Brookings: Experts - Ibrahim Sharqieh

65 Years After 'Catastrophe,' Palestinians Have Little to Cheer About

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On May 15, the Palestinians will commemorate 65 years of their “Nakba” – “the Catastrophe.” This is how they describe 1948, which saw the destruction of Palestinian society, 750,000 Palestinians forced from their homes, and over 450 Palestinian towns wiped off the map. Today, there are over 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations’ UNRWA. But while 1948 was a terrible trauma for the collective Palestinian memory, the reality is that it was only the beginning of a long journey of displacement, dispossession, and exile. The real Nakba is ongoing, and the Palestinian people live it on a daily basis both inside and outside the Palestinian territories. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry throws himself into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, we have to ask: Will his efforts bring this human tragedy a step closer to the end? Or only make it worse?

On a recent trip to Lebanon, I made sure to visit the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. While under control of the Israeli army that occupied Beirut in 1982, approximately 800 to 3,500 Palestinian refugees were massacred at the hands of Christian militias. In the camps today, the bitter reality of the Palestinian refugees’ life in exile is on full display: an enormous mass grave in the camps’ center holds the victims of 1982 massacre. It is a daily reminder to the refugees of their continuing human tragedy.

The Palestinians in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee camp have hardly been spared the bitterness of displacement and dispossession. Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the estimated 150,000 Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk have reportedly been subjected to terror, horror, and murder of all kinds. Many have fled the camp to become “double refugees” in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Um Mazen, one of these twice-displaced told the Financial Times, “It’s the Nakba of Yarmouk.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, too, have their share of Nakba. An Israeli policy of collective punishment has left 1.7 million Palestinians trapped in a besieged Gaza, the world’s largest prison. In the West Bank, the modern-day Nakba can be seen in continued settler violence, settlement expansion, and a dividing wall that encroaches on Palestinian land and, in many cases, deprives people of their livelihoods. This is in addition, of course, to the many Palestinians of Jerusalem who lost the right to return home after living only a few years abroad.

Against this grim backdrop, Kerry has made a public commitment to bring peace to the region through his intensive personal diplomacy. But while it may be too early to pass judgment on his initiative, the traditional American approach to this conflict has been predictable – and unworkable. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, suggested ending the agony of Palestinians refugees’ exile by sending them to…Chile and Argentina.

As Edward Abington told me, Arafat urged President Bill Clinton to ask Benjamin Netanyahu to stop or at least delay the construction of the Har Homa colony – a colony that threatened the collapse of the entire peace process. Abington – former U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem and the key U.S. contact with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1996 – said that Arafat repeatedly entreated Clinton, but to no avail. Finally, Clinton is said to have passed the request on to newly appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She seemed to done nothing. It was then, Abington said, that Arafat knew he could not count on the Americans to make a real difference.

The Palestinian Nakba is one of the root causes of today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict; if Secretary Kerry is to succeed, he will need to address it. The economic package he plans to introduce would affect the Palestinians in the West Bank. But it would do nothing for the Yarmouk’s double refugees or Shatila – surrounded by death, past and present.

Kerry’s major step to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been the adjustment of the 11-year-old Arab Peace Plan to include mutual land swaps. The plan will now accommodate the illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank – including Har Homa. It is absurd that Washington’s position has shifted from freezing settlement activities during the Obama administration’s first term to accommodating those settlements in the second term.

By pressuring the Arabs to accept land swaps even before negotiations begin, Kerry has set up his mediation efforts for failure. He has left no incentive for the Netanyahu government to negotiate; on the contrary, now that the Arabs have in principle accepted land swaps, Netanyahu will likely take advantage of this concession to further intensify settlement activities.

By presenting the land swap to Netanyahu without a firm commitment to stop settlement building, Kerry has sabotaged himself. As he will discover, Netanyahu’s right-wing government is only interested in exploiting every possible opportunity to sabotage peace efforts, building more colonies – and as a result, continuously exacerbating the crisis of America’s image and credibility in the Middle East. To be certain, Netanyahu government has just announced, in response to Kerry’s land swap, the building of 300 units at the heart of the West Bank’s city, Ramallah. This outcome has shown clearly there is nothing innovative about Kerry’s peace plan and that his efforts align perfectly with traditional Washington mediation efforts of appeasing Israeli governments, damaging American image and credibility in the region, and of course making the anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba more painful.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohammed Salem / Reuters

Nonviolent Resistance Key to Middle East Breakthrough

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Almost twenty years of negotiations “brought us nothing but more Israeli settlement. Palestinians have had enough of negotiations,” one senior Palestinian official said at a conference I attended recently. And yet, ahead of his first visit to the Middle East as secretary of state this month, John Kerry appeared to be suggesting more of the same.

“My prayer is that perhaps this can be a moment where we can renew some kind of effort to get the parties into a discussion,” he reportedly said. Such platitudes bode poorly for President Obama’s planned visit to the region this week. Indeed, it seems as if it will be business as usual on Palestinian-Israeli policy during the president’s second term, with yet more fruitless talks and an ever-increasing disconnect between U.S. diplomacy and developments on the ground.

Yet unmentioned by U.S. officials and diplomats is the fact that a credible alternative to the 20-year-old, U.S.-sponsored negotiation process has emerged on the ground. Nonviolent popular resistance could create a real breakthrough – and even an opportunity for a constructive American role.

Read the full op-ed on CNN »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohamad Torokman / Reuters

The Libyan Revolution at Two

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Arriving in the Libyan capital Tripoli, it is immediately (and dispiritingly) clear just how much needs to be done before the country can experience any sort of secure and just order. During my January research trip to Libya, the city seemed to have been overtaken by a paramilitary culture. The streets of Tripoli are thronged with Libyans in military uniform; not members of a national army, but rather of an expanding constellation of independent revolutionary and military councils. The city regularly rings out with automatic gunfire, particularly at night. Its walls, meanwhile, are papered with posters of the 2011 revolution's "martyrs," some of which couple a professional studio portrait with a later, amateur picture of the same man's corpse. Surrounded on all sides by headshots of the Libyan revolution's dead, it can sometimes be difficult to imagine how Libya can achieve national reconciliation and become a stable, functioning country.

Post-revolutionary Libya's accomplishments to date, of course, should not be minimized. The country saw a smooth handover of power in August 2012 from the National Transitional Council to an elected and representative parliament, the General National Congress. The previous month's parliamentary elections to the National Congress, held in a country with no history of electoral politics, were considered generally free and fair by local and international observers. This is a very strong start for Libya's transition process. Libya has witnessed political party formation, another novelty. The country now has functioning political parties -- with offices, staff, and publications -- that work to represent their respective constituencies and took part in last year's elections. Political parties were banned under the ousted ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. The parliament has also passed a law that governs the drafting of the new Libyan constitution. It sets out how the constitutional committee's 60 members, split evenly among Libya's three districts, will be elected.

Outside the realm of formal politics, Libya has seen a proliferation of civil society organizations, including women's and youth organizations. The women's organizations include those pushing for greater political empowerment and participation for women; in particular, they are advocating the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, which emphasizes the importance of women's political participation in post-conflict societies. And in a reflection of Libyans' hunger to speak freely (and to criticize their government), the country has also seen a flood of new media voices. The blossoming of private television channels and newspapers has created a vibrant media scene you might think has existed for decades, not just two years.

Libya also has some cultural factors working in its favor as it struggles to rebuild. It has managed to avoid some of the issues that have dominated transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, notably the ideological divide between Islamists and liberals. There is an irony in the fact that many pointed to the National Congress elections as a success for liberals. "Liberals'" majority share of the vote can be explained in that the Islamist and non-Islamist divide essentially does not exist in Libya, thanks to the deep religious and social conservatism of almost all Libyans. Supposedly liberal factions like that of former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril are closer to Islamism than to the sort of "West-leaning liberalism" on display in Egypt. As some like to put it, Libya's liberals are the equivalent of Tunisia's Islamists. Insofar as this neutralizes the electoral advantage Islamists have enjoyed in other Arab countries, it has also helped to avoid the majority-minority and Islamist-secular dynamics that have proven so divisive and poisonous elsewhere.

Still, it is clear that other basic questions of Libyan identity remain disputed and unanswered, and, in the aftermath of its 2011 revolution, the country has in many ways become a blank slate. Libyans reject the Qaddafi-era system and its legacy, and symbols of the old regime have been removed or defaced. There is little certainty, however, on what should take their place, particularly among symbols of the country's past. Omar al-Mokhtar, a hero of the resistance to Italian colonialism, has become a sort of new unifying figure for the Libyan people. (Former King Idris barely figures into the country's political narrative.) Al-Mokhtar, though, is probably the only personality in the country's past and present on whom there is a Libyan consensus; everyone else in Libya today is the subject of disagreement.

These issues are part of a broader effort by Libyans to deal with their national past, reconstructing their history and piecing together a shared narrative of their experience under Qaddafi's rule. Among the problems they face is ambiguity and disagreement over how far they should look back. How much history must be exhumed before the new Libya can move forward? Some argue that it is only necessary to go as far back as the beginning of Qaddafi's "Popular Revolution" in 1973. A consensus seems to be forming, however, on the need to begin from Qaddafi's arrival to power in 1969. This effort to deal with the past is not simply a philosophical exercise. It is crucial to the functioning of the state and the prospects for reconciling different Libyan factions. Qaddafi's Ownership Laws of 1978, under which all properties not in use by their owner were confiscated, present one problematic example. Libyans have been drawn into complicated -- and often violent -- struggles for ownership as some try to reclaim properties taken under these large-scale redistribution policies. The Libyan state must struggle to fairly adjudicate these disputes, which have their roots in decades-old practices of the Qaddafi regime.

The issue of how to deal with members of the former regime is one of the most high-stakes and controversial challenges to realizing Libyan national reconciliation. The National Congress has agreed in principle to a Law of Political Exclusion that will prohibit old-regime figures from participating in politics or occupying leadership roles in the new Libya. The criteria for defining a "member of the former regime," however, have yet to be determined -- and raise difficult questions. There seems to be overwhelming support from revolutionaries and militia members for the exclusion of anyone who was part of the Qaddafi regime. That could include up to 80 percent of the current National Congress, however, if the law is implemented in the broadest sense. There is not even consensus on whether regime defectors should be integrated into the new order. Some say only those who defected in the first four days of the revolution should qualify, others that it should be anyone who joined the rebels before NATO strikes began.

Many are pushing for purging the judiciary in particular of all Qaddafi-era authorities. If such a step is taken, however, there will be almost no remaining judges to try members of the former regime. (Some have advocated bringing in other Arab or Muslim judges from abroad.) Former dissident Saami al-Saadi, a prominent Salafi figure, demonstrates the thorniness of this issue when he notes that the judge who had ordered his execution in a Qaddafi-era court is still working today. "How can I accept him as a valid authority?" he asks.

Libya's new institutions, meanwhile, are hamstrung by the strength of revolutionary groups and militias. It is these groups that represent the real centers of power in the country today. At least two Libyan states, but arguably many more, exist in parallel. The "official state," led by civil authorities and represented by the General National Congress and the government, is relatively weak. The "unofficial state," led by the Supreme Security Committee (SSC, al-Lajna al-Amniya al-Ulia) and other military councils in the country, hold the real power. While the SSC receives funding from the state, it is still outside the official structure of the state. Beyond this body, there is an array of revolutionary unions and organizations in each town that effectively run their own mini-states. Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi is, for example, being held in a Zintan prison and will likely be tried in a Zintan court. Libya has repeatedly refused to surrender him to the ICC for trial in The Hague. These rebels' arsenals are one source of their strength -- of a declared 200,000 rebels, only 10,000 have signed up for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and surrendered their arms to state control.

The revolutionaries, meanwhile, are themselves divided. Mr. Haidar, a prominent leader in the Misurata rebels, is keen to point out that the real anti-Qaddafi rebel forces are only about 40,000-strong in all of Libya. The remaining 160,000 "rebels" are in fact just power-seeking opportunists, he says.

What unites the revolutionaries, though, is a "culture of the victor" that poses a real obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation. This culture has divided Libya into victorious towns and cities like Misurata, Zintan, and Benghazi and defeated ones like Bani Walid and Sirte. The victorious have taken ownership of the revolution and indulge in self-glorification, while the defeated undergo a process of shaming and marginalization. As resentment grows among the revolution's "losers," there is no real sign of the deep divisions between the two camps being bridged.

One former "Qaddafi town," Tawergha, has been entirely emptied of its citizens. When Tawerghan men attacked Misurata during the war, Misuratans say, they systematically raped Misurata's women. Now Tawergha's 35,000 residents are either refugees or internally displaced. The majority of Tawergha is now being housed in three camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from where most young men have fled. The Libyan judiciary is at a loss for how to deal with a "town accused of rape," and no one has the weight or nerve to convince the rebels of Misurata to allow these people to return to their homes. "We do not have, in our legal system or in our tradition, a way to deal with systematic rape," says Minister of Justice Salah Margani. "We just look at it, acknowledge the suffering of the victims of rape and the IDP camps, and feel powerless about doing anything about it, simply because we don't know how."

The debate over transitional justice has become a central feature of the Libyan transition. A formal transitional justice mechanism is seen by almost all revolutionary factions as a prerequisite to any form of national reconciliation. There is currently no forum in which rival Libyan factions can sit down together, making clear the need for a national dialogue of sorts. There is a general unwillingness, however, to meet with any members of the former regime, foreclosing the possibility of an inclusive transition that could actually resolve the country's security challenges.

Libyans have begun to establish some processes of national reconciliation, but little has actually been achieved thus far. They have set up an independent truth and reconciliation commission led by a judge who served in Qaddafi's Supreme Court but defected before the revolution. Almost a year after its launch, however, the commission has yet to begin its work. A major part of the problem is a lack of technical expertise. The commission's members have sought external advice, but, in the absence of more hands-on cooperation and assistance, they are struggling to make use of it.

If the Libyan people are to restore order to the country and begin to build the modern society Qaddafi denied them, they have a number of key priorities. First and foremost, the establishment of security is an absolute necessity. The lack of security can be seen and felt throughout Libya, whether in raids on Benghazi police stations in the East or the brazen and aggressive smuggling enterprise in Southern city of Sebha. Libya has no future without the return of security and the end of the parallel security-militia state that effectively governs much of the country.

The reintegration of militants into society will require an effective DDR process. Ex-combatants have legitimate grievances and concerns that the state must listen to and address. This will require a state-revolutionary dialogue that, as of now, does not exist. There must also be an end to the culture of victor and vanquished. To whatever extent possible, the state must try to resist the classification of whole tribes and towns as defeated elements of the old regime. As towns like Bani Walid and Sirte and tribes like the Warfella are excluded from the process of rebuilding the country, divisions within society are being deepened. IDPs and refugees have likewise been ignored, which threatens to produce a generation that feels excluded, frustrated, and angry. To the extent that all these segments of Libyan society feel marginalized and abandoned, this situation has dangerous implications for the country's stability. They must be included in the country's rebuilding to avoid the return of violence and civil conflict. For the state to absorb these actors, of course, this process must be coupled with the reform of Libyan state institutions. Libya has made very slow progress in institutional reform, but it can start with its judiciary.

The international community also has a role in the rebuilding of Libya. On border security and the care of refugees (of whom there are approximately one million), Egypt and Tunisia are seen as key partners. Technical support is needed, meanwhile, in initiating a national dialogue, starting the work of the truth commission, and rehabilitating revolutionaries. While the European Union is widely cited as a natural partner for this sort of support, many Libyans have concerns about blurring the line between assistance and intervention. The only real international presence in the country at the moment is the United Nations, which has limitations to what it can achieve. One key message stressed by Margani, moreover, is that whatever assistance is given to the country should not come with conditions that might conflict with "Libyan sovereignty and cultural sensitivities."

Libyans face a long process of rebuilding their country -- or in some respects, building it for the first time. The impoverished state in which Qaddafi left Libyan society has only made Libyans' accomplishments to date all the more impressive. Now is the time, though, to push even harder for a real and comprehensive political transition and to realize Libyan national reconciliation. If not, the forces of revenge and militia violence threaten to overtake everything else.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Esam Al-Fetori / Reuters

An Ill-Advised Purge in Libya

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

At the January national conference of the Association of the Families of the Abu Salim Prison Massacre in Tripoli, I saw the Libyan legislator Abdel Wahab Mohamed Qaid lead a chant in support of the country’s proposed “Political Exclusion Law.”

The law, which Parliament has accepted in principle, will disqualify anyone associated with the regime of Muammar el-Qaddafi from holding public office in Libya — not just senior regime officials, but potentially the country’s upper- and mid-level bureaucracy as well.

In the expansive auditorium in Tripoli, victims’ families responded in unison, cheering Qaid and calling on him to push the law.

I had heard similar sentiments two days earlier when speaking with former revolutionaries protesting in front of Parliament. They told me that the Political Exclusion Law must be approved and strictly enforced if Libya is to protect the revolution and head off corruption in the country’s new government.

Libya’s revolutionaries and the families of victims of the Abu Salim massacre are sincere and well-intentioned in their efforts to both build a new Libya and keep those who contributed to Qaddafi’s rule away from any form of authority.

The emotions at the People’s Auditorium in central Tripoli were high; victims’ mothers and sisters cried, while men chanted “Allahu akbar” (God is great). They had come to the conference for answers — to find out what really happened to their 1,270 loved ones, executed without trial by Qaddafi’s secret police.

Qaid himself spent 16 years in Abu Salim prison; “I grew up in prison,” he told The New York Times last October. He is the brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was described in the article as Al Qaeda’s “brightest star and second in command” and was later killed in an American drone strike in Pakistan. Qaid is now a moderate member of the Libyan Parliament, advocating tolerance and pluralism. Part of his mission is championing the Abu Salim families.

For their part, the revolutionaries protesting in front of Parliament underwent their share of suffering under Qaddafi. In addition to serving long years in prisons, many were either wounded or lost loved ones during the fighting to oust Qaddafi. Now the revolutionaries believe their mission is to defend their victory. They must protect Libya from a counterrevolution they see as beginning with the penetration of state institutions by Qaddafi loyalists.

These impulses to hold former regime figures accountable and build a Libyan state based on good governance are what motivate calls for the Political Exclusion Law. The law’s advocates should be careful, however: Societal division, instability and the regrouping of Qaddafi loyalists could be among the unintended consequences of the law as written.

The advocates must be mindful not to repeat the Iraqi experience of “de-Baathification.” In attempting to strike all members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party from public life, the Coalition Provisional Authority essentially wrecked Iraqi reconstruction, marginalizing large segments of society and fueling sectarianism.

The first, direct outcome of enforcing the Libyan Political Exclusion Law would be pushing smart, influential former officials — some with access to key resources — toward a not insignificant segment of Libyan society unhappy with the revolution’s outcome.

There are currently around one million Libyan refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia and Egypt, in addition to tens of thousands of internally displaced persons all throughout Libya.

One of the grimmer aspects of the Libyan revolution was that it labeled entire towns (including Sirte and Bani Walid) and entire tribes (including the Warfalla) as pro-Qaddafi, thus excluding them from Libya’s rebuilding process. These marginalized communities — refugees, displaced people and ostracized tribes and towns — are a ticking bomb. The Political Exclusion Law will push a new group of powerful former officials to join these excluded communities. Together, they can regroup to mount a challenge to the revolution and the stability of the country.

The officials targeted by the Political Exclusion Law are also the ones with governing experience and the knowledge of how to actually run the country, including the state’s education, economy and oil bureaucracies. Libya has a shortage of judges, for example, and almost every working judge had some role in the former regime. So the Political Exclusion Law would leave Libya with a paralyzed judiciary, with devastating consequences.

Equally important, the Political Exclusion Law is an arbitrary and ineffective defense against corruption. Corrupt bureaucrats who were not part of the Qaddafi regime would be able to occupy senior positions in the new government, while honest individuals forced to work in the old system for lack of an alternative would be ousted.

The frustration of victims’ families and revolutionaries is understandable and must be addressed. The solution to their grievances is a transitional justice law that targets individuals — not communities — based on their actions under the old regime. The law should hold accountable individuals who are guilty of real crimes, not guilty by association.

Instead of the Political Exclusion Law, Libyans should be investing their efforts in building a thorough and transparent transitional justice law. It would provide a real, fair accounting for those guilty of offenses under the previous regime while allowing victims’ wounds to heal. At the same time, it would avoid further dividing Libya, and spare the country from another wrenching conflict.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: New York Times

Image Source: © Esam Al-Fetori / Reuters

A Lasting Peace? Yemen's Long Journey to National Reconciliation

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Yemenis sit down to their long-delayed national dialogue, they face an array of challenges that threaten to pull the country apart – from an unfinished revolution to regional demands for independence. Can Yemen grapple with its legacy of dictatorship and violence and prevent another slide into civil conflict?

In a new paper from the Brookings Doha Center, A Lasting Peace: Yemen’s Long Journey to National Reconciliation, Ibrahim Sharqieh outlines a process of national reconciliation that is Yemen’s best hope for stability.

Based on extensive field research and interviews with key Yemeni figures, Sharqieh describes the challenges facing post-revolutionary Yemen and the key actors in the country’s national reconciliation, from the Islamist Islah Party to the country’s tribes. He also lays out the mechanisms for a successful reconciliation process, discussing not only the country’s nascent national dialogue but also the sort of transitional justice bodies that must follow it. Finally, he concludes with how the international community can help Yemen achieve reconciliation – and warns against regional and international powers acting as spoilers.

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Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Image Source: © Mohamed Al-Sayaghi / Reuters

Time for U.S. to Stop Shielding Israel

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Wed, 23 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

We are now set for a third term for Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu. And, although Netanyahu’s Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition seems to have underperformed expectations, a plurality of the vote will allow him to once again lead Israel’s government.

But even a somewhat moderated Netanyahu government will continue to advance radical positions that put regional and global security in danger. The question, then, is how the United States can best push another right-wing administration to behave in accordance with the principles of the international security system – and its own national interests.

Over the past two Netanyahu terms, the international community, and the United States in particular, adopted an approach based on accommodation when dealing with the Netanyahu government. The hope was that this approach would contain the risks this extremist government posed to international security. Yet just as that strategy did not work then, it will not work now. The United States must therefore now take a harder line with Israel’s coming government – it must switch from a strategy of accommodation to one of confrontation, and it should start by letting fall its diplomatic shield.

In order to protect Israel from international pressure, the United States has repeatedly vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions that criticize Israeli government actions – including resolutions on settlement construction that the United States itself publicly rejects. In return, Netanyahu has publicly flouted American priorities. Europe has also accommodated the Netanyahu government. In exchange, Netanyahu refused a request from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, his strongest European ally, to temporarily freeze settlement construction. The negotiating “Quartet,” meanwhile, has yielded to the Israeli government’s position since its inception. The Quartet – made up of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations – was repaid in last January’s Amman talks. It requested that each negotiating party submit in writing its vision for final status talks; while the Palestinians complied, Netanyahu declined, dealing the Quartet a humiliating defeat.

This international forbearance has tipped the already skewed balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians and essentially left Israel with no incentive to negotiate or compromise. A Netanyahu-led Israel whose military, economic, and now diplomatic power dwarfs that of the Palestinians no longer sees any reason to be part of a sustainable solution.

Continuing to enable the latest iteration of the Netanyahu government threatens a host of dangerous, unpredictable consequences. Netanyahu’s plans to continue settlement expansion will effectively put an end to peace efforts in the region. Just Tuesday, British Foreign Secretary William Hague said that Israel’s settlement policy “will make a two-state solution impossible.” Now, a further deterioration of peace prospects could produce the long-overdue “Palestinian Spring.” We may see the first stirrings of this sort of mass, nonviolent protest in Bab al-Shams and Bab al-Karama – two tent cities that have sprung up to obstruct Israeli expansion plans in the occupied West Bank. More dangerously, though, settlement growth will likely lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, something the United States has gone to great lengths to protect and support. The vacuum left by the Authority’s implosion could lead to a surge of violence, which may seem to many Palestinians like their only legitimate alternative. The same void would effectively invalidate the Quartet’s reason for existence – and even require direct international intervention to restore order. And all this is to say nothing of the possibility Netanyahu could drag the United States into a new region-spanning war with Iran, just as America is winding down its long, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of course, there is now reason to think that Israel’s ironclad international support may be changing. Europe made an obvious and historic shift in its diplomacy when its member states either voted yes or abstained in the recent United Nations vote on Palestinian statehood. President Obama’s nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense, coupled with his refusal to withdraw the nomination in the face of sharp opposition, also suggests a possible policy evolution. Obama has entered his second term with a freer hand on foreign policy. Hagel’s anti-war positions and his openness to dialogue with Iran imply that Obama may be willing to challenge Netanyahu at some point; if so, he will have European and international backing.

The Obama administration has leverage, and it should use it. Further accommodation of Netanyahu and his right wing policies will only exacerbate the already complicated and difficult issues underlying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The United States has to draw the line sometime – and that time should be now. It can start by practicing more assertive diplomacy, namely by refusing to provide diplomatic cover for dangerous, unproductive moves – settlement expansion is only one example. If Netanyahu wants to continue on this road, he must understand that he’ll have to do so alone. The American veto policy of unconditional support for illegal Israeli practices must end, and, like the Europeans, the Obama administration must let Benjamin Netanyahu face the consequences of his own policies.

By letting slip its diplomatic shield, the United States can leave behind a failed policy of accommodation. In doing so, it can once again provide hope for a just, sustainable solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and at the same time protect its national interests in the Middle East.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Is Yemen’s Power Struggle Over?

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Fri, 21 Dec 2012 17:45:00 -0500

In a dramatic move this week, Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi struck at some of the old regime centers of power that have persisted since the removal of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Saleh’s influence has lived on through allies that retain command of key military and security units – in particular, his son Brigadier General Ahmed Ali Saleh, who heads the country’s Republican Guards, and his nephew Yehya Saleh, who leads the Central Security forces. But with a set of decrees reorganizing Yemen's armed forces, Hadi moved to fold these units into a four-branch Yemeni army, with the president serving as commander-in-chief.

Hadi’s decrees aimed to end the low-intensity struggle that has ground on over the past year between Saleh’s allies and their rivals in the country’s political and military leadership. In so doing, however, Hadi has run the risk of destabilizing a country that the United States views as a front line on the war on al Qaeda. After all, Yemen is also adjacent to Saudi Arabia, and chaos in Yemen could disrupt oil supplies and upset world energy markets.

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Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

Can the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Resolve Conflicts?

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Ibrahim Sharqieh’s article examines the potential of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to contribute to mediation of conflicts in the Muslim world. Based on interviews with OIC senior officials and government officials from Iraq and the Philippines, as well as research involving other primary and secondary sources, the author analyzes four cases in which the OIC participated in mediation efforts: the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, and Somalia. The article concludes with an assessment of the advantages and challenges of including the OIC in such mediation efforts, as well as recommendations related to capacity-building and inter-organizational partnerships that might enhance the potential for the OIC to play a constructive role in conflicts involving the Muslim community.

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Read the entire Fall 2012 Issue (Volume 19, Number 2) Of Peace and Conflict Studies »

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Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Peace and Conflict Studies

Image Source: © Benoit Tessier / Reuters

U.S.-Yemeni Terror Obsession Will Not Solve Yemen's Woes

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 13 Nov 2012 18:30:00 -0500

Among the world leaders who congratulated President Barack Obama for winning a second term last week was the Yemeni president, Abdrabu Mansur Hadi. From the Yemeni leader's point of view, the most important aspect of Mr Obama's reelection is perhaps the issue of the continuation of a U.S.-Yemeni war on terrorism.

In the congratulatory cable, President Hadi "reiterated that the Yemeni-American partnership will continue to advance and the cooperation in the fight against terrorism will progress." Mr. Hadi praised his American counterparts' "achievements in curtailing the threat of terrorism and highlighted the linkage between global interests with the performance of the U.S. administration". No other Yemeni subjects were raised in the cable.

The prominence given to antiterrorism efforts in the U.S.-Yemeni relationship recalls the days of the old regime. Under Ali Abdullah Saleh, there was consistent controversy about whether the former president was sincere in his fight against Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), or was just manipulating the cause to secure more military aid and support to his regime.

This is not to suggest in any way that Mr. Hadi is manipulating the security cause, but to mention "terrorism" twice in a short note of congratulation raises questions about Mr Hadi's approach to the challenges facing Yemen and his strategies for moving the country forward.

Mr. Hadi's appetite for tighter collaboration on security and antiterrorism seems to be motivated by his successes in the Abyan province, where AQAP militants have been driven out of several cities they'd controlled during the uprising against Mr. Saleh (including Lawdar, Jaar, Zinjibar and Shaqra).

AQAP moved into the remote province during the uprising in Sanaa, taking advantage of a collapse of security beyond the capital. Then, for probably the first time in its history (it was formed in 2009), AQAP abandoned its traditionally secretive approach and expanded into civil governance in Abyan. AQAP controlled police stations, regulated traffic and solved local disputes.

A collaboration of Yemeni boots on the ground, along with American drones overhead, led to the decisive collapse of this experiment in AQAP governance.

It also brought promises of even more antiterrorism funding from the U.S. The Washington Post reported in July that to consolidate this U.S.-Yemeni security collaboration, "the U.S. military is preparing to give more than $100 million in counterterrorism and security aid to [Yemen] this year".

Before President Hadi reiterates his commitment to taking security collaboration to the next level, he, along with the U.S., should be assessing to what extent the collaborated effort has indeed been successful.

First of all, the collapse of AQAP governance in Abyan does not weaken the organisation in terms of its ability to attack. It only returns the organisation to its previous state, as a clandestine group that plans and hits selected targets, either in Yemen or abroad. Governance has never been part of organisation's mandate. Renouncing its hold on Abyan may actually even end up strengthening AQAP, as it relieves the group from the burden of governance.

Furthermore, the Yemeni army did not provide the full protection needed after the fighting and left the local tribes who fought as part of the alliance with the U.S. military vulnerable, in particular to retaliatory attacks from AQAP. In fact, AQAP responded in August with a suicide bombing that targeted a funeral in the city of Jaar, killing 45 people.

If the Yemeni-American security alliance does not address the needs of the local tribes, it is unlikely they will be around when the next fighting begins. In other words, providing security and maintaining order takes more than just drone attacks with no strings attached.

In Northwest Pakistan, the same model has led to the alienation of local communities and turned them to easy recruiting targets for Al Qaeda. In Yemen, an estimated 200,000 people displaced by the fighting are still unable to return to their homes.

President Hadi's emphasis on "the Yemeni-American partnership in the fight against terrorism" should deal with the root causes of the problem rather than treating it merely as a matter of military aid and arms. That is the failed model that his predecessor used for years.

At the top of the list of root causes for the spread of terrorism is poverty. The UN's World Food Programme reports that food insecurity in Yemen had doubled in the last two years, leaving approximately 45 per cent of the population short of food. An estimated 300,000 children are facing malnutrition, while unemployment exceeds 46 per cent.

Equally important are the challenges facing President Hadi on the political front. The political settlement - or GCC initiative - that brought him to power is facing serious obstacles almost one year on from its signing in Saudi Arabia. Loyalists of the former president are still actively advancing their own agenda. The national dialogue process that was supposed to take place months after the signing has not even started. And there is now talk of the Southern movement boycotting the dialogue. Unless the political settlement produces result soon, Yemenis will begin to question where the political process is really taking them.

The results the Yemeni people expect are definitely not those emphasised by President Hadi in his cable to the American president. Rather, the focus from both Mr. Hadi and his American counterparts should be on meeting serious development objectives.

Yemenis need to see hope, not drones. Failure to reorient the U.S.-Yemeni relationship in this way will only add further pressure to the fraught political settlement, and bring its collapse one step closer, an outcome that would damage the ability of both the U.S. and Yemen to advance security, stability and development in the country.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: The National

Image Source: HANDOUT

Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda

Tue, 13 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 13, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post 9/11 era. Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure—orchestrated with U.S. support—raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation. How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war? What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?

On November 13, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore these and other questions about the conflict in Yemen. Panelists included Gregory Johnsen, a Ph.D. candidate in the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton, and Fellow Ibrahim Sharqieh, deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center, who appeared via video conference from Doha.

Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman, director of research for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

Obama Must Stand Up to Netanyahu on Israeli Settler Violence

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

My Palestinian driver had reason to worry as we passed near the Israeli settlement Yitzhar in the West Bank. The settlement is notorious for frequent attacks on nearby Palestinian citizens. Only a month earlier, my driver had himself been attacked by a group of settlers with a big rock that barely missed his car. Two miles farther up the road, he reported the attack to an Israeli Army patrol that was in the area. The patrol commander asked if anyone in the car had been injured. “No,” the driver had said. “Then you can go, no problem if no one was hurt,” the Army personnel replied.

While my driver was lucky to escape the attack unscathed, others have been less fortunate. Returning to their Bethlehem home in August, the Ghayatha family was attacked by settlers who hurled a firebomb at their taxi. Ayman Ghayatha, his wife, their three children, and the taxi driver were all severely injured. “The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms yesterday’s attack on a Palestinian taxi in the West Bank,” said State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland. Subsequently, violent attacks by Jewish settlers against “Palestinian residents, property and places of worship” were cited for the first time in the U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism as “terrorist incidents.”

While such a designation marks a significant development in how the U.S. treats the settlement issue, it threatens to remain a label on paper rather than a term that inspires action. Crucially, the designation “settler terrorism” fails to highlight that the Israeli government bears the major responsibility for this phenomenon through its own policy and the complicity of its response to this violence. Viewing this campaign simply as isolated settler terrorism is likely to limit understanding of the problem and obstruct an effective strategy for addressing it.

Settler terrorism has been rising sharply in recent years. The first half of 2012 alone witnessed 154 attacks. According to a report drafted by senior European officials in February this year, the number of attacks rose from 132 in 2009 to 411 in 2011. A UN report released in July 2012 said that settler terrorism targeting Palestinians in the West Bank had risen 150 percent since 2008. These attacks have not been restricted to violence against individuals. Places of worship (mostly mosques) have been torched, trees have been uprooted, and livestock have been slaughtered. Also in August, Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that 14 sheep were killed in a settler attack against Palestinian shepherds near the West Bank village of Akraba.

There is increasing evidence to suggest that the Israeli government has been taking a passive and complicit role in dealing with settler terrorism. Dan Halutz, former Israeli Army chief of staff, recently told the Israeli Army radio that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is not doing enough to stop settler violence. “If we wanted, we could catch them and when we want to, we will,” Mr. Halutz said. Furthermore, Haaretz and Channel 2 television reported in February 2012 that an Israeli justice minister was caught on tape advising right-wingers on how to seek pardons for Jewish terrorists – which he might later approve.

A March 2012 report by senior European Union officials said that “[d]iscriminatory protections and privileges for settlers compound...abuses and create an environment in which settlers can act with apparent impunity.” The report said these and other actions have created the perception that “settler violence enjoys the tacit support of the state of Israel.”

Successive Israeli governments of all ideological stripes – left, right, and center – can be held responsible for perpetuating the root causes of settler terrorism by creating and nurturing the settlement movement in the West Bank. They have largely pursued or refused to fully curb this policy, despite international consensus on the illegality of building those settlements.

The U.S. government has been right to consistently oppose Israeli policies on settlements as a serious obstacle to achieving peace and stability in the region. However, the U.S. failure to back up that rhetoric with action has helped create the monster of settler terrorism that is now proving so difficult to contain. While President Obama made the right decision in demanding a settlement freeze, his failure to back up his demand allowed the Netanyahu government to launch the most aggressive settlement policy to date.

Settlement activities in the Palestinian territories pose a structural threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. As such, Washington must not shy away from confronting them. The U.S. State Department listing settler attacks as “terrorist incidents” clearly indicates a concern that such attacks may trigger a response from the Palestinians that could push the area into a new cycle of violence, something the United States cannot afford at a time of major upheaval and turmoil throughout the region.

The State Department’s decision to designate settler violence in the West Bank as terrorism presents an opportunity and a challenge for U.S. interests in the Middle East. It is an opportunity for Washington to correct the historic mistake of accommodating Israeli settlement policies that are inherently hostile to the regional stability the U.S. seeks. However, to effectively address the problem, the US must deal with its root cause: the Israeli government’s systematic expansion of settlements in the Palestinian territories. In order for that regional stability to be secured, my driver must feel safe while trying to make his daily wage, and the Ghayatha family must feel assured that they will never again be attacked while driving home.

Designating settler violence as “terrorism” is definitely the first step toward a solution. However, the Obama administration can do more to address the problem. The time has come for Washington to bluntly inform Israel that the U.S. is no longer willing to be associated with its violations of human rights in the Palestinian territories. It must make clear that in the future, Israeli policymakers will have to take full responsibility for their actions regarding settlements, without the guarantee of unconditional American protection.

Further, the U.S. should resist behaving in a hypocritical manner by labeling the phenomenon as “terrorism” when it has vetoed resolutions condemning Israeli settlements in the Security Council. Financial leverage is another tool the U.S. could certainly use to end a situation whereby American taxpayers’ money is indirectly funding settlement activities. The U.S. should make its financial aid to Israel conditional on the Israeli government’s compliance with international law and ending its settlement activities. A number of European countries have made progress on this front by boycotting settlement products on the basis of settlers' involvement in human rights violations against Palestinian farmers in the West Bank.

Defining the phenomenon as settler terrorism also presents a further challenge for the U.S. Failing to fully act on the implications of this terminology could exacerbate America’s perpetual dilemma: being accused of “double standards” in the Middle East. Washington’s historic position on terrorism is well known for its zero tolerance – where terror is involved, actions follow words. A failure to apply those standards in this case will beg the question across the region: Are all terrorists created equal?

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Christian Science Monitor

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

The Yemeni Model Probably Won’t Fit Syria Now

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 21 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with Voice of America’s David Arnold, Ibrahim Sharqieh says it may be too late for a negotiated settlement in Syria, in contrast with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s peaceful departure from power earlier this year. Sharqieh says although a model for peaceful change, Yemen still needs to prepare for national reconciliation.

The escalation of violence in Syria stands in sharp contrast to the relative calm that followed a similar Arab Spring uprising in Yemen last year. In past months, Middle East observers have proposed that the transition from the 33-year rule of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh could be a model for the proposed departure of another long-serving head of state, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But as the violence increases, time appears to be running out for a peaceful transition in Damascus.

Among those observers who once urged a negotiated settlement in Damascus, conflict resolution specialist Ibrahim Sharqieh of the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center, told VOA’s David Arnold this week it may be too late for Syria. “My argument at this point is that it’s becoming extremely difficult, and every day that passes without a serious initiative, the chances become less, unfortunately,” he said.

Yemen became a model for peaceful change and possible political reform in part because the Gulf States negotiated Saleh’s peaceful departure. The country still needs to prepare for national reconciliation and to provide electricity, water and jobs for the people, according to Sharqieh. But he says conditions have improved under the new president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi.

Here is Sharqieh’s assessment of the two countries and five reasons why he thinks a negotiated regime change probably won’t work in Syria:

Progress in Yemen

“Yemen made progress on two levels. One is in terms of working with a balance of power and the fighting with the former president’s group. President Hadi was able to eliminate to a certain extent and weaken the block of former President Saleh and marginalize many of its leaders. So he is gaining momentum in having a centralized power…. The other progress he made is in the fighting with al-Qaida, especially in the south where al-Qaida was able to control the entire province of Abyan.”

Syrian bloodshed

"There are five elements we need to consider in my view that prevent any easy implementation of the Yemeni scenario in Syria. Number one is that we have an army split in Yemen, where half of the army supported the revolution. In Syria, we’re only seeing, at least formally, the army is backing the regime. Two, which is more important…is that in Yemen we did not see the bloodshed we are seeing in Syria now.”

Divided opposition, divided neighbors

“Number three: In Yemen…we have a unified opposition…that was able to engage in negotiations and sign, whereas, in Syria we have seen a split position that does not have any unity…. Number four: The trust has been completely eliminated in Syria…. While it wasn’t perfect in Yemen, to a certain extent the parties were able to trust each other when it comes to signing on papers. Number five: The different parts of the international community – Saudi Arabia, the United States, China, Russia – were all united and pushing for the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] initiative to implement a solution in Yemen. In Syria…we are seeing a split in the international community in two blocks.”

Listen to the interview at middleastvoices.voanews.com »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Voice of America

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Yemen Can't Do It Alone

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Fri, 01 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

During a recent visit to Yemen, I was sitting in a cafe in Sana when we suddenly experienced a power outage. I asked the waiter what happened, and he replied: “Saleh’s men keep attacking the main power plant in Mareb to disrupt life in Sana. Saleh is still working against the revolution. He won’t give up.”

Regardless of the real causes of the outage, the waiter’s explanation reflected a general sense that the uprising against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his aides is far from over.

Officially, the uprising, which was inspired by the Arab Spring and led to hundreds of deaths, ended last February when the former vice president, Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi, was installed as president. But many Yemenis do not believe that Saleh has entirely exited the political scene after 33 years of authoritarian rule over the poor, deeply divided country.

Some progress has been made under the new president. By and large, change and uprising in Yemen are proceeding on parallel tracks, and unless the international community provides Yemen with serious support these tracks may collide — with dire domestic and regional consequences.

Some Yemenis have blamed the opposition for signing the power transfer deal that removed Saleh from power without insisting on making his immunity conditional on his retirement from political activity. The terms of immunity allow Saleh to exercise politics in any capacity he wishes other than the presidency, while also completely shielding him from prosecution. Saleh still serves as president of his General People’s Congress party, which makes many Yemenis nervous about his plans.

“He is like a ghost,” my waiter said. “You don’t see him but you certainly feel his presence.”

Young revolutionaries fear their uprising has not yet achieved its goals. Six months since the signing of the power transfer deal, there are still thousands of tents in Sana’s Change Square. Protesters continue pressing their demands as they have for months.

A revolutionary culture permeates the area, with political slogans, leaflets, music and youths discussing politics around the clock. Almost all political parties are represented at information centers in the square — liberals, Islamists, socialists and secularists. Even the Houthis, a militant rebel group that has fought six wars against the central government, still operate an information center tent called “Shabab al-Somoud” (Steadfast Youth).

Preparing for what seems to be a long stay in Change Square, the Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman upgraded her tent to accommodate her family, a secretary and a space to meet visitors. The “Nobel Tent” makes a blunt statement: The Yemeni uprising is no longer a fully domestic affair but has a global dimension and will continue until the uprising’s objectives have been fully met.

Yemen’s transition, unlike others in the region, was met with unanimous support from the international community, which has positioned Hadi strongly to deal with the multiple challenges he faces. Indeed, President Obama’s recent threat to freeze the assets of “those trying to disrupt the political transition” sent a clear message to Hadi’s rivals about the strong American stance on Yemen.

Hadi has used this robust international support to change the balance of power in his country. He succeeded in sidelining General Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, the air force chief and Saleh’s half brother, as well as Tareq Saleh, a commander of a powerful brigade in Sana and Saleh’s nephew, significantly boosting the president’s power and popularity.

The partnership between Hadi and the U.S. administration undoubtedly extends to the fight against Al Qaeda. For Hadi, defeating the group is crucial for several reasons. He needs to distance himself from his predecessor by proving his sincerity about routing Al Qaeda. This will earn him the trust of the international community. Furthermore, winning the war against Al Qaeda will pave the way for restoring security and stability in Yemen.

Hadi has thus far been successful in restoring order in the city of Louder, and the army says it now controls most of Zinjibar, a known Qaeda stronghold. But the suicide bombing at a military parade rehearsal in Sana on May 21, which killed nearly 100 soldiers, highlights Al Qaeda’s effort to shift the battleground from the south to Sana.

Although these successes are important, they will not transform Yemen into a stable, functioning nation. It will take more than defeating Al Qaeda and sidelining Saleh’s allies for Hadi to win the hearts and minds of Yemenis.

Above all, Hadi must quickly deliver desperately needed services to the people. Yemen is on the verge of a humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by recent clashes, and aid must be delivered before it is too late. In my discussions with tribal members, “looming starvation” was mentioned several times.

In addition, power outages happen many times a day, complicating attempts at economic recovery and stalling efforts to resume normal daily life. Frustrated by the frequency of power outages, it is no surprise that the waiter I spoke to believes that Saleh’s men are behind these disruptions. Although it is not required under the power transfer agreement, Saleh’s departure to another country could restore some needed credibility to the political process in Yemen.

Yemen’s problems can be solved, but the international aid community must step in immediately if the country is to stave off a looming disaster.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

Focus on Al Qaeda in Yemen Magnifies Chronic Instability

Wed, 25 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In a recent conversation, the White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan and Yemen's newly elected President Abdrabu Mansour Hadi "pledged that the two countries, together with Yemen's other international partners, will work closely together to confront Yemen's security and economic challenges".

Despite the fact that Yemenis signed a power-transfer deal in November in the hopes of achieving lasting political change, this process was not mentioned in that high-level conversation. Undoubtedly, political progress has been made, with the election of a new president and the formation of a coalition government, yet economic improvements have yet to be delivered. Yemen is increasingly insecure, as the number of drone attacks has risen post-revolution.

No wonder The Washington Post reported last week: "The CIA is seeking authority to expand its covert drone campaign in Yemen by launching strikes against terrorism suspects even when it does not know the identities of those who could be killed, US officials said."

Since the February 25 inauguration of Yemen's new president, Abyan province has become the front of a new war against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In mid-March, the bombing of Abyan resulted in the deaths of more than 60 militants.

By mid-April, violence had escalated; at least 222 people were killed in five days of clashes around the southern town of Loder. This escalation sends a clear message that a security solution is being pursued even more aggressively today than under the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who still wields considerable power in the country. Recent actions also suggest that the pattern of investing resources in a security solution - even at the expense of economic development - is also surviving in Yemen's post-Saleh period.

With the "Friends of Yemen" scheduled to meet next month, the international community should think carefully about the aid it provides. Investing resources in fighting AQAP has caused more harm than good.

In the past few years, focus on military spending to aid the fight against AQAP has perpetuated domestic instability. This can take place in two ways. First, in the context of instability, units created to preserve security can be manipulated to serve narrow political agendas. For example, the counterterrorism unit which the US helped to create and train, headed by Mr Saleh's nephew Yahya, opted to stay in Sanaa to protect the former president during the uprising - rather than mobilise in the South to preserve security.

Yemen's security establishment remains divided between supporters of the former regime and Mr Hadi and his supporters, creating dangerous conditions for the manipulation of security resources.

Second, the fight against AQAP has created beneficiaries who now depend on continued fighting for their survival. AQAP, for instance, announced that its attack against the Yemeni army, immediately following the inauguration of Mr Hadi, killed over 100 soldiers and led to the capture of their weaponry. Al Qaeda is arming itself with the weapons meant to fight it.

Some Yemeni analysts such as Abdul Ghani Al Iryani trace the emergence of Ansar Al Sharia - an AQAP-linked group - to the December 2009 drone attack that killed over 40 people, many of whom were civilians. Mr Al Iryani suggests: "Of the thousands of Ansar Al Sharia now fighting in Abyan, the majority were not Al Qaeda; they were angered by what they saw American aggression … one event that radicalised the entire [province]".

A third reason the international community should not invest in additional attacks is that the security solution has failed miserably. The most noticeable accomplishment of the drone attacks has been the aggravation of the security situation on the ground. Yemen analyst Gregory Johnsen agrees, stating that "such an approach actually does more to exacerbate the problem of Al Qaeda than it does to solve it". AQAP, which has something to fight against as long as attacks continue, has recently become stronger in Abyan, gaining control over areas such as Arhab, Jaar, Shaqra, Rawdah and Azzan.

Furthermore, continuing drone attacks are overshadowing Yemen's political process. Success in the country has been measured by the number of AQAP members killed, rather than by the development of a viable political system post-Saleh. Indeed, five months have passed since the signing of the transfer of power, yet no agreement has been signed on the location, participants or agenda of the upcoming national dialogue.

The Friends of Yemen meeting on May 23 should keep in mind that true friendship to Yemen involves helping the country become self sufficient through the delivery of economic assistance and the launch of a genuine, inclusive and sustainable national dialogue. It is also imperative for a clear political road map to emerge. The GCC-mediated power transfer led to a fragile peace, yet mistrust in the political process lingers. A successful national dialogue process may secure the now-fragile peace.

Pursuing a security solution in Yemen has created greater instability. A development strategy featuring an inclusive national dialogue should help break the cycle of violence. The time has come for a paradigm shift. A security solution is not sustainable in the long term in Yemen, yet economic development and a viable political road map are.

Publication: The National

Focus on Al Qaeda in Yemen Magnifies Chronic Instability

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Wed, 25 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Yemen's security establishment remains divided between supporters of the former regime and Mr Hadi and his supporters, creating dangerous conditions for the manipulation of security resources.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: The National

Security Challenges in Libya

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Thu, 05 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Ibrahim Sharqieh joins a panel of experts including Mohamed Nasr Harizi, spokesman for the Transitional National Assembly; Khalid Sharif, commander of the National Guard in Tripoli; and Dr. Saleh al-Sanusi, professor of political science and international law at the University of Benghazi on Al Jazeera Arabic's program "Hadeeth Al Thawra" (Talk of the Revolution) to discuss the latest security challenges facing Libya.

The issue of arms proliferation in post-Gadhafi Libya is now back at the forefront as clashes between and within tribes and different armed groups raise many questions regarding the stability and security of Libya, not to mention the ability of the transitional government to contain the revolutionaries’ weapons and impose it s authority over the nation’s territories and borders.

View the full interview or read the transcript in Arabic on Al Jazeera Arabic »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Al Jazeera Arabic

From Protests to Politics, a New Way Forward for Yemen

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Fri, 16 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The Yemeni people have reason to celebrate. They managed to keep their 12-month uprising largely peaceful, held successful and transparent presidential elections and ultimately put an end to the country's autocracy. Though it is still too early to judge the success of the post-Saleh government, it seems the Yemeni model of transition is laying the groundwork for a more democratic Yemen.

The GCC initiative that outlined the transfer of power from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to an elected president may not have satisfied everyone in the Yemeni uprising. There was, after all, only one candidate in the running. But it has certainly created a politically viable alternative to Mr. Saleh's autocracy and ended a brutal stalemate that impeded any genuine political change for almost a year.

Since the signing of the GCC initiative, a unity government has been established, in addition to a military and security reform committee. With the success of the recent presidential elections, Abdurabu Hadi now serves as executive. Remarkably, all of this progress has been made in only a few months - despite the fragile security environment in Yemen - suggesting that similarly impressive political changes could be forthcoming.

When it was first launched, the GCC plan was supported by the Gulf countries and broadly by the international community. Last month's successful presidential election demonstrated that the majority of the Yemeni people have also bought into the new political process, lending the initiative local credibility.

The successful presidential election shows unmistakable progress toward democracy. This is very important as Yemenis now are seeing a possible end to one year of uncertainty and instability. The political process has earned the support of the international community, Gulf countries and most importantly the Yemeni people. The impressive 60 per cent participation in the election demonstrates a trust in the political process, granting the newly elected leader popular legitimacy and power that he needs to make change.

The success of this model of negotiated regime change and a coordinated transition is important not only for the Yemeni people but also for the entire region, particularly those countries experiencing popular unrest. Yemen has thus far been the only Arab country to negotiate the exit of its leader. With Bashar Al Assad still clinging to power, Yemen's model of coordinated transition may well provide insights for Syria, where the international community remains divided in its approach to the increasingly violent crisis.

While they enjoy a well deserved celebration after the successful election, Yemenis should keep in mind that the hard work of rebuilding the country has just begun.

Enormous challenges lie ahead, and many unanswered questions. Just this week, Mr Saleh made a new condition for his departure: he won't go unless 10 of his political and military rivals leave too. This was widely seen as a ploy for the ousted leader to remain in Yemen longer.

There are also other lingering issues. The southern secessionist movement, the Houthis, Al Qaeda and the severe lack of economic development are only examples of the coming challenges. Mismanagement of the rebuilding process could easily unravel the progress that has already been made.

The first step towards a genuine rebuilding of the country should involve an inclusive national reconciliation process beginning with a national dialogue. The coordinated transitional model left the domestic power struggle over the country's army and large bureaucratic system intact, and the new Yemeni leadership must now unite these forces behind transition. In so doing, this leadership should realise that transitioning to a strong democratic model that treats diversity in Yemeni society as an opportunity rather than a threat is a key factor in success.

The grievances of southerners in particular should be recognised and addressed through the democratic system. The southerners - as stakeholders contributing equally to the rebuilding process - should realise that they will need to give this model a chance. Since 1994, they have suffered from Mr Saleh's autocracy that marginalised the southern region in particular. Today, however, the southerners will finally have the opportunity to air their grievances with the national government and contribute equally to building a democratic system.

To ensure success, Yemen's coordinated transition should lead to the construction of highly transparent state institutions. Again, the model of negotiated exit has provided a new leader and his staff but not state institutions. Reforming the public sector institutions and eradicating corruption must begin immediately. Otherwise, this model will prove to be one of presidential change rather than genuine regime change.

Finally, we must not overlook that this is a historical moment for Yemenis to begin a new era of rebuilding and reconciliation. Though presidential elections were critical to the rebuilding process, Yemenis should know that this is not enough. A new executive cannot reform the entire system alone. All stakeholders are equally responsible for both success and failure.

The coordinated transition model has provided an opportunity, yet the model will not be fully successful without a genuine and inclusive reconciliation process. With elections and free choice comes a responsibility - to replace protests with dialogue as the most effective way forward for the country.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: The National

An Update on Libya

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Wed, 07 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview on the Kojo Nnamdi Show, Ibrahim Sharqieh discusses the security situation in Libya.

MR. KOJO NNAMDI: Nearly six months after the fall of Col. Moammar Gadhafi, hopes for a transition to a stable democratic government in Libya are meeting reality. Libya's interim government is struggling to maintain control amidst violence and power struggles between malicious and tribal chiefs. The latest challenge is in the oil rich eastern region. Local leaders there have declared themselves semi-autonomous, reviving old divisions and threatening the already fragile unity of the country.

MR. KOJO NNAMDI: Tripoli is now controlled not by government security forces but by competing militias. And in the South, a hundred people were killed in tribal fighting last week. Many fear Libya is in danger of becoming a failed state. Joining us to discuss that situation by phone from Doha, Qatar is Ibrahim Sharquieh. He is the deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center. Ibrahim, thank you so much for joining us.

MR. IBRAHIM SHARQIEH: Thank you, Kojo.

NNAMDI: Right now, there's a transitional government with an interim leader. Is there any timeline for an elected government in Libya?

SHARQIEH: That's correct, yes. That is actually on June 23. There's supposed to be an election of a council that - this council will be tasked to draft their constitution. And after drafting the constitution, there should be a referendum. And early in 2013, we should see legislative elections as well in Libya.

NNAMDI: One of the more serious issues for the National Transition Council are divisions and violence. In the south, more than 100 people were killed last week as we just said. Tripoli also has issues with security. What does that say about the government's ability to unify and control tribal leaders and militias?

SHARQIEH: This is—there are plenty of indicators that suggest that the security situation in the country is actually deteriorating. Last week, we have seen over 100 people killed in the southern city of Kufra in the tribal clashes between different tribes. And also, we have seen, over the past two, three months, a number of incidents clashing security forces in the capital Tripoli. So the National Transitional Council has been struggling trying to control these security situations.

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Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: The Kojo Nnamdi Show - NPR

Congress Defunds Palestinian "Sesame Street," Jeopardizes U.S. Policy in Middle East

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 00:00:00 -0500

There will be no Big Bird, Elmo, Bert, or Ernie for Palestinian children as long as their leaders continue their quest for United Nations recognition. That’s the latest message Palestinians are receiving from Congress.

In December, the chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee escalated pressure against the Palestinian statehood appeal to the UN by freezing $192 million in funding for USAID programs. Those funds go primarily to hospitals, education, and government institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. One of the largest programs affected by the suspension of aid is the iconic children’s show, the Palestinian version of "Sesame Street," known in Arabic as “Sharaa’ Simsim.”

The move not only jeopardizes "Sharaa’ Simsim," but the Obama administration’s efforts to improve American relations with the Middle East.

The show first began in 1996 and worked to promote messages of peace, tolerance, and diversity. According to the show’s executive producer, Dauod Kuttab, USAID funded the program with a budget of $2.5 million between 2008 and 2011. An additional $2.5 million was scheduled to cover the program’s costs until 2014.

“If we had funding,” Mr. Kuttab says, “we would be writing scripts, we would be reviewing scripts, we would be hiring film-makers to produce the videos.” Though the program worked to promote peace and tolerance, its staff of 80 may face the harsh reality of unemployment.

The suspension of funding to programs like "Sharaa’ Simsim" is hugely detrimental for both U.S. policymakers and the people of the Middle East. First, it deepens mistrust and widens the chasms between U.S. foreign policy and people in the region. And this occurs at a critical time, when unprecedented political change – the Arab Spring – is taking place.

The freeze on these aid programs also damages U.S. soft power abroad, as "Sesame Street" is a landmark American show.

The fund suspension reinforces already widespread suspicions about the “real motives” of U.S. aid to the region, causing people to see it merely as a bargaining tool to support a political agenda rather than to promote peace and improve humanitarian conditions.

The lawmaker behind the freeze is Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republican of Florida and chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Her action appears aimed at demonstrating to her constituents and to the Israel lobby that she is taking tough action against the Palestinians. The temptation exists to use foreign policy solely to bolster individual election campaigns.

Regardless of what the real philosophy of American aid to the region is, this perception that political gain trumps peace building is becoming increasingly widespread among global observers, especially in the Middle East, and may irreparably harm the U.S. image in the region.

While it has frozen humanitarian aid, the United States continues to support Palestinian Authority security forces by funding training and equipment. This reinforces the notion that Washington is interested solely in maintaining Israel’s security.

Because of the aid freeze, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has publicly rejected the $150 million earmarked for security service. If he failed to provide education and health while delivering security to Israel, Mr. Abbas would be committing political suicide. The decision would make the PA seem eager to guard the interests of Israel while compromising on Palestinian basic rights of education and health.

As Kuttab explained to The Washington Post, “Palestinians would see the aid as analogous to the 30 pieces of silver that were accepted by Judas Iscariot when he delivered Jesus – a position Abbas does not want to be in.”

The "Sharaa’ Simsim" cancellation raises the question of whether a U.S. bias toward Israel is reflected not only in the political arena but in the humanitarian realm as well. Congress has frozen the funds for Palestinians, but the State Department is investing $750,000 in the Israeli version of "Sesame Street." Danny Labin, an executive at the Israeli television station that co-produces the Israeli "Sesame Street," expressed concerns, calling the act “extremely unfortunate.”

The funding cuts should provide an important lesson to the Palestinians as well. They should learn that diversifying their sources of funding is vital not only for the survival of worthwhile programs like "Sharaa’ Simsim" but also for their national independence. The Palestinians should not accept a partnership that forces them to choose between an educational show for children and their statehood appeal at the United Nations.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Christian Science Monitor

Turkey-EU Relations: Implications for the Middle East and Beyond

Tue, 31 Jan 2012 18:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2012
6:00 PM - 7:30 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center

Doha, Qatar

On January 31, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a special policy discussion with H.E. Egemen Bağış, Turkish minister for European Union affairs and chief negotiator, as part of the Center’s Distinguished Lecture Series. Bağış’s address focused on Turkey’s changing role in the international scene, in particular its ongoing EU bid and response to political changes in the Middle East. The event, which included a question and answer session, was moderated by Ibrahim Sharqieh, deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center, and attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, diplomatic and media communities.

Minister Bağış opened his remarks by speaking about Turkey’s strong ties with Qatar. Having met with H.H. Emir Shaikh Hamad bin Khalfa al-Thani the morning of the event, Bağış said Qatari-Turkish relations have prospered over the past several years, with trade volume at over $1 billion and close personal ties between the countries’ leaders. Furthermore, he added, both Qatar and Turkey are implementing major reforms, and Bağış referred to Qatar as “a source of inspiration, especially in terms of its stability.”

Bağış then turned his attention to the responsibility of his ministry, which he considers “the reform kitchen of Turkey,” because it ensures that EU-mandated reforms are implemented in Turkey. The Turkish-EU relationship dates back to 1959 with Turkey’s first application to the European Economic Zone. A great deal has changed in Turkey in the past 52 years, Bağış stated, with per capita income rising from $300 to $11,000 and with increasingly transparent governance in Turkey. EU-led reforms have had largely been responsible for these changes, Bağış said. While the outcome of the EU application is important, the process has already been successful in greatly improving living standards and governance in Turkey. Unfortunately, Bağış said, some EU members are trying to block Turkish membership in an attempt to gain support from segments of their local constituencies.

Bağış went on to say that the EU’s 27 member states have become more democratic and transparent through EU-mandated reforms. This does not mean, however, that these countries are perfect, as demonstrated by the current Eurozone crisis. Bağış explained that such problems have arisen largely because not all of the countries fall in line with the EU criteria initially required for membership. Bağış asserted that lax enforcement of EU rules is responsible for such problems, and has become commonplace due to the Union’s requirement that decisions must be approved unanimously.

Just as Turkey has benefitted from its implementation of required EU reforms, Europe also stands to gain from Turkish membership. Indeed, the continent needs new markets, and Turkey has become the fastest growing economy in Europe, with GDP growth of over 8 percent for more than five years. It is also set to remain the fastest growing European economy until 2020, according to the OECD. Furthermore, Europe is aging, while Turkey is a young country - the median age in Turkey is 29, almost half that of Germany. In addition, Europe is facing an energy crisis with which Turkey can assist, as it has considerable access to energy resources to its East. With the largest and strongest military in Europe, Turkey is also a source of stability in the region. Bağış described his country as “the most Eastern power of West and most Western power of East.” To be a dependable bridge between the continents and societies, he said, Turkey is strengthening its East, South, North, and Western alliances simultaneously.

Following Bağış’s presentation, the question and answer session covered a range of issues, including Turkey’s growing relations with the East, the issue of Cyprus, and prospects for Turkey succeeding in its EU bid. Bağış asserted that Turkey attaining EU membership is “a question not of if, but when” and that ultimately the Turkish people will have to decide through a referendum whether they want EU membership. Bağış maintained, however, that “the process itself is much more important than the end result,” stating that if Turkey has the same living standards and transparency as EU member states, the outcome of its application is not hugely important. On the issue of Turkey being a predominantly Muslim state, Bağış rejected the notion that the EU is “a Christian club,” stating that the fact that Turkey is Muslim is an advantage, and will help Europe address issues of integration that it already faces. Indeed, 10 percent of Europe will be Muslim by 2025. Having a moderate Muslim power in the EU will help ensure that Muslim youth in the EU hear messages of peace and coexistence, rather than those encouraging violent confrontation, Bağış said.

In response to a question about the Armenian genocide as an obstacle to EU membership, Bağış said what happened to the Armenian population in 1915 cannot be classified as genocide, and said it was his job as a politician to concentrate on the future, not the past. As for French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s efforts to criminalize denial of the Armenian genocide in France, Bağış said that this amounts to censorship and therefore runs counter to the ideals enshrined in the French constitution. He also charged that Sarkozy is using the Armenian issue as a means of garnering support from the far-right going into elections.

Another audience member claimed that the Turkish role in the Palestinian issue has diminished in the past few years. Bağış responded that “Turkey is as determined as ever to solve the Palestinian issue because we see it as the mother of all problems in the Middle East.” He said that Turkey has tried to work with the Israelis, pointing to its role as a mediator in Israeli talks with Pakistan and Syria. Following the killing of nine Turkish citizens aboard the MV Mavi Marmara in 2010, Turkey set three conditions that must be met before the normalization of relations with Israel: an apology for the deaths, aid to the families of those killed, and an end to the “illogical and illegal” embargo of Gaza. Until then, he said, Turkey cannot help Israel make a deal with the Palestinians.

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Moderator

Panelists

H.E. Egemen Bağış

Turkish Minister for European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator

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Participants