Brookings: Experts - Ruth H. Santini

The EU and North Africa: Defining the Criteria for Effective Partnership

Ruth H. Santini — Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:09:00 -0400

With a persistent economic downturn spreading across North Africa, ensuing social disruptions and rising political instability especially in Egypt and Tunisia, one might wonder what role Western actors are trying to play in the region. As the new US Secretary of State traveled to Egypt and pushed for an end of divisive political bickering on the road to new parliamentary elections, forcefully insisting on economic reforms to finalize a $4.8 billion IMF loan, Europe was nowhere to be seen.

However, on March 20th, following its own bureaucratic schedule, the European Commission came out with an assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the annual reports on the progress status of a number of ENP countries, among which Egypt.

The EU openly recognizes it must work with other partners in order to support political and economic transitions. Many external actors are engaged and contribute to shape the pace and direction of political change, first and foremost the US and Gulf countries. With the creation in 2012 of EU bilateral “task forces” with Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, we have seen greater coordination among international donors in terms of economic support. What has not (yet) materialized is greater multilateral political coordination in terms of which joint messages to get across to these countries’ political establishments when democratic backsliding occurs. The EU acknowledges that economic and political developments are intertwined and tries to influence the latter by focusing on the former. Brussels has so far committed 3.5 billion euros to the southern neighborhood for the 2011-2013 period and more recently 300 million euros in smaller grants. Compared to that, the US on March 10thagreed to allot a package of $190 million in aid to Egypt from a commitment of $450 million aimed at industrial support.

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Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Beppe Grillo: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution for Italy’s Democratic Party?

Ruth H. Santini — Mon, 04 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Many aspects of the recent Italian general elections surprised observers and commentators, from the extent to which established political parties such as the center-left Democratic Party and the center-right People of Freedom Party lost consensus across the country (receiving respectively 3.5 million and 6.2 million of votes less than in the previous elections), to the unforeseen success of Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement. Given the dearth of information and media coverage in the run up to the elections of the Five Star Movement, perhaps most surprising was its success. This movement, which is not a party, was only created at the end of 2009 and, running for the first time at the national level, gathered 8 Million votes, equaling one quarter of the electorate. The Five Star Movement is now the largest single group in the lower house.

The Italian establishment as a whole, from the political class, to the main media groups and the economic lobbies, had disregarded Grillo, and often depicted him as a populist, demagogue, enraged and dangerous political figure, without lending him any credibility. Yet the former comedian has in the past few years effectively transformed himself into a media-savvy political entrepreneur. The refusal to engage with Grillo on the personal level has translated into the inability to engage with the issues his movement has consistently waged for: formulating a law against corruption, reducing the costs of the political establishment, adopting models of environmentally sustainable development, defending public goods, creating a more transparent and more efficient public administration. More than anything else, the movement has battled for the moralization of political and economic life and for the primacy of politics vis-à-vis economics. However, rather than recognizing, both instrumentally but also existentially, the issues where convergence would be desirable in the interest of real reforms, the Democratic Party has often demonized Grillo and refrained from distinguishing him from the movement and its campaigns. The strategy of ignoring the wave of discontent, even when it came coupled with pragmatic proposals to deal with public affairs, has backfired and the Democratic Party is, once again, now in a difficult soul-searching phase.

Rather than seeing in such a protest movement (an anti-establishment, albeit not an anti-political movement) an antidote for post-democracy and its illnesses, the Democratic Party has retrenched. It failed to run an electoral campaign, falsely self-confident that the fear of a Berlusconi come-back or a renewal of painful austerity measures by Mario Monti would suffice to scare voters towards its ranks. The party failed to build any kind of narrative articulating the challenges Italy faces as well as pointing out what the light at the end of the tunnel might look like. It likely did so because it assumed that there is no autonomy for politics vis-à-vis economics and its constraints. The Democratic Party fell in the trap of believing that economic imperatives will dictate the pace of changes and reforms and that Italian political decisions will continue be taken elsewhere, be it Brussels or international financial markets.

In voting for Grillo, a quarter of the electorate has chosen a different approach. One where communication is simple, where proposals are advanced, where new ideas are tested, and where getting people involved, in some embryonic form of liquid democracy, is encouraged. Grillo’s voters feel that sovereignty should be exercised independently from Brussels and financial markets. Their starting point is the necessity to react to the rapid shrinking of the middle class which has accelerated since the global financial crisis hit Italy, exacerbating a stagnating political and economic system. The Five Star Movement aims for a resurgence of conscience and will to engage in political activities, at all levels. And therefore it should be an inspiration for traditional political parties, given its effective style of communication, innovative and truly interactive use of social media, the way in which it selects political personnel from civil society, and the issues it chooses to prioritize, emanating from local demands directly affecting civic and public life.

Grillo’s voters, like many other Italians, point to a desire for ”more” and not less politics, closer to them, which is able to listen rather than preach and lecture. They believe that professional politicians need to earn popular respect on the basis of what they deliver, a somehow revolutionary message in 2013 Italy.

Of course, one should not be fooled and forget that having a non-elected leader of a movement whose non-statute was written by only two people and never put to a vote is also not ideal. Yet while the Five Star logo is the property of Grillo and not the movement itself, one should not confuse the founder with its members.

The Five Star Movement has its contradictions, many of which remain to be discovered and brought to life. But much could be learned from the movement which could help revitalize the way in which politics is conducted in Italy. Italy’s traditional parties should embrace the Five Star Movement’s vitality, accepting and endorsing the idea and practice of citizens regularly expressing their dissent, and using protest and pressures to encourage change from within the party system.

Now the Five Star Movement’s “citizen-deputies” will be torn between two opposing objectives, the desire to realize some of the most pressing issues within their platform, and their goal of serving as an “outsider” watchdog designed to denounce the mistakes and corruption of the existing political elites. It is the tension between these two goals that will test the truly democratic nature of the Movement, and the autonomy of its elected representatives vis-à-vis their non-elected leader, Beppe Grillo.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Transatlantic Academy

Why Europe Should Not Worry About Italy

Ruth H. Santini and Francesco Giumelli — Mon, 04 Mar 2013 14:54:00 -0500

Contrary to what many think, the sick man of Europe is Europe itself, not Italy.

While seemingly a threat to EU stability and at the heart of possible contagion, Italy is historically used to navigating through uncertainty, short-lived governments and catastrophic economic forecasts.

Yet, the world continues to wonder where the Belpaese is heading to with a divided center-left, a never ending dawn of Berlusconi’s political influence, and with the impressive rise of the protest-driven party of a former comedian.

Undoubtedly, Italy’s elections have produced an uncertain political situation, but the world should be aware by now that uncertainty is the norm, not the exception for Italy.

Italy’s case has time and again struck foreign observers. How is it possible that such a dysfunctional system, ineffective institutions, widespread corruption and generalised limited care for rules would allow the country to become the eighth economy worldwide?

Italy has developed in a constant state of emergency, short-term planning and flexible interpretation of laws. However inexplicable, this is the way it works in the peninsula.

There are three elements that should reassure the markets and the international community that Italy will emerge from this crisis once again.

The first element is the strength of two key characteristic, which allow for the continuity of the country, namely its bureaucracy and its small and medium enterprises. Let’s try to understand why.

Ironically, Italy’s national bureaucracy has ensured the continuity of the country’s central authority in the past 60 years.

With a new government every 11 months, bureaucracy has helped to maintain the system together by ensuring that the high political turnover did not affect the institutional continuity of government. Moreover, despite being harshly struck by the economic crisis, Italy’s small and medium enterprises, which account for 70 percent of Italian GDP, continue to represent the backbone of the Italian economic and social structure.

Second, the political rise of Beppe Grillo, the comedian-politician-entrepreneur who has shaken Europe’s economic and political certainties, should not be considered as a more destabilising political figure - if not in his personal style - than French leader Francois Hollande or British PM David Cameron.

Grillo’s political programme is composed of several common sense points, many of which have been advanced by other political parties as well and would only help to strengthen the bond between the citizens and the state.

Other points are tailored to address popular concerns fueled by the growing inequalities and resentment towards EU policies. Grillo calls for an increase of taxes on the wealthy and has questioned, under the current circumstances and EU obligations, Italy's membership of the euro.

He nevertheless re-affirmed the importance of building a truly united European Union and sees the future of Italy firmly anchored within a fairer and more democratic Europe.

To what extent is this different from Hollande’s 75 percent wealth tax or Cameron’s proposal to have a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU?

Grillo’s agenda is not scarier than theirs, and his 25 percent of the votes does not grant him with the majority.

Finally, despite enormous limits in their leadership and their shared responsibility for lack of reforms in the past years, the Democratic Party (PD) and the People of Freedom Party (PdL) reacted to the deadlock reached by the country in late 2011 and jointly supported Mario Monti’s technocratic government.

This experience, mainly aimed at reassuring international financial markets about the solidity of Italy’s budget and institutions, could be repeated if conditions in the eurozone require it.

Italy indeed is a difficult beast to understand – let alone tame - for the other European countries, but it is an anchor, not an iceberg, for the European integration process.

Obviously, Italy’s economic troubles should not be underestimated, but they should not raise greater concerns than those in Spain and France.

Italy will deal with its domestic uncertainties. Europeans should be more concerned about the lack of progress, beyond a useful and yet scarcely revolutionary banking union, of an EU austerity package which has failed to be coupled with the necessary social and economic growth measures necessary to jumpstart renewed trust in European institutions. The greatest dangers for the EU come from this, not Italian party politics.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Francesco Giumelli

Publication: EUobserver

The Windy Road of Arab Transitions and Europe’s Weak Hand

Ruth H. Santini — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Once again the Middle East is taking a series of unpredictable detours where, seemingly, nothing goes as planned.

Tunisia, considered a trailblazer in the region, origin of the Jasmine Revolution, symbol of a smooth transition process, characterized by consensus and inclusiveness, is torn by ideological cleavages, political violence, economic crisis and a broader lack of confidence in its own capacity to overcome the current stalemate.

Egypt, considered the bad boy of the revolutions, is continuing its bumpy road towards a new form of government and state-society relations. The new constitution, after being analyzed carefully, is less revolutionary than it might seem. While not extremely dangerous in terms of limiting civil liberties, including minority and women’s rights, according to many it will likely create problems given its vagueness and juxtaposition of articles and norms which fail a consistency test. The economy, which until recently seemed on the verge of salvation through an IMF loan, is now set to derail (given the quickly decreasing monetary reserves within an overall economic fragile context) if an agreement is not negotiated.

One thing the Egyptian and the Tunisian transitions have in common is the criticism their ruling Islamist parties are receiving in terms of delivering the public goods they were entrusted with providing. Often cited is the lack of competence, the inexperience, the divisions, found within these parties. Personal charisma of the newly elected leaders in neither country suffices to placate public discontent and discomfort. Both countries show the difficulties of changing political cultures and adapting to new ones: while contestation has become much more widespread than before the revolutions, it has by no means become a standard accepted practice. The Egyptian independent trade union, created after the start of the revolution, struggles to operate and some of its members have been persecuted. Cleavages take many forms in both countries but are not limited to the one between secularists and Islamists of various stripes, or those between urban and rural areas, or even the cross-cutting ones, for example on socio-economic issues. There, unexpectedly, Egyptian Muslim Brothers defend their free market, neo-liberal world view, while the Tunisian Ennahda adheres less strictly to this paradigm.

Read the full article at aspeninstitute.it »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

Obama’s Win Viewed from the Middle East

Ruth H. Santini — Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Most of the countries in the Mediterranean and North Africa (MENA) region stayed out of the U.S. presidential campaign and avoided taking sides or expressing opinions on Obama’s first term and what a second one might mean for international affairs.

In the past couple of years, many MENA commentators in Washington and elsewhere have expressed disillusionment with the Obama presidency’s foreign policy track record in the region. Three main issues were traditionally pointed out.

The first was the Middle East peace process, which the President tried to accelerate in 2010 by pushing Israel to agree to stop settlement construction, and suffering from a humiliating public refusal from the Israeli leadership. Rather than engaging in secret talks with the two sides, the U.S. diplomacy acted in an over-confident way which alienated the Israeli Prime Minister and much of the political elite and which bore no fruits since it was not followed up by a back-up plan of any sort. The U.S. administration decided to ignore the issue for the remaining two years and leave it to a possible second term.

The second issue was the Cairo speech of June 2009: here again, deeds did not follow words, and relations between the U.S. and the Arab world pretty much remained on the same path, until, alas, the Arab awakening occurred.. This is where the third issue comes into play - U.S. reactions to the revolutionary changes. Despite supporting the changes, many lamented the slow pace of change of tone and the failure to translate this support into substantial economic aid.

However, bilateral relations between the U.S. and Arab awakening countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya) are on a good course, while those with Israel have remained problematic.

Read the full article at aspeninstitute.it »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: © Omar Sobhani / Reuters

The Limits of Deterrence with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Ruth H. Santini — Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

At the recent EU Foreign Affairs Council, sanctions against Iran were further strengthened, at the same time re-affirming the validity of the dual track approach and expressing the hope that Iranian authorities will soon decide to re-start nuclear negotiations with the E3+3.

This round follows the sanctions adopted after the EU Foreign Affairs Council of last January. The restrictions mainly target the trade, energy, transport and financial sectors. Great Britain, France and the Netherlands, with the active support of Italy and other EU member states share the conviction that tightening the grip on Iran’s revenues and financial transactions represent the best chance for the international community to push Iran toward a negotiated settlement on its nuclear program and to avoid an external military intervention.

The logic behind Western sanctions targeting several economic sectors (but far yet from being a full trade embargo) in Iran is straightforward: economic and financial isolation, the devaluation of the national currency, the rising inflation and unemployment will increase domestic pressure on the government and lead it either to capitulation in nuclear negotiations or to regime change if domestic unrest will be massive.

When the recession will become unbearable, Western leaders expect Iranians will turn against their leaders and at least partially blame them for the country’s economic decline and chaos.

Read the full article at aspeninstitute.it »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: © Yves Herman / Reuters

Syria’s Neighbors: Protagonists and Victims

Ruth H. Santini — Thu, 04 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The war in Syria has been ravaging for the past 18 months and has no end in sight. Despite what many analysts and policymakers think, namely, defections from key members of the regime and the security apparatus have been minor. Moreover, desertions from the army, in the thousands, have not altered the existing military balance of power favoring the regime forces over the opposition. The war in Syria is not different from a proxy battle, waged by one group of backers (Iran and Russia) and another, supporting the Free Syrian Army (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the US). Not all of the players involved realize that its spillover effects, manifesting themselves across sectarian lines, extend well beyond Syrian borders and will have a long-lasting impact upon the regional balance of power.

With Europe constantly on the verge of financial crises, the US already overwhelmed by its election month, Russia and China vetoing UN resolutions against Syria, it is unsurprising that consensus over “red lines” beyond which intervention could not be postponed has yet failed to emerge.

Intervention could take different shapes, as the Turkish leadership often underlines, and as the French have come to appreciate: for a start, the creation of buffer zones of those areas controlled by rebels at the Syrian borders would provide a politically strong signal that the international community will not be a bystander anymore. These areas would subsequently need to be secured through a no-fly zone, patrolled by international air forces. And then, should this fail to meet the target (deter attacks in the minimalist version, a collapse of the regime in the wider interpretation of the policy), a military operation, with limited boots on the ground and as much unmanned aerial vehicles as possible, would come next.

This is on paper. In reality there are numerous events unfolding in parallel, inside and outside Syria, which will have an impact for years to come for Syria and many of its neighbors.

Read the full article at Aspenia Online »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

A Slow Chicken Game: Iran and the P5+1 Nuclear Talks

Ruth H. Santini and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi — Wed, 27 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The third round of nuclear talks between the international community and the Islamic Republic of Iran began in April in Istanbul, continued in Baghdad in May and few weeks later in Moscow on June 18th-19th.

All parties, especially the P5+1 (the five permanent member of the UN Security Council plus Germany), acknowledged the extent of the impasse, with a number of expectations raised in Istanbul that, however, led to disappointment in the two subsequent meetings. Given the distance between the Iranian stance and that of the P5+1, it was decided that negotiations would continue only on a technical, rather than political level. The P5+1 has a clear agenda: “Stop, Shut and Ship”. Stop uranium enrichment, Shut the Fordo nuclear facility near Qom and Ship the uranium enriched beyond 20% abroad.

The statement delivered in Moscow by Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, demonstrated that the P5+1 is currently putting more emphasis on the necessity of Iranian compliance with its "international", not just its NPT, obligations (i.e. suspending all its enrichment activities), differently from what came out in Istanbul. Of course, the burden of proof is on Iran’s shoulder, and as for the international community, 20% uranium enrichment lies at the heart of the matter. Agreeing to stop the enrichment and ship the stockpiles of 20% enriched uranium abroad are the main parameters of any agreement proposed by the P5+1. Before the last talks, pressures on Tehran were strongly exerted not just by the EU, but also by Russia and China. So far, to no avail.

This time around, expectations were high not only because previous political-level meetings led many to believe that new steps could be undertaken to overcome the nuclear stalemate, but also because the meeting took place in Russia. The common assumption was that Moscow had managed to secure some bilateral agreement on progress to be made with regards to negotiations with the Islamic Republic. This would have increased Russia’s political capital and leverage vis-à-vis the US.

Read the full article at Aspenia Online »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Publication: Aspenia Online

Image Source: Sergei Karpukhin / Reuters

Iran’s Nuclear Crisis: Domestic, Regional and International Pressures

Ruth H. Santini and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi — Mon, 04 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Before the latest talks in Baghdad between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the “P5+1” group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany), there were speculations that an agreement on the nuclear program was in the cards, given the constructive atmosphere since the restart of negotiations in April 2012. However, not only an imminent breakthrough failed to materialize, but only two days after the Baghdad talks, Iranian authorities denied the possibility they might accept to suspend 20% uranium enrichment.

In Moscow, on June 18-19, there will be a third round of nuclear negotiations after the talks held in Istanbul on April 14 and the ones in Baghdad on May 23-24. Both rounds in Istanbul and Baghdad were predictably inconclusive, given the amount of reciprocal distrust that has accumulated over the past few years between the two sides and the technicalities involved in any possible agreement.

Truth be told, the offer on the table from the P5+1, on the key issue of uranium enrichment, had not been framed in unequivocal terms: many in Tehran believed that a suspension of highly-enriched uranium could have been compensated not only with the shipment of uranium, but with the continuation of enrichment to 3.5-5% levels, in line with the NPT and finalized to enrichment for civil purposes. As it turned out, however, the offer only consisted of a revival of previous attempts to convince Iran to ship abroad its stockpiles of enriched uranium, offering in return fuel for its Tehran medical reactor, assistance with safety at all other reactors, and help to the country’s airline industry in acquiring spare parts. Iran was required to suspend all enrichment activities, contrary to the NPT framework, the terms of which were reiterated by the parts in Istanbul. Rather than a positive tit-for-tat, where in exchange for the suspension, all sanctions would be lifted, it was made clear that pressure would be eased only when Iran will take concrete steps to prove it does not seek nuclear weapons.

The timing of the next round of talks was chosen by accident: on July 1, new and tougher sanctions – barring the imports of Iranian oil into Europe as well as financial transactions with all Iranian banks – are scheduled to enter into force.

Interestingly, while on the surface critical factors revolve around the percentage of uranium enrichment, it is domestic elections in Iran, the United States and Israel that will shape the evolution of negotiations.

Iran has been a recurring theme in foreign policy debates during American presidential campaigns for the last three decades. The discourse has periodically shifted from containment to engagement, as was the case during the 2008 presidential campaign. From Obama as a candidate to Obama as President, the U-turn was visible and caught some by surprise. Constructive and appreciative of Iranian culture and society during his electoral campaign, confident that dialogue could break the impasse linked also to mistakes of the previous administration, once elected Obama strengthened coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Tehran: sanctions have never been as tough and ‘biting’ as under his presidency. The President has become convinced that under the current circumstances a deal is almost impossible and is resorting to diplomacy in a last attempt to stave off an Israeli pre-emptive war before November.

Any deal is more likely to be reached after the American elections in November: foreign policy is hardly a sexy topic in the current political climate where retrenchment and downsizing seem to capture the mood of most Americans. If a deal were to be seriously discussed before the elections, it would likely regard only the nuclear issue, avoiding any mention of ‘grand bargains’. This is so partly because the geopolitical situation in the Middle East has changed and the US no longer considers Iran a potentially legitimate regional power, but aims at curtailing its influence and tame its ambitions. Today, Afghanistan and Iraq no longer represent a topic of common interest between Washington and Tehran, or when they do, the interests of the two sides rarely overlap. Moreover, also as a consequence of Iran’s decade of nuclear activities, any deal could be seen as insufficient to fully reassure Israel and placate its security concerns.

In Iran, President Ahmadinejad is moving into his last year in office and the ruling theocracy is closely watching for any signs of internal opposition resurging before next year's elections.

Ahmadinejad looks increasingly weakened at every new round of talks, as demonstrated by his inability to play a central role in the nuclear negotiations. "If the Westerners change their attitudes and pay respect to the Iranian nation, they will be treated respectfully by Iranians, in return," Ahmadinejad said recently during a tour of eastern Iran. "They should know that the Iranian nation will not take a single step back from its basic rights" - a clear reference to uranium enrichment. However, Ahmadinejad is isolated and does not represent any specific power center within the Iranian religious, political and economic establishment. In a last-ditch attempt to capture media attention, given his diminishing influence on foreign policy, Ahmadinejad undertook provocative actions, such as visiting - and delivering a speech - at the contested island of Abu Masa, being the first senior member of the Islamic Republic to do so. The dispute over the island, which strongly mirrors Iran’s nuclear program in terms of national sensitivity, provoked angry reactions from several Arab countries.

On the other hand, the Supreme Leader Khamenei has positioned himself at the heart of all matters related to Iranian security. The obvious intent is gaining legitimacy should there be a breakthrough in the nuclear crisis and take control and responsibility for all stages of the foreign policy-making process. Still, Khamenei badly needs to let off steam in a domestic situation that risks implosion, given the unprecedented political and economic isolation and rising factionalism. And while any deal for him would be better than nothing, he has to be able to sell the agreement to several domestic audiences, which, particularly in the case of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), have been heavily indoctrinated on the nuclear issue. For the IRGC, for example, nothing can and should stop Iran from its unalienable right to enrich uranium. A sign that Khamenei is attempting a delicate balancing act between striking a compromise with the West and maintaining domestic legitimacy is his March statement. In it, he stressed that acquiring nuclear weapons is un-Islamic, with a clear reference to his 2005 fatwa. Such declaration lends credit to the belief that reaching the threshold capability might be Tehran’s ultimate goal, which would address the Iranian leadership’s security concerns without violating the NPT.

The threshold, now even closer given the recent disclosures regarding the degree of enrichment reached at the Fordow plant (well beyond 20%), would not alleviate Israeli security concerns and might tip the balance in Israeli assessments over the costs and benefits of a military operation against nuclear sites in Iran.

Military calculations are not the only game in town in Israel. A tense political battle is being played out on the Iranian issue. On the one hand, Benjamin Netanyahu has decided to avoid early elections and now enjoys an ample majority, which includes the centrist party Kadima. Its leader, Shaul Mofaz, opposes the idea of unilateral action by Israel against Tehran. Former Mossad (secret services) and Shabak (domestic intelligence) chiefs Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin share this view and have called for Israeli leaders to act rationally and refrain from behaving in a “messianic” way. This came in response to remarks by Netanyahu comparing the Iranian threat to the Nazi one in the 1930s. However, despite the existence of prominent dissident voices against the military option, the coalition government actually strengthens the Israeli prime minister, who enjoys wide popularity and legitimacy.

In a three-player game, one defection will suffice to derail the process. In the current context, it is Tel Aviv, rather than Washington or Tehran, that might have the final word.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Publication: The Aspen Institute

Image Source: Thaier Al-Sudani / Reuters

The Syrian Conflict and the International Alliance Race

Ruth H. Santini — Tue, 24 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Unrest in Syria has been ongoing for the past 13 months. It was initiated by 15 kids in the southwestern city of Deraa, who were inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and openly mocked the regime by creatively expressing their dissent. When these kids were arrested and tortured, anti-regime demonstrations were triggered. Protests spread from Deraa to Damascus, Homs, Homa and other cities. Since then, the regime has stepped up its repression, increasingly targeting villages that host protesters and armed fighters. There have been approximately 9,000 casualties, 200,000 people are displaced within the country and almost 40,000 have escaped to neighbouring countries – mainly Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Two critical junctures in particular are key to understanding the diplomatic stalemate. The resulting choices shed light on both the humanitarian consequences and the regional and international power politics that played out.

The first of these junctures occurred last summer, when the regime’s actions towards the uprisings turned increasingly violent and bloody. The international community started to divide itself among different interpretations of the events on the ground and their implications. While Moscow deplored all solutions ignoring an involvement of the regime and of Alawites in general, the Gulf states started to envisage ways to support the Syrian opposition. European and US declaratory policies became assertive but toothless. Some of the difficulties in adopting a clear-cut stance were linked to the status of the Syrian opposition - which started as civic uprisings, then turned into militarized forms of resistance and eventually, as we see now, paved the way for guerrilla warfare dynamics. Parts of the opposition coalesced around the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which however falls short of representing a unified front of opposition against the regime. Also, minorities, such as Alawites, Druzes, Christians and Kurds failed to be integrated into the Syrian National Council (SNC) - the political body supposed to represent the opposition. This led many to suspect that sectarian logics would dictate the evolution of the opposition, something which significantly diminished the SNC and FSA appeal and atout. More broadly, many in Western capitals shared the Russian fear that a post-Assad Syria would become a buffer zone between regional powers (Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other), characterized by persistent internal instability, with potential devastating regional spill-over effects.

The second juncture happened in New York last February at the UN Security Council. The US and Europe put forward a resolution on Syria, supported by the Arab League, guided by Qatar. The idea was to try to broker a Yemeni solution with the Assad regime, devising an acceptable exit strategy for the Assads.

Read the full article at Aspenia Online »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: The Aspen Institute

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

EU Sanctions against Iran: New Wine in Old Bottles?

Ruth H. Santini and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi — Tue, 06 Mar 2012 14:41:00 -0500

Abstract: Iran is the first country against which the EU has developed a sanctions’ policy out of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) concerns, starting in 2006. In 2010, departing from previous policies, Europe has adopted “comprehensive” sanctions, in addition to targeted ones, taking a toll on the country as a whole and attempting to diplomatically and financially isolate it. Earlier this year, this coercive approach has been further reinforced with an oil embargo, to be fully implemented next July.

The paper examines the old and new sanctions’ legislation, it provides an analysis of the nature of economic relations between European countries and Iran and explores the potential political and economic impact of the oil embargo. It concludes by showing how, despite publicly endorsing dual-track diplomacy, leaving the door officially open to dialogue, Europe is mostly limiting incentives and increasing pressure on the Iranian regime, in line with American political preferences. This very two conditions, however, might hamper any chance for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear standoff and also be a costly policy for European struggling economies.

Read the full paper (PDF) »

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Publication: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale

The Arab Spring and Europaralysis in the Levant and the Gulf

Ruth H. Santini — Thu, 01 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Europe has never had a comprehensive approach towards the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Arab Awakening has not significantly altered the calculations behind the existing policy fragmentation.

Despite framing political and economic relations with MENA through collective diplomatic frameworks, either multilateral (such as the 1995 Barcelona process) or bilateral (as the European Neighbourhood Policy), the Union has never developed a fully-fledged strategy of engagement with the region, but it has fostered partially complementary and partially mutually exclusive policy goals (such as the simultaneous promotion of democracy and security).

The lack of a comprehensive vision is a consequence of at least three factors: the persistence of political and economic post-colonial interests by many big European states, the weakness of the European External Actions Service, -still not fully operational and understaffed-and the lack of leadership at the European level able to offer strategies if not grand visions of what Europe could and should become for its neighbourhood, and viceversa.

Europe has dealt with the MENA region tacitly endorsing a threefold sub-regional division between North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf, without however clearly spelling out the different goals and rationales of its actions and inactions.

Europe has looked at North Africa through the prism of three geopolitical concerns: domestic political stability, security for Europe and energy security. The three North African countries who have been turned upside down by the 2011 revolts, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, perfectly represent the mixture and interplay among these various concerns. Despite that, in all three cases, Brussels has successfully managed to reach something more than a common enominator on how to respond to the uprisings, from diplomatic openings to offers of increased bilateral cooperation through Advanced status recognition, to the proposal of enhanced partnerships. Europe has however failed to deliver what it has pledged in terms of direct and indirect financial help, as well as effectively exerting pressure on European member states on increased mobility and market access, two crucial issues for southern Mediterranean countries. That would represent a tangible offer, beyond the usual diplomatic symbolic carrots. Europe has also failed to come clean on its biased democracy promotion track record, characterised by ad hoc support of anti-regime political forces in the region. Some credit however goes to the capacity of the EU to find a common ground among European stakeholders, substantially helping them to get their acts together. That was the case in Tunisia and Egypt, and only to a lesser extent, with regard to Libya.

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Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Swiss Political Science Review

The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East

Fri, 18 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2011 381pp.

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"The events began in Tunisia in January 2011 . . . shook the political, social, and intellectual foundations of the Middle East. The tremors can still be felt, and no one is quite certain when the aftershocks will end, or when another shock wave of popular unrest might occur. Nevertheless, enough time has passed to try to make sense of what has happened so far and, perhaps, gain an inkling of where the region is headed."—from the Introduction by Kenneth M. Pollack

About the Book | Contents | Author Commentary | Events | About the Authors

About the Book

The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. Coauthored by 18 of the leading experts on the Middle East, it is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences.

Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.

The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the "Arab Street"; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The authors also look at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. They offer insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, as well as individual nation studies.

Part I: The Dynamics of the Arab Spring
Part II: Countries in Transition
Part III: The Imperative of Reform
Part IV: States in Crisis
Part V: Other Regional Actors
Part VI: The External Powers

Author Commentary

" Israel Looks at the Arab Awakening with Skepticism" by Daniel Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, February 9, 2012
"International Order in the Arab World " by Bruce Jones, Brookings Up Front blog, February 1, 2012
"Yemen's Transition of Power" by Ibrahim Sharqieh, Brookings Up Front blog, January 9, 2012
"The United States and Iran: The Arab Awakening Changes Everything" by Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Up Front blog, January 4, 2012
"The Palestinians and the Arab Awakening" by Khaled Elgindy, Brookings Up Front blog, December 29, 2011
"United States Policy in Syria: Masterful Inaction" by Michael S. Doran, Brookings Up Front blog, December 13, 2011
"The Long Spring Ahead" by Stephen R. Grand, Brookings Up Front blog, December 8, 2011
"Arab Public Opinion: A Question of What They Want and Say" by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Up Front blog, December 6, 2011
"Can Al Qaeda Capitalize on Unrest in Egypt and Syria? " by Daniel L. Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, December 1, 2011
"The Egyptian Military Faces Its Defining Hour " by Kenneth M. Pollack, Brookings Up Front blog, November 28, 2011
"Saudi Arabia: Its Rulers and its Future in Light of the Arab Awakening " by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Up Front blog, November 23, 2011
"Egypt: The Military, Elections, and the Hope for Reform " by Shadi Hamid, Brookings Up Front blog, November 21, 2011

Events

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Akram Al-Turk

Akram Al-Turk is the publications manager and senior research assistant in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Pavel K. Baev

Daniel L. Byman

Michael Doran

Khaled Elgindy

Stephen R. Grand

Shadi Hamid

Bruce Jones

Suzanne Maloney

Jonathan D. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he is
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Previously, he was director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House).

Bruce Riedel

Ruth H. Santini

Salman Shaikh

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Ömer Taşpınar

Shibley Telhami

Sarah Yerkes

Sarah Yerkes is a former Research Analyst of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

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Berlusconi: End of an Empire in Italy

Ruth H. Santini — Wed, 16 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview with Bloomberg, Ruth Hanau Santini discusses former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, his impact on Italy's economy and political environment, and the outlook for the European debt crisis.

BLOOMBERG: How did Berlusconi manage to stay in power for so long given all of the scandals?

RUTH SANTINI: Thanks for having me, first of all. So that’s a very interesting question. Berlusconi managed to win enormous public approval from the very beginning because he was jumping a situation of huge political and moral crisis at the beginning of the 90s, whereby the Italian political system was basically crumbling on the weight of huge political scandals in all the main political parties—from the Christian democrats to the socialist party, which basically then disappeared from the political scene. When these political scandals erupted, Berlusconi, by criticizing these politicians for their perceived lack of touch with reality and with the Italian public, managed to create an aura of being a self-made man, someone that was very down-to-earth, capable of turning situations around with an enormous gut instinct able to lead through a very complex political system, which then he was really able to shape. He was the main creator of the Italian bi-polar system, which never really existed before.

[...]

SANTINI: If we were talking about Berlusconi’s legacy, we are talking about the system that he created and put in place. He was the main stakeholder and he profited from that system he created. Let’s remember that he also reformed the electoral law, making a much less democratic electoral law. Of course he was able to get very different political parties together; he was a very shrewd politician. But he profited from that system he managed to create. One of the three main legacies that he will leave Italy is the political culture of tax evasion, corruption, ambiguity in terms of not being transparent, that is exactly one of the main legacies that will remain. Together with more structural legacies—the reforms he implemented. Wrong reforms, like the reform of education and of the university, and the reforms he promised and didn’t deliver on, like the reform of the public administration and the reform of the job market.

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Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: Bloomberg

What Women’s Rights Tell Us About the Arab Spring

Ruth H. Santini — Thu, 10 Nov 2011 18:10:00 -0500

Since September 11, 2001, numerous studies and surveys have attempted to dissect the divide between the Islamic world and the West. Some scholars claim that the core differences revolve around issues of gender equality rather than democratic governance per se. Researchers have found that citizens in Muslim countries tend to be less permissive about gender equality than about democratic principles in general. This thesis has been refined subsequently to differentiate the Arab and the non-Arab Middle East, but the assumption has not changed: cultural factors are the main element impeding women’s realization of full citizenship rights in most Arab countries.

In that respect, have the 2011 uprisings changed the discourse and substance of this reality? Why are women’s rights issues central to political debates in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while women, after contributing significantly to liberate their countries, are far from being granted full emancipation?

Women have been largely eclipsed in the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, which is all the more striking given that these revolutions were carried out in the name of dignity and social justice. In the context of post-revolutionary emancipation, local populations feel for the first time that they have their political and economic future in their own hands. However, this same empowerment has so far failed to apply to women. After playing a prominent role in the initial phase leading to the overthrow of their autocratic leaders, female activists have been marginalized in the political space and their voices sidelined.

Progress on women’s rights is a crucial indicator of democratic development and a powerful symbol of increased pluralism. The debate on these rights, however, has stalled. Women are losing the battle to turn their ideas into political influence and to sustain the active role they played initially, although to a different extent in each of these three countries.

Some observers might be tempted to use the strong electoral performance of female candidates in Tunisia to brush aside commonly expressed fears of a human rights backlash following an Islamist takeover. But Tunisia is not a standard Arab Muslim country as far as gender equality is concerned, thanks to its long history of women’s rights, the presence of several, well-organized women’s groups and a small but powerful secular pro-Western elite.

Moreover, (free and fair) elections are only the start of democratic life and not the end of the process, though Europe and the U.S. forget this detail far too often. Maintaining a truly democratic political life remains a challenge in every single liberal democracy, and we should not expect any democratic enfant prodige to emerge from the 2011 revolutionary processes.

Western analysts and policymakers should suspend judgment until the new democratically-elected parliaments and governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya start making decisions focusing on women’s rights. In particular, they should closely watch any reform to Personal Status Code law. Rather than insisting exclusively on the immediate application of universal rights, which triggers antagonistic reflexes and political misunderstandings, Western governments and NGOs should focus on encouraging concrete improvements in women’s lives in the region and empower women to make their voices heard.

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Ruth H. Santini

Image Source: © Zoubeir Souissi / Reuters

The Arab Democratic Wave and the Middle East: A Window of Opportunity?

Ruth H. Santini — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 00:00:00 -0400

The Arab Spring has impacted heavily upon the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The fall of Mubarak and the subsequent political uncertainty in Egypt, turmoil and instability in Syria and protests in Amman have all changed Israeli and Palestinian strategic calculations. The distance between the two sides has now increased to such a point that there is now talk of the death of the already ‘stalled’ process as we know it.

Israel is facing less secure borders on every side; after the killing of five Egyptian soldiers by Israel in the Sinai and the subsequent assault of the Israeli embassy in Cairo by an angry mob, diplomatic relations are tense. Moreover, the Sinai Peninsula, allegedly having already been penetrated by radical Islamists, has never been so insecure. The re-opening of the Rafah border crossing has further fuelled Israeli fears of an Iranian rearmament of Hamas. Many in Jerusalem fear an eventual Islamist takeover in Egypt and Tunisia, and possibly in Syria, a sentiment which reinforces a siege mentality. Moreover, for the first time, the weight of Arab public opinion, upgraded from the amorphous ‘Arab street’, will weigh more on foreign policy decisions. While the direction these changes will take is far from determined, Israel’s policymakers and public opinion are holding their breath, refraining from taking new regional or bilateral diplomatic initiatives.

The Palestinian Authority has rightly interpreted the uprisings as a wake up call vis-à-vis its frustrated population, two thirds of which do not believe a Palestinian state will emerge in the next five years and oppose a continued U.S. role in negotiations with Israel. It has intensified its attempts to gather support for its UN membership bid on the one hand and has tried to reconcile with Hamas on the other, so as to limit its political vulnerability. As for the peace process itself, the new era of Arab politics implies a final demise of the process as we know it and requires the elaboration of a new process for peacemaking, based upon a greater and deeper involvement of Arab actors and upon the re-definition of some of the traditional redlines.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

Publication: EU Institute for Security Studies

The Transatlantic Relationship After the Arab Uprisings: Stronger in North Africa, Shakier in the Middle East?

Ruth H. Santini — Thu, 09 Jun 2011 16:50:00 -0400

On May 19, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a long-awaited speech on the Middle East and North Africa. The region has been shaken by the challenging Tunisian and Egyptian transitions, by forceful repressions in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, by civil war and a NATO military intervention in Libya and by an upcoming Palestinian statehood proclamation. Only a few days earlier, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton covered much the same ground during her visit to Washington, which was aimed at strengthening transatlantic cooperation. Given the stakes in North Africa and the stalled peace process, can the U.S. and the EU work together to increase their weight and impact collectively? What are the main convergences and divergences in their approaches? This paper argues that America and Europe, while sharing common objectives, have different priorities concerning support for democratic processes in the region. More importantly, they have significantly distinct readings of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), which will become an increasingly decisive issue in the coming months.

The same reading of the uprisings in Washington and Brussels

On Friday, May 20, President Obama gave an honest account of the long-standing vital U.S. interests in the Middle East, ranging from countering terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to ensuring Israel's security and the free flow of trade and fostering the MEPP. For Europe, the stakes in the Middle East are important but less vital, but the stakes in North Africa are essential. North Africa is the European Union's southern neighborhood-its own backyard. Promoting prosperity and stability in this region has been a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic partnership over the past two decades, especially in response to increasing security concerns of European states, including terrorism and illegal migration. Equally important is the fact that Europe is also the main trading partner for most of these countries.

Even with the long history of engagement and the high stakes, the U.S. and Europe have failed to formulate consistent approaches to explain the links between the promotion of democracy and security interests in the region, letting the latter trump the former whenever they contradict. The Arab uprisings have forced both transatlantic actors to re-think their policies and rationales in attempting to address three dilemmas in particular. First, the uprisings signal the end of Western led top-down models of reform in the Arab world. That political change has to start endogenously and that it should be based on indigenous understandings of democracy is a lesson the U.S. and Europe are slowly learning. The U.S. and the EU operated also under the assumption that promoting democracy in the MENA could only be attempted in weak states (Lebanon, Palestine) where there was no risk of destabilizing important pro-status quo regional players. In these cases, the same normative values were overcome by realpolitik considerations. Betting on weak states as easy targets for democracy promotion policies has hardly proven to be a successful recipe, with pro-Western elites in these states habitually damaged by the close collaboration with U.S. and European counterparts. On the other hand, the complementary assumption, which held that friendly authoritarian regimes would be politically sustainable in the long run-their societies too fragmented and disillusioned to represent any kind of powerful opposition-has been torn into pieces. In many parts of the Arab world, political sustainability will be granted by democratic and inclusive political processes, especially in those states not able to take advantage of oil and gas rents to buy loyalty through public subsidies.

It should be underlined that, despite their deep involvement in the region, neither the U.S. nor the EU saw the Arab revolts coming, but they both welcomed the democratically-inspired changes. They modestly acknowledged their status as mere observers and took time to re-adjust their vision of the region, of where it might go, and how they could help sustain the democratic momentum without jeopardizing their interests. On the declaratory level, for the first time in recent history the U.S. forcefully put Arab peoples-rather than their regimes-at center stage in its policy. This follows the decline of one of many long-standing "Orientalist" assumptions in the West, which held that Arab peoples are content with their leaders even when they are politically and intellectually subjugated by them. The belief that unaccountable and authoritarian pro-Western regimes could represent long-term bastions of stability has also collapsed.

The U.S. and EU's MENA policies now imply a "reset" on two issues: the kind of democracy to be supported and the new U.S.-EU policy toward the region. Washington and Brussels share the same agenda on these two points, albeit with different emphases. They are putting their weight behind the two transitions, identifying common actions and trying to bring the rest of the international community together to demonstrate a real (especially financial) commitment to these states' successful recovery. President Obama's understanding of the kind of democracy the U.S. stands for in the region is a comprehensive one, based on the three pillars of economic opportunities, political reforms, and minority rights. The parallel he made between a prosperous economy in Tunisia and Egypt acting as a democratizing magnet for the rest of the region and the European enlargement in the 1990s to the former Eastern European communist states is illustrative. Washington sees the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions as dependent on significant economic growth based on innovation and accountable and efficient institutions, generating youth employment and a virtuous circle between modernization and democratization. Europe is endorsing a more political approach, emphasizing the need to support the construction of 'deep democracies', acknowledging the urgency of favoring economic reconstruction, as signaled by the creation of a European task force for the southern Mediterranean, which is composed by members of the European External Action Service, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international financial institutions. The challenge ahead for an effective European and American engagement in economic development in the MENA will have to focus on helping enhance intra-regional trade and financial relations and overcoming an under-developed economic intra-regionalism.

An increasingly normative Europe

The Arab world perceives the EU as a complacent actor-punching below its weight, contenting itself with minor reforms to the rule of law, moves to liberalize the economy, and technocratic progress, rather than substantial political and economic development. Looking at European policies so far, there is some truth to this perception, and the revised European Neighborhood Policy (currently still under discussion) focuses on political reforms and improving basic political freedoms, but falls short of devising a broad new approach tying together goals and tools within a regional framework.

The discourse in Europe has shifted from procedural understandings of democracy to the promotion of full-fledged 'deep democracy' that goes well beyond electoral fetishism. Deep democracy would consist of political systems characterized by the rule of law, freedom of speech, respect for human rights and an independent judiciary. With a reformulation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) toward the region, the EU is hedging its bets, trying to restore part of its lost credibility for having engaged authoritarian regimes for several decades without having effectively promoted reform. Despite having at its disposal the opportunity to use both positive conditionality (through the ENP) and negative conditionality (through the Barcelona Process), the EU refrained from utilizing these tools, thereby limiting its own ability to positively influence political transformations in its southern neighborhood. The absence of clear-cut democracy and human rights benchmarks further constrained Europe's ability to tie funding to specific policy objectives.

The enhanced 'More for More' logic of the reframed ENP should imply a closer relationship between political progress and funding. However, the continuing absence of benchmarks does not bode well for an effective implementation of the policy. The reference to 'mutual accountability' between the EU and third parties-aimed at countering power asymmetries by making the EU accountable-could further diminish conditionality claims. Above all, because it was an outgrowth of the initial Neighborhood Policy aimed at Europe's Eastern countries, the EU's southern policy lacks political vision for the region. The southern Mediterranean was added to the ENP by former Commission President Romano Prodi almost as an afterthought. From that vantage point, in the new ENP Communication, we do not see much of a change. The solution of regional conflicts will continue to be dealt with in isolation from bilateral Action Plans, North Africa and the Middle East will continue to suffer from insufficient intra-regional cooperation and, more broadly, there will be no strategy to define the kind of relations the EU wants to develop with North Africa and the Middle East in the medium to long-term. The purely reactive logic, working in the aftermath of a crisis, and doing what the EU does best, i.e. capacity and institution building, without setting a broader political horizon, will hardly be an effective recipe for closer, more comprehensive relations with the EU's southern neighbors.

Some in Europe are already challenging the whole foundation of the Neighborhood Policy, which gathers sixteen very different countries across Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and the MENA. Despite the fact that the EU has tried to tailor its individual sets of bilateral relations, according to some critics there should be completely different frameworks to deal with the social, economic and political diversity across the southern and eastern region, not one single over-arching framework. A sensible change would be to provide for the differentiation between sub-regional clusters, identifying one approach for the Maghreb, for example, and another for the Mashreq. Within each cluster, cross-case comparisons and the sharing of best practices could become feasible. Within such sub-regional approaches, linkages could be created for specific issues, focusing, for example, on conflict resolution dynamics based on confidence building measures and intra-regional integration schemes to bring together different parts of the European Neighborhood policy.

Transatlantic convergence over North Africa translating into effective coordination

EU-U.S. convergence on approaches to North Africa is further reflected in High Representative Catherine Ashton's "3 Ms" approach for the future of the region and Europe's contribution to it, which centers on market access, money and mobility. Market access refers to the need for Europe to open up its market to its southern neighbors in a more consistent way and in accordance with these countries' needs and readiness. Money refers to the resources needed in the short-to-medium term when transitions are more challenging and instability risks are higher. Lastly, mobility stands for the European Union's intention to open its doors to more young people and businessmen coming from MENA. And yet, in the first phases of their outreach to MENA, the U.S. and the EU allocated only $2 billion for Tunisia and Egypt, then, at the G8 meeting in Deauville on May 26, an additional $20 billion was pledged. There was, however, no specification of where the money would come from. In the meantime, regional stakeholders will not hold their breath: Saudi Arabia alone has pledged $4 billion in aid to Egypt. If this will come with strings attached, they will likely differ from European political conditionality. Most of the U.S. and European activity is concentrated on increasing the role of international financial institutions that are expected to step in with long-term loans: the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank of Investment (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, that will hardly be enough to grant these countries smooth economic transitions, which is widely recognized as the key to their future prospects of political stabilization. Both the U.S. and Europe have underscored that the loans are focused on trade and investments more so than on aid and assistance, and that these loans will be tied to the democratic reforms the two countries in transition are expected to undertake. The EBRD, which was created at the end of the cold war to help the transition of communist countries to developed market economies, will extend its mandate to grant aid to MENA countries committed to the core principles of democracy, political pluralism and the market economy.

The emerging U.S. policy toward the region will include a much stronger engagement with local civil society organizations (CSOs), to include even those which "speak uncomfortable truths". This position is in line with President Obama's call to stand on the side of individuals rather than regimes. Europe will also increase its emphasis on working with local CSOs. In that respect, neither Washington nor Brussels has addressed the core dilemma they both will increasingly face: will they engage anti-Western political and civil society actors if they renounce the use of violence? In his Cairo speech, President Obama said the U.S. would respect all democratically-elected governments committed to the respect of human rights and equality and which reject the use of violence, but these words will be tested.

What stands out from these overlapping but not identical U.S. and EU conceptions of democracy is the preeminence each attributes to either economic or political progress. While both the U.S. and Europe deem these two dimensions as intertwined and mutually reinforcing, Washington puts a premium on economics, while Europe's rhetoric focuses on politics. The transatlantic convergence is more apparent however on the ground. Since the uprisings, the U.S. and Europe have been collaborating on a practical and day-to-day level, facilitating the transitional phase through the direct transfer of know-how and coordination of joint programs. Europe has been particularly active in Tunisia, where Brussels has sent an electoral team in preparation for the July elections. Tunisia represents the success story Europe needs to boost its normative claims in the region.

The elephant in the room in transatlantic discourses: recalcitrant authoritarian states

Washington and Brussels have not consistently condemned all those Arab states unwilling to undertake political reforms but whose allegiance has served the West for decades to ensure regional stability, peace with Israel, and flows of trade and oil. Even if pro-status quo rulers, currently stepping up the repression of their oppositions across the Middle East and the Gulf, are considered to be on life support, this has not implied a fundamental re-thinking of how U.S. and European strategies need to change. Both seem intent on preserving relations with some of their key regional authoritarian allies, especially the Gulf monarchies. Neither the U.S. nor Europe has drawn the conclusion that a consistent regional foreign policy in respect to dealing with autocrats is now required: Obama never mentioned Saudi Arabia in his speech, and Catherine Ashton and other European statesmen are reformulating EU policy by targeting only selected countries in MENA outside the Gulf. Political and institutional relations between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), encompassing the six Gulf states and, more recently, Jordan and Morocco, remain underdeveloped, even though economic cooperation has increased in the past decade. On the other hand, the intense economic and military relations the U.S. enjoys with the GCC have spared these states from consistent pressure from Washington to pursue political reform.

However, even if there are no shifts in U.S. and EU foreign policy toward the Gulf monarchies, the changed discourse in Washington and Brussels-linking further aid and investment to regional states' commitments to embark on a path of gradual but continuing reforms-will have an impact in the Persian Gulf too. Given its military and security commitments in the Gulf, U.S. leverage is historically much more significant there than Europe's, but it has been diminished by the Arab uprisings. By siding with Arab peoples rather than with their regimes, and having supported democratic movements in overthrowing Arab autocrats, Washington's influence and credibility as an ally has decreased among Gulf leaders. The U.S. and Europe now have two options to act normatively: either to exert influence upon those regimes-pushing for the introduction of gradual but real reforms-or to adopt a more "balanced" approach that deals with autocrats as regional powers but not as allies.

Divisions over the proclamation of a Palestinian state will weaken the U.S. and Europe

Based on a preliminary analysis, the U.S. and Europe have mostly agreed on how to respond to the uprisings and their aftermath in North Africa, although they have significant disagreements on how to move the Middle East Peace Process forward. If it comes to a resolution recognizing a Palestinian state at the UN Security Council, the U.S. will veto it, and will either vote against or abstain at the UN General Assembly. In doing so, the U.S. will isolate itself, polarize many of its European allies and lose further credibility in the Arab world. President Obama has depicted the proclamation of a Palestinian state at the UN as an act detrimental to "Israel's legitimacy". While President Obama has stated that "symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the UN will not create an independent state", most European countries (including France, Britain, Spain and Norway, to date) will recognize a Palestinian state, with Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy currently opposing this move. In order to avoid this scenario, European diplomacy is actively working behind the scenes to evade both intra-EU splits and a transatlantic rift, by preparing a possible alternative resolution to present at UNGA which might be accepted by both Israelis and Palestinians.

After having recognized the 1967 borders as the starting point for negotiations (with land swaps), in his address at AIPAC on May 22, 2011, President Obama reaffirmed his administration's commitment to Israel's sense of security as the first and foremost priority. At AIPAC, the President made clear that the U.S. would never impose the 1967 borders condition on Israel, but the provision would be a starting point for negotiations and open to significant changes under the guise of "land swaps". In both his May 19 Mideast speech and at AIPAC, Obama ignored the three issues deemed essential by the Palestinians: the right of return of refugees, halting the construction of settlements and accepting East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital. In contrast, in the President's 2009 Cairo Speech, these two latter issues were at least mentioned as important aspects to be included in a future agreement. Europe, which has welcomed the explicit mention of the borders' parameters, has held a consistent and forceful position on both issues, criticizing settlements and recognizing East Jerusalem as the future capital of two states.

By not laying out a path for the resumption of talks or advancing comprehensive parameters, the President seemed intent to place the ball in the Israeli and Palestinian courts. He avoided asking Israel for a moratorium on further settlement construction, further ease of the Gaza blockade, or disbursement of seized tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority. Significantly, the Quartet has not met in the past few months and the U.S. envoy resigned a few days before the speech by the President. The Quartet, already a half-hearted exercise in multilateral diplomacy poised by an internal imbalance of power in favor of the United States, looks weaker by the day and seems to be heading toward demise without much regret. This diplomatic format will likely not survive a Palestinian state reached in absence of peace negotiations.

President Obama defended the validity of the Quartet's three principles (renouncing violence, accepting the legitimacy of Israel's existence and accepting all previous agreements) as pre-conditions for negotiations, depicting the intra-Palestinian reconciliation as an obstacle to peace. On this issue, the Europeans have favored a different view, accepting the inclusion of Hamas as the only way to build a representative negotiating team able to speak for all Palestinians.

The U.S., as well as Europe, seems to realize that regional and international constraints will increasingly exert pressure on Israel to make concessions and work for peace. President Obama has expressed the need to embark on a negotiating path sooner rather than later. However, he has refrained from indicating both a timeline and a new mechanism for negotiations, and will not accept leaving it to France or convening a conference with the two parties.

The Israeli-Palestinian issue will-after decades of transatlantic cooperation-start to distance most of Europe from the U.S., with the former siding with the international community and the latter sharing Israel's increasing geopolitical isolation. With little evident U.S.-Israeli political will to push the peace process forward, and after more than forty years of direct involvement in the MEPP, many in Europe are frustrated by the lack of consistent effort in moving things forward. Unless the international community throws its weight behind convincing the Israeli leadership and public that time is now working against them, there is little prospect for re-starting negotiations. In other words, the current Israeli preference for waiting to approach the Palestinians until the Arab dust settles may be dangerously misplaced.

If the broad U.S. and European political interests in the Middle East revolve around stability, reforms and peace, both Europe and America now face a double dilemma: constructing a new narrative to explain how reforms will lead to greater stability for change-resistant regional regimes, and linking the MEPP to these broader considerations. The first narrative has been tentatively put forward by both President Obama and Catherine Ashton. Though still not substantiated on the ground, the U.S. and EU's decisive support for the transitions in North Africa has signaled a new era in normative politics. To be truly normative, however, the MEPP must also be tackled simultaneously. So far the MEPP has been dealt with in isolation from regional political considerations and without a clear sense of urgency. The clock started to tick on January 25, 2011 for all regimes in the Middle East and North Africa and for their supporters. It also started to tick for Israel, which must now reorient itself and find a new place in an increasingly multipolar Middle East, where the influence of the outside powers that have traditionally supported it are greatly diminished.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini

The Libyan Crisis Seen from European Capitals

Ruth H. Santini and Arturo Varvelli — Wed, 01 Jun 2011 15:52:00 -0400

Some in Brussels are breathing a sigh of relief that the military intervention in Libya has not replicated the European divisions over the 2003 Iraq war—when the EU famously split in two camps and the United States cherry-picked “New” European allies over war-reluctant “Old” Europe.

Still, Europe has hardly been speaking with one voice on Libya. Different rationales within Europe have failed to be reconciled, hampering the emergence of a common EU stance on the crisis. The Franco-British convergence, later joined by Italy, has however prevented inaction. Different domestic and foreign policy considerations have dominated European states’ calculations over Libya: France’s Arab policy is interlinked with the weight of its own Maghreb community; in the United Kingdom, foreign policy calculations have prevailed with the importance of the transatlantic alliance and concerns over North African regional stability converging; on the other hand, in Germany, domestic politics have trumped traditional German value-oriented foreign policy and concerns over Spring 2011 state elections have led to an anti-intervention stance. Lastly, Italy’s initial inaction was motivated by an attempt not to jeopardize its privileged relationship with Qaddafi and by domestic concerns over a possible political crisis within the right-wing government–with the Northern League opposed to military intervention. In light of these considerations, there was little that EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton could do to bring European states together. Yet the crisis may still prove significant in pushing for a more consistent EU approach towards North Africa in general, as with each debacle the EU strives harder to find common ground.

The EU remained silent when the protests in eastern Libya erupted in mid-February, but the UK and France quickly asserted themselves as the revolution’s protagonists. They convinced the United States to impose a no-fly zone, despite initial objections by Catherine Ashton motivated mainly by German and Italian opposition and criticism by other NATO members, especially Turkey. Only after it became obvious that the actions of Italy’s long-standing ally Muammar Qaddafi were beyond salvage, Italy joined the camp of belligerents. In the meantime, the EU, internally blocked by Berlin’s veto, remained on the sideline. Germany has supported sanctions and humanitarian aid, but has argued steadfastly against military intervention, which it considered potentially detrimental to a regional transition. Berlin’s economic and domestic concerns have trumped its long-standing multilateral and human rights-driven foreign policy, eliciting widespread criticisms both inside and outside Europe for an increasingly self-absorbed international posture. The EU, on the other hand, limited itself to organizing humanitarian aid through EUFOR LIBYA, which will work at the request of the UN.

The situation in Libya is different from that in Iraq for several reasons. First, it is Europe’s backyard. Alongside geographical proximity, there are colonial ties and strong European energy interests. But there are also overlapping rationales within Europe over military intervention, ranging from what Europe perceives as ‘new’ security challenges (energy security and migration), Responsibility to Protect (R2P), concerns over regional stability and European states’ national prestige. This appears particularly striking in opposition to the more consistent U.S. approach, which blends humanitarian concerns and fears of regional spill-over effects. These rationales were espoused by France and UK, but were combined with other interests. For Italy, given its colonial past and the extent of oil dependency, the calculus has been more complex and the policies adopted have been less consistent.

European states’ rationales beyond the Libyan intervention

In France, the stance has centered on the need to restore French credibility over its ‘politique arabe’ after the slow and controversial response to the protests in Tunisia. Within this Arab policy, several factors played a role, from removing a dictator intending to increase regional instability, to electoral considerations, just one year before the next presidential elections. President Sarkozy’s interventionist policy is aimed at enhancing his international profile, at a time of decreased domestic popularity. The trade-off for France was a relatively easy one; by intervening, Paris would redress its reputation as friend of Arab peoples and a staunch defender of basic human rights principles.

British Prime Minister David Cameron has been at the forefront in advocating a tough response to the civilian massacres in Libya. He has underlined the importance of maintaining the momentum of the region’s democratic transition, which would have been undermined by an all-out repression in Libya. His Foreign Minister, William Hague, has stressed the concept of R2P and the necessity for Europe to come forward and engage more robustly in order to avert humanitarian catastrophes. From the beginning, London has stepped up its rhetoric and proven itself ready to engage militarily, partially in an effort to demonstrate its capacity to ‘deliver’—both internationally and specifically vis-à-vis the United States—while other European countries were hesitating due to domestic political calculations.

Rome has been the elephant in the room since the outset of the Libyan crisis, refusing to take a pro-active stance despite the extent of interests and stakes in the country. Despite the Italian colonial past, namely, that the two countries enjoyed a privileged relationship for some four decades, when Rome was Libya’s only real Western diplomatic interlocutor and Tripoli served as Italy’s leading supplier of oil and third largest supplier of natural gas. This bilateral relationship served both countries and buttressed the Qaddafi regime’s domestic stability through the redistribution of oil revenues. Rome and Tripoli signed a Treaty of Friendship[1] in 2008, which—alongside Italian formal apologies for the colonial past—has enhanced bilateral cooperation, especially in areas of recent mutual interest such as immigration.[2] Nevertheless, Italy’s closer ties with Libya did stir up some controversy both domestically and internationally, with criticism chiefly focused on Libya’s human rights record and the implications of the agreements for migrants returning to Libya.[3] Italy justified its engagement with Tripoli by styling itself as a bridge-builder between the Mediterranean and the international community, especially Washington.

Italian foreign policy was first dictated by status quo concerns (linked to energy and migration agreements), and only after pressure by international partners and domestic public opinion has Rome adopted a rationale based more on humanitarian concerns and wider geopolitical considerations. When the crisis erupted, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini initially thought they could continue with business as usual, not understanding that the calculus in Washington (as in Paris and London) had dramatically changed. The crisis and Operation Odyssey Dawn ruptured Italy’s long-held assumptions regarding Tripoli and left Rome no choice but to end its preferred policy of non-interference which it had gotten away with until now. However, by distancing itself from the Libyan dictator only after all other Western allies had taken sides against him, Italy lost its leverage with Libyan opposition and effectively abdicated its international mediating role to France[4]. Politically, Rome has reversed its initial minimalist approach, thanks in part to the leadership of the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, who appears to be particularly receptive to R2P calls and to the broader geopolitical considerations of the “transitional change” under way in Northern Africa. The Libyan crisis epitomizes Italy’s geopolitical marginalization, underlining Rome’s traditional preoccupation for its “ranking” more than its actual role.

The EU and Libya: the impossible task of building a consistent policy

For Europe as a whole, Libya has been on the radar mainly with regard to two issues: energy and migration. The lack of a broader political vision over Libya, which is not part of the European Neighborhood Policy, partially explains the lack of a common stance over the crisis and Europe’s role in it.

Europe looks at the southern Mediterranean predominantly through the prism of illegal migration, which it sees as a threat to its security, “Europeness” and welfare. Since the start of the Arab uprisings, more than 20,000 Tunisians and over 8,000 Libyans have landed in Italy, fuelling a populist narrative of being overwhelmed by a “migrant tsunami”. The anti-migration discourse is gaining popularity in countries as socially and politically diverse as Italy, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland, and has failed to be countered by a new narrative aimed at reshaping discredited models of European multiculturalism. This deficiency characterizes both the national and the supranational level. The EU, following the member states’ populist rhetoric, has singled out the fight against illegal migration—especially coming from Africa and transiting through Libya—as one of its leading foreign policy priorities.

Secondly, energy security figures highly in most European countries’ domestic and foreign policy priorities. While oil has not been the primary reason for advocating a military intervention against Qaddafi, it has played a role nevertheless. Libyan oil has many advantages: it has a comparatively low cost of recovery, is generally very high quality and is geographically very close to Europe. Despite representing only 2% of world oil input, it provides for 14% of European energy needs. In particular, 22% of Italian, 16% of French and 13% of Spanish crude consumption comes from Libya. French and British long-term energy interests will especially benefit from a more structured and advantageous presence in Libya facilitated by their military engagement and their pro-National Transition Council (TNC) stance.

Given these two overarching European interests, i.e. migration and energy security, in November 2008 Brussels and Tripoli started negotiating over a Framework Agreement so as to build official bilateral contractual relations (negotiations were suspended in 2011 in the aftermath of the outbreak of internal repression). In the Libya Country Strategy paper 2011-2013, the EU proposed a wide range of reforms, touching upon governance in several sub-fields (economics, trade, environment, and rule of law), but with marginal attention to full democratization requirements or goals. Democracy and human rights, in other words, were never at the forefront of European relations with Libya, with Brussels trying to legitimize European member states’ energy and migration concerns through EU-Libya formal relations.

Options ahead in Libya

At a time of the rebels’ recovery of Misurata and NATO air strikes over Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli, lingering doubts over Libya’s future remain. It is difficult to imagine a solution to the military stalemate without the deployment of land troops against Qaddafi, which will need the approval of the UN Security Council. NATO’s bombardment strategy is mostly directed at exerting political and psychological pressure against the regime by striking tactical military targets so as to weaken Qaddafi’s loyalist forces. The aim seems to focus on eroding Qaddafi’s prestige and consensus, a strategy used against Slobodan Milosevic during the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. This strategy created enough pressure inside the ruling inner circle to force Milosevic to succumb[5]. But Qaddafi isn’t Milosevic and Libya is not Serbia. The Qaddafi’s inner circle is composed by his clan and family, in a country characterized by reliance upon tribal allegiances. Whether and for how long he and his followers may resist is the great unknown. According to a Stratfor report, the choice for NATO is between keeping air operations for an extended period of time with no certainty over their final output, or launch a ground invasion[6]. The recent decision by Britain and France to use helicopters in operations testifies to the difficulty of finding an alternative solution to the “boots on the ground” option.

If the conflict were to drag on, the deployment of an interposition force may be a last resort to overcome the impasse. However this solution, as much as a ceasefire, would proclaim the de facto division of the country for an undetermined period of time. Even though no one favors the partition of Libya, in light of the current situation on the ground, it still represents a likely outcome. Some countries might actually find this scenario acceptable: Egypt would gain a weak and yet resource-rich neighbor, Cyrenaica, to which it has contributed political and military help. The Gulf States would also stand to gain: Qaddafi would be severely constrained, and a rival oil exporter would be weakened. Eventually, even France and Britain may see partition as an acceptable compromise if faced with the possible failure of the military intervention that they have championed. Italy, on the other hand, would face Tripolitania—ruled by Qaddafi—and Cyrenaica, which would look for European partners less connected to the old regime. More than anyone else, the TNC would lose from a partition: it would become a powerless political actor in a divided country, facing all sorts of challenges without a broad legitimacy.

The second scenario foresees the (probable) fall of Muammar Qaddafi. In fact, Qaddafi’s survival is closely intertwined with the perpetuation of resource distribution and patronage. The war and the international sanctions could halt these rentier mechanisms and thereby alter his inner circle’s strategic calculations. It is the vision which, despite not being openly called for, is espoused by all the European powers, i.e. through the protection of civilians to force regime change. For Italy this means killing two birds with one stone: fully realigning with NATO, in exchange for assurances on long-term Italian energy interests in Libya; and changing its image in the eyes of the TNC, attempting to renovate the privileged relationship between the two countries. In this view, during talks in Rome on 5 May, Italy pressed the United States and international partners to create a temporary fund to assist rebel groups. Italy and France will be the only two NATO-EU members to sit on the board managing the trust fund aiding the Libyan National Transitional Council. The fund, called "Temporary Financing Mechanism", will be based in Doha and it will gradually absorb deposits and assets pertaining to the "Qaddafi Inc.". This consists of sovereign wealth funds and bank accounts worth $130 billion, of which $30 billion in the United States and $7 billion in Italy. At present, this fund can count on gifts and public and private loans (of which about $ 600 million are already available)[7].

However, even if Qaddafi were to fall, the outcome might not be a peaceful transition to democracy but protracted instability or civil war that could have significant consequences for the region and for Europe. In the future the need for a process of national reconciliation in Libya, the creation of new institutions and a renewed balance between the various components of power will require a major commitment to “state building”.

The fledgling European foreign policy has been put to a severe test by the Arab uprisings and the Libyan crisis. While some European countries have reacted to prevent a civilians’ massacre in Libya, intervening with a NATO mission, the EU has failed another litmus test and is now attaching its hopes to a possible humanitarian mission. By failing to determine the fate of Libya, the EU has lost additional political capital in North Africa—at a time when Arab faith in Europe is a rare resource. The Lisbon Treaty, which should have provided the EU with a better toolbox in addressing foreign policy challenges, has not lived up to its expectations, partly due to resurgent foreign policy re-nationalization by some member states and partly to the lack of clear leadership from Catherine Ashton. The fact that Britain and France took the lead in pushing for UN Security Council resolutions authorizing a no-fly zone and then a military intervention has constituted a late but powerful response to the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Franco-British convergence has strengthened over this crisis, at a time of uncertainty over the future of European defense.

One can only hope that this foreign policy crisis will push Brussels adopting a more ambitious and comprehensive strategy towards North Africa, one that tackles not just economic governance, democratic developments, and migration agreements, but a broader political vision for Europe. The two Communications elaborated by the European Commission between March and May aimed at reshaping the European Neighborhood Policy go a step in this direction, substantially increasing the political engagement in supporting democracy and human rights’ progress in neighboring countries from the outset of contractual relations. So far, however, this is falling short from implying a coherent European strategy towards the region. This would need an intra-regional ongoing multilateral dialogue among MENA countries, more resources, less duplication among European and different European states’ democracy promotion policies, and a more forceful action to solve the Middle East Peace Process, to be tied in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority’s ENP Action Plans. In recent weeks, the EU is clearly trying harder to come to the forefront, by acknowledging the rebel transitional government, setting up an office in Benghazi, and sending the Polish Foreign Minister there to show forward-looking attention to the southern Mediterranean under the upcoming EU Presidency. If the EU learns by doing and by making mistakes, as the experience with the Balkans might suggest, Brussels might be on the right path to show more dynamism with its southern neighborhood.

[1] The Treaty requires Italy to find the funds needed to “complete basic infrastructural projects” for an annual amount of $250 million for 20 years. The projects to be undertaken are decided upon annually by the two parties, while the funds are managed directly by the Italian companies that carry out the work in Libya.

[2] On domestic and international reactions to the signing of the treaty, see C. Gazzini, “Assessing Italy’s Grande Gesto to Libya,” Middle East Report online, 16 March 2009.

[3] See for example “UN agency warns of refugee conditions in Libya,” Eubusiness, 21 September 2009, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/unhcr-immigration.k4/

[4] The timing of the recognition of the NTC is indicative. Italy recognized the NTC on 4 April as “the only political interlocutor legitimized to represent Libya”, denying that the recognition was a way to tag on France, which had already recognized the NTC on 10 March, while, at the same time, manifesting clearly the anxiety for losing the privileged relationship: “[our] French friends have made a decision, which we obviously have appreciated, but I think that is difficult to imagine to supplant Italy in the heart and in the historical relations that Italy has and will have with Libya.”

[5] “This Week at War: the Milosevic Option,” Foreign Policy, 20 May 2011.

[6] The Libyan War of 2011, Stratfor, 21 March 2011.

[7] Sole24Ore, “Varato il fondo pro ribelli - Italia e Francia nel board,” 6 May 2011.

Authors

Ruth H. Santini
Arturo Varvelli

Iran and Turkey After Egypt: Time for Regional Realignments?

Emiliano Alessandri and Ruth H. Santini — Tue, 19 Apr 2011 12:00:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Both Iran and Turkey have a major stake in how the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East is reshaped in the months ahead. Tehran and Ankara have developed their own separate narratives on regional events that take credit for providing the political inspiration for the Arab uprisings. Simultaneously, they have aimed to reinterpret reality on the ground to deflect attention away from their own domestic problems. While regional uprisings (with the possible exception of a resurgence of Kurdish separatism) do not necessarily threaten the stability of the Turkish state, Iran is experiencing its own waves of protests.

As European and American leaders formulate policies toward North Africa and the Middle East, Iran and Turkey will have to be factored in and engaged in very different ways. This commentary offers a snapshot of Iranian and Turkish perceptions and reactions to the democratic protests in the Arab world, and explores ways in which the United States and the European Union might interact with Tehran and Ankara in channeling the currents of change.

In Iran’s initial public commentary on the first uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Iranian leaders portrayed the protests as “Islamic awakenings” inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution. As events in Libya unfolded, the Iranian narrative shifted away from the protests to criticize the United States and its allies for staging a military intervention, and for being motivated—according to Iranian leaders—primarily by oil interests. Tehran’s narrative on Libya pointedly ignored United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, and the endorsement of the Arab League for the intervention.

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Authors

Emiliano Alessandri
Ruth H. Santini

A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Egypt’s Development: The Role of Civil Society and the Way Forward

Thu, 24 Mar 2011 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 24, 2011
9:00 AM - 12:45 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

On Thursday March 24, the Brookings Institution, the International Youth Foundation, and the Egyptian NGO Nahdet El Mahrousa co-hosted a roundtable entitled “A Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Egypt’s Development: The Role of Civil Society and the Way Forward.” The participants represented a wide variety of sectors including think tanks, universities, Egyptian civil society organizations (CSOs), U.S. based international NGOs, U.S. government, donors, and U.S. based philanthropic foundations and social investment funds.

The roundtable was convened to create a clear roadmap of support for Egyptian civil society which will be filling a vital role in the country’s political and economic development in post-Mubarak Egypt. Specifically the roundtable’s goals were to:

Identify the internal and external challenges currently facing CSOs in Egypt.
Discuss future plans of participating organizations.
Reach common ground on key goals and priorities.

A series of key recommendations provided a starting point for the roundtable discussion. The roundtable was divided into two sessions: the first focused on the role of civil society in political reform, democratization, and human rights, while the second focused on economic development and employment.

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Also on March 24, Global Economy and Development at Brookings conducted further discussions on the role of civil society in supporting Egypt's development at an event titled The Role of Civil Society in a New Egypt.

Learn more about this event »