Brookings: Experts - Salman Shaikh

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia

Is Obama’s Red Line a Green Light?

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime was finally blown open last week. In a letter to U.S. lawmakers, the White House stated that U.S. intelligence agencies believed "with varying degrees of confidence" that Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on a "small scale." The letter followed others sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by Britain and France alleging the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and similar assessments by Israeli military intelligence in the last few weeks.

Still, President Barack Obama's administration sounded a cautious note. Asked whether Assad crossed the "red line" Obama drew last year that could spur American intervention, a U.S. official replied, "we're not there yet." The White House continues to contend that the evidence is not "airtight," and that it needs further corroboration. In meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on Friday, Obama stated that "there are a range of questions around how, when, where these weapons may have been used."

While these are important questions, especially a decade after the intelligence failure in Iraq, the evidence already gathered by Western countries from inside Syria provides significant evidence of chemical-weapons use by the Assad regime. Here is what I have learned about the regime's use -- and logic for the use -- of chemical weapons over the past six months.

The Assad regime's scientists have been experimenting for more than a year with mixtures of toxic and poisonous gasses that could be used to "cleanse areas" of what it calls "terrorists" -- the rebel forces it is fighting. Its security and military apparatus has sought to devise methods to use artillery shells or aircraft to deliver chemical weapons in "localized ways" -- in areas of one or one and a half square kilometers.

The regime's logic was that the relentless bombardment of rebel-controlled areas, including in the neighborhoods around the main cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, had forced most civilians to leave. Civilian casualties, in this warped thinking, could therefore be kept to a minimum if chemical weapons were used in these areas. This was important if the regime was to avoid the attention of the international community, especially the United States, which clearly did not want to intervene in Syria.

I first heard this frightening information in the late summer and fall of last year. It came from a small number of privileged Syrians who often travelled to and from Damascus. I had gotten to know and trust them, especially as their information was often corroborated later by other sources and events. All spoke often to current and former senior security officers and regime personalities from the Assad regime's feared security forces, including the presidential guard, Syrian military intelligence, and Syrian air force intelligence -- people they had known in some cases since childhood.

Listening to them, it was clear to me that the regime had the intention to use these horrendous weapons -- and that it would do so as it came under further pressure in key strategic areas, especially the major cities in the west of the country.

According to my interlocutors, Assad and those closest to him had been emboldened by the international community's weak response to his bloody military campaign. The United Nations claimed in February that the death toll from the fighting in Syria was well over 70,000 people, while, during that same month, a lieutenant from Syrian military intelligence informed one of my Syrian interlocutors that the regime estimated that around 85,000 civilians had been killed, with many more thousands "missing."

Successive statements from Obama and senior U.S. officials, these interlocutors said, had been interpreted by the regime as a "green light" to continue its campaign. The exclusive focus on political and diplomatic solutions, as well as the international community's rising fear of Islamic jihadists, further reinforced the regime's belief that "the U.S. and its Western allies did not mind the current military operations," according to a retired general in Damascus. "Like any war, there are political and diplomatic efforts, while it is the winner that dictates terms in the end."

In the eyes of the regime, therefore, Obama's "red line" prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- first drawn last August, in the midst of an election campaign -- had to be tested.

Read the full article »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

BRICS Leadership Will Be Tested by Syria

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is probably the most serious crisis facing the world today. And yet, the international community is struggling to find a way forward. With more than four million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and three million internally displaced – a conservative UN estimate based on surveys of 6 out of 14 governorates in Syria – the humanitarian response to the plight of civilians so far has been entirely inadequate. A recent UNICEF report highlighted the two million children maimed, orphaned, and suffering from malnutrition as a result of the conflict – an entire generation “scarred for life”. Meanwhile, over one million refugees are seeking asylum in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This number will likely hit the three million mark by the end of 2013 – a ticking bomb for countries based on delicate social, ethnic, and sectarian balance.

Humanitarian access in opposition-held areas, where assistance is most urgently needed, is extremely limited. The humanitarian policy dilemma has shown what a mess we are currently in. Under General Assembly resolution 46/182, the United Nations cannot operate inside rebel-held territory without the explicit consent of the Syrian government. As that government’s authority is waning, however, many wonder whether we should be bound by the sovereignty of a tyrannical regime that continues to aggravate the crisis. Others, meanwhile, are advocating for direct humanitarian cross-border action in coordination with the internationally recognized Syrian National Coalition. With the election of Ghassan Hitto as the interim prime minister of a transitional government in “liberated” areas, this call will no doubt grow louder.

It is time for the international community to overcome this obstacle and allow for a more effective humanitarian response in Syria – whenever and wherever it may be required. One way forward would be for key countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India to support a more aggressive effort to ramp up the UN’s cross-border aid operations inside the country. Such an opportunity presents itself at the forthcoming 2013 BRICS summit in Durban next week. These countries should use their influence to secure a Security Council endorsement of this approach, principally by applying pressure on Russia and China.

Furthermore, they should use their direct channels with Assad to insist that the regime allow for cross-border operations and give full humanitarian access to all areas of the country.

Why the BRICS? Given their rising prominence on the world stage, it’s become clear that these nations play a key role in steering the international response to this crisis. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Assad, travelled to South Africa last week to deliver a message to President Zuma, urging BRICS nations to intervene to stop the violence in Syria and encourage the opening of a dialogue. Three weeks ago, she was in India, doing the same. It goes without saying that such cynical diplomacy on the part of the regime should be met by more purposeful calls to spare the lives of civilians. This is a strategic opportunity for the BRICS to use their influence and play a more decisive, helpful role.

There is no time to lose. To date, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to protect the Syrian population. Even with regard to the funding of UN humanitarian operations, only 20% of the $ 1.5 billion pledged by international donors in Kuwait in January has been honored. International inaction in Syria will leave a lasting legacy of insecurity and suffering, while the spillover effects of this humanitarian crisis will only contribute to the growing instability in Syria’s neighborhood and across the greater region. The BRICS nations, along with the international community, have a responsibility to act now.

Given the state of emergency on the ground, however, humanitarian cross-border access alone may not be sufficient. In order to protect civilians, guarantee the safe passage of relief organizations as well as refugees attempting to leave the country, there is a growing imperative for the establishment of humanitarian corridors and civilian safe areas along the sensitive borders of Syria. Make no mistake, such safe areas will have to be secured and protected by all means possible. Here, there will be much to learn from the UN’s experience in Bosnia in the 1990s – involving an assessment of what went right as well as wrong.

The BRICS and their international partners should be ready to endorse such measures. The situation demands it. Yet at a minimum, they must now demand that Assad allows the UN to cross Syria’s borders to reach civilians in need. The UN has the required institutional knowledge to deliver aid to fragmented areas making it the organization that is best placed to do so in Syria. Enabling the UN to undertake a country-wide response would help prevent the politicization of assistance as well as ensure a coordinated response in crucial sectors such as water, sanitation, infrastructure reconstruction, food assistance and education. The end goal would be to ensure that the UN is able to meet the basic needs of all civilians and upholding fundamental humanitarian principles in this bloody conflict.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Asharq Al-Awsat

Syria's First Interim Prime Minister

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:30:00 -0400

After weeks of hot debate within Syrian opposition circles, the Syrian Opposition Coalition has managed to appoint a new interim prime minister, Ghassan Hitto. Much of the commentary has focused on his expatriate background as an information technology executive who had lived in the United States for more than 30 years. Reports of the Coalition’s meeting in Istanbul also point to a fraught voting process with a dozen or so of the more liberal-leaning members walking out in disgust.

Whatever the backstory, Hitto and his transitional government will now face the daunting task of meeting the expectations of a desperate population living inside the so-called “liberated” or regime-free areas of northern and eastern Syria. The UN has estimated that up to 3 million people are displaced inside the country and that up to 4 million need humanitarian aid. Both are likely to be very conservative figures given the ferocity of the conflict and inability of the UN and other international agencies to get aid to rebel-held areas.

To date, the Coalition has struggled to build the infrastructure required to deliver such aid efficiently and consistently. If it manages to do so, and to establish a real presence on the ground, it may just have a chance of establishing real credibility as an opposition force inside the country. This, however, would be no mean feat given the intensity of the regime’s aerial attacks and the fragmented nature of control exerted by various military groups and civilian local councils. Much will also depend on the international support that has been promised to the new government from regional and Western supporters, but which has been very slow to arrive. The U.S. decision, in particular, to support directly the political opposition and the fighting rebels may be a sign of things to come.

In his first address, Prime Minister Hitto has recognized the very difficult task that lies ahead for his administration. He has pledged to provide the services that so many Syrians are lacking. He has also promised to prepare the conditions for free and fair elections in a post-Assad regime Syria.

Many Syrians, though, will regard the appointment of Hitto with suspicion. Since the announcement, I have heard both Syrian nationalist figures and those from some minority communities – inside and outside the country – talk dismissively about the move. For them, Hitto is a pawn of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which has undoubtedly gained a key role in the internationally-recognised SOC. They point to the instrumental part played by the Brotherhood leadership within the SOC in securing Hitto’s election, saying that he would reached the position without their backing. . There is a sense that Hitto’s appointment has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood, assisted by key regional actors, to walk in through the front door and assume control of Syria’s opposition movement. (One interlocutor remarked acidly “who would have thought that one hundred years later, a Syrian Prime Minister would be announced in Istanbul.”) For them the move signifies the complete revival of the Brotherhood, a movement which suffered terribly under the brutal assault of the Baathist regime in the 1980s.

Such talk, even if exaggerated, should be worrying for the SOC and the Muslim Brotherhood. It shows that there is a very large number, particularly in the “grey area” of Syrians who have not declared their opposition to the Assad regime, have not accepted either the SOC or the Muslim Brotherhood. The appointment of Syria’s first interim Prime Minister should be a watershed moment for all Syrians. That it may not prove to be so, does not bode well for the impending post-Assad transitional period, which surely will start sooner or later.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Image Source: © Osman Orsal / Reuters

U.S. Intervention in Syria

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The U.S. has pledged financial and other non-lethal support for rebel factions now engaged in a two-year long civil war with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime. As the death toll mounts and conditions become more dangerous, there are many who question whether America is doing enough. Fellow Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, says the situation is critical and notes that the Syrian people need more than simply “biscuits and band aids” they need U.S. leadership.

Video

U.S. Intervention in Syria

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now.

Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh — Fri, 08 Feb 2013 15:47:00 -0500

Until recently, among President Barack Obama's most senior advisors on national security, an ironclad consensus reigned: Arm the Syrian rebels. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 7, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, affirmed that they both supported the call by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and David Petraeus, former director of the CIA, to provide lethal support to the Syrian opposition.

What were the arguments that convinced Obama to overrule his advisors? We may never know, but one thing is clear: They were not based on a sober reading of the situation on the ground in Syria, where U.S. policy is caught in a contradiction between word and deed. Though the president has repeatedly called for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad's ouster, he has proposed no credible plan for achieving that goal.

Last week, for instance, Obama stressed that the United States had "joined with nations around the world in calling for an end to the Assad regime." No sooner had he made this statement, however, than he dispatched Vice President Joseph Biden to attempt -- once again -- to engage Russia on a solution to the conflict. But reliance on mediation from Moscow -- with its emphasis on an Assad-led transition -- has proved to be fundamentally flawed. Assad will never preside over his own removal.

The diplomatic back-and-forth has come at the expense of decisive steps toward regime change. Obama has been right, after a decade of war, to ask hard questions about whether greater U.S. involvement can really work in the interests of either Syria or the United States. But his hands-off policy has now proved to be self-defeating. In the absence of American assistance, the rebels' momentum has stalled, and the battles for Damascus, Aleppo, and Syria's other strategic centers have devolved into a grim stalemate.

Meanwhile, Syrian society is fragmenting, and sectarianism is on the rise. While Jabhat al-Nusra, the local al Qaeda affiliate, is growing ever stronger, the Iranians and Hezbollah have doubled down on their support for the regime. Both have, for example, sent forces to fight alongside the Syrian army. In addition, they are training and equipping the Jaysh al-Shabi, a Syrian government-controlled force that, according to at least one Iranian source, is modeled on the Basij militia of the Islamic Republic. Iran is also providing economic aid and propaganda support.

The polarizing influence of Iran and al Qaeda portends a further escalation of sectarian violence, which will inevitably spill over into surrounding countries. To prevent the worst, the United States must assume a greater leadership role, which, as the president's advisors have made clear, means building the capacity of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a network of nationalist and secular-leaning rebel brigades. This would not necessarily require direct and sustained American military intervention, but it would entail arming the FSA and helping it to develop a countrywide military strategy.

From a purely military point of view, the rebels need help neutralizing the weapons that give the Syrian state its greatest advantages -- namely, armor and fixed-wing aircraft. The provision of light anti-tank weapons would go a long way toward stopping Assad's tanks. However, eliminating the regime's air superiority, which rebels and civilians fear the most, is a thornier challenge. Here the United States and the international community have a crucial role to play in projecting a credible threat of force to stop Assad from indiscriminate bombing. While it may not be necessary to impose a Libya-style no-fly zone (NFZ), it is imperative to keep the threat on the table and to be willing, if required, to carry it out. An obvious alternative to an NFZ is to provide man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs). But the legal and prudential restrictions are considerable. The use of these systems would require a stronger partnership between the FSA and key regional allies than currently exists.

In addition to weaponry, the FSA needs training, resources, and intelligence support. It currently lacks a sound military strategy. Only the Americans, working together with Arab partner nations, have the requisite diplomatic and military resources to help the FSA develop this capacity. It is often said that the United States has no successful track record of providing this kind of assistance. But that is simply false. In fact, in recent months it has enjoyed a number of quiet successes in Yemen. With a very light footprint, the Pentagon has helped train and equip the Yemeni army, giving it the wherewithal to retake territory that it previously ceded to al Qaeda. While the American drone campaign has grabbed the headlines, the effort to build partnership capacity holds out the greatest long-term promise. The partnership being developed in Yemen is precisely the model that is needed in Syria.

It is important to remember that arming the FSA is a political act. The most important decision of all is simply to provide lethal assistance. The goal of the operation is to build a force on the ground that is more likely to respect American interests and that is committed to building a nonsectarian, stable Syria. Even the provision of light weaponry would be a good start to this project.

This policy does entail the risk of unintended consequences. Some arms may flow to al Qaeda. Some groups may take American aid and then turn against the United States. But inaction also carries risks. The current hands-off policy has hardly succeeded in preventing extremists from acquiring arms. It has simply given them time and incentive to develop their own independent sources of external support.

By establishing itself as the most important international player shaping the conflict inside Syria, the United States will lay the groundwork for helping the Syrian people forge a genuine national dialogue on the nature of their transition. This should include the creation of a national platform that brings together Syria's diverse ethnic and religious communities -- including Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, Christians, and Kurds, as well as tribal and religious figures -- to discuss the future of the country. In particular, it should include Alawis who enjoy wide legitimacy within their community, but who are also willing to talk about a post-Assad Syrian regime.

At the same time, the United States should bring together key international and regional powers to create an international steering group. This group -- including China, Russia, Turkey, and key Arab and European states -- should agree on a number of basic goals for the transition and set benchmarks for their effective implementation. The immediate focus should be on protecting civilians, minorities, and vulnerable groups through the creation of an international stabilization force; addressing humanitarian issues; safeguarding chemical and other unauthorized weapons; and supporting Syrian-led transitional governance and transitional justice efforts.

For this to succeed, Obama must first persuade Russia to abandon its demand that Assad play a role in the transition. If Moscow remains defiant, however, the president must be willing to pursue an independent policy -- while still keeping the door open for Russian President Vladimir Putin to eventually join the international consensus.

The Syria challenge is difficult. Its intractability is what initially made nonintervention attractive. But developments on the ground have since made it an increasingly dangerous option for American interests. It's time Obama listened to his foreign-policy and national security advisors.

Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Lebanon and its Multiple Challenges

Thu, 31 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 31, 2013
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On January 31, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion on the state of Lebanon at a time when the country faces grave challenges from within and without. Speakers discussed Lebanon’s failing governmental institutions and the possibility of reform, as well as the long shadow cast over Lebanese politics and society by the Syrian conflict. The panel featured Ziad Baroud, former minister of interior and municipalities; Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri and former minister of finance; Ali Hamdan, head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Lebanon’s Amal Movement; and Rami Rayess, spokesman of the Progressive Socialist Party and media advisor to Walid Jumblatt. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business, and media communities.

Even as the discussion opened on Lebanon’s domestic challenges — namely, costly and unreliable electricity, underdeveloped infrastructure and high unemployment — it almost immediately turned to the Syria crisis. While moderator Salman Shaikh challenged participants to address the Lebanese government’s historic failure to deliver real services to its citizens, participants were ready to defend the current government as having maintained Lebanon’s stability amid what Mohamad Chatah called a “perfect storm in the region.” Ali Hamdan stressed that Lebanon “is not an island” and that this government, led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati, came to power amid regional “turbulence.” Rami Rayess, also from the March 8 bloc, said that, given events in Syria, the government’s effort was “good enough.” Even though Chatah, of the opposition March 14 coalition, offered some stinging criticisms of the March 8 government, he nonetheless emphasized that Lebanon is “lucky” not to be at war.

When the debate delved into the real dysfunction of Lebanese politics, however, participants found blame in the very nature of Lebanon’s political system. Rayess, for instance, pointed the finger at a political community that approaches issues in the narrow terms of how its members can secure gains for their constituents. Chatah attributed that to a Lebanese system “filled with moral hazard” – a system that drives politicians and leaders to act sectarian or else risk missing a promotion or being punished by their constituents. Chatah said that this dysfunctional system could probably be traced back to the birth of Lebanon, a sentiment seconded by Hamdan, who said that since its independence, Lebanon had failed to build up a real government and concept of citizenship. The result, he said, was a level of trust that was negligible and led the country’s parties to constantly level accusations against one another. Ziad Baroud, a political independent, said that the same problems had been going on for decades but still bemoaned what he saw as a purely reactive approach to dealing with Lebanon’s worsening social and economic problems.

These systemic problems have now helped shape the debate over the law governing Lebanon’s June parliamentary elections. Baroud described a situation in which there is no stable legislation for the country’s electoral law, which means that political parties simply draft a new electoral law from which they expect to benefit. Both Baroud and Hamdan complained that Lebanon was still hashing out the same legal issues that had supposedly been resolved with the 2008 Doha Agreement. Baroud, Chatah, and Hamdan all expressed sympathy with the Christian demands for more effective representation that have underpinned the proposed “Orthodox Gathering” electoral law. Baroud said, though, that the issue was less one of numbers than of the role Christians can play in building modern Lebanon.

Rayess emphasized that the dispute over the electoral law should not be an excuse to delay elections. Lebanon has been holding elections for the past 60 years, he said, and at a time when other Arabs are making sacrifices to realize democracy at home, Lebanon cannot be seen to go backwards. If Lebanon does not go to elections, Baroud asked, who guarantees that the country’s system will not collapse? And if it does, who guarantees that the country will get another system – and at what price?

In part, these fundamental issues return to disparate readings of the country’s constitution and what Chatah referred to as its “constructive ambiguity.” Both Chatah and Rayess pointed to the establishment of a bicameral system, with a Lebanese senate alongside its parliament, as a possible way out of the country’s political deadlock. Hamdan warned against a reliance on quick fixes. He said that the country’s problem lay in the selective implementation of the Taif Accord, which itself calls for the eventual establishment of a senate. Baroud said that, whether the solution was a senate or anything else, the real challenge lay in establishing mechanisms to “make diversity function” in Lebanon.

Of course, the discussion was not without some partisan back-and-forth. Chatah in particular made some sharp allegations against the country’s March 8 government. The government, he said, had come to power after its predecessor was toppled by the threat of force and sectarian war, and government figures had repeatedly shielded the assassins (attempted or otherwise) of March 14 leaders. He pointed to the assassination of Wisam al-Hassan, who had just uncovered an alleged Syrian plot to assassinate prominent Christian and Sunni leaders, as what finally forced March 14 to withdraw from any negotiations or dialogue.

Hamdan nonetheless called for a return to the national dialogue that began in 2006, a dialogue that has lately centered on Lebanon’s national defense strategy – that is, state authority over Hizballah’s arms. Even though Hamdan agreed that the dialogue had yet to show solid results, he said that even if the Lebanese wasted time in dialogue, it was better than boycotting. Rayess also thought that national dialogue is a necessary exercise and should be kept open at all costs. While he expressed appreciation for Hizballah’s liberation of Lebanese land from Israeli occupation, he said that the state had to monopolize military power. The faster Lebanon built a consensus on a national defense strategy, he said, the sooner it could build capabilities to confront Israeli aggression. Chatah, however, rejected Lebanon’s national dialogue as essentially pointless; the dialogue could only go in circles, he said, given that Hizballah’s sole objective was to maintain the status quo. He called the dialogue a “sham” and a “charade,” complaining that Hizballah’s “declared” strategic link with Iran means that Lebanese are left to wait for their next war, one whose timing will be decided by others. Still, Baroud said that the dialogue seemed to be the only remaining political alternative. He said that some factions had made the mistake of thinking they could defeat others outright; consensus, he stressed, is “how Lebanon functions.”

The conversation eventually returned to the Syria crisis, which Hamdan described as “the greatest threat” to Lebanon in its history. He praised the June 2012 “Baabda Declaration,” according to which Lebanon announced a clear policy of “disassociation” or “positive neutralism.” As he put it, the Lebanese have no other choice; Lebanon can do nothing to affect the situation in Syria, while the war’s spread into Lebanon would consume the country.

For his part, Chatah was willing to take sides – rhetorically. Those socially and ethnically closest to the Syrian people in Lebanon, he said, were among the foremost adversaries of the regime. He said that some in Lebanon, and in the North in particular, had been subjected to the sort of bombing and killing 25 years ago that can be seen in Syria today. Syria’s Lebanese allies, meanwhile, are those with a “strategic link” with the Syrian regime. Chatah nonetheless emphasized, in the same terms as Hamdan, that Lebanon should not be involved in Syria; he praised the Baabda Declaration, saying it was “historic” and should be enshrined in the country’s constitution.”

Participants voiced fears, however, that Baabda might not be enough, or that some were willing to flout it. Rayess warned that the commitment of the document had to be reinforced, as the presence of Lebanese fighters in Syria and other provocations like Hizballah’s Ayoub drone had threatened to destabilize the situation. Chatah likewise warned that sending fighters or amassing weapons for Syriainside Lebanon could only put the country in harm’s way.

At the time of this discussion, the previous night’s Israeli airstrike on a Syrian target had only complicated the Syria situation. Chatah, the most vocal critic of the Syrian regime among the participants, said that Lebanese were without exception against the Israeli action. If Israel thinks it can buy credibility with the Syrian rebels, he said, it is wrong. Hamdan complained of daily Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, land, and sea, and warned that Israel was waiting for the weakening and division of Arab power so it could act again. Chatah discounted the possibility that the Israeli air attack on Syria was a signal of a broader campaign, as, in his reading, Israeli “aggression” is never declared or signaled in advance. Still, he said, the Israeli action drove home the need for the Lebanese to be united on this issue.

When asked about how the international community could help Lebanon, answers differed. Chatah said that the influence of the international community has “waned” and that there is “a lot of exaggeration” of the impact of international action. Still, he flagged Lebanese calls for international technical assistance in monitoring the country’s Syria border, but said that such help was hamstrung by strong opposition from Hizballah. Baroud reiterated Lebanese requests for international funding assistance in absorbing the country’s new refugee burden, and Rayess said that dealing with the humanitarian situation is the best way to preserve Lebanon’s stability.

In the diplomatic realm, Hamdan asked that the international community not adopt a double standard in dealing with Israel and its Arab neighbors, and Baroud and Hamdan warned against plans for a “new Sykes-Picot” that would divide Syria and the wider region. Rayess called for international consensus on the June 2012 Geneva agreement, while Chatah asked that the international community affirm and act on Lebanon’s declaration of neutrality. If the world treats Lebanon as a staging ground for Syria’s war, he said, the country will be in grave trouble.

Among those who spoke at the event’s end was special guest Miguel Moratinos, former foreign minister of Spain. He said that, after 20 years of dealing with Lebanon, he was optimistic for the country. There was no comparing the Lebanon of today with the Lebanon of 15, or even five, years ago, according to Moratinos; he could not imagine the Lebanon of previous years not being totally engulfed by the Syria issue. He expressed his hopes that the Syria crisis would be a moment for the Lebanese to take their destiny in their own hands; this time, he said, the Lebanese could have a dialogue in Beirut, not Doha or Taif.

This sort of forward-looking change may need to start now. As Chatah pointed out, in the coming decade Lebanon faces two milestones: the centennial of its founding in 2020 and the first returns from the country’s Mediterranean natural gas reserves. If Lebanon sees a huge influx of money into a government that continues to be dysfunctional or corrupt, real reform may be put off indefinitely. The Lebanese people’s ability to come together over the next few years, then, stands to determine whether Lebanon begins its second century with political change or with more of the same.

The Road Beyond Damascus

Salman Shaikh and Michael Doran — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

If the United States does not take on a more active leadership role in Syria, the country will become a failed state, a second Somalia in the heartland of the Middle East. Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

How can the United States provide greater leadership and concrete assistance including direct military intervention?
What other kinds of American-led international efforts are necessary?
How should President Obama engage with Russia President Vladamir Putin, who wants Assad as part of transition talks?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Michael Doran and Salman Shaikh

Syria is standing on a precipice reminiscent of Iraq in early 2006. The regime will likely fall, but the prospect now is one of a failed state that produces a toxic culture of extremism and lawlessness. If the United States does not take on a more active leadership role, the trend toward warlordism and sectarian fragmentation will likely prove inexorable. Syria will become a second Somalia, in the heartland of the Middle East and on the borders of Israel, Turkey and Jordan, the three closest regional allies of the United States. Conversely, through active intervention you can help ensure a more stable transition to a post-Assad order that will provide a better future for the Syrian people and a strategic gain for the United States and its regional friends.

In your first term, when it came to the Syrian revolution, you wagered that the risks of active intervention outweighed the risks of a more cautious approach. Now, however, we believe the massive toll of civilian casualties, the dismemberment of the country, and the intensification of the conflict along sectarian lines dictate a revisiting of your decision.

Recommendation:

To stave off disaster and play a leadership role in shaping Syria’s future, the United States should provide lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition, forge a genuine national dialogue that includes Alawis and Christians, and create an International Steering Group (ISG) to oversee and lend support to the transitional process, including the creation of an international stabilization force to provide protection to Syrian civilians. You will need to engage directly with President Putin to overcome already weakening Russian resistance to these essential endeavors.

Background:

A descent into chaos in Syria poses many risks to the United States. In particular, it creates opportunities for Iran and Hezbollah to safeguard their interests. Perhaps the greatest potential benefit to the United States of the uprising had been the damage that it did to the alliance system of Iran, the strategic adversary of the United States in the Middle East. For a time it seemed that Iran’s foothold in Syria would be washed away naturally by the tide of events. But as the conflict has deepened, Tehran has spared no expense to make itself an indispensable partner to a number of groups who seem destined to thrive in the growing chaos.

Secondly, the fragmentation of Syria means perpetual civil war. Violence is already developing along sectarian lines, between Sunnis and Alawis, Sunnis and Christians, and other religious communities; along intra-sectarian lines, particularly between al-Qaeda affiliates and their Sunni nationalist rivals; and along ethnic lines, as Arab-Kurdish violence spreads across the country’s north. Furthermore, this violence will increase the risk of spillover to neighboring countries: increasing refugee flows, the growing presence of rival Iraqi factions inside Syria, and growing tensions in Lebanon. Other, more dramatic forms of spillover are looming: direct intervention by Turkey, against the background of Kurdish problems, or by Israel, in an effort to destroy Assad’s chemical weapons.

Finally, the chaos is enabling al-Qaeda to gain a significant foothold. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, is now recognized as one of the most potent fighting forces in the country.

Until now, the primary U.S. answer to the fragmentation has been to support the newly established Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), the umbrella organization that is trying to tie together many of the political strands among the opposition. As a result, the SOC has gained significant international recognition as “the sole representative” of the Syrian people. This support is timely and encourages greater opposition unity. But in the absence of a more robust American leadership, it will not stabilize Syria, because the writ of the SOC is limited by its failure to reach a national consensus and by the growing power of the warlords.

It is time to place a new bet on a more active American leadership role, one that seeks to protect civilians, hastens the fall of Assad, and shapes a new political order more amenable to the needs of the Syrian people and to American interests. A greater leadership role does not necessarily mean direct military intervention. Continuous U.S. airstrikes and large numbers of American boots on the ground should not be necessary. However, removing the threat of intervention entirely only emboldens Assad and his chief patron, Iran. If the scale of civilian bloodletting continues to escalate, the United States must be prepared to act decisively, in the spirit of “the responsibility to protect.” In this regard, we encourage you to communicate to Assad and his allies that the United States is willing to intervene to establish a no-fly zone with its European and regional allies to protect civilians in Syria. We believe this would hasten Assad’s demise, hearten the opposition, and significantly enhance American credibility in the region.

In 1995, President Clinton was forced to intervene militarily in Bosnia and threaten the greater use of military force. He did so after over 100,000 Bosnian men, women and children had been killed over a four-year period. Clearly, Syria is not Bosnia. But after nearly two-years, 60,000 killed (the UN thinks this is a conservative estimate) and the UN-Arab League Special Envoy warning that another 100,000 could be killed in 2013, the United States must not allow Assad’s killing machine to continue the slaughter with impunity.

Today, the United States simply does not possess an effective ground game in Syria. It needs to help the Free Syrian Army (FSA) develop a country-wide military strategy and insist that it forge stronger links with the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Like it or not, the FSA is the nucleus of the post- Assad military, which will be the most significant institution of the Syrian state. If the new Syria has any hope of being stable, more pluralistic, and friendly to the United States, then the effort to shape its institutions must begin now.

The centerpiece of that effort is the provision of lethal assistance by an American-led coalition. To be sure, the fragmentation of the rebels and the presence among them of al-Qaeda fighters present daunting challenges. There is no guarantee, for instance, that some weapons will not find their way to al-Qaeda. Nor will the internal divisions within the FSA be overcome without internecine bloodletting. However, a continuance of the current, hands-off policy will only make al-Qaeda stronger and the conflicts within the FSA more permanent. As daunting as the challenges in Syria are today, if the United States does nothing, it will face even more virulent problems tomorrow.

In addition, a continuation of the status quo will lead to a permanent diminishment of American influence. A reluctance, thus far, to provide lethal assistance has led to a growing sense of betrayal among Syrians. Many of them now argue that your faltering attitude — paired with your perceived responsibility for the inability to overcome the diplomatic impasse with Russia — has played a decisive role in the intensification of the Syrian conflict.

After establishing itself as the single most important player shaping the conflict on the ground, your administration should provide assistance to the Syrian people to forge a genuine national dialogue on the nature of the desired transition. This requires the creation of a national platform that brings together the diverse ethnic and religious communities of Syria — including Sunnis, Shia, Alawis, Christians and Kurds, as well as tribal and religious figures—to discuss the future of the country. Specifically, it should include Alawis who enjoy wide legitimacy within their community but who are also willing to talk about a post-Assad regime in Syria. As an exclusively Sunni club, the Syrian Opposition Coalition is not qualified to win the necessary trust of under-represented minorities and communities.

At the same time, the United States should bring together key international and regional powers to create an ISG for Syria that would work in close collaboration with a legitimate and empowered transitional Syrian executive authority.

The ISG should include Russia, China, Turkey, and key Arab and European states. It should agree on a number of basic goals for the transition and set benchmarks for their effective implementation. The immediate focus: protecting civilians, minorities and vulnerable groups through the creation of an international stabilization force; addressing humanitarian issues; safeguarding chemical and other unauthorized weapons; and supporting transitional governance and transitional justice efforts. This work should be followed by a longer-term commitment to assisting Syrians on security sector reform, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and supporting a transitional governance roadmap, including preparations for multi-party elections and a constitution-drafting exercise; economic recovery, including planning and coordination on infrastructure and reconstruction; and assisting national reconciliation efforts.

To succeed, this strategy will have to overcome the persistent Russian demand that Assad play a role in the transition. His absence from the process, however, is an equally firm demand of the rebels. In order to overcome this gap, you will need to engage with President Putin in an effort to persuade him that Russian interests are better protected by partnering with you in an effort to promote a stable post-Assad order than by resisting it. In the process, you will need to insist that removing Assad is a fundamental requirement for a successful transition. With reports now reaching President Putin that detail the collapsing control of the regime, he may be coming around to accepting that Assad is finished and may be willing to reconsider Russia’s role.

The Syria challenge is difficult. The very intractability of the problems is what made the original bet of avoidance of active involvement an attractive option. But developments since have made it an increasingly dangerous option for American interests; it’s time for a reassessment.

Downloads

Authors

Image Source: © Youssef Boudlal / Reuters

A People’s Agenda for Gulf Co-operation

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 15 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Gulf Co-operation Council’s (GCC) 33^rd annual summit, held in Bahrain on December 24-25, 2012, was meant to address economic issues and further regional integration. In practice, however, these concerns were largely overshadowed by the other main agenda item – security.

While the summit managed to touch on banking co-operation and electricity and water linkage, the main headlines that emerged from Manama centred on a warning to Iran and the creation of a unified GCC military command. Participants, including Saudi Crown Prince Salman, expressed disappointment and frustration at the summit’s failure to make more progress on GCC integration and related issues. This is nothing new, however.

Since its founding in 1981, the GCC’s accomplishments have largely been realized in spite of diverging political visions, and security concerns have frequently crowded out non-security areas of co-operation that would realize more tangible benefits for Gulf citizens.

Amid a Middle East influx, it seems clear that Gulf leadership must now focus more seriously on meeting the needs of the region’s citizens and residents. The GCC’s founding came against a backdrop of regional chaos and upheaval, perhaps most notably the Iran-Iraq War and the threat posed by the Iranian revolution. The body has since suffered from a search for identity.

Aspirations to economic union by the end of the 1980’s have moved forward only haltingly, while Gulf security has in many ways continued to define the GCC.

Still, the reality is that the GCC’s six member states face a set of shared domestic challenges in addition to external threats. All suffer from a dependence on hydrocarbon-related activities, bloated public sectors, and a reliance on imports of labor and basic foodstuffs.

All are looking to diversify their economies and encourage private sector employment, both in anticipation of the depletion of regional energy reserves and to accommodate their booming populations – low unemployment figures conceal much higher rates of joblessness among young Gulf nationals, and adding more jobs to an already bloated public sector is not a realistic long-term solution.

Greater Gulf states co-operation could be a forum to help meet these needs. The GCC could offer practical advantages for Gulf residents in the fields of transportation, employment, communications, education, training and food and water security.

In recent years, it has been proven that regional groupings can have a genuine impact in these areas. With the relatively small regional population for which the GCC is responsible, forward-thinking and innovative measures fostering greater co-operation could have a quite dramatic effect.

Most Gulf citizens and residents aren’t looking for revolutions, and they don’t want to tear down their regimes. They are, however, increasingly finding their voice, especially through their embrace of social media. While some would say that reforms administered, in part, through the GCC would run counter to the region’s prevailing rentier-state social contract, they should be better understood as a modernisation of that contract.

In the medium to long term, the Gulf monarchies’ path to stability lies in recognising and better meeting their peoples’ demands. By showing that they are more sensitive to the changing needs of their publics and more capable at meeting those needs, including through greater regional co-operation, Gulf states can effect a more progressive relationship between rulers and ruled. It is an incremental step, but a crucially important one.

To date, the GCC’s accomplishments have been limited. In 2012, the Gulf states completed the last phase of a shared electricity power grid that will allow them to better meet domestic energy demand, and efforts are being made to further simplify already-streamlined procedures for GCC nationals’ travel between member states.

GCC members have largely stood together in support of shared positions on Syria and Libya – based on interests but also, arguably, on some degree of principle – and they have helped apply effective pressure within the Arab League and the UN.

On a much longer list of measures, however, the GCC has thus far fallen short. Stymied by intra-GCC divisions and a requirement that all decisions meet with the six-members’ consensus, targets for general economic integration have been repeatedly missed.

A Gulf customs union was first launched for a three-year transitional period in 2003; it was meant to impose a common single-entry tariff on goods entering the GCC and to lift all tariffs on goods moved within the GCC. Problems related to revenues and general protectionism delayed the union’s implementation, and it is now slated to go into effect in 2015.

At the GCC’s 2007 Doha summit, the organization resolved to establish a Gulf common market that would remove administrative and regulatory barriers to regional trade. As of today, though, this has yet to be fully implemented, and its attendant gains for regional business and entrepreneurship have gone unrealized.

A plan to establish a Gulf monetary union has stalled. Oman and the United Arab Emirates withdrew from a plan to adopt a shared currency in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Kuwait, meanwhile, dealt a blow to the region’s shared dollar peg when, under inflationary pressure, it shifted from a dollar linkage to a currency basket in 2007.

In 2009, the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia signed the Monetary Union Agreement and the Basic Statute of the Monetary Council, a precursor to a GCC central bank. Since then, however, there has been little progress.

Changes that are arguably more mundane but that would make a real difference for Gulf residents have met similar fates. A railway project connecting the GCC member states was announced at the organisation’s 24^th summit in 2003, but has been repeatedly delayed.

The rail line, which would run from Oman to Kuwait and would offer more choice for regional movement and trade, was meant to be completed in time for last week’s Bahrain summit. While Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to allow Qatar Airways and Gulf Air access to its airspace is a step in the right direction, protectionism and a lack of economic and political integration have stymied the sort of “open skies” policies that would drive down Gulf airfares.

Studies on European liberalization have shown increased competition cut European fares by a third and doubled the rate of growth in the market. Efforts to bring the Gulf’s relatively high mobile roaming charges in line with more developed markets, meanwhile, have only just started to show results.

Within the region, much of the discussion has revolved around the establishment of a “Gulf Union”. The Union likely would not entail the dissolution of any GCC member states or a common presidency or flag; rather, it would function as a confederation establishing common policy on economics, foreign relations, and defense.

Saudi Arabia, which announced plans for the Union at 2011’s summit in Riyadh, has been a vocal advocate of the plan, as has Bahrain.

It is seen as a means of ending Gulf reliance on a resource that is rapidly being depleted and on a Western security umbrella, particularly as the US becomes less reliant on the Gulf for its energy needs. Some in the Gulf are resistant, however, fearing that union would basically amount to Saudi Arabia swallowing its smaller neighbours. There are also concerns that a union would be premised entirely on immediate security concerns rather than broad popular support and meaningful reforms.

In the medium term, we may see a two-tiered GCC, in which there exists a union on a bi- or trilateral basis, but anything more substantial would require compromises and sacrifices from all GCC member states.

Ultimately, though, these discussions are degrees removed from the experience of the people of the Gulf. Issues of GCC consensus are not just theoretical; instead, they should centre on delivering concrete gains to Gulf states’ citizens and residents. Growth rates are high for the moment, but they are driven by strong global energy markets.

There is no guarantee that hydrocarbon revenues will continue to allow GCC members to escape economic realities, especially with youth unemployment high and some states are already or on the verge of running budget deficits. Looking forward, the GCC’s member states need to rethink the organization’s structures, especially its emphasis on inter-governmentalism and its crippling consensus decision-making.

The GCC needs a more viable model for benefiting the people of the Gulf. If the organization’s members can overcome past divisions, however, and co-ordinate on practical improvements to Gulf quality of life, then together they could be a powerful force for development in the region.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Gulf Times

Image Source: © Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters

The Challenge for Palestinians Is Leveraging UN Gains

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

It was a victory for Palestinians in the United Nations yesterday, when member countries overwhelmingly voted to upgrade their status and recognize them as a non-member observer state. Despite the leverage Palestinians gain from the action, the victory is bittersweet notes Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, especially for Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. There is a feeling, says Shaikh, that the ground beneath Abbas is shifting and the focus is on Hamas.

Video

The Challenge for Palestinians Is Leveraging UN Gains

Authors

Salman Shaikh

With Ceasefire, Hamas' Isolation Has Ended

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 23 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Critics of the ceasefire reached Wednesday between Hamas and Israel argue that little has changed. For now, they say, the Egypt-brokered de-escalation has merely placed a Band-Aid over a seeping wound, restoring the status quo established after Israel's Operation Cast Lead offensive of late 2008. Certainly, we may well see the return of airstrikes and rockets; the truce represents only a small first step toward a more durable solution. The nature of the agreement, however, points to a clear "Arab Spring truth" and a significant shift in regional dynamics: The international isolation of Hamas has ended.

The influence exercised by Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar was clearly instrumental in delivering this ceasefire. The role of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy, in particular, has been praised by Hamas political leader Khaled Meshaal and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton alike, with the latter commending Egypt's government for "assuming responsibility and leadership" in de-escalating the crisis.

Read the full article at cnn.com »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Ibraheem Abu Mustafa / Reuters

Between Interference and Assistance: The Politics of International Support in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya

Shadi Hamid and Salman Shaikh — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Summary:

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have all held relatively successful elections, ushering in parliaments and governments with popular mandates. Tunisia and Egypt also saw landslide Islamist victories, provoking fear among both Arab liberals and the international community, particularly in the West. Libya, which saw a surprising showing for a more liberal grouping, presents a critical case of a political community being created almost literally from scratch.

With three ongoing transitions, the Brookings Doha Center’s second “Transitions Dialogue”—which took place on May 29-31, 2012—provided a venue for addressing the tensions that threaten prospects for successful transitions. Seeking out shared lessons from each country case, the working group brought together a diverse group of mainstream Islamists, Salafis, liberals, and leftists, along with U.S. and European officials, to discuss issues of economic recovery, civil society development, regional security, and the role of the United States and other international actors.

Download » (English PDF)
Download » (Arabic PDF)

Read other publications from the 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum »

Downloads

Authors

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Syria: The Path Ahead

Thu, 08 Nov 2012 09:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 8, 2012
9:30 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

As the Syrian conflict approaches its twentieth month, fears are mounting that Bashar al-Assad’s regime may stay in power or that Syria will collapse into sectarian war. An enduring conflict in Syria will have far-reaching consequences for the region, could threaten key U.S. partners, and may require urgent decisions. Has the struggle for democracy in Syria been lost? Is there more the United States could do to influence events there? What steps could the international community take to prevent strife and sectarianism from spreading throughout the region?

On November 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will explored these and other questions about the conflict in Syria. Panelists Mike Doran, the Roger Hertog senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Director of the Brookings Doha Center Salman Shaikh, appearing by video conference, discussed policy options for the U.S. and international community, with a focus on Shaikh’s recently authored paper, "Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It)." Daniel L. Byman, senior fellow and research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

Audio

Syria: The Path Ahead

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121108_syria_transcript

Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It)

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In light of the Syrian regime’s continued campaign of violence on its own people and the opposition’s inability to unify its ranks, is the collapse of Syrian society approaching a point of no return? Is there a way to hold Syria and its people together and, in doing so, prevent the spread of sectarianism across the Middle East?

In a new paper from the Brookings Doha Center, Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It), Salman Shaikh proposes a path forward for addressing Syria’s spiraling crisis.

Based on months of first-hand interviews with opposition leaders, activists, and rebel commanders, Shaikh provides new insights into the current state of fragmentation within Syria’s opposition. He offers a set of five policy principles for the international community – with the leadership of the United States – to help unify the political opposition, reassure minority communities, and coordinate the flow of arms. Shaikh argues that the actions – or inaction – of Syria’s international partners will have critical consequences for the viability of the post-Assad order, and urges immediate planning for the “day after.”

Download » (English PDF)
Download » (Arabic PDF)

Watch Salman Shaikh's interview with Lara Setrakian, reporter and founder of Syria Deeply, about his publication » (English)

Downloads

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Protests Are as Mindless as Anti-Islam Film

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 21 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

To say that I am upset by the copycat violent protests spreading around the Arab and Muslim world would be an understatement. I want to protest against the protesters.

The mindless and criminal actions of a few in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and elsewhere, which have already led to the deaths of innocents, threaten to do a great deal of harm and seem never to make a sensible point.

Like many other Muslims, I suspect, I have wrestled with the most appropriate response to that 14-minute trailer of trash produced by extremist, criminal -- yes, the "producer" apparently has a criminal record -- filmmakers in California. I have come down on the side of sanity.

For sure, as a Muslim, I am offended by those who recklessly and purposely denigrate my faith and those who share my faith. Certainly, some of the protesters represent the unemployed, the abused and the just plain forgotten in Arab and Islamic states that have been ruled by autocrats enjoying the patronage of Western governments.

It is also an obvious point for anyone living in this part of the world that virulent anti-Americanism is a driving force for what is happening today. U.S. policy in the region has bequeathed a fatal breakdown in trust between successive American administrations and Arabs and Muslims. An unjust and illegal Iraq war, a "war on terror" that spawned a whole new drone industry, Washington's double standards in promoting human rights in the region and its unflagging support for Israel in spite of an expanding occupation in Palestine have all contributed to that legacy.

As Arab states undergo a historic transformation, this breakdown in trust is having a devastating effect as the Obama administration wrestles with the right thing to do. Arabs, with the notable exception of most Libyans, give the U.S. very little credit for what it is doing and complain, as in Syria and Bahrain, about what it is not.

But absolutely none of the above should justify the violent protests sweeping the globe.

Instead, the violence of the protests has undermined our legitimate pain in the eyes of billions across the globe. The protests have reinforced those who seek to portray Muslims as wide-eyed extremists and Islam as an inherently intolerant, violent faith.

Worse still, they have detracted the attention of the world from the continuing slaughter in Syria. Last month was reportedly the most violent on record in all the Middle East's recent conflicts -- more so even than Iraq at the height of its civil war. Many Syrians on social media and elsewhere are asking themselves, rightfully, where are the protesters when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime continue to kill more than 150 men, women and children a day? And when his supporters continue to chant "There is no God but Bashar"?

If we are not careful, these protests could encourage the world to forget the so-called Arab Spring and turn away from the struggle for dignity, justice and opportunity that has driven people to demand change. Surely, that is the hope of their biggest supporters -- a mix of former regime elements, al Qaeda offshoots, other jihadists and Salafi political parties.

It is no coincidence that the protests first took root in weakened states, such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, which are in the early stages of democratic transitions. While not all the protesters may know it, their actions are helping those who want to derail those transitions.

That is why new governments in these countries must show zero tolerance for the violent challenge posed by these protesters. As they must surely know, they are engaged in a battle for the soul of their societies. There must be no hesitation, no equivocation and no nuance in dealing with such violent aggression.

In particular, President Mohamed Morsy of Egypt, an Islamist leader from the Muslim Brotherhood party, has to demonstrate the clear moral leadership that is required to steer his country to calmer waters. For many, his response to date and that of the Muslim Brotherhood has been troubling, illustrating both a lack of understanding of the United States and a desire to appease the demonstrators. It has shown a lack of confidence.

Morsy must realize that he is the president of Egypt, not simply a leader of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party -- from which he actually resigned on taking office just a few months ago. The economy and international reputation of his country is suffering great damage, which he must urgently reverse. Although opinions about him are sharply divided, Morsy has the legitimacy to rally his people. He has the responsibility to insist on safeguarding the rule of law, without restricting new democratic freedoms.

The protesters must realize that we cannot continue to go through this kind of turmoil every time an ill-meaning hate-peddler decides to mock our faith. The idiocy and recklessness of the people behind "Innocence of Muslims" are without question. Sadly, those who continue to protest violently against them are acting just as stupidly.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: CNN

Syria: The Crisis, the Rebels, and the Endgame

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 18 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

PBS Frontline turned to 10 experts — Syrian activists, journalists who have reported from the country’s dangerous front lines, and analysts who specialize in the region — to explain the long-term impacts of Syria’s deadly conflict. Below, you will find Salman Shaikh’s excerpts from the Frontline piece.

There are reports that thousands of the country’s Alawites are fleeing regions with bigger Alawi populations like Latakia and Tartous. Some have even speculated the eventual formation of an Alawite state in these coastal areas as an option of last resort. What are the prospects for some sort of a separate Alawite refuge in Syria as the conflict continues?

I don’t believe that there is a realistic prospect for a retreat of Alawi communities to the mountainous areas of northwest Syria, as some have suggested. Over the course of the last 80 years or so, Alawi communities have become increasingly urbanized and no longer represent a unified, geographically distinct bloc.

What is more, I am unconvinced that most Alawis would choose to follow the regime rather than stay where they are if the Assads do retreat to their traditional base. Increasing numbers of Alawis are already in touch with the opposition — at great risk to their safety — seeking the sort of reassurances that will encourage them to abandon the regime.

What are the longer-term regional ramifications of the Syrian refugee crisis?

These figures point to the reality of what is a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis. Those refugees join millions of others across the region – some of who have been tragically without a permanent home for decades. These refugees can also represent a huge strain on local communities, and are likely to affect the security and stability of neighboring states.

Syria has five of the most sensitive borders in the world and instability on those borders represents a dangerous development. We face the prospect of increasing terrorism and insecurity in Turkey, the reigniting of sectarian conflict in Lebanon, a further uptick in Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq, and even the possibility that Israel’s northern borders will be challenged or compromised.

When the Syrian uprising first broke out, there were many who predicted it would be mere months before President Assad’s regime fell. A year and a half later, and a slew of failed international efforts to resolve the crisis, the regime is still intact. What’s behind its survival, and what would it take to end the conflict?

In the absence of a united international will to pressure and isolate Bashar al-Assad, his regime was always likely to last longer than some expected. At the outset, many assumptions were based on the eventual alignment of international powers behind a transition of power — particularly once the Arab League had backed that course. Alongside the impotence of a divided U.N. Security Council, the regime was able to benefit from the direct support of reliable allies in Iran and Russia.

On the other side, those in the international community that have called for an end to Assad’s rule have not shown the political will to adopt some of the tougher options in support for Syrians striving for that goal on the ground.

In addition to financial and other sanctions targeted towards regime figures, the U.S. and other Western allies have — at least until very recently — largely relied on a fruitless diplomatic course centered on shifting Russia and China’s stance.

In the meantime, the Assad regime’s brutal campaign against protestors – civil and armed – has been calibrated to make the most of this diplomatic back-and-forth. While its modus operandi has always been fear, intimidation, and violence, the regime has gradually escalated the severity of its onslaught in a way that allowed it to maintain the degree international support necessary for its survival.

At this point in the conflict, is a diplomatic or negotiated political solution still possible?

Competition between rebel groups for arms, money, and influence is becoming an uncomfortable reality in key areas of the country. This is a trend, which is likely to continue absent a greater effort to organize and influence the armed opposition.

… State Department officials have recently been engaged in impressive efforts to encourage opposition consensus on a common vision for the future of the country. Washington must now also redouble its efforts to familiarize itself with the military dimension of the opposition – as it has indeed begun to do.

Meanwhile, the U.S. should continue to directly target the core elements of the regime — now stripped to a handful of families and a cadre of Alawi security officers — in order to encourage their abandonment from the regime. Increased pressure, and threats of legal action in international courts should be accompanied by incentives offered to those willing to turn on Assad.

Read the full set of interviews at PBS.org »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: PBS Frontline

Syria: Leading Up to "The Day After"

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 09:00:00 -0400

Brookings Doha Center Director Salman Shaikh spoke to Foreign Policy at Brookings on July 19 and described the rapidly deteriorating situation in Damascus. His comments follow the July 18 bombing that resulted in the deaths of Syria’s defense minister and deputy defense minister and Russia and China’s veto of the U.S.-backed U.N. resolution calling for further sanctions. The failure of the U.N. resolution made it unclear what would happen after the current mandate expires on July 20. (The U.N. Security Council has since approved a 30-day monitoring extension.) Shaikh further spoke about the international community’s responsibility in addressing these developments and the opposition’s readiness to take control if and when the Assad regime loses power.

previous play pause next

mute unmute

Salman Shaikh on the Syrian Bombing 9:30

Right-click (ctl+click for Mac) on 'Download' and select 'save link as..'

Get Code

Copy and paste the embed code above to your website or blog.

Audio

Salman Shaikh on the Syrian Bombing

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Image Source: Radu Sigheti / Reuters

The Deteriorating Situation in Syria: A Discussion Among Four Brookings Middle East Experts

Michael Doran, Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman and Salman Shaikh — Wed, 18 Jul 2012 18:27:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Following the bombing that killed Syria’s Defense Minister and Deputy Defense Minister, British Foreign Secretary William Hague described the situation in Syria as "deteriorating rapidly," while Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel called on the United Nations to take “urgent” action and pass a new resolution on Syria. Brookings Middle East experts Michael Doran, Kenneth Pollack, Daniel Byman, and Salman Shaikh discuss the current developments in Syria and the implications for the United States.

Michael Doran: Today’s events in Syria are game changing. Bashar Assad might have to dump Damascus, because it lies outside the Alawite enclave. Take a look at this Washington Post article: http://t.co/lKqtR45p. Reacting to it, Michael Young (@BeirutCalling), tweeted the following question: “Will Assad's reserve elite units defend Damascus if all is near lost, or will they redeploy to defend Alawi heartland?” That is a great question. My theory is that, in fact, they will redeploy, and the elite security services will eventually become an Alawite militia, a Syrian form of Hezbollah, with or without Assad. At any rate, the battle for Damascus may give us some insight into future trends. All of this, of course, raises the question: what is Iran's Plan B? (The U.S. does not yet have a Plan A, so it is not worth asking what the Plan B is.)

Kenneth Pollack: I share Michael's perspective. Holding Damascus might prove too much for the rump Syrian Armed Forces--increasingly just an Alawite militia, like the Lebanese Armed Forces became during the 1970s-1980s. The obvious move for them is to hunker down in the mountains around Latakiya and defend the Alawi heartland. But, as we are seeing, they won't give up Damascus without a fight and their residual heavy weapons could make that a very long one. As I’ve said in the past, they might eventually end up as a Syrian version of the Northern Alliance, holed up in the Panjshir valley.

Daniel Byman: A question to me is whether the violence will spike dramatically -- far more than it has already. We have both desperation (defense of Damascus) and revenge (death of a very prominent figure) that could lead to the units being moved from the Golan to use their firepower and simply level rebellious neighborhoods rather than cordon them off.

My understanding is that Damascus is a very diverse city. Clearly, many regime supporters are in the capital. But there are also poorer neighborhoods, outskirts of the capital, etc. that house many Sunnis that are very hostile to the regime. And as the violence rises in the city, we will see “cleansing” of neighborhoods by partisans of each side. So there are, and may be more, areas in Damascus where the regime can (if it chooses) employ heavy force in a demonstrative way.

Salman Shaikh: I don't think the Alawi minority will stand with the regime to the end. At this stage, they cannot guarantee that there will be a "safe haven" in the mountains for the family. The environment around Latakia is increasingly hot with rebel penetration. There are also some indications of Alawis getting more and more nervous about this family's ability to save them.

Today's event means that we are on the road to the end of this regime. The one person whose name I have not seen is Mohamed Nasif - the "godfather" of the security apparatus. If he had gone, then really we would be talking about "game over". Makhlouf was probably the number two of the security apparatus.

Together, they are the "two legs" of Bashar Assad (the closest to him). I have been in Cairo with quite a few of the folks involved in the operations in Damascus, Aleppo etc. They are working feverishly (one predicted “a big event” would happen today last night over dinner). We may still be headed for a big, drawn out bloody battle (especially since the rebels are still poorly equipped; though there has been a relatively large infusion of arms courtesy of Q/KSA via Turkey over the past week), but other scenarios of a quick regime collapse cannot now be ruled out.

It is therefore imperative that the opposition accelerate its readiness of to lead the transitional phase. They would need to form an as yet elusive coordination committee, involving the main opposition blocs (including Kurds and some folks from the inside) and get that committee to deepen their understandings on arrangements for the transition.

Daniel Byman: I think Salman has the key issue exactly right. The opposition’s ability to lead is what will determine whether this is a “win” for the U.S. (and Syria and its neighbors) in the long-term. And the opposition’s coherence will make it better able to topple Assad.

Kenneth Pollack: Salman, I hope that you are correct, but fear it will prove otherwise. I am afraid I have seen exactly the kinds of cross-signals too many times in the past. On occasion, and eventually they may prove correct (Yemen), but most of the time they are ultimately trumped by the fear of retribution for a failed coup and the sense that internal dissension would ultimately lead to collapse (Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, etc.)

Michael Doran: Another question for you: Whither Aleppo? It's a mystery to me. I have never understood why the regime had such a good grip on it, and why Damascus would explode before it did. If by the end of the week, we have major violence in both cities, then the Alawis will certainly be heading for the hills. But I would like somebody with real knowledge to explain the stability of Aleppo.

Salman Shaikh: Aleppo: Huge number of detentions (thousands); regime economic investments; MB has not wanted Aleppo to explode (their strategy is to be ready for the day after); Turks don't necessarily want Aleppo to explode either (refugees). Also protests have become large recently but are not well covered by Arab media. Regarding Tlass - this is seen as a failed Russian/Iranian play for a "constructive" scenario. They are too late.

Michael Doran: Fascinating re: Aleppo. I'm sticking by my Alawite enclave theory, however. I'm sure the average Alawites dislike Bashar and feel caught between the regime and the Sunnis, but will they really be able to resist when Bashar's loyal divisions settle down in the north with Russian and Iranian backing? It's speculation on top of speculation, I do admit. But I don't know anybody who truly has a clue about intra-Alawite politics, so my speculation is as good as any!

Authors

Image Source: Reuters

The UN’s Handling of Syria: Another Horrific Episode of Ineptitude?

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 17:30:00 -0400

Members of the UN Security Council continue to bicker over what to do in Syria while the country burns. They are locked in a heated debate over what to do to keep alive the UN-Arab League Joint envoy, Kofi Annan’s six-point plan, the UN observer mission and indeed, Kofi Annan. Russia and China continue to resist any resolution under Chapter 7 that would have “consequences” – even the relatively weak economic and financial ones that are being proposed - for those who continue to flout Annan’s plan. To make matters worse, protestors in Syria have dubbed this Friday as the “Friday of toppling Annan, the Servant of Assad and Iran.”

What a sorry state of affairs.

Annan has said that he is “shocked and appalled” by the latest massacre in Tremsieh, just outside Hama, which has reportedly killed over 200 civilians, including women and children and singled out the Assad regime for not ceasing the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. The head of his observer mission, General Mood has followed the same line by pointing to the “use of mechanized units and helicopters” in the village – albeit from the his observers position some 5-6 kilometers outside of the village. On Thursday, their boss, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon in the monthly private Security Council lunch admonished its members for their lack of unity and urged Chapter 7 action – that was before the extent of the massacre in Tremsieh became known. Today he expressed doubt about Assad’s commitment to Annan’s six-point plan and called for serious consequences for those who do not implement it.

The simple truth is that the Security Council should have outlined the “consequences” to Assad for the use of his “killing machine” months ago. Annan should have pursued a more aggressive strategy to coerce compliance to his plan in March not four months after the start of his mission. Instead, even the latest UN report gives the impression that what is taking place is a fight between two equal sides – the regime and the rebels – and that they need to sit down and talk on equal terms. The failure of the Council to act more forcefully earlier has made it and the efforts of Annan irrelevant to what is unfolding inside Syria.

Yet, Russia and China but not only them – India, Pakistan and South Africa as well – continue to resist efforts to impose any accountability in Syria. Moscow, which has called the latest massacre a “bloody atrocity” but not pointed the finger at the regime, faces a moment of truth. It knows that if it is not willing to back stronger Council action now, veto-wielding Western members of the Council may well not agree to the continuation of the UN mission, which it strongly favours. Annan’s visit to Moscow on Monday may be the last chance for him to persuade the Russians and for him to keep his job, for now at least.

History will not judge kindly this latest episode of inaction by the world’s powers in Syria. For months, they have bought time by settling on the efforts of Kofi Annan, even as these efforts have failed. In the days ahead, developments on the ground will continue to set the agenda in Syria. The slaughter of civilians, rape, torture and the forced movement of populations, which is being labeled as ethnic cleansing, as well as the clear dangers for Syria’s neighbours as a direct result of the conflict should be clarion calls for international action. What is most disturbing is that the methods used to perpetrate the recent massacres in Houla, Qubeir and Tremsieh are frighteningly similar to those that Assad’s father, Hafez Al-Assad, used in committing the Hama massacres in 1982. One fears that there is much worse to come in Syria, especially as we enter the holy month of Ramadan.

For the UN, Syria is shaping up to be another horrific episode of failure and ineptitude. To Rwanda and Bosnia, we must now add Syria. It is a collective failure, first and foremost of the UN member states who “said never again” and who in 2005 unanimously passed a doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” That summit also endorsed the role of the international community to “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

Just seven years on, if the Security Council is not capable of acting immediately in the face of the evil that we are witnessing in Syria today, many will conclude that it is time to bypass it and the UN. Next week, the UN Secretary-General produces his next report on the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” – interestingly, on the role of the international community. This is a timely opportunity for this Secretary-General to find his voice and use his bully pulpit to urge the international community to collectively meet the challenges of Syria. Today, he said that there must be “united, sustained and effective pressure now.” Let us hope that the members of the UN Security Council are listening to him.

Authors

Salman Shaikh