Brookings: Experts - Natan B. Sachs

Israel’s Three Gambles in Syria

Daniel L. Byman and Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

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Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Obama, Netanyahu and the Peace Process: Is Progress Possible?

Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Despite the notable diplomatic victory of helping normalize relations between Israel and Turkey, hopes for reviving the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians remain low following President Obama’s first trip to Israel. Billed as a trip where the President would ”listen” to the newly formed Israeli government and Palestinian leaders as opposed to actively seeking to renew talks between the two sides, it remains unclear whether any progress can be made on this perpetually vexing issue. Is there any hope for a renewed peace process? What role can the Obama administration play in restarting talks between Israelis and Palestinians? What will the new coalition in Israel mean for the country’s foreign policy?

On March 28, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine the future of the stalled peace process. Panelists included former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich, Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Natan Sachs. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Brookings Expert Roundtable on President Obama’s Trip to the Middle East

Martin S. Indyk, Khaled Elgindy and Natan B. Sachs — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 13:30:00 -0400

On March 19, President Obama will travel to the Middle East where, in addition to visiting Israel, he will meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. While this will be Obama's first visit to Israel as president, the White House has sought to lower expectations for any breakthrough in the peace process. In a roundtable discussion, Brookings experts Martin Indyk, Khaled Elgindy and Natan Sachs preview the president's trip. Their discussion explores Palestinian and Israeli expectations of Obama’s trip and the Israeli government's newly formed coalition government—including its prospects for negotiations with the Palestinians. They also discuss what role, if any, Secretary of State John Kerry might play in the future of the Middle East peace process.

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Brookings Experts on Netanyahu’s New Coalition Government in Israel

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:59:00 -0400

Yesterday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled his new coalition government, seven weeks after his re-election. Following deadlocked negotiations, a slimmer government—with just 21 members—emerged and will be Israel’s first without ultra-Orthodox parties since 2005. Netanyahu’s announcement comes just days before President Obama is scheduled to visit the country. Martin Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, and Natan Sachs weigh in on the new coalition, and analyze the effect on the Middle East peace process.

Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Benjamin Netanyahu starts his new term as Prime Minister in a weakened position after he conceded essentially to all of Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid's demands (even yielding on education minister at the last minute) and still not getting an agreement for another week.

Lapid as finance minister, and Yesh Atid holding education and welfare, puts them in a strong position to fulfill campaign promises and position Lapid for greater gains in the next election. Indeed, the next election seems his primary concern. For Lapid, the peace process is not a priority issue.

Bayit Yehudi, for its part, received ministerial positions for Jerusalem, Diaspora, and religious services, all key for its constituency. A former head of the settler council, Uri Ariel, will run the ministry of housing and construction. No one expects this government to last a full term. Scenarios raised are either that it won't pass a budget or that Netanyahu will stymie Lapid so badly that it will drive him out of the coalition, allowing Netanyahu to bring in the religious parties and to shape the government he wanted all along. The latter could, I believe, only strengthen Lapid in new elections.

Aryeh Deri notwithstanding, the Haredis' attitudes on territorial compromise have changed. Netanyahu may not be comfortable with the status quo in Israel's relations with the Palestinians, given the price in international isolation and the harm to trade and relations with Europe. But beyond making some gestures, it's not clear how much he is willing to do. And with or without the Haredim, his coalition will not push him in a conciliatory direction.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

If the U.S. pushes Netanyahu on anything serious (not likely), then the coalition will fall, because Bennett will not be able to support. Which leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: you really need the ultra-Orthodox parties in the government to support serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues, because those parties give the government an extra margin of support.

I predict a short life for this coalition. This strikes me as a government in which everybody will be jockeying for position in the next election right away. The big issue will be Haredim in the military, and that will be very divisive.

Israelis love to complain about the Haredim, it's true, and everybody thinks they have gone too far. However, the secular-religious fight that is going to open up will be brutal. It's the biggest fault line in the society, and once the religious start hammering away at this government, I think we will see lots of cracks open up quickly—on lots of different issues.

The territorial questions are not central to the Haredim’s political identity and their participation in a government gives the prime minister more room to maneuver. They do not facilitate, and they have obstructionist tendencies, but they help to create an environment that is more propitious than what we get without them, which we see before us now. To me, it's a great irony of Israeli politics that I never contemplated before now.

Martin Indyk
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program

The Haredim issue will not divide the government, but I don't doubt it will divide society. However, the bark is always worse than the bite in Israeli politics.

The proposition that the ultra-Orthodox parties need to be in the government for it to be able to make serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues is unsupported by any evidence. The Haredim have been one of the enablers of the settlement movement, and they moved progressively to the right on peace issues while they were in the government. Now in the opposition they'll be in bed with Labor and the Arab parties. Maybe that will bring them back to where they were during the Yitzhak Rabin years, but even then they were unreliable peace partners.

The Haredim are out of this government, so drafting them into the army will not divide it or bring it down. On the contrary: Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett are united on this issue, Tzipi Livni supports them, and Avigdor Lieberman’s side of the Likud is at least as hard line on it as they are. The rest of the Likud are secularist settler sympathizers. And the Haredim won't get much comfort from Shelly Yacimovich and their new leftist-secularist parties allies in the opposition. We are about to see a reasonable sharing of the burden. Good news for Israeli society even if it's bad news for the peace process.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree that the Yair Lapid-Naftali Bennett alliance hides real differences between their parties, especially on issues of religion and foreign policy. In some respects, this is not a “natural” alliance; I'm actually very impressed by the discipline among the ranks of Bennett's Jewish Home party throughout these negotiations, sustaining the alliance with the secularist Yesh Atid. But the religious issues might not fracture the coalition in the short term; the main questions surrounding the Haredim have been agreed upon already and will be implemented before long, according the coalition agreement. In other words, that hurdle is largely passed. Now what remains is for Jewish Home to collect the benefits, in terms of jobs and influence within the religious community, from control over the religious affairs ministry and other positions of power. This they will be very happy to do.

One potential source of tension in the coalition is actually is the Bennett-John Kerry axis. If the United States pushes on the Palestinian issue, fissures can emerge between the core of the coalition and its far right. I agree completely that the Haredim are not a secure base for the Middle East peace process, but the Jewish Home is much less so. One of their central demands was to get the housing portfolio, with settlements in mind, and with the new, hawkish defense minister (Moshe Yaalon, from the Likud) there may be more activity on that front.

The potential silver lining for diplomacy is that some of the recent noises from the prime minister’s office are consistent with Tzipi Livni's more moderate approach. Even Yaakov Amidror, the national security advisor—probably as right wing as anyone—now reportedly sees the diplomatic price Israel pays over the settlements. The PMO's solution will likely be an attempt to garner support through talks--and through having Livni in place to lead them—whether or not these talks are meaningful or based on a true change in policy. But it's worth remembering that there is always discussion whether now—of all times—there is a change of heart in Netanyahu's circles on the Palestinian issue. This may well just be spin.

If and when the government falls, there could either be an alternative government, with the Haredim, or even new elections. A lot depends on whether Lapid sees an electoral opportunity and whether Livni is inclined to leave as well. If the center leaves en masse, Netanyahu will have a hard time, mathematically; the right + religious is likely too narrow for comfort. If Bennett's party leaves because of diplomatic developments, the Haredim may jump back in to get revenge on the Modern Orthodox, but if the mood is that Netanyahu is vulnerable, they may prefer elections to get their revenge on him too. In short, as is usually the case, the brand new government in Israel may not last its full term.

Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

It looks as though the new Israeli government intends to be quite active on the Palestinian issue after all—though not in the way most had hoped. With the appointment of Uri Ariel, former head of the settlers’ umbrella group known as the Yesha Council and himself a West Bank settler, to head the Ministry of Housing and Construction we can expect an even greater surge in settlement expansion in the occupied territories than we’ve seen in recent years. Ariel’s Bayit Yehudi party, the third pillar of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition and third biggest vote-getter in the Knesset, not only opposes territorial concessions to the Palestinians but openly rejects the two-state solution itself—sentiments shared by many in Netanyahu’s own Likud party. The strong pro-settlement bent of the new Israeli government is certain to alarm Palestinian leaders in Ramallah, who are sure to reiterate their message about the dangers posed by the settlements and the urgency of a two-state solution to President Obama directly on his upcoming visit to Israel and the occupied territories. Having withstood similar pleadings for much of the last four years, however, there is little reason to expect the administration to abandon its laissez faire attitude toward settlements or become more actively engaged in peacemaking any time soon.

Martin Indyk

In addition to settler control of the Housing Ministry, the Interior Ministry will be in the hands of Likud and the Defense Ministry also. So the three critical ministries for settlement activity will be in the hands of those most committed to the settlement cause.

Authors

Israelis Love to Argue: And Four Other Tips for Obama's First Presidential Visit to Israel

Natan B. Sachs — Wed, 06 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Barack Obama's announced trip to Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank in March appears at once premature and long overdue. Premature because the tangible goals of this trip seem, as yet, unclear. Overdue because -- as many critics have suggested -- his failure to visit Israel and the Palestinian Authority in his first term contributed to a sense, among Israelis in particular, of a presidential cold shoulder.

Of the two big items on the president's Israel plate -- dealing with Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- the former appears paused, awaiting a diplomatic move by the international community, while the latter is in deep freeze and beset by pessimism on all sides. Unsurprisingly, Obama does not plan to announce a major new peace initiative on this trip, and he is unlikely to bring about a breakthrough on Iran now. Rather than seeking to extract specific policy concessions from any of the parties, the president should approach this with the broader aim of restarting his engagement with Israelis and Palestinians, while setting the stage for dealings with Iran and the peace process over the next four years. But even an unambitious trip to the Middle East is full of political minefields. Here, then, are five suggestions for Obama's first presidential journey to the Holy Land.

Don't promise the moon.

Many things are lost in translation between the political cultures of the Middle East and United States, but few contrasts are as sharp as the gap in cynicism. Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbors are cynical to a degree that often astounds Americans, and with the endless unmet promises of peace and of "process," the attitude is not completely unwarranted. As Obama knows all too well, to have tried and failed in Middle East peace is sometimes worse than not to have tried at all. Today, after so many failures, the fanfare of the 1990s peace process is best replaced by sober -- though vigorous -- negotiations more reminiscent of the mid-1970s, when Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy set the stage for the subsequent grand gestures of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

But in the halls of Washington these days, there is speculation that Secretary of State John Kerry could back a new full-scale push for comprehensive peace. The motivation is understandable, even laudable, and the goal of achieving a two-state solution is vitally important. But the peace process of old is over; the trust between the parties that was to be wrought through interim steps is long gone, to the degree that it ever existed.

A push for peace now should not assume that the process has merely stalled; its old form is likely dead. The repeated failures to achieve final status agreements from the second Camp David summit in 2000 onward and the new realities of the Middle East -- with turmoil in Egypt, Syria, and potentially among other neighbors of Israel -- have redefined the nature of the process at its core. Right now, quiet talks over practical steps, with peace as the ultimate goal, are far better than grand promises that few believe will be fulfilled.

But don't give up on reaching for the moon.

The myriad difficulties of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not lessen the vital need to halt backsliding on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the need to advance toward an eventual resolution. The untenable nature of the status quo is no less true because of the difficulties of achieving the goal.

In this respect, there's a silver lining for Obama in the grim cloud of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though seemingly dead in the water, the peace process did leave both parties and the international community with a relatively clear view of what resolution would eventually look like. Obama can therefore focus on articulating U.S. interests -- as he has done in the past -- rather than dealing with the intricate details of negotiation (something his predecessor, Bill Clinton, may have done too often).

The irony is that the very same polls that show Israeli and Palestinian skepticism of the prospects for peace also show their fundamental agreement with the terms required to achieve it (even among right-wing Israelis, there is willingness for real compromise). Stopping the backsliding on the ground -- the erosion of the Palestinian Authority and the moderates, on one side; the construction of Israeli settlement outposts, on the other -- while building Palestinian independence and ensuring long-term Israeli security remains in everyone's interest. On these points, the president should not shy away from articulating the long-term U.S. vision, whether his hosts agree with every detail or not.

Talk to ordinary Israelis.

Israelis may seem tough and argumentative, but at times it seems that they just want to be understood. While Israelis don't "deserve" Obama's undying love, the trust of ordinary Israelis can be a useful tool for a president facing several dramatic crises in the Middle East -- not least of which involving Iran's nuclear program -- and a prime minister with whom he's not on particularly good terms. In this regard, he could stand to learn a thing or two from Bill Clinton on how to capture the hearts of Israelis: mention Israel's right to exist, acknowledge the horrors of the Holocaust, and reaffirm the ancient Jewish attachment to the Holy Land. Quote from the Old Testament (not the New). Psalms worked well for Clinton.

Here's something to avoid: don't repeat that part of the 2009 Cairo speech which seemed (to Israeli ears) to suggest that Israel was born of the Holocaust. In fact, the state was founded mostly by the Jews who already lived there, and modern Zionism predates World War II by many decades. This matters to Israelis.

But, of course, there's more than sympathy and understanding. Ordinary Israelis want to hear (yet again) the president's resolve to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon -- a commitment that is underappreciated both in Israel and among Obama's opponents in Washington. The clearer the public alignment of goals is on Iran (despite important differences in nuance), the less likely it is that Israel will launch a unilateral strike. Both ordinary Israeli citizens and the nation's elite are already deeply divided over the wisdom of an Israeli strike, and the best antidote to rash decisions is Obama's firm, stated leadership.

Don't read too much into the Israeli election results.

The news of Obama's visit has already stirred speculation in Israel that the White House is trying to meddle in domestic politics and intervene in the ongoing coalition-formation process. Clearly, the precise makeup of Benjamin Netanyahu's next coalition (which could easily change again in the future) is not what motivates the first presidential visit since George W. Bush, but there is a longstanding temptation to overplay the U.S. hand in Israeli politics.

Obama faces a dilemma here: the United States is an influential actor in Israeli political life, and swaying the population can have an effect. But Washington is not adept at meddling in the details of Israeli party politics (as it tried to do, unsuccessfully, in 1996) and it shouldn't bother, for both practical and principled reasons.

Nor should Obama read too much into the purportedly moderate results of the Israeli elections. Netanyahu won, as widely expected (albeit more narrowly than most predicted) -- and while the makeup of his new coalition will have important ramifications for his foreign policy, it will not be altogether more centrist than, for example, Netanyahu's short-lived grand coalition in the summer of 2012. In truth, on the Palestinian question, Israeli politics has moved much less than is often claimed, whether to the right or to the center. Yes, there is a real rise of radical politicians on the right, but the strength of the overall blocs -- right, religious, center, left, and Arab-Israeli -- is remarkably stable.

Don't underestimate how much Israelis like to argue.

With 120 members in the Knesset, there are, at the very least, 120 opinions on anything. Argument is not merely tolerated among Israelis; it's the national pastime. And Israelis respect someone who does it well. Gaining their trust does not mean obscuring U.S. priorities or papering over disagreements. Appreciating Israel's difficult neighborhood and the complexity of its position does not mean Obama has to agree with Benjamin Netanyahu. Many Israelis disagree with their leader -- and those who don't often pretend to.

In other words, so long as Israelis are sure that the United States is still on their team, disagreement is just a fact of life. Moreover, Obama will realize that Israelis might actually listen to him -- not something they usually do -- and at times even hear him.

Obama's upcoming visit carries particular weight because it is so long-awaited. Clinton, though brilliant in capturing the hearts and minds of Israelis, also spoiled them. He visited the country four times and made both Israelis and Palestinians expect that he would be intimately involved in detailed negotiations. But that's not the president's role.

Obama faces a complex task, to say the least. But while his goals should be broad, his aim should be narrow. He needs to restate clearly his vision of peace and re-energize the efforts to prevent backsliding without appearing naïve or, conversely, creating unrealistic expectations. He needs to impress upon Israelis his proven commitment to the U.S.-Israeli alliance while remaining true to U.S. interests. And he needs to capture the hearts of cynical publics -- Israeli and Palestinian -- without losing sight of the grim and volatile realities of the contemporary Middle East. Despite the potential pitfalls and the formidable challenges, the president should be commended for re-engaging the region. True, it's never easy to win friends and influence enemies in the Middle East, but at least it's warm and the food is fantastic. Good luck, Mr. President.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Darren Whiteside / Reuters

The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
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Israelis headed to the polls just one day after President Barack Obama’s second inauguration and as the peace process remains stalled and changes sweeping the Arab world introduce new challenges for Israel. The tense relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the projected winner of next week’s elections, raises questions as to how the two countries will cooperate in dealing with these challenges, and others, including Iran’s nuclear program. What do the election results tell us about Israel’s trajectory in the coming years? How will the United States and the region react to a new Israeli government?

On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the election outcomes and their meaning for Israeli domestic and foreign policy and for the incoming Israeli government’s relationship with the United States. Panelists included Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, who has spent the last four weeks in Israel observing the election campaign, and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings and former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, Saban Center Research Director, provided introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.

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The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?

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Israeli Elections

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In an interview with Owen Bennett-Jones of BBC World Service, Natan Sachs discusses the potential outcomes of the elections in Israel. Read an excerpt below.

Owen Bennett-Jones: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict wasn’t mentioned in the Obama second inauguration speech. Will the outcome of the Israeli election mean that Washington does put more time into the issue? What do you think the White House will make of this result?

Natan Sachs: It is one of the worst kept secrets in DC that the White House secretly would have preferred Netanyahu to lose these elections, but they had been realistic. They knew that Netanyahu was probably going to win. By and large they are going to try and keep a holding pattern – continue the same sort of approach – not much engagement, I would suspect on the Palestinian issue at least from the White House, although the State Department may be a different issue, and continued focus of course on Iran and its nuclear program.

Bennett-Jones: Let’s stay with that State Department issue. John Kerry coming in there, what are you expecting different from him? Does he want to do something on the Middle East, do you think?

Sachs: Well it remains to be seen, but the talk here in Washington is that Senator Kerry, now Secretary-designate Kerry, if he is confirmed, which he probably will be, would like to move on the Palestinian issue, and would like to push possibly forcibly. He is of course very experienced in foreign policy from the Senate and from before, but there is a disagreement between him and many in the White House who see it differently. The Obama White House was badly burned by their experience early in the first Obama term, where they pushed forcefully for a resolution of the conflict on the Palestinian issue and essentially were rebuffed by almost all parties involved – the Israelis, the Palestinians, and also their Arab partners outside of the Palestinians. So there is probably much more skepticism in the White House about reengaging forcefully for final status resolution at this point in time when it seems quite unlikely to be successful.

Bennett-Jones: Right, so even though these elections are surprising in many ways and do change things within Israel quite a bit, they don’t change it much on that issue – on the Palestinian issue.

Sachs: Not for the time being. Most things in Israel will probably remain the same, in the sense that the leader is the same and foreign policy is mostly set in the prime minister’s office. But the instability that you are hearing about from Israel is profound, and it may mean that things could change within Obama’s term. It may not be the last election in Israel that we see during Obama’s presidency, and Obama may be able to deal with a very different political reality in Israel and possibly elsewhere in the Middle East before his term is through.

Bennett-Jones: That’s a very interesting thought. You’re saying because of the way this is working out it may be quite a short term government.

Sachs: Absolutely. Remember in Israel short terms are the norm. Actually this term, which was a four year term was shortened from its original due date – October 2013 – but even so it was a long term by Israeli standards. Generally, in recent decades two or three years are not unheard of. With this kind of unstable coalition that includes polarized parties, and includes backbenchers, both in Netanyahu’s own Likud and in the right-wing Bennett’s party, who are very radical and very different from the positions that Netanyahu may want to take with Washington, we may see that the coalition cannot withstand external pressure.
But all of this depends on several other key issues in the region stabilizing within the next two or three years – Iran most notably, but also the civil war in Syria and instability in Sinai and potential threats to the Palestinian Authority and perhaps the regime in Jordan.

Bennett-Jones: Tell us about Iran – What does this result mean for that?

Sachs: It is hard to say at the moment, partly because the Iranian issue is not parallel to the Palestinian one in Israel. Hawks on the Palestinian issue are not necessarily hawks on the Iran issue and vice versa. It does mean that Netanyahu does not come with the same kind of strength around him that he had earlier, and as we saw even during his previous term where he had a much stronger position, there was fierce opposition within the security establishment and within the political establishment against his more hawkish approach on Iran. A weakened political situation may hurt his ability to act unilaterally, but it may also mean that Netanyahu moves closer to the position of the United States. But it is important to remember – Iran for Netanyahu is the number one issue bar none. This is what he sees as the defining question of his legacy and on this issue the Prime Minister is likely to take the lead. By and large these things are determined, after all, in the prime minister’s office and not elsewhere.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: BBC World Service

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Israeli Elections: Netanyahu Presumed to Maintain Office

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: In an interview with Jason Mark of WBEZ Chicago Worldview, Natan Sachs discusses the election in Israel. Read an excerpt below.

Jason Mark: Let’s just go off one of the latest headlines I saw in one of the Israeli newspapers – turnout highest since 1999. Just off the top of your head, what do you make of that? What does that possibly say for the outcome?

Natan Sachs: Well it is probably the result of a strong energy that swept through Israel in 2011. In the summer of 2011 there were massive protests – social justice oriented protests – that some called ‘Occupy Tel Aviv’, a bit like Occupy Wall Street. But unlike Occupy Wall Street they were huge. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis in a small country of less than eight million went to the streets calling for change in the political system and the economic system. And so some of that energy has left a mark on the younger generation. Perhaps this is what explains the high turnout. I would also just point out that the high turnout is not uniform across the country. Of course the results are preliminary, but we don’t see the same high turnout among Israeli Arabs, about 20 percent of the population of Israel is Arab citizens, and we don’t see the same results in traditional right-wing strongholds. So this will likely strengthen the center and the left, but not strengthen the Arab parties, which are traditionally part of the left in some respects, and weaken perhaps, the center-right.

Mark: That’s interesting that you say that. There was sort of a movement over the last couple of weeks among Israeli Arabs, saying that they were going to stay away from elections as a protest, and a counter-movement to that, that said ‘look, if we don’t vote, we are not going to have a voice.’ Which way does it look like it is going right now?

Sachs: It looks like the trend of apathy or abstaining from voting that has been the case for several years, in fact over a decade and a half, has continued. Israeli Arabs are a minority which is excluded to a certain degree from mainstream politics, but certainly have a voice, and could have a great deal of effect on national politics. In 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin won as head of Labor and then lead the peace negotiations with the PLO, the Arab vote gave him an important base of power – without it he could not have won. Today this is very different. The Arabs vote in much lower numbers than do general Israelis. But that’s not the whole story of course.

Mark: What’s even more interesting to me about those numbers is that over the last several years polls have been carried out by various entities polling Israeli Arabs let’s say in and around Jerusalem, and a huge chunk say that if there was a Palestinian state that was officially formed, a large chunk of them would actually choose to become Israeli citizens. So I am curious as to how both sides of that are working right now?

Sachs: Well, there are two different populations. Inside Israel, including East Jerusalem, Israeli Arabs are full citizens just like anyone else. In East Jerusalem, they were granted the right of residency by Israel when it annexed East Jerusalem after 1967, but they are not full citizens yet. Those polls probably contrast national aspirations, which tend to be aligned with the general Palestinian population of course, with personal preferences – Israel is far richer than the Palestinian territories, and personal prospects and job opportunities are far greater than Israel. So like any individual, they are probably conflicting interests at heart – some national, while others simple family interests, personal interests and job interests.

Mark: Another fascinating part of this election to me seems to be that the old secular leftist elite that was Labor is gone, and the old rightist elite that was Likud under Menachem Begin is gone. This election seems to be about what they call in Israel kippot srugot – religious nationalists headed by people like Naftali Bennett of Habayit Hayehudi. Talk about Bennett’s rise and the rise of the kippot srugot.

Sachs: There is a sea-change happening behind the scenes. On the face of it, Netanyahu is winning and so it seems like a boring election. But actually there is a lot of change on both right and left. Labor has changed dramatically. It used to be the big left-wing party of Oslo and peace, and now it has transformed and actually re-energized, but as a party of social democracy, very active on economic issues but almost silent on issues of peace and the Palestinians.

On the right on the other hand, the old elite as you said – that Menachem Begin, the former prime minister, typified of the secular and liberal in some respects, not on issues of economics or the Palestinians, but on issues of rule of law and respect for minority rights – that old elite lost badly in the last primaries in the Likud. Instead of them we have modern orthodox – what you called kippot srugot – who are orthodox and religious, but not unlike ultra-orthodox or Hassidic Jews, they participate fully in the military and the economy in Israel, part and parcel of the Israeli society, and they have been growing in prominence. Naftali Bennett, so far the star of the election, although we will have to see what happens tonight, typifies this. He is a young, charismatic, intelligent leader, quite right-wing in terms of Palestinian issues. His proposed annexation plan would sound very radical in the United States – radical to the right – but on most domestic issues, issues of religion-and-state, issues of the economy, he is very mainstream Israeli and his resume is an exemplary mainstream Israeli resume. And this brings the modern orthodox population straight into the mainstream of Israeli society. He is appealing in fact to many secular voters who would never in the past have dreamed to vote for the National Religious Party, which is the old form of Habayit Hayehudi, the Jewish Home.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: WBEZ Chicago Worldview

Image Source: © Darren Whiteside / Reuters

Israel Elections: Netanyahu’s New Coalition Troubles

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 15:23:00 -0500

Update: Exit polls indeed suggest a very narrow victory for Netanyahu’s right wing/religious bloc. The results suggest a difficult task ahead for Netanyahu of building—and maintaining—a stable coalition.

Israelis head to the polls today—January 22—to elect the 19th Knesset, Israel’s parliament. With current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s return all but assured, these elections at first glance lack drama and indeed, the campaign has been relatively subdued. But slightly beneath the surface, deep political and societal changes on both the right and on the left could alter the future of Israeli politics and foreign policy. That potential, however, might not manifest for a few more years, until another round of parliamentary elections.

While a Netanyahu victory suggests overall continuity in Israel’s foreign policy and U.S.-Israeli relations, the Israeli political landscape’s drift to the right, in some respects, and the make-up of the new Knesset may threaten the very stability of his government, should it face pressures on the Palestinian issue in particular. This suggests less flexibility by Netanyahu in governing on the Palestinian issue, but also raises the prospect of another round of elections before President Obama’s second term is through.

A Fractured Campaign Agenda

The outgoing Israeli government was relatively stable and long-serving by Israeli standards, where early elections are the norm rather than the exception. This is not likely to be a trend. In recent decades as the major parties have shrunk, coalition formation has become even more complex. The 19th Knesset will likely convene with at least a dozen factions, which may splinter further during the Knesset’s term.

Given this, most political parties in Israel entered this election campaign less with the aim of defeating Netanyahu outright and more with an eye toward increasing their own power and gaining a better position in coalition negotiations. While the opposition pays lip-service to the notion of an electoral victory, opposition politicians are visibly jockeying for positions in light of Netanyahu’s re-election. Indeed, early in the campaign, it appeared that the leaders of the major opposition parties, including Shelly Yacimovich of Labor, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni of the Movement, and journalist-cum-politician Yair Lapid of the newly established Yesh Atid party, were hoping to join Netanyahu’s cabinet. They each carved out a niche agenda, hoping to attract a different segment of the opposition vote, but failed to form a united front to mount a genuine challenge to Netanyahu in the elections. With this fragmentation on the left and in the center, deeper changes in Israeli society have emerged into the political arena, exposing domestic differences that are usually masked by the foreign policy debate.

The right also reveals brewing change. While Netanyahu’s leadership of his own camp is unchallenged, he now finds himself with a transformed right wing, consisting of far-right candidates in his own Likud party and a resurgent national-religious party headed by newcomer and this election’s rising star Naftali Bennett.

Taken together, Netanyahu faces a daunting task of reconciling a polarized political landscape in one coalition. If in his next term foreign policy issues do not create pressure on Netanyahu his coalition may end the term early. This was his fate during his first term as Prime Minister from 1996-1999.

Outlook for the Next Coalition

The key question to be answered in today’s election – assuming Netanyahu’s bloc indeed wins a majority – is the size of Netanyahu’s Likud/Yisrael Beitenu joint list, and thus the leverage he will bring to negotiating his governing coalition. Should Netanyahu’s own faction be large enough, he will be able to form a relatively stable coalition with either the right or the center, granting him leverage over negotiations with either.

However, should the Likud list drop to the low 30s in terms of MKs, as some polls have suggested, and the combined right-wing/religious bloc to the low 60s (of 120 MKs), Netanyahu will not be able to form a right-wing/religious coalition stable enough to sustain pressure on Palestinian issues or other contentious questions (including budget cuts and legislation on religion-and-state issues). In this case, Netanyahu will be forced to turn to the center, without the leverage of a credible alternative to reduce the demands of centrist parties.
And yet, the center in the next Knesset is expected to be significantly smaller than it was, therefore it will likely not suffice to grant Netanyahu a stable coalition, according to the latest polls. It may well be that Netanyahu, in other wods, will be forced to bring in both right wing or religious parties and center parties, reconciling them with each other in coalition negotiations and the division of sensitive portfolios. Moreover, he will have to maintain this polarized coalition in the face of foreign policy pressures and difficult fiscal decisions looming throughout his next term.

Foreign Policy Outlook

Beyond the fractured Knesset and the rise of extremists in his own party, Netanyahu also faces a diplomatic challenge: with the exit of Defense Minister Ehud Barak from the Knesset and the retirement of President Shimon Peres in two years, Netanyahu loses Israel’s main public faces to the world. Other interlocuters to Washington may also be absent, including Dan Meridor and even Ambassador Michael Oren (rumored to be leaving his post at the end of his term next year). Netanyahu, conscious of Israel’s difficulties in the international arena, may well try to bring some of these figures back into the cabinet on a personal rather than party basis.

The same logic would suggest that Netanyahu will strive to bring in to his coalition centrist figures, such as Tzipi Livni, to soften the image of his government abroad. However, the inclusion of moderates in the coalition may, in fact, have little impact on Israel’s foreign policy. For instance, on the Iranian question, the lines of the debate in Israel do not run parallel to those in the Palestinian arena. Some relative doves on the Palestinian issue are hawks on Iran, and vice versa.

Moreover, the main result of the fractured and polarized Knesset and coalition will be paralysis rather than moderation. Since the center will not suffice to support a coalition on its own, and since Labor is likely to remain in the opposition for the time being, Netanyahu will have to secure his right flank in order to survive politically. To do so, he will probably opt for continuation of the foreign policy status quo as much as possible. This is especially likely given Netanyahu’s own singular focus on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, and his own preference to avoid any dramatic changes on the Palestinian issue.

And yet, for those hoping for change in Israeli policy, the fractured and polarized political arena offers a glimmer of hope for the future. Should there be any U.S. diplomatic movement on the Palestinian question, the pressures within Netanyahu’s coalition may lead to early elections. Netanyahu may find himself having to move toward the center to placate the United States and his centrist coalition partners, while risking an outright revolt from his right and from his own back bench.

Furthermore, in Israel’s next election, the social and political processes outlined above on both the right and the left may change the political landscape considerably. Labor may emerge stronger, and clearer lines between the dominant political blocs may emerge. Most importantly, the current fragmentation in the political center and the lack of a centrist leader may be resolved before the elections to the 20th Knesset. In short, Netanyahu’s likely victory today may spell stagnation on many foreign policy issues for awhile, but the seeds of more fundamental political change in Israel may also be planted by the results announced tonight.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Bibi Can't Lose in the Upcoming Israeli Elections

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

It's one of Washington's worst kept secrets: President Barack Obama's administration would prefer Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to lose the Israeli elections in January 2013. Netanyahu is not only too hawkish on the Palestinian issue and Iran for the White House's comfort, he has the added burden of a fraught personal relationship with Obama -- cemented by his perceived public endorsement of Mitt Romney in the U.S. presidential election.

In theory, a Netanyahu defeat is not beyond the realm of possibility. He is popular in Israel but not loved, trusted as prime minister but not revered. His command in the polls is steady -- essentially undisturbed since he took office in 2009 -- but not overwhelming. He appears to have suffered somewhat from the inconclusive outcome of the recent military operation in Gaza -- though if he lost any votes, they were to the right rather than the center, meaning that his electoral bloc remains intact. Among his biggest assets is a lack of viable alternatives: The leaders of the two largest parties in the current opposition are either too unpopular (Kadima's Shaul Mofaz) or too inexperienced (Labor's Shelly Yacimovich) to credibly challenge him.

Little wonder, therefore, that eyes have been fixed on potential new entrants to the political arena -- or, as is often the case in Israeli politics, recycled entrants. The return of former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has been the most anticipated of these political earthquakes: Merely four years after leaving office under indictment for corruption charges (of which he was largely acquitted, pending appeal) Olmert appears to be the only man capable of mounting a serious challenge to Netanyahu. In truth, however, his chances of defeating Netanyahu remain lower than wishful thinkers in Washington may like to believe. His imminent announcement on whether he runs is therefore unlikely to alter the outcome of the elections.

The case for an Olmert candidacy has been threefold. First, he has the gravitas and experience that no other opposition leader offers. Although his premiership was marred by public criticism of his leadership in the 2006 Lebanon war (culminating in the Winograd Commission report), he remains one of the most experienced leaders in the Israeli political system. He has led Israel to war in Gaza, like Netanyahu, and handled the country's most tightly held strategic secrets. In contrast to other opposition leaders -- journalists-turned-politicians Yacimovich or Yair Lapid of the newly formed Yesh Atid ("There is a Future") party -- he can credibly challenge Netanyahu on the national security front.

Olmert can also use his foreign affairs experience to capitalize on Netanyahu's electoral vulnerabilities. Olmert maintained a close relationship with the United States during his term, a clear shortcoming of Netanyahu in the wake of Obama's reelection. On dealing with the Iranian nuclear program, Olmert enjoys the trust and support of many in the security establishment, in contrast to the near revolt against Netanyahu's leadership by several former security chiefs. Unlike Netanyahu, Olmert provides a clear vision for trying to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and negotiated in earnest with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. Though the Israeli public is highly skeptical of the chances of peace in the near future, it remains supportive, in theory, of a two-state solution.

All that may be true, but it will count for nothing if Olmert can't forge a governing majority in the Knesset. The second argument for Olmert running has been, accordingly, that he alone has the ability to forge post-election alliances with members of Netanyahu's right-wing/religious bloc. And yet, this argument was less convincing from the start.

It's true that Olmert, a politician of considerable wit and charm, maintains close relationships with many figures who are now in Netanyahu's camp. One of them is Aryeh Der'i, a leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, who himself returned to politics after serving a prison sentence for bribery. Another is Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman -- a leader who offers a mix of inflammatory, nearly xenophobic, rhetoric, but appears pragmatic on some issues of substance. Both Der'i and Lieberman have joined centrist coalitions in the past -- and some assumed Olmert could lure them away from Netanyahu's coalition.

But while Olmert's political skill sets him apart from other opposition leaders, it does not provide him a path to victory on its own. There are significant political obstacles in splitting Netanyahu's allies from him: Der'i, for his part, shares his party's leadership with the ultra-hawkish Eli Yishai, and the final say in Shas belongs to Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the 92-year old patron of the party. Shas's electorate, moreover, is firmly right-wing and clearly prefers Netanyahu to any centrist candidate. Nor would Lieberman opt for a centrist government if given the choice, as he proved by forming a pre-election alliance with Netanyahu. For both Shas and Lieberman, a centrist coalition would be palatable only if a right-wing coalition is numerically impossible. In other words, to win the post-election coalition building, Olmert would have to beat Netanyahu in the ballot box.

The third and final argument in favor of Olmert running was that he could potentially steal the votes of moderate right-wing voters. There's some logic to the idea: Given Netanyahu's shift to the right through his electoral alliance with Lieberman and the very right-wing list produced this week in the primaries of his Likud party, there appears to be room in the center for a serious challenge. If enough moderate right-wing voters find the Likud's right-wing shift too distasteful, they may prefer a moderate like Olmert.

Indeed, if Olmert could attract enough right-wing voters to the center, bringing Netanyahu's bloc below 60 (of 120) Knesset members, all bets would be off on the coalition building process. Polling, however, has not been kind to this theory: The right-wing bloc has appeared poised to win around 65 seats throughout the campaign, and the result was not much changed when surveys asked about a hypothetical Olmert run. Nevertheless, an Olmert-led centrist coalition remains the only plausible path to a Netanyahu defeat.

And even if Olmert were to announce his intention to run, his legal troubles may still come back to haunt him. The State Prosecutor's office has announced that it will appeal his partial acquittal. A court decision on a separate corruption case against him is still pending, and legal challenge would likely be mounted against his appointment as prime minister even if he were to win the elections. Many voters on the center-left, moreover, will find Olmert's legal troubles unsavory (even in his partial acquittal, the judges' language in describing Olmert's actions was harsh). Yacimovich has already attacked Olmert on this front, saying that anyone who backs his political return "supports the destruction of the [political] system."

Netanyahu, in other words, remains the heavy favorite to form the next Israeli government regardless of the jockeying in the center. And yet, despite these obstacles, Olmert has been eager to return to the political game. He knows well the cardinal rule of Israeli politics articulated by Ariel Sharon -- himself, once a disgraced minister of defense who climbed his way back to the top of Israel's leadership. Israeli politics, Sharon noted, are like a Ferris Wheel: Sometimes you find yourself on top and sometime below, but the trick is to stay on the wheel. Olmert himself, one should remember, first ascended to the prime minister's office in unlikely circumstances, after it was thrust upon him following Sharon's debilitating stroke.

Should Olmert decide to re-enter the political game, we will be in for a contentious, perhaps dramatic campaign. Those in Washington hoping for a Netanyahu defeat, however, are likely to be disappointed.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: Foreign Policy

Israel Loses an Envoy

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 30 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Early in his tenure as Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman explained why he refrained from heading diplomatic negotiations with the United States over the Palestinian issue: “For me to deal with this issue – it would be a clear conflict of interest,” he said, alluding to the fact that he lives in a settlement in the West Bank. “I wouldn’t want to be accused of intentionally sabotaging the negotiations.”

The Israeli government’s solution to the problem—to the fact that Israel’s top diplomat had a “conflict of interest” on a core foreign-policy issue—was to send Defense Minister Ehud Barak in Lieberman’s stead. Barak, as head of the dovish Labor party, served as prime minister between 1999 and 2001 and maintains longstanding working relationships in Washington and elsewhere. In the current and generally-hawkish government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Barak functioned as one of Israel’s de-facto foreign ministers, as did, to a lesser degree, President Shimon Peres. He offered, as some suggested, diplomatic cover for Netanyahu’s right wing coalition and served as an interlocutor between Netanyahu and the U.S. administration.

This kind of arrangement will likely not be available to the next Israeli government, to be formed in early 2013. Barak, facing electoral defeat, retired this week from political life, citing a desire to spend more time with his family. The next prime minister (Netanyahu or his successor) could still appoint Barak as a minister in a future cabinet, as some have suggested (see here as well), but this would require determination and considerable political will on the part of the Prime Minister. More likely than not, Barak will leave the defense ministry—and his diplomatic role—with the formation of a new government.

Barak’s retirement stems from a paradox: though he is one of Israel’s most influential strategists and practitioners, having shaped much of its recent foreign policy, he is deeply unpopular with the public. He is—by all accounts—analytically brilliant, yet plagued by mistrust and even dislike from many of his peers. As Prime Minister he alienated many of his senior ministers and left his voters, many of whom were jubilant at his election, disillusioned and disappointed. He remains, many believe, a commando officer at heart: brilliantly executing complex (at times overly complex) plans but incapable of collaborating effectively with anyone.

To many on the right—including many in the current coalition—he remains the Labor leader who offered a far reaching proposal to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. To some people’s shock, he negotiated over the division of Jerusalem as a capital of both Israel and Palestine. To many on the left, he remains the man most responsible—besides Arafat—for anchoring the perception in Israel that there is no partner for peace on the Palestinian side; he presided over the long-term electoral calamity that befell the Israeli left wing in the aftermath of the Camp David summit of 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada.

An exception to the Barak-the-brilliant-loner rule, for a while, was his collaboration with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the current cabinet. Barak and Netanyahu have known each other for decades; Barak was Netanyahu's commander in the Israeli elite unit Sayeret Matkal in the early 1970s, and later unseated and succeeded him as prime minister in 1999. To the surprise of many, Barak proved able to work harmoniously as defense minister under Netanyahul’s leadership. Most notably, they alone seemed to share the full extent of Israel’s planning with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. Barak was often the voice of the Netanyahu-Barak duo on Iran, in interviews abroad and background briefings.

Barak’s departure, if it is indeed final (never a given in Israeli politics,) will have considerable effect on Israel’s foreign policy. On Iran, it removes a leading hawk from the country’s innermost decision-making circles. On the Palestinian front, it removes one of the few remaining ministers who still urge a proactive Israeli approach. And in Washington and other foreign capitals, it will remove one of Israel’s main de facto foreign ministers.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: The National Interest

The Palestinian's United Nations Bid

Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 17:34:00 -0500

Some in the Israeli leadership have threatened to respond harshly to the Palestinian bid to the United Nations, which Israel views as unilateral action that sidesteps direct negotiations. Even though Israel strongly disagrees with the Palestinian bid it should constructively engage Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, especially in light of his repeated public affirmation of the basic principles of peace with Israel.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

What Bill Clinton Can Teach Obama about the Israelis

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 23 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama was right to dispatch Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to the Middle East this past week to help broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. But as the president enters his second term, he faces the prospect of bigger challenges in the Middle East, most notably on Iran’s nuclear program. To make sure the Israeli government does not act on its own on Iran, Obama needs to gain the trust of the Israeli public.

And to do that, Obama should look to the example of another Clinton — Bill. Although the former president had his own fraught relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he managed to gain leverage over Netanyahu because he had the trust — and even the love — of the Israeli public. The lack of such deep trust is Obama’s biggest deficit in dealing with Israel.

Ordinary Israelis, who are keenly aware of politics, care deeply about the U.S. president’s policies and attitudes toward their country. Clinton understood this and mastered it. He knew how to make the Israeli people believe that he had their interests at heart. Obama has yet to inspire such trust. While Israelis respect Obama for his office and his intelligence, he has yet to inspire their trust.

To Clinton, who dealt with Netanyahu when he was prime minister from 1996 to 1999, charm comes easily, and the Israeli public fell for it willingly. The public’s love was no accident; Clinton carefully cultivated it. Even when he strongly disagreed with Netanyahu’s policy, he framed the disagreements judiciously, using Israeli public opinion — more moderate on some issues than Netanyahu’s policies — to his advantage. Sen. John McCain’s recent suggestion that Obama appoint Bill Clinton as his Mideast envoy shows Clinton’s lingering relevance. But no envoy can replace the role and power of the sitting U.S. president.

Clinton understood a fundamental truth about Israelis: Although they are a tough and battle-tested people, they are eager for recognition and assurance. Although Israel possesses considerable military power, Israelis are acutely aware of the multiple threats that surround their country — from the chaos in Syria to Israel’s north, to the breakdown of authority in the Sinai Peninsula and the flow of weapons to the Gaza Strip, to Iran’s ominous rhetoric and nuclear ambitions.

Moreover, Israelis are well-aware of the anti-Israeli sentiment around the world. Although most Israelis view their country’s actions as fundamentally just, they sense how poorly they are perceived abroad. Israelis feel more vulnerable than one might expect from a powerful, seemingly self-assured country — making the public highly receptive to simple sympathy. Clinton understood this; he knew how to win over Israelis by recognizing their concerns.

For example, when Clinton appeared at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, to mark the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994, he sounded genuine to his audience when saying, “So long as Jews are murdered just because they are Jews or just because they are citizens of Israel, the plague of anti-Semitism lives and we must stand against it.”

Similarly, when Clinton eulogized Yitzhak Rabin after his assassination in 1995, saying in Hebrew, “Shalom, haver” — or “goodbye, friend” — the phrase echoed through Israeli public discourse. It adorned bumper stickers and placards nationwide, becoming part of the national mourning process. When bombs struck buses in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon in February and March of 1996 — as they did again last week in Tel Aviv — Clinton visited Israel to pay tribute to the fallen and their families. By the president of the United States coming to show his support, Israelis thought that he understood their pain and anger, much as if the bombings had occurred in New York or Los Angeles. He visited my former high school in Jerusalem, which lost alumni in the bombings, and the community was deeply moved by his gesture.

The point of Clinton’s visits and words was not merely to express his love for Israel (and it was matched, one should note, by genuine sympathy toward Palestinians as well). Nor should Obama seek the public’s affection as a policy goal in and of itself. But the trust Israelis bestowed on Clinton gave him the room to disagree publicly with the Israeli government over policy — such as expansion of settlements in the West Bank and the pace of the peace process — while counting on support from ordinary Israelis.

In a sense, Clinton “triangulated” the Israeli political arena similar to how he addressed domestic U.S. politics. By appearing, convincingly, to understand the Israeli point of view, he could pressure the Israeli government over policy on which many Israelis themselves were divided. For example, althoughmost Israelis are sympathetic to settlers in the major settlement blocs of the West Bank — they think these communities must be part of Israel in any peace deal — they are far less supportive of settlement activity in the heart of the Palestinian population. So when Obama, early in his presidency, insisted on a building freeze in all settlements, many Israelis fell in line behind Netanyahu in his opposition to U.S. pressure. Even though many Israelis are less hawkish than Netanyahu on settlements, they rallied behind his stance in the face of the blanket U.S. demand. When Clinton, on the other hand, disagreed with Netanyahu on settlements, his demands were targeted and his motives were trusted by Israelis, even though his policies weren’t all that different from Obama’s.

Viewed from Israel, Obama has vacillated between seemingly blanket pressure early in his tenure and apparent acquiescence with Israeli policy later on. Neither pressure nor acquiescence is needed now. Rather, a more Clintonian approach is appropriate: deliberate toughness coupled with convincing love.

Obama is not Clinton and should not try to be. For one thing, the region has changed dramatically since the Clinton years. Israeli perceptions of security threats are greatly heightened and the advance toward peace has stalled. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not gone away — the past week has demonstrated all too clearly — and there’s an urgent need to stop further backsliding and bloodshed. Even more acutely, the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program looms larger than ever.

As its leaders have made clear, Israel would greatly prefer that the United States and the international community deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. U.S. military capabilities are far superior to Israel’s and the United States can rally international support in a way that Israel cannot. Indeed, if Israel trusted Obama’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Netanyahu would not feel the need to repeatedly sound alarms on Iran. And yet, while Israelis recognize that the United States shares their concern over a nuclear Iran, they do not fully appreciate the depth of Obama’s resolve.

Obama and Clinton’s presidential styles also are very different. Both are exceptionally gifted orators, but where Clinton is a charmer, Obama is analytical. Where Clinton empathized with Israelis’ fears, Obama appeals to their logic.

While not a charmer of Clinton’s stature, Obama has a remarkable ability to convey complex ideas. In his first campaign for president, he spoke honestly and subtly about uncomfortable topics: racial tensions, income inequality and international affairs. If used wisely, the same ability may be instrumental in conveying tough policy disagreements with Netanyahu’s government — on issues where moderate Israelis may be at odds with their government — while simultaneously expressing genuine affinity toward Israel and an understanding of Israelis’ security concerns.

An appeal to the Israeli public could help resolve the paradox of Obama’s standing in Israel. On the one hand, relations between the countries — in the way of sharing intelligence and technology — are closer than ever. The remarkable success of the Iron Dome missile-defense system, the hero of Israel’s latest conflict with Hamas, is a case in point.The Israeli system was developed with U.S. financial backing of more than $200 million in 2011, in addition to annual military assistance and further aid this past year. On the other hand, the public does not trust Obama’s gut instincts about Israel.

In his second term, the president should visit Israel to speak directly to the public. He should explain yet again, in plain language, what seems obvious to many in Washington: that although he disagrees with Netanyahu about settlements and how to pursue peace with the Palestinians, his positions stem from — rather than contradict — his commitment to Israel. Most acutely, he could convey — yet again — his resolve to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, a commitment that is appreciated here in Washington but grossly underestimated in Israel. Such an appeal could go a long way toward getting Israelis to trust him on Iran, rather than opt for a unilateral Israeli strike.

The next time U.S. leadership is required in the Middle East, the stakes may be higher than ever. In a year in which the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program may finally come to blows, it is essential that the president utilize all the tools at his disposal. And this includes the goodwill and trust of Netanyahu’s bosses: Israel’s citizenry.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: The Washington Post

Israel, Engage Abbas Now

Natan B. Sachs — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The long-term prospects for the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas are, unfortunately, grim. But Israel may still have recourse with a Palestinian partner who is thoroughly different from Hamas.

From the start of the operation in Gaza that ended Wednesday, the Israeli goal was limited: to restore deterrence with Hamas and dissuade the organization from firing rockets at Israel. Speculation (and accusations) have swirled that Israel's upcoming elections drove the Israeli leadership's calculus when ordering operation "Pillar of Defense" (Israel heads to the polls in January 2013.)

But in truth, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a significant and secure lead in the polls even before the operation, meaning that going to war, with its inherent unpredictability, would only place his own victory in jeopardy. A shrewd and experienced politician like Netanyahu does not create his own October surprise when already ahead.

Read the full op-ed at CNN.com »

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: CNN

Air Raid Sirens Sound in Tel Aviv

Natan B. Sachs — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 12:38:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview with John Hockenberry on The Takeaway, Natan Sachs discusses the situation in Israel and Gaza. Read an excerpt below.

John Hockenberry: Is the situation in Israel and Gaza at a crossroads right now? Is Israel poised for a land invasion of Gaza once again and our militants in Gaza poised to fire longer range rockets into Tel Aviv itself? Since the fighting began at least 20 Palestinians and three Israelis have been killed, the Israeli Army has begun an initial draft of 16,000 reservists. Natan Sachs follows Israeli foreign and domestic policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. Natan Sachs, welcome to the show.

Hockenberry: Two things – First, how would you characterize the mobilization of Israel at this point, and what of the tactics of militants in Gaza do you find most alarming at this point?

Natan Sachs: Israel is preparing for the possibility of even a ground invasion and the call-up of reserves, thousands of reserves, is clearly preparation for that. But the decision to launch a ground operation has not been made yet. Israel would prefer to stop at this point – it scored a tactical victory from its point of view - in the killing of the head of the Hamas military wing Ahmed Jabari at the beginning of this operation, and also in the destruction of most of Hamas’ medium and longer-range missiles known as Fajr missiles, those are the ones that can hit Tel Aviv. But on the Hamas side we have already seen attacks this morning – missiles that hit Tel Aviv though they did not cause casualties there – but sirens were heard again in Tel Aviv today. We are seeing an ability by Hamas to fire many rockets, hundreds of rockets into Israel, mostly short range rockets, but now we are also seeing longer range ones.

Hockenberry: But doesn’t the timing of this escalation and the campaign against the Hamas leadership you just referred to play into arguments like these – here is Mustafa Barghouti, a member of the Palestinian National Legislative Council, who says the escalation in Gaza must be stopped, and is political in nature, . Listen to Barghouti: “This Israeli government has escalated the situation purposefully, and we think that Netanyahu the Prime Minister of Israel is using Palestinian and Israeli blood for his election campaign. We had a truce, the truce could have been confirmed on the 12th by the Egyptians, and the Israelis broke it.” What do you make of that argument, and does it find resonance there in Israel and among the Palestinians?

Sachs: It certainly finds resonance among the Palestinians. Among Israelis it finds little resonance. And the reason is that in recent months the world press has not paid all that much attention but Israelis have focused very strongly on the rocket fire on Israel. Today we heard about Tel Aviv, but in truth, many towns and cities nearer to Gaza have been suffering rocket attacks for weeks, and the Israeli press and the Israeli public pay a lot of attention to it. It is worth remembering that Israel is a very small country, and this was actually a significant proportion of the population that was under fire. The cease fire – Israel broke what seemed to be a short term cease fire brokered by the Egyptians – it did so mostly because it evaluated that Hamas had changed its tactic since four years ago. Four years ago was the previous involvement when Israel invaded the Gaza Strip, it was called Cast Lead in Israel, and after that Hamas largely refrained from firing rockets itself, but other groups – such as the Islamic Jihad and other factions did this, but Hamas either stayed aside or stopped them from doing it to keep the kind of deterrence that existed between Israel and Hamas. That has changed recently. Hamas was arming itself, and getting involved itself directly in firing rockets at Israel. This is a fundamental change.

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: The Takeaway

The Firefight Between Israel and Hamas

Natan B. Sachs — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

With Palestinian rockets now targeting Tel Aviv, the firefight between Israeli forces and Hamas appears to be spreading beyond the Gaza Strip where it began some days ago. It is a deadly circumstance for both the Palestinians and Israel notes Fellow Natan Sachs, and there are fears that it could escalate into a ground war.

Video

The Firefight Between Israel and Hamas

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Abbas Appeals to Israeli Public

Natan B. Sachs — Wed, 14 Nov 2012 13:08:00 -0500

President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) of the Palestinian Authority made headlines last week. In an interview with Israel’s Channel 2 News, Abbas seemed to relinquish the demand for a right of return of refugees of 1948 to their former homes inside Israel, while reaffirming his commitment to non-violence.

Abbas himself is a refugee, having fled as a child from Safed (Tzfat) in the Galilee in northern Israel. Asked about his desire to visit his hometown, He replied: “It’s my right to see [Safed] but not to live there…. I am [a] refugee, but I’m living in Ramallah. I believe that [the] West Bank and Gaza is Palestine, and the other parts [are] Israel.... This is now and forever.”

Abbas’s statement merits attention in two different respects: in its substance and, more importantly, in the context in which it was delivered.

Did Abbas give up the right of return?

Unsurprisingly, the provocative substance of Abbas’s statement drew most attention. To Israeli ears, such words seem to confirm the central tenet of the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process: Israel relinquishing the land it captured in 1967—on which a Palestinian state would be established—in exchange for Palestinian acceptance of the outcome of the war in 1948, the creation of the state of Israel.

For Israelis, the two state solution necessarily entails that the millions of Palestinians descended from the refugees of 1948 will settle permanently outside Israel, either in the Palestinian state or elsewhere, including the countries where their families have resided for over 60 years. For Palestinians, the right of the return of refugees is perhaps the most cherished national demand and a cornerstone of the Palestinian historical struggle. Giving up the right of return, in theory and not just in practice, seems like a betrayal of the Palestinian national cause.

Read the full article »

Authors

Natan B. Sachs

Publication: The National Interest