On the face of it, the deal announced by President Donald Trump on the normalization of Israel-United Arab Emirates (UAE) ties was something that his administration can claim as an achievement. From the point of view of the administration’s project in the Middle East, it is. Less obvious is that the prospect of Joe Biden being the next president of the United States also had something to do with it, as uniform Democratic opposition to Israeli plans to annex parts of the West Bank was key in the calculus.

Let’s be clear: The UAE and Israel have had expanding cooperative relations for some time, including in intelligence, technology, military, business, and politics. Both governments have been close allies of the Trump administration — and both may still have an interest in seeing Trump re-elected in November.

But leaders in Israel and the UAE also read the polls, and know that the odds are that Joe Biden is likely to win the White House in November. It’s even possible that the Democrats may regain control of the Senate.

As with all members of the Arab League, the United Arab Emirates had supported the Arab Peace Initiative, which is still the consensus position of the Arab states: It offers full diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967.

Israel’s plans to annex parts of the West Bank were a big potential headache for Arab states, beyond their presumed support for the Palestinians. The Arab states’ position in support of two states, like the American and international position, has served as a psychological trick to pretend that Israeli occupation remains temporary, and that — as long as there was no formal annexation of territories — expansion of Israeli control and settlement remain reversible. Annexation would have made the Arab and international position untenable, which is why there was strong opposition to it across the board. It was less about ending the occupation of Palestinians, and more about avoiding even more of a headache.

The UAE, which had already scored points in Israel through its warming relationship, was vocal in its opposition to annexation. Its ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, penned an article in an Israeli newspaper saying it’s either normalization or annexation. Less noticed was that Al Otaiba did not say “it’s either ending occupation or normalization,” which has been the consensus Arab position. But the UAE scored brownie points internationally, and even among Democrats in the U.S.

In some ways, the article was a break with the full support that the UAE has lent the Trump administration, as annexation is a featured part of its plan for the Middle East. But the act itself, an Arab ambassador writing in an Israeli newspaper, pledging peace, was also seen as an act of normalization, thus softening the blow. Among Democrats in the U.S. — who uniformly opposed annexation, with some in Congress linking it to aid to Israel — the UAE intervention was a welcome move. Presumed presidential nominee Joe Biden also strongly opposed annexation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had already frozen his anticipated annexation moves, originally expected in July. Much of what’s happening in Israel is connected to internal politics in a messy political environment, in which an indicted Netanyahu faces legal trouble and Israel may be approaching a fourth election (its last election in March was its third inconclusive election within a year). At the same time, Israelis are always watching the most critical backer, the United States.

Had Netanyahu moved to annex parts of the West Bank in the coming months, his government would have started its relationship with a possible new Democratic administration on the wrong foot, even as the Biden-Harris ticket seems palatable to Israel on issues pertaining to Israel-Palestine. The fact is that the Democratic party has moved on this issue, as even pro-Israel members of Congress opposed annexation, Democratic constituents are to the left of Biden-Harris on this issue, and congressional Democrats who are far more critical of Israel have shown electoral muscle in recent primaries.

The agreement with the UAE helps Netanyahu justify his suspension of annexation to hardliners, even though he was already moving in that direction anyway, and more because of the prospect of Democrats winning in November than because the UAE offered official normalization. Still, the prize for Israel is big: Efforts to normalize ties with Arab states have principally focused on Saudi Arabia, because of its financial and political clout, but secondarily on the UAE because it is wealthy and influential, and because it is a possible back door to Saudi Arabia. And, as Israel’s interests in confronting Iran matches that of the UAE, more access to one of Iran’s neighbors — which has robust trade relations with Tehran — gives Israel new levers.

Israel’s suspension of annexation provides a fig leaf for the UAE move that it hopes will mitigate Palestinian and other Arab states’ reactions, and it has likely cleared the move with some of its Arab allies already. But the UAE has something to gain too, and it has a lot to do with Washington — for the Emirates, this deal was not really about the Palestinians.

Certainly, the UAE scores points with the Trump administration, as it gives the White House a perceived foreign policy success in the final months of an election campaign. But most congressional Democrats — relieved that annexation is off the table for now, and always calling for Arab normalization with Israel in any case — will also generally applaud the move. This comes at a time when the UAE is not only seen as a Trump ally, but also as one of the Saudi-led coalition partners in the Yemen war, which has drawn significant criticism in Congress. If, as polls indicate, Biden becomes the next president, the UAE has put itself on a path that mitigates the strikes against it among Democrats. Keep in mind that both Israel and the UAE would expect a Biden administration to have an Iran policy closer to Obama’s than to Trump’s, which would concern both countries, even aside from other issues.

In their strong and unanimous opposition to annexation, including by Joe Biden, and in the message they sent in recent primaries, Democrats can claim much of the credit for stopping annexation. The fear, however, is that the Democrats’ comfort could lead to complacency. Israeli normalization with Arabs states is taking place without real progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. That, coupled with Israel taking annexation off the table for now, could help reinforce a terrible status quo, especially for the Palestinians, instead of pushing to end the 53-year-old Israeli occupation.

       

Israel’s annexation of occupied West Bank territories is now looming, a move that U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has said would be a “most serious violation of international law.” In fact, President Trump’s so-called Israeli-Palestinian peace plan proposed such a move. The Trump administration plan also purports to offer a Palestinian “state,” but the proposed entity hardly bears resemblance to states as we have known them: Palestinians would rule over about 70% of the occupied territories, in fragmented sections connected through passages, with no control over security, borders, air, territorial waters, or alliances with states. After reviewing Trump’s offer, 50 former European leaders described it as akin to apartheid. Not surprisingly, the Palestinians quickly dismissed it. This then opened the way for Trump to possibly back Israel’s unilateral implementation of aspects of the plan, including annexation, that could take place as early as the beginning of July.

How do Americans feel about the offer, and about possible Israeli annexation of West Bank territories?

To find out, we fielded a set of questions through the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. The poll was carried out by Nielsen Scarborough, among a nationally representative sample of 2,395 American adults, fielded March 10-20.

Notably, only 8% of respondents who were at least “somewhat familiar” with the plan — including 14% of Republicans — said that what the plan offers the Palestinians constitutes a “state” when presented with the description of the offer. Instead, a plurality of respondents, including majorities of Democrats and independents, describe what’s being offered as “occupation.”

The data

The poll began by asking respondents: “In early February, the Trump administration released its Middle East plan addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How familiar are you with this plan?” Not surprisingly, 34% said they were “not very familiar” and another 36% said they were “unfamiliar.” Four percent said they were “very familiar” with the plan, and 25% said they were “somewhat familiar” with it.

The following are key takeaways based on the opinions of respondents who said they are either “very familiar” or “somewhat familiar” with Trump’s plan.

First, without being given any information about the plan, the general impression of respondents who were at least “somewhat familiar” with it is more unfavorable than favorable, and far more viewed the plan as “too favorable toward Israel” than toward the Palestinians.  As with almost every issue in the current American political environment, there was also a notable partisan divide.

A majority of all Democrats (71%) and independents (53%) had “unfavorable” opinions of the plan, compared to only 12% of Republicans. More than half of Republicans expressed a “favorable” opinion (54%), whereas only 5% of Democrats responded this way.  Overall, fewer Americans found the plan “favorable” (29%) compared to the other options — 42% said it was “unfavorable,” 22% said it was “neither favorable nor unfavorable,” and 7% said they “don’t know.”

Only 10% said the plan is “too favorable toward the Palestinians,” with little variation across the partisan divide: 8% of Republicans, 9% of independents, and 11% of Democrats. In contrast, 42% say it’s “too favorable toward Israel,” including 72% of Democrats, 46% of independents, and 12% of Republicans. At the same time, 40% said it was “about the right balance,” including 71% of Republicans, 29% of independents, and 10% of Democrats.

Second, we presented the respondents with a brief description of the entity that Trump’s plan offered the Palestinians, then provided them with options to describe it:

The Trump plan envisions Palestinian control over about 70% of the West Bank and Gaza, which were occupied in the 1967 War, in addition to some territorial exchange. According to the plan, the Palestinian territories will be fragmented but connected through passages and Palestinians would have no control over territorial water, air, security, borders, and no right for alliances with other countries. In your opinion, what would you call an entity with those characteristics?

Respondents were presented with randomized options: “A state,” “occupied territories,” “autonomous region,” “one state but without equality,” and “don’t know.”

Only 8% of respondents would call what the entity Trump offered the Palestinians “a state,” including 3% each of Democrats and independents, and 14% of Republicans. A majority of both Democrats and independents would consider the entity “occupied territories” (53% for both), while a plurality of Republicans said they “don’t know” (34%).

Third, we presented a set of questions about proposed Israeli annexation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This issue highlights the partisan divide: A strong majority of Democrats (79%) oppose the proposed annexation of settlements, while more than half (56%) of Republicans support this, bolstered by strong support from evangelical Republicans (64%).

It is notable that this bottom-line question on annexation was preceded by a series of questions probing the principles on which respondents supported or opposed annexation. Two arguments were presented against annexation: one based on international law, and one based on Palestinian rights. Two arguments were presented in favor of annexation: one based on realities on the ground, one based on biblical claims. After testing support for each argument separately, we asked respondents which one was closer to their view. Respondents were divided down the middle, along partisan lines, with a majority of Democrats citing international law, a plurality of Republicans citing biblical claims, and independents leaning more toward the Democratic positions.

Finally, we repeated a question we have been asking for years about Israel’s Jewishness versus its democracy, which was asked of all respondents, not only those who were at least somewhat familiar with Trump’s plan: “Which of the following statements is closer to your view if a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not an option?” As in previous polls, nearly two thirds (63%) said: “I favor Israel’s democracy more than its Jewishness. I support a single democratic state in which Arabs and Jews are equal even if that means Israel would no longer be a politically Jewish state.” This includes 81% of Democrats and 70% of independents. Republicans were split, with a plurality (49%) saying: “I favor the Jewishness of Israel more than its democracy. I support the continuation of Israel’s Jewish majority in the government even if it means that Palestinians will not have citizenship and full rights.” It is notable, however, that non-evangelical Republicans favor democracy over Jewishness by 10 percentage points (51% compared to 41%).

What it could mean for the election

Needless to say, the American public has not followed Trump’s Middle East plan closely, with 70% of respondents saying that they are either “unfamiliar” or “not very familiar” with the plan. This also applies to evangelical Christians, who tend to support Israeli annexation more than other Americans. As one evangelical leader put it, the issue of Israeli annexation “would have great resonance with most evangelicals” under different circumstances, but given other issues dominating the national dialogue, there is little if any “interest or attention being paid” to annexation “by American evangelicals at the grassroots level.” Evangelicals at the grassroots are not driving Trump’s decision on this issue, and they are unlikely to base their support for Trump’s reelection on what he does on it.

The same could be said about the upcoming 2020 election more generally. It’s improbable that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will play a major role, given everything else that Americans now face. The main story is to be found in the attitudes of Democrats. The strong opposition to annexation, and the pervasive sense that Trump’s plan is too favorable to Israel, adds to other recent findings suggesting a shift taking place — one that could be solidified by Israeli annexation of West Bank territories. In an October poll for example, we found that 66% of Democrats back sanctions or stronger measures against Israeli settlements; in a March poll, we found that 81% of Democrats say it’s “acceptable” or even the “duty” of members of Congress to question the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Recent Democratic primaries may point to the consequences: In New York’s 16th District, progressive candidate Jamaal Bowman apparently unseated long-time Congressman Elliot Engel, who has been one of the most reliable supporters of Israel in Congress. One remarkable thing about that race is that Bowman made an issue of Engel’s support for Israel and his lack of support for Palestinian rights. Polling suggests annexation will likely energize Democratic critics of Israel further.

       

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, reportedly told U.S. lawmakers last week they’re “free to criticize Israel’s looming annexation plans — just as long as the criticism stops there.” Why would AIPAC send such a message about the controversial annexation of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank — and what does it say about the changing public conversation about the U.S. relationship with Israel?

This could be a preemptive AIPAC move, to avoid looking weak should Congress start to criticize Israel’s annexation plans, as some members have already done. The partisan divide between Democrats and Republicans on Israel policy has expanded in recent years. New House members since the 2018 midterm election have been more openly critical of Israeli policy, while counter-voices in Congress have argued that “questioning support for the U.S.-Israel relationship is unacceptable.”

But Israel will likely reveal its annexation plan as early as July 1, leaving few options for U.S. politicians to sit on the fence. Do Americans think that questioning the American relationship with Israel is unacceptable? Our recent University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll asked this important question.

Here’s what we found: 67 percent of respondents in our survey said either that it is “acceptable” to question the Israeli-American relationship, or that it’s the “duty” of members of Congress to do so. Among Democrats, that number was an overwhelming 81 percent, but a majority of Republicans also agreed. What does this mean?

Here’s how we conducted this survey

Our March 12-20 online survey polled a nationally representative sample of 2,395 respondents. We asked: “In the midterm election, several members of the House of Representatives were elected who have been vocally critical of Israeli government policies and of American support for Israel. Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with their specific criticism, or whether or not you back American support for Israel, tell me which of the following is closer to your view?” Participants picked one of four randomized responses.

Overall, 9 percent said it’s “unacceptable” for members of Congress to question the Israeli-American relationship — this figure reflects 12 percent of Republicans, 6 percent of Democrats and 9 percent of independents in our sample. And 19 percent said it is the “duty” of members of Congress to defend the relationship — that’s what 32 percent of Republicans, 12 percent of independents and 9 percent of Democrats said.

So the net result is that 28 percent of Americans feel that it’s unacceptable to question the U.S.-Israeli relationship or that members of Congress have a duty as members to defend the relationship. That’s a strikingly small number, given the historic reluctance of Congress to voice criticism of Israeli policies, and “for decades, it was seen as too politically risky” for members to raise questions about the Israeli-American relationship.

Do Americans favor closer scrutiny of U.S.-Israeli relations? Overall, 43 percent said it was “acceptable” for a member of Congress to question the relationship: That total broke down into 46 percent of Democrats, 42 percent of Republicans and 39 percent of independents in our survey. And 24 percent overall said it was the “duty” of members of Congress to question the relationship — 35 percent of Democrats, 29 percent of independents and 11 percent of Republicans felt this way.

This suggests two-thirds of Americans, including majorities of Democrats, Republicans and independents, say it’s either “acceptable” or even the “duty” of members of Congress to question the relationship. Since our polls have not probed this question in prior years, we don’t have an accurate way to measure how U.S. attitudes may have changed over time. But given the increased polarization of views on issues related to Israel, it’s striking that majorities across the partisan divide now appear open to questioning the Israeli-American relationship.

On many issues, including Israel, political lobbying and campaign contributions frequently don’t reflect public opinion. Of course, public opinion is always a factor in democratic politics, but the opinion of the “issue public” — or those segments of the public who rank an issue high in their priorities — matters most. Americans have indicated their desire for neutrality in U.S. diplomacy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — but those who ranked this issue high in their priorities generally tended to favor Israel’s position more.

So, are people who rank this issue higher in their priorities likely to insist that Congress avoid criticizing the bilateral relationship? Not really. The survey found some differences in the views of those who ranked the Israeli-Palestinian issue among their top five priorities, but without changing the basic results: 10 percent said questioning the relationship was unacceptable; 23 percent said it’s a duty to defend the Israeli-American relationship; 40 percent said it’s acceptable to question the relationship; and 24 percent said members of Congress had a duty to question the relationship.

Those differences with the overall survey findings do not suggest that the issue public is interested in stifling debate on Israel’s policies. The survey findings generally align with previous polls showing that Israeli-Palestinian tensions had become part of the intensifying values struggle in America, with Israel increasingly sitting outside the Democrats’ values universe.

Democratic constituents, especially, seem to embrace openness, even desire, to question the Israeli-American relationship. Presidential candidates appeared to reflect this public sentiment during the Democratic primaries: Sen. Bernie Sanders suggested using aid to Israel as a lever to influence Israeli government policy. Joe Biden opposed linking aid to Israel with protests over Israeli policies, but gave a clear criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying, “Bibi Netanyahu and I know one another well. He knows that I think what he’s doing is outrageous.”

It’s not likely that the Israeli-American relationship will be high on the overall priorities of U.S. voters, as November’s elections may be more about identity and partisanship. But the partisan divide on Israel could emerge as a tempting line of attack for Republicans, especially if Israel policy enters the political conversation at the upcoming Democratic Convention. This poll’s findings suggest that attacks on the legitimacy of criticizing Israel may fall flat — if not be helpful to Democratic candidates.

       

As the Trump administration finally released its long-touted Middle East plan, it orchestrated selective briefings to minimize early criticism and to set a tone of acceptance — including limited, controlled briefings of diplomats and congressional leaders. The result initially muted opposition, allowing administration officials to claim widespread support, and paint the Palestinians as isolated in their rejection.

First daughter Ivanka Trump retweeted a tweet suggesting that only Iran and the Palestinians opposed the plan. It seemed like a clever tactic to control the narrative early, but reality has a way of catching up, and in this case, it happened quickly. The damage done by the spin will be measurable, but not nearly as serious as the principles anchoring the plan.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi issued a mild statement following a two-page briefing on the 181-page document. But one-quarter of Democrats in the Senate — including three presidential candidates — fired off a letter to President Trump blasting the “one-sided” plan that “violates the Palestinians’ right to self-determination.”

After the Palestinians shared and analyzed the full details of the plan with Arab foreign ministers at an emergency meeting of the Arab League, they unanimously and unambiguously rejected it. Noting that the plan would lead to “apartheid” instead of to two states, the Arab League chief went on to say: “In all honesty, we didn’t expect that the proposed end of the road would be as disappointing and unfair as it is, although the signals have been there.” Following the Arab League step, and a meeting in Saudi Arabia, the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation also unanimously rejected the plan; even if this rejection is partly meant for public consumption, it’s indicative of how Arab governments read the pervasive public sentiment.

Mistrust of the Trump team has been high to begin with, especially among the Arab public, but this episode is likely to lead to resentment even among allied rulers. The plan itself — the fact that the offered “state” is not a state at all, but a fragmented entity that includes about 60% of the West Bank, with no control over territorial water, air, borders, security, or alliances — furthers the resentment.

But the roots are much deeper. They go to mistrust of the plan’s authors, their actions, and the stated principles underpinning their approach.

The fact that the plan was mostly crafted by President Trump’s son-in-law and former real estate developer Jared Kushner and U.S. Ambassador to Israel (and Trump’s former bankruptcy lawyer) David Friedman was worrisome to Palestinians from the outset, because of their known positions. Friedman was a known booster and fundraiser for Israeli settlements, and Kushner’s family foundation, which he co-directed, donated to settlements and had bragging rights that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had once slept in his own bedroom, as a visiting family friend. Their behavior since has confirmed the concerns: They moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem long before they released their plan — assuring a Palestinian boycott of talks — and cut off aid to Palestinians, which has hurt many ordinary people. The claim that the plan has the Palestinian people’s interests in mind is thus received in the Arab world as a cruel joke.

The most worrisome aspect, however, is the key principle the Trump team touts to underpin its conclusion: The need to ignore the past in crafting its terms. There are three far-reaching implications.

Put aside for a moment the long and painful history of the conflict and consider the immediate issue of Israeli settlements, internationally regarded as illegal: Palestinians are told they now should not only live with them as reality, but also live with applying Israeli sovereignty to them. This principle thus rewards and encourages violations of international law — a troubling position to project globally. Imagine saying to Ukraine: “Get over it, the Russians already control your territory, so let’s forget history and start from there.”

The Trump team invokes the existing asymmetry of power favoring Israel in framing its plan. But as I argued last May, the current level of asymmetry is in large part one of America’s doing over the years: The U.S. mediated and paid for peace between Israel and Egypt, thus taking the biggest Arab army out of the equation; protected Israeli settlements from international consequences by often employing the veto at the United Nations; and uniquely provided Israel with the technological edge to maintain military superiority in the region. It was often suggested that in making Israel more secure, these measures make Israel more willing to compromise; instead, the opposite has happened. Now, the Trump team not only wants to legitimize the resulting “reality,” but also to apply the weight of American power to further the asymmetry, and to bestow sovereignty over land that is not its own on Israel. Disturbingly, Washington also contemplates the transfer of Israeli towns with a quarter-million Arab citizens to Palestinian control — something they oppose — just because of their ethnicity.

Finally, the only history that underpins the Trump plan seems to be the biblical narrative of history — something that’s profoundly troubling. Trump officials, especially Friedman, have frequently invoked the Bible in framing U.S. policy toward the West Bank and Jerusalem. Religious narratives of all sides are important and must be respected. But to employ a religious narrative of history as a basis for political sovereignty is not only wrong, it’s dangerous. It helps define the conflict in zero-sum religious terms, planting the seeds of unending confrontations ahead.

Today, Israel is dominant, Palestinians are weak, and Arab states are distracted. The Palestinians will surely resist, and Arab public opinion will remain decidedly on their side, regardless of what their governments do. Israel may assess that, with Washington’s help, it can bear the cost, and keep the regional reaction “manageable” — an open question. Regardless, this will come at a cost for Washington: America will find itself championing Israeli repression of Palestinians and on the wrong side of international law and norms. And, in attempting to limit the Arab reaction, it will also find itself increasingly backing Arab governments’ repression of their own people. Is this what America stands for?

       

The Washington Post’s recently published Afghanistan Papers project revealed a purposeful effort, by both Democratic and Republican administrations, to mislead the American public on the harsh realities of the war in Afghanistan. This fall, we asked a nationally representative sample of Americans, as part of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, what exactly they thought of the state of America’s longest war.

The survey was carried out October 4-10, 2019, online among a nationally representative sample of 1,260 respondents from Nielsen Scarborough’s probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The margin of error is +/- 2.76 percentage points. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division and political party affiliation.

Here is what we found: Despite Americans’ hesitancy to deploy U.S. troops into other conflicts, they remain comparably supportive, after 18 years of war, of maintaining the U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan.

Little polarization on Afghanistan

At a time of deep partisan polarization on nearly every issue, there is little on Afghanistan. Take, for example, Americans’ preference on U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. Among Democrats, 38% favored maintaining current troop levels in Afghanistan, compared with 34% of Republicans. Twenty-three percent of Republicans and 21% of Democrats favored decreasing troop levels.

Compare this to the question we asked on the U.S. withdrawal from northern Syria. Attitudes were set along party lines, and the partisan gulf was far wider — 66% of Democrats opposed the move, while only 23% of Republicans did (a 43 percentage point difference).

Even when partisan disparities occur on policy preferences related to the war in Afghanistan, they generally do not appear severe enough to constitute polarization. Republicans (63%) were 23 percentage points more likely than Democrats (40%) to disagree with the idea that the United States has a responsibility to ensure that Afghanistan has a liberal democratic government. Despite the difference, however, taking no responsibility for Afghanistan’s democracy was the most popular response for both Republicans and Democrats, with only 22% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats agreeing that the United States should ensure that Afghanistan has a liberal democracy.

This lack of deep polarization on Afghan issues may be a function not only of relative consistency across Republican and Democratic administrations, but also of the almost universal congressional support for the war when it was initiated after the 9/11 attacks.

Public supportive of staying the course

The American public is relatively conservative on troop presence in Afghanistan. A plurality of respondents favored maintaining current troop levels (34%). Regardless of the wisdom of the initial intervention, a plurality of respondents (44%) also felt that the United States has an obligation toward the Afghan government and segments of Afghan society affected by the war.

Among those respondents, nearly one-third (30%), including 28% of Democrats, felt that responsibility should take the form of a limited military role. Compare this to the opposition that respondents showed to potential military options with Iran. Only 20% of respondents felt that the United States should be prepared to go to war with Iran, versus 76% who felt the goals of U.S. policy didn’t warrant waging war.

In September, an attack blamed on Iran involving drones and missiles hit Saudi Arabian oil fields. Respondents were asked whether the U.S. should consider military action if sufficient evidence of Iranian involvement were produced, and only 32% of Americans said “yes,” while 66% said military action would not be warranted.

Trump not having a huge impact on public opinion on Afghanistan

President Trump’s policy toward Afghanistan included negotiating with the Taliban (off and on) to end the war. We found respondents were divided on negotiating with the Taliban, with 42% supporting and 41% opposing. Typically, we would expect Republicans’ opinion to fall in line with Trump’s stated aims. However, Republican respondents were still nine percentage points more likely to disagree (49%) than agree (40%) with negotiations. Likewise, we noted the lack of a shift among Democrats to oppose the president. Republican respondents were 14 percentage points more likely to disagree than Democrats (35%).

Last year, the president revealed that a peace summit had been scheduled with the Taliban at Camp David — for Sept. 8 — but ultimately canceled. When asked to respond to plans for the summit, 82% of respondents expressed criticism of the summit for either hosting the Taliban on U.S. soil, signing an agreement with the group in general, or hosting the summit so close to an anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. These critical respondents included 83% of Democrats and 79% of Republicans, a highly unusual show of disapproval about the summit.

In short, Americans displayed views that were uncharacteristically supportive of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan given trends in public opinion on other conflicts. These views were not affected by party- and Trump-based polarization in the same way as other issues of interest. While it is difficult to discern whether our poll results are directly related to the effect of the deliberate policies of Republican and Democratic administrations revealed by The Post, there is much in the findings to suggest a connection.

       

Even as Americans are preoccupied with the impeachment process and a raft of other news developments, the issue of U.S. policy toward Israel has not escaped our national debate as of late. President Trump’s December executive order on anti-Semitism, which some saw as an attempt to limit free speech on Israel policy, followed a July resolution in the House of Representatives that directly addressed the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Although BDS had not been on most Americans’ radar screens, it has suddenly become a subject of more mainstream conversation. How much do Americans know about BDS and what do they think about it? Does it matter for the American political process? The newest University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll provides some answers.

First, some context about American public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most important change taking place in American public attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past decade has been increased partisanship on an issue that had historically escaped a high level of partisanship. In my 30 years of conducting public opinion polls on this issue, it has always been the case that a large majority of Americans, around two-thirds, wanted the U.S. to take neither side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That has not changed. What has changed over the past decade has been that Republicans have expressed increased desire for the U.S. to take Israel’s side instead of being neutral, with our recent polls showing a slight majority of Republicans choosing that option. In contrast, more and more Democrats (recently over 80%) have supported neutrality, with those wanting the U.S. to take sides roughly evenly divided between wanting to take the Palestinians’ side and wanting to take Israel’s.

When I started observing these trends during the Obama administration, I also noted that the gap between elected Democrats and their constituents on this issue was increasing, with constituents growing more critical of Israel than politicians. I have wondered if this gap would be sustained.

An area where we have seen increased polarization has been preparedness to take action against Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank. For a few years now, the polls have consistently shown a majority of Democrats wanting to take action against Israeli settlements, including imposing sanctions, while Republicans and independents wanted to do nothing or limit opposition to words. But until this fall, I had not asked directly about the BDS movement, as it was not on the radar screen of most Americans. However, the recent debates in Congress and elsewhere have raised the profile of the issue.

In October,* our University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll included questions about BDS, starting with a probing question to determine the extent to which respondents had heard of the movement: “How much have you heard about BDS, or the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement aimed at Israel?”

Nearly half of respondents (49%) said they have heard about BDS at least “a little.”

Among those who said they have heard of the movement, we then asked:

A majority of respondents, including a large majority of Republicans, said they opposed the movement. But the story was different among Democrats, who said they had heard at least “a little” about the movement: A plurality, 48%, said they supported the movement, while only 15% said they opposed it.

Given that those who said they had heard “a little” about BDS are likely less informed about the movement than those who said they had heard “a good amount” or “a great deal,” we probed the better-informed respondents further. I found that a majority of the 16% of Democrats who said they had heard “a good amount” or “a great deal” about BDS supported it (66%), compared with 37% among those who said they heard just “a little.”

The respondents then were presented with two typical arguments from the public discourse for and against BDS to probe the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with these arguments, knowing that some respondents can agree/disagree with both simultaneously. We found that overall, 36% said they agreed with the argument “BDS is a legitimate, peaceful way of opposing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Inspired by the South African anti-apartheid movement, BDS urges action to pressure Israel to comply with international law. Opposing Israeli policy does not equal anti-Semitism” and 43% disagreed; among Republicans, 69% disagreed, while among Democrats only 13% disagreed. At the same time, 49% said they agreed with the argument against BDS — “Regardless of how BDS defines itself, it is an anti-Israel organization attempting to weaken Israel and to undermine its legitimacy. Some of its supporters are opponents of Israel’s very existence and may even be anti-Semitic” — and 26% disagreed.

After giving respondents the chance to evaluate each argument independently, they were then asked: “Now tell me, which of the following is closer to your view?” Here, the partisan divide was clear: While a majority of Democrats (77%) said the argument for BDS was closest to their views, a large majority of Republicans (85%) agreed with the argument opposing BDS; independents were divided.

Independently from the BDS questions, all respondents were presented with a question probing moves to pass laws opposing boycotts of Israel:

On this issue, respondents appear to transcend the public divide, regardless of their views on BDS or boycotts of Israel broadly: Majorities of Democrats (80%), Republicans (62%), and independents (76%) indicate opposition to such laws, principally over the fact that these laws infringe on the constitutional right to free speech and peaceful protest.

DOES THIS MATTER FOR THE U.S. ELECTION?

As Jon Krosnick and I suggested in a 1995 article, the segments of the public that matter most for the electoral process and elections are those segments that rank the particular issue in question high in their priorities. Over the years, I have thus probed how respondents rank the Arab-Israeli issue in their priorities. Over the past quarter-century, it has been the case that, while a majority of Americans favored U.S. neutrality on this issue, those who ranked the issue among their top priorities tended to favor Israel more. Has this equation changed?

In a September poll,** we found that, overall, while 60% of respondents wanted the U.S. to take neither side in the conflict, 52% of those who ranked the issue among the top three issues in their priorities wanted to take Israel’s side, compared to 35% of those who ranked the issue among the top five, and 23% among those who didn’t rank the issue among the top five. But the bigger story here is to be found in the attitude of Democrats.

Among Democrats who rank the issue first or top three, a large majority (62%) still want the U.S. to take neither side in the conflict, but this is lower than the 80% of all Democrats who want to take neither side. As for leaning toward Israel or the Palestinians, ranking the issue higher increases the chance that Democrats will want to take Israel’s or the Palestinians’ sides almost equally:

The bottom line is that Democrats want U.S. even-handedness on this issue, even among those who rank the issue high in their priorities. And on specific policy issues, such as sanctions on settlements, BDS, and opposing laws prohibiting sanctions against Israel, they have strong views. Will these views matter, at least in the Democratic primaries?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is hardly a central issue in American elections, and certainly not in the 2020 presidential race, where the stakes are so high on matters that are at the core of the American political system and the future of the country. It’s improbable that a significant number of people will base their votes (or financial contributions) principally on the candidate’s position on this issue. But there are other ways in which public opinion on this issue among Democrats matters.

Candidates who reflect public opinion more are likely to energize their supporters more, and those who take a position that’s substantially at odds with public opinion may lose credibility and appear less authentic. Among Democrats, positions on Israel-Palestine may have become part of a candidate’s authenticity check, either discounting them in the public’s mind or enhancing their stature. This is unlikely to include positions on BDS specifically, but issues like tying aid to Israel to its policy toward the Palestinians have already made their way into the Democratic campaign debates. Arguably, Bernie Sanders speaking publicly in favor of Palestinian rights (as well as Israelis’) during the 2016 election campaign helped his credibility among supporters and energized his base. He is following a similar pattern this time around, as are several other candidates. Joe Biden, on the other hand, has chosen a different path, criticizing Sanders on this issue by saying, “In terms of Bernie and others who talk about dealing with Zionism, I strongly support Israel as an independent Jewish state.” Notably, in the Democratic debate after his criticism of Sanders, Biden seemed to go out of his way to criticize Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying, “Bibi Netanyahu and I know one another well. He knows that I think what he’s doing is outrageous.” The outcome of the primaries will hardly be determined by the candidates’ position on this issue, but those who stand to embrace the public’s sentiment stand to gain more, and those contradicting it risk having their authenticity questioned.

* The survey was carried out October 4-10, 2019 online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough’s probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The poll was conducted among a national poll of 1,260 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.76%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation

** The survey was carried out September 3-20, 2019 online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough’s probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The poll was conducted among a national poll of 3,016 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 1.78%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans.  The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation

       

In a drone strike authorized by President Trump early Friday, Iranian commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who led the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, was killed at Baghdad International Airport. Below, Brookings experts provide their brief analyses on this watershed moment for the Middle East — including what it means for U.S.-Iran relations, for America’s overall position in the Middle East, and more.

Madiha Afzal (@MadihaAfzal), David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and the Center for Middle East Policy: What worries me is how much (or little) thought was put into this decision by the Trump administration — and the connection of the strike with it being a re-election year, Trump’s obsession with Barack Obama (and Obama’s killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011), and the beating of war drums to drive American nationalism and distract from his domestic political troubles. This doesn’t require a colorful imagination: In 2011, Trump repeatedly said that Obama would go to war with Iran to get re-elected. Obama obviously didn’t, and the big difference between this strike and the decision that Obama did take in 2011, his bin Laden raid in Pakistan, is that it killed the world’s then-deadliest terrorist and beheaded his organization. And it embarrassed the country that he was found in. It was as clean a decision as a commander-in-chief could have made. Soleimani’s killing, on the other hand, is remarkably messy, because — rightly reviled as he was by many — he represented Iran’s military, and Iran will see this as an action of war. And there will be some form of retaliation. In the end, Trump may end up endangering more American lives through this strike, not fewer.

Ranj Alaaldin (@RanjAlaaldin), Visiting Fellow in the Brookings Doha Center and Director of the Proxy Wars Initiative: Soleimani’s assassination represents a tectonic shift in U.S. policy in Iraq. The complexities of Iraqi politics, the failures of the reconstruction process, and the state-building process in the country more generally has been particularly kind to Shia militia groups, which have thrived as a result of the state’s fragility and a fractious political landscape. The U.S. commitment to defeating terrorist groups like ISIS and its commitment to developing Iraqi state institutions has been tolerant of these groups, premised on the idea that the use of force will do little to rid Iraq of these actors and that it is instead stronger institutions and a functioning Iraqi state with a respected and professionalized military that will eventually suppress Iran’s proxies.

But it is now becoming apparent that the U.S., under the current administration, no longer has the appetite to expend greater resources, time, and indeed American lives for a state-building project that has yielded very limited returns, despite all the U.S. blood and treasure invested in recent years. The immediate implications of this proactive policy aimed at pre-emptively eliminating Iran’s proxies will be felt in Iraq before anywhere else, where we will see a consolidation of power and influence by Iran-aligned actors. There is now unlikely to be any serious prospect of achieving good governance and reform in Iraq, and we may be witnessing the end of Iraq’s fragile democracy.  Soleimani’s assassination represents the death knell of the civilian-led reform movement that has gripped the country in recent months.

Daniel Byman (@dbyman), Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy: As I write in more detail elsewhere, the killing of Soleimani, the long-time head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is likely to prove a watershed in Washington’s relations with Iraq and Iran and will substantially affect the overall U.S. position in the Middle East. The blowback may be huge, and much depends on how well prepared the United States is for Iran’s response and that of its many proxies in the Middle East.

Based on the Trump administration’s record in the region, there is reason to be worried.

It’s hard to overstate Soleimani’s influence. Because Iran’s conventional forces are weak, Tehran often works through militias, terrorist groups, and other proxies to advance its interests abroad. The IRGC takes the lead for many of these operations. In Iraq, and in other countries where Iran plays both a military and political role — such as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, as well as with the Palestinians — the IRGC is often the dominant actor in Iran’s foreign policy, or at least an important voice.

In April, the Trump administration took the unusual step of officially designating the IRGC as a terrorist group even though it is an arm of the Iranian state, and thus not a non-state actor, unlike most of the entities on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations.

Soleimani has been the architect of many of Iran’s most contentious foreign policy issues, and he and the IRGC-QF are responsible for the deaths of many Americans.

The Quds Force, with perhaps between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters in its organization, provides training, weapons, organizational guidance, and other support to a range of pro-Iran groups.

The IRGC, with the Quds Force in the lead, is the key Iranian liaison with the Lebanese Hezbollah, the strongest paramilitary organization in Lebanon — and one that has attacked Israel and the U.S. at Iran’s behest. The Quds Force also works with Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, among other nefarious organizations in other countries. When the United States clashed with pro-Iran forces in Iraq, the Quds Force made them far more deadly, providing them after 2005 with sophisticated explosives that could penetrate U.S. armored vehicles, killing almost 200 Americans.

Having been at the helm of the Quds Force since 1998, Soleimani has cultivated a power network in Iran itself and through the IRGC’s many proxies. He is a symbol of Iran’s power, prestige, and reach.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (@AFathollahNejad), Visiting Fellow in the Brookings Doha Center: Through the target killing of Soleimani, Iran’s notorious commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and the personification of the Islamic Republic’s regional policies — along with Iran’s main military man in Iraq, Abu-Mahdi Muhandis — the U.S. has effectively clipped the wings of Iran’s quite successful expansionist regional policies. The Supreme Leader, meanwhile, was forced to descend to a lower level: For the first time ever, he attended a meeting (an emergency one at this point) of the Supreme National Security Council. Thus, the rulers in the Islamic Republic, for understandable reasons, are in a state of shock.

For Tehran to save face, this dramatic U.S. operation demands some urgency to retaliate. However, Tehran doesn’t have any good options — and it knows that. A full-blown war with the U.S. could jeopardize regime survival, and an escalation in the Persian Gulf will deprive Iran of what remains from its decimated oil income. Yet, in Iraq and in Lebanon, there might be chances of some sort of retaliation. In any case, the Pandora’s box has been opened.

Meanwhile, as much as Soleimani was widely revered in Iran as a genius operator, his killing has been a cause of celebration on Iraqi streets and among Syrians, where he is loathed as a chief architect for bringing death and destruction to their homelands.

Jeffrey Feltman, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy: While little noticed at the time, Soleimani had a cameo role in a controversial U.N. report in December — as he had in previous reports. On December 10, 2019, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres submitted to the Security Council his eighth report on implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), the codification into international law of the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) and related measures. Given great power divisions, the report tiptoed carefully around the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iranian violations of Resolution 2231, and questions surrounding ballistic missiles. Also under 2231, which was adopted unanimously and passed under Chapter VII (i.e. with the powers of enforcement) of the U.N. Charter, the Council banned Soleimani from any travel outside of Iran.

With self-incriminating “selfies” taken on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, and with glowing articles about his role in Iranian, Syrian, and Iraqi media, each 2231 report noted Soleimani’s blatant (but not surprising) disregard for the travel ban. In December, in the dry bureaucratic language characteristic of such reports, Guterres obliquely fingered Iraq for not enforcing that ban. In paragraph 14 of his December report, Guterres noted the following: “Information from Iraqi media outlets suggests that Major General Soleimani has undertaken travel inconsistent with the travel ban provisions of the resolution. I call upon all Member States to diligently implement the restrictive measures imposed on the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231.” A more direct reference followed in paragraph 38: “During the reporting period, information surfaced regarding additional travel by Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, he traveled a number of times to Baghdad in October 2019. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq, and I will report to the Council in due course.”

Tanvi Madan (@tanvi_madan), Director of the India Project and Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy: As I write in more detail elsewhere, India’s reaction to the killing of Soleimani came in a carefully worded statement. India will have serious concerns about further escalation. It has vital interests in the Middle East. In the Gulf region alone, India has 8.5 million citizens. This region is a significant source of Indian oil and gas imports (India imports the majority of the oil it consumes), as well as a growing source of investment in the Indian economy. Delhi has also hoped that this region will serve as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, including through the Iranian port of Chabahar that it is helping develop — and for which it has received a U.S. sanctions exemption. Moreover, parties in this region not only affect developments with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also India’s counterterrorism concerns.

Any U.S.-Iran escalation will complicate these Indian interests. Delhi will be anxious about potential spillover, not just in the broader Middle East, but also elsewhere (depending on the nature of any Iranian retaliation).  If the situation deteriorates further, it could also have implications for India’s equities with Iran and the U.S. To protect these interests, Delhi has walked a tightrope in balancing its relationships with Washington and Tehran (as well as countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel). But any significant escalation could put India under pressure to make choices it does not want to make.

Suzanne Maloney (@MaloneySuzanne), Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy:

As I wrote in the Washington Post today, the long, shape-shifting shadow war between the United States and Iran’s Islamic Republic has taken a pivotal turn with the death of Soleimani, an infamous and iconic Iranian military commander. By killing the architect of Iran’s expanded influence across the Middle East, the Trump administration has escalated simmering tensions with Tehran from an economic onslaught to an act of war that is likely to instigate a dangerous and unpredictable Iranian backlash.

The Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guard have a deep bench of experienced commanders who can assume Soleimani’s responsibilities, and the quick elevation of Soleimani’s long-time deputy, Esmail Qaani, to replace him is meant to reinforce the continuation of business as usual. The Islamic Republic’s endurance three decades after the death of its charismatic founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, is a testament to its insulation against reliance on any single individual.

There’s little evidence that the Trump administration has mapped out a strategy for managing such a protracted, unpredictable confrontation with Tehran. Soleimani’s death on what has effectively become his home turf in post-Saddam Iraq — alongside a key Iraqi partner — and the capture of leaders of the most powerful pro-Iranian militias in the country has dire implications for U.S. presence there. The strike also leaves the government in Baghdad, already debilitated by months of protests over corruption and Iranian influence, in an even more precarious position. Is there a plan for managing the fallout in Iraq, beyond the hasty call for Americans to flee the country?

The Trump administration would be wise to avoid any precipitous victory laps. There are simply no easy solutions to the challenges posed by Iran. Soleimani’s death will almost inevitably degrade the environment for American interests and allies in the region significantly. Neither Trump nor Tehran may really want a war, but each side has proven unwilling or incapable of detouring from a path that will almost inexorably precipitate a much wider and more costly conflict.

Michael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOHanlon), Senior Fellow and Director of Research for Brookings Foreign Policy: As I write in more detail elsewhere, I find it hard to oppose the Trump administration’s decision to target and kill Soleimani. In effect, as my colleagues Dan Byman, Suzanne Maloney, and Bruce Riedel among others have explained, he was the most important military leader in Iran and perhaps the country’s second most powerful leader overall. Soleimani’s machinations had led to the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq (since the Quds force funneled explosively-formed penetrator devices and other technologies to the militias and insurgents that were fighting us there during much of the 2000s and beyond). Killing him was more akin to shooting down the plane of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto in World War II than attacking a civilian leader.

Iran’s lack of restraint in killing Americans also removed one major argument against political assassination in general — the fear of legitimating a form of attack that will then be used against our own country or citizens. While there is clearly a heightened fear of retaliation at this juncture, it was Soleimani, not America, that crossed the assassination threshold first and often — attacking Americans (and others) with abandon. He succeeded earlier Iranian leaders who had done equally heinous things against Americans in Beirut in 1983 and at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia in 1996. America’s history towards Iran is checkered, to be sure, in our support for the Shah before 1979, and in our support for Saddam (at times) during the Iran-Iraq war. But over the last 30 years especially, it is Iran that has used lethal force against us much more than the reverse. And for the last 22 years, Soleimani was the chief plotter and mastermind in much of this. Given the believable intelligence reports that he was planning additional attacks against U.S. assets and personnel in Iraq, and given his central role over the years in many similar atrocities, I cannot object to this U.S. action.

The most pressing matter now is preserving, if at all possible, the U.S. military partnership with Iraq. If we are thrown out of Iraq by that country’s parliament as a result of this action, it will be a net win for Iran, since there will no longer be a balancing foreign power with comparable clout inside the country. It will also leave Iraq more vulnerable to further sectarian strife and/or ISIS and al-Qaida attack. America’s 5,000 troops have played important roles in training, providing air power, providing intelligence, and playing a role of political honest broker that has helped Iraqis of different sectarian groups work together. It may be too late to salvage our role, and our presence, in Iraq. But we should try. Most of all, we should be willing to accept certain restrictions on any future U.S. uses of force within Iraq itself.

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence: Saudi Arabia is undoubtedly pleased to see its nemesis Iran lose its top commander and best strategist. Soleimani was active in supporting the Houthis against the Saudi kingdom and probably played a key role in the attack last September, which gravely damaged the Abqaiq oil facility. Publicly, the Saudis have called for restraint by all parties.

Inside the royal palace, there is grave concern about what comes next: Where, when, and how will Iran retaliate? The Iranians will certainly seek the ouster of the American presence in Iraq. If they succeed, then the Saudi presence there is also unsustainable. Iran will have consolidated its influence on the kingdom’s northern border. Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates will join the Saudis in nervous apprehension.

In the south, the Saudis have been de-escalating the war with the Houthis. Saudi air strikes have all but stopped, and Houthi drone and missile attacks have halted. Will Tehran now press the Houthis to change course? Late last month, the Houthis unexpectedly threatened a wave of new attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE worse than the Abqaiq attack.

The Saudis also have an internal Shia problem. They remember that the Iranians were behind the deadly 1995 attack on the Americans barracks at the Khobar Towers, working with Saudi Shia and also Hezbollah. For Riyadh, like the rest of the region, it’s a time for acute anxiety.

Shibley Telhami (@ShibleyTelhami), Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy: As a Washington Post editorial put it in addressing the crisis in Iraq, even before the death of Soleimani, President Trump “got himself into this mess by withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, despite U.N. certifications of Iranian compliance, and launching a massive sanctions campaign that has badly damaged the Iranian economy.” This has set up an impossible situation: Iran could not afford to accept the costs of the administration’s “maximum pressure,” and was bound to keep making the status quo uncomfortable for the United States. And the Trump administration would consequently feel it must respond, but is restrained only by Trump’s seeming instinct to avoid escalation that could lead to possible war with Iran. Add to this the hawkish advisers and regional actors who wouldn’t mind escalation with Iran, and the concern from the outset has been one of slippery slope. What may seem to the president (or to Iran’s leadership) as a limited response to the other’s action may turn out to be more than the other side could tolerate, either strategically or politically, which could set in motion rapid escalation.

It’s not that Iran is likely to go out of its way to escalate; full military confrontation is not in its interest. But Soleimani has been the face of Iran’s policy in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. He has faithful allies who may not be fully under the control of Iran’s leaders. And Iranian leaders themselves, who feel they are already at war given the economic war waged against them, have much at stake with the death of one of the their most influential generals — a symbol of their regional clout. Even Trump’s seemingly steadfast aversion to escalation may not be enough this time around. And even if the day is saved by extraordinary restraint, the very contradictions set in motion by Trump’s early actions on the Iran nuclear deal and expanded sanctions, coupled with Iran’s own contradictions, ensure more crisis ahead.

Tamara Wittes (@tcwittes), Senior Fellow in the Center on Middle East Policy: Was the Trump administration right to decide that taking out Soleimani is worth the escalatory risk? I don’t know — and there are two specific pieces of information I’d need to help me decide.

The first is what intelligence information the administration had to justify its assertion that the assassination prevented an imminent attack. Soleimani has been involved in targeting American personnel, facilities, and interests for many years, and Iran-linked militias have been sending missiles into Iraqi bases hosting Americans for over a month. So why the need for imminent self-defense at this moment, in this location? On what basis does the administration assess that killing Soleimani will actually prevent a specific attack? This information will matter to the Iraqi government as it determines whether it can swallow such a frontal assault on its sovereignty. It will matter to U.S. allies and partners left blindsided, again, by American action. And members of Congress will be asking these questions as they consider whether to grant the president any additional authority to use force against Iran. The president’s claim of imminent self-defense allows him to justify this assassination under his inherent Article II authority; but should the U.S. and Iran enter an escalatory spiral, it’s unlikely that claim will be unexamined for long.

The second, and in many ways more important unknown is: What’s the administration’s strategic objective in its confrontation with Iran? What does it think this assassination will achieve, beyond relieving the claimed immediate threat? At various points, the Trump administration has put forward widely divergent objectives in its pressure campaign on Iran, including regime change, leverage for renewed negotiations, and deterrence against additional Iranian troublemaking. Does the Trump administration think Soleimani’s death will eviscerate Iran’s expeditionary capabilities in the region? Does it believe the loss of Soleimani will topple an already weakened Iranian government? Does it believe this devastating blow will induce Iran to sue for peace on terms favorable to Washington? Or, as some have suggested, is this blow meant to be a farewell move by the Trump administration before withdrawing from Iraq and Syria — effectively saying to Israel and Arab states: “We’ve killed your ‘big bad,’ now we are out of here.”

Without clarity on American objectives, it will be very difficult for regional and international partners to do other than hedge against a worst-case scenario of wider U.S.-Iran confrontation. And without clarity on American objectives, the Iranians will have little to weigh against their threat perception and desire for revenge.

       

U.S. airstrikes in Iraq on December 29 — in response to the killing of an American contractor two days prior — killed two dozen members of the Iranian-backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah. In the days since, thousands of pro-Iranian demonstrators gathered outside the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, with some forcing their way into the embassy compound and setting some of the outbuildings on fire. Below, Brookings experts analyze the Trump administration’s decision to retaliate against Kata’ib Hezbollah and what it means for U.S.-Iraq relations, Iran’s influence in Iraq, Iraqis’ attitudes towards the United States and Iran, and more.

Ranj Alaaldin (@RanjAlaaldin), Visiting Fellow in the Brookings Doha Center and Director of the Proxy Wars Initiative: U.S.-Iran tensions have manifested themselves on Iraqi soil for a number of years. During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, in particular, American forces regularly targeted Shiite militias, and Iranian proxies launched some of their most audacious and brazen attacks on U.S. and other Western personnel. Kata’ib Hezbollah has long troubled the U.S. and Iraqi governments and has been at the forefront of efforts to violently suppress the civilian-led protests that have gripped Iraq in recent months, efforts that have killed and wounded thousands of civilians. Part of the challenge for Washington is that it still lacks a political strategy that allows it to leverage its military superiority over Iran and its Iraqi proxies, one that empowers U.S.-aligned groups in Iraq that have long desperately pleaded for a more assertive American presence in the country.

There are serious questions that have to be addressed in Washington and Baghdad: How is the U.S. working with its allies in Iraq to push back against Iran’s influence? Why did the Iraqi military allow Kata’ib Hezbollah militias to storm the U.S. embassy? What steps has the Iraqi government taken to ensure the U.S. and Iran do not use its territory as a launching pad for attacks on one another?

Things in Iraq could turn ugly very quickly. How would the U.S. react if there were another American fatality, this time in the heart of Baghdad? The storming of the embassy was partly the proxies reasserting their presence in the country and partly an attempt to diminish the protest movement. For the coming weeks, they’ll have the upper hand in the political theater, which is precisely what they wanted. Their rivals can only hope they won’t be able to sustain the momentum.

Moving forward, there needs to be a far greater effort by Iraqi politicians and institutions like the Iraqi military to constrain the space for Iran’s proxies to operate. Otherwise, Iraq could dramatically deteriorate, possibly prompting the U.S. to give up on Iraq’s institutions and move toward a more coercive containment strategy (including, for instance, airstrikes on Iraqi territory and sanctions on the Iraqi state). That would be catastrophic for a country that has yet to defeat terrorist groups like ISIS, is struggling to ensure it doesn’t relapse into another civil war, and is already on the brink of a socio-economic implosion.

Scott Anderson (@S_R_Anders), David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Governance Studies program: However justified, the Trump administration’s recent airstrikes do harm to U.S. interests in Iraq. For years, provocations by Iran-backed militias — like the December 27 rocket attack that tragically killed a U.S. contractor — have capitalized on the fact that any U.S. military response is likely to trigger Iraqis’ widespread post-2003 misgivings about U.S. military operations and undermine political support for the U.S.-Iraq relationship. By pursuing an aggressive response over the express objections of Iraqi officials, the Trump administration played into these predictable consequences. Nor are airstrikes likely to be an effective long-run deterrent, as they are too politically costly to pursue with any regularity — at least so long as the United States maintains a significant presence in Iraq.

The United States should have used the December 27 attack to make common cause against Iran-backed militias with Iraqi protesters, who have suffered even greater violence at the militias’ hands. Paired with sanctions and other measures, this could have put pressure on pro-Iran factions during forthcoming government formation negotiations (following the November 29 resignation of the prime minister) and strengthened ongoing efforts to assert government control over the militias. Even if the United States later pursued a military response, such visible early restraint would have strengthened the U.S. case that it was acting only as a last resort. Instead, U.S. actions have pulled public scrutiny off Iran onto itself, and strengthened the leverage of hostile political factions at a sensitive moment in Iraqi politics.

Daniel Byman (@dbyman), Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy: The Trump administration’s decision to push back against Iran and its proxies is overdue — indeed, not responding to the death of an American at the hands of an Iranian-backed group would be a devastating admission of U.S. weakness. The good news is that Tehran is sensitive to U.S. pushback, recognizing the relative weakness of its own forces. The response and subsequent back-and-forth, however, also reveal some of the problems created by the administration’s inconsistent and uneven engagement with the region. In recent months, Iran has stepped up its aggression against the United States and its allies, even striking an oil processing plant in Saudi Arabia, an action that in another administration would have been well beyond any red line. The failure to respond to this and other Iranian attacks against allies, and Trump’s open desire to head for the exits, has made the U.S. hand weak, while Iran’s influence had grown. Even staunch anti-Iran powers like Saudi Arabia doubt the U.S. commitment to fighting Iran, and Iraqis recognize that Iran, not the United States, will remain in the region. So now that an open confrontation is occurring, U.S. allies are cautious, Iraqi leaders are skeptical of U.S. promises, and Tehran and its proxies are well-prepared for a long fight.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad (@AFathollahNejad), Visiting Fellow in the Brookings Doha Center: The attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone was a show of force by the Iranian-aligned, Shiite-majority Popular Mobilization Units and its faction Kata‘ib Hezbollah (or the Hezbollah Brigades). Kata‘ib Hezbollah, the most notorious and most potent Shiite militant force in Iraq, is the militia closest to Tehran, and has as a proxy also fought in the war in Syria under Iranian command.

The embassy attack was probably instigated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and demanded for some time now by Iran’s ultra-conservatives. It was a message sent to the U.S. that Tehran — and not Washington — is the main player on the ground in Iraq.

There can be no doubt that the U.S. — as much as Iran — is deeply unpopular in Iraq, given the legacy of the illegal and brutal U.S. invasion and occupation that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. This also helps explain the shaky grounds on which Washington operates in Iraq’s political scene, as well as Iraq’s propensity to call for a complete U.S. withdrawal from the country.

However, the hundreds of Iraqis attacking the U.S. embassy in Baghdad haven’t been mere “protesters,” as some media reports have called them. Rather, they are largely members of the same Iran-backed militias that, not least at the behest of the IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, were engaged in killing hundreds of peaceful protesters during recent anti-regime demonstrations in Iraq.

There is still an impotent central government in Baghdad that has long been afraid that Iraq would become a battlefield of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions. Dependent on both Washington and Tehran, and with one of the world’s worst corruption problems, it has not been able to craft policies to prevent that outcome and assert its sovereignty. Last but not least, the Islamic Republic — where the aftershocks from the unprecedented November 2019 protests are still felt — might see a mid-level escalation as welcome distraction. Crucially, the embassy incident also helps divert attention away from the Arab Spring-like demonstrations in Iraq’s “Tahrir Square” to these “Green Zone” protests as a way to maintain its challenged power and influence in Iraq. Yet, Iran’s dilemma lies in its collapsing financial means that might counteract its drive for escalation and limit its appeal for Iraq’s political class, whom it also cannot afford to further alienate by such brute shows of force such as the embassy attack.

Jeffrey Feltman, John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy: David Ignatius, in a January 2 appearance on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe,” compared U.S. airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to longstanding Israeli military practices: If the enemy kills one of yours, show decisively that the enemy will suffer a far higher casualty rate in response. But the comparison of the U.S. and Israel only goes so far: Israel has managed for years to strike Lebanese Hezbollah facilities in Syria, without triggering anything akin to the humiliation (with potential strategic reverberations) of the attack on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.

Of course, the Israelis do not have an embassy in Damascus, so there is no easy target for an Iranian-sponsored rent-a-mob. But that is the point: The U.S. closed its embassy in Damascus and withdrew all American personnel in February 2012.

If the intended recipient of the U.S. message to the Kata’ib Hezbollah rocket attacks was predominately Tehran, one wonders why U.S. airstrikes did not focus on Iranian interests inside Syria. The risks of a significant Iranian counter-reaction with strategic implications for the U.S. seem lower in Syria than in Iraq. Trashing a chancery that has been vacant for nearly eight years does not pose a strategic conundrum about the vulnerability of U.S. personnel. The U.S. troops in northeast Syria do not rely on an official blessing from Damascus and presumably have in place significant force-protection measures. War-weary Syrians would be unlikely to muster sustained outrage about yet more violations of sovereignty. Hezbollah does have the power (and precedent) of attacking the U.S. embassy in Beirut, but Hezbollah is unlikely to present its hand-picked Lebanese prime ministerial candidate with a new crisis.

U.S. policymakers know that Iran will respond to pressure and attacks. But in this dangerous game, the U.S. needs to consider targets more carefully than was the case on December 29. The U.S. airstrikes in Iraq were a gift to Iran, eager to shift the focus of growing Iraqi nationalism from Iran to the United States.

Steven Heydemann (@SHeydemann), Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy:

I share the sense of Mike and Natan that de-escalation is the preferred course. It is important, however, not to let de-escalation be misunderstood. It is possible to signal support for de-escalation while also making clear that Iran cannot attack U.S. personnel with impunity. There are some steps we can take to link de-escalation to a vigorous effort to shift the focus back to Iran’s malign influence in Iraq, and our interest in countering its regional influence.

1. Work to secure support from Iraqi officials for a U.S. policy of holding Iran accountable for any actions that place U.S. personnel and facilities at risk, including our right to take punitive, retaliatory actions.
2. If we want to bolster Iraqi sovereignty, we should avoid actions that undermine it, which means more extensive consultations with Iraqi officials about U.S. intentions if/when future actions are determined to be needed.
3. Undertake a vigorous public messaging effort in Iraq, making clear that the U.S. is working to strengthen Iraqi sovereignty and the capability of legitimate armed forces, while Iran is undermining sovereignty and empowering its affiliated militias. Make clear we stand with the protestors seeking Iran’s removal from Iraq.
4. Respond to the belligerent statements of Kata’ib Hezbollah by noting that the U.S. is capable of asymmetric responses to Iranian aggression. Iran is on a back foot at home, in Lebanon and Iraq, and even in Syria, where Russia is consolidating influence while Iran’s is eroding. Regionally, it is in a more vulnerable position now than at any time since 2011. Visible efforts to lend appropriate support to civil society forces working against Iran in the region should be a priority. But it is only one part of what should be a broader strategy to exploit Iranian weakness. As an aside, it is important to establish that the purpose of such an effort is not regime change, but to work toward a regional security architecture that responds to the interests of all regional actors. It’s worth reinforcing, especially given the biases of the Trump administration, that treating regional security in zero-sum terms is not helpful.

Suzanne Maloney (@MaloneySuzanne), Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy program and Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy: The Trump administration is learning a lesson that came at hard cost to each of its predecessors over the past 40 years: There are no quick fixes or cheap victories in dealing with the challenges posed by Iran. U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military superiority over the Islamic Republic is and always has been crystal clear. However, from the very earliest days of the mutual antagonism, Washington’s approach to Iran has been tempered by bipartisan judiciousness about our capabilities and priorities in the Middle East. Policymaking is at its essence about harmonizing resources and objectives, and the prospective costs and risks to American regional interests and partners has always outweighed unconditional ambition and discouraged illusions about a panacea to the Iran problem.This is why Jimmy Carter agonized over a military response to the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, why Ronald Reagan withdrew U.S. forces from Lebanon after Iranian-orchestrated terrorist attacks, why both Presidents Bush countenanced diplomacy toward Tehran even as they confronted Saddam Hussein, and why the Obama administration invested in constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions without predicating a deal on any wider amelioration of Iranian domestic or regional malfeasance.

Surrounded by hawks and unfettered by insight or policy deliberation, President Trump has jettisoned the prudent calculus of the Republicans and Democrats who came before him, instead gambling on maximalist tactics as a silver bullet. His far-reaching blockade of Iranian trade and financial transactions has indeed dealt a devastating blow to the country’s economy. Unfortunately, disregarding policy trade-offs doesn’t make them disappear. Through a series of attacks in and around the Persian Gulf since Trump ratcheted up economic pressure, Iran’s leaders have used provocation to generate leverage, inject urgency among world powers, and dissuade their neighbors from cooperating with Washington. The attack on the fortified American presence in Baghdad’s Green Zone was just the latest demonstration of Tehran’s ability to impose costs on U.S. interests and allies.

Although it will receive less media attention than the evocative images of another U.S. embassy under siege, the relatively orderly denouement of the latest skirmish is as telling as its eruption: Tehran is dictating the pace, scope, and location of escalation with precision and deliberation. Iran’s leaders are shrewd navigators of the unsettled regional environment and above all their self-interest lies in regime survival. They sense a particular historical resonance in the vulnerability of an American president in an election year, and they will continue to strike where they see some possibility of enhancing their own advantage and alleviating the siege on their economy. That Iraq has become the foremost arena for this clash only compounds the tragedy, as Iraqis have already paid too high a price for American hubris and Iranian aggression.

President Trump has jettisoned the prudent calculus of the Republicans and Democrats who came before him, instead gambling on maximalist tactics as a silver bullet.

Michael O’Hanlon (@MichaelEOHanlon), Senior Fellow and Director of Research for Brookings Foreign Policy: In this situation, it’s most crucial to keep our eye on the ball in Iraq and not jeopardize the U.S.-Iraq security relationship (thereby increasing Iran’s influence further, and risking an ISIS or al-Qaida resurgence). To my mind, the U.S. competition and conflagration with Kata’ib Hezbollah (and thus, indirectly, with Iran) is secondary to the Baghdad-Washington situation. Tehran, and Kata’ib Hezbollah leadership, were happiest after the unilateral U.S. airstrikes led many Iraqi politicians to talk about revisiting the entire U.S.-Iraq security partnership. We need to avoid descending further down that road.

Thus, even if the recent U.S. airstrikes were justified, in some sense, it may not be wise to repeat them. Doing so may play into the hands of Iran’s Quds force as well as Kata’ib Hezbollah leadership, putting the continuation of an American military and diplomatic (and economic) presence within Iraq in jeopardy.

We should in fact limit any future unilateral military action within Iraq to direct, prompt defense of attacked U.S. assets and/or personnel, and perhaps to hot pursuit of anyone who has just attacked us, but should not conduct asymmetric retaliation under any similar circumstances. That kind of action should only be taken in collaboration with Baghdad, unless circumstances change dramatically.

Most of all, we need to work with the Iraqi government on a strategy to constrain Kata’ib Hezbollah. Of course, Baghdad can’t and won’t cut off the group altogether. But the Iraqi government might, for example, stop payments to any cells or sub-units of Kata’ib Hezbollah that shell U.S. facilities in the future, since it is on the Iraqi government payroll as one piece of the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces. At least, we should attempt this strategy — and let the Iraqi people (and Iranian government) know that we are doing so, before any repeat of the kind of airstrikes that were just undertaken.

Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence:

Foolishly and recklessly, the Trump administration threw this all away. It may prove to be the worst decision ever in American foreign policy. Egged on by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, the policy changes have ironically made Israel and Saudi Arabia less safe. Israeli security experts bemoan the loss of the nuclear deal. The Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities in September illustrated dramatically the vulnerabilities of our gulf allies. The Iranians’ proxy in Iraq is now threatening the Saudi, Bahraini, and Emiratis embassies in Baghdad.

It will be hard to find a way out of the hole the administration has dug.

It will be hard to find a way out of the hole the administration has dug. The first step is to avoid escalation in Iraq. Iraq is the battlefield most friendly to Tehran. Iran has embarked on a high-risk strategy of attacking its neighbors and now America. The extremists are pushing the fight. A multilateral effort to restore the nuclear deal, ease sanctions, and open dialogue is essential.

Natan Sachs (@natansachs), Director of the Center for Middle East Policy: Until these latest events, the Trump administration has for the most part displayed a surprising willingness not to react to Iranian belligerence, at least visibly. The most glaring of these, as Dan notes, was the attack on the Abqaiq oil facility in Saudi Arabia, a watershed moment and one that brought home to the Middle East the overdue understanding that for all his tough rhetoric, Trump-in-the-Middle East is not a return from Obama to Bush, he is considerably “softer” than Obama.

Speaking of Bush: In the latest escalatory situation in Iraq, Trump’s willingness to let enemies strike the last blow, even if sometimes misguided, has merit when used properly. Here he should stick to direct U.S. interests — the well-being of its diplomats and other personnel, and, as Mike notes above, the security cooperation with Iraq.

The U.S. should look now to deescalate.

The fight with Iran calls for tough action, but the battleground should be chosen wisely, and should not be chosen by Iran. A fight with the U.S. in neighboring Iraq would be a godsend to Iran. The U.S. should look now to deescalate.

Shibley Telhami (@ShibleyTelhami), Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy: President Trump’s call for the Iraqi people to stand up against Iran, following the assault on the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, reveals a superficial administration assessment of the Iraqi people’s attitudes toward the United States. Sure, in recent months, Iraq has witnessed unprecedented demonstrations against Iran, including among some Shiite. But to assume that anger with Iran would suddenly translate into an embrace of the U.S. role is a misread of Iraqi attitudes. Indeed, the lowered profile of American involvement in Iraq in recent months is probably one reason that Iraqis’ focused turned to Iran.

Now, the U.S. finds itself in a real bind. It’s caught between, on the one hand, the president’s desire to look tough on Iran, bolstered by administration advisers who see a need to respond to actions of Iran and its regional allies; and on the other, the president’s strong determination to avoid escalation and new military entanglements. These contradictions are further exacerbated by the thinnest of experts who are heard at top levels of decisionmaking. The day may be saved by the fact that no one wants escalation — including Iran — and certainly not Iraq’s dependent government. But the contradictions in the U.S. approach, and within Iraq, mean this crisis will not be the last.