wilkie, served in a Senate-confirmed position at the Defense Department; EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler worked there for President George H.W. Bush; and Interior nominee Bernhardt worked for that agency throughout President George W. Bush’s administration. (The one noteworthy exception to this practice was CIA Director Mike Pompeo and his move to the State Department. His prior career was in business and politics as the U.S. Representative from the 4^th District in Kansas.) If Cabinet turnover leads to successors with more substantive experience, that will likely benefit the Trump administration in its pursuit of policy goals.

President Trump’s first set of cabinet appointments was largely drawn from former and current politicians like Scott Pruitt, Jeff Sessions, Tom Price, Rick Perry, Ryan Zinke and Sonny Perdue, but this practice appears to be giving way to an approach that values specific substantive experience. With the 2016 campaign decidedly in the rearview mirror and declining pressure from campaign fundraisers and staffers (who may have wanted jobs in the early days of the administration), the Trump team seems to have adopted a new approach. At this point, however, it is too soon to know whether prior experience will lead to longer tenures. It makes sense that familiarity with the department coupled with substantive expertise might result in a savvy Cabinet secretary with better survival skills. But the president has played a key role in this elevated turnover, suggesting that all Trump appointees best keep their resume updated.

       

The rate of turnover among senior level advisers to President Trump has generated a great deal of attention. Below, we offer four resources to help measure and contextualize this turnover. The first set of resources tracks turnover among senior-ranking advisers in the executive office of the president (which does not include Cabinet secretaries), whereas the second set of resources tracks turnover in the Cabinet.

President Trump’s “A Team” turnover is 88% as of July 15, 2020

The following chart and table reflect turnover among the most influential positions within the executive office of the president. This data is compiled and tracked by Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, who refers to this group of advisers as the president’s “A Team.” The list of positions that make up the “A Team” is based on National Journal “Decision Makers” editions, and Dunn Tenpas’s methodology is described in detail in a report she published in January 2018. The chart and table below will be updated as additional members of the “A Team” depart their positions. It is important to note the following:

• Because the “A Team” is made up of members of the executive office of the president, it does not include Cabinet secretaries.
• The count for turnover among Donald Trump’s administration is ongoing.
• Each position on the “A Team” is only counted once. If multiple people hold and depart from the same position (e.g., communications director), only the initial departure is tracked/affects the turnover rate. For more information on these instances, see the “serial turnover” section below.

Summary and analysis of “A Team” turnover in the Trump administration

Set out below is a list of the senior level departures from the executive office of the president since the beginning of the Trump administration (each of the 65 “A Team” positions is only counted once toward the turnover rate, thus, this chart only includes the first person to hold/depart a given position). Highlighted text indicates a position that went through multiple instances of turnover; see below for more details.

Serial turnover within the Trump “A Team”

The turnover data above include only the president’s initial team of advisers and when one departs, the position falls out of the sample. One of the limitations of this approach is that it does not consider multiple departures within a single position, a common phenomenon within the Trump team. Set out below are the “A Team” positions that have had more than two occupants.

40% of President Trump’s “A Team” departures have undergone serial turnover as of July 15, 2020

The chart and table below are dedicated to tracking turnover in the Cabinet. They will also be updated as additional turnover occurs. Unlike the trackers above dedicated to the president’s “A Team,” these resources look at every departure from the president’s Cabinet, even if multiple people have occupied that position.

Notice of updated methodology

The current table of Cabinet-level turnover has been updated from a previous version, accessible here for reference, that was based on a different methodology; this change was made on May 21, 2019. This newer table provides data going back to President Reagan (1981) and adheres to a strict definition of Cabinet by only including the heads of the executive departments. While presidents often promote a position like EPA administrator to Cabinet-level status, these appointments are ad hoc, can be short-lived, and make it difficult to compare over time. Given the variability, we only include Senate-confirmed Cabinet members who are in the presidential line of succession, since this allows for greater consistency and standardization. More information on this update is available in a piece on Brookings’s FixGov blog. Additionally, since Reagan’s presidency, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security have been added to the list (increasing from 13 to 15 positions). Year of departure is determined by the date a Cabinet member announced they were resigning, regardless of their final end date.

Summary and analysis of Cabinet departures in the Trump administration

Set out below is a list of departures from the president’s Cabinet since the beginning of the Trump administration.

       

When President Trump appoints a replacement to Chief of Staff John Kelly, whose resignation (or firing) he announced on December 8th, he will once again have set a record. This time it is the record for most chiefs of staff within the first 24 months of an administration. Since President Trump’s inauguration, the most influential staff position within the presidency has been characterized by instability, public criticism, and huge fluctuations in influence.

The position of chief of staff, created by President Truman, but at the time vaguely referred to as “the assistant to the president,” was first occupied by John R. Steelman, who stayed a record-setting six years on the job. Since its inception, no president has had three different chiefs of staff over the course of 24 months in office. Among those with some turnover during the second year were President Ford, who was already serving a truncated term due to Nixon’s resignation. In this case, Donald Rumsfeld served 14 months on the job before being promoted to his first stint as Secretary of Defense. He turned the reins over to a young deputy chief of staff, Richard Cheney. After a rocky first year, President Clinton replaced his chief of staff, Mack McLarty, with the OMB Director, Leon Panetta. (McLarty served 16 months on the job.) Most recently, President Obama replaced Rahm Emmanuel (who decided to run for Chicago mayor) after 21 months on the job (Pete Rouse initially served as “acting” chief of staff before Bill Daley took over). In stark contrast, Reince Priebus lasted a little over six months, and assuming John Kelly leaves at the end of December as Trump announced, his tenure will have lasted a tumultuous 17 months. This rocky period was punctuated by threats to leave and claims that the president and others were set to fire him. Such conditions no doubt tested the grit of the retired Marine Corps general.

Aside from those three cases, the remaining seven presidents who named individuals to that post did not have any turnover within the first two years of their administrations. (Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did not have that position within their White House staff structure.) Interestingly, the position during both Bush White Houses was characterized by remarkable stability throughout the first term, posing a sharp contrast to the chief of staff turnover in the Trump White House, where high staff turnover generally has been an historic anomaly.

Though a permanent successor to Kelly has not yet been named, the appointment of a third chief of staff will by no means ensure future stability. In fact, the months ahead will likely complicate an already difficult job. In addition to the vast array of responsibilities and the constant need to temper the president’s instincts, the new chief of staff and the rest of the White House will also be contending with the growing pressure of the Special Counsel’s investigation, the Democrats’ majority in the House of Representatives (likely resulting in multiple investigations and subpoenas), and a preoccupation with the reelection campaign—a condition that permeates the modern presidency. The intensive efforts the reelection campaign will require will have a profound impact on day-to-day operations and add an additional realm of responsibility and oversight. The new chief of staff will become the linchpin between the White House and the reelection campaign—necessitating management, critical decision making, and perhaps an added level of stress as the president tries to navigate this new terrain.