Brookings: Experts - Shibley Telhami

Arab Perspectives on Iran’s Role in a Changing Middle East

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In this contribution to The Changing Security Architecture in the Middle East series, a joint project of the Wilson Center and the United States Institute of Peace, Shibley Telhami examines Arab perspectives on Iran's role in the region. Read an except below or download a PDF of the full paper at wilsoncenter.org.

Since the start of the Arab uprisings, there has been much discussion about how the new strategic environment in the Arab world will affect both Iran’s role in regional politics and, more broadly, Arab attitudes toward Tehran. It was clear from the outset that the picture for Iran was mixed: on the one hand, there was the loss of key opponents, like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the empowerment of the Shi’a communities in neighboring Arab states, especially Bahrain; on the other hand, there were the troubles of Iran’s key allies in Damascus and the consequent pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon. Overall, there was a sense that the Arab uprisings presented more costs than benefits for Iran. Add to this a prevalent assumption that a democratic Egypt that could regain its popularity in the Arab world would ultimately erode non-Arab Iran’s influence—which is in good part a function of the vacuum of popular leadership in the Arab world—and Iran’s prospects look even weaker.

Worries among Gulf states, particularly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, about the expansion of the Arab uprisings to their own Shi’a populations have also increased these countries’ incentives to highlight a perceived Iranian threat. But this picture masks a far more complex reality in Arab attitudes toward Iran before and after the start of the Arab uprisings. This complexity is reflected not only in the gap of perception between the Arab people on the one hand and Arab governments on the other, but also in important differences on Iran across Arab governments. And even among Arab governments most threatened by Iran and most inclined to see it weakened, including militarily, their sense of threat and how to address it differs substantially from Israel’s sense of threat.

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Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: The Wilson Center and the United States Insitutes of Peace

Image Source: © Caren Firouz / Reuters

The Limits of U.S. Influence in Israel

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A victory in Tuesday’s Israeli elections by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud Yisrael Beiteinu alliance and the ascent of even more extreme parties are indications of Israelis’ continued move to the right.

It is also an indication of the limits and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in its relationship with Israel. Despite Netanyahu’s obvious preference for President Barack Obama’s Republican opponent, Mitt Romney, in the U.S. presidential elections — and a sense that he was intervening through proxies — Obama’s ability to influence the outcome of the Israeli elections has been negligible.

The Obama administration’s situation underscores the need for a quick decision about its policy toward whatever type of governing coalition emerges in Israel after the election. If Netanyahu forges a government with parties to his right, the White House should drop the pretense of possible peace negotiations and formulate policy accordingly: It can either produce a detailed peace plan or fall back on highlighting international law and human rights and the obligations of the parties that they entail.

Israelis were certainly aware of the tension between their prime minister and the U.S. president. Had they not been, the much-publicized report by journalist Jeffrey Goldberg about White House warnings of Israeli isolation drove the point home. Yet there is no indication that a dispute will have a significant impact on Israeli elections, since the right-wing parties that support the settlements are expected to do well. The question is: Why have the stated American opposition to Israeli settlements and subtle attempts at influencing Israeli opinion been ineffective?

This puzzle is made more acute by the consensus that Israelis — both the public and virtually all politicians—view the relationship with Washington as their most crucial strategic priority.

In the past, Israelis reacted to threats of worsening relations with the United States by punishing those politicians viewed as responsible — as happened in the defeat of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir after his confrontation with President George H. W. Bush in 1992. But it now seems that Israelis have grown to take the U.S. relationship for granted. There is clear evidence of this from the polls.

In a poll I conducted in Israel with the Program for International Policy Attitudes after the U.S. presidential elections, fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute, most Israelis said they believed the tension between Netanyahu and Obama would not affect the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

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Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Israeli Public Opinion after the November 2012 Gaza War

Shibley Telhami — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Read about the poll release event »

In a new poll of Israelis conducted by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Non-Resident Senior Fellow and Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, 60 percent of Israelis have a favorable view of President Obama – up 6 points from last year. In addition, Israeli Jews now cite Obama as the most admired world leader, and more Israelis think American support for their security interests has increased. Overall there has been an increase in Israeli optimism regarding U.S.-Israeli relations in Obama’s second term.

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2012 Israeli Public Opinion Poll

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2012 Israeli Public Opinion Poll

A public opinion poll conducted November 21-26, 2012.

The poll, conducted in late November, also highlights perceptions on the Israel-Gaza conflict. Forty-five percent of respondents felt neither Israel or Hamas emerged victorious from the recent conflict. Thirty-eight percent of respondents think Israel isn’t any better or worse off than before the escalation in Gaza. Forty percent of respondents believe the fighting in Gaza will not end; 29 percent believe fighting will end when there is a political final status with the Palestinians.

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Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: University of Maryland and the Program on International Policy Attitudes

Image Source: © Ahmed Jadallah / Reuters

Attitudes Toward a Middle East in Crisis: Surveys of Arab and Jewish Opinion in Israel

Fri, 30 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 30, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Now that the Israeli-Palestinian standoff has once again spiraled into violence, how do Arab and Jewish Israelis view the conflict with Hamas and other important issues in the region? What is their opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt? How do Israelis feel about the prospect of war with Iran and the deteriorating situation in Syria? Has the reelection of Barack Obama changed the Israeli public’s view of the United States?

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2012 Israeli Public Opinion Poll

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2012 Israeli Public Opinion Poll

A public opinion poll conducted November 21-26, 2012.

On November 30, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami for the release of his annual survey of Arab and Jewish Israeli public opinion. Telhami, the poll’s principal investigator and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, will present his research and key findings followed by a discussion with Dana Weiss, moderator of Channel 2 News’ “Meet the Press” in Israel. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.

After the program, panelists will take audience questions.

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Attitudes Toward a Middle East in Crisis: Surveys of Arab and Jewish Opinion in Israel

Event Materials

30 israel poll full report

@ Brookings Podcast: What Americans Think about the Middle East

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

From the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the paradigm shift of the Arab Spring, to attacks on U.S. government personnel in Egypt and Libya, to the potentially explosive situation in Syria--events in the greater Middle East region continue to resonate here at home. In a recent study, “Americans on the Middle East,” Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami finds that Americans have a great understanding and concern about Middle East events. Learn more about these findings in this episode of @ Brookings.

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Shibley Telhami: What Americans Think about the Middle East

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Who's the Bigger Friend of Israel — And Do Voters Really Care?

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 23 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

One of the striking aspects of the third presidential debate was the frequent mention of Israel (34 times). Western Europe and the challenges facing the European Union, or Mexico and Latin America hardly registered. It is as if the Israel issue is a burning one in American politics, or that the American public is dying to see which candidate supports Israel more. Neither is close to the truth.

Even aside from the fact that Americans are not much focused on foreign policy in any case in determining their electoral choices, the Israel issue is often misunderstood. For years now, polls indicate that when Americans are asked if they want the United States to lean toward Israel, toward the Palestinians, or toward neither side, about two thirds consistently choose neither side. Roughly one quarter to one third want the US to take sides, and among those, Israel is favored over the Palestinians by a strong ratio, ranging from 3-to-1 to 5-to-1. But something happened over the past decade in public attitudes toward Israel: America has become far more polarized than ever before.

Historically, there was little difference in the degree of support for Israel among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. In recent polls, a huge difference emerged. According to two polls I conducted with the Program for International Policy Attitudes in 2010 and 2011, more than two thirds of Democrats and Independents wanted to the United States to take neither side in the conflict, and among those who supported one side or the other, the ratio of support for Israel over the Palestinians was about 2-to-1. Republicans had substantially different views: Nearly half wanted the United States to lean toward Israel and the ratio of support for Israel over the Palestinians was 46-to-1. In other words, the Israel issue has become far more a Republican issue than a Democratic one, at the level of constituency opinion. Obviously, given the demographic makeup of both major parties, it is more about the Evangelical Rights than about Jewish Americans.

Yet these demographics do not explain why both candidates would go out of their way to compete in avowing support for Israel. In fact, two of the constituencies that were a central target of the final presidential debate, Independents and women, were less likely to want the United States to take sides. And it is obvious that Mitt Romney labored to bring up women's issues (at least in the Middle Eastern contest, where it is "safe" politically) and projected himself as a candidate for "peace," knowing that the general public — especially Independents and women — feared being dragged into another costly war. Is there any risk of alienating them?

No. An Israeli friend with whom I spoke the morning after the debate said he felt "embarrassed" and "uncomfortable" about the frequent mention of Israel in the debate, knowing that neither candidate truly ranked this issue as high in their priorities as they made it appear. I suspect that many Americans felt the same way, or felt at least puzzled. But here is why it is not likely to make a difference for those who didn't like the focus on Israel: In the polling we have done in the past couple of years, those who want the US to take neither side rank the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict much lower in their priorities than those who want the US to take Israel's side. Those who don't rank the issue high in their priorities are less likely to vote based on the candidate's position on that issue. They can be uncomfortable, but not uncomfortable enough to make a difference.

In a close election campaign like this one, the focus is much narrower. Certainly, there is a fundraising aspect of American electoral politics, and supporters of Israel tend to be generous contributors in the American electoral process, which is an important element of the clout of organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose mission is to consolidate American support for Israel. But electorally it matters, too. Sure, majorities of Jewish Americans will vote Democratic no matter what, as the Israel issue is not the top (or even the second top) issue in their voting behavior. And the Evangelical Right will mostly vote Republican, no matter what Romney's position is on foreign policy. Still, both constituencies also need to be energized.

But, in the end, the principle focus of the campaigns in the final two weeks on this issue is two swing states in which Jewish voters could affect a close election: Florida and Ohio. One Republican advisor, Ari Fleischer has been quoted to say that with only 25% of Jewish votes going to Romney, Republicans would win Florida, and 30% support would mean winning Ohio and the election. That certainly sounds like an exaggeration. But no democratic strategist wants to test it out.

All of this adds up to a show that is particularly hard to take seriously for many voters, and which is puzzling to audiences around the world, especially in the Middle East. But most have come to expect that there is in the end little correlation between what is said in the heat of political campaigns, and what presidents in fact do when elected.

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: Al-Monitor

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Americans on the Middle East: A Study of American Public Opinion

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 08 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In mid-September 2012, attacks on US diplomatic missions in Libya and Egypt—countries going through revolutionary processes that began with the Arab Spring—shocked Americans in the midst of a closely fought presidential campaign. The very different governments of Libya and Egypt, both new and untested, had to formulate responses to the attacks, which immediately fed in to the American political process. The University of Maryland’s Anwar Sadat Chair and the Program on International Policy Attitudes sought to learn what have been the American public’s first impressions of these events, and how attitudes on other issues in the region may have changed.

Highlights of key findings from the poll include:

1. Most Americans believe that the the recent violent attacks against the American embassies in Libya and Egypt are the work of extremist minorities, not majorities, but most are dissatisfied with the reactions of the Libyan and Egyptian governments.

2. There is support for decreasing aid to Egypt, but not for stopping it.

3. A majority of Americans believes that an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would result in a drastic oil price increase, Iranian attacks on American bases, and a worsened American strategic position in the Middle East.

4. Majorities of the American public support increasing sanctions on Syria and imposing an international no-fly zone, but overwhelmingly oppose bombing Syria, arming rebels, or sending troops to Syria.

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Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland and the Program for International Policy Attitudes

U.S. Public Opinion Toward Arabs and Islam: How "The Video Incident" May Affect U.S.-Muslim Relations

Mon, 08 Oct 2012 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

October 8, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was streamed live on C-SPAN.org.

A provocatively offensive film and violent demonstrations protesting it have once again roiled the relationships between Americans, Arabs and Muslims. In both the United States and the volatile transition states of North Africa, popular reactions have been swift, severe and complicated by domestic politics. But beyond the partisan scorekeeping and the loudly raised voices, how have these recent events changed the way the American public views Arab and Muslim communities? Within the emerging democratic Arab states, how has the furor over the video altered the public debate regarding freedom of speech, civil liberties and other constitutional rights? Finally, how are these issues examined within the context of religious expression, pluralism and tolerance—values that are central to American identity?

On October 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings hosted a discussion on these questions and unveiled a new University of Maryland public opinion poll examining attitudes just days after violence erupted in Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East. The poll, conducted by Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami, gauges American public attitudes toward Arabs and Muslims and toward U.S. foreign policy in the region. Panelists included Brookings Senior Fellow William A. Galston, the Ezra K. Zilkha chair in Governance Studies; Hisham Melhem, Washington bureau chief of Al Arabiya News; and Telhami, principal investigator of the poll and the Anwar Sadat chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #USArabViews.

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U.S. Public Opinion Toward Arabs and Islam: How "The Video Incident" May Affect U.S.-Muslim Relations

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Understanding Arab Anger

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

With all the protests and violence in Arab and Muslim countries generated by a despicable and demeaning film about Islam, here is a sobering prediction: There will be more such films and clips, they will be even more provocative, and they will generate even more violent reaction among Arabs and Muslims. And no matter who is behind them, many will see the hands of Israel and the United States.

Yet this is not time for panic but for steady and intensive diplomacy.

This is an easy prediction to make. In the era of the information revolution, any 12-year-old can produce a short film and post it online. There is no shortage of racists, bigots or individuals with sinister goals.

And consider this payoff of a relatively cheap product with minor efforts: disruption of regional and global priorities, affecting U.S. relations with Arab and Muslim countries, influencing internal dynamics in the Middle East and possibly even affecting the outcome of U.S. elections. It is too easy and too tempting, even for those with low personal stakes — and especially for those with higher stakes.

The Arab and Muslim reaction is predictable enough. The people who mobilize and act violently are by no means majorities, but the issues of Islam and the prophet Muhammad touch raw nerves across Arab and Muslim societies so that meaningful calls for calm will remain limited. Coming after a decade during which Muslims felt their religion and values under assault, the empowerment of the Arab uprisings will most likely only bring more people into the public square — and some with more than peaceful anger. Who will stop them?

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: The Baltimore Sun

With Arab Protests, Panic Is Not a Policy

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Yet this is not time for panic but for steady and intensive diplomacy.

Two factors work against effective prevention. The first is a lack of leadership that commands true moral authority. The Arab world has long lacked leadership respected by the Arab public. That was certainly the case before the Arab Spring uprisings, when the vacuum of leadership Arabs admired was glaringly obvious in public opinion polls.

For different reasons, this remains the case now. The Arab uprisings have been unique in part because they took place without charismatic leadership — or even the usual need to rely on political parties and social organizations. That made them authentic, grass-roots-based and reflective of deep public aspirations. Essentially, they were leaderless.

Meanwhile, those who have been democratically elected since, like Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, have not yet established their credentials and moral authority. There is no Nelson Mandela to set the tone, though many are trying.

The second is that the norm established by the course of the Arab revolutions has restrained the state’s use of coercive means to stop demonstrators. Governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, with memories of hated regimes doing just that, are fearful of cultivating the same reputation when they are seeking to build their public legitimacy.

Even police and security forces, who suffered during the Arab revolutions for being instruments of the rulers against the people, have a built-in reluctance to intervene — particularly over an issue on which they deeply sympathize with the demonstrators.

So the norms established in the course of the mostly peaceful Arab revolutions have had the consequence of undermining the coercive power of the state — and thus the state itself.

It is striking that the anger and violence immediately targeted the United States, and the chants of demonstrators singled out Israel and America — before the facts about the film were known. Even after more information was revealed about those apparently behind the film, and when it should have been clear that Washington could not have had a hand in this sinister production, suspicion and conspiracy theories have endured.

At the core, pre-existing anger with Israel and the United States, and a sense that the two led an assault on Islam after the tragedy of Sept. 11, are hard to separate from the facts of any particular episode.

These perceptions were somewhat about U.S. discourse that focused on a clash of civilizations but mostly about U.S. led-wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and U.S.-supported Israeli wars in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. That decade of war and destruction had more impact on the outlook of Arabs and Muslims toward the United States than anything said then and since.

In the short term, it is, of course, naive to think that through public relations, Washington will reverse a tide of suspicion built over decades — even as the United States continues to take the moral high ground against racism and provocation. The deepest sources of anger against America are harder to grapple with since they pertain to the presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East and to U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

But it is a mistake to conclude that nothing should be done — even beyond working with governments where common interests remain, as President Barack Obama has done with Morsi, to limit the damage and put in place preventive measures for the future.

Washington must separate the sources of Arab and Muslim anger from the sources of violence. There are continuing battles in each Arab country for its future. Extremists often rely on violence over deeply held religious beliefs to settle these internal battles. Arab rulers, still lacking in moral authority and not in full control, have an interest in preventing the disruption of their priorities and strategic choices — even as their capacities are limited.

The worst thing that Washington can do is panic, abandon common interests and allow arbitrary events — the likes of which are almost inevitable — to alter our strategic course. The current crisis has been sobering not only to Americans but also to Arab governments and many Arabs who don’t want to see Arab revolutions hijacked.

This provides an opening for intense diplomacy, not its abandonment.

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: POLITICO

The Perils of Tough Talk

Shibley Telhami — Thu, 21 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

For many years now the issue of Iran’s nuclear program has been at or near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. For the most part the issue has been debated in strategic terms: Will deterrence and extended deterrence work on an Iranian nuclear weapons capability or not? What are the proliferation implications of an Iranian breakout? Would a nuclear weapons capability embolden or restrain Iranian policy? Politics tends to play a secondary role in serious analyses of such questions. It is not clear, however, that politics is necessarily a secondary factor, and the U.S. presidential election season is revealing how important it can be. In the end, political tails in the United States, Israel, Iran and elsewhere may wag strategic dogs. If they do, it would hardly be the first time history has recorded such a phenomenon.

The Iranian nuclear issue isn’t at the center of debate in the campaign thus far, but it may rise in importance as election day approaches if Republicans, deprived of major foreign policy issues, use Iran’s nuclear program and the Obama Administration’s handling of it against the President. If they successfully paint him as ineffective or failing on Iran, they could neutralize his popular national security accomplishments, like the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, the killing of Osama bin Laden, and his pledge to bring American troops home from Afghanistan.

Read the full article at the-american-interest.com »

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: The American Interest

Image Source: © Thaier Al-Sudani / Reuters

2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Mon, 28 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 28-31, 2012

Qatar
Doha

Read the 2012 working group and long conversation papers »

See the forum agenda for details on sessions and speakers.

The 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, convened by the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, housed within the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, in partnership with the State of Qatar, took place in Doha, Qatar, on May 29-31. The theme for the forum was, "New Voices, New Directions," emphasizing the challenge of change. Policy makers and officials, thought leaders and activists, and entrepreneurs and journalists met during sessions to facilitate productive dialogue concerning problems faced in U.S. relations with the Islamic world.

In 2011, the forum took place in the midst of the “Arab Awakening” and the dramatic changes that continue to transform the Middle East and North Africa. From Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen, ordinary citizens made possible extraordinary political and social changes. The 2012 forum examined the impact of these changes and continuing challenges posed for Muslim communities around the globe, including in South and Southeast Asia, as well as strategic implications for the United States.

During the three days of the forum there were a variety of formats for candid dialogue and engagement:

A series of keynote speeches at the opening gala dinner from world leaders on the challenges confronting Muslim communities around the globe and their relations with the United States.
Three plenary sessions of fast-paced, in-depth discussions among prominent international figures on broad thematic issues: political, social, and geostrategic change in the Muslim world.
Two panel discussions featuring experts on key issues: the 2012 U.S. presidential elections and the role of arts and culture in social change.
A set of four small working groups that brought together practitioners from specific fields to develop practical partnerships and policy recommendations presented in papers published by the Brookings Institution.
The 2012 signature event, “The Long Conversation,” is an effort to explore the dynamic relationship between citizen, religion, and the state in a changing world. The resulting policy paper incorporates discussion amongst forum participants during this off the record session.

Video

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Khaled Abol Naga

Actor, Producer, and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador

Naif Al-Mutawa

Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Teshkeel Media Group

Hossam Bahgat

Founder and Director, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights

Anies Baswedan

Rector, Paramadina University

Endy Bayuni

Senior Editor, Jakarta Post

Saeb Erekat

Chief Negotiator, Palestinian Liberation Organization

Nabil Fahmy

Founding Dean, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo

William A. Galston

Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow

Rached Ghannouchi

Co-Founder, Ennahdha

Stephen Grand

Director and Fellow

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu

Secretary General, Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Martin Indyk

Colin Kahl

Associate Professor, Georgetown University
Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Hina Rabbani Khar

Foreign Minister, Pakistan

Dalia Mogahed

Executive Director and Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies

Saad Mohseni

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, MOBY Group

Rami Nashashibi

Executive Director, Inner-City Muslim Action Network

Iqbal Noor Ali

Senior Advisor, Aga Khan Development Network

Walter Parkes

Film Producer and Writer, Parkes/MacDonald Productions

Kori Schake

Research Fellow, Hoover Institution
Associate Professor of International Security Studies, United States Military Academy

Cynthia Schneider

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Shibley Telhami

Nonresident Senior Fellow

What Do Egyptians Want? Key Findings from the Egyptian Public Opinion Poll

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 21 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The 2012 Public Opinion Survey in Egypt was conducted from May 4-10, 2012, in the weeks leading up to Egypt’s historic presidential election. The survey assesses which candidate is most favored by the public, what issues are driving public preferences, what Egyptians want their leader and their country to look like, and what role they want religion to play in politics.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not possible at this point to develop a good predictive model of electoral behavior in Egypt, as the experiment is new, coalitions are still forming, and little information is available about likely voters. Therefore, polls, including this one, can give a hint of the trends in public opinion about the Presidential candidates but cannot provide accurate predictions. One case in point is the fact that Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, the best organized group in Egypt today whose party won the largest block in the parliamentary elections, has been far behind in most Egyptian polls (including this one) although there has been evidence that he is gaining ground. In our poll he garnered only 8% support. But we know that political machinery is essential in getting out the vote and that the political environment in Egypt is changing almost by the day. It is possible, even probable that Morsi will get more votes than the polls are showing.

Still, there is evidence that voters differentiate between Parliamentary and Presidential elections and are not applying the same criteria in their selection. It is also noteworthy that the majority of respondents, 71%, said that the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to field their own presidential candidates after they said that they would not was a mistake.

Muslim Brotherhood supporters are divided between Morsi and Abul-Fotouh, as are the ultra conservative Salafis. Salafi support for Abul-Fotouh appeared to hurt him among the many liberals who supported him. This fluid environment, in the absence of enough electoral history to develop a model for anticipating electoral behavior means that poll numbers on candidate popularity are mostly indicative of trends, but not necessarily of election outcomes. The most interesting information is on issues that are the driving forces in public assessments.

With this in mind, Abul-Fotouh led with 32%, followed by Amr Mousa with 28%, followed by Shafiq with 14%, and Morsi and Sabahi with 8% each. This poll ended on the day of Egypt’s first ever-Presidential debate on May 10th, 2012, and thus did not measure any impact the debate may have had.

Egyptians who voted in the parliamentary elections say that the most important factors in determining their choices were political party (24%) followed by candidate’s record and experience (21%), and candidate’s position on the economy (19%). But they rank these factors differently in their choices of Presidential candidates, with personal trust in the candidate being the most important (31%) followed by the economy (22%) and record and experience (19%). Interestingly only 9% ranked the role of religion in politics as the most important factor in the parliamentary elections and 8% in their Presidential preferences.

Those who say that the economy is their primary factor of selection tend to have a slight preference for Amr Mousa as President, while those who emphasize personal trust prefer Arab nationalist candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi and former Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafiq. Among the supporters of Abd Al-Men’em Abul-Fotouh, the biggest factor is the role of religion in politics. Among Amr Mousa’s supporters, the biggest stated factor is foreign policy.

Demographically, Mousa received the highest support among Christians (43%), followed by Sabahi (24%) and Abul-Fotouh (9%). Among university graduates Abul Fotouh led with 35% followed by Mousa with 23% and Sabbahi with 18%. Abul-Fotouh also led among the youth (under 25) with 36% to Mousa’s 23%. Mousa led among respondents who lived outside cities with 31% followed by Morsi with 21%, Shafiq with 17%, and Abul-Fotouh with 16%. Depending on the voter turnout, this category may turn out to be very important to the outcome of the elections.

The Role of Religion

Although less than ten percent of respondents said that the role of religion in politics is the most important factor in their voting in both the parliamentary and presidential elections, two-thirds of respondents (66%) say they support making Shariia as the basis of Egyptian law. However, only 17% say that they prefer applying Shariia literally, including to the penal code, while 83% say they prefer applying the spirit of Shariia but with adaptation to modern times.

In envisioning the role Islam should play in the Egyptian political system, respondents were asked to choose which of six models (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia, Morocco) is closest to their aspirations, a majority chose Turkey (54%), followed by Saudi Arabia (32%).

Admired Leaders

When asked in an open question to choose the leader they admire most in the world, but outside of Egypt, 63 percent of Egyptians identified the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Teyyib Erdogan, while five percent each identified President Obama and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. But asked which leader they want their next president to look most like in an open question that did not exclude Egyptians, 35 percent identified Anwar Sadat, 26 percent Gamal Abdel Nasser, and 15 percent identified Erdogan.

Attitudes toward the United States

Attitudes toward the United States continue to be unfavorable (85%).

Asked to name the two steps by the United States that would improve the views of the US the most, 66% identified brokering Middle East peace and establishing a Palestinian state, 46% identified stopping economic and military aid to Israel, and 44% identified withdrawal of American forces from the Arabian Peninsula. Only seven percent identified withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan as one of the two top steps, 12% identified an American push to spread democracy in the Middle East, and 18% identified providing more economic assistance to the region.

Although Egyptians in the past year have been understandably preoccupied with their own political and economic situation and have not been paying as much attention to the American elections as usual, and they probably know less about the republican candidates for president, that has not prevented them from giving their opinions. Presented with a choice between President Obama and likely Republican candidate Mitt Romney, 73% said they preferred Romney, and only 25% chose Obama. It is unlikely that most Egyptians know much about Romney, and the choice is more likely to be an expression of disappointment with Obama. When Obama first came to office in 2009, even before his important speech in Cairo, Egyptian public opinion of the President was more favorable than unfavorable. This contrasted with Israeli public opinion, which was more suspicious of Obama. Since then, there has been a reversal of fortune, where in a poll we conducted in Israel last February, Israeli Jews expressed preference for Obama over all the leading Republican candidates (although his lead over Romney was within the margin of error).

Attitudes toward Israel

Respondents were almost equally divided among those who would like to see Egypt maintain its peace treaty with Israel (46%) and those who would like to see it cancelled (44%). 10% would like to see the treaty amended. With regard to the prospects of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, 55% indicated that they don’t believe this will ever happen, while only five percent said it will happen in the next five years, and 40% said it is inevitable, but it will take more time.

Attitudes toward Iran and its Nuclear Program

When asked in an open question to identify the two countries that posed the biggest threat to them, 97% included Israel in that list of two, 80% included the United States, and 20% included Iran. While Iran remains far behind Israel and the United States as a perceived threat, which is consistent with our polls over the past several years, those who identified Iran as one of the two biggest threats have increased from 8% in 2009 and 15% in October 2011 to 20% in the current poll.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, 61% of respondents say they would like Egypt to build its own weapons program, while 32% want Egypt to push for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East that includes Iran, Israel, and Arabs. Even if Iran does not build nuclear weapons, but Israel retains its own, 49% of respondents say they would like Egypt to build its own, while 45% say they prefer pushing for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

Attitudes toward the Crisis in Syria

While respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of the rebels against the Syrian government, they were divided on how to address the crisis. A plurality (43%) said they didn’t want to see any external military intervention in Syria, while 18% supported military intervention, but only with UN Security Council support, and 15% supported Turkish Arab military intervention. Another 40% indicated support for international or Arab arming of the rebels.

When it comes to international actors’ roles in Syria, Turkey was identified by 31% as playing the most constructive role, followed by Saudi Arabia, 26%, and the United States, 20%. Only three percent each identified Russia and China. At the same time, however, 38% identified the United States as playing the most detrimental role in handling the Syrian crisis, while 21% identified Iran, and 18% identified Russia.

Image Source: Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Egypt’s Presidential Election and Public Opinion: What Do Egyptians Want?

Mon, 21 May 2012 15:00:00 -0400

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May 21, 2012
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

The elections of 2012 could prove to be even more consequential for Egypt than the turbulence of 2011. Various Egyptian factions have spent the last year trying to find their place in the new post-Mubarak order, and for the first time Egyptians have an opportunity to choose their president. It is a critical time to take the pulse of the population.

On May 21, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings unveiled the results of a new University of Maryland poll. Conducted in the weeks leading up to Egypt’s historic presidential election, the poll gauges which candidate is most favored by the public, what issues are driving public preferences, what Egyptians want their leader and their country to look like, and what role they want religion to play in politics. In addition, the poll explores Egyptian public attitudes toward the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the Iran nuclear issue, the Syria crisis, and the American presidential election. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami, principal investigator of the poll and the Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, presented his latest research and key findings. Steven Cook, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations provided commentary and offer his insights from his own research. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, director of research for the Saban Center, moderated the discussion.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

Shibley Telhami

Arab Opinions on a Nuclear Iran

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 16:35:00 -0400

At a recent event, Shibley Telhami discussed the differences in how Arab governments and the Arab public feel about Iran's nuclear program and a possible military strike against this program by Israel.

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Shibley Telhami

The Israeli and Arab Dimensions of Iran's Nuclear Program

Shibley Telhami — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 11:23:00 -0400

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Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Suzanne Maloney wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on Iran. The following paper is a response to Maloney’s piece by Shibley Telhami. Michael Doran also prepared a response arguing that the most consequential decision the president faces this election year is determining the fate of Iran’s nuclear program.

Get audio and video from our Campaign 2012 event on Iran »

Suzanne Maloney draws attention to many important angles of the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear program and America’s policy choices. But there are also others for Washington to consider—namely, the Israeli and Arab dimensions. Here are ten brief points for the next president to reflect on.

First, an Israeli strike on Iran between now and the 2012 elections would reshuffle the deck on the Iran nuclear issue and change the possibilities for this administration and the next. If there is no such strike before the elections, the new administration will have to concern itself immediately with whether or not Israel will strike on its own and draw the United States into a military confrontation with Iran. The centrality of the Iranian nuclear issue for the United States cannot be separated from Israeli concerns. A new president will have to begin by managing this as a triangular relationship.

Second, just as many prominent Israelis are walking away from calling Iran an “existential threat”—because doing so portrays Israel as a weak state, lowers its public’s morale, and limits its options—the United States needs to walk away from calling a nuclear Iran the greatest strategic threat the United States faces today. Such framing has ramifications for political, economic, and military priorities as the United States faces greater challenges to its standing in the world: the global shift of power toward Asia, diminishing American economic clout, even the growing gap between the rich and poor and diminishing social mobility at home. A nuclear Iran poses challenges, but even if Iran ultimately develops nuclear weapons, they are manageable ones.

Third, whether or not Iran moves to build nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that it is moving toward having the capability to do so. Its success in that effort is a function not only of opportunity and resources, but also of priorities and will. What the United States and other international partners do affects both Iran’s costs and its incentives. Tough sanctions may limit the resources available to the regime and create some internal fissures, but they can also send the signal that the aim is regime change and that Iranians are better off riding the hardship and accelerating their nuclear program as a deterrent against future threats. Sanctions will slow Iran’s program only if, at an appropriate time, the United States and its allies put on the table a deal that provides a face-saving measure to the Iranians.

Fourth, while such a deal is theoretically possible and some Obama administration officials have been hopeful that the costs of sanctions are providing incentives for Iranian rulers to meet its terms, they are not likely to comply. The Iranians have always given themselves a face-saving way out by denying that their aim is acquiring nuclear weapons and by even taking a religious position against such weapons. But no one believes that Iran would give up the right of uranium enrichment on its soil—something that the Israelis are insisting on as a way of heading off an armed strike. The extent to which a compromise is possible has in the end to do with the limits on Iranian enrichments. Nothing so far suggests that a deal acceptable to both Israel and Iran is possible.

Fifth, the events in Syria may actually provide Iran with a greater incentive to move rapidly toward nuclear capabilities. Syria had been Iran’s only state ally in the Arab world and a link to Hezbollah. The weakening of these two would make Tehran more insecure and more inclined toward nuclear capability as the ultimate provider of deterrence against foreign intervention.

Sixth, an increasing source of anxiety in the Arab world is that there may soon be two non-Arab nuclear powers (Iran and Israel). Arab states may respond by nuclearizing. Saudi Arabia would be the most inclined and capable Arab country to go nuclear. As Egypt comes out of its revolutionary transition, public pressure will mount on Cairo to follow suit.

Seventh, while Arab governments are particularly concerned about the growth of Iranian power, Arab public opinion is caught between concern about Iran and hope that Iran could give Israel and the United States black eyes. Arabs polled, including those in Saudi Arabia, rank Israel and the United States as bigger threats than Iran. And most Arabs reject international pressure to curb the Iranian nuclear program, because of a sense of “double standards” in the international position. While an Iranian bomb would pressure Arabs to want their own, it would also increase the Arab public’s admiration for Iran in a manner that is potentially threatening to Arab rulers.

Eighth, even if a deal is reached with Iran to limit the level of enrichment on Iranian soil, Arabs will likely feel compelled to move in the nuclear direction unless a regional forum can put downward pressure on regional proliferation—for example, through a convention to move toward a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. It is improbable that Israeli leaders would be open to the idea of reducing, let alone ultimately giving up, their nuclear weapons before there is full and stable peace with their neighbors.

Ninth, while disarmament in the short to intermediate terms is improbable, the beginning of a regional convention toward that end would be consequential: it would create regional engagement, which would have a large impact on public opinion across the region, and would place downward pressure on proliferation while providing face-saving arguments for leaders who want to avoid the nuclear course. However, such a conversation is unimaginable without parallel credible peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

Tenth, given that the above developments remain unlikely in the foreseeable future, the risk of war will remain high before, and even after, the American elections. There is no doubt that the Israeli threat to strike Iran has a political aspect, or that the costs for Israel of a strike would be enormous. But the strategic reality still holds: Israel may be able to live with a nuclear Iran, but it is hard to believe that the Israelis would be assured by the kind of possible negotiated deal with Tehran or that they would refrain from doing all they think they can to slow Iran’s program. The potential risks to American interests are huge, and any administration must prepare for all contingencies. But precisely because of the enormous consequences, no idea or political effort should be avoided, even if its prospects are seemingly limited—including using the upcoming UN conference on a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East to launch a serious regional engagement that changes the conversation and plants the seeds of new initiatives after the American presidential elections.

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Shibley Telhami

Campaign 2012: The Challenge of Containing Iran

Tue, 10 Apr 2012 13:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 10, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Follow @BICampaign2012
Iran remains a central foreign policy challenge for the United States as tension mounts over its growing nuclear program. The country’s support for destabilizing forces throughout the Middle East, unpredictable domestic politics and hostility toward Israel pose a great threat to regional and international security. Although an international coalition has deployed an array of economic sanctions, dealing with Iran will remain a key challenge for the United States.

On April 10, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on Iran, the fourth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. Josh Gerstein of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Suzanne Maloney, Shibley Telhami and Michael Doran, who presented recommendations to the next president.

After the program, panelists took questions from the audience.

You can follow the conversation on this event on Twitter using the hashtag #BIIran or on our @BICampaign2012 Twitter feed.

Download papers from the event:

Keeping Iran in Check: The Next President Must Focus on Achievable Goals, by Suzanne Maloney
The Israeli and Arab Dimensions of Iran's Nuclear Program, by Shibley Telhami
The Ghost of Iran's Future, by Michael Doran

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The Muslim Brotherhood and the New Egyptian Politics

Shibley Telhami — Wed, 04 Apr 2012 15:20:00 -0400

In a surprising move, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood decided to field it's own candidate, Khairat Al-Shater, for the presidency of Egypt, after months of insisting that it would not do so. Immediately, questions were raised about its credibility not only among its opponents but also among some of its supporters, many of whom opposed the move.

What explains this sudden reversal by a group that has been very calculating and careful in its political actions since the fall of Hosni Mubarak? The answer is: It found itself out-maneuvered by both the ruling Military Council and the surprisingly strong and more conservative Islamist competitors, the Salafis. And it stood to risk losing much of its gains.

The Brotherhood's strategy has been clear. It looked ahead not only to winning control of the Parliament through its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) but also to governing. From the outset, its leadership understood that the Egyptian public would ultimately judge it by how it performs once in leadership.

Above all, they understood the urgent economic rebuilding challenges that required internal and external stability in an environment where there is much international skepticism about the Brotherhood’s aims and capabilities. Much of what the Brotherhood has done in the early months was to assure domestic and international groups, from the Egyptian military, with whom it reached early tacit understandings, to the Egyptian Coptic Christian minority, to Western governments—and even to Israel.

Its view was clear: It preferred a strong parliamentary system in which it dominates with an internationally-respected president who is more liberal but is prepared to make a deal with them. They could be the kingmaker but not the king. For a while, it flirted with the idea of supporting former IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei for president until the latter polled out of the race.

But two things happened that Brotherhood leaders didn't anticipate. Following their parliamentary victory, their constituents were already judging them based on their performance, even though the Egyptian government in charge is outside their control and appointed by the military rulers. They became suspicious that the military and the interim government are deliberately acting to undermine their parliamentary credibility. The brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party threatened to bring down the government through a parliamentary vote of non-confidence. The military council countered with its own threat of dissolving the parliament—something that's allowed under the existing constitution.

This drove home the reality that the Brotherhood's move to oppose revisiting the constitution before holding elections could come back to haunt them. The military threat to dissolve the parliament may have been a bluff. But what if an elected president who’s not a member of the Brotherhood acted on his own prior to constitutional revision?

Such a scenario has become more plausible in recent weeks as the field of presidential candidates expanded, despite the loss of some prominent potential candidates such as ElBaradei. When the Brotherhood looked around, the two leading presidential candidates were not to its liking. Former Arab League chief, Amr Moussa, who remains popular, is seen by the brotherhood as a threat to its control, and Hazem Abu Ismail, the Salafi candidate of the Nur party, who is a direct Islamist competitor to the Brotherhood, is seen to be so conservative as to lead Egypt into isolation.

The rise of the latter and his party has been the biggest surprise to almost all observers, including the Brotherhood. During the Mubarak era, the Salafis kept a relatively low political profile while being allowed by Mubarak security services to operate freely as a religious and social organization attracting funds from conservative religious groups and individuals from Arab Gulf states—probably as way of limiting the influence of the Brotherhood.

When Mubarak fell, everyone was surprised by the strength of the Salafis and their ability to translate their social and religious organizations into political clout. And while the chances of their presidential candidate seemed slim only weeks ago, the articulate Hazem Abu Ismail, has quickly risen to the top in the polls.

Given the fragmented field, it was no longer guaranteed that a liberal or moderate candidate would win simply by being endorsed by the Brotherhood. Some lacked international stature and significant Egyptian public support; others like Abd Al Monem Abul Futouh angered the Brotherhood by breaking from them to run for president, and had the Brotherhood endorsed him, he would have been counted as one of their own any way. By choosing one of their leaders to run for the presidency, the Brotherhood is betting that they will rally their supporters behind the nomination and hope to get a few more backers through coalition building.

But there are risks with this move, which is probably why the Brotherhood’s decision was far less from unanimous. The cost to their credibility is one problem. Egyptian public weariness of political dominance by any party may also work against them. Potential divisions within the Brotherhood’s own ranks is probably the biggest threat, especially if, the Islamists votes are fragmented and their candidate ends up losing. Welcome to the new Egyptian politics.

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: CNN

Americans on Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Program

Shibley Telhami — Mon, 12 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

On Monday, March 12, Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, released a poll on American views on Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Program. The poll surveyed 727 Americans, assessing opinions on Israel, Iran and nuclear nonproliferation.

Key Findings:

Israel

Only one in four Americans favor Israel conducting a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program. Seven in ten favor instead the United States and other major powers continuing to pursue negotiations with Iran. Three in four say that the United States should primarily act through the UN Security Council rather than acting by itself.

Only one in seven Americans thinks the United States should encourage Israel to strike Iran’s program, but views are mixed as to whether the United States should openly discourage Israel or stay neutral.

If Israel goes ahead with a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program and Iran retaliates (but not against American targets), only one in four favors the United States providing military support for Israel and only 4 in 10 favor the United States providing even diplomatic support. Few would support open opposition. The most popular position is for the United States to take a neutral stance. If Israel strikes Iran even without American approval one in three Americans think the United States would provide military support and a slight majority thinks that it would at least provide diplomatic support.

Americans think that a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program is not likely to produce much benefit or to be low in cost. Only one in five believe that a military strike will delay Iran’s abilities to acquire nuclear weapon for more than five years. Less than half believe that a strike would weaken the Iranian government. Also, few Americans believe that a strike will involve a short exchange: a large majority believes that a strike would lead to at least months of military conflict between Iran and Israel, and half believe that it would go on for years.

Respondents who favor providing military or diplomatic support to Israel in the event of a strike are more optimistic that a strike will substantially delay Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons and that the strike would not lead to a drawn out military conflict between Iran and Israel, though even they were not optimistic that the conflict would be short.

Iran

Americans show substantial pessimism about Iran and its nuclear program. Six in ten believe that Iran has decided to try to produce nuclear weapons and is actively working to do so. Nine in ten believe that it is likely that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons.

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons six in ten believe that it is more likely that Iran would use them against Israel rather than that they would be deterred by the likelihood of retaliation. The largest concern is that Iran would either use nuclear weapons or that it would make Iran more aggressive, less that it would engender a nuclear arms race in the region.

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Shibley Telhami

Do Israelis Support a Strike on Iran?

Shibley Telhami — Wed, 29 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

When President Barack Obama meets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington next week, Iran’s nuclear program is likely to top their agenda. With increasing signals that Israel may be contemplating a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the United States and its European allies have made no secret of their opposition.

In the face of this mounting public disapproval, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman declared that the issue is no one else’s business and that the allies’ opposition won’t influence Israel’s decision. But how do the Israeli people feel?

They don’t support a strike without U.S. backing, a new poll shows, even though they are not fearful of Washington’s retribution if they go against U.S. advice. They appear less influenced by the rhetoric of U.S. politicians competing for their embrace, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the Obama administration’s reluctance to support a military strike against Iran has apparently not affected their preference for Obama as the next president. In fact, their views seem to partly reflect the White House’s assessment of the consequences of war and the problems created by military action.

Only 19 percent of Israelis polled expressed support for an attack without U.S. backing, according to a poll I conducted — fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute Feb. 22-26 — while 42 percent endorsed a strike only if there is at least U.S. support, and 32 percent opposed an attack regardless.

This does not appear to be because of Israeli worries about potential American punishment. In fact, Israelis remain confident the U.S. would support them, at least diplomatically (38 percent), or join the war on Israel’s behalf (27 percent) — even if Israel struck Iran without Washington’s approval. Only 15 percent expect reduced American support. What seems behind these attitudes is an assessment of the consequences of an Israeli attack.

A majority of Israelis polled, roughly 51 percent, said the war would last months (29 percent) or years (22 percent), while only 18 percent said it would last days. About as many Israelis, 44 percent, think that an Israeli strike would actually strengthen Iran’s government as think it would weaken it (45 percent).

Two-thirds of Israelis, meanwhile, believe Hezbollah would most likely join Iran in retaliation against Israel — even if Israel did not strike Hezbollah forces. An additional 27 percent believe Hezbollah would join only if attacked.

What would be the outcome for Iran’s nuclear program? Only 22 percent of Israelis said a strike would delay Iran’s capabilities by more than five years, while an additional 31 percent said it would delay its capabilities by one to five years, 18 percent said it would not make a difference and 11 percent said it would actually accelerate Iran’s capabilities. In a similar poll I conducted (also with Dahaf) last November, 90 percent of Israelis expressed the view that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons.

Since the Israeli public appears not fearful of losing U.S. backing if Israel strikes without a green light from Washington, these results are probably related to the lack of confidence in the Israeli government’s own assessment of the consequences of an attack. If U.S. and European allies have a different estimate of the likely results of a strike, the Israeli public, in turn, has less confidence in its own government’s evaluation.

Reinforcing this interpretation are Israeli public attitudes toward the Obama administration. In the current U.S. campaign rhetoric, Obama is often portrayed as less supportive of Israel — even its detractor. Shortly before this poll was fielded, one story in the Israeli press cited Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum saying that Obama “was throwing Israel under the bus” and “helping Iran obtain nuclear weapons.”

Not surprisingly, what Obama and the Republican candidates are saying about Israel and Iran is often a lead story in Israel. It is, of course, hard to assess the direct impact of these stories on Israeli public preferences about U.S. politics. No country matters more for Israel than the U.S. — and no country gets more scrutiny in the Israeli press. So whom do Israelis want to see as the next U.S. president?

In our recent poll, Israelis were asked whom they preferred in a paired competition between Obama and each remaining GOP candidate. Not surprisingly, a significant minority of Israelis expressed no opinion or chose none of the candidates. Though the results were sometimes close — within the margin of error — Obama was the preferred candidate over every potential Republican rival among Jewish-Israelis, and ahead of all among a combined sample of Arab- and Jewish-Israelis, except for tying Mitt Romney.

Overall, Obama led Santorum 33 percent to 18 percent; former House Speaker Newt Gingrich 32 percent to 25 percent; Ron Paul 32 percent to 21 percent; and tied Romney at 29 percent. It is noteworthy, that Paul performed slightly better — but within the margin of error — than Santorum, despite his strong opposition to a U.S. role in a military strike against Iran.

What does all this add up to? Contrary to the current discourse in our presidential elections, the Israeli public is neither enthusiastic about the prospect of war with Iran nor swayed by the seeming embrace of Israel by our GOP presidential candidates.

It has to live with the consequences of war and appear to take the U.S. assessment of these consequences seriously in forming its opinions.

With all the white noise surrounding the Iranian nuclear issue, the best service the Obama administration can provide — certainly to American interests and the cause of peace but also to Israelis — is to be faithful to the facts and the professional analysis of what’s at stake if Israel strikes Iran.

Israeli leaders may decide to strike without U.S. support, but their public wants them to follow Washington’s lead — and Israelis appear to be influenced by America’s judgment.

Authors

Shibley Telhami

Publication: POLITICO