Brookings: Experts - Olumide Taiwo

One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

On July 9, 2012, South Sudan will celebrate its first anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. The January 2011 referendum effectively ended the prolonged, violent confrontation between the Republic of Sudan and the territories that would ultimately gain independence as South Sudan. This development marked an important stage in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In addition to regulating relations between the two feuding parties from 2005 to 2011, the CPA also implemented the framework for the creation of two separate nations. Despite the success of the CPA in guiding South Sudan’s path to independence, the young nation must now address a myriad of challenges related to its domestic policies as well as continued hostilities with the Republic of Sudan.

As international observers applauded the CPA’s success, the people of South Sudan also celebrated the birth of their nation with high expectations. Independence brought with it hope for a better future and the opportunity to build a united developmental state. Revenue from valuable oil resources, which were a primary source of the conflict between the two nations, gave South Sudan the opportunity to invest in the development of its natural and human resources. Additionally, formal separation was expected to end the long-standing conflict with the Republic of Sudan. However, these expectations were tempered by the many restraints that came with establishing conditions for sustained economic growth and improving the delivery of public goods and services.

After many years of brutal civil war, South Sudan emerged with extremely poor infrastructure and a population with limited human capital. More importantly, the country was born with weak institutions that were not suited to the delivery of sustainable economic growth and development. Finally, while the people of South Sudan were largely united in the war against Khartoum, the country is to a large degree ethnically fragmented, with each group seeking to maximize its own objectives—a process that has significantly weakened the ability of the government to work toward national integration.

South Sudan’s first year of independence has been fraught with major challenges, like the continuing struggle with the Republic of Sudan over their common border. These conflicts have become top priorities for the country, impeding the ability of the government to concentrate on economic growth and human development.

The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution has been following developments in South Sudan in order to offer independent policy proposals that can translate into sustainable economic growth and development, effective delivery of public services, and the building of institutions for a united and peaceful nation. This collection of policy briefs seeks to highlight some of the important issues that have affected South Sudan during the country’s first year of independence and identify policy areas that both South Sudan and the international community must emphasize in order to enhance the nation’s ability to achieve peace, economic growth and human development. It is important to note that many of the policy recommendations offered by the various briefs are similar even though each brief was based on independent analysis. This is due primarily to the fact that many of the issues faced by South Sudan lend themselves to similar solutions.

Image Source: © Adriane Ohanesian / Reuters

Managing Ethnic Diversity

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

Julius Agbor and Olumide Taiwo provide insight into how South Sudan can deal with violent ethnic mobilization by focusing on the need to strengthen sub-national governments and provide a comprehensive process to define property rights. They argue for respect for traditional institutions (e.g., village or tribal councils) and encourage the government to engage all citizens in the construction of the country’s laws and institutions.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Extending the Learning Community: Rural Radio, Social Learning and Farm Productivity in Ghana

Olumide Taiwo and Emmanuel Asmah — Tue, 17 Apr 2012 14:34:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Agricultural productivity remains a crucial factor in poverty reduction and rural transformation in Africa. After a long period of decline and stagnation, there have recently been reports of improved performance by the agricultural sector in many if not all countries on the continent. Mugera and Ojede (2011) provide a good survey of the literature on this subject and show that a variety of changes have made this progress possible. The studies cited in their survey emphasize the impact of remarkable changes in farm inputs such as crop varieties, fertilizer, pesticides and water resources (rainfall and irrigation), and the infrastructural changes that have made these gains possible, such as market reforms and extension services. However, whereas changes in inputs and markets are well captured, changes in extension services are muted in these reports, to the effect that credit is given to the effectiveness of orthodox agricultural extension. To the contrary, a survey of attitudes toward and experiences with orthodox extension services shows that farmers have largely been abandoning those services since the beginning of the last decade.

The implication is that the credit given to extension services is largely misplaced, and the analyses omit a crucial change in the form of the knowledge to which farmers are adapting and the ways in which this knowledge is being disseminated. The literature on knowledge systems clearly distinguishes between formal or explicit knowledge that is based on scientific evidence and informal or tacit knowledge that is experimental and is acquired after a given practice has proved fruitful (Roling 1992). Whereas orthodox extension services focus on application of the former, there is evidence that farmers are instead shifting to the latter. In a survey of farmers’ perspectives on agricultural extension in the East Akim District of Ghana reported by Boateng (2006), two-thirds of farmers surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with orthodox extension services. Among the dissatisfied majority, the main reasons cited were the unreliability of the service (47 percent) and the enormous costs of applying the new techniques (47 percent). In their responses to other questions in the survey, the farmers unanimously declared extension services as unreliable because “they were not involved in the development of technologies passed on to them by the experts” (Boateng 2006, 24). This attitude toward orthodox extension services is not a “new millennium” experience. Conley and Udry (2010) found from a survey conducted between 1996 and 1998 among pineapple farmers in three villages in southern Ghana that only one in three farmers took advice from an extension agent from the Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture. They found from their data that average fertilizer use is less than one-tenth of the 400 kilograms per hectare recommended by extension officers. Their analysis and findings show that farmers adjust fertilizer use not after the recommendations of the extension officers but following the experiences of other farmers in their neighborhood.

Recent developments in communication and socialization infrastructure have extended the sphere of social learning beyond village borders. In the Ghanaian context, the rural radio phenomenon has successfully moved the borders of social learning from the village to the range of radio broadcasts. “Rural radio stations,” a term used interchangeably with “community radio stations,” are FM radio stations that have been established with the aim to broadcast to a rural audience that is predominantly engaged in agriculture. These new stations are not mere extensions of national FM radio stations to rural areas but are new FM stations that are owned and situated in rural areas. As noted by Girard (2001, 6), “In 1985 the term ‘rural radio’ usually referred to a division within the national broadcaster that produced programs in the capital and broadcast them to the countryside. Now rural radio is local radio.” A study by Chapman and others (2003) suggests that the community element of rural radio encourages the active participation of the audience, the engagement of the community’s intellectual resources, and community ownership of the radio station. In particular, community radio stations are set up with the aim to “enable marginalised communities and groups to generate and share their knowledge and experience” (Quarmyne 2001). In terms of their programs, they focus on livelihood and development issues, transmit most of their events in local dialects and cater strongly to occupational segments such as farmers and fishermen. The main advantage is that the uneducated rural population in those communities can and does participate in these programs. Radio Ada, the first community radio station in Ghana, started operations in February 1998, shortly after the liberalization of the Ghanaian airwaves in 1996. At the end of 2005, there were seven operational community radio stations in Ghana with broadcast ranges covering large swaths of seven of the country’s ten regions. It is estimated that community radio stations reached between a quarter and two-fifths of the country’s area as of that time (Whaites 2005).

The development of rural radio has brought about a change in the content of radio transmission that is accessible to rural audiences. McKay (2003, 4), in his qualitative study of radio participation in a fishing community, cited a fishmonger’s account:

The first [radio we bought] was 16 years ago. Back then we tuned to the radio a little, but we mainly played cassettes. My husband is educated, so he liked tuning to where they spoke English. But if my husband was not in the house, then we put the cassette in the tape player and played gospel songs. Now we listen to Radio Ada, because of the Dangme being spoken.

Whereas learning from neighbors is confined to members of the same village, rural radio stations enable individuals to learn from more distant counterparts. McKay (2003, 3) cited a fisherman who was knowledgeable about the development occurring among fishmongers in his Anyakpor community as saying:

Anyakpor women, when they’ve finished smoking, use a certain grass named lale giving colour to the fish here. With a programme from another community along the coast here, I learned that there’s another grass which is called zue which is used in giving the fish colour and it is better than the lale the Anyakpor fishmongers are using. So the women here are changing to use zue.

In Ghana, rural radio has been used to promote the adoption of a high-yield rice seed named New Rice for Africa. The impact of this promotion, as documented by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (2010), is a doubling of demand for the seed among farmers between 2008 and 2009. However, the report shows that the adoption of the seed variety is made possible by having farmers talk to themselves on the radio. Citing a 46-year-old female rural rice farmer, Faustina, who experienced a turnaround on her rice farm, the report makes the case that it is often more convincing to learn about a new yield-improving technology from a farmer than from an extension agent. “Hearing about the rice from other farmers made it more convincing,” says Faustina.

In this paper, we attempt to evaluate the impact of social learning through rural radio on crop yields in Ghana. We lay the theoretical foundation and examine the literature in the next section and follow with a section describing our identification strategy and examining the data. We then present descriptive statistics and our results, discuss the results, and offer conclusions.

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Olumide Taiwo
Emmanuel Asmah

Preferences or Cultural Obligations: Reexamining the Source of Gender Differential in Resource Allocation and Child Well-Being

Olumide Taiwo — Tue, 27 Mar 2012 14:03:00 -0400

ABSTRACT

The empirical literature examining intrahousehold resource allocation finds that mothers’ incomes have a larger impact on the well-being of children than fathers’ incomes. Although this finding is amenable to various interpretations, the most widely held view is that, as a matter of preference, women care more about the well-being of children than do men. This implies that policies that reallocate resources toward women are beneficial for the quality of children’s well-being. Many policy interventions are targeted toward a specific gender in part due to this interpretation.

Although the findings in this literature are largely not disputable, given the frameworks from which the results are derived, the interpretation can be questioned. Although most of the findings are obtained from analyzing data collected in developing countries where household structures depart from the Western model, the data sets have been analyzed within the context of two-person, independent households. Interdependence among households and interhousehold resource transfers in lineages and extended families that are widespread in developing societies are incompatible with the independent household model.

In this paper, I argue that the finding of differential effects between fathers’ and mothers’ incomes is not necessarily an outcome of differential preferences. I demonstrate through a simple framework of extended families that the outcomes are consistent with models of household behavior where fathers and mothers care equally about child well-being but fathers play an expanded role in extended families. I draw data from societies with different systems of family organization to emphasize the importance of social contexts in interpreting empirical findings related to household behavior.

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Olumide Taiwo

Around the Halls: 2012 Senegal Presidential Election

Fri, 10 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Later this month, Senegal will hold the most contentious presidential election since the introduction of a multi-party democratic system in the 1980s. Notwithstanding who wins, the election is bound to have far-reaching implications on the future of the nation. Senegal has long been held as an example of good leadership and stability in West Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa: It has escaped military rule and managed to have peaceful and democratic transition of power. Yet, the events leading to the 2012 election suggest that its record of democracy may be tainted if not completely negated. Scholars from AGI and its partner in Senegal, the Consortium for Social and Economic Research (Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), discuss the forthcoming election.

What are the key issues and implications of Senegal's upcoming presidential election? Join the conversation on Twitter using the #AGISenegal hashtag and register for our February 16 event on Senegal's election, a turning point for democracy and economic growth.

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President Abdoulaye Wade’s Controversial Re-election Bid
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

A major contentious issue in Senegal has been whether it is constitutional for the incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade to run for office again. Wade has been a glowing example of a victorious former opposition figure who managed to peacefully obtain office from the then longstanding incumbent. However, his most recent re-election campaign has caused many of his admirers and supporters to doubt his commitment to democratic ideals. Popular opinion in the country – also widely held by the international community – appears to be that he should not run for another term.

President Wade came to power in 2000 after defeating incumbent, Abdou Diouf who held power from 1981 to 2000. Wade had been an opposition candidate in four presidential elections before he was finally elected in 2000. He was then re-elected in 2007 with 56 percent of the vote in a crowded field of 15 candidates. In 2001, during the beginning of his first term, the constitution was amended, which limited the presidents to two terms and reduced the length of each term from seven to five years. In 2009, he indicated that he would run again in 2012 as the amendments came into effect after he took office, but many consider such a move to be in contravention of the constitution. However, it was not official until January 27, a month before the scheduled election, when the Constitutional Council cleared Wade to run for a third term, a move that dismayed the electorate and triggered riots.

Recent public opinion surveys of likely Senegalese voters show declining support and trust of President Wade and his government:[1] in a 2008 survey, a majority of respondents felt that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.[2] Most telling was that 74 percent of respondents agreed or agreed very strongly that, “The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.” Recently there have been concerns over Wade’s actions, which are seen as undermining democracy and weakening his political opponents, including his suggested appointment in the end of last year of two leading opposition figures, who are now running for the presidency, to ministerial positions and the arrest of a the rival socialist party youth leader. In the summer of 2011, Wade declared plans to change the constitution, lowering the required proportion of votes needed for a first round presidential election from 50 percent to 25 percent, a move likely intended to improve his chances of winning the election. These actions warrant concerns as to whether Wade will continue to erode the gains made in advancing democracy in Senegal if he wins another term.

What is at Stake in Regards to Senegal's External Relationships?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, President, Schneidman & Associates International, Special Guest, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

Several of Senegal’s key external relationships could be jeopardized if the elections scheduled for February 26 do not go well. In 2009, according to World Bank figures, Senegal’s net Official Development Assistance was nearly 8 percent of GDP. Last year when the government of Malawi reacted violently to public protests over an increase in food prices, the U.S., the UK and other donors suspended assistance due to an alleged deterioration in political freedoms and the death of at least 19 protestors.

Election observers from the EU, Senegal’s largest donor, have already arrived in the country and have expressed concerns about the transparency of the process used to determine the eligibility of candidates. The observers have also remarked on the use of force against opposition protestors.

U.S.-Senegal relations have been “excellent” over the past several years, but Washington has voiced apprehension about backsliding on government transparency. Two weeks ago, in reference to the upcoming elections, State Department Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland said “the [statesmanlike] thing to do would be to cede to the next generation, and we think that would be better.” This was echoed by Deputy Secretary of State Chris Burns at the African Union summit and a letter to Wade from the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Africa.

The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact to Senegal requires countries to uphold political freedom performance indicators. Thus, it may be the first assistance to be suspended if there is a drop in the current level of democracy. Trade relationships, including membership in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and broader assistance are at stake if the election results in a reduction of political liberties for the Senegalese public.

The Economic Community of West African States has also sent election observers to Senegal. One of the observers, Ambassador Bassir from Sierra Leone, said, “whatever affects Senegal negatively, will no doubt spill over in the sub region and that a lot rest[s]on ECOWAS to ensure that the government, actors and the citizenry as a whole, take the necessary measures to prevent any such ugly situation.”

The Youth Vote in Senegal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium of Economic and Social Research
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

According to the World Bank, Senegal has started to recover from the global economic slowdown that started in 2009; however, the aftermath of the crisis on the current macroeconomic conditions continue to put strain on the youth population. Senegal’s energy sector has performed poorly and tourism and remittances have begun to suffer from the eurozone crisis, keeping the West African nation below the expected 4.6 percent average sub-Saharan growth rate. Senegal, once a leader in the region in terms of economic performance, is falling behind other top performers, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Small gains in growth for Senegal are not translating into improved employment opportunities for young people.

The youth population (ages 15-24) is feeling the brunt of these adverse economic conditions. The Consortium of Economic and Social Research (CRES) in Dakar indicates that youth are blocked from many employment opportunities due to a policy of increasing the retirement age and a hiring freeze in the public sector. Additionally, sectors driving growth have intensive capital requirements, such as information and communications technology (ITC) and infrastructure and youth often have difficulty gaining access to start-up capital and credit to participate in these needed markets. Thus, young people are pushed toward working in the informal sector, migrating out of Senegal, or participating in illegal activities. In response, young Senegalese have created a movement called “Y’en a marre”, or enough is enough, to express their frustrations with the economic situation, lack of amenities, government corruption and the rise in food and fuel prices. Youth effectively protested Wade’s first attempt at constitutional tampering last year, and have already begun to protest the announcement of Wade as an official candidate via the youth dominated group “Movement of the 23rd” or M23.

If Wade is re-elected, frustrated youth might see current economic conditions as cause for large scale revolt. What is particularly disturbing is that neither the outgoing government nor a new government stemming from the opposition seems well equipped to face massive youth unemployment. The recently adopted Social and Economic Document of Policy 2012-2015, which succeeds the Strategic Documents for the Reduction of Poverty (DSRP) of the 2000s, dedicates only minor support to the unemployment issue. Even though the opposition parties denounce youth unemployment, they have not proposed concrete solutions to reduce it significantly.

Senegal’s Electoral Institutions and Prospects for Democracy
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

Holding elections does not necessarily strengthen democracy if the electoral processes are weak and subject to manipulation by the executive or any other branch of government, or allows the government to favor one candidate or party. Recent protests following the ruling of the Constitutional Council concerning the eligibility of the incumbent president to seek re-election for a third term reflects poorly designed electoral institutions that are likely to weaken democracy.

Besides the Constitutional Council, other electoral institutions in Senegal include the Ministry of the Interior and the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (or La Commission électorale nationale autonome – CENA). The Constitutional Council is made up of five judges appointed by the president and has the final say on matters relating to the constitution – including determining eligibility for the presidency, confirming the announcement of the CENA, and ruling on challenges related to the elections. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of the election logistics and CENA is supposed to provide autonomous oversight for the electoral process. Both the Constitutional Council and the Interior Ministry are heavily influenced by the executive. CENA is somewhat influenced by the executive as the president confirms its members, but they are initially nominated by independent sources for their integrity and unbiased opinions. Technically the CENA was established by a law so its existence is less permanent and continues at the “discretion of the legislature,”[3] and as mentioned, it still ultimately reports its results to the Constitutional Council for confirmation.

Following his re-election in 2007, Wade appointed an entirely new Constitutional Council in 2008 raising suspicion that it was to ensure his eligibility for a third term. The recent ruling on Wade’s eligibility to contest another presidential term seems to confirm those suspicions. Evidently, the executive has a firm control or influence over the functioning of the electoral institutions, making them inadequate to further democracy. Truly independent electoral institutions are a requirement for smooth and democratic transitions of government. A post-election priority should therefore be reforming the electoral institutions.

What Might Influence Electoral Choices in Senegal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Research Assistant

To a large extent, voting in sub-Saharan African countries tends to be influenced by the primary loci of identification: ethnicity, religion or region. Simply, identity politics often dominate issue politics, like the state of the economy. In the past, voting in Senegal has not been primarily on the basis of identity. AfroBarometer data confirms the viewpoint that generally voters’ ethnic identity is not the leading determinant of voting and research indicates that, “Senegal is a country in which ethnicity plays little or no role in politics.[4]” Religion is seen as something that unites the electorate, with around 94 percent of the population identifying as Muslim. The Islamic brotherhoods in the country are seen as transcending ethnic divisions [5] and political leaders, similarly, have support from multiple Islamic brotherhoods or sects. However, the upcoming election could reveal some clear voting patterns along specific identities and issues. As shown in a companion piece, there is the possibility of candidates instigating divisions based on ethnicity and religious sect for lack of more relevant differences in the presidential contestant agendas.

In the upcoming election, rural-urban voting patterns may also emerge. Senegal’s population is divided almost evenly between urban and rural areas. Perceptions of the economy also vary based on region. Rural voters surveyed have a slightly less favorable view of the economy with around 10 percent more people indicating that the current state is “bad” or “fairly bad” than those surveyed in urban areas. Additionally, almost half of rural residents state that their living conditions are worse or much worse than the rest of the Senegalese population, versus 21 percent in urban areas. These differences in perceptions of well-being could influence voting patterns--opposition candidates may do better in rural areas if they have a convincing message of change.

Another voting pattern that may emerge is that of the Senegalese Diaspora. As of 2000, there were 15 different countries where Senegalese could vote externally. A 2007 study indicates that external voters account for between 4 and 5 percent of the total vote in Senegalese elections. In 2000, the majority of external voters continued to support the incumbent, Abdou Diouf, and could have had significant influence if the second round had been a close runoff. In a close election, the Diaspora vote could indeed be pivotal.

Finally, younger voters have been more opposed to Wade’s re-election bid. They are more likely to vote for opposition as persistent problems of youth unemployment plague the country and the current government lacks a plan for addressing the situation.

Senegal’s 2012 Election: Towards a Replay of Ivory Coast?
Julius Agbor, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

Although Senegal’s election differs from the Ivory Coast in that there is no armed rebel opposition involved in the election or a North (Muslim) vs. South (Christian) regional divide, the circumstances surrounding this election points very much towards an Ivorian post-election scenario. A companion piece by Mwangi Kimenyi and Zenia Lewis discusses the structural problems created by the lack of independence of the electoral institutions in Senegal. Perhaps a more subtle problem is the potential for post-election conflict in Senegal similar to the Ivory Coast during 2010-2011, which stemmed from the ambiguities arising from the overlapping jurisdictions of the various electoral bodies.

These conflicting jurisdictions in Senegal could trigger confusion with the potential for post-election violence. In the Ivory Coast, although the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was in charge of the organization and supervision of the elections, it could only publish tentative results that were subject to the approval of the Constitutional Council – which also handled all disputes resulting from the electoral process. The confusion then resulted from significant disparities between the figures earlier announced by the Electoral Commission and those officially proclaimed by the Constitutional Council. In Senegal, this is also likely to happen in event that the official results proclaimed by the Constitutional Council contrast with those reported by the (supposedly) Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA). This could especially incite violence due to the widened rift of trust between Senegalese people and Senegal’s political institutions following the controversial ruling in favor of the candidacy of incumbent President Wade by the Constitutional Council. The cases of Senegal and Ivory Coast point to general weaknesses in electoral systems and institutions in former French colonies. Going forward, there is need for these and many other African countries to invest in building electoral institutions that are clear of jurisdictional overlapping and at the same time independent of any branch of government. Unless such an unambiguous electoral framework is built, elections will not serve to entrench democracy but may instead trigger chaos as seen in Ivory Coast.

Neglect of African Indigenous Institutions and the Fragility of Senegalese Democracy
Olumide Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow
Anne W. Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The decision by President Wade to seek a third term in office remains the most contentious issue in the Senegalese elections and one that is likely to trigger a post-election crisis.

It is now a pattern that African countries appear to be stable democracies for a while and slide into constitutional crisis thereafter and most of the crises are associated with tenure elongation ambitions of incumbent presidents. Senegal is unlike other African countries where elections are contests between ethnic groups for state resources. The unifying force of the Senegalese Islamic brotherhood has served to mitigate ethnic divisions, [6] which is particularly important since over 90 percent of the population is Muslim. The Senegalese constitution also allows for a strong central government, and President Wade has taken numerous steps to even make the presidency stronger. This consolidation of power at the center is antithetical to ethnic diversity and is the undoing of many democracy projects in African countries. Moreover, such centralization of power is beginning to take its toll on Senegal. There are indications that opposition candidates and President Wade are beginning to appeal to ethnic groups and specific segments of Islamic organizations for support. With this, Senegal may follow many African countries that are mired in ethnic or religious competition.

Successful and stable democracies in Africa have reformed constitutions and redesigned governance institutions to reflect indigenous collective choice apparatuses. These involve extensive decentralization and devolution of power and recognition of the role of tribal chiefs in the governance process. For example, Botswana – cited as the most stable democracy in Africa – is organized into a federation of autonomous tribes ruled by tribal chiefs, who are also permanent members of the House of Chiefs, which plays an advisory and oversight role in government. Similarly, the Ghanaian constitution created the House of Chiefs at every level of government and empowers the chiefs to play their traditional roles and pursue the interests of their constituents. These arrangements guarantee substantial degrees of autonomy and self governance to the tribal groups and a relatively weak central government. Countries where the center remains powerful may initially appear stable, but such stabilities will always be short-lived.

The Senegalese constitution, like most African constitutions, is far removed from the history of the indigenous people. Simply inheriting a constitution and amending it will only increase the level of animosity and instability. Instead, Senegal needs to rework its constitutions in ways that decentralize power and incorporate its indigenous people in the governance process.

Footnotes

[1] AfroBarometer Report

[2] 53 percent of respondents thought that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.” (36 percent stating often, and 17 percent stating always, while 25 percent said never/rarely and 25 percent said they didn’t know)

[3] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[4] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews, 2009. “Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research.”

[5] Dennis Galvan, 2001. “Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia.”

[6] The Casamance region lying to the south of the Gambia river is excluded from this description.

Dans les couloirs : L'élection présidentielle 2012

Ce mois-ci, le Sénégal va procéder à l'élection présidentielle la plus litigieuse depuis l'introduction d'un système démocratique à plusieurs partis dans les années 80. Quelque soit le gagnant, l'élection aura certainement des conséquences à long terme sur l'avenir du pays. Depuis longtemps, le Sénégal donne l'exemple d'un pays stable et bien gouverné en Afrique de l'Ouest et en Afrique subsaharienne : il a échappé au régime militaire et a réussi la transition pacifique et démocratique du pouvoir. Pourtant, les événements qui ont abouti à l’élection 2012 suggèrent que sa réputation en tant que pays démocratique n’est pas vraiment méritée et peut même se révéler entièrement incorrecte. Les experts universitaires de MGA et de son partenaire au Sénégal, (le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), parlent des prochaines élections.

Quels sont les enjeux et les implications de la prochaine élection présidentielle du Sénégal? Rejoignez la conversation sur Twitter en utilisant #AGISenegal hashtag et inscrivez-vous à notre rencontre du 16 février sur l'élection sénégalaise, tournant historique pour la croissance démocratique et économique.

Réélection controversée du président Abdoulaye Wade
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

L'une des questions les plus importante au Sénégal est de savoir s'il est constitutionnel pour le Président Abdoulaye Wade de se représenter. Wade représente le bon exemple d'un ancien membre de l'opposition qui a gagné l'élection et a réussi une transition pacifique en remplaçant un président sortant qui était là depuis fort longtemps. Cependant, au cours de sa plus récente campagne électorale, plusieurs de ses admirateurs et partisans ont pu douter de son engagement en faveur des idéaux démocratiques. D'après l'opinion publique dans le pays – partagée également en grande mesure par la communauté internationale, il ne devrait pas briguer un autre mandat.

Le Président Wade fut élu en 2000 après avoir battu le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, qui avait gouverné de 1981 à 2000. Wade avait été candidat de l'opposition pendant quatre élections présidentielles avant d'être finalement élu en 2000. Il fut ensuite réélu en 2007 avec 56 % des voix dans une arène encombrée, comprenant 15 candidats. En 2001, au début de son premier mandat, la constitution fut modifiée, limitant les présidents à deux mandats et réduisant la durée de chaque mandat de sept à cinq ans. En 2009, il signala qu'il pourrait se représenter en 2012 du fait que les modifications n’étaient entrées en vigueur qu’après sa prise de fonctions, mais beaucoup considèrent que cette démarche violerait la constitution. Ce ne fut toutefois que le 27 janvier, un mois avant l'élection, que le Conseil constitutionnel autorisa Wade à se représenter pour un troisième mandat, ce qui consterna l'électorat et engendra des émeutes.

Des sondages récents d'électeurs sénégalais montrent une diminution du soutien et de la confiance du président Wade et de son gouvernement :[7] Dans un sondage datant de 2008, la majorité des personnes interrogées ont indiqué qu'à leur avis, le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. [8] En outre, 74 % des personnes interrogées ont convenu et certaines ont même vivement affirmé que « la Constitution doit limiter le président à deux mandats au maximum. » Récemment, on a exprimé des inquiétudes au sujet de certaines actions de Wade, ayant pour résultat de saper la démocratie et d’affaiblir ses opposants, notamment sa suggestion en fin d’année dernière de nommer deux personnes importantes de l’opposition (actuellement candidats à la présidence), à des postes ministériels et l’arrestation d’un jeune leader socialiste du parti opposant. Au cours de l'été 2011, Wade a indiqué son intention de modifier la constitution, diminuant la proportion de voix nécessaires pour un premier tour des élections de 50 à 25 pour cent, geste sans doute calculé pour améliorer ses chances de remporter les élections. Ces actions soulèvent des inquiétudes quant à la question de savoir si Wade continuera à saper les progrès de la démocratie au Sénégal s'il remporte un autre mandat.

Qu’est-ce qui est en jeu à l'égard des relations extérieures du Sénégal ?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, Présidente, Schneidman et Associates International, invitée spéciale, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Plusieurs des relations externes clés du Sénégal pourraient être compromises si les élections prévues pour le 26 février ne se déroulaient pas bien. En 2009, selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, le pourcentage net de l'aide au développement officiel du Sénégal était proche de 8% du PIB. L'année dernière, lorsque le gouvernement du Malawi a réagi violemment à des protestations publiques dues à une augmentation des prix de l'alimentation, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et d'autres donateurs ont suspendu leurs aide, en déclarant que les libertés politiques s'étaient détériorées et qu’au moins 19 manifestants avaient été tués.

Des observateurs de l'UE, le plus grand donateur du Sénégal, sont déjà arrivés dans le pays et ont exprimé des préoccupations sur la transparence de la démarche employée pour déterminer l'admissibilité des candidats. Les observateurs ont également observé l'emploi de la force contre les manifestants de l'opposition.

Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Sénégal sont « excellentes » depuis plusieurs années, mais Washington a exprimé des appréhensions à propos d’un recul de la transparence du gouvernement. II y a deux semaines, au sujet des élections à venir, le porte-parole du Département d'Etat, Victoria Nuland, a déclaré « qu'il serait sage de faire place à la nouvelle génération, et nous pensons que ce serait mieux. » Cela a été repris par le Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint Chris Burns lors du sommet de l'Union africaine et dans une lettre adressée à Wade par le sous-comité sénatorial des Etats-Unis sur l'Afrique.

Le U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact pour le Sénégal exige que les pays respectent les indicateurs de performance en matière de liberté politique. C'est pourquoi c'est probablement la première aide à disparaître en cas de baisse du niveau de la démocratie. Les relations commerciales, y compris l'appartenance à l'African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) et l'augmentation de l'aide sont en jeu si l'élection entraîne une réduction des libertés politiques du public sénégalais.

La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest a également envoyé des observateurs au Sénégal. L'un des observateurs, l'ambassadeur Bassir du Sierra Leone, a déclaré : « tout ce qui a des répercussions négatives sur le Sénégal s'étend aussi par contagion vers le Sud et la CEDEAO détient une grande responsabilité pour s'assurer que le gouvernement, les acteurs et les citoyens dans leur ensemble, prennent les mesures nécessaires pour éviter ce genre de situation. »

Le vote des jeunes au Sénégal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium de la recherche économique et sociale
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Selon la Banque mondiale, le Sénégal a commencé à se remettre du ralentissement économique qui a débuté en 2009. Toutefois, les conséquences de la crise sur les conditions macroéconomiques actuelles continuent à mettre la pression sur la population des jeunes. Le secteur de l'énergie au Sénégal se porte mal; quant au tourisme et aux envois de fonds, ils ont commencé à subir les conséquences de la crise dans la zone euro. Tout cela a fait baisser la moyenne du taux de croissance des pays en-dessous de la moyenne subsaharienne prévue de 4,6 %. Le Sénégal, auparavant en tête de la région en matière de performance économique, se classe maintenant derrière d'autres acteurs très performants comme l'Ethiopie, le Nigeria et le Mozambique. Les petits gains de croissance au Sénégal ne se traduisent pas par des améliorations d'emplois pour les jeunes.

La population des jeunes (de 15 à 24 ans) est la plus touchée par ces conditions économiques défavorables. Le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale (CRES) de Dakar indique que de nombreux emplois ne sont pas accessibles aux jeunes en raison d'une politique d'augmentation de l'âge de la retraite et d'un arrêt de l'embauche dans le secteur public. En outre, les secteurs en croissance comme ceux de la technologie de l'information et des communications (ITC), ont de grandes exigences de capitaux et d'infrastructure et les jeunes ont souvent du mal à obtenir l'accès au capital de démarrage et les crédits nécessaires pour participer à ces secteurs. De ce fait, les jeunes sont forcés de se tourner vers les secteurs non officiels, d'émigrer ou de participer à des activités illégales. En réaction à ces difficultés, des jeunes sénégalais ont créé un mouvement désigné « Y'en a marre », afin d'exprimer leurs frustrations face à cette situation économique, du manque d'infrastructures, de la corruption du gouvernement et de l’augmentation des prix de l’alimentation et de l'essence. Les jeunes avaient protesté contre la première tentative de manipulation de la constitution par Wade l'an dernier ; ils ont déjà commencé à protester contre l'annonce de la candidature officielle de Wade par le biais du mouvement « Mouvement du 23 juin » ou M23, dominé par les jeunes.

Si Wade est réélu, la frustration des jeunes pourrait s’exprimer par une révolte à grande échelle. Ce qui est surtout inquiétant, c'est que ni le gouvernement sortant ni un nouveau gouvernement d'opposition ne semblent en mesure de gérer l’énorme taux de chômage parmi les jeunes. Le nouveau document de politique économique et sociale (2012-2015) qui succède aux documents stratégiques pour la réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) des années 2000, ne consacre qu'un soutien mineur à l’enjeu du chômage. Bien que les partis d’opposition dénoncent le chômage des jeunes, ils n’ont pas proposé de solutions concrètes pour le réduire de façon efficace.

Les institutions électorales sénégalaises et les perspectives démocratiques
Mwangi Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Le fait de tenir des élections ne renforce pas nécessairement la démocratie si le processus électoral est faible et soumis à des manipulations de l'exécutif, ou de toute autre branche du gouvernement ou s'il est permis au gouvernement de favoriser un candidat ou un parti. Les protestations récentes à la suite de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel, concernant l'admissibilité du président sortant à se faire réélire pour un troisième mandat, reflètent des institutions électorales mal conçues, et il est probable que la démocratie en sera affaiblie.

Hormis le Conseil électoral, les autres institutions à ce sujet incluent le Ministère de l'intérieur et la Commission électorale nationale autonome, (la CENA). Le Conseil constitutionnel se compose de cinq juges nommés par le président et celui-ci a le dernier mot en matière de constitution, y compris la détermination de l'admissibilité des candidatures, la confirmation de la déclaration de la CENA, et les décisions en cas de difficulté au cours des élections. Le Ministère de l'intérieur est chargé de la logistique des élections et la CENA doit superviser le processus électoral de manière autonome. Le Conseil constitutionnel et le Ministère de l'intérieur sont tous deux extrêmement influencés par l'exécutif. La CENA est quelque peu influencée par l'exécutif car le président confirme ses membres, mais ces derniers sont initialement nommés par des sources indépendantes et connus pour leur intégrité et leurs opinions impartiales. Techniquement, la CENA a été créée par une loi, si bien que son existence n'est pas aussi permanente et qu’elle survit à la « discrétion de la législature, »[9] et comme évoqué ci-dessus, elle transmet toujours ses résultats au Conseil constitutionnel qui doit les confirmer.

A la suite de son élection de 2007, Wade a nommé un Conseil constitutionnel entièrement nouveau en 2008, soulevant des soupçons que c'était pour assurer son admissibilité à un troisième mandat. La décision récente à ce propos semble confirmer ces soupçons. Il est évident que l'exécutif contrôle et influence fortement le fonctionnement des institutions électorales, les rendant inadéquates à la démocratie. Il est indispensable que les institutions électorales soient véritablement indépendantes pour que les transitions de gouvernement se produisent de façon disposée et démocratique. Après les élections, ce serait donc une priorité de réformer les institutions électorales.

Quelles seraient les influences des choix électoraux au Sénégal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Dans une grande mesure, le droit de vote dans les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne est influencé par les points principaux d’identification : selon l'origine ethnique, la religion ou la région. Tout simplement, la politique identitaire domine souvent la politique de résolution des problèmes, comme l'état de l'économie. Auparavant, le vote au Sénégal ne s'est pas fondé principalement sur la politique identitaire. Les donnés de l'afrobaromètre confirment qu'au Sénégal l'ethnicité des électeurs ne constitue pas l'élément déterminant des élections et les recherches indiquent que « le Sénégal est un pays où l'ethnicité ne joue pratiquement aucun rôle en politique.[10] La religion unifie l'électorat, qui comprend 94 pour cent de musulmans. Les fraternités musulmanes du pays transcendent les divisions ethniques [11] et les chefs politiques, de même, sont soutenus par de multiples fraternités ou sectes musulmanes. Malgré tout, les prochaines élections pourraient révéler des schémas électoraux basés sur des identités et des problèmes spécifiques. Comme le montre une publication qui fait pendant à celle-ci, il est possible que certains candidats créent des divisions fondées sur l'ethnicité et la secte religieuse en l'absence de différences plus pertinentes dans les programmes des candidats à la présidence.

Au cours de l'élection à venir, des schémas de vote ruraux-urbains pourraient aussi apparaître. La population du Sénégal est divisée de façon quasi égale entre les zones urbaines et rurales. La perception de l'économie varie aussi selon la région. Les électeurs ruraux ont un point de vue légèrement moins favorable de l'économie, avec 10 pour cent d'entre eux indiquant que l'état actuel des choses est « mauvais » ou « assez mauvais », par rapport aux sondages des zones urbaines. En outre, près de la moitié des résidents ruraux déclarent que leurs conditions de vie sont pires ou bien pires que celles du reste de la population sénégalaise, contre 21 % dans les zones urbaines. Ces différences de perception du bien-être pourraient influencer les schémas de vote et les candidats de l'opposition pourraient avoir de meilleurs résultats dans les zones rurales s'ils transmettaient un message convaincant de changement.

On pourrait voir apparaître un autre modèle de vote, celui de la diaspora sénégalaise. En 2000, il y avait 15 pays différents où les sénégalais pouvaient voter à l’extérieur de leur pays. Une étude de 2007 indique que les électeurs externes comprennent entre 4 et 5 pour cent du vote des élections sénégalaises. En 2000, la majorité des électeurs externes a continué à soutenir le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, et ce soutien aurait pu faire la différence si les résultats avaient été serrés au second tour. Si l'élection était serrée, les votes de la diaspora pourraient vraisemblablement faire la différence.

Enfin, les jeunes électeurs ont tendance à s'opposer à la réélection de Wade. Ils voteraient probablement pour l'opposition en raison des problèmes constants de chômage et du fait que le gouvernement actuel n’ait pas de programme défini pour résoudre la situation.

Élection de 2012 au Sénégal : Même scénario qu’en Côte d'Ivoire?
Julius Agbor, Chargé des recherches africaines, Africa Growth Initiative

Bien que les conditions de l'élection au Sénégal diffèrent de celles de la Côte d'Ivoire, vu l'absence de rebelles armés ou d'une division régionale entre le Nord (musulman) et le Sud (chrétien), les circonstances entourant cette élection ressemblent beaucoup à un scénario postélectoral ivoirien. Un texte de Mwangi Kimenyi et Zenia Lewis qui fait pendant à celui-ci traite des problèmes structuraux créés par le manque d'indépendance des institutions électorales au Sénégal. Mais il existe un autre problème plus subtil : c'est la possibilité d'un conflit après les élections comme c'est arrivé en Côte d'Ivoire au cours des années 2010-2011, du fait des ambiguïtés découlant du chevauchement de compétence des différents corps électoraux.

Ces conflits de compétences au Sénégal pourraient créer des confusions et déclencher des scènes de violence à la suite des élections. En Côte d'Ivoire, bien que la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) ait été chargée de l'organisation et de la supervision des élections, elle ne pouvait publier que des résultats provisoires soumis à l'approbation du Conseil constitutionnel, qui était également responsable de traiter tous les différends découlant du processus électoral. La confusion a ensuite découlé des anomalies importantes entre les chiffres annoncés auparavant par la Commission électorale et ceux qui ont été proclamés officiellement par le Conseil constitutionnel. Au Sénégal, c'est aussi susceptible de se produire au cas où les résultats officiels proclamés par le Conseil constitutionnel diffèrent de ceux signalés par la Commission électorale nationale (soi-disant) autonome (CENA). Cela serait particulièrement susceptible d'inciter à la violence en raison du fossé se creusant de plus en plus entre le peuple sénégalais et les institutions politiques du pays, à la suite de la décision controversée du Conseil constitutionnel en faveur de la candidature du président sortant. Les cas du Sénégal et de la Côte d'Ivoire indiquent les faiblesses générales des systèmes électoraux et des institutions dans les anciennes colonies françaises. A l'avenir, il est indispensable pour ces pays et beaucoup d'autres pays africains de créer des institutions électorales ne pouvant pas se prêter à ces chevauchements de compétences et qui seraient en même temps indépendantes de toute branche du gouvernement. A moins qu'on ne crée ce genre de structure électorale non ambiguë, les élections ne serviront pas à renforcer la démocratie, mais plutôt à déclencher le chaos comme on l'a vu en Côte d'Ivoire.

Négligence des Institutions autochtones africaines et la fragilité de la démocratie sénégalaise
Olumide Taiwo, Chargé de recherche de l'Afrique
Anne W. Kamau, Chargée de recherche, Africa Growth Initiative

La décision du président Wade de solliciter un troisième mandat demeure la question la plus brûlante des élections sénégalaises, susceptible de déclencher une crise postélectorale.

Il apparaît maintenant que les pays africains suivent la tendance suivante : ils semblent être démocratiquement stables pendant un certain temps et glissent ensuite dans une crise constitutionnelle ; la plupart de ces crises sont associées aux désirs des présidents sortants de prolonger leurs mandats. Le Sénégal est différent des autres pays africains où les élections se transforment en luttes entre groupes ethniques pour s'approprier les ressources de l'état. La force d'unité de la fraternité musulmane a minimisé les divisions ethniques, [12] ce qui est particulièrement important, du fait que plus de 90 % de la population est musulmane. La constitution sénégalaise prévoit également un gouvernement centralisé et puissant et le président Wade a pris de nombreuses mesures pour rendre la présidence encore plus forte. Cette centralisation du pouvoir s'oppose à la diversité ethnique et mène à leur perte de nombreux projets démocratiques dans les pays africains. En outre, une telle centralisation du pouvoir commence à exercer ses ravages sur le Sénégal. Selon certaines indications, les candidats de l'opposition et le président Wade commencent à faire appel au soutien de groupes ethniques et de segments spécifiques d'organisations islamiques. En suivant cette voie, le Sénégal pourrait suivre l'exemple de nombreux pays africains embourbés dans des conflits ethniques ou religieux.

Les démocraties stables et prospères en Afrique ont réformé leurs constitutions et revu leurs institutions de gouvernance afin de refléter leur appareil de choix collectif indigène. Pour se faire, il faut effectuer une décentralisation poussée et un transfert des responsabilités et reconnaître le rôle des chefs de tribus dans le processus de gouvernance. Par exemple, le Botswana, cité comme le pays dont la démocratie est la plus stable d'Afrique, est organisé en une fédération de tribus autonomes dirigées par des chefs de tribus qui sont également membres permanents de la Maison des chefs et qui assument un rôle de conseil et de supervision au sein du gouvernement. De même, la constitution du Ghana a créé la Maison des chefs à chaque niveau du gouvernement et donne le pouvoir à ces chefs d'assumer leurs rôles traditionnels et de favoriser les intérêts de leurs électeurs. Ces arrangements garantissent des niveaux d'autonomie importants et d'auto-gouvernance aux groupes tribaux et un gouvernement central relativement faible. Les pays dont le gouvernement demeure centralisé peuvent sembler stables au début, mais cette stabilité ne dure pas longtemps.

La constitution sénégalaise, comme celles de la plupart des pays africains, est très éloignée de l'histoire des peuples indigènes. Le fait d'hériter et de simplement modifier une constitution ne fait qu'augmenter le niveau d'animosité et d'instabilité. Au contraire, le Sénégal doit refonder ses constitutions afin de décentraliser le pouvoir et de faire participer ses peuples indigènes au processus de gouvernance.

Notes

[7] Rapport de l'afrobaromètre

[8] 53 pour cent des personnes interrogées pensent que le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. » (36 pour cent ont indiqué souvent, 17 pour cent ont indiqué toujours, tandis que 25 pour cent ont indiqué jamais/rarement et 25 pour cent ont dit qu'ils ne savaient pas)

[9] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[10] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews. 2009, "Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research."

[11] Dennis Galvan. 2001, "Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia."

[12] La région de Casamance située au sud du fleuve Gambie est exclue de cette description.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Abdoulaye Diagne
Anne W. Kamau
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Zenia Lewis
Witney Schneidman
Jessica Smith
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Sub-Saharan Africa's Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or Disaster?

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:48:00 -0500

Julius Agbor, Olumide Taiwo and Jessica Smith analyze the implications of the growing youth population in Sub-Saharan Africa. They emphasize that African governments must heed the example set by the youth-led Arab Spring and push for greater inclusion of young people into their economies to avoid political instability in their own countries.

Publication: Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012

Big Box vs. Spring Boks: Wal-Mart’s Troubles Entering the South African Retail Market

Jessica Smith and Olumide Taiwo — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 12:06:00 -0400

Earlier this year in June, after much deliberation by the South African Competition and Competitiveness Tribunal, Wal-Mart purchased a 51 percent share in the South African retailer Massmart. Under the agreed upon conditions, the merged entity would do the following: refrain from cutting any current Massmart jobs for two years, give hiring preferences to the 503 employees that were retrenched by Massmart in June 2010, honor labor bargaining rights for at least three years, and implement a local suppliers’ development program worth R100 million within three years of the merger to improve the competitiveness of South African producers. Wal-Mart estimates that the merger will create up to 15,000 jobs in the next three years and increase local procurement by R60 billion.

The opposition coalition, which is composed of two organized labor unions — The Congress of South African Trade Unions and The South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union — and three government departments — Economic Development, Trade and Industry, and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries — is not satisfied with the terms of the merger due to concerns about job loss. The opposition coalition has recently brought their argument to the Competition Appeals Court in Cape Town. The key demand from the coalition is that Wal-Mart scale up the local suppliers’ development program from R100 million to R500 million. This is an attempt to hedge the Wal-Mart merger from shifting retail procurement to more imported goods, and potentially worsening an already gloomy unemployment situation by destroying jobs in agricultural production and manufacturing.

According to the opposition, an estimated 4,000 jobs will be lost from consumer goods, food and beverage sectors if just one percent of procurement shifts from local to imported merchandise. The government ministries point to Wal-Mart’s propensity to import from Chinese suppliers as a pitfall of the merger for South African producers. A report on the South African labor market by the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) at the University of Cape Town shows that agricultural and manufacturing sectors are already in decline; between the second quarter of 2009 and the same period in 2010, employment in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector contracted by 13 percent; while the manufacturing sector contracted by 11 percent.

The sheer size of Wal-Mart in the United States gives the opposition coalition cause to be wary that the firm will change the supplier relationships of incumbent retailers if they struggle to compete with the low-price giant. As of August 2011, Wal-Mart reported that it had approximately 1.4 million employees in the United States and 700,000 employees worldwide. As of 2008, Wal-mart made up 10 percent of the U.S. Retail Sector, one percent of U.S. employment, and was the largest grocer and third largest pharmacy in the United States. However, Wal-Mart does not have the same clout in international markets as it does in the United States. In Germany, Wal-Mart entered as a smaller share of the retail market in comparison to the domestic competition. Wal-Mart was eventually pushed out of Germany by the well established retailer, Aldi, principally, because Aldi had already offered German consumers low prices and developed streamlined relationships with suppliers. In Mexico, local retailers Gigante, Comercial Mexicana and Soriana created a purchasing association, called Sinergia, to compete with Wal-Mart’s purchasing prowess. The incumbent retailers in South Africa also have well-developed relationships with suppliers, and Massmart does not have the largest market share. Massmart South Africa has only 316 stores, compared with Shoprite’s 1,800 stores and Pick n Pay’s 775. Additionally, Shoprite and Pick n Pay are aggressively expanding to other parts of Africa in search of the growing African middle class. The examples from Germany and Mexico show that incumbent retailers can maintain their share of the market and their existing relationships with suppliers upon Wal-Mart’s entry.

The labor union contingent of the coalition is also worried about maintaining job quality with Wal-Mart as an employer. Although the company has earned a reputation as an anti-union, low-wage and low-benefit employer in the United States, the retail giant has not earned this reputation internationally. Wal-Mart pays workers in Mexico higher bi-weekly salaries than the major supermarket chains; the same holds true in China and Germany. Although Wal-Mart’s tendency has been to maintain an anti-union posture in the United States and other wealthy nations like Canada, it has accommodated organized unions’ demands in poorer countries. It is not likely that the deleterious labor rights effects purported by the South African unions will materialize. This is especially true if Wal-Mart intends to use South Africa as its port of entry into the African retail market, as the company would not want to ruin its chances on the continent.

The resistance to Wal-Mart in South Africa stems from the extraordinarily high level of unemployment the country faces. As the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are already contracting under the weight of global competition, it will be difficult to isolate Wal-Mart’s effect on job numbers in those specific markets, although the supplier development program may help in averting future job losses. The conditions already attached to the merger should offset job destruction from any increase in imports from outside of South Africa, at least for the two years that Wal-Mart is under the retrenchment ban. The reaction to the Wal-mart-Massmart merger highlights the reluctance of the South African government to allow any foreign investment that might destroy jobs. While Massmart and Wal-Mart may resent an increase in the level of obligations currently being considered by the Appeals Court in Cape Town, they may have to consider them as the fixed cost of initiating operations in Africa.

Authors

Jessica Smith
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: Â© Siphiwe Sibeko / Reuters

Local Governance Reforms Are Critical to Improving the Effectiveness of IMF/World Bank Lending to Africa

Julius Agbor and Olumide Taiwo — Thu, 29 Sep 2011 16:07:00 -0400

In the wake of the global financial crisis and the persistent global food and fuel price shocks, international development institutions — notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank — have increased their concessional lending to low-income countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2009 and 2010, the IMF committed new concessional lending to sub-Saharan Africa of about $4 billion, compared to $1.1 billion in 2008 and only about $0.2 billion in 2007. The IMF’s concessional lending is expected to reach $17 billion in 2014.

With higher amounts of aid from the IMF flowing to sub-Saharan Africa, issues of governance and accountability become crucially important. There is a need to ensure that the resources acquired from concessional lending translates into poverty reduction, lower infant mortality and malnutrition rates, increased rural infrastructure, higher school enrollment, and better education and learning outcomes.

However, with a few exceptions, most sub-Saharan African countries that stand to benefit from IMF concessional lending are the poorest performing in terms of governance indicators. For instance, only Ghana and Lesotho were highly ranked on the 2010 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, while only Ghana received a favorable global ranking as the least corrupt country in the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).

In recognition of the governance deficiency in Africa, the IMF is currently upgrading the focus of its concessional loan’s conditionality from broad public participation and country ownership to issues of transparency in the management of public resources. In addition, the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims to strengthen governance in natural resource-rich countries through the full publication and verification of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. While these initiatives could have the potential to improve governance at the national level, it is unclear whether such a top-down accountability model would improve governance at local and council levels, where accountability in service delivery is most needed.

The gradual shift in emphasis among development partners toward local accountability and inclusiveness, in order to ensure prudent management of public resources and service delivery, comes as no surprise. Strategies to achieve these objectives have been mainly placed on decentralization efforts, such as the transfer of political, financial and administrative authority and responsibilities to local councils and entrenching competitive multiparty elections at the council level. The idea here is that free and fair elections give constituents the opportunity to demand accountability from elected local council officials. Unfortunately, in practice, decentralization and multiparty elections do not always guarantee local accountability and effective service delivery. This is not even in the case in some of Africa’s most established democracies.

Typically, candidates running for local council are chosen through primaries held by each political party. In most cases, party “kingmakers” provide financial and organizational support to candidates on the condition of their party allegiance. Therefore, in the use of local council funds, elected local authorities tend to prioritize political party interest at the expense of constituents’ needs. In other instances, candidates would borrow from financial institutions to finance their electoral campaigns and would pay back with council funds. Either way, the consequence is that funds allocated for basic services are captured by local officials. The World Bank Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys, which cover 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, show that in the absence of interventions, large amounts of funding for education and health services are diverted by local officials and politicians.

In many African countries, institutional frameworks that balance the interests of politicians and political parties with the needs of local constituent are weak or nonexistent. Therefore, there is a general lack of accountability for local politicians and officials. Constituents often do not have a way for redress if services are not delivered other than to wait for the next election in four to six years. Therefore, free and fair elections cannot be used as the sole mechanism for ensuring political accountability, as many African politicians tend to renege on their electoral promises soon after they are elected.

The current consensus that more information guarantees transparency ignores the fact that having information is one thing but being able to act on it is another. Constituents’ ability to critically scrutinize local officials depends on the extent of their supervisory power within the local governance framework. In many cases, this supervisory power is weak or non-existent.

To address the underlying institutional weakness, we suggest the following two reforms in the governance of local councils in sub-Saharan Africa: The framework of local governance should be restructured to provide constituents with the power to recall non-performing or corrupt officials. Additionally, political party involvement should be de-emphasized in local governance. The latter is not entirely new to Africa. In Ghana political parties are banned from participating in local elections, which allows constituents to supervise their elected officials. Indeed, the World Bank Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys show public resource leakage rarely occurs between the district government and the recipient facilities in Ghana, demonstrating that accountability is better enforced by empowered constituents.

Local accountability will remain elusive as long as it is inhibited by decentralization and elections. Currently, the election process does not control the quality of political kingmakers, or the institutions that restrain the behavior of elected leaders.

Authors

Around the Halls: African Elections

Wed, 21 Sep 2011 11:18:00 -0400

In the next two months, a number of African countries will hold presidential and legislative elections. Historically, many of these countries have faced challenges in their electoral process and given the fragility, these elections will prove to be a test to the uneasy political climate throughout the region. Mwangi Kimenyi, Nelipher Moyo, Julius Agbor, Melvin Ayogu, Anne Kamau and Olu Taiwo discuss the upcoming elections in Madagascar, Cameroon, Liberia, Gambia, Congo as well as the growing importance of China in Zambia, post-election.

Zambian Elections: The Growing Importance of China
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Senior Fellow, Director, Africa Growth Initiative and Nelipher Moyo, Research Analyst

On September 20, 2011, Zambians went to the polls to elect a new president after one of the most contested election campaigns in the nation’s history. The contest was primarily between the incumbent Rupiah ‘RB’ Banda, who represents the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which has lead the country since its first democratic elections in 1991, and Michael “King Cobra” Sata, leader of the Patriotic Front and a former MMD member.

Mr. Banda has pointed to the country’s recent economic growth and prudent economic management as justification for why he should be re-elected. Sata seeks to reach out to unemployed youths and the poor-- the constituency left behind in Zambia’s recent economic growth. Although Zambia was recently reclassified as a middle income country, many Zambians do not enjoy middle income living standards.

Mr. Sata has previously spoken out against China’s ‘exploitation’ of Zambia’s minerals and its poor labor practices. During the 2006 elections, China’s ambassador to Zambia threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Zambia if Sata was elected president. This was one of the first times that China interjected itself in the internal political affairs of an African country. While China denies providing any direct campaign assistance to Banda’s reelection bid, there is no denying the ‘made in china’ Banda campaign favors present at rallies. Some argue that this election is in fact a referendum on China, with Banda representing those Zambians in favor of closer ties and Sata representing those in favor of a more cautious approach.

Should Mr. Banda win the election, the country‘s policies will remain more or less the same. Despite softening his stance on China, it is not clear what the implications of a Sata win would be on China-Zambia relations. Would Mr. Sata revert to his previous anti-China stance, or would he prove to be more pragmatic and continue to engage the Chinese who are important for the country’s growth?

There are two areas of concern; first, Mr. Sata is among those who supported former President Chiluba’s disgraceful third term bid. In the event of a Sata Presidency, it will be important to ensure that ‘King Cobra’ does not have a similar lapse in judgment. Second, while Zambia has a history of peaceful elections, there are a large number of unemployed youths who can be mobilized for violence should either candidate fail to concede the election. It will be important for both candidates to put the interests of the country above their own.

Sustaining a Stable Post-Elections Democracy is the Crucial Challenge Facing Madagascar
Julius Agbor, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in Madagascar have been postponed three times since the beginning of the year, due to the unfavorable political climate in the country. As has been the tradition in the past, presidential elections in Madagascar have raised ethnic tensions, whereas parliamentary elections have generally taken place smoothly. Whether or not the forthcoming Malagasy election will be free and fair seems not to be the main problem. The critical challenge facing the country is sustaining a stable post-elections democratic government, considering the high degree of ethnic polarization that has characterized Malagasy politics since 1990 and has led to the frequent deposition of democratically elected Presidents. Ethnic tensions between the coastal Betsimisaraka tribe of long serving former President Didier Ratsiraka, and the highland Merina tribe of recently deposed President Marc Ravalomanana, have often polarized Malagasy political debates, fueling violent anti-government demonstrations that frequently paralyze state institutions. A recent episode is the military-backed uprising in March 2009 that led to the deposition of democratically elected President Ravalomanana’s government and the institution of a High Transitional Authority led Andry Rajoelina. Ravalomanana, who was in the third year of his second and last five-year term in office, engaged the country in an aggressive economic recovery path following a 12 percent drop in GDP provoked by the 2002 political crisis. Sadly, Ravalomanana’s economic and political reforms have largely been reversed by his successor, Andry Rajoelina.

Madagascar’s polarized politics and frequent institutional and policy reversals are creating additional disincentives for investors in a country plagued by negative per capita income growth, high inflation, and staggering poverty levels. The greatest task ahead for Madagascar’s post-election would be to uphold the outcome of the November 2010 referendum in which a new constitution was endorsed.

Autocracy in Cameroon: C’est la Vie?
Melvin Ayogu, Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

On October 9, Cameroon will hold its presidential election. Our question, and that of many Cameroonians and international observers, is if anything has changed to ensure a fair contest, since it is not apparent that the newly established electoral commission, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), is able guarantee a just process.

Since gaining independence in 1960, Cameroon has only been led by two presidents, who are from the same political party: Ahmadou Babatoura Ahidjo for 21 years and current President Paul Biya for 29 years. Biya has also recently announced plans to run again. Beyond the obvious problem of an autocratic history, there are many other reasons to doubt that the upcoming elections will be free and fair. The system, as it currently exists, has been criticised for its ultra openness. Critics argue that it has been deliberately designed to engender too many political parties, which prevents unstructured opposition from competing with the dominant political party. In addition, there is unequal access to the media as the State owns all the bill boards and charges exorbitantly for their use – a crucial tool to the campaign apparatus in developing countries where ownership of television sets is low and electricity very limited. Lastly, the design of ELECAM is far from independent, as the President appoints members to the election board, and laws require line reporting of ELECAM activities to the state security apparatus.

The recent ban on twitter does not give much hope that Cameroon is on the way to a meaningful procedural democracy, where free and fair elections would be the norm. Without a strong commitment to the reform of ELECAM’s structure, management and control, the idea of free elections in Cameroon remains an aspiration.

Liberia Elections: Solidifying Peace or Reversion to Conflict
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Senior Fellow, Director, Africa Growth Initiative

On October 11, Liberia will hold presidential and legislative elections. This is a critical juncture for this post-conflict country, and fair and peaceful elections will be instrumental in solidifying gains made over the last eight years since the cessation of conflict. But Liberia remains a fragile state and tensions arising from hotly contested elections could easily reverse the recent gains. A credible election process will also impact Liberia’s economic growth trajectory, especially in regard to prudent management of natural resources. With increasing interest in oil exploration, drilling and the exploitation of other natural resources in Liberia, the election of a leader who is not committed to improving governance could expose the country to natural resource curse.

The incumbent president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has been in power nearly six years and will face 15 other presidential candidates. Early in her term in office, President Sirleaf commanded broad support and there has been significant progress in consolidating peace and improving the economy. She has been particularly successful in forging a positive post-war image for the country internationally. However, her administration is increasingly facing criticisms for its failure to effectively deal with rising poverty, youth unemployment and corruption. The president is also being criticized for failing to devolve powers of what is considered an imperial presidency.

The upcoming Liberian elections promise to be most hotly contested in the country’s history. With a crowded field of presidential hopefuls, it is unlikely that any single candidate will receive the minimum proportion of votes required for an outright win. Thus, a runoff election is almost certain. Already the election campaigns have fractured the society along various axes of identification. Given the fragility of the security situation in Liberia, these elections could trigger widespread violence. The African Union and the broader international community must be prepared to assist in the electoral process and beef up security so as to prevent a replay of the recent Ivory Coast scenario.

The Gambia: Free and Fair Elections
Anne Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

On November 24, 2011, The Republic of The Gambia will hold its fourth democratic presidential elections. The current president, who was elected by the popular majority, is seeking a fourth term. The opposition sees these elections as a defining moment for the future of Gambia, with the president’s reelection results bringing either the establishment or the end of a monarchy. The international community and missionaries have expressed concerns about the conduct surrounding the elections, including the voter registration process and the issuing of old identification cards. Observers are concerned that foreigners from Guinea Bissau are being registered to vote in Gambia. Natives have also expressed concern that a repeat of the turmoil that followed elections in neighboring Ivory Coast will occur in Gambia if the election process is marred by fraud. As the election date draws near, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is challenged to oversee the free and fair elections and significant progress has been made to ensure this happens. However, the political undertones remain tense, with opposition not openly campaigning and fearing terror if they lose. It is evident that citizens desire a change, but the incumbent president will not relinquish power willingly. Gambia deserves the urgent attention of the world to oversee a peaceful process of free and fair elections. International communities should advise and assist in the election process to avert any violent eruptions during and after elections and to help avoid a repeat of Ivory Coast in The Republic of The Gambia.

Democracy at the Crossroads: The 2011 Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Olu Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo takes place on November 28, 2011 in advance of the mandate for the current president, Mr. Joseph Kabila, expiring on December 6, 2011. Current events in the country cast doubts on both the possibility of holding the election on this schedule and the credibility of the outcome if held under the current circumstances.

There are enormous challenges to the democratic process. Pre-election violence has recently surged in the capital city and elsewhere, while renewed incidents of violence are reported in the troubled eastern part of the country. The U.S. Department of State designates the DRC as a Critical Crime and High Political Violence country. Preparation for the election is underfunded, as donors have been unable to provide adequate resources. International funding of the electoral budget has dropped from 80 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2011 and the DRC government is unable to make up the shortfall.

Recent changes to the electoral framework challenge the credibility of the outcome. A constitutional amendment was passed in January 2011 that eliminated the second round of voting during presidential elections. This implies that a minority of total votes may elect a president as long as the candidate receives more votes than other candidates. It also makes it possible that support from a few ethnic groups or provinces would be sufficient to win the presidency. This portends clear dangers to election credibility in a country that is home to as many as 250 ethnic groups. In addition, the highest electoral body, the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which is thought to be fairly balanced in terms of composition, has been replaced by a new Independent National Election Commission (INEC) that is constituted with a more partisan majority that leans toward the ruling party.

The DRC remains a fragile state. The forthcoming election presents an opportunity to consolidate the democratic process initiated in 2006 when multiparty elections were held for the first time in 40 years. The challenges constitute real dangers of missing this opportunity.

Authors

Image Source: Â© STR New / Reuters

Reforms to Improve Local Accountability in Nigeria

Nelipher Moyo and Olumide Taiwo — Tue, 06 Sep 2011 12:00:00 -0400

Nigeria’s president, Goodluck Jonathan, appears to have placed good governance at the forefront of his political agenda. He is considering a constitutional amendment that would limit governors and presidents to a single longer term in office. This proposal is aimed at reducing the violence and political jockeying associated with elections in Nigeria by ensuring a candidate only stands for one election with a longer ‘breathing space’ between elections. President Jonathan is said to be considering an additional set of reforms, the most effective of which is to do away with the State-Local Council joint accounts and to grant Nigeria’s 774 local governments financial autonomy. Local councils in Nigeria represent the third layer of government after the federal government and state governments. Federal and state government allocations to local councils are deposited into special “State Joint Local Government Accounts.” Through these accounts, local governments are supposed to finance primary, adult and vocational education; agriculture and natural resource development, as well as health services.

Unfortunately, the existing joint account framework has been particularly vulnerable to abuse. Local council chairmen are typically nominated by political party “kingmakers” who help to finance their election campaigns. Because politicking in the country is quite expensive, federal allocations to local councils have become the means of paying back “kingmakers” for supporting their election campaigns. Keeping the political party happy is often at the forefront of councilmen’s agenda and addressing the needs of the local constituents - who have very little say in who stands for election - comes second. By the time the political party elites receive their share of the funds and the council chairmen remove their “entitlement,” there is very little left for local council development programs. Local council leaders are beholden to the entrenched interests of their political parties and those who refuse to “share” federal government allocations are often not nominated for re-election. Some devastating consequences of this misuse are demonstrated in the country’s high infant mortality and low literacy rates: Nigeria is ranked among the top 10 countries with the highest infant mortality rate in the world (91.54 deaths/1,000 live births) and it has an adult literacy rate of only 61 percent. These outcomes are likely to improve if local governments are given greater financial autonomy.

Granting local government’s financial autonomy is necessary to facilitate local development by creating the space for local leaders to invest in their constituents and to limit the opportunities for abuse by political parties. Critics of the proposal to eliminate State-Local Council joint accounts point to a few instances of success as justification for maintaining the status quo. The most commonly cited “success” case is in Lagos State, where Governor Babatunde Fashola has facilitated significant local development by managing resources prudently. However, Mr. Fashola particularly stands out because he is an anomaly ; very few governors have managed their state’s resources as prudently Mr. Fashola. Local development should not only be possible when “accidental altruists” become state governors because, frankly, such leaders are rare.

The World Bank’s Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS) of Nigeria’s health care sector found evidence of widespread leakage in public resources in the delivery of primary health services by local governments. In one state, 42 percent of health staff had not been paid for 6 months due to public resource leakages. One key recommendation from that study is to provide Nigerians with greater information about the resources and responsibilities of their local representatives so that the public can hold leaders accountable.

There is a valid concern that financial autonomy for local governments will not necessarily reduce theft or mismanagement. Evidence suggests that councilmen’s fortunes change dramatically within months of assuming office in ways that their salaries and allowances cannot support. Nigeria needs strong institutions that impose constraints on leaders so that outcomes are not dependent on the characteristics of leaders, but rather on the institutions themselves. In order to institute good governance in the country, President Jonathan must find ways to ensure council financial autonomy is accompanied by credible instruments that make the council chairmen answerable to local constituents.

Historically, one of the most common accountability mechanisms was for people to “vote with their feet” in protest of poor or corrupt leadership. Constituents would simply move elsewhere to escape bad leadership. This is not realistic in modern states with fixed borders. In advanced democracies, local councils have functioned well because of effective checks that balance political party objectives and local constituency interests. However, these checks are weak or non-existent in Nigeria. Elsewhere in West Africa and particularly in Ghana, political parties are, by law, not involved in local elections. Local constituents vote for candidates not based on party affiliation but on visible credentials. Barring political parties from participation in local government elections would remove the stronghold political parties have on local councilmen. While a plan to adopt this system is unlikely to receive high-level support, it is certainly worth consideration.

In addition to providing more information about local government budget allocation and use, we recommend the Nigerian constitution be amended to allow the people to recall non-performing elected local government officials. It is not enough to simply provide more information to the public, there needs to be mechanisms for citizens to act on that information. The power to recall officials will ensure elected officials prioritize the needs of their local constituents and deliver promised goods and services.

Ultimately, average Nigerians do not care about how long the president or governor is in office, they care about a system that can effectively deliver the necessary goods and services, needed for their wellbeing. Strategies to improve governance in Nigeria should be centered on how to design a system that is more accountable to people at this level.

Authors

Nelipher Moyo
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: Â© STR New / Reuters

The Paradox of Financial Safe Havens for African Dictators

Nelipher Moyo and Olumide Taiwo — Tue, 17 May 2011 12:26:00 -0400

Prompted by Muammar Qaddafi’s brutal military campaign against popular demand for political reforms and access to economic opportunities, the U.S. Treasury recently announced its decision to freeze $32 billion worth of assets held in U.S. banks and other investment outlets on behalf of Qaddafi and his inner circle. Recently, Swiss authorities announced that they had frozen about $1 billion worth of assets belonging to the trio of Qaddafi, Mubarak, and Ben Ali. These decisions provoke the following question: why would financial institutions accept such large sums of capital from well-known dictators? The volume of funds looted from Africa by dictators and accepted overseas are staggering in comparison with economic conditions on the continent. In a 2004 report, the African Union estimates that nearly $148 billion is lost to corruption annually and most of these funds are invested abroad. To put this in context, the figure represents about 25% of Africa’s Gross Domestic Product and many times larger than annual Overseas Development Assistance flows to Africa.

It is arguable that foreign institutions have little or no incentives to refuse looted funds brought to their doorsteps. In fact, the line of defense has been that the responsibility rests on the origin countries to address their problems of corruption and weak governance. Capital is crucial for creating economic opportunities; the more capital grows, the more economic opportunities can be created. Given these benefits, and because stolen funds are typically laundered in ways that make them appear legitimate, financial institutions in the west can be expected to refuse them only when the moral disincentives – the guilt associated with being seen as propping up dictators – outweigh the economic incentives.

The other side of the coin, however, is worth some consideration. When capital is looted from an economy, fewer economic opportunities are available for the local population. Stolen funds retained in the victim economy continue to create economic opportunities both directly and indirectly. Funds deposited in local banks facilitate loans and other bank activities. If the dictator decides to build lavish houses or complete the unfinished tower of Babel, jobs will be created locally. If instead he decides to buy a million pairs of shoes for a pricey wife, jobs will be created along the chain of commerce. In short, opportunities created by stolen funds in the destination economy represent opportunities withdrawn from the origin economy.

There is clear evidence that crime, conflict and instability take root where economic opportunities are limited or restricted. The link is well established in Somalia where pirates are permanently on the sea taking hostages and demanding ransoms. This is also clear in North Africa and the Middle East where unemployed youth and others denied access to opportunities have been at war with their governments. Indeed, the seed of the ongoing revolution was sown in Tunisia where an unemployed graduate set himself on fire because the police confiscated his vegetable cart. Since then, most of the places where the revolution has spread are countries where economic opportunities are scarce while the kings and dictators ruling over these nations have billions of dollars stored away in the capitalist centers of the world.

Conflict, unrest and war pose enormous security threats to capitalist interests. More than anything else, they serve as effective recruiting and training grounds for terrorist organizations including the broad Al-Qaeda network. The costs of keeping these threats at bay run into tens of billions of dollars annually, and are usually borne by taxpayers. For example, it costs the U.S. taxpayers approximately $1 million per day to keep aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Eden to protect commercial vessels from the Somali pirates. The cost of the first day of Operation Odyssey Dawn, aimed at preventing Qaddafi from killing his own people, is estimated at about $100 million in missiles alone. After just one week, Operation Odyssey Dawn had cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $600 million and some experts suggest that the operation could cost US taxpayers billions as the crisis continues. These costs exclude financial support for rebuilding collapsed economies and overseas development assistance.

In reality, the costs associated with globally policing conflict zones and funding post-conflict reconstruction far outweigh the benefits of keeping the stolen funds, particularly when one takes into consideration the impact on lives and human welfare. The longer dictators are aided in exporting stolen funds, the fewer economic opportunities their citizens have and the more conflicts are likely to erupt in those countries. In response, the U.S. and other havens for stolen funds have to spend public funds to police and protect their interests, resulting in perennially huge defense budgets. Sooner or later, taxpayers must bear the cost of this spending.

Efforts to prevent expatriation and support repatriation of stolen funds are enormously beneficial. For example research shows that if only a quarter of the stock of capital stolen from sub-Saharan Africa is repatriated, the region would transit from trailing to leading other developing regions in terms of domestic investment needed to create economic opportunities. The 2005 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) provides a framework for collective action against expatriation of stolen funds. African countries and other victims of state looting have implemented a number of reforms and have achieved major advances in the fight against corruption on the domestic front. They now require support from the other side of the stolen funds equation.

In 2010, the G-20 agreed on an Anti-Corruption Action Plan which calls on the group to lead by example to fight corruption. Such initiatives are applauded; however, it is time to move beyond rhetoric to actually implement the UNCAC and other anti-corruption measures. After the September 11 attacks, led by the United States, western governments began to work together and have achieved significant success in combating terrorism finance. This proves that with strong political will and effective cooperation it is possible to curb the flow of illicit funds. A similar concerted effort needs to be made to prevent the flow of stolen assets from developing countries to safe havens in the West.

The moral reasons why advanced economies should not accept stolen funds from dictators are obvious but they have not been compelling enough for financial institutions to stop this practice. Nevertheless, when one looks beyond the short term it becomes clear that the gains from holding stolen assets may not exceed the long term security, development and other costs associated with the persistent lack of opportunity in victim countries. Policymakers should consider whether U.S. gains from holding $32 billion worth of Qaddafi’s assets (about 41 percent of Libya’s 2010 GDP) will exceed the security related costs that the United States and its NATO allies are now incurring. Ultimately, it is dime-wise, dollar-foolish to continue to accept stolen assets from dictators.

Authors

Nelipher Moyo
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: © Zohra Bensemra / Reuters

Is Zimbabwe Next? Following the Path of Political Revolution

Olumide Taiwo — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 15:13:00 -0500

The recent weeks have undoubtedly ushered in a period of political change in the Middle East and North Africa. The governments of Tunisia and Egypt have been overthrown by the popular will of the people, and the forces of change are currently at work in Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. Seeing the potential for revolution, other countries in the region have taken some tangible steps toward government reform as a means of pacifying possible protesters. In a country that has faced serious economic decline, food and public health crises, and human rights abuses over the past decade, will Zimbabwe face similar uprisings resulting from mounting frustrations of its people?

Although there have been reports that Zimbabwean authorities have arrested 46 people for attending a lecture on the Egyptian and Tunisian protests, several economic factors must be weighed to consider whether a country is volatile enough for an uprising.

Most of the analyses of the peaceful revolutions argue that the protests signal demand for political freedom, and have therefore risen primarily in countries ruled by dictatorships and oppressive regimes. Others argue that economic rights are central to the problem considering the large number of unemployed youth in those countries. The protests are thus seen as wildfires that will spread to countries where the rulers have been in power for far too long or where economic conditions are tough.

If these yardsticks are applied, then 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa—including Zimbabwe—in which rulers have been in power for more than 15 years should be on the watch list. The list of countries with their respective age of current regime include Equatorial Guinea (32), Angola (32), Zimbabwe (31), Cameroon (29), Uganda (25), Burkina Faso (24), Swaziland (24), Sudan (21), Chad (21), Eritrea (18), Gambia (17) and Ethiopia (16). All these countries are faced with the problems of youth unemployment and are also ranked as poor countries.

However, Sub-Saharan Africa is different from MENA in one particular respect. MENA lies largely in the desert where landed resources are limited to oil and perhaps other mineral deposits. Individuals and households lack arable farmlands that primarily provide employment and livelihood in many societies; and as a result, they have limited ability to generate economic activity independent of the state. This has led to employment opportunities being largely created by the state. For example, in Egypt, the public sector is the primary employer of college graduates. As a result, these countries must be organized as welfare or “nanny” states. In contrast, the productive farmland, instead of the state, remains the primary source of livelihood for individuals and families in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the exception of South Africa, the concept of welfare statehood is generally unpopular in the region.

The decline in capacity of the “nanny” state is arguably the proximate cause of the on-going revolution that is spreading worldwide. Inadequacies of the welfare state over the years in Tunisia and Egypt were the seeds of the recent revolutions. Protests for political rights would have little effect in the welfare states that are performing well in the region. For example, the Al Saud dynasty retains monopoly of power in Saudi Arabia since the country was formed in 1932 but the country has remained a healthy welfare state. Similarly, Qatar has been ruled by the al-Thani family since the 1800s—the current ruler has been in power for 15 years—but remains a strong welfare state. Other performing welfare states include Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Although protests have recently been organized in Bahrain, the protesters still find it difficult to articulate the purpose of their dissent.

By all standards, Zimbabwe is far from being a nanny state. Although economic conditions, such as an estimated 95 percent unemployment rate, and recent hardship could fuel dissent, there are many factors that serve as effective counterweight. As in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the middle class in Zimbabwe is emerging gradually, and not many of them are likely to jump into the protest fray. The power-sharing government has provided some stability and made possible a cessation of the recent hyperinflation. The inflation rate was about 5.3 percent in 2010. Despite many economic hardships, Zimbabwe is seeing consistent growth. The country went from -14.4 percent of GDP in 2008, to a growth of 4.1 percent in 2010. This progress is likely to keep Zimbabwe clear of an uprising; and it is not likely the country would fall in the near future, at least not before the next election.

Authors

Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: © Philimon Bulawayo / Reuters

Resolving the Crisis in Ivory Coast: The Role of Regional Organizations

Brandon Routman and Olumide Taiwo — Thu, 27 Jan 2011 12:17:00 -0500

The post-election crisis in Ivory Coast has generated a flurry of reactions and stated positions from regional and continental bodies as well as from the wider international community. The crisis has lingered this far primarily because it is unclear what the actual issues are. The debate is even more intense among those seeking to understand the crisis from the constitutional point of view. The United Nations and other bodies seem to have elevated the outcome to be far more important than the process. But a simple fact is that an outcome is as good as the process that generates it. In the Ivorian case, the process was grossly defective.

The country’s constitution is a complex document. Different provisions can be reasonably cited to accord more or less power to the Independent Electoral Commission or the Constitutional Court in matters of elections. Unfortunately, the former is purportedly dominated by loyalists of Alassane Quattara; the latter, by loyalists of Laurent Gbagbo. Unsurprisingly, each declared the winner of last year’s election as their respective favored candidate.

Rather than treating the crisis as a constitutional problem, however, the United Nations and other organizations have declared that the commission’s decision is final and the court’s decision is immaterial. When Thabo Mbeki, the former South African president who served as the first African Union envoy to the country, suggested that the issues needed to be investigated, he was quickly replaced by Kenyan Prime Minister Ralia Odinga who is strongly in favor of sustaining the position of the international body.

The member nations of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) quickly aligned themselves with the U.N. position. In fact, they have even gone further to advance a military option against Gbagbo, in case diplomatic efforts to remove him from office fail. It is possible that they hurriedly stated the position out of need to align with the rest of the international community. It is also likely that they anticipate a coalition government in the future, and probably feel that another power-sharing government would be a terrible outcome, bearing in mind previous experiences in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

To many African leaders and the international community, the idea of power-sharing in a coalitional government is unappealing at best and repulsive at worst. In fact, elevation of Odinga as the envoy has been interpreted by some as a warning to ECOWAS members to prohibit the option. At present, the option of a power-sharing government in Ivory Coast is off the table as all efforts are directed toward ousting Gbagbo by every means possible.

Voices within the continent, including South African President Jacob Zuma and President Museveni of Uganda, are calling for an investigation of the constitutional and electoral issues in the country. But, by and large, they are being drowned out. ECOWAS leaders are taking sides with Quattara’s camp and, through the Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia, are asking for a military operation in Ivory Coast. They see themselves as liberators whom the Ivorians would line the streets to greet after removing Gbagbo.

Ivorians are no strangers to rebellion and ethno-regional conflict. There is presently a high level of unemployment and underemployment among the youth. These conditions portend danger of chaos and insurgency if a major conflict should break out in the country. The world has seen many of these before.

As political leaders gather at the African Union Summit this week, they will need to focus on objectively understanding the facts regarding the Ivorian political and electoral crisis. As they weigh the various options, including possible military intervention, they must take into account possible risk of a massive influx of refugees and a potential humanitarian disaster. Post-election crises are not new to Africa; and countries have managed to work through them in several ways. But foreign military intervention could devastate the country, its people, and its economy. Thus, before calling for a coup and commando operations, regional organizations should explore all other options to end the crisis.

Authors

Brandon Routman
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: © Luc Gnago / Reuters

The Crisis in Tunisia: Africa’s Youth Unemployment Time-Bomb

Nelipher Moyo and Olumide Taiwo — Wed, 26 Jan 2011 13:44:00 -0500

The Annual African Union Summit convenes this week in Addis Ababa. In addition to discussing this year’s theme “Towards Greater Unity and Integration through Shared Values,” African heads of states are faced with two major crises in Cote d’Ivore and in Tunisia. While many scholars have focused on the regime change aspect of the crisis in Tunisia, we suggest that a primary contributory factor of the crisis is high joblessness among youths.

The crisis in Tunisia is an important reminder of why unemployment, more importantly, youth unemployment should be at the forefront of Africa’s growth agenda over the next decade. Youth unemployment/underemployment is not just a threat to authoritarian regimes like that of Tunisia but also to democracies. In Ghana, one of Africa’s most successful democracies, jobless youths have taken to barricading government offices and making demands to politicians.

Africa has had significant growth over the last decade. In fact, GDP growth averaged more than 5 percent over the last decade. The continent is now being praised for a speedy recovery in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. Unfortunately, high GDP growth has not led to employment growth. As reported by the International Labor Office (ILO), about 7.2 percent of Africa’s youths are unemployed and an additional 46.9 percent are underemployed or inactive. African economies have been able to achieve and sustain high growth but attention now must focus on job creation.

According to the 2010 Africa Economic Outlook, more than 60 percent of Africa’s population is under the age of 25 and expected to increase to 75 percent by 2015. The United Nations Population division has also observed that Africa’s youth bulge is quite unique; the region will account for 29 percent of the world’s population aged 15-24 by 2050, up from 9 percent in 1950. By comparison Asia/Pacific and Latin America/Caribbean will maintain their 1950 shares of 54 percent and 7 percent respectively in 2050.

With aging populations in advanced economies and rising wages in Asia, Africa has the opportunity to become the next center for manufacturing, ICT and service sector jobs. Africa’s “youth bulge” need not be a harbinger of conflict and instability in Africa.

A key challenge for Africa is the fact that the jobs that are available in the wage sector are too few compared with the bulging youth labor market. Also, the market for capital that youth should be able to access to create enterprises and jobs for themselves is severely underdeveloped in Africa.

One part of the solution to address this problem is to provide tax incentives for foreign firms that establish operations in Africa. These incentives should be focused on investments made in targeted industries such as manufacturing and ICTs. Incentives could be designed to reward companies that hire local staff across the spectrum of their operations especially in the upper management category.

Africa has the opportunity to attract manufacturing companies as wages rise in Asia. There will be a significant first-mover advantage for those countries that create a good business environment and provide the right kind of skilled labor. It is important therefore for countries to align skills training with the kinds of jobs they want to attract. Those countries that wish to attract manufacturing jobs should ensure that local youth are trained in the use of machinery. Similarly those countries wishing to attract ICT-related jobs should provide computer training.

In addition to attracting foreign businesses to invest in Africa, African countries need to develop comprehensive strategies to create jobs locally. With more than 80 percent of the labor force engaged in small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs), the growth of SMEs should be an integral part of Africa’s job creation strategy.

This will require that capital be made available for businesses of all sizes. At present very small businesses have access to capital through microfinance institutions and large corporations have access through commercial banks. There is a “missing middle” for firms seeking to grow their businesses from small to medium to large, and for individuals willing to start businesses at middle levels. It is important to address this capital gap.

Governments need to make it easier for banks to extend loans to the “missing middle.” This means addressing the information problems that banks face when trying to extend loans to young entrepreneurs. National identification systems should be prioritized as a starting point for development of credit/consumer information systems. By facilitating information gathering, African governments can help to reduce the risk of doing business with young entrepreneurs which will in turn result in more favorable lending terms.

Real regional integration is essential for job creation in Africa. One of the primary obstacles to doing business in Africa is the high transportation costs. Meaningful regional integration can help to reduce these costs. Manufacturing companies require efficient supply chains for their operations. Governments should work within their regional economic groups to make it easier to conduct cross-country commerce in Africa. One stop borders are a great place to start. The East African Community has reaped significant benefits from increased regional trade. Indeed, Uganda’s recovery from the global financial crisis was due in large part to the fact that half of the country’s trade is with regional partners. Other regional groups can reap similar benefits.

The crisis in Tunisia offers an important warning about the dangers of youth joblessness. With a comprehensive innovative strategy to tackle youth unemployment, Africa’s burgeoning youth population could become a real blessing for the region.

Authors

Nelipher Moyo
Olumide Taiwo

Image Source: © Stringer France / Reuters

Improving Aid Effectiveness for Africa's Economic Growth

Tue, 11 Jan 2011 16:17:00 -0500

Olumide Taiwo examines the importance of improving aid eff ectiveness in 2011 and beyond. He calls on donors to adhere to the principlesoutlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and on African governments to tackle corruption, increase internal revenue generation and boost national saving.

Publication: Foresight Africa: The Continent’s Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011

Weathering the Storm: Africa after the Crisis

Wed, 07 Jul 2010 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 7, 2010
2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Throughout the financial crisis, Africa has proved resilient, despite a 50 percent reduction in the pace of economic growth from the previous decade. Prudent macroeconomic policies prior to the crisis, coupled with sustained foreign aid and loan support from the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, have softened the impact of the crisis on Africa. However, challenges still remain to ensure that African countries stay on track to meet the Millenium Development Goals and recover growth rates to pre-crisis levels.

On July 7, the Brookings Institution hosted Abebe Shimeles, principal research economist at the African Development Bank, for a discussion of the recently released African Economic Outlook for 2010. The report, produced by the African Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), reviews Africa’s performance through the crisis and presents projections for future recovery. Dr. Shimeles’ remarks were followed by a panel discussion with Brookings scholars to examine how public resources may be utilized in Africa to reduce external dependence moving forward.

Audio

Weathering the Storm: Africa after the Crisis

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Abebe Shimeles

Principal Research Economist
African Development Bank

Around the Halls: Vice President Biden Visits Africa

Emmanuel Asmah, John Mutenyo, John Page, Ezra Suruma and Olumide Taiwo — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 11:50:00 -0400

Vice President Biden travels to Africa this week with several stops, including Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Experts from around the halls of Brookings weigh in on the significance of a visit that highlights a new U.S. strategic interest in region. Issues to be discussed include economic growth, peace and stability and a range of other bilateral and regional issues.

In this edition:

Ezra Suruma: Is Vice President Biden Coming to Help Carry the African Burden?
John Page: From Cairo to the Cape - The Wrong Conversation
Emmanuel Asmah: Focusing on ‘the Positives’ in Africa
John Mutenyo: Zero Tolerance for Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa
Olumide Taiwo: Peace and Stability in the DRC

Is Vice President Biden Coming to Help Carry the African Burden?
Ezra Suruma, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

Both Americans and Africans should take pride in the fact that America’s victory in World War II was quickly followed by decolonization in Asia and Africa. American ascendency to world leadership promised and delivered freedom from colonial rule inspired by America’s own exemplary struggle against colonialism and aspirations for human equality and democracy. Despite those early hopes for freedom and development, it is now almost 50 years since most African nations attained political independence, yet poverty and instability continue to bite hard.

As Vice President Joe Biden visits Africa, he cannot help but take stock of the continuing upheavals and threats of upheavals in the Great Lakes Region notably Congo, Somalia and Sudan. With al Qaeda’s long arm reaching out to Somalia, Darfur and elsewhere, America’s professed lack of interest in Africa has now faded, making Africa’s burden also America’s burden. Peace and security is Africa’s number one problem since without it economic development cannot proceed. No foreign or domestic investor can contemplate a serious investment in Somalia, Darfur, or eastern Congo. With the UN Security Council meeting in Kampala this month to consider among others, the instabilities in Congo, Sudan and Somalia, it is clear that Biden needs little reminder of the severe implications of yet another military front for the U.S. The vice president will therefore be expected to assure Africa’s leaders in Nairobi and Pretoria of America’s full commitment to peace and security in the continent.

It is good that Vice President Biden will join other world leaders to kick off the world’s greatest sports event, the World Cup. While the U.S. may not be a front runner in the matches, it is important that it is participating and Biden’s presence will go a long way in boosting the U.S. team’s morale. The African teams are in a similar position as the American team in that they are not favored to win. Nevertheless, they are most enthusiastic that this great event is taking place in Africa.

Biden’s visit will be seen by African nations as a show of U.S. support for Africa. The symbolism is excellent. What it says to Africa is: “We are with you in this one and we shall be with you in other matters as well.” This should help to lighten the burden of the vice president’s visit. Sharing in the joy of participating in the World Cup in Africa should bring much needed relief to the entire world community, America included. From the stresses of war, economic recovery and environmental disasters, Americans should hopefully be able to have a ball if only for a few weeks. The United States and Vice President Biden are certainly most welcome in Africa.

From Cairo to the Cape - The Wrong Conversation
John Page, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development

Vice President Biden’s Africa trip is a welcome demonstration of interest in Africa by the U.S. administration, but his talking points in Egypt, Kenya and South Africa represent a missed opportunity to focus on a crucial missing link for creating jobs and growth in Africa—regional integration. In Egypt, Vice President Biden will meet with President Hosni Mubarak to discuss "a full range of bilateral and regional issues," begging the question of which region will be discussed given the current international climate. In Kenya, he will address matters of "peace and stability;" and in South Africa, Biden will “meet with South African and world leaders attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup.”

From Cairo to the Cape, Biden will visit the three largest economic powers in COMESA—the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa—a regional economic grouping, encompassing 19 member states with a population of 430 million. This regional market of significant size and diversity has failed to deliver on its potential. When I spoke at the COMESA investment forum held in Egypt in April, both the potential and the frustrations of COMESA were evident. Business leaders from across the continent meeting with senior trade and development officials from member states were bullish on COMESA—pointing to its robust recent economic growth, improved investment climate and recovering global export markets as sources of dynamism. Simultaneously, they were deeply frustrated with lack of progress by member states in achieving meaningful progress toward true regional integration.

COMESA is a “common market” in name only. It has not achieved free trade among its members, cross-border movement of people remains problematic, and it is far from integrating its financial markets. Its member states belong to other regional economic groupings—most importantly the East African Common Market and the Southern African Development Community—and it is unclear how these multiple and overlapping regional groups relate. Without leadership from its most important members—precisely those countries Vice President Biden will visit—COMESA is likely to continue to frustrate investors and trading partners alike.

Why is regional integration so important for Africa? Its economies are small both in population and economic size. Transport and power links between countries are limited, and poorly performing institutions such as regulation of commerce and customs raise the cost of trade logistics. Without effective regional integration, Africa simply cannot compete in the global market for manufactures, traded services such as tourism and IT-based services, and high value-added agriculture. Yet the region’s long-term ability to create high-paying jobs and sustain growth depends fundamentally on its success in competing globally in these industries. Integrating locally to compete globally is fundamental to Africa’s economic success.

Biden’s trip is a missed opportunity to raise the issue of how Egypt, Kenya and South Africa can push the pace of creating an effective COMESA; and for the administration to think about how it can support regional integration in Africa through aid and trade. Africa and Biden deserve a better set of talking points.

Focusing on ‘the Positives’ in Africa
Emmanuel Asmah, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Africa is coinciding with a historic World Cup soccer competition that is being held in Africa for the very first time. This means the entire world will be watching Africa, giving the continent more international media coverage than ever before. This is a great opportunity for Vice President Biden to communicate the diversity and wealth of Africa and the contribution it can make to resolving global problems, like low-carbon growth and food security.

The last thing Africa needs is intense global media attention on negative African stereotypes and challenges, such as humanitarian tragedies, famines, disease, piracy, violence and state capacity deficits. People should be made to realize that Africa is a diverse and vast continent. Therefore, headline-grabbing challenges in a few areas in the continent should have little bearing on conditions elsewhere. By highlighting Africa’s successes during his visit, Biden can change the way Africans are perceived by the international community.

Africa needs more investments and fair trade to accelerate the pace of economic growth and development. Moreover, Africa needs a renewed sense of respect, real partnerships and positive engagement with the rest of the world. Foreign investors and the international community should focus their attention on:

Africa’s rich human and natural resource potentials;
profitable trade and investment opportunities
some remarkable achievements in human development, political accountability, peace and security; and
improved investment climate change related areas.

The last decade has seen remarkable examples of recovery from conflict and democratic consolidation. Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Kenya are a few examples. Improvements in governance performance in 31 out of 48 countries, as assessed by the Mo Ibrahim Index are also worth mentioning. As an expression of political commitment to good governance and openness to criticism, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been a positive sign for those countries that have submitted themselves to assessment.

Though progress is still insufficient, public expenditure management in several countries has improved, regulatory and supervisory bodies have been strengthened, and tax systems have been reformed to internationally recognized standards of good fiscal practice. Some measures to improve the business environment, such as alleviating supply-side bottlenecks, have created a more attractive environment for foreign investment. As a result, Africa is performing much better today than a decade ago and African economies look motivated to sustain the momentum that has been building up in recent years. Africa is hoping to add to ‘these positives’ with a World Cup win by an African country. The future looks bright for Africa and nothing less than a campaign for political goodwill, positive encouragement and practical support for Africa’s economic and social development is needed during Biden’s visit to the continent.

Zero Tolerance for Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa
John Mutenyo, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

When Vice President Biden visits with African leaders this week, he should stress the importance of good governance and tackling corruption. Botswana and Mauritius clearly demonstrate the “yes, Africa can” develop if it builds strong institutions; while the situation in Zimbabwe proves that bad governance and corruption lead to economic downfall. If Africa is to develop it needs strong institutions to support good governance, strong and independent judiciary, transparency, zero tolerance of corruption, and independent police and the military among others.

African nations typically fall at the bottom of every list of economic activity despite being abundant in natural resources. The bottom 25 spots of the U.N. Quality of Life Index are regularly occupied by African nations. In 2009, 33 of the 49 countries on the U.N. list of least-developed nations were from Sub-Saharan Africa. And in September 2009, out of 40 highly indebted poor countries, 29 were from SSA.

There are many causes for poor economic development and instability in Africa, but weak government institutions due to corruption and bad governance are at the center of the problem. For instance, rigged elections have become quite common and have recently transpired in Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to name a few.

Corruption in African countries is on the rise. According to World Bank data on governance, in 1996, 27 of the 50 most corrupt countries were from Africa; and by 2008, 37 of the 50 countries were from Africa. Corruption seems to be an African affair, even engulfing the mighty South Africa whose corruption index has been worsening since 1990.

Many African governments have instituted anti-corruption agencies and laws, which are basically used to hoodwink the donor community. In the slightest chance that these laws are ever enforced, the culprit is most likely to be a political opponent. During the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in Uganda, it was suspected that some of Uganda’s ruling government officials, including the vice president and several ministers, embezzled serveral million dollars. Surprisingly all these suspects are still occupying government offices today. Shortly before this incidence, millions of U.S. dollar donor-funds meant for treating AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria were stolen. To date, the suspects are at large and some are members of Parliament.

If African countries are to develop economically and fight poverty, emphasis must first be placed on improving the quality of institutions. This will encourage both foreign and domestic investment and discourage capital flight. Vice President Biden needs to stress strong positions against corrupt and despotic regimes. Biden should reiterate the words of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during their separate visits to Africa that the continent needs to build strong institutions, increase transparency, reduce corruption and support democratic processes. Biden, like Obama should also challenge Africa to take charge of its destiny in the world.

Peace and Stability in the DRC
Olumide Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Africa Growth Initiative

It is a welcome development that Vice President Joe Biden will visit Africa this week with stops in Egypt and Kenya, and then South Africa, in time for the 2010 World Cup opening ceremony. More assuring, Vice President Biden will spend some time addressing peace and stability issues in the Horn of Africa, specifically in Sudan and Somalia, before the competitions kick off in Johannesburg.

In most African countries, international football competitions usually eclipse ongoing conflicts. The conflicts only become more vigorous after the competitions are over. However, while focusing on peace and stability in the Horn of Africa is laudable, ignoring peace and stability in the heart of Africa or treating the sub-region as unimportant or a lost cause is not.

The focus on Sudan and Somalia is understandable considering the U.S. classifies Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism and Somalia as a safe haven for al-Qaeda fighters. There are presently no perceived links between al-Qaeda terrorism and the multinational conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where militias from Rwanda and Uganda are battling the DRC government over its resource-rich eastern Kivu region. Unfortunately, conditions in this conflict zone make it no less a potential recruiting ground for terrorist activities, especially if things continue to fester. The DRC government of Joseph Kabila remains incompetent in defending its territory and protecting its citizens against foreign militias. Worse still, President Kabila has ordered a “crush or neutralize” tactic to suppress political opponents in order to retain his power. The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the region seem unable to do anything significant to advance peace and stability. The DRC, particularly the Kivu region, is presently a safe haven for war criminals who have created a mini-state for themselves with accompanying threats of violence and land-grabbing. Hundreds of thousands of boy soldiers have been trained and engaged in the conflict. Poverty, unemployment and illiteracy rates continue to rise as conflict after conflict ravages the region. It is important to note that these conditions are not qualitatively different than those which existed in Sudan and Somalia before the incursion of al-Qaeda.

Peace and stability in Kivu region, and ultimately in DRC, is achievable under a credible and strong democratically-elected government that respects human rights. This is not likely to be different from the requirements that Vice President Biden will outline when addressing the situations in Sudan and Somalia. The odds of achieving this goal in the DRC would be significantly improved if Biden devoted some press time during his visit to discuss electoral reforms in the DRC so as to ensure free and fair elections next year.

Authors

Challenges and Possibilities for Progress in Nigeria

Olumide Taiwo — Mon, 17 May 2010 12:20:00 -0400

The death of Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua did not come as a shock to most Nigerians due to his prolonged illness. In memory of his brief presidency, Yar’Adua will be remembered most for his unyielding commitment to the rule of law and his personal transparency as a politician. These attributes are rare among the Nigerian political elite. As president-elect, he declared his financial assets and invited Nigerians to judge his pledge of transparency at the end of his elected term when he would once again declare his assets. His attempt to find a lasting solution to the crisis in the oil-producing Niger-Delta region produced an amnesty program that required militants to lay down their guns and embrace peace and development in their communities. After admitting flaws in the election that brought him the presidency, Yar’Adua immediately initiated an overhaul of the electoral process to ensure that Nigeria could conduct credible elections in the future. He removed the selectivity stain that previously clouded anti-corruption efforts. In a departure from his predecessor, Yar’Adua institutionalized efforts to fight corruption rather than build the efforts around an individual, although his efforts against corruption were overshadowed by noise from within and outside the country.

During his inaugural speech, the new Nigerian president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, affirmed his commitment to Yar’Adua’s legacy in the areas of transparent governance, electoral reform, peace and development of the Niger Delta, security of life and property around the country, and the fight against corruption. Since the return of democratic governance to Nigeria in May 1999, elected presidents have tended to live up to their promises. A comparison of the last two presidents’ inaugural speeches and their subsequent achievements not only support this but also provides a basis for confidence in the new president.

Jonathan has learned important governing lessons from the various crises and challenges of democratic governance during his tenure as a deputy governor, then as governor of his home state before becoming vice president in May 2007. While these experiences are invaluable, it is also important that, as president, Jonathan seizes this opportunity to put Nigeria back on the path of rapid progress by devising fresh approaches to tackling the country’s growth and development problems.

Good Governance and Electoral Reforms

President Jonathan has taken some steps to demonstrate his commitment to good governance. He declared his financial assets back in 2007, and has included more people with either good knowledge of the country or proven managerial skills in his cabinet. While these were good steps, the problem of political patronage remains the bane of political and economic progress in Nigeria. Although the leadership crisis that gripped the country following the former president’s illness is partly attributable to weakness in the constitution regarding succession of power, it is to a greater extent a reflection of the strength of political patronage. Going forward, the president needs to establish new standards regarding who should do business with government and how government business should be run. Some of the steps taken by the Obama administration in the U.S. could provide guidance in this respect. On electoral reforms, he has taken some bold steps by removing the controversial chairman of the electoral commission. He should continue to engage the Judicial Council in the reforms and ensure that credible electoral officers are appointed, while ensuring the independence of the electoral commission. He also needs to ensure that the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) becomes an institution that operates independently of the presidency subject to the rule of law.

Peace and Development of the Niger-Delta

The crisis in the Niger Delta has festered over more than two decades. The late president had already initiated an amnesty program to tackle the issue. Moving forward on this agenda requires a critical look at the historically important issues. Although the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed that their struggle was borne out of total neglect of the Niger Delta areas, insiders would say that the crisis was more a result of the loss of confidence and trust by the youth in their political leaders. First, the federal government did not make good on its plan to compensate the indigenes for land appropriated for oil exploration. Second, monetary compensations by the oil companies to the communities through their leaders are often misappropriated. The youth reacted by attacking the homes and properties of community leaders. After cycles of infighting and having realized their approach was not fruitful, the youth changed their strategy and resorted to demanding compensation directly from the oil companies by taking hostages and demanding ransoms.

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which was established about a decade ago to develop those areas, has made minimal impact primarily due to internal conflicts among its members. Members from different states and ethnic groups would prefer to appropriate most of the funds and projects for the benefit of their own respective areas. The absence of tangible impact by the commission remains a rallying point for militant youth to return to hostage-taking. As an indigene and former governor of a member state of the Niger Delta, the acting president needs to demonstrate that he has the knowledge, executive power and the political will to implement the terms of the amnesty program. Although he has recently appointed a new minister of the Niger Delta, there is a pressing need to restructure the NDDC in order to fasten the pace of development efforts. Jonathan could consider appointing a trusted Nigerian non-indigene of the Niger Delta area as chair of the governing board in order to break the current and potential stalemate in the commission’s decision process.

Security Issues around the Country

The crisis in Jos, Plateau State and similar crises in other parts of Nigeria provide lessons in the handling the country’s security matters. However, the lessons would be lost if the causes of these security crisis are not thoroughly examined. The Jos crisis began as an ethno-political one, but has recently assumed a dangerous religious dimension. The crisis started in 1996 during election for chairmanship of the Jos North local government. The new council was created by the Ibrahim Babangida administration in 1994 and governed by an appointed chairman for the first two years during which there were no crises. The area is populated by indigenous people and immigrant settlers. Since the settlers have outnumbered the indigenes over the years, the council election was won by a representative of the immigrant Hausa ethnic group, the majority population group in the council area. The outcome was not acceptable to the indigenes who felt entitled to the office. Since then, the battle for control of the local government has generated unrest on a recurring basis. The crisis assumed a religious dimension since the immigrant Hausas are Muslims and the indigenes are predominantly Christians. Other ethnic groups have become victims of the intermittent crisis either accidentally or by taking sides with the two groups based on religious affiliations.

Fundamentally, the Jos crisis can easily be replicated in other parts of the country as long as there are grounds for rivalry for resource control, particularly along ethnic lines. The main lesson learned is that governance by appointed administrators who are typically from outside the council area has worked better for peace and development. While this is at odds with the principles of democratic governance, the model provides clues as to how to solve the crisis. The government has always dealt with this and other crises on a post-mortem basis by setting up committees of inquiry. It is time to switch from the committee-of-inquiry approach to investing in more proactive domestic intelligence gathering system. Every crisis-in-waiting can be averted with little additional investment in the intelligence apparatus. Nigeria has the manpower to achieve this goal; there are people with deep knowledge of the history of every potential trouble area that would be happy to be part of the process.

Sound and Long-Term Public Institutions

The major problems confronting development in Nigeria are rooted in socio-cultural composition. The society consists of distinct and numerous communal groups, extended families and lineages, clans and ethnic groups, which have served to sustain livelihoods during years of bad governance, unemployment, deprivation and financial insecurity. As a result, these groups have transformed into solidarity groups, the welfare of which has assumed greater importance than the welfare of the larger society. This explains why female relatives of a Nigerian politician ordered to be arrested for corruption are willing to strip naked in protest. A Nigerian politician who holds public office is expected to use the country’s resources first and foremost for the benefit of his or her cultural, familial, ethnic or religious group. Instead of hard work on the farm or other productive enterprises, politics and political patronage have turned out as the most productive private investments and the platform for achieving the “Nigerian” dream.

For Nigeria to move forward in a sustainable way, it is imperative to strengthen public institutions, including law enforcement and social security institutions. The parliament needs to take seriously the issue of retirement benefits for politicians in every part of the county. There is urgent need for viable debate on how to eliminate the “fear of the unknown” that is the leading driver of corruption. If necessary, new institutions should be creatively designed with two objectives in mind. First, they must have the potential to weaken group solidarity. Second, they should provide Nigerian citizens some sense of ownership of the larger society in the country. It is also time to start investing in the collection of rich data that can provide the necessary information for development planning and robust policy analysis. The current depth of data collection efforts is anything but commendable.

The 2011 Presidential Election

President Goodluck Jonathan should not make participation in the 2011 presidential election a do-or-die affair. He should rather focus on building on the legacy of his late friend and predecessor Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. He has the support of various interest groups and citizens from across the country behind him. He should seize the moment and pursue the goals he promised in order move the country onto a path of sustainable development. If Jonathan decides to run in the 2011 presidential election and wins, it would be good news for the country since it guarantees continuity in his programs and policies. If instead he decides to just complete the tenure of the Yar’Adua administration, then he can focus more energy into his plans and supervise a credible election later this year. Either way, it is a win-win situation for the country.

Authors

Olumide Taiwo