Brookings: Experts - Stephen J. Stedman

Changing How We Address Global and National Security

Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual and Stephen J. Stedman — Mon, 16 Mar 2009 12:00:00 -0400

When it comes to global security threats, there has been no shortage of wake-up calls. Transnational criminals illegally traffic sophisticated nuclear technology to unstable regimes in the most conflict prone regions of the world. Terrorist groups who seek to inflict mass casualties are found with training materials for using biological weapons. Sea levels rise, droughts last longer and longer, and storms are more frequent. Skyrocketing energy prices lead to astronomical rises in food costs, prompting riots and warnings of food emergencies in poor countries. Economic turbulence and insecurity drain savings and jobs in large parts of the world. Deadly viruses cross borders, continents, and species.

This is the world of transnational threats where the actions -- or inaction -- of people and governments anywhere in the world can harm others thousands of miles away. It is a world where national security is interdependent with global security and where sovereign states acting alone are incapable of protecting their citizens. It is a world for which we are woefully unprepared.

The interdependence of national and global security

A profound but underappreciated truth about globalization is the extent to which national security and international security have become inseparably linked. This is true even in the most powerful countries. In the United States, for example, most Americans would agree on a short list of threats to their national security: transnational terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, a pandemic of a new deadly disease, global warming and economic instability and crisis. What stands out on this list is that these threats can affect every country's security.

Nor do the threats that preoccupy other parts of the world stand in isolation. Poverty, civil wars, regional conflicts -- all of these are connected with what threatens the United States. Transnational terrorism uses ungovernable spaces for sanctuary and to gather recruits, capital, and weapons; and it uses a narrative of grievance stoked by protracted civil and regional conflicts. Climate change exacerbates the competition for land and water and places greater burdens on the poor. Poverty not only increases the risks of civil war and state failure, but also precipitates the emergence of deadly infectious diseases.

The interconnectedness of these threats and their cumulative effect pose grave dangers to the ability of states to protect their sovereignty. For many states the domestic burdens of poverty, civil war, disease and environmental degradation point in one direction: toward partnerships and agreements with international institutions. Entering agreements or accepting assistance is not a weakening of sovereignty; it is the exercise of sovereignty in order to preserve it. Even stronger states, to preserve sovereignty, must enter into agreements to counter transnational threats such as deadly infectious disease and nuclear proliferation that cannot be overcome in the absence of sustained international cooperation.

American foreign policy has yet to come to grips with the implications of security interdependence. Especially in the last seven years, Washington has elevated one threat -- transnational terrorism -- above global warming, poverty, deadly disease and other dangers, neglecting to notice that terrorism is the least salient threat to many states and that most of these threats affect each other. The United States hasn't seen the wisdom of placing threats to its security in a global framework. And that neglect has cost it much in the way of international cooperation. The reality of a world of inter-connected and transnational threats is a simple one: you have to cooperate with others to get them to cooperate with you.

The Post-Cold War International Void

Our international institutions to promote cooperation for peace and prosperity were all designed in a different era of different threats and different power relations. This does not mean they are obsolete. Some have shown remarkable resilience, while others have adapted in rather ad hoc fashion to changing realities. It is better that we have them than not, but they are inadequate to produce the capacity and collective action to predictably address today's new threats. Similarly, new international norms have emerged, but these have been norms of the "what should be done" as opposed to the "what will be done" variety. As a result, international order is now frayed; we have commitments without compliance, resolutions without resolve and we lack predictability and confidence in international responses to today's challenges.

Historically it has taken war or crisis to bring about a fundamental transformation of international order. The failure to seize the opportunities afforded by the end of the cold war and 9/11 creates a much more difficult challenge: to use the urgency of looming existential security challenges to prompt global action before their worst consequences are felt.

Rebuilding international order will require focusing on specific institutions for addressing specific threats -- and making them effective. But as a prerequisite it also requires a vision; a foundational principle that gives a moral value to order and brings coherence to expectations about how states should act across multiple issue areas. Such a principle must appeal to diverse populations in every region of the world, win the support of key states, and resonate with America's self-image.

We believe that responsible sovereignty, or the injunction that sovereignty entails obligations and duties to one's own citizens and to other sovereign states, is such a principle. In our book, Power & Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat, we refine and extend the concept and apply it to diverse transnational threats to formulate solutions. We argue that responsible sovereignty requires all states to be accountable for their actions which have impacts beyond their borders; and makes such reciprocity a core principle in restoring international order and in providing for the welfare of one's own citizens. In a world of interdependent security, states cannot exercise their responsibility to their own citizens without also exercising it in concert with other states.

International order in an age of transnational threats requires power in the service of responsibility. Major powers must be convinced to exercise their sovereignty responsibly and weak states must become capable of exercising their sovereignty responsibly. Building this order depends on four prerequisites: effective institutions that provide legitimacy, mobilize resources and coordinate multiple actors towards common goals; negotiated understandings of the applicability of responsible sovereignty to different issues; institutionalized cooperation between the US and the major and rising powers, including through the G20 or a variant.

But above all it will require effective international leadership by the United States -- leadership President Obama has a unique chance to provide.

Authors

Publication: The Huffington Post

Power & Responsibility : Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats

Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual and Stephen John Stedman — Tue, 27 Jan 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2009 360pp.

Praise for Power & Responsibility

"Power & Responsibility analyzes the threats that surround us, but does not yield to the temptation to despair. It rightly points out that in a world of problems without passports, our security and prosperity depend on unprecedented international cooperation, and that such cooperation is within our reach. By accepting that sovereignty incurs responsibilities and by strengthening international institutions, governments can create an international order in which all can be safe and thrive. This book makes a compelling argument for such an approach."
—Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of United Nations

“The vision, ideas, and solutions the authors put forward in this book have the potential to redeem American foreign policy.”
—from the Foreword by Brent Scowcroft

“I salute Power & Responsibility for undertaking the challenging endeavor of strengthening and improving our current means of international cooperation. This book sets a platform from which to take forward the vital agenda of restoring American leadership and creating a more effective international system."
—Madeleine K. Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State

“Offers timely, relevant, and responsible advice on America’s future foreign policy. The authors address our need to strengthen our alliances and forge relationships based on common interests.”
—Chuck Hagel, former U.S. Senator (R.-Neb.)

“An essential guide to the critical decisions we must make to create a world where all people are secure and can prosper. The authors persuasively argue that in this age of transnational threats, we are compelled to think anew about the nature of power and the role of responsibility. And they challenge us to ‘use the urgency of looming existential security challenges to prompt global action before their worst consequences are felt.’”
—William J. Perry, former U.S. Secretary of Defense

“Power & Responsibility is that rare book that combines a major conceptual breakthrough with relevant and practical policy prescriptions. Scholars, policymakers, and all practitioners of statecraft should take heed.”
—Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

“The aim of the Managing Global Insecurity project is to launch a reform effort of the global security system in 2009. That task is both ambitious and urgent. . . . The time to act is now.”
—from the Foreword by Javier Solana

The twenty-first century will be defined by security threats unconstrained by borders—from economic instability, climate change, and nuclear proliferation to conflict, poverty, terrorism, and disease. The greatest test of global leadership will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet the challenge. Power & Responsibility describes how American leadership can rebuild international order to promote global security and prosperity for today’s transnational world.

Power & Responsibility establishes a new foundation for international security: “responsible sovereignty,” or the notion that sovereignty entails obligations and duties toward other states as well as one’s own citizens. Governments must cooperate across borders to safeguard common resources and tackle common threats.

Power & Responsibility argues that in order to advance its own interests, the United States must learn to govern in an interdependent world, exercise leadership through cooperation, and create new institutions with today’s traditional and emerging powers. The result of a collaborative project on Managing Global Insecurity, the book also reflects the MGI project’s global dialogue—extensive consultations in the United States and in regions around the world as well as discussions with the MGI project’s Advisory Group, composed of prominent U.S. and international figures.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Bruce Jones

Bruce Jones is director of the Managing Global Insecurity initiative, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.

Carlos Pascual

Carlos Pascual is the United States ambassador to Mexico and former vice president and director of Foreigh Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.

Stephen John Stedman

Stephen John Stedman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former assistant secretary general and special adviser to the secretary general of the United Nations.

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Tackling the Crisis of Global Order

Tue, 09 Dec 2008 12:00:00 -0500

The heads of state of the world’s twenty leading economies came together in November to begin the process of enhancing the ability of international financial institutions to ensure the stability of capital markets. The leaders were spurred to action by the deepest crisis of the global economy since the Great Depression.

It is a truism that in crisis lies opportunity. But in this case, the problem – which comes with a price tag of two trillion dollars in losses (and counting) and a global recession – is a lot clearer than the solution, as the vague outcome of the G20 Summit suggests.

The financial crisis dramatizes several hard truths. First, economic interdependence creates shared risks as well as shared opportunities. Second, existing financial institutions reflect yesterday’s realities and aren’t up to today’s challenges. And third, the old G7 formula – counting on a club of advanced democracies to lead the world – no longer works. Emerging countries like China, India and Brazil have too large a share of the global economy – not to mention $450 billion dollars of G7 debt – to be left out of the search for a more effective international system.

And then there’s the fourth lesson of the current crisis: unless we strengthen mechanisms of cooperation in other areas – by countering global warming, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the failure of states, and the emergence of new, fast-spreading infectious diseases – our physical security and even our survival will be in jeopardy.

At least the financial crisis has given us another chance. Some of those other threats are not so forgiving. The most compelling example is global warming. We must deal with that before it becomes a crisis.

On November 20, we met with colleagues from around the world to launch a plan for action to meet this goal, designed by the Managing Global Insecurity project. The plan – produced after intensive consultations in the U.S. and with U.S. allies and the emerging powers – shows how America profits from strong international institutions, and explains why the world still profits from strong American leadership. It does not compromise U.S. interests in the search for cooperation, but identifies shared interests in action against transnational threats.

Its scope is broad, but that reflects the real global agenda that will soon confront the Obama administration – starting with climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009, non-proliferation treaty talks in May 2010, and the possible resumption of the Doha trade round at anytime. Each of these processes needs an injection of political courage – and the adrenaline to sustain it – as does reform of global security institutions. The plan for action calls for U.S. leadership and sustained cooperation between the U.S., its allies, and the emerging powers – including through an expanded and reformed G8, a G16 – to provide the necessary political boost.

On day one, crises in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere will flood the in-coming Administration’s in-boxes and draw attention away form investing in a more effective set of international partnerships and institutions. But in an interdependent world cooperation is not a luxury. Investment in stronger international institutions and better cooperation with the rising powers could help create the diplomatic surge needed to safely withdraw troops from Iraq, build a strong united front against Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and garner the broader partnership necessary to build self-sustaining peace in Afghanistan.

The G20 Summit provides a foundation for stronger global cooperation to meet today’s economic challenges. It also holds out the prospect of broader cooperation. To grasp the opportunity it represents, President-elect Obama will have to break decisively with recent U.S. policy. First, he must demonstrate his commitment to forging a new compact with today’s great powers to tackle collective threats. Second, he must work to build the rules and institutions to handle global threats before they escalate – including a strong and effective UN.

Fortunately, there is another truism of politics: leadership matters. President-elect Obama has written incisively that protecting American security depends on promoting global security. The international response to the election shows a pent-up demand for U.S. leadership. The job ahead is daunting but do-able. Forging effective cooperation against transnational threats is the leadership challenge of our time – and the time to start is now.

Authors

Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat

Thu, 13 Nov 2008 14:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 13, 2008
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM EST

Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center

Stanford, CA

On November 13, 2008, the Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) co-directors launched “A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed World- 2009, 2010, and Beyond” at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) Transitions 2009 International Conference.

The 20-month-long project, which incorporates feedback and direction from nonpartisan U.S. and international advisory groups, dovetailed closely with the theme of FSI's fourth annual conference: "Transitions 2009.” Conference participants included Stanford faculty, researchers, and students, as well as media and donors. MGI co-directors discussed concrete actions for the incoming administration to restore American credibility, galvanize action against transnational threats ranging from global warming to nuclear proliferation, and rejuvenate international institutions such as the United Nations.

The Plan for Action will also be presented November 20, 2008 at a high-profile event at the Brookings Institution that will feature leaders such as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Brookings President Strobe Talbott. That in turn will take place on the heels of the upcoming G-20 emergency summit to discuss measures to stave off a global recession and give a greater voice to developing nations. MGI's Plan for Action includes a series of recommendations on key transnational threats such as economic insecurity and climate change.

Participants

Panelists

International Cooperation for a Changed World

Tue, 15 Jul 2008 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 15-16, 2008

Heads of international organizations and foreign policy leaders from around the world met in Berlin, Germany on July 15 and 16 to discuss the future of international security and cooperation. Convened by Brookings’ Managing Global Insecurity Project (MGI) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the event -“Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World” – focused on the idea that all states, whatever their politics and interests, share duties to their citizens and each other in tackling common threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and global climate change.

The Berlin meeting convened by Strobe Talbott, Brookings President; EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana; Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference; and Gunther Thielen, Chairman and Chief Executive of the Bertlesmann Foundation.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier; U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; and Rajendra Pachauri, Nobel Peace Prize winner and Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change opened the event. Notable international officials and other participants included Mohamed El Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency; former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin; former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov; former Indian Foreign Minister Lalit Mansingh; and former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. Also present were Francis Deng, Ban Ki-moon’s Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide and the originator of the idea of Responsible Sovereignty in the 1990s.

Also in attendance were the co-directors of the Managing Global Insecurity Project, Brookings Vice President and Director for Foreign Policy Ambassador Carlos Pascual; Steve Stedman of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and Bruce Jones of the New York University Center on International Cooperation. The Berlin meeting was the capstone conference for the MGI advisory group - made up of U.S. Bipartisan and international leaders.

Participants discussed a framework for a new era of security cooperation as well as the revitalization of the United Nations and other international institutions after nearly a decade of under-investment and discord. These concepts reflect the fact that, in spite significant political differences, a consensus is emerging among major powers on the need for sustained and predictable cooperation – a view also shared by the current U.S. presidential candidates.

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Event Materials

Managing Global Insecurity Project Consultations in Beijing, China

Wed, 19 Mar 2008 12:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 19, 2008
12:00 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

The Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) project visited Beijing, China March 19-21 to elicit Chinese priorities and perspectives on international cooperation and revitalization of the multilateral security system. The visit, one of a series of consultations MGI is conducting in key international capitals, included meetings with government officials, Party leaders, policymakers, scholars, students and private sector representatives. MGI highlighted the vital role China, as new great power, would play in the future of the international security system and introduced some of MGI’s initial recommendations.

Themes from MGI Consultations in China

An Evolution of International Order: During discussions in China, many stressed that globalization has made the world smaller and more interdependent. We are on the “same boat,” one Chinese official emphasized, and therefore have a shared responsibility to keep it afloat. The China of today does not want to see the US economy in a recession—global reverberations of the sub-prime mortgage crisis had radically impacted the Chinese economy. Policymakers and scholars viewed today’s global challenges as severe and transnational—no nation acting alone will be able to address them. One policymaker also pointed to the limits of traditional war in the face of new threats. War used to be a very powerful tool that could settle problems, but when the most powerful country in the world can’t win Iraq, this underscores the limitations of military might. Alongside recognition of new transnational threats, one scholar denoted, must be recognition of the rights and responsibilities of emerging powers. The US will have to pay attention to the legitimate demands of these states as key partners in building an effective international system.

Many participants pointed to an evolution of international order over the past decades. One Chinese interlocutor characterized three stages: The first, from the end of World War II until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1989, the Cold War period. The second, for the 20 years following the Cold War, a period characterized by one dominate super-power, the United States. This was a time in which the US became “intoxicated” by its superpower status, leading to increasingly unilateral US action. Finally, today’s world, which has seen the rise of new powers including India, China, and many East Asian countries. Another Chinese commentator emphasized that we are witnessing the early stages of a shift of the center of gravity of international relations from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In 20-30 years, the US position will be closer to a “first among equals.” It would be important for the US to accept and adapt to this new reality.

One scholar characterized five different ways to understand how global governance could evolve within this new international order: 1) shared governance by great powers; 2) selective cooperation among great powers that often results in unilateralism; 3) an alliance of values, as seen in the call for a “concert of democracies” for global leadership and decision-making; 4) a world with no poles, neither a multi-polar nor unipolar international order; and 5) the failure of unipolarity and US unilateralism. This commentator asked MGI in which of the “five chairs” MGI recommendations would sit. All agreed that a “sixth chair” emerged, where great powers operated in cooperation based on the principle of responsible sovereignty and within the framework of the United Nations, which bestowed broader legitimacy. MGI has introduced responsible sovereignty as a principle that could underpin a strengthened international order. Three levels of responsibility are included: 1) to one’s own citizens; 2) to neighbors; and 3) to the international community to address the transnational affects of domestic policy.

Rejection of a Concert of Democracies – Threatens of a New Cold War: All of MGI’s Chinese counterparts rejected the notion of a “concert of democracies” to govern international affairs as a divisive distraction that would take away from the vast potential for cooperative dialogue to address increasingly shared threats. Some called the notion “dangerous,” saying it could lead to a second Cold War that would separate the world into the “democratic” and “undemocratic.” Others compared this philosophy with that of the crusaders, emphasizing the bold judgment assumed in labeling states “democratic” when the evolution toward democracy was a nonlinear and organic process. Others highlighted that such a dichotomy would leave out many of the emerging powers who must be integrated into the international system. It was important, one Chinese official emphasized, to promote democracy across all states in various stages of democratic evolution and counter-productive to exclude, and therefore lose the ability to influence, those deemed undemocratic.

Reactions to the Principle of ‘Responsible Sovereignty’: The vast majority of Chinese participants in MGI discussions were supportive of the concept of responsible sovereignty, particularly in contrast to the exclusionary “concert of democracies.” However, they acknowledged the importance China bestowed on the protection of sovereignty and highlighted the need for MGI to be specific in defining what it meant to be “responsible.” If responsibility was to be negotiated, they asked, who would negotiate? How would irresponsible sovereignty be dealt with? Some discerned that there must be “differentiated responsibility” based on state capacity and level of development and many noted that China’s first responsibility was its internal affairs. With such a large country and a booming population, it would be increasingly important for global stability for China to manage internal crises and potential catastrophes within its borders.

During a week when the world was focused on the protests in Tibet, MGI’s Chinese interlocutors underscored the sensitivity of sovereignty to the Chinese. One policymaker said that vis-à-vis Tibet, it was the responsibility of the Chinese government to maintain law and order, territorial integrity and human safety. MGI countered that responsibility also entailed a commitment to protecting human dignity and the well-being and safety of citizens.

China’s Role in the International System: Policymakers stressed that after years of focusing on internal development, China was beginning to see the impact of external factors on China’s internal affairs and protection of Chinese national interests. One scholar characterized “transformation changes” in China’s foreign policy as China looked from traditional political security to more comprehensive economic, military, and political security and attached additional importance to transnational issues such as climate change. Across the board, climate change and energy security (see below) emerged as the key issue for China vis-à-vis international cooperation and the multilateral security system.

However, participants underscored that China was still focused overwhelmingly on economic growth and development—but increasingly realized the impact of many other issues – such as climate change, inequality, and energy security – on a successful economy. One policymaker also noted that Chinese do not yet have “energetic discussions” or widespread political debate on the international system. We “sleep on a soft pillow,” he said, because we are not “number one.” We leave it to the US to worry.

Many said that China has never entertained the idea of unilateralism and instead looks for equality and mutual benefit in the international system—“win/win” progress. Characterizing Chinese as “reformers,” they affirmed that China does not seek an overthrow of the current system. Others called for a democratization of international politics, with increasing opportunities for dialogue and conversation between states. One worried that the US and Europe were coordinating policies to contain and control China as a rising power as opposed to engaging China in discussion. Many were complimentary of MGI’s approach because of its focus on ‘listening’ and the use of diverse regional dialogues in crafting the project’s recommendations.

More Representative International Institutions and Fora: Chinese interlocutors looked favorably on MGI’s idea of an expansion and re-conceptualization of the G8 to a new G16 to serve as a more representative forum for great power pre-negotiation and deal-making. However, they emphasized that a simple expansion of the G8 was not enough—a role for the new powers in setting the agenda and convening the summits must be articulated. They highlighted a growing resentment among the +5—who felt they were often invited as an afterthought to G8 summits, without any consultation regarding topics to be covered and priorities set. In form and function, policymakers argued, an expanded G8 must go beyond Europe and the US dictating for others. A G16 must operate on the basis of democratic and equal footing among members. Many also stressed that there was a need to link the G16 to the UN and the UN charter to give the G16 increased legitimacy.

On Security Council reform, policymakers pointed to the many changes in the international system that required a re-assessment of the composition of the UNSC. However, they contended that reform must be conducted carefully after dialogue. Some affirmed that discussions between China and Japan on the issue has improved over the last three years. While in the past, China had vetoed the idea of expansion, the issue was now open for discussion.

Chinese Views on US Foreign Policy: Many MGI spoke with were eager to see a new US President signal renewed US commitment to international cooperation, and ability to overcome the “unilateralist impulse.” Policymakers were particularly critical of the war in Iraq—calling it a wasted opportunity that had become a liability rather than an asset. They viewed a new administration as an opportunity to deepen cooperation and build trust on issues of mutual concern. One interlocutor offered the following agenda for US-China relations that would benefit wider global stability: 1) cooperation on trade and the economy; 2) joint approaches to regional hot spots; 3) combating terrorism and promoting nonproliferation; 3) focusing on international issues of the environment, energy resources, and climate; and 5) expanding cooperation in science and technology. Participants stressed that on economic issues, China had a great interest in a stable U.S. economy and said that the debate on global imbalances was often mis-characterized: China was in fact running a greater trade deficit regionally in Southeast Asia that its surplus with the US. Therefore, the issue required more than the bilateral discussion called for by the US.

Climate Change at the Top of China’s International Agenda: Across the board, Chinese discussants pointed to the issue of climate change and energy security as a possible priority testing ground for revitalized international cooperation. This was an issue that was at the top of the Chinese agenda and required concerted international action to address. In discussions with government ministries, participants emphasized the need to understand the constraints and opportunities facing developing countries on carbon emissions. One pointed out that seventy-seven to eighty percent of the world’s carbon emissions were still from developed countries. Even in their “post-industrialization” phase (between 1990 and 2005), developed world emissions had increased by eleven percent. It was therefore unreasonable to expect developing countries to significantly reduce their emission during what is only the beginning of their industrialization process. This is in addition to the legacy of emissions that the world faced that had originated from the developed world. It would be important to look toward common but differentiated responsibility in future climate agreements based on accumulated GHG, per capital GHG emissions, total emissions, and levels of development

Policymakers and experts also pointed to domestic constraints within China on the issue. A large population, rapid economic growth and development had created an enormous demand for energy. They also underscored that China was taking the issue seriously and had taken important internal steps that often went unrecognized by the international community. For example the Chinese government has set a target to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 20% by 2010 and was making plans for further reductions after 2010. One NGO representative pointed to the difficulty of ensuring that national policies and regulations on emission levels were being carried out at the regional and local-level.

However, despite the importance of recognizing the developing world’s right to economic development and growth, Chinese policymakers stressed that they understood the existential threat that climate change posed to all states. China did not want to “repeat the mistakes made by the developed countries, who finished industrilztion 150 years ago but are still emitting.” The key, they explained, was technology transfer and investment. Even simple technologies that exist currently in developed world have yet to reach China. Organizations such as the IFC, which works with local financial institutions to make it attractive for them to finance simple clean technologies, has been overwhelming successful in China and has been unable to keep up with demand. International agreements reached, Chinese policymakers underscored, must create incentives and include commitments on the transfer of technology to the developing world—for reducing carbon emissions, CCS and for the development of alternative sources of energy including hydro, nuclear and solar power. Many called for a “cooperative discourse” on climate change and an agreement that would give countries such as India and China appropriate time to adapt while recognizing the existential threat posed by the issue.

An Opportunity Not to Be Wasted: MGI’s consultations revealed a window of opportunity for the US and other powers to engage China in a cooperative dialogue on many challenges plaguing global stability. Emerging from a period of domestic focus on national development and economic growth, China is increasingly stepping, and being thrust, onto the world stage. MGI’s Chinese counterparts pointed to increasing signs that China is recognizing the value of investments in international cooperation and the international system to protect both its own, and global, security. As one policymaker put it, China now sees that its future is closely tied to the future of the world. The challenge to other key states in the international system, including the US, is to make room for China at the table, seeking dialogue and building trust. The temptation to apply western conditionality that will leave China alienated from cooperative arrangements must be avoided. China will continue to loom large on the global horizon and attempts to revitalize international cooperation and international institutions will not succeed without China’s energetic participation.

2008 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Sat, 16 Feb 2008 12:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 16-18, 2008

Doha, Qatar

The 2008 U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar, brought together key leaders in the fields of politics, business, media, academia, and civil society from across the Muslim world and the United States. The forum is a positive cross-cultural engagement among leaders from the United States and the Muslim world.

The theme for the 2008 forum was, "New Directions: The Opportunities and Challenges Ahead in the U.S.-Muslim World Relationship." Speakers and participants came from over 30 countries around the world, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, U.S. Admiral William J. Fallon, Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat, U.N. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzhad, Egyptian televangelist Amr Khaled, Muhammadiyah chairman M. Din Syamusuddin, TIME columnist Joe Klein, former Palestinian Foreign Minister Ziad Abu Amr, Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana), former U.S. National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, Professor Francis Fukuyama, and many more.