Adequately housing Africa’s growing and urbanizing population is an increasing challenge for policymakers and the private sector: According to a recent study by McKinsey,[1] by 2025 over 35 million housing units will be needed in Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa alone, and over 90 percent of Africa’s young population will live in urban areas. In 2017, policymakers should begin to focus on how to successfully prepare for this growing need.

Addressing the housing challenge is critical for growth. The real estate sector has underpinned economic recovery in many developed countries and can help Africa weather its continued slow growth by generating domestic demand, creating jobs, and increasing wealth. However, following the 2008 financial crisis there has been a latent aversion to housing finance systems. Mortgage systems are under scrutiny, and the debate around adequate regulatory structures and appropriateness of instruments to whom and in what markets persists. Meanwhile, incomes are indeed rising on the continent, but most citizens cannot afford to independently finance mortgages. On the private sector front, mortgage markets are shallow and the perception of credit risks in the sector remains high.

Some public programs, concessional financing, and a much improved regulatory environment are crucial to attract more private financing needed to support government’s ability to keep pace with the demand. In 2017, then, policymakers must consider several important steps.

First, governments, working with the private sector, must develop and adopt an adequate legal and regulatory framework for housing finance. Fundamental to which is reducing financing risks to all parties, which requires first and foremost strengthening the land titling systems and enforcing property rights to ensure robustness of security and collateral. At the same time, a robust housing finance system relies on availability of good credit information. Accordingly, governments should accelerate the development of credit information bureaus. Finally, there must be clarity regarding the role of all institutions engaged in housing finance, private banks, micro-finance institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, and others in order to ensure all systemic risks are managed.

Second, the financing role of the government must be clearly defined and should support market creation. A stable and predictable agreement on the division of risks and financing between the public and private sector must be reached, allowing for the possibility of providing blended financing to accelerate housing development. The public sector can guarantee demand-related risks by underwriting, for example, payment of housing units. Similarly, the private sector can assume all costs and quality related risks.

Finally, capital markets development must be accelerated to provide instruments needed to support the development of housing finance. There is an increasing need for local currency long-term financing and development of secondary mortgage finance markets. These markets can help smooth default and financing risks and provide banks with an outlet to trade housing loans in order to adequately manage exposure to the housing sector. With a more developed housing finance market, financial institutions can begin offering longer-term financing, which will also support demand.

[1] McKinsey Global Institute. Lions on the move II: Realizing the potential of Africa’s economies. September 2016. Available at: http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middle-east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move-realizing-the-potential-of-africas-economies.

      

 

 

Editor’s note: For more on African political transitions, see our interactive African Leadership Transitions Tracker, which presents changes at the head of state level in every African country from independence or end of the colonial period to the present.

Africa has gone through a number of leadership transitions in 2016 and with each one the edifice that will shape Africa’s leadership and political transition process is being molded. 2016 has been another of year progress on the African leadership transition front. This year there have been 16 elections, in seven of the elections there was an effective leadership transition and over 60 percent of the elections were conducted in a free and transparent manner with satisfactory citizen involvement and little or no unrest—such as in Ghana or Cabo Verde.  Overall, the leadership transitions have been largely peaceful, constitutional, and transparent. However, the experiences across countries and sub-regions have been quite varied and provide us with many lessons for the future. I will use Gabon, Gambia, and Ghana (the “three Gs”) to illustrate these experiences.

Three elections, in Gabon in August, and the Gambia and Ghana in December, are shaping the narrative of this dynamic process and providing important lessons for the transition process. First, the struggle for change continues: While Africa is slowly moving towards more participatory political transitions, the fight has not completely won. In addition, the growing importance and maturity of electoral commissions; citizens’ increasing awareness that their votes matter; the slow but certain move away from tribal politics to issues politics; and now regional, rather than foreign, ownership around leadership transitions all contribute towards the deepening of democracy on the continent. Each of the countries—Gabon, the Gambia, and Ghana—have tackled these issues differently.

The struggle for change persists

Ghana is the pride of Africa when it comes to democratic transitions. Once again, its most recent election has proven this point.  Despite the tense and intensely fought campaign both parties continue to pledge respect for the process. Indeed, there is much to celebrate around Africa’s leadership transitions, but much remains to perfect the process the continent over. This year many elections were held freely and fairly on the continent, and both incumbents and new leaders were elected to office—including Benin, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia for example. And in an unprecedented move the President of Mauritania and Angola all declared they will not seek re-elections at the end of the term. A very positive and encouraging trend if the pronouncements come to pass.

However, in a number of countries the old has not given way to the new, and the evolution of democracy is still in motion with too-often deadly consequences for the citizens in Burundi, Gabon, and the Gambia to name a few. These examples demonstrate that the concept of leadership transition has not yet been fully adopted. A number of lessons can be drawn from these latter experiences. The populations are increasingly more vocal about transparency of elections. Both sides incumbent and opposition have increasingly equal chances of getting their voices heard and results tend to be closer in these countries. There is still a need for vigilance, and the tendency to slip remains. Peaceful leadership transitions are not yet the norm.

Election commissions: Strong, credible, and independent institutions are emerging

In the three Gs, the role of the electoral commissions has been a determining factor. In fact, electoral commission heads are increasingly becoming the new villains and/or heroes in the African struggle for peaceful leadership transitions.

In Gabon, the head of the electoral commission’s independence was largely questioned primarily by the opposition and the people of Gabon, as well as international election observers. Notably, the final results of the election were not announced by the head of the electoral commission, as constitutionally stated, but by the minister of the interior—an institution with no independence from the incumbent. Gabon’s incumbent President Ali Bongo won by 49.9 percent over 48.2 percent for his rival Jean Ping, less than a 6,000 vote difference and suspiciously high turnout in Bongo’s home province. Violence and protests erupted not long after the announcement.

The Gambia’s electoral commission performed and fared much better: Three months before the election, the head of the electoral commission Alieu Momarr Njai pledged in a memorable but unpublicized speech to uphold the integrity of the commission and protect the integrity of the process.  During the launch of the electoral process he said:

Election results may be rigged to predetermine who will win or lose, and election may be disrupted, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the process, but I stand here today to pronounce to you that, as far as our concerted efforts are in play, this will never be the case in our dear country. The Independent Electoral Commission believes that an election without integrity subverts the purpose of a democratic election, and cannot be considered fair and equitable. The IEC will ever concentrate on conducting free and fair elections. This, I believe we will ever achieve by upholding governing principles such as: respect for principles of electoral democracy; ethical conduct; accuracy and transparency.

The people of the Gambia and many others did not expect such clarity of vision from the head of the electoral commission, and many dismissed this as normal election propaganda. However, Njai kept his word. He pronounced the elections results in favor of the opposition candidate Adama Barrow and called for President Yahya Jammeh, who has been in power for over 22 years, to step down, eliciting pride and jubilation from the people of the Gambia. The Gambia’s troubles have instead come from Jammeh’s withdrawal of his concession and determination to stay in power.

In Ghana, the head of the election commission benefitted from a robust and solid system, which has a history of inclusion, transparency, and most of participation by all members of the political exercise. The continuous process undertaken by the Ghanaian electoral commission to continuously educate the electorate and the political parties is clearly a lesson for the rest of the continent on how to build trust and interact with the population.

However, even in Ghana there are lessons to learn from the election, such as how to manage delays in the announcement of the election results and or glitches in the system on election day. In Ghana the commission needed more time to ensure everyone eligible to vote had voted and to count the votes.  Tensions began to mount as the population waited for the elections results to be proclaimed, both sides began proclaiming victory and the supporters of each candidate began filling the streets.

This could have led to severe unrest. However, the communication of the election committee head asking the people for patience while all the votes were counted was an example of good election management. The people could only heed to this request because of the trust built by the commission and a legitimate sense of ownership of the commission.  Therefore, while independently elected, the first task of every election commission is to build trust with the people. As African countries prepare for more elections this should be an area that gets special attention.

Ownership: The people’s voice, the continent’s voice

Ethnic politics is slowly giving way to issues politics. The economy is taking center stage in elections. In Ghana, as in the Gambia, the last few years have seen citizens suffer under the weight of weakening currencies, erosion of purchasing power by over 50 percent, increasing poverty, joblessness, and interest rates above 25 percent. Similarly, the rise of corruption, noted by Ghanaian President John Mahama in his concession speech, undermined all the achievements of Mahama presidency—and most of all his struggle to give affordable and reliable power to the people of Ghana. The results of these elections increasingly show that while there will always remain a thread of local politics in elections, the electorate is becoming more sophisticated and are voting on issues broader than ethnic origins. Citizens are more engaged and are owning the election agenda.

African leaders are also increasingly more active in the resolution of African leadership transition issues. During the crisis period of the Gabon elections the French and the European Union were the most active and vocal voices. The French president called for a recount and the EU asked that all results be published, but Chadian President Idriss Déby, as head of the African Union, was the central mediator of the proceedings. In the case of the Gambia, the African Union alongside five other presidents of ECOWAS[1] countries have taken it upon themselves to mediate a settlement of the impasse. The acknowledgement and ownership of the transition agenda by Africa’s leaders is an important part of assuring peace and stability during transition crises.  The cases of Burundi and the Gambia should provide lessons on how to make such negations successful. What incentives could be put in place to minimize difficult transitions?

As the Ghanaians celebrate the peaceful election of new President Nana Akufo Addo, as President Bongo of Gabon settles into his second term, and as the Gambians wait anxiously for a resolution, the continent must heed the lessons of these three transitions and begin putting in place systems that allow citizens more ownership of the process, ensure that election commissions are truly independent and equipped to build trust with citizens, and encourage candidates that acknowledge the increasing sophistication of the electorate so campaign messages must have content and can no longer rely solely on identity politics.

[1] Economic Community of West African States

      

 

 

Ahead of the second U.S.-Africa Business Forum, where President Obama, in his “swan song,” looks to deepen U.S. investment in the continent and spur implementation of the deals at the last forum in 2014, Brookings scholars Amadou Sy, Witney Schneidman, and Vera Songwe discuss.

Vera Songwe:

“I think what President Obama has seen is you can go from aid to trade and actually make that partnership more effective, but the continent is clearly growing, it is going to be 1.1 billion by 2025, we have 24 million every year on the continent, so that is increased productivity but also increased demand for goods and consumption. Basically what I think you see is the Americans cannot lose out and they should not lose out in this new emerging market.”

Witney Schneidman:

“I think Chinese companies have made a contribution to the continent in terms of infrastructure development, roads, ports, airports, but I think where they fall short and where American firms would excel is not just investing in Africa, but investing in the people of Africa. I have yet to see a Chinese firm where there is an African CEO or an African COO or an African CFO.”

Amadou Sy:

“One concern I have is if you look at the challenge in Africa to create jobs and the role that SMEs play in job generation, I would have liked to see a much greater presence of SMEs.”

      

 

 

Benin is the new field of dreams and promises kept.

In a year when many countries on the continent are changing their constitutions to allow for incumbent presidents to run yet again, Benin, under President Yayi Boni, is respecting the term limits set down in its constitution. Thanks in part to pressure from the population, this development is allowing for political and democratic change. Indeed, the second round of elections took place on Sunday, between Prime Minister Lionel Zinsou and cotton magnate Patrice Talon who won 27.1 percent and 23.5 percent of the first round votes, respectively. In the second round Patrice Talon is believed to have won with a provisional margin of about 65 percent. Official certification from the Supreme Court is still pending, but Lionel Zinsou has publicly conceded. 

These elections prove that Benin is consolidating its political transitions process. It joins many other African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania in respecting their constitutions, continuing the process of political transition, and supporting institution building. With a total of 20 leadership transitions (defined as a change in the ruler/president of the country) overall since Benin’s independence, the last five have been contested multi-party elections. Sunday’s election is the sixth successive multiparty contest since 1991 with three complete, democratic leadership transitions—from Nicephore Soglo in 1991, to Mathieu Kerekou in 1996, to Yayi Boni in 2006. Benin is unique: Only six African countries have similar records. Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Mauritius, Cape Verde, and Malawi have succeeded in having three uninterrupted peaceful leadership transitions over the last 20-25 years with two-term presidents.

Benin’s success comes with a number of electoral innovations that are challenging the status quo and could have important implications for the rest of the continent in the future. 

In this election, Benin’s politicians attempted at succession planning, albeit tentative in many ways. Africa has more often witnessed presidents that tend to undermine the aspirations of their cabinet and government members creating a leadership vacuum around them, which generally paves the way for them changing the constitution to run again. In Benin, however, outgoing President Boni appointed Lionel Zinsou Prime Minister in June 2015, following a two-year vacancy of the job to provide him with a platform to prepare for the elections. In December 2015, Zinsou announced his candidacy for the presidency of the republic, endorsed by Boni. The nomination and endorsement of Zinsou by the president creates a potentially welcome precedent.

Second, the diverse nature of the candidates and the influence of the private sector:

For the first time on the continent over the last three decades we will have two candidates vying for the highest public office who have spent the majority of their careers in the private sector. While private sector actors have traditionally played a more backseat role, funding campaigns or influencing the choice and direction of policy, they have rarely had their names on the ballot. In most countries technocrats, defined as specialists especially in the public policy field, have shied away from politics.

Of the 33 original candidates in the first round, the top five candidates comprised one of the most technocratic short lists of presidential candidates possibly ever seen on the continent. The list included two prime ministers (one current and one former), Zinsou (formerly the head of French private equity firm PAI Partners) and Koupaki;  two independent and wealthy candidates, Talon the cotton baron of Benin and Adjavon, the poultry baron; and two former IMF and West African Central Bank senior managers, Bio Tchane and Koupaki (again). Zinsou worked for the French government as adviser to the foreign minister while Koupaki also worked as advisor to President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire in the past. The choices for the population were between successful international technocrats or extremely successful businessmen. Choices like these are not generally available to populations on the continent. The diverse line-up in Benin could mean that once leadership transitions are institutionalized and populations’ belief in the transparency and governance of the process is established, more robust candidates are willing and prepared to participate in the process, which until now could mean jail, exile, or torture for anyone out of the ruling party.

This election saw a growing involvement of the diaspora in politics: The role and importance of the diaspora in leadership transitions on the continent remains a thorny issue in many countries. While increasingly more countries make it possible for the diaspora to vote in elections, the majority of countries do not. Benin’s constitution was amended in 1995 to allow candidates with dual citizenship to stand for elections and for the diaspora to vote in elections. There are over 4 million Beninois that leave outside of Benin, mostly in other African countries like Nigeria, France and the U.S. The diaspora generally is associated with opposition parties and hence incumbent parties tend to be suspicious of them. However as the number and frequency of multiparty transitions increases all political parties are increasingly courting the diaspora and in some countries the diaspora is represented in the parliament. In the case of Benin, Zinsou, Koupaki, and Bio Tchane—among the top five candidates—all emanate from the diaspora. They spent most of their professional lives abroad working for international organizations, doing business, or serving other functions.

These welcome trends imply that African leadership transition institutions are maturing. Leadership positions are moving from being occupied by professional politicians and the military to technocrats, professionals, and the private sector, thanks to a more open and participatory process. The continent has moved from a place where civil society (including the private sector) could only speak up through riots and street protests to one where they can play a direct role in the leadership transition process. From Burkina Faso to Kenya to Benin, the continent is maturing, despite setbacks in places like Burundi.  

Second, political platforms and second-round elections will continue to be important to the future of the leadership transition process. In Benin, while the incumbent party benefited from a well-organized party process, and the candidate had the support of the organized political parties through successful succession planning, 22 opposition candidates had a loosely defined coalition, called the “rupture alliance,” aimed at improving governance in the country and stopping the progression of the incumbent party candidate. The two wealthy private sector candidates Talon and Adjavon ran as independents with no party apparatus. With a second round, the losing candidates are obliged to organize themselves into a more organized and homogeneous structure as they throw their voices behind either of the top two candidates. This process helps build institutions and strengthen the leadership transition process, providing clear choices to the population and obliging the last two candidates to improve the messages and choices they offer. As African countries move from uncontested one-party elections to more contestability, this sequential process will help build alternative coalitions and form the bases for genuine political party development over time. Moving from a loose coalition of people to a coalition of people with like-minded public policy positions will essentially mature the participatory process.

Third, the new makeup of the candidate field is changing the amount and composition of election spending. There is no spending limit for elections in most African countries. In a country with a GDP per capita of $800, poverty remains high and free handouts in cash or kind can sway votes. In most elections, the incumbent party has the most resources. It has access to national resources and can dominate the campaign scene. In fact, an IMF study by Ebeke and Ölçer, Fiscal policy over the election cycle in low income countries (2013) showed that government consumption significantly increases during election years, normally because incumbents vying for a new mandate use the public purse for the election. While increasingly many countries budget for and provide some resources to all candidates, these resources are a small fraction of what is spent by the incumbent ruling party.

In Benin, with two of the richest private sector contenders vying for the presidency, the cost of the first round of elections was high. Candidates spent usually large sums to get out the vote.  Both Adjavon and Talon, self-made millionaires, had their own money to use for the elections. It is clear that the overall cost of the election went up as the war chest of the private sector candidates was comparable to that of the incumbent party candidate. Further analysis is needed to see if such massive private sector funding of the election substantially increased the share of public sector consumption. If this phenomenon were to continue then there will be a need to focus more on campaign finance on the continent. However, in this case, it also helped put candidates on equal footing with the incumbent party candidate. With similar financial resources, the two private sector candidates came very close to the incumbent with 27.3 percent for the incumbent party, 23.5 and 22.1 for both private sector candidates, Talon and Adjavon, respectively.

Fourth, there is a place for the diaspora in African politics. Increasingly on the continent countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Kenya, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria are leveraging their diaspora to serve within the government. There are increasingly more ministers and prime ministers from the diaspora in African governments. However, the appetite for having a president from the diaspora is not yet widespread. Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are the most common examples of this. Zinsou’s strong showing after the first round implies that populations may be more willing to consider diaspora candidates than they have previously been. In countries with a substantial part of the population outside the country this could be an important development as it broadens the choices of candidates for the population and should be encouraged. Candidates from the diaspora are often seen, wrongly or rightly, as more willing to tackle difficult policy issues and more willing to tackle corruption.

As the people of Benin prepare to welcome a new president, there are already a number of lessons to draw and learn from. Overall, the Benin experience demonstrates that Africa’s leadership transition process is maturing as strong institutions are being built, and Africa’s processes are converging with the rest of the world in an era where we have politicians and business moguls vying for top public office in many other countries.

      

 

 

As President Obama said during his recent address at the African Union, “There’s a lot that I’d like to do to keep America moving. But the law is the law, and no person is above the law, not even the president.”

This sentence, uttered during his speech to the African Union last month, summarizes President Obama’s message to Africa when it comes to the need for strong institutions. In his speech he highlighted that the first president of the United States, George Washington (1789-1797), refused to run for a third term in 1798—during the nascent years of the republic—despite popular acclaim and instead stepped down to ensure there was peaceful transition and the principles of democracy upheld. South Africa’s Nelson Mandela did the same thing.

 In 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, in an unprecedented move in U.S. history—and about a century and a half after George Washington—sought a third and a fourth third term and won. Those were extraordinary times some would say: World War II had begun. However, shortly before the 44th president of United States was born, and before many African countries got independence in 1951 the United States Congress moved to ratify an amendment to the U.S. constitution formerly limiting presidential terms to two. The amendment was passed in 1947 and took four years to ratify.

Thus, it took the U.S. from George Washington to Harry Truman, 1797 to 1951, to strengthen and perfect this institution. Thus, even in America building institutions takes time, but, once built, they are respected: No one has since dared to change the 22nd Amendment, even as America continues to strive to build a more perfect union.

The concept of elected representation (representative government) began on the continent at independence towards the end of the 1950s for some and the 1960s for most. As Figure 1 shows, from the 1950s to the 1980s the number of uncontested (single party) elections increased substantially. The continent went from having less than five uncontested elections in the 1950s to over 37 uncontested elections by the 1980s. One could term this period “the learning years,” as countries were experimenting with the concepts of the ballot box and representative rule. By the end of 1980 almost all countries on the continent had organized elections at least three times, and the moment was ripe for more inclusive and contested representation. Citizens began to demand more representation. But leaders remained reluctant for the most part to opening up. Unrest set in.

Figure 1. Number of single party elections in sub-Saharan Africa by decade

From uncontested elections to coups: A tortuous transition

The transition from uncontested elections to contested elections was not a peaceful one, with a multitude of military interventions around the continent (see Figure 2). In fact, the decade 1980-1989 saw the most coups in the history of Africa. In this way, the 1980s also saw the most government transitions overall, but mostly in an uncontested setting. By the end of the 1990s many countries had experienced the cost of coup d’états, and there was a growing rejection of military coups and the emergence of opposition parties across the continent. This experience helped Africa transition from uncontested to contested elections. 

Figure 2. Number of coup d’états in sub-Saharan Africa by decade

Source:

African Leadership Transitions Tracker,

Brookings Africa Growth Initiative

Multiparty elections become a more common, though not universal, political transition

By the 1990s the transition trend in African countries had resolutely migrated from a dominance of uncontested elections to contested elections. The number of contested elections grew exponentially from less than 20 in the 1980s to a staggering 72 in the 1990s as countries introduced term limits, reduced mandates from seven years to five years or less, and adopted new constitutions. This trend was consolidated at the end of the last decade and the concept of contested elections—multi-party elections—became commonplace.  

Source:

African Leadership Transitions Tracker,

Brookings Africa Growth Initiative

Africa is at a new crossroads in its institutional building process. While the number of uncontested elections and coup d’états has dropped, the number of contested elections leading to leadership transitions is not proportionally increasing. In addition, there are a number of countries that have experienced only one leadership transition since independence, and none of those transitions was competitive.

In addition to the intransience of many leaders, another great and growing fear is that of backsliding. Leaders elected through an open and contested process, with clear and transparent constitutions in place, are beginning to question the need for term limits. There is a groundswell of initiatives across the continent of presidents trying to change constitutions not to bring more stability to the system but to regress. In Burkina Faso and Burundi these attempts have led to civil unrest and the loss of lives. These are the groups to whom President Obama was referring to when he now famously said to the African Union, “I think if I ran [again], I could win. But I can’t.”

Over the next year, Africa will see elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Gabon, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea—all countries where presidents have met their term limits. How Africa defines this decade will depend on what happens in all these countries and many more with elections before the end of 2020 in which sitting presidents will have met their term limits.  

First, while many countries have moved from single party to peaceful, contested elections there is still significant dominance of incumbents winning elections. This trend implies that the competitive process is not ripe enough to deliver the results contests are meant to produce.

Second, the countries with the most leadership transitions have been those where the competitive process has been circumvented like in Nigeria, Comoros, Libya, Benin, Ghana, and Somalia. These countries have had the most leadership transitions, but most of these have been as a result of non-competitive processes and most of the time by military takeovers. In fact, the countries with the most transitions are countries that have had the most number of coups. Nigeria leads the pack with over 16 transitions of 6 coups, followed by others like Comoros with 5 coups and over 12 leadership transitions. Importantly, Ghana and Nigeria transitioned from coup d’états into competitive elections and have never gone back but have rather continued to perfect the competitive process. These two countries have even had leaders die in office, but as a testament to their competitive experience and their institutions, the competitive process was orderly restored or maintained. Despite these developments, they are outliers and the process of peaceful contestation resulting in leadership transitions is not yet a consistent and dominant normal.

Third, initial conditions seem to matter: Countries that launched competitive transition processes shortly after independence—like Mauritius, Zambia, and Botswana—have succeeded in keeping the momentum and have not been plagued by coups or other disruptions in leadership. Whereas countries like Liberia that launched mock contestations where the same leader was reelected ended up with coups before settling once again into competitive election processes.

Fourth, looking ahead to the rest of this decade, there are ominous signs that citizens in countries where a truly competitive process has not taken root will be fertile ground for popular uprisings and instability—including, unfortunately, terror. As President Obama recently noted, “If we sacrifice liberty in the name of security we risk losing both.” This truth is all the more relevant in countries with rapidly expanding youth populations, low literacy rates, and rising unemployment.

The continent has clearly leap-frogged into the process of contested elections and representation. What the United States took a century and a half to accomplish, some African countries have accomplished in less than 40 years. The process has been, at times, tortuous; there is still backsliding in some countries and inertia in others. However, clearly emerging is a resolute move towards more contested elections and leadership transitions.

Importantly, over the next five years the role of citizens, the role of African Union, and leadership demonstrated by other countries like the U.S. will be critical in determining how Africa’s leadership transition history evolves. Will the African Union succeed in adopting legislation that makes term limits binding? Will Western countries support civil society in isolating leaders who attempt to circumvent their constitutions? Will President Obama take positive measures to ensure the hopes and dreams of so many of the youth that listened to him come to pass when the sun sets on this decade?

In the meantime, while we celebrate countries like Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde, Benin, Zambia, Botswana, Kenya, Ghana, and many others, we cannot lose sight of the fact that there is still a lot more to do to perfect the institutions for representation in these countries and on the continent as a whole. To protect and strengthen these institutions a number of challenges need to be tackled such as dealing with the  cost of contested elections, developing transparent and inclusive electoral codes, clarifying the election process (in many countries election day is not set in the constitution),  perfecting the voting systems, building credible  electoral commissions, and most of all protecting the will of the people—first to exercise their civic duty to participate in the contest and second to accept the results.  Here Africa can learn from itself but also from other countries and could even provide solutions for the world to employ. The African Union, like the U.S. Congress of 1947 can take on these challenges, and with the youth of Africa by her side, an Africa with leaders chosen by the people with dignity and peace underpinned by strong institutions will emerge.

For more on leadership transitions on the African continent, see the Africa Growth Initiative’s


African Leadership Transitions Tracker.

      

 

 

Last week, Togo, a country of over 7 million people, voted for incumbent President Faure Gnassingbé for a third time. Gnassingbé is the son and immediate successor of Togo’s fifth president—Gnassingbé Eyadema—and, once he serves out his third term, his family will have run Togo for 48 years. In light of this latest development and as the continent moves toward more closely contested elections (see the Africa Leadership Transition Tracker), it might be time to quickly reflect upon the current status and trends of family political dynasties in sub-Saharan Africa. The first question is: Is Africa different from the rest of the world?

Political dynasties exist around the world. In the United States in 2001, George W. Bush became the first modern president whose father (President George H.W. Bush) had also been elected president. (The sixth president, John Quincy Adams, served from 1825-1829 and was the son of the second president, John Adams.) Bush also became the first U.S. president to hold the position for longer than his father. In East and South Asia, there have been many daughters of heads of state who have been elected to the same position, such as South Korean President Pak Geun-hye, former Philippines President Corazon Aquino, and former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In Pakistan, in a rare occurrence, a husband took over from his wife, Benazir Bhutto. Clearly, we should be wary of characterizing political dynasties as an African phenomenon. However, given the vastly male-dominated world of African politics, what do we know about African father-son presidential transitions and legacies?

The experiences of the U.S., the Philippines, and South Korea seem to indicate that citizens are willing, through a contested process and based on an individual’s merit, to elect family members of former heads of state. Notably, in cases like these, usually the family members do not immediately follow their parent; there is a time lag between the two.

Africa has a more mixed experience. Seven countries on the continent have had both father and son (and one brother) lead the country: Botswana, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Togo, Mauritius, and Malawi (Morocco and Swaziland are excluded from the list since they are kingdoms). In each of these cases, the succession process has been different, as has the interim between father and son.

Three sons of a founding father (the first president or prime minister after independence) are currently in power in Botswana, Kenya, and Mauritius—President Ian Khama, President Uhuru Kenyatta, and Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, respectively. In the case of all three, the succession took place over a decade after the father left office: In Botswana, Khama was elected 27 years after his father left office, while in Kenya, Kenyatta was elected 34 years after his father, and, in Mauritius, Ramgoolam was elected 13 years after his father. Therefore, enough time had elapsed in which citizens could assess the impact and results of the father’s leadership and make an informed decision regarding the son. By the time the sons became president, the three countries had a history of contested elections, and each one took over in generally peaceful elections and under stable constitutions. Malawi’s President Peter Mutharika similarly was elected president years after his brother’s death in office.

On the other hand, some sub-Saharan countries have experienced immediate succession by the son of the head of state after his father’s death, often leading to decades of rule by a single family. With President Gnassingbé’s reelection, his family will have run Togo for over 87 percent of its 55-year post-independence history, with five more years to go. Gabon has a similar experience: With a father and son at the head of the country for over 86 percent of the country’s post-independence history (1967-2009 and 2009-2015)—47 out of almost 55 years—and the son is still in power.

In the DRC, President Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001 immediately following the untimely assassination of his father. Altogether, the Kabilas have ruled the DRC for a third of the country’s post-independence history—almost 18 years.

The Rangoolam family of Mauritius has similarly ruled the country for over half of its independence history, for 20 out of 39 years. However, as noted above, succession was not immediate from father to son but rather through a contested process with two leaders in between.

So, given the mixed experiences of these African countries, can we identify a trend on the continent? The automatic succession of sons does not seem to be the norm. There have been over 38 cases on the continent where the leader passed away in office, and sons have succeeded their fathers in only three. Over the last two years there have, however, been two contested elections that involved the son and brother of a former president—Kenyatta in 2013 and Mutharika in 2014. Increasingly, countries have put in place constitutional provisions to handle the passing of the president or are respecting constitutional provisions from earlier constitutions such as in Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, and Ethiopia, all countries who have seen their presidents pass away and whose transitions have been handled in a smooth and constitutional way. It seems that the passing of presidents has not generated prolonged political instability on the continent. 

Africa does not have a monopoly on family political dynasties. However, to guard against the creation of birth-right dynasties as opposed to merit-based family political dynasties, recent events suggest that countries should and must have clear constitutional processes for succession as well as open transparent freely contested elections. In Kenya, Mauritius, and Botswana where this has happened, the sons of past leaders are trying to keep the memory of a past not yet forgotten alive. History will determine which sons carry the day and how Africa’s president’s sons are treated in the future.  

***Note: This blog was updated on May 11, 2015 at 11:00 a.m. EST to correct the population of Togo. 

      

 

 

The African Leadership Transitions Tracker (ALTT) is an interactive feature that factually recounts and visually presents changes at the head of state level in every African country from independence or end of the colonial period  to the present. The interactive application aims to start a broader conversation about leadership transitions and what they mean for the region and beyond.

The ALTT does not intend to validate the nature of transitions. However, it looks at the process of competition and the contestability of transitions over time in order to highlight key trends.

For example a multiparty election is defined in the tracker as one in which “two or more political parties have affiliated candidates competing in an election.” Only military coups that lead to a change in leadership are presented. The attached technical appendix provides further detail on all definitions.

To learn more about this interactive, read the introductory blog »

Last Update: December 6, 2016

      

 

 

Editor’s Note: In this blog, Vera Songwe introduces the African Leadership Transitions Tracker, a new interactive that aims to start a broader conversation about leadership transitions and what they mean for the region and beyond.

On March 28, Nigerians voters will go to the polls to participate in their nation’s fifth election since the military handed over power to civilians in 1999. As Africa’s largest economy and an important oil exporter, this election comes at an important time for Nigeria and for the continent as a whole.

Events around this election have generated significant debate around electoral and voting processes on the continent such as the importance of a constitution, the cost, the frequency and level of contestability, and the power of incumbency in African elections. However, amid this dialogue, much less consideration has been devoted to where this election stands within the continuum of leader transitions Nigeria has experienced since it first gained independence in 1960. Nigerians have, in fact, gone through 18 leadership transitions in the last 55 years, including the untimely death of former President Umaru Masu Yar’Adua in May 2010, the multiparty elections that brought President Olusegun Obasanjo to power in 1999, and the first presidential elections that brought President Shegu Shagari to power in 1979. Nigeria’s high rate of leadership changeover should not, however, be considered illustrative of Africa’s overall story. On the contrary, a high level of diversity exists among countries in the region on this measure, with countries like Angola having had only one leadership transition since it achieved its independence in 1975, and Benin, on the other hand, undergoing an election, coup, or other type of leadership transition nearly every two years in the country’s 55-year post-independence history. However, overall in Africa today there are more peaceful and competitive leadership transitions than there have been over the last six decades. This contestability process is gaining ground across the continent, and while coups d’etat appear to be fading revolutions are gaining ground where competition has not taken hold.

The recent passing of Singapore’s 30 year-long leader Lee Kwan Yew credited with having taken Singapore from a third world country to a fully developed country in less than a generation, has brought the question of leadership and leadership transitions back to the fore. A 2010 report by Michael Spence’s Growth Commission heralds Lee Kuan Yew as the hero of Singapore’s growth story. The African Leadership Transition Tracker hopes to launch a dialogue on what the frequency, nature, and scope of leadership transitions mean for African countries’ growth, stability, and development trajectory overall. Moreover, how have transition trends in the region changed from the time of the African founding fathers and the tumultuous years of the 1960s to the present day?

As an initial step towards thinking this question through, Brookings’s African Growth Initiative is today launching the African Leadership Transitions Tracker as a resource both to inform readers about African political history and a tool to initiate analysis on what leadership changeover might mean (or not mean) for development. The Transitions Tracker specifically records all changes that have occurred at the head-of-state level in every African country between the end of the colonial period and the present day. We are hoping that recording this information and presenting it visually (and as a downloadable data set) will help start a broader conversation and support additional work on these issues. Brookings will update this data on a regular basis, and we welcome your feedback as we further refine this interactive. Moreover, the information we present today is by no means the full story—key variables are needed to complement this study, including, for example, the various political party affiliations of leaders within a country or cross tabulations with resources that seek to measure the level of citizen participation and engagement in these transitions. However, as further analysis takes place, we are hoping that the African Leadership Transitions Tracker will enrich dialogue about developments occurring in the region and place current news on elections or other types of changeover events within the broader context of the continent’s leadership story overall.  Over the next few months, we will be running a series of articles based on this data.  

Special thanks to Ehui Adovor, graduate student at George Washington University and the many AGI research assistants, analysts, and program staff that have supported this project, including Jessica Pugliese, Brandon Routman, Christina Golubski, Andrew Westbury, and Amy Copley.

      

 

 

On January 15th, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion with leading Africa experts on the most important challenges the continent will face in 2015. The panel of Brookings experts offered their expertise on these pressing issues and gave recommendations to national governments, regional organizations, multilateral institutions and civil society on how to approach them in order to create a peaceful and prosperous 2015 for Africa.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #ForesightAfrica

The event follows the release of the new Foresight Africa report, a collection of short briefs on the major issues for Africa in 2015.