Executive Summary

Pyongyang’s latest nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests have underscored North Korea’s growing threat to the United States and its allies and have fueled a rising sense of urgency inside the Obama administration. Future nuclear and missile developments, together with North Korea’s threats to use these weapons, will soon present the next U.S. president with an even greater challenge.

Author

Evans J.R. Revere

Nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies

North Korea believes it has the United States deterred, and that the United States will have to accept the permanence of its nuclear status and deal with Pyongyang on its terms. As it boosts its arsenal and threatens to use its new capabilities, North Korean rhetoric is conveying a warning to the United States: “We are willing to risk nuclear war to achieve our goals, are you?”

By taking denuclearization off the table and by rushing to build nuclear weapons and missiles, North Korea intends to present the United States and the international community with a nuclear fait accompli. The ominous implications of this will come to a head on the next U.S. president’s watch.

The new American president will soon discover that the list of options to deal with North Korea is narrow and unappealing, and that the price of inaction is unacceptable. A rapidly growing threat to U.S. interests posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea requires the next president to adopt a different policy approach. That approach must abandon incrementalism and steer clear of policies that offer illusory outcomes with no hope of success.

The United States and its allies and partners should make North Korea choose between nuclear weapons and survival.

Instead, the new president should adopt an approach that focuses on North Korea’s main goal: regime survival. The president should make clear to Pyongyang that the United States is prepared to put at risk the one thing that the DPRK holds even more dearly than its nuclear weapons—the preservation of its regime—in order to convince Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table and end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies and partners should make North Korea choose between nuclear weapons and survival.

A more robust approach should aggressively build on current policy by going after the financial lifeblood of the North Korean regime in new ways: starving the regime of foreign currency, cutting Pyongyang off from the international financial and trading system, intensifying sanctions, squeezing its trading networks, interdicting its commerce, and using overt and covert means to take advantage of the regime’s many vulnerabilities. A strong foundation of military measures must underlie this approach.

Such an approach carries risks, including more complicated relations with China and some danger for South Korea. Importantly, however, America’s South Korean ally agrees that now is the time to take risks in order to avoid a darker future and starker choices.

The United States should continue to pursue diplomacy, dialogue, and denuclearization, even in the face of North Korean obstinacy and rejection. But with the threat rising, the next U.S. president must try to convince Pyongyang to reconsider before it is too late using a broad and elaborate toolkit. By closing off other options, North Korea has left the United States with no other choice.

INTRODUCTION

With apologies to Samuel Johnson, there is nothing better than the danger of a rising nuclear threat to focus the mind. Not before time, North Korea’s recent launch of three medium-range ballistic missiles and its largest-ever nuclear weapon tests have pushed the sense of urgency in Washington about a nuclear-armed North Korea to an unprecedented level.

The tests are the biggest challenge yet to the Obama administration’s steady-as-you-go approach of patience, as well as incremental upticks in sanctions, pressure, and isolation. Fairly or not, that approach has been widely criticized as too passive in the face of Pyongyang’s determined pursuit of a nuclear strike capability.

The nuclear and missile tests have fueled a growing appetite in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo for stronger measures to end North Korea’s race to develop the means to strike South Korea, Japan, U.S. bases in those countries, and even the United States itself, with nuclear weapons.

With only three months left in office, the Obama administration has been working quickly to lay the foundation for the next administration to take even stronger measures to deal with Pyongyang. But barring an unlikely diplomatic breakthrough or a miraculous turnabout by North Korea, President Obama, like each of his predecessors over the past 24 years, will hand to his successor a more dangerous North Korean challenge than the one he inherited. And the next American president will discover that the bill for decades of failure to stop the North Korean nuclear program is going to come due on his or her watch.

THE LEGACY OF FAILURE

More than two decades of diplomacy have failed to stanch Pyongyang’s inexorable march to obtaining nuclear weapons. The policy mix has included incentives, rewards, and security guarantees on the one hand, and pressure, sanctions, threats, and isolation on the other. Nothing has worked more than temporarily.

America and its allies long tried to avoid the nightmare of a nuclear-armed and aggressive North Korea possessing the capacity to intimidate, blackmail, or attack its neighbors and the United States. That nightmare is nigh upon us.

NEW THREATS

In conducting the September 5 missile tests, Pyongyang demonstrated an ability to launch, simultaneously and accurately, ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets throughout Korea and Japan, including U.S. bases and staging areas that would support efforts to defeat a North Korean attack on the South. The launches may have been intended to show how Pyongyang might overwhelm defenses during a conflict by “flooding the zone” with ballistic missiles.

The September 9 nuclear test—which North Korea described as the test of a “standardized warhead”—signals a major advance in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, if it is true that the regime can now produce multiple nuclear warheads. And the evidently successful September 20 test of a powerful long-range rocket engine could mean that North Korea has taken another step towards its goal of fielding a long-range nuclear strike system.

Of no less concern is the North’s development of solid-fuel missiles. Such systems would greatly enhance the DPRK’s ability to reduce or even eliminate the warning time the U.S.-ROK alliance—and Japan—would have to defend against a medium-range ballistic missile attack. In giving Pyongyang a possible first-strike capability, North Korea’s possession of reliable solid-fuel ballistic missiles would require the United States and its allies to consider a pre-emptive attack on the North’s missile-related facilities to avoid being hit first. Without question, the development of solid-fuel missile systems greatly increases instability on the Korean Peninsula.

While Pyongyang has not yet shown it can mount a nuclear weapon on a missile and deliver it to a target, many experts believe it can. Demonstrating that capability via a missile-launched atmospheric nuclear test could be the next step for the regime.

The September 5 missile tests took place as leaders of the international community were meeting at the Chinese-hosted G-20 summit in Hangzhou. The nuclear warhead test occurred after the East Asia Summit had issued an unprecedented demand for the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons program.

This defiance shows Pyongyang’s determination to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, even in the face of near-universal condemnation. It also underscores the importance to North Korea of becoming a nuclear weapon state at all costs.

PYONGYANG’S GOALS

For years, many experts argued that Pyongyang wished to use nuclear weapons as “bargaining chips.” In this view, North Korea was prepared to “trade” its nuclear capabilities for aid, concessions, rewards, and inducements, including diplomatic normalization and security guarantees.

Agreements with North Korea, starting with the Agreed Framework in 1994 and continuing through the so-called “Leap Day” agreement in 2012, were largely based on the expected attractiveness of incentives and rewards. That hypothesis was worth testing early on, but experience demonstrated that incentives were of little value. As American negotiators and the international community eventually discovered, Pyongyang was not building nuclear weapons just to trade them away.

In trying to understand the reasons for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, two factors stand out. First and most fundamentally, Pyongyang wanted nuclear weapons to ensure the survival of its regime.

Nuclear weapons, in the mind of Pyongyang’s leadership, would give North Korea a deterrent, a potential first-strike capability, and even a second-strike capability against a U.S. adversary that, in North Korea’s eyes, threatens the DPRK with nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s leaders long ago concluded that the United States would not attack a country that has nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. North Korean interlocutors have said as much in unofficial dialogues with American experts, and also declared that the DPRK was determined “not to become another Libya or Iraq.”¹ The belief that the only way to defend against American military power is to possess nuclear weapons was a central theme of DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, 2016.

Meanwhile, a second motivation for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is now clear. DPRK representatives have said privately to American interlocutors that they have the United States “deterred.” They believe they have neutralized the U.S. ability to bring its conventional and strategic capabilities to bear against the North. They assert that the United States and the international community must now live with, if not formally accept, a permanently nuclear-armed North Korea. They have declared that the DPRK’s possession of a deterrent means the United States should now accept Pyongyang’s longstanding demand to negotiate a peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice agreement.

North Korean officials have also reaffirmed privately what the DPRK has declared publicly: North Korea will not, under any circumstances, give up its nuclear weapons. They have made clear that the DPRK is prepared to use its nuclear assets to strike regional targets and the United States, preemptively if necessary. And they have emphasized the DPRK’s intention to further strengthen its nuclear and missile arsenals, a point Foreign Minister Ri also made in his address to the U.N. General Assembly.

North Korean representatives have said the United States and the DPRK should now engage in “arms control” talks. One goal of such talks would be removing the U.S. “threat,” which the North Koreans, when asked, define as the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, and the removal of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella”—the centerpiece of the extended deterrent that helps defend South Korea and Japan.

DPRK representatives clearly do not understand that none of their beliefs or assertions are true or possible. Nor does it seem that Pyongyang comprehends the unacceptability of its demands of the United States.

Pyongyang appears to believe its nuclear and missile forces have fundamentally changed the dynamics of U.S.-DPRK relations. Significantly, North Korea may also think it can compel the United States to enter a dialogue that would achieve its long-sought goals of ending the U.S.-ROK alliance and removing the U.S. extended deterrent. If Pyongyang were to succeed in doing this, it would open the way for the DPRK to achieve its ultimate goal: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.

The DPRK may also believe that the mere existence of its nuclear capabilities will complicate U.S.-ROK alliance crisis management decisionmaking, and give the United States and its allies pause before responding to a conventional provocation.

By threatening the actual use of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is signaling its preparedness to risk more in trying to achieve its goals than the United States and the ROK are willing to in defending their interests. Put another way, Pyongyang’s message to the United States is: “We are willing to risk nuclear war to achieve our goals, are you?”

Pyongyang’s message to the United States is: “We are willing to risk nuclear war to achieve our goals, are you?”

This thinking represents a unique challenge to the U.S.-ROK alliance and to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to deter North Korea and defend South Korea. The belief that it has changed the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula makes the danger posed by North Korea all the more destabilizing. It requires the United States, its allies, and partners to find a better way to deal with the North Korean threat.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s actions and rhetoric are also designed to make the United States’ choices as stark and difficult as possible. By closing off options that the United States might prefer, Pyongyang hopes to leave the United States with no alterative but to deal with a nuclear-armed North Korea on its terms.

The DPRK has declared denuclearization dead, and with it, any possibility of a dialogue on the subject. To reinforce this point, both the DPRK’s foreign minister at the U.N. General Assembly and individual North Korean representatives in informal dialogues have stressed not only North Korea’s intention to retain nuclear weapons, but also its plan to expand its nuclear arsenal and refine the capabilities of its ballistic missile delivery systems.

By making clear what North Korea is prepared to risk, the DPRK seeks to force the United States to choose between accepting a nuclear-armed North or risking war to prevent Pyongyang from realizing its nuclear ambitions.

THE CHANGING CHINA FACTOR

As the next American president mulls options, he or she will need to take into account the evolution of China’s position on North Korea.

There are signs that the United States may have reached the limits of Beijing’s willingness to do more to isolate and pressure the DPRK. Beijing’s distaste for sanctions, its opposition to unilateral measures, and its concern that excessive pressure could lead to the collapse of the regime are well-known. These Chinese concerns have not abated as Beijing sees growing U.S., ROK, and Japanese interest in taking sanctions and pressure to a new level.

Even after the latest nuclear test, China has resisted demands that it do more against Pyongyang. On September 14, the Communist Party-controlled People’s Daily rejected U.S. suggestions that China take further steps, saying that the United States bears primary responsibility for the current situation.² China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson had already weighed in along similar lines on September 12, saying that the North Korea issue was a “dispute between the DPRK and the United States” and expressing opposition to the role of sanctions in dealing with North Korea.³

China’s Premier Li Keqiang managed to avoid mentioning sanctions at all in his September 21 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly used a September 14 telephone call with his Japanese counterpart to convey opposition to unilateral sanctions on North Korea.

China is trying to have it both ways on North Korea.

China is trying to have it both ways on North Korea. Beijing’s leadership continues to stress the importance of friendly China-DPRK ties, while China avoids directly challenging North Korea’s assertions about its nuclear ambitions. Constant attentiveness to North Korean sensitivities characterizes China’s approach to dealing with its troublesome neighbor and ally, even as Pyongyang’s actions threaten regional stability.

China is more direct and often critical when it has something to say about the U.S. position on North Korea. This reflects longstanding Chinese misgivings about Washington’s preference for sanctions and pressure. But Beijing’s opposition to tougher steps on North Korea is increasingly being driven by broader, geopolitical concerns, especially China’s strategic rivalry with the United States in East Asia.

Such concerns are seen in China’s vehement opposition to the planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea, which China regards as the first step in a U.S. effort to create a U.S.-led, regional system that would target Chinese strategic rocket force. Many Chinese interlocutors have also complained that the United States is “using” the North Korea issue as a pretext to enhance U.S. regional military deployments aimed at China.

As a result, Chinese contacts say Beijing is no longer willing to “do the United States a favor” by strengthening cooperation on North Korea as long as the United States complicates China’s strategic environment. A Chinese scholar with close connections to PRC policymakers said privately that the leadership in Beijing seems inclined to deal with the North Korea issue not solely on its own merits, but rather within the context of growing regional rivalry with the United States.

China’s recent willingness to work with the United States to investigate illicit China-North Korea trade suggests Beijing has not closed the door on cooperation with the United States. However, Chinese cooperation may have been motivated by a desire to head off a broader U.S. effort aimed at sanctioning Chinese companies, banks, and other institutions doing business with North Korea.

China’s relations with North Korea are complex and difficult. But Beijing’s bottom line is that it is better to keep a troublesome North Korean ally afloat than to risk what might result if we push Pyongyang too hard.

This suggests that U.S. policymakers should be modest in their expectations for increased cooperation from China. It also suggests that efforts by the United States to ramp up sanctions and other measures against North Korea may complicate U.S.-China relations. In this regard, the recent imposition of direct U.S. sanctions on a Chinese company that had violated U.N. sanctions seemed to signal Washington’s preparedness to run this risk.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS: PLUSSES AND MINUSES

As a new U.S. administration prepares to deal with North Korea, policymakers will find the list of options narrower and less appealing than ever. They will also quickly realize that inaction, insufficient action, or the wrong action could create an even worse situation than the one they have inherited.

The list of likely policy options for the next administration is hardly new, and remains an unsatisfying one.

Staying the course-plus. One option is to pursue a version of current policy, but with a gradual increase in multilateral and unilateral sanctions and enhanced pressure on and isolation of North Korea. Significantly, it would continue to rely on the passage of time and the cumulative effect of sanctions to convince Pyongyang to resume denuclearization talks.

This approach has not worked. In fairness, sanctions imposed after the January 2016 nuclear test have not been in place long enough to judge their ultimate effectiveness. However, with advances in Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs, threats to use its nuclear weapons, and the likelihood that it will soon have the capability to make good on its threats, time is no longer on our side. In addition, China’s preparedness to enforce current sanctions is already suspect and there is little reason to think it will have an appetite for additional measures.

Pyongyang has also declared the goal of denuclearization null and void, called the Six-Party Talks dead, and said it no longer has an obligation to abide by the September 19, 2005 denuclearization agreement. The DPRK has enshrined its nuclear status in its constitution and made nuclear weapons development one of the pillars of its national development plan. These actions have all but closed off the preferred route of dialogue and diplomacy, and ended the likelihood that Washington can attain its goals through gradualism. Continuing current policy, even on an enhanced basis, seems unlikely to yield the results the United States seeks.

Military action. The United States and South Korea could use overwhelming military force against North Korea, destroying its nuclear, missile, and military infrastructure, including nuclear production and known storage facilities, missile launchers and platforms, together with a broad array of other military targets and support facilities. Such an attack would degrade or eliminate most of the North’s air defenses, leave the DPRK virtually incapable of mounting a significant ground counterattack, and render the Korean People’s Army ineffective as a major fighting force.

Nevertheless, North Korea could do significant damage to South Korea with its artillery and other conventional capabilities, even as allied attacks take place. Even an intense and broadly successful air campaign could probably not stop North Korea from using some of its nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against the ROK, Japan, and U.S. bases and forces.

Most experts believe that China would not risk intervening in a Korea conflict. But Beijing might oppose a war that begins as a result of U.S. and allied action, rather than one initiated by a North Korean attack.

Damage to the ROK in a conflict would be severe. A military scenario would likely escalate to a full-scale war that would end with the military occupation of the North and the termination of the North Korean regime. The Chinese view of such a scenario would not necessarily be positive.

The U.S. experience with regime change brought about by military means is hardly a case study in success. While the significant capabilities of the ROK would be of immense value in post-conflict stabilization, there is no guarantee that the stabilization process would proceed unopposed or smoothly.

Military action against North Korea is a dangerous option that could undermine regional stability, provoke a conflict with China, create peninsula-wide chaos, and cause major damage to our ROK ally. On the other hand, DPRK military action against the United States, the ROK, or Japan would justify a military response. If it appears likely that the North might be preparing to take any of the military steps it has threatened to take, the United States has every right and obligation to defend itself, its allies, and its interests, and a logical outcome of this action could be the end of the North Korean regime.

Living with a nuclear North Korea. Some argue that the United States and the international community are already living with a nuclear-armed North Korea, and that we should now accept the fact of a permanently nuclear-armed DPRK. While the DPRK cannot be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States could decide to “live with” a nuclear North Korea and rely on containment and deterrence to defend itself and its allies, manage the continuing nuclear threat, and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Taking this path would reverse years of U.S. policy by accepting the permanence of the North’s nuclear arsenal. It would damage, perhaps fatally, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime by signaling that the Pyongyang regime has now achieved its nuclear goals and is a de facto member of the “nuclear club.”

It would shake the confidence of America’s South Korean and Japanese allies, who have adamantly refused to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons status. Seoul and Tokyo would require further extended deterrent assurances from the United States, well above the robust steps that the Obama administration has already taken. Calls would escalate in both South Korea and Japan to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability.

Meanwhile, North Korea would have no practical restraints on its ability to enhance its nuclear and missile arsenals. The temptation to engage in proliferation would be strong, especially since the fabric of the NPT had been damaged and American resolve was now questionable.

Pyongyang could be tempted to use its nuclear weapons capability to threaten, intimidate, or blackmail, especially since the United States would be seen as having capitulated in its efforts to end the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. Accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state would make things worse, not better.

Accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state would make things worse, not better.

Changing the goal of dialogue. With Pyongyang having declared denuclearization defunct, North Korea has proposed discussion of a different subject—replacement of the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. DPRK officials have also made clear their expectation that the ROK would not be a participant in such a dialogue.

Some argue that the United States should accept this proposal, perhaps in conjunction with a temporary “freeze” (see below) of North Korea’s nuclear program, in the hope that a peace treaty would defuse tensions, convey U.S. seriousness about dealing with Pyongyang’s concerns, and remove what Pyongyang claims is the “root cause” of its development of nuclear weapons.

Such thinking is delusional. Buying into North Korea’s proposal would seriously damage ties with the ROK, which is not prepared to negotiate a peace treaty with a nuclear-armed DPRK. Seoul would also not accept a peace treaty discussion in which it is not a central player. Peace on the Korean Peninsula can only be achieved if the two Koreas are at the table, and Pyongyang’s proposal undermines this principle.

Entering a peace treaty discussion with a North Korea that retains its nuclear and missile arsenals while foregoing denuclearization discussions would essentially buy into the North Korean game plan discussed earlier. U.S. policy under such an approach would be based on an illusory hope that accepting North Korea’s demands will convince Pyongyang to accept those of the United States. North Korea’s goal is a peace treaty that leads to the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The next U.S. administration must not put the United States on such a path.

A “freeze.” For some, freezing the current North Korean nuclear program in place and then trying to eliminate it over time represents the best hope for U.S. policy. Would that this were true. A freeze leading to denuclearization was the central premise of both the 1994 Agreed Framework and the September 19, 2005 agreement. Both efforts failed. Except as a temporary step (and one which we would have little ability to verify), a freeze is unlikely to lead to denuclearization.

A freeze is only as good as the means to verify it, and North Korea has made clear it will not accept international verification. Disagreements over verification led to the collapse of the Six-Party Talks and the September 19, 2005 agreement, and Pyongyang’s position on verification has since hardened.

The only elements of the nuclear weapons program that could be confidently monitored from outside North Korea to ensure compliance with a freeze would be the explosive testing of nuclear weapons and the operation of the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon that produces plutonium. External monitoring of the North’s uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon would be almost impossible. More problematically, the DPRK has almost certainly built redundant enrichment facilities to which U.S. or international monitors would have no access, even if we knew where these facilities were.

Without on-site monitoring of all production facilities, under a “freeze” North Korea could continue to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. If the goal of a freeze is to prevent the North from making additional nuclear weapons, it will not work.

Without on-site monitoring, North Korea would be free to conduct non-explosive improvement of its warheads, manufacture larger warheads, and make other refinements to its weapons during a “freeze.” And a freeze that does not include a halt in the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles would still leave North Korea with the ability to improve its delivery systems.

If the United States nonetheless decided to pursue a freeze on nuclear testing and plutonium production, perhaps as an interim step leading to eventual denuclearization, Pyongyang would almost certainly demand a high price for it, including a peace treaty. And there would be no guarantee that Pyongyang would not pocket the treaty once it were concluded, demand an end to the U.S. alliance based on the fact that the peninsula was now “at peace,” and refuse denuclearization unless its demands were met.

Unless a temporary freeze on nuclear testing and plutonium production is part of a mutually agreed plan that leads to verifiable denuclearization, it runs the risk of creating the illusion of progress where none actually exists.

TIME FOR A DIFFERENT APPROACH

Past failure to denuclearize North Korea and the growing threat to U.S. interests posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea requires the United States to adopt a different, and much more robust, approach.

U.S. policy must be built on an even stronger foundation than exists today, one that includes improved U.S. and allied defensive and offensive military capabilities on and around the Korean Peninsula; enhanced extended deterrence and measures to physically demonstrate the determination of the United States to fulfill its commitments; more robust exercises of U.S. and allied military capabilities (including the capabilities of other members of the U.N. Command, such as the United Kingdom and Australia); and sending the clearest possible message to Pyongyang that the United States and the ROK (as well as Japan) will defend themselves.

The United States must apply unprecedented pressure on the North Korean regime to compel it to return to the negotiating table and resume implementing its denuclearization commitments.

The United States must apply unprecedented pressure on the North Korean regime to compel it to return to the negotiating table and resume implementing its denuclearization commitments. A more robust policy approach must convince North Korea that it will never be accepted as a nuclear state and that the United States is prepared to respond to the North’s nuclear ambitions with steps designed to deter, contain, respond to, and greatly raise the cost to Pyongyang of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Until recently, the rhetoric of U.S. policy has included some of these elements. The United States needs to convert rhetoric to reality.

An enhanced policy approach should make clear that the preference is for the resumption of meaningful dialogue with Pyongyang, and that the United States stands by past agreements (including the September 19, 2005 accord) to eventually normalize relations with a non-nuclear DPRK. The approach should assure Pyongyang that the United States is prepared to engage at the highest levels with the DPRK and to address the full range of its concerns if Pyongyang is prepared to reopen a serious denuclearization dialogue.

MAKING PYONGYANG’S CHOICE CLEAR

With this as the foundation, U.S. policy should focus on demonstrating that America is prepared to put at risk the one thing that the DPRK holds more dearly than its nuclear weapons—the preservation of its regime—in order to convince Pyongyang to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

North Korean officials tell us their goal is the preservation of their system. Pyongyang has convinced itself that nuclear weapons are the best means to achieve this goal. The United States must convince Pyongyang otherwise.

U.S. policy should emphasize a new message to Pyongyang: If regime survival is the goal, the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons will not only not achieve this goal, but will actually undermine it.

The late South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun once said that the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is to give Pyongyang a choice between nuclear weapons and survival. Only when North Korea is faced with this stark choice is it likely to reconsider its reliance on nuclear weapons.

THE U.S. TOOLKIT

The tools to convince North Korea to take a different path largely already exist. They include strengthening economic, trade, financial, and other measures designed to starve the North Korean regime of hard currency and disrupt the ability of North Korean companies and state-run enterprises to do business in violation of U.N. and other sanctions.

Sanctions on North Korea should be ramped up to the level once applied on Iran. The United States and like-minded countries should intensify efforts to isolate and expel North Korea from the international banking and financial system, including ensuring that Pyongyang is denied access to the global banking and financial transaction clearing system.

Secondary sanctions should be applied on third-country entities, including Chinese firms, banks, and state-owned enterprises, that do business with suspect North Korean entities or that contribute to North Korea’s defense and weapons of mass destruction industries. Existing authorities under U.N. Security Council sanctions and relevant unilateral sanctions should be used to pressure and, if possible, shut down firms, including travel and tourism companies, currently doing business in North Korea.

Existing authorities should be used to increase the inspection and interdiction of suspect North Korean vessels and aircraft, or third-country vessels and aircraft trading with the DPRK. Imposing a naval quarantine or embargo to prevent North Korea from violating existing U.N. Security Council sanctions or trading in illicit materials, including drugs, should also be considered.

The United States should lead an international effort to freeze or seize overseas North Korean assets if these assets can be linked to illicit activities or trade in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions. Surveillance should be increased of overseas DPRK trading offices with an eye towards shutting these down in cases where they are in violation of international sanctions. The United States should encourage the international community to stop trading with North Korea and be prepared to cut off firms that do business with North Korea from the U.S. market.

New U.S. legislation calls for an increase in information operations against the DPRK. In this context, the United States and others should explore vulnerabilities in the DPRK’s cellphone system to maximize the flow of information into the country. Efforts should be made to encourage overseas representatives of the DPRK to defect or to cooperate with international law enforcement to stop illicit trade and other activities. Covert activities designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the DPRK’s communications, banking, and financial systems should be considered—but the less said publicly about these measures, the better.

ASSESSING THE RISK

A more robust new policy approach along these lines is not without risk. But the risk of allowing North Korea to expand the threat it poses is much greater. The next U.S. administration must be prepared to act from the outset with a sense of urgency, determination, and intensity, especially since Pyongyang may challenge it early on.

No country knows the risks associated with the above approach better than the Republic of Korea. The next U.S. president would be irresponsible to ignore South Korea’s concerns and sensitivities, particularly if the 2017 presidential election brings a government of the left into power in Seoul.

Importantly, there has been a dramatic shift in ROK thinking about North Korea, and Seoul today is more open than ever to new ways to dealing with North Korea. As one noted ROK expert said: “It is time to tell the North Korean leader that the logical and necessary response to his threats to use nuclear weapons against us is to threaten the existence of his regime. Perhaps this will get his attention.”⁴ Senior ROK officials have made clear privately that they are prepared to tolerate increased risk if it means that the threat from North Korea might be reduced.

With a growing nuclear threat, virtually no hope for denuclearization, and the DPRK determined to present the United States with a nuclear fait accompli, the next U.S. president may eventually have to use all the instruments of national power to present Pyongyang with an even starker choice than the one being North Korea seeks to impose on the United States. Before things get to that dangerous point, every effort should be made to find a way back to diplomacy, dialogue, and denuclearization, even as Pyongyang throws obstacles in the way. But with the threat rising, the next U.S. president must try a different and much more intense approach to convince Pyongyang to reconsider before it is too late. By closing off other options, North Korea has left the United States with no other choice.

Read more in the Election 2016 and America’s Future series.

      

 

 

Nurturing and strengthening the alliance relationship—which has served U.S. interests well—will be a central task for the next U.S. president. This will be particularly true in light of growing concerns in the region about America’s staying power, worries about neo-isolationist trends in the United States, and fears about China’s attempt to become the region’s dominant actor. Another challenge will be South Korean politics, where a victory by the center-left in the 2017 presidential election could bring to power forces critical of the alliance, sympathetic to China, and inclined to adopt a softer line towards North Korea.

Thanks to the efforts of both countries, the U.S.-ROK alliance is stronger and more cooperative than it has ever been. But the alliance can become even closer if it is managed well. If it is, the result will be a more prominent American profile in Asia at a time when the regional demand for U.S. leadership is greater than ever.

      

 

 

Summary

East Asia today faces a number of difficult challenges, beginning with that posed by a dynamic, militarily powerful China whose ambitions and intentions are far from clear. As U.S. policy makers deal with this challenge, their main task will be to try to accommodate a more activist China while simultaneously reassuring allies and partners that Beijing will not be allowed to become the regional hegemon or to supplant the United States as the region’s preeminent actor.

The challenge of China has major implications for the region’s economic and trade institutions, as well as East Asia’s military balance. The military dimension is particularly important, since Beijing has demonstrated that it is prepared to use military muscle to enforce its territorial claims. China’s actions have serious implications for the United States, which is committed to ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce in these vital waters and to supporting its regional allies and partners.

Regional concerns about China are being exacerbated by Beijing’s ongoing crackdown on human rights and individual freedoms, as well as its campaign to perpetuate the rule of an increasingly authoritarian Communist Party. For all these reasons, U.S.-China relations are certain to remain highly complex, difficult, and sensitive for the foreseeable future, even as U.S. policy makers seek a modus vivendi with China based on managing major differences and expanding areas of cooperation with Beijing.

North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them is an increasingly urgent regional challenge. Years of exhaustive diplomatic efforts by the United States and others have failed to prevent North Korea from becoming a de facto nuclear-weapons state. North Korea is today on the brink of being able to threaten the region, and U.S. territory, with nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles. The January 6 nuclear test shows Pyongyang is making important strides in achieving this capability. Once it does, it will fundamentally alter security dynamics in East Asia and elevate regional concerns about peace and stability to a new level. Unless a way can be found to end North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat could be here to stay, fulfilling North Korea’s goal of becoming a permanent nuclear power.

Faced with this challenge, U.S. policy makers are looking at a range of difficult options as they try to thwart North Korea’s ambitions. They are likely to settle on an approach that greatly increases pressure on the Pyongyang regime, threatens the North’s economic viability, intensifies the DPRK’s isolation, and makes the regime’s choices as stark as possible – all in order to compel Pyongyang to resume carrying out its denuclearization commitments. Such an approach is long overdue, but it should also provide North Korea with an “off ramp” if the regime shows an interest in a diplomatic solution.

Until now, U. S. policy makers have put off making tough decisions to deal with the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea in the hope that patience and quiet determination could solve the problem. The result has been an increasingly nuclear-armed North Korea and a rising threat to the region. The time for urgent action has now arrived.

Introduction

East Asia is undergoing a dynamic transformation. Propelled by a risen China, power relationships among regional actors are shifting, creating anxiety among China’s neighbors, as well as in the United States. The intentions and ambitions of a strong, revitalized, and militarily powerful China remain unclear, contributing to these concerns and providing a rationale for worst-case planning by the United States and others.

Meanwhile, North Korea’s determined pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them has introduced a major, perhaps game-changing, factor into regional security calculations. Today there is a real prospect that, unless a new mechanism can be found to denuclearize North Korea, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat will be here to stay — a reality that would fundamentally alter the region’s security environment.

These challenges exist in a region that is famously plagued by territorial disputes and the weighty legacy of colonial occupation, conflict, and tragic history. These factors contribute to lingering intra-regional animosity and resentment and could someday provide fuel for confrontation. Meanwhile, regional political developments, for example the outcome of Taiwan’s presidential election, remind us that we cannot assume that past flashpoints will not erupt again.

At a time of rising security concerns, it is no surprise that regional actors are increasingly uncertain about the future. Also no surprise is the fact that the demand signal emanating from America’s allies and partners for U.S. engagement, activism, and leadership is stronger than ever.

The so-called “rebalance” — the elevated diplomatic and military profile that the United States has adopted in Asia during the Obama Administration — has provided valuable reassurance of America’s commitment to friends and allies. But as regional threat perceptions evolve, and as the region’s political, diplomatic, and security dynamics shift, calls for an enhanced policy response to ease rising regional concerns by this and the next U.S. administration are bound to increase.

The ongoing U.S. presidential campaign has thus far seen little considered focus on the concerns mentioned here. This is unsurprising, since much of the foreign policy rhetoric in the campaign is aimed at scoring points and appealing to political bases, not advancing serious solutions to serious issues.

But soon the campaign sloganeering, rhetorical bombast, and one-upsmanship will be over, and a new U.S. president will have to deal with the reality of a transforming East Asia — a region filled with nervous allies and partners.

Among the many challenges facing the region and the new president, this paper will focus on two — China and North Korea — and outline the major policy tasks and priorities facing the current administration, and to which a new administration will necessarily devote its attention. This paper will also suggest new approaches for policy makers to consider as they face the task of responding to the challenges of a region in flux.

The China challenge

Without question, the preeminent geo-strategic challenge facing the United States in East Asia is the one posed by an economically and military powerful China eager to establish itself as a dominant — perhaps the predominant — actor in the region. For U.S. policy makers, the main task in responding to this challenge is trying to accommodate China’s determination to play a greater role while simultaneously reassuring allies and partners that Beijing will not be allowed to become the regional hegemon. In doing so, Washington must also tackle the challenge of keeping U.S. relations with China on a positive plane and establishing a modus vivendi with a Beijing whose intentions are opaque, whose ambitions are multi-dimensional, and whose ideological underpinnings run counter to core U.S. values.

China seeks a central role in regional institution building and intends to bring its considerable economic power to bear to ensure its voice is heard. Beijing’s establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its “One Belt, One Road” initiative, together with its activist membership in Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), reflect both its ambitions and its increasing clout.

As long as these efforts remain transparent and open to broad participation, and as long as they adhere to globally accepted standards and do not undercut the role of existing institutions, they are to be welcomed. After all, the United States has long urged China to be a “responsible stakeholder,” and it is to be expected that a more economically powerful China would want to have a say in making the rules and shaping the institutions in which it participates.

But as China’s power and influence grow, U.S. policy makers are increasingly focused on how to ensure that China does not rewrite the rules of the regional economic and political order in a way that damages the status quo or enables Beijing to dominate regional institutions to the detriment of the United States and its interests — and to the consternation of America’s allies and partners.

Washington’s response to China thus far in this area has been problematic. U.S. rejection of AIIB membership sent the wrong signal to Beijing about U.S. willingness to cooperate with a more activist China. It also appeared to contradict Washington’s longstanding “stakeholder” argument. Washington’s decision not to join meant that the United States would not be a part of the decision-making fabric of the organization — preventing the United States from exercising leverage and from helping to shape the organization’s development. One task for future policy makers will be to revisit this ill-advised decision.[i]

Similarly, the U.S. argument that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is aimed at preventing China from “making the rules” on trade in the Asia-Pacific region has served to cast the TPP in a negative, anti-China light in the eyes of the PRC.[ii] Such an approach should be reconsidered and replaced by one that stresses that the door to membership will be open to China if and when Beijing is able to meet the TPP’s high standards. And it goes without saying that U.S. ratification of the TPP would be a major geopolitical and economic step forward for the United States and would send a strong signal of U.S. leadership to the region.

A much more problematic policy challenge is that being posed by China’s growing military power.

China is rapidly developing the capacity to advance its regional interests using its armed forces. Some of those interests do not correspond with those of its neighbors. At the same time, the speed and scope of China’s military buildup has raised questions about whether China’s ultimate goal is to achieve military dominance over the region and replace the United States as the leading military power in East Asia.[iii]

Chinese leaders regularly declare that their intention is not to supplant the United States or to push America out of the region. They frequently assure the United States that the Pacific is “big enough” for both powers.[iv] But the double-digit growth of China’s defense budgets, the acquisition of sophisticated systems that could offset longstanding U.S. military advantages in the Asian littoral, the development of a blue-water navy, and China’s focus on an anti-access/area-denial strategy on its periphery suggest that, at a minimum, the PRC intends to keep its options open.

The planned major reduction in the size of the PLA underscores China’s determination to improve its ability to engage in modern warfare. By streamlining regional military commands, shifting the center of gravity of the military from ground forces to higher-tech air and naval capabilities, by emphasizing joint command structures, and by moving the savings gained by demobilizing ground troops into improving combat technology and systems, China is building a military based on the U.S. model — a model that has shown considerable success in power projection and conducting offensive military operations.

China’s attention to a more modernized military reflects in part a legitimate desire to defend its territory, sovereignty, and interests. As China has become an increasingly prominent actor on the world stage, the range of these interests has naturally expanded, requiring corresponding attention to the means to defend them.

But China’s approach to its interests includes a vigorous assertion of territorial claims that has put the PRC at odds with many of its neighbors, including U.S. allies like Japan and the Philippines, and also contributed to an escalation of tensions in the region.

China’s claims in the South China Sea raise particular concerns. Some of these claims contravene or exceed what is permitted under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). And because China often uses military and paramilitary assets to enforce or assert its claims, they pose a potential threat to freedom of navigation and access in these strategically important waters.[v]

Meanwhile, China’s use of its naval, air, and Coast Guard assets around the disputed Senkaku Islands (called “Diaoyu” by the Chinese) has heightened Japanese concerns about China’s intentions. In a new development, the PRC has begun to send armed warships into the waters near the Japanese-controlled islands, increasing tensions and creating the possibility of a miscalculation or accidental confrontation.[vi]

While experts frequently argue whether China’s military growth and modernization will ever pose a serious threat to the United States, whose military capabilities are hardly declining, China’s actual use of military assets in dealing with several of its neighbors shows that Beijing’s threat is hardly a theoretical one. This challenge is made all the greater by China’s ongoing land reclamation and island-building in the South China Sea and the militarization of newly created land — steps that will inevitably give China new power projection capabilities in these sensitive waters.

The Obama Administration has responded to this situation with increasing intensity, using a range of policy tools, including:

• Vigorously asserting freedom of navigation rights in the South China Sea and the importance of maintaining the full range of customary high seas freedoms provided for under UNCLOS.
• Conducting freedom-of-navigation operations to challenge some of China’s (and others’) territorial claims and assertions where these do not comport with international law.
• Working with like-minded countries like Japan and Australia to build naval and air surveillance capacity to allow affected states to better monitor their waters and air space.
• Calling on all parties to resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with relevant international law.
• Urging the adoption of a concrete code of conduct among disputants.

And with respect to the East China Sea, the United States has assured its Japanese ally that the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty covers the Japanese-administered islands.

The United States’ unambiguous support for its Japanese ally and Washington’s high-profile operations in the South China Sea have sent clear messages to Beijing. But if Chinese land reclamation and island building continue, or if there is further militarization of these islands or more Chinese military challenges to its neighbors, the United States will be compelled to take additional steps. These could include an expanded U.S. military presence in the waters and airspace of the South China Sea, more challenges to China’s territorial assertions, and further support for efforts by regional claimants to boost their military capabilities.

It remains to be seen whether Beijing will moderate its behavior in light of the current U.S. approach, or in response to the increased willingness of the countries on its littoral to push back when challenged. In the meantime, barring new developments, the waters of the East and South China Seas can be expected to remain areas of contention, possible miscalculation, or even confrontation. It is in this context that U.S.-China relations are expected to remain complex, difficult, and sensitive for the foreseeable future.

No less problematic for U.S.-PRC relations are internal developments in China.  Domestically, China is cracking down on intellectuals, NGOs, lawyers, and human rights advocates. The ongoing crackdown in China also threatens the vast educational, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges that serve as important ballast for U.S.-PRC relations.

In China, there has been a significant tightening of controls on the Internet and suppression of dissent and criticism, all in support of a major effort to revitalize the leading role of the Party. Even the Party itself, including its elites, are being targeted by a rigorous campaign led by Xi Jinping to stifle dissent and prevent “factionalism,” among other sins.[vii] These trends bear witness to a growing trend towards illiberalism in China.

Longstanding expectations in the United States that reform, opening, and the incorporation of China into the world order would transform China’s authoritarian political system into something more benign have not panned out. This has led to growing concern, even among some long-time American China hands, about China’s prospects, about the limits of reform, and the impact of a more authoritarian domestic approach on U.S.-China relations.

These developments highlight the fundamental differences between today’s PRC and the liberal international order advocated by the United States. Some experts have even predicted that China’s more authoritarian trajectory, coupled with its rising military and economic power, portend inevitable confrontation or conflict with the United States.[viii]

Chinese and American leaders have rejected this notion, emphasizing instead their determination to build a more cooperative relationship and to work together in dealing a range of bilateral and global issues. The September 2015 summit between President Obama and President Xi produced a number of agreements, including on the cessation of cyber-theft of intellectual property and an understanding that could lead to new rules of the road for conduct in cyberspace. The summit also saw progress on a bilateral investment treaty, climate change cooperation, and enhanced military-to-military communication.

But even a quick glance at the two leaders’ remarks at the summit’s concluding press conference found frank references to problematic issues that continue to plague bilateral relations, including human rights, the South China Sea, and cyber warfare.[ix] Nevertheless, the act of highlighting the gaps was a useful acknowledgement of the reality that there are important differences that require serious attention and hard work by the two governments.

Going forward, a key task of U.S. policy makers will be to develop a mechanism for managing relations with China in a way that advances cooperation and prevents differences from damaging ties. Towards this end, several principles may be helpful in guiding U.S. policy makers (and their Chinese counterparts) as they seek to develop a more cooperative relationship:

• First, the two countries should continue to acknowledge their differences, including those of fundamental values and ideology, and accept the fact that some of these differences may be irreconcilable, although they may be able to be managed.
• Second, the U.S. and China should acknowledge areas where their respective interests and goals create the potential for strategic rivalry and should seek to prevent these from negatively affecting areas of ongoing or potential cooperation. However, the United States should make clear its determination to abide by its principles, including by vigorously and coherently defending freedom of navigation.
• Third, both countries should make avoidance of military confrontation between them a central goal of their relationship and agree that a confrontation between the two would be disastrous and difficult to control.
• Fourth, Washington and Beijing should increase military transparency through exchanges, dialogue, and cooperation. Such cooperation should include a formal, high-level dialogue on nuclear weapons and strategic stability.
• Fifth, expanding the zone of cooperation between the U.S. and China should be a core goal of the relationship, and both sides should identify a range of issues on which they see real potential for enhanced bilateral cooperation.
• Sixth, the two sides should identify one or more areas that are particularly ripe for cooperation and use upcoming summits or other high-level leadership meetings as action-forcing events to energize their respective bureaucracies to develop plans for cooperation.

On the last point, the U.S. insistence that the cyber issue needed to be addressed at the September 2015 summit resulted in an unprecedented bilateral understanding on this sensitive issue. Needless to say, the proof of the value of this understanding will be in insuring that it is fully and faithfully implemented. Building on this experience, a valuable issue for future high-level focus should be the challenge posed by North Korea, which is today greater than it has ever been.

The North Korea challenge

North Korea is an urgent and dangerous problem for the United States and East Asia. It is the main challenge to regional peace and stability today.

Perhaps no regional foreign policy or security challenge has absorbed as much attention and effort as North Korea in recent years. The United States and like-minded countries have tried diplomacy, economic and political sanctions, informal dialogue, isolation, threats, and accommodation as they have sought to end North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. All these efforts have failed, and the danger posed by North Korea is growing.

It is now seven years since the Six-Party Talks — the multilateral forum designed to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization — last met. It is more than a decade since the conclusion of the September 19, 2005 agreement — the Six-Party agreement in which North Korea explicitly committed itself to denuclearization in return for an array of benefits and a fundamental transformation of relations with the United States and the international community.

Today, the Six-Party Talks and the September 19 agreement seem like distant memories as the region watches North Korea developing its nuclear and missile programs to newer and more sophisticated levels, virtually unrestrained by anything other than its own resources and ambitions. And the North’s ambition to become a credible nuclear power is on its way to being achieved. Pyongyang made this point suddenly and dramatically when it conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test on January 6, 2016.

While the test may have been of a fission bomb, not the fusion weapon that Pyongyang claimed, the successful test of a nuclear weapon by Pyongyang and the strong North Korean statement that announced it demonstrated that the North Korean regime has not slowed in its determined pursuit of nuclear weapons.[x]

North Korea has perfected two paths to fissile material production for nuclear weapons – uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. By now, the North Korean regime may have new uranium enrichment capabilities in addition to the known facility at Yongbyon. Pyongyang is building a light-water reactor that would give it additional capacity to produce fissile material.

North Korea has also has developed intermediate-range, road-mobile missiles that, when deployed, would give it the ability to strike a range of regional targets, including targets on U.S. soil, with nuclear warheads. Senior U.S. experts have stated that North Korea has probably succeeded in developing miniaturized and shielded nuclear warheads — a key requirement if Pyongyang is to be able to attack targets as far away as the United States.[xi] The test on January 6 could have been of such a warhead.

Nuclear weapons constitute, together with economic modernization, the twin pillars of the North’s byungjin national development policy. Reliance on nuclear weapons is the centerpiece of North Korea’s plan for regime survival in the face of what Pyongyang perceives to be a “hostile” international environment and the “threat” posed by the United States. These points were explicit in the January 6 statement.

We should also not underestimate the degree to which nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have become symbols of the regime’s power and prestige as Pyongyang tries to gain the respect and attention of the international community.

For Kim Jong Un, who came to power four years ago with a need to demonstrate both that he was up to the task of ruling North Korea and that he was a force to be reckoned with, nuclear weapons have become a valuable, even indispensable, tool.  And as Kim prepares to chair the first Korean Workers’ Party Congress in 35 years this spring, he will be able to point to nuclear weapons development as one of the successes of his leadership.

North Korea has declared itself a nuclear weapons state. This principle is now enshrined in its constitution. Pyongyang’s rhetoric and actions today treat its nuclear capabilities as a “given” — not a subject for concession or negotiation. While the United States and its partners may declare that they “will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state,” the reality is that the regime is well on its way to becoming just that.[xii]

It came as no surprise that an important overture by President Obama to engage North Korea in a dialogue on denuclearization was ignored by Pyongyang.[xiii] Instead, Pyongyang proposed “peace talks” and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States. This proposal is consistent with a pattern of North Korean rhetoric that seeks to change the subject of any future dialogue with the United States from denuclearization to peace talks and “arms reduction”, the latter a now-familiar euphemism for the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the removal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, and the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Korea and Japan.

For decades, U.S. efforts to engage North Korea sought to test Pyongyang’s sincerity and its interest in denuclearization. North Korea has failed this test. As a result, the United States and the international community face tough choices ahead as they deal with the reality of a North Korea that has no intention of giving up what it sees as the key to its survival.

After all that has been offered to Pyongyang over the years to convince it to denuclearize, it is hard to imagine what else might be used to induce the regime to give up its nuclear program. Experience has taught us that it not overly cynical to think that any renewed negotiations to end Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuit would have little chance of succeeding.

This dismal situation faces the current U.S. administration and will confront the next team of U.S. policy makers as they contemplate how to deal with the challenge of a nuclear North Korea. And as they weigh their options, they are likely to come to the same conclusions many non-government U.S. experts have, including that:

• Reliance on conventional diplomacy and existing sanctions is unlikely to compel the North Korean regime to resume implementing its denuclearization commitments or stop its nuclear program.
• Military action or forcible regime change are likely to remain unacceptable or unrealizable means for achieving the denuclearization of North Korea.
• A nuclear-armed North Korea with the ability to strike or threaten regional targets with nuclear warheads will generate profound concern among U.S. regional allies and partners, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea;

• It will raise questions about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies using its strategic arsenal;
• It will create demands for more explicit U.S. commitments and extended deterrence assurances by the United States;
• And it and will fundamentally alter security dynamics in the East Asia region.

• Additional U.S. steps to reassure and defend its allies, particularly new deployments of missile-related defenses and the designation of additional military assets to deal with Pyongyang’s threat are likely to complicate relations with the PRC, which will see these steps as devaluing China’s own strategic arsenal.

U.S. policy makers will probably also conclude that Pyongyang would not use its nuclear arsenal for fear of massive retaliation by the United States. For the United States, the greatest danger in the coming years may not be that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against these targets, even though Pyongyang has said that it would. Nevertheless, policy makers would be deeply remiss in not taking into account the possibility that North Korea might miscalculate and do what it has promised to do.

In addition, North Korea’s possession of deliverable nuclear weapons would enable it to engage in nuclear blackmail in the event of a regional crisis. It would increase significantly the possibility of proliferation by the North and could prompt North Korea’s non-nuclear neighbors to consider developing their own nuclear deterrent.  Op-Ed writers and some political leaders in South Korea are already calling for this.

As they look to the rising challenge posed by North Korea, American policy makers are certain to conduct a reassessment of U.S. policy. Their review will be necessitated by the realization that the North’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems is creating a new and dangerous situation in East Asia.

The policy choices that grow out of this review should be driven by the conclusion that only by escalating pressure on North Korea, narrowing the regime’s choices, and enhancing regional and international cooperation to deal with the threat can the United States hope to convince Pyongyang to reconsider its development of nuclear weapons. Policy makers may also conclude that only by threatening what the North Korean regime holds most dear — the stability and survival of its system — can the United States hope to change Pyongyang’s policy and priorities.

The tool kit that the United States could d

raw on to carry out such an approach might consist of some or all of the following:

• Tougher, targeted economic sanctions, including on the North Korean banking system and on financial flows that sustain the regime.
• Economic and financial measures, implemented with the support of North Korea’s trading partners, designed to limit Pyongyang’s access to foreign exchange, fuel, and other essential commodities.
• Enhanced deterrence steps, including the deployment of missile defense assets to the region, increased force deployments to counter the North’s nuclear and conventional threats, more explicit public warnings to the North, and high-profile public statements of assurance to U.S. regional allies.
• An increase in the tempo and scope of joint and combined military exercises on and around the Korean Peninsula.
• Expanded efforts to interdict North Korean ships and aircraft suspected of sanctions violations or trafficking in WMD.
• An increased focus on the North’s dismal human rights record in the United Nations and other international fora.
• More efforts to increase the flow of information into North Korea by radio broadcasts, DVDs, and other means.
• Covert steps designed to undermine North Korea’s ability to support financially its WMD-related programs.

At the same time, U.S. policy makers might conclude that such an approach should usefully be accompanied by a renewed emphasis on diplomacy to give the North Korean regime an “off-ramp” to re-engage in dialogue.[xiv]

Policy makers will also recognize that securing Chinese cooperation will be critical if increased pressure is to succeed. A single-minded focus on pressure alone is unlikely to win Chinese support. However, if combined with a serious effort to restart bilateral (U.S.-DPRK) and multilateral dialogue, Beijing’s support might be obtained, although we should not underestimate how difficult this will be.

The PRC’s relationship with North Korea has become increasingly complex and difficult. In the past, Beijing’s approach to dealing with Pyongyang was driven by a desire to maintain stability on the peninsula and avoid conflict on its Northeast border. Other concerns, even those created by Pyongyang’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, have usually been subordinated to the priority of stability.

However, with North Korea’s continued military provocations, threats to use nuclear weapons, and with Pyongyang approaching the point at which it will pose a credible nuclear threat to its neighbors, Beijing may be inclined to reconsider the wisdom of its past approach.

The January 6 nuclear test was nothing if not a slap at China, which had tried to improve relations with the DPRK in late 2015 and dispatched a senior member of the CCP Politburo to Pyongyang with the understanding that North Korea would forego provocations, including nuclear and missile tests. Beijing was almost certainly stunned and humiliated when North Korea began 2016 with a nuclear weapons test near the Chinese border.

But despite China’s ire, we should not expect China would abandon its only treaty ally. Importantly, many in China remain convinced that the United States bears as much responsibility as North Korea for the current situation.

Despite China’s reluctance to increase pressure on North Korea, concerns are rising in China about North Korean behavior. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear test will prompt Beijing to work with the United States and others in developing a strong common response to this latest provocation.

But if the latest nuclear test and the insult it conveyed to China do not convince Beijing that the time has come to use its leverage against North Korea, than nothing is likely to do so. Should China not be prepared to cooperate in putting in place additional sanctions and other measures to deal with the emerging North Korean threat, the United States and its partners must be prepared to work without Beijing’s support, but leave the door open to Chinese participation if the PRC reconsiders its position.

Meanwhile, Beijing understands that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems provide a powerful rationale and justification for U.S. military deployments and exercises on and around the Korean Peninsula — with implications for China’s own security. If anything, the recent test increases the likelihood that the United States will ramp up its military posture on and around the Korean Peninsula.

Quiet, official, high-level dialogue between the United States and China (a dialogue that should also bring in the Republic of Korea) will be crucial to the development of a common approach to deal with the emerging threat from North Korea. Importantly, Chinese experts are increasingly willing to acknowledge privately that Beijing’s policy approach has also failed and is in need of reassessment. And with the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles on the verge of changing security dynamics in the region, China has an incentive to reconsider its traditional support for the North.

American policymakers should encourage such a reassessment and underscore U.S. preparedness to work more closely with China, together with the ROK, in shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula in ways that would eliminate a source of regional instability and accord with the aspirations of the Korean people, as well as with the interests of both the United States and the PRC.

Towards this end, U.S.-PRC-ROK discussions should ultimately include frank and quiet dialogue about issues connected with Korea’s eventual reunification, including the status of U.S. troops in a reunified Korea, a united Korea’s military capability, the management of refugees, and the disposition of the North’s nuclear weapons and other WMD. The resolution of these issues could provide important reassurances to China about the future of the Korean Peninsula.

In the absence of Chinese willingness to be more cooperative in applying pressure on the North Korean regime, dealing effectively with the North will be difficult.  Pyongyang understands this and is likely to seek to manage relations with China, as it has in the past, in a way that ensures continued PRC tolerance for its behavior and support for its existence.

If Pyongyang succeeds in doing so, the regime will continue to make significant strides in developing nuclear weapons and missiles, and pose an even greater challenge to the United States and like-minded countries. The current U.S. administration has been able to defer making the tough decisions to deal with the regional implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea. The recent nuclear test has now made clear that putting off these decisions is no longer an acceptable option.

A Final Word – “Wildcards”

China and North Korea may be the most prominent policy challenges facing the United States, but they are by no means the only ones. U.S. policy makers face the prospect of sudden developments — “wildcards” — that could roil the region and increase regional tensions.

One of these is Taiwan, where a victory by the opposition, pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the January 16, 2016 presidential election has unsettled the PRC. How will Mainland China respond to the DPP victory? Will Beijing continue to think that time is on its side and that eventual unification is in the cards, despite the DPP victory, growing Taiwan identity, and increasing mistrust of the Mainland in Taiwan?

Will China’s leaders accept an alternative to the “1992 Consensus” – the artfully ambiguous one-China formula that has bridged cross-Taiwan Strait differences, but which is not accepted by DPP leader and President-elect Tsai Ing-wen? Could growing economic and social difficulties in the PRC prompt Xi Jinping to distract a restive population by using nationalistic fervor over Taiwan? The answers to these questions will determine whether Taiwan once again becomes a flashpoint in East Asia.

Elsewhere in East Asia, what about Japan-Korea relations? Will they continue to improve, building on the recent breakthrough agreement on the “comfort women” issue? Or will either Seoul or Tokyo retreat from their commitments in the agreement and cause this emotional issue to once again damage bilateral ties and undermine trilateral cooperation with the United States?

And what of Japan-China ties and their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands?  Does China’s military challenge to Japan’s control over the islands and Japan’s determination not to yield on sovereignty mean that the two powers are inevitably headed for confrontation? Or will the fact that the two sides have been taking halting steps to improve ties lead to an agreement to disagree on the islands and a reduction in tensions?

For East Asia, a region being transformed, the issues addressed in this paper represent formidable concerns. For U.S. policy makers, they are important challenges, the successful management of which will provide an opportunity to demonstrate American leadership in a region eager to see America play the role that only it can.

[i] For a useful summary of concerns about the U.S. position on AIIB, see:  Stephen S. Roach, Zha Daojiong, Scott Kennedy, and Patrick Chovanec, “Washington’s Big China Screw-Up,” Foreign Policy, March 26, 2015, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/26/washingtons-big-china-screw-up-aiib-asia-infrastructure-investment-bank-china-containment-chinafile/

[ii] “Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The White House, October 5, 2015, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership

[iii] For a skeptical/critical view of China’s intentions, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 381-396.  Available at: http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/4/381.full.  For a more benign view and a more positive assessment of the prospects for continued U.S. pre-eminence, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,  “The China Challenge,” Boston Globe, April 3, 2015, available at: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/04/03/the-china-challenge/fCvYDdIwhtSjBctl0nfn3J/story.html

[iv] See, for example, Sang-won Yoon, “Xi Tells Kerry China and U.S. Can Both Be Pacific Powers,” Bloomberg Business, May 17, 2015, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-17/xi-sees-room-for-both-china-u-s-as-powers-in-pacific-region

[v] For an overview of China’s claims, the relevance of UNCLOS, and a discussion of regional tensions and U.S. interests, see: Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” Brookings Policy Brief, August 2014, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/08/south-china-sea-perspective-bader-lieberthal-mcdevitt

[vi] James Mayger and Yuji Nakamura, “Japan Protests Intrusion of Armed Chinese Vessel Into Its Waters,” Bloomberg Business, December 26, 2015, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-26/japan-coast-guard-says-three-chinese-ships-near-senkaku-islands

[vii] See, for example, Jun Mai, “All the President’s Men: Xi Jinping tells Communist Party’s top echelon to unite behind him in thought and action,” South China Morning Post, January 9, 2016, available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1899546/all-fall-chinas-president-tells-communist-partys-top?page=all, Laura Zhou, “Some questions should not be asked, China’s President Xi Jinping tells Communist Party members,” South China Morning Post, January 3, 2016, available at:  http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1897837/some-questions-should-not-be-asked-chinas-president-xi, and Simon Denyer, “China’s Xi tells grumbling party cadres: ‘Don’t talk back,’” Washington Post, December 29, 2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-xi-tells-grumbling-party-cadres-dont-talk-back/2015/12/27/a6b25d2c-a446-11e5-8318-bd8caed8c588_story.html

[viii] Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 72, April 2015, available at:   http://www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china/p36371

[ix] “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2015, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint

[x] English translation of the statement can be found in: “North Korea’s Hydrogen-Bomb Statement, Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2016, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-hydrogen-bomb-statement-1452060894

[xi] Elizabeth Shim, “U.S. Commander: North Korea has capacity to miniaturize nuclear warheads,” UPI, October 9, 2015, available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/10/09/US-commander-North-Korea-has-capacity-to-miniaturize-nuclear-warheads/9831444398424/

[xii] Pamela Dockins, “Analysts: Broad Response Need to N. Korea Test,” Voice of America, January 6, 2016, available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-broad-response-needed-to-north-korea-test/3134027.html

[xiii] Associated Press, “Obama: If North Korea is serious about no nukes, we’ll talk,” New York Post, October 16, 2015, available at: http://nypost.com/2015/10/16/obama-if-north-korea-is-serious-on-denuclearization-well-talk/

[xiv] For additional details on measures that could be taken and a discussion of diplomatic options, see: Evans J.R. Revere, “Re-Engaging North Korea After Kim Jong-il’s Death: Last, Best Hope or Dialogue to Nowhere?”, Brookings, Policy Paper No. 29, January 2012, available at:  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11-north-korea-revere/0111_north_korea_revere.pdf,

Evans J.R. Revere, “Facing the Facts: Towards a New U.S. North Korea Policy,” Brookings, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS), CNAPS Working Paper, October 2013, available at:  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/10/16-north-korea-denuclearization-revere/16-north-korea-denuclearization-revere-paper.pdf,

Evans J.R. Revere, “United States-Republic of Korea Relations in President Obama’s Second Term: Managing Challenge and Change,” Brookings, CNAPS Working Paper, February 2013, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/02/us-south-korea-relations-revere/us-south-korea-relations-revere.pdf?la=en,

And also, Bruce Klingner, “Time to get North Korea Sanctions Right,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 2850 on Asia and the Pacific, November 4, 2013, available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/11/time-to-get-north-korean-sanctions-right

      

 

 

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement marking the 70^th anniversary of the end of World War II was the latest, halting, complex, and problematic step in Japan’s longstanding attempt to deal with its troubled history – and with its resentful neighbors.

Despite its faults (more on that below), the statement could help ease tensions between Japan and Korea if handled well by both sides, and if the opportunity presented by the statement is wisely exploited. Despite the criticisms being leveled at it, the Abe Statement, unlike previous remarks by the Prime Minister, probably won’t make things worse between Japan and its Korean neighbor. It might just make them better.

Seeking a new paradigm

The statement was long, some three times longer than the 1995 Murayama statement issued on the 50^th anniversary of the war’s end. The Murayama Statement marked the high-water mark of postwar Japanese apologies. The length of Abe’s statement, plus the fact that it was Cabinet-endorsed, suggests the Prime Minister was determined to make this the definitive Japanese word on the war, on the legacy of that conflict, and on the issue of apologies. Only time will tell whether that will be the case, since a future Japanese government may have more – or less – to say on this subject.

The statement’s content also made clear that Abe sought to eliminate the need for future generations of innocent Japanese to have to apologize for the sins of their fathers and grandfathers. Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, the statement’s shortcomings probably guarantee that Tokyo has not heard the last of calls from the region – particularly from Korea – for further apologies. But this does not mean that relations between Tokyo and Seoul are destined to remain in the depressing funk they have been mired in during the tenures of the Prime Minister and his counterpart, Republic of Korea President Park Geun-hye. But more on that later.

Better than expected

For all its faults, the Abe Statement is better than we had reason to expect, although not as forward leaning on some issues as some of us had wished.

Abe’s well-known reluctance to apologize to Japan’s neighbors, his support from those holding strongly nationalist views, his past quibbling over whether Japan really committed “aggression” during World War II, and his denial of official Japanese involvement in the sexual enslavement of the so-called “comfort women” gave us ample reason to fear that this year’s anniversary statement would be deficient, even troubling, in many respects.

But Abe surprised us, including by using the word “aggression,” and making it clear it was Japanese aggression he was talking about. The Prime Minister also mentioned “colonial domination,” “deep remorse,” and “apology” for good measure. In doing so, he passed an important test, since few critics thought that these words would ever pass his lips.

Nonetheless, the extensive use of the passive voice in the statement and his citation of apologies made by previous governments rather than delivering his own gave the impression that Abe was trying to stay one step removed from the level of contrition and responsibility that had been conveyed in earlier Japanese statements.

But we can take comfort in the fact that Abe did highlight the landmark statements of his predecessors, and that he reminded us Japan has often stated its deep remorse and heartfelt apology over the years.

A new foundation for future statements

Most importantly, Abe endorsed all of the previous Cabinet statements, including those he had been explicitly or implicitly critical of in the past. In doing so, he associated himself with them as never before. And by describing these statements as “unshakable,” he made these words of remorse, apology, and contrition the foundation for future government pronouncements on the issue of Japanese wartime responsibility.

That is something that the Republic of Korea can – and should – interpret as evidence that Mr. Abe is finally willing to accept the verdicts of his prime ministerial and cabinet predecessors.

Looking back over the ups and downs of his tenure, it is fair to say that Abe has come a long way towards meeting the concerns of Koreans. But has he met all of their concerns?  To be sure, no. And is his statement the basis for a turnabout in Japan-ROK relations? On this, the jury is still out.

More might have been said

Several things in the statement have justifiably disappointed the Koreans. They had hoped to see a specific reference to (and apology for) Japan’s colonization of Korea. But that was probably a bridge too far, especially since many in Japan believe  the colonial annexation of Japan puts Korea in a different “category” than China, requiring different treatment. That is why Abe went out of his way to make a specific, positive gesture towards China. No such gesture was forthcoming for the Koreans.

The Abe Statement’s historiography provided some cringe-worthy moments, including from an American perspective, as Abe attempted to explain, and even justify, Japan’s drift to expansionism, colonialism, and war in the 1930s. Little of this can have been pleasant to the ears of Koreans, who remember only too well the harshness of their colonial experience.

But Abe’s historical analysis was tempered and corrected by his admission that Japan “took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war.” Coming from this particular Prime Minister, that is a sentiment and admission to be welcomed. 

Abe could have and should have made a stand-alone reference to the suffering of the Korean people, instead of merely including them on a list of many who suffered. This was a lost opportunity.

Koreans had some reason to think that Abe might do right by them. Only days before the Abe Statement, Koreans witnessed the profoundly moving scene of former Prime Minister Hatoyama falling to his knees in front of the former Japanese prison in Seoul as a gesture of apology to the Koreans who had suffered there.

And again before the statement, Koreans heard Abe advisor and former senior Japanese diplomat Yukio Okamoto describe Japan’s annexation of Korea as a “historical sin.”  Either of these gestures could have set the stage for a magnanimous step by Abe. But the Prime Minister stopped short of a Korea-specific statement of apology or atonement.

Tragedy of the “Comfort Women”

Also lost was an opportunity to make a specific reference to the comfort women – arguably the thorniest and most emotional issue complicating ties between the two countries. A positive word in this regard would have gone a long way.

Nevertheless, Abe’s admission that the “dignity and honor” of women had been damaged by Japan should not be taken lightly. It’s clear enough in his statement what he is referring to. Nor should his statement that Japan “wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts” be dismissed. Each of these statements potentially opens the door to a more forthcoming approach by Japan on an issue of central importance to Korea. And Korea will have a chance to hold him to his words in the months to come.

So for all of its shortcomings, Abe’s statement seems to offer Korea something to work with if Seoul is prepared to recognize how far Abe has come since early in his tenure, particularly with his endorsement of previous official Japanese statements of regret, remorse, and apology.

However, Abe’s attempt to relieve future generations of Japanese of the burden of apology misses an important point from the Korean perspective: For Japan to be relieved of the need for future apologies, it is important that today’s expressions of remorse and regret are seen as genuine, credible, and sincere. To do so, Tokyo will have to make further efforts to reconcile with its Korean neighbor.

Korea’s reaction

That is the core point of the official ROK reaction, as conveyed in President Park Geun-hye’s Liberation Day remarks last Saturday. Park was careful not to dismiss Abe’s sentiments expressed the previous day. Instead, she said his statement “did not quite live up to our expectations” – a relatively mild criticism by recent Korean standards.

Reacting to Abe’s positive statements of remorse, Park challenged his government to “match with consistent and sincere actions its declaration that the view of history articulated by its previous cabinets will be upheld, and thereby win the trust of its neighbors and the international community.” Put another way, Abe’s deeds will have to match his words.

President Park also “took note” of Prime Minister Abe’s endorsement of previous official Japanese statements. In doing so, she highlighted that one of the groups most grievously harmed by Japan’s past actions were the comfort women. She called on Japan to resolve this issue in a “speedy and proper way.”

Park restated her commitment to move towards a future of “renewed cooperation and shared prosperity” with Japan – repeating a key theme of her statement on the 50^th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-ROK diplomatic relations in June. By reiterating the importance of bilateral friendship and cooperation, and by stressing Korea’s preparedness to expand ties with Japan in the security, economic, and social and cultural arenas, Park clearly left the door open to further improvement in relations with Tokyo.

Time to turn the page?

The tone and direction of Japan-Korea relations has shifted in recent months, away from the acerbic atmosphere of last year in favor emphasizing the possibility of a more positive and future-oriented relationship.

Importantly, Prime Minister Abe’s statement appears to have given Korea just enough to work with as the two sides explore ways to improve ties and settle pending issues.

Without question, the Abe Statement could have been better, and certainly more could have been said to assuage Korean sensitivities. But the good news here is that the Korean President seems to agree that Abe is in a better place on matters of mutual concern than he has been, and that the Abe Statement contains enough to warrant further efforts to open doors, not slam them shut.

It’s too early to tell whether Seoul and Tokyo will be able to make progress on the issues that divide them. But what seems clear is that, in the aftermath of the Abe Statement and thanks to President Park’s wise, prudent, and statesmanlike reaction to it, the two sides seem prepared to try.

The U.S. role

The United States, which has a strong interest in close ties between its two allies, can help by reminding Tokyo and Seoul of the stake they have in improved relations and of the danger of allowing ties to fester. But there is little more than offering good advice and good offices that the U.S. can or should do. At the end of the day, Japan and the ROK must themselves conclude that the challenges they face and the values they share are much more important than the tragic history that divides them.

      

 

 

Summary

Republic of Korea (ROK) President Park Geun-hye is making a determined push to prepare for Korean reunification. Her high-profile effort has mobilized government ministries in an unprecedented way as she seeks to revitalize popular interest in, and support for, national reunification. But despite President Park’s fervor in pursuing reunification, attaining that goal will require overcoming major obstacles, not the least of which is North Korea’s determined opposition to reunification on anything other than its own terms. North Korea will not accede to its own demise and even the most earnest hopes of Seoul are unlikely to change Pyongyang’s antipathy to being absorbed into the ROK.

Other challenges to reunification include North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats, which may require the United States to adopt more aggressive countermeasures, some of which could destabilize the North Korean regime. At a minimum, there is potential for friction between Seoul’s eager pursuit of North-South reconciliation on the one hand, and the U.S. need to prevent the emergence of a dangerous new North Korean threat on the other. The United States and the ROK could face tough choices ahead as they work to keep their approaches in sync.

China’s support for reunification is uncertain. Beijing may prefer the status quo to having a free, united, democratic, economically dynamic, and militarily capable Korea on its border, especially if Korea remains a U.S. ally and host to U.S. troops. But China’s position is evolving, and the United States and the ROK should engage the PRC in a frank and unprecedented conversation about the future of the Korean Peninsula in order to convince Beijing that a reunified Korea is in its interests.

United States support for Korean reunification is firm, reflecting the strong U.S. interest in seeing a united Korea that is free, democratic and led by the ROK. When Korea is inevitably reunified, the major U.S. policy interests will include ensuring a peaceful and stable region, preventing the emergence of new security threats, and supporting Korea as it creates a unified, democratic, market-oriented society and economy that benefits all the Korean people.

The United States will have much to contribute to Korea’s reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation process when reunification happens. Dismantling the North Korean military machine and eliminating its nuclear weapons will be central priorities for Washington. And a unified Korea will need a security guarantor, a role that the United States should play, even with a downsized military presence and a new rationale for its alliance with Korea.

Despite the U.S. and ROK preference, peaceful reunification is by no means guaranteed. Reunification reached as a result of North Korean collapse, internal chaos in the North, or civil war would impose a massive burden on the Korean people as they seek to build a united nation. But with North Korea living on borrowed time, now is the time for the United States and the ROK, together with China and Korea’s other neighbors, to discuss and plan for an alternative future for the Korean Peninsula.

Introduction

Republic of Korea (ROK) President Park Geun-hye has made preparing for Korean reunification the centerpiece of her government’s approach on North Korea. [1] More than any Korean President since Syngman Rhee, she has sought to mobilize Korean public opinion and international support for her vision of a reunified Korea. She has emphasized the benefits of reunification and downplayed its costs as a way of building domestic enthusiasm for her policy. [2]

Park’s determined approach on reunification is in part an effort to reverse the flagging interest of younger Koreans in reuniting the country. With the 70^th anniversary of Koreas division approaching, she also seeks to use the occasion to revitalize broader popular support for the goal of reunification. And at the midpoint of her presidency, she is no doubt concerned about the legacy that she will leave when she departs the Blue House.

Korea’s national reunification, when it eventually but inevitably comes, will remove one of the most dangerous legacies of the post-World War II era and heal a tragic national division that has lasted almost three-quarters of a century.

Northeast Asia will be a very different place after Korea’s reunification. A newly reunited Korea will establish itself in the region while its neighbors will be digesting the reality of engaging with a dynamic nation of 75 million people – a nation with considerable economic clout, a strong military, impressive human resources, but also with a host of internal challenges as reconstruction, integration, and reconciliation begin in earnest.

The primary U.S. interests in and around the post-unification Korean Peninsula will include ensuring a peaceful and stable region, preventing the emergence of new security threats, and supporting Korea’s task of creating a unified, democratic, market-oriented society and economy for all Koreans. The United States’ pursuit of these interests will be greatly affected by a number of factors, not the least of which is the manner in which reunification occurs.

If the two Koreas reunify peacefully, either through mutual consent or other non-violent means, and if the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is disestablished and absorbed into the Republic of Korea, the region will be well placed to welcome and work with a united Korea, greatly easing the task of the United States in maintaining peace and stability.

If Pyongyang’s nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction capabilities are eliminated as part of the reunification process, prospects for a transition to a peaceful and stable regional order will be considerably enhanced. Such a transition would clearly be in U.S. interests.

And if Korean reunification can be achieved in a way that does not threaten the security interests of Korea’s neighbors, and especially if China’s understanding and support for reunification is obtained, prospects for a stable new regional order will be bright – a situation that would again accord well with U.S. interests.

In sum, U.S. interests will be best served if Korea’s national reunification is achieved peacefully, if the North’s WMD potential is eliminated as part of the reunification process, and if unified Korea’s neighbors are comfortable with both the process of reunification and its outcome.

However, several factors seem likely to complicate greatly the achievement of these goals and throw obstacles and uncertainties into the path of Korean reunification.

Challenges to Peaceful Reunification: The DPRK Factor

The first factor is the likelihood that North Korea will oppose national reunification on anything other than its own terms. Put another way, we should not expect the DPRK to agree to its own demise, accept absorption into the South, or reunify on the ROK’s terms. Accordingly, the greatest challenge to peaceful reunification will be North Korea itself and the Pyongyang regime’s determination not only to retain its own system, but also to impose it on the South.

The United States has long supported the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and ROK President Park Geun-hye’s goal of a reunified Korean Peninsula is one that is today comfortably shared by the United States.

In a major policy development early in the Obama Administration, the United States took its support for a reunified Korea to a new level. In June 2009, the United States and its Republic of Korea ally issued a “Joint Vision Statement” for the bilateral alliance that declared that a central goal of the U.S. and the ROK would now be “…to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” (Emphasis added.) [3]

This declaration was one of the most explicit policy statements on Korean unification ever made by Washington. It was also the first time that reunification was cited as a specific shared goal of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Most importantly, the Joint Vision Statement made clear the U.S. position that the governing principles of a new Korea would be those of the ROK. Implicit in this view was the U.S.-ROK judgment that reunification would involve the North’s absorption by the ROK.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the DPRK has not responded well to the Republic of Korea’s emphasis on reunification and to Seoul’s call for the two Koreas to take steps to lay the foundation for it. Pyongyang almost certainly sees this ROK approach as a thinly veiled prelude to an eventual attempt to absorb the DPRK. And Pyongyang is not likely to be interested in a process designed to put itself out of business and bring its political and social systems to an end.

It is also no surprise then that, despite Seoul’s hopes and fervor, the actual prospects for near-term reunification seem as distant as ever. There is today no common South-North vision of a united Korea. Indeed, the contrasting visions of what a united Korea might look like are zero-sum mirror images of each other – reflecting the Manichean nature of the South-North struggle for supremacy on the Korean Peninsula.

One of the most important and eloquent statements of Seoul’s vision is to be found in President Park Geun-hye’s trustpolitik policy of seeking to build relations of confidence, cooperation, and transparency with the DPRK. [4] Her idealistic vision is based on the belief that such ties can eventually be forged between North and South, despite their radically different political, economic, and social systems.

North Korea has not only been unwilling to reciprocate this vision with positive actions, it has responded to it with acrimony, accusation, threat and insult. [5] Despite occasional tactical shifts by the North, such as the high-level DPRK delegation’s visit to the ROK in connection with the Asian Games and, more recently, Kim Jong Un’s expressed willingness to consider a North-South summit, [6] military provocations and probing, ad hominem attacks on the ROK president, and threatening language directed at the ROK have more often than not characterized the North’s approach to the South.

All of this suggests that the ROK goal of easing tensions, building transparency, and creating an atmosphere in which reconciliation might lead to reunification is unlikely to be realized any time soon.

Further complicating the ROK’s task is the fact that the DPRK has its own reunification plan – one that would eliminate the ROK and end its democratic system. The gulf between the two Koreas’ respective visions of a united nation suggests that Seoul’s hope for a reconciliation-based reunification faces a major challenge.

Nevertheless, for the United States, supporting the ROK and staying in sync with Seoul’s on reunification serves U.S. interests and should be a priority. Support for Seoul’s approach demonstrates appropriate solidarity with a long-time ally. It also recognizes that South Korea’s pursuit of reconciliation and incremental steps towards peaceful reunification will reduce the possibility of North-South confrontation and accord well with the U.S. goal of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. And U.S. support for the ROK’s approach reaffirms that South Korea is usually the best judge of how far and how fast to push North Korea in the direction of reunification, keeping the ROK in the lead in determining the future of the peninsula. But the United States must also be mindful of other priorities, including North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats.

Nuclear Weapons and Reunification

A second factor complicating the path to peaceful reunification is the challenge posed by the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

The DPRK’s growing ability to threaten the region with nuclear weapons may, in the not-too-distant future, require the United States to respond in new, more aggressive ways to defend itself, its interests, and its allies. Some possible responses could affect North Korea’s stability or even bring about the regime’s collapse. At a minimum, North Korea’s goal of posing a credible nuclear threat to its neighbors and the United States will soon compel the United States and the ROK to make difficult choices with important ramifications for peninsular stability.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons- and ballistic missile-related capabilities are expanding. Credible reports and analysis indicate that the DPRK may have constructed an additional uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, boosting the DPRK’s ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. [7]

A new study warns that the North could have material to make as many as 79 nuclear weapons by 2020. [8] Meanwhile, the DPRK may also be making significant strides in missile development, including in the ability to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a missile. [9]

Pyongyang has long since declared that nuclear weapons development is, together with economic modernization, one of the twin pillars of its byungjin national development plan. The DPRK’s status as a nuclear power is enshrined in its constitution. And during the summer of 2014 a senior DPRK official told a European interlocutor that Pyongyang was prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States “as one nuclear weapons state to another” – another indicator of Pyongyang’s belief that it is now a nuclear weapons state. [10]

Through words and actions, the DPRK has made clear it has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons program. In doing so it has rejected the central goal of the Six-Party denuclearization talks that were suspended in 2008. And today, there is no diplomatic process capable of slowing or stopping the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons.

Over the years, the United States and its allies and partners have tried a variety of means to convince the DPRK to end its nuclear pursuit. Nothing has worked.

United States policy remains focused on trying to convince North Korea to resume implementation of its denuclearization commitments. Washington is also mindful that a denuclearized North Korea would make inter-Korean rapprochement more attainable, sustainable, and credible. However, North Korea’s behavior suggests it will not be swayed from its current path.

When North Korea does develop the capability to deliver accurately a miniaturized nuclear warhead using a medium- or long-range missile, it will have a profound effect on the Northeast Asia region. It will change the security calculus and perceptions of many of the region’s actors, who will have to take into account a new threat to regional stability. It will raise concerns among North Korea’s neighbors about their vulnerability to intimidation and nuclear blackmail.

Pyongyang’s possession of a credible nuclear delivery capability may prompt allies to question the U.S. deterrent and the assurances they have received from Washington to defend them. This could, in turn, spark a debate in Seoul and Tokyo about the need to consider developing their own nuclear weapons.

Concern among U.S. allies and partners will probably require the United States to make its deterrent commitments and assurances even more explicit. It may also compel the United States to take other measures to deal with North Korea, including new missile defense-related deployments and exercises, in order to reassure allies and partners.

Some of these steps may be interpreted by the PRC as a U.S. attempt to neutralize China’s strategic forces, using the pretext of a North Korean threat. This would seriously complicate U.S.-China relations. Indeed, there are signs that this issue is already having an effect as witnessed by Beijing’s negative reaction to the possible U.S. deployment of the THAAD missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula. [11]

As North Korea nears the ability to strike regional targets with nuclear weapons, calls for tougher and more direct measures to deal with the DPRK are likely to intensify in U.S. policy circles. With North Korea destined to pose a credible nuclear threat to its neighbors and even the United States, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere may begin to conclude that the only way to achieve the North’s denuclearization is to end the regime itself. Some prominent U.S. figures are already arguing that it is time for the United States to move in this direction. [12]

Even short of a policy of regime change, more intensive economic and banking sanctions would put unprecedented pressure on North Korean and, if effectively crafted and applied, could undermine its ability to sustain itself. Increased efforts to interdict suspect cargoes entering or leaving the DPRK through such initiatives as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would also put new strains on a regime that relies on illicit arms trade to earn hard currency. And a sharply focused policy aimed at cutting off financial flows into the DPRK could put the regime’s survival at stake. [13]

While such measures might compel the North Korean regime to resume denuclearization talks, they could also destabilize North Korea and bring about its collapse, with uncertain consequences. Attempts to destabilize or force the collapse of the DPRK would certainly be strongly resisted by Pyongyang, possibly through military means. And absent a major turnabout in China’s policy, the PRC might also oppose such approaches, including via intervention if it believed its own interests were threatened.

The pursuit of significantly more aggressive measures to counter North Korea’s rising nuclear capability would mark a significant shift in U.S. policy away from its current focus. Adoption of a regime change policy would require the United States to run the risks associated with such an approach, including the dangers inherent in the precipitate collapse of the North Korean regime.

Either of these approaches could put the United States at odds with its ROK ally if Seoul were not prepared to abandon its preference for gradualism and its emphasis on reconciliation. For Seoul, abandoning that approach would mark a dramatic turning point in South-North relations – a step that any ROK government might be reluctant to take. Accordingly, a decision to move policy towards the DPRK in a more confrontational direction would be a difficult one to take for both Washington and Seoul.

Nevertheless, North Korea’s current trajectory may eventually present the United States and the ROK with no other choice. Today, there seems to be no prospect of a change in Pyongyang’s determined development of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Nor does there seem to be any near-term hope for the resumption of serious denuclearization talks with Pyongyang.

The DPRK’s single-minded pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability and the strides it is making towards that end will soon pose a major new challenge to the Northeast Asia region. Sooner rather than later, that challenge may require Washington and Seoul to choose between continuing their current approach on the one hand, and taking measures on the other that run the risk of instability in order to avoid the greater evil of a nuclear-armed North Korea that can threaten its neighbors with nuclear weapons.

The China Factor

One of the most significant challenges for United States (and ROK) policymakers will be securing China’s cooperation in bringing about a united Korea under the banner of the Republic of Korea. Despite some deterioration in PRC-DPRK ties and a marked improvement in relations between Seoul and Beijing, China may have little interest in helping to bring about a ROK-led Korean Peninsula. For China, the status quo has its attractions.

There is little question that China’s relationship with North Korea has undergone a significant transformation in recent years. A relationship once described as “close as lips and teeth” is today anything but that.

Three years into his rule, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has yet to be invited to visit Beijing. PRC leader Xi Jinping and ROK President Park Geun-hye have not only traded state visits, they have had no fewer than five substantive meetings since each assumed office. ROK-PRC relations are at a historic high point and bilateral ties are today characterized by a high degree of amity.

The same cannot be said for PRC-DPRK relations, which today are cool and distant. China’s state-controlled media frequently carries commentary critical of the DPRK, and prominent Chinese are increasingly being allowed to speak about the DPRK in negative terms. [14] The cooling of China-North Korea relations has been the result of several factors, not the least of which is the DPRK’s unwillingness to return to the Chinese-hosted Six-Party Talks with the intent to engage in serious negotiations on its denuclearization.

Pyongyang’s unwillingness to accept Beijing’s advice to adopt Chinese-style economic and structural reforms has also been a sore point for China, which has for years staked its North Korea policy on the possibility of gradually transforming the nature of the North Korean economy. And North Korea’s attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 greatly elevated tensions in the region and unnerved Beijing by taking the peninsula to the brink of conflict on China’s doorstep.

North Korea’s virulent rhetorical attacks on the ROK, Japan, and the United States in 2013, including its threat to use nuclear weapons against them, took the DPRK’s bellicosity to a new and dangerous level. That year also saw the arrest and execution of Jang Song Thaek, one of the few senior North Korean officials known to have close ties to China. This, too, seems to have unnerved Beijing.

Despite the evident downturn in PRC-DPRK ties, China’s bottom line on the Korean Peninsula continues to focus on maintaining stability and avoiding conflict near its northeast border at all costs. [15] China’s aversion to instability explains the cautious approach that Beijing has generally taken in dealing with North Korea, even when faced with North Korean provocations and Pyongyang’s threats to use nuclear weapons against its neighbors. For Beijing, the collapse of the North Korean regime would be anathema, as would major instability within the DPRK.

Accordingly, Beijing might be expected to oppose any scenario that could increase the risk of violence, refugee flows, or escalated tensions near its border with North Korea. And China would almost certainly reject any approach by the United States and the ROK that did not take the PRC’s security concerns into account. For China, which has a greatly improved relationship with the ROK and proper, if occasionally problematic, ties with Pyongyang, there are worse things than the current status quo.

More fundamentally, China would be deeply suspicious of any scenario that might bring about the creation of a united, democratic, economically dynamic, and militarily capable Korea on its border. This would be especially so if post-unification Korea were to remain an ally of the United States and continued to host a significant U.S. military presence, especially if those forces were to operate north of the 38^th parallel.

If the United States and the ROK seek a reunified Korea based on “…the principles of free democracy and a market economy…,” then a major task must be to convince Beijing that the existence of such a Korea is in China’s interests. This would require shaping China’s understanding of what a post-reunification Korean Peninsula would look like and convincing Beijing that the situation that would obtain following the demise of the North Korean regime and its absorption into the ROK would be more in China’s interests than today’s situation on the peninsula.

Making this case to Beijing would be difficult. It would require the United States and the ROK to carry out a frank and unprecedented dialogue with China. The agenda for such a dialogue would necessarily include discussion of the post-reunification nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the disposition of U.S. military forces in a reunified Korea, and even the post-reunification roles and missions of the ROK military.

It would also have to address the disposition and role of Chinese forces on a united Korea’s border, as well as the security guarantees and confidence building steps that China might be prepared to take to reassure a reunified Korea. Such steps by the PRC would be essential if the United States and the ROK were to contemplate making any changes in their alliance or force structure to deal with China’s concerns.

The dialogue described above would touch on some of the most sensitive subjects for each of the involved parties. It would also require China to overcome its long-standing aversion to discussing Korean peninsula contingencies, particularly those involving the possible end of the DPRK regime.

For these and other reasons, conducting such a dialogue in the context of the current regional security environment will be difficult, and may be impossible. And yet it is a conversation whose time has come, particularly if the PRC leadership begins to accept what many Chinese experts have already concluded: that the DPRK is a net liability for China and it is time to explore other options.

U.S. Interests and a Reunified Korea

Once Korean reunification takes place, the United States will continue to have a major stake in and around the Korean Peninsula. As noted earlier, the primary U.S. interests will include ensuring a peaceful and stable region, preventing the emergence of new security threats, and supporting Korea as it embarks on building a unified country.

The analysis below generally assumes that Korean reunification will take place peacefully. However, if reunification occurs through other than peaceful means, the environment in which the United States pursues these interests would be highly complex, and the challenges that both the United States and the ROK would face would be considerably greater.

An urgent post-reunification goal for the United States would be to provide all possible assistance to the ROK’s reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation process. While the leadership and major resources for this process can be expected to come from the ROK itself, the complexity and scope of these tasks will require outside assistance from the United States, Korea’s neighbors, and other elements of the international community, including UN-related organizations.

The United States, because of its role as the ROK’s sole treaty ally and its international leadership role, will be in a unique position to assist Seoul in this endeavor. This could include the provision of economic, food, and other humanitarian assistance to the northern part of united Korea. The United States would also be well placed to work closely with Japan to encourage Tokyo to do its utmost to support Korea’s transition to united nationhood.

The United States will have a significant stake in ROK efforts to dismantle the Korean People’s Army’s offensive military capabilities and to demobilize and integrate former KPA forces into Korean society. Korea’s success in these two areas, and in establishing security and the rule of law in the former North Korea, will be crucial to preventing new security challenges from arising after reunification. A violent collapse of North Korea or a hotly contested absorption of the North by the South would enormously complicate this task.

The United States will also want to play a major role in ensuring that all elements of the DPRK’s WMD programs are removed. This will be a paramount priority, especially in ensuring that custody of WMD and nuclear materials is maintained if reunification occurs by other than purely peaceful means.

The successful elimination of the North’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs would greatly ease the concerns of Korea’s neighbors, particularly China and Japan. It would also send a strongest signal to the region and the international community that a united Korea will not pose a threat to its neighbors and that it will abide by all of its international treaty obligations.

As part of both the pre- and post-reunification processes, the United States will be deeply engaged with Korean counterparts to discuss the nature and structure of the post-reunification U.S.-ROK alliance and ROK security requirements. It is anticipated that a reunified Korea will want and need a continuing security alliance relationship with the United States, although one cannot rule out the possibility that Korea might consider other options, including neutrality.

Assuming that Korea opts to continue its alliance with the United States, the end of the North Korean threat means that the rationale for that alliance will necessarily change. In considering a new rationale, leaders of a reunified Korea will be mindful that they now share a border with China, and the PRC will be a factor in their thinking about future security requirements.

But Koreans will be no less mindful of the need not to provoke China or be perceived by China as a threat, something that U.S. policymakers will want to take into account as they work with the ROK to define the parameters of a post-reunification alliance. Importantly, however, if the U.S. and the ROK have succeeded in working with China in the run-up to reunification to deal with each other’s security concerns, this could be a manageable issue.

Absent any new threats to a united Korea, downsizing

      

 

 

The reality is that U.S. policy over the years has not proven effective in changing things inside Cuba. In fact, that policy has only served to isolate the United States in the region and in the United Nations. There was a real prospect that continuing on the path adopted many years ago would not only not have worked, but might also have led to continuing difficulties for the United States in the hemisphere.

At the same time, U.S. public opinion has also shifted on Cuba, including among Cuban-Americans and the business community. It was clearly time for a change — a change that was hinted at by Candidate Obama before he became president.

Unlike North Korea, Cuba did not slap away the “outstretched hand” of the Obama Administration in 2009. Pyongyang responded to President Obama’s outreach with a missile test and a nuclear test. Also unlike North Korea, Cuba has not posed a threat to the United States for some time. Cuba is also not threatening the region with nuclear holocaust. Cuba is not developing weapons of mass destruction, and there have been numerous signs that Cuba is interested in pursuing serious reform, again unlike North Korea. For all those reasons, and more, Pyongyang has received the near-universal opprobrium of the international community.

It is ironic that Cuba, a country on America’s doorstep within easy reach of American military power, and with a 55-year history of antagonistic relations with the United States has been willing to reciprocate the good will of Washington. Today’s developments reflect considerable wisdom and courage on the parts of both the United States and Cuba, and impressive leadership on the part of Pope Francis.

Many times over the years, the DPRK has had an opportunity to demonstrate similar wisdom and courage, but instead has opted for a tragic course of confrontation and duplicity. Twenty years ago this month, North Korea and the United States agreed to open liaison offices in each others’ capitals. I was supposed to open that office in Pyongyang. It is interesting to reflect on where bilateral relations might be today had Pyongyang not reneged on that agreement, as it has with so many other agreements.

Today’s move by the United States and Cuba, together with the ongoing delicate talks between the United States and Iran, serve only to highlight the degree to which the DPRK is an outlier in contemporary international society. What a tragedy for the DPRK and its people.

      

 

 

The United States, China, and Japan are at a pivotal juncture in their longstanding efforts to deal with the serious challenge to regional peace and stability posed by North Korea. How they deal with this challenge in the coming months may well determine whether or not the international community will have to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea for many years to come.

Before assessing the major elements and implications of this challenge, it is worth reviewing North Korea’s current actions.

North Korea is in the midst of an unusually intense period of diplomatic outreach. In recent months, the world has witnessed high-profile diplomatic engagement by the Pyongyang regime on a number of fronts. DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong traveled to New York City in September to address the UN General Assembly (UNGA) — the first such participation by a North Korean foreign minister in the UNGA in 15 years. While Ri scrupulously avoided contact with U.S. officials, and his staff turned away requests by influential American experts and former officials to meet with him, Ri did meet with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and delivered a letter to Ban from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Other senior North Korean official have also been busy on the diplomatic front.

For months, Pyongyang has been engaged in intense talks with Japan to resolve the fate of missing and abducted Japanese citizens. In September, the North Korean Workers’ Party secretary for international affairs, Kang Sok Ju, travelled to Europe as a special envoy of the North Korean leader, meeting with senior officials in several capitals.

More recently, Pyongyang released one of the three Americans being held for alleged offenses committed in North Korea in a gesture that some have interpreted as an effort to jump-start talks with the United States.

There have also been reports of intensified Russia-North Korea dialogue aimed at improving relations and expanding economic cooperation.[1]   North Korean diplomats in New York and Geneva have also been unusually active and outspoken in defending their country’s human rights record, and Pyongyang has even indicated a willingness to engage in discussions of its human rights record.

But perhaps the biggest diplomatic “splash” by the North occurred in relations with South Korea when three senior DPRK officials (Choe Ryong Hae, Hwang Pyong So, and Kim Yang Gon) travelled to Incheon to attend the closing ceremonies of the Asian Games. The dispatch of Hwang and Choe, generally regarded as the second- and third-ranking figures in the North Korean regime, to the South to meet with ROK counterparts made major headlines in the South Korean press and was viewed by many in the South as a harbinger of the resumption of long-suspended North-South high-level talks.

What explains this North Korean activism? Pyongyang’s diplomatic offensive seems motivated by at least three factors.

The first is the DPRK’s desire to reduce its political and economic isolation. While international sanctions, including UN Security Council measures, have not been able to end the regime’s ability to fund its nuclear weapons- and missile-related development programs, sanctions have nonetheless had some “bite.” They have constrained the regime’s ability to finance these programs, compelled the Pyongyang to expend increasingly scarce financial resources on them, and reminded the regime of the inherent contradiction of its policy of pursuing simultaneously economic and nuclear weapons development.

By reaching out to the international community, Pyongyang may be acknowledging that isolation has taken a toll, one that requires the regime to engage in creative diplomacy in the hope of easing sanctions and creating the possibility of new sources of trade and aid.

The second factor involves the state of the regime’s difficult relations with China. Beijing has been conspicuously absent as a target of Pyongyang’s diplomatic offensive, probably reflecting the current coolness in bilateral ties and the DPRK’s desire to look elsewhere for support.

China’s leader has yet to hold a summit with North Korean counterpart Kim Jong Un, even though President Xi Jinping has already met South Korean President Park Geun-hye five times, including during a state visit to the ROK (the first time a Chinese leader has ever travelled to the South before visiting the North). Senior Chinese officials have voiced concern over provocative North Korean language and actions, and many analysts believe China is holding off on a summit or improvement in ties as a way of pressuring the DPRK not to carry out a nuclear test or other provocations.

Nevertheless, China remains one of the DPRK’s few “lifelines,” providing essential aid, a modicum of diplomatic support, and a safe environment for North Korean firms to operate away from the watchful eye of international sanctions monitors. The net effect of international sanctions and isolation on the North has been to increase this dependence on China – a situation that does not sit well with a Pyongyang regime that prides itself on its independence, self-reliance, and unique brand of hypernationalism. Accordingly, and particularly in the absence of the valuable endorsement that a PRC-DPRK summit would offer, Pyongyang appears to be seeking to diversify its political and diplomatic lines of communication in an effort to ease its growing reliance on its huge neighbor.

The third factor represents an important new phenomenon: the potential for international concern over North Korea’s abysmal human rights record to affect the DPRK regime.

Close observation of the recent North Korean diplomatic outreach suggests strongly that the major driver of this initiative has been the regime’s profound concern over the international attention being given to the UN Commission of Inquiry’s (COI’s) devastating report on the DPRK’s human rights situation. Pyongyang seems deeply fearful that the UN General Assembly, and even the Security Council, might take action on the COI’s report and hold the North and its leadership accountable for the regime’s human rights record.

North Korea’s vehement denunciation of the report suggests that the inquiry has struck a raw nerve in Pyongyang, compelling the regime to mobilize its diplomatic resources in an unprecedented way to prevent further UN action, including by inviting human rights monitors to visit the country. The COI report has thus shown a remarkable ability to mobilize the international community’s outrage over the DPRK’s treatment of its people.

Importantly (and ironically), years of international pressure on the regime over its nuclear and missile programs, its violation of its international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its military provocations against its neighbors, and its threats to use nuclear weapons against others have not elicited the reaction that the COI report has received from the international community. As the international community ponders ways to affect the regime’s behavior in the future, the value of pursuing action based on the North’s long history of human rights abuses – which have now been authoritatively and definitively documented in the COI report – should not be underestimated.

Yet for all of its attempts to expand its diplomatic room for maneuver and ease international pressure and isolation, North Korea’s current offensive seems unlikely to succeed. The level of international concern over its human rights record is proving too strong and the DPRK’s concerted efforts at UN fora in New York and Geneva are unlikely to stop it. And it is hard to imagine how the notoriously defensive and closed regime could ever satisfy the demands of human rights organizations. At the end of the day, the fate of the UN’s action on the regime’s human rights record is much more likely to be determined by a Russian or Chinese veto than by the North’s strident rejection of the COI report.

Meanwhile, attempts to parley high-level diplomacy into renewed talks with Seoul (and restart the aid benefits that might flow as a result of these talks) have already fallen short. The ROK has proven unwilling to meet the North’s conditions and the military provocations in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in the waters of the West Sea that accompanied the North’s outreach clearly unnerved Seoul, causing it to back away. Despite Seoul’s keen interest in renewed dialogue, the North will have to do much more to ease the ROK’s concerns prior to any resumption of bilateral dialogue.

It also remains to be seen whether North Korea will be able to meet the high expectations that many Japanese have for talks on the fates of the many Japanese citizens believed to have been abducted by Pyongyang. At the same time, the release of a single American as a humanitarian gesture while others are still being held seems unlikely to sway the minds of U.S. policymakers, who remain determined to hold North Korea to its past denuclearization commitments and who will not in any event be interested in “trading” a moderation of this principled position for incarcerated Americans.[2]

But perhaps the biggest shortcoming of Pyongyang’s diplomatic offensive is that the DPRK’s position on its weapons of mass destruction programs remains unchanged, and therefore unacceptable to the international community. North Korea appears as committed as ever to the development of its nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. North Korea’s nuclear weapons status has now been enshrined in its constitution and the enhancement of this capability now stands as one of the two pillars (the other being economic modernization) of its national development program.

North Korean envoy Kang Sok Ju did little to ease international concerns over the regime’s nuclear aspirations when he suggested to some European interlocutors that North Korea was prepared to engage with the United States in dialogue as “one nuclear state to another” and when he suggested that as a nuclear weapons power the DPRK was prepared to adopt a “no first use” policy.

Meanwhile, according to reliable reports, North Korea is working on new delivery systems for its nuclear weapons; has constructed new launch facilities for medium- and long-range ballistic missiles; is engaging in materials and explosives testing necessary to miniaturize an effective, deliverable nuclear weapon; and may now have a second uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon – giving it additional capacity for producing fissile material for weapons.

As the only country to have threatened the use of nuclear weapons in the 21^st century, North Korea is a unique outlier in the international community. North Korean officials have told their American and other interlocutors that the regime intends to keep its nuclear weapons, which they describe as a “strategic deterrent.” Despite its formal commitments in 1994, 2005, and 2007 to freeze, open for international inspection, and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons production facilities, North Korea has rejected the idea of returning to Six-Party Talks designed to implement these commitments.

This track record leaves the international community, and the three countries represented at this forum, with a series of major challenges.

First is the strong likelihood that the DPRK will conduct individual or multiple nuclear weapons tests.  Having paid a significant political price for its determination to have nuclear weapons, and having repeatedly stressed the centrality of these weapons to its national survival, North Korea must at some point demonstrate that its “strategic deterrent” actually works. The international community should be prepared for the DPRK to take this step at a time of its own choosing.

The international community should also prepare for further testing of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles by Pyongyang. There is little credibility to a “strategic deterrent” that cannot be accurately delivered over significant distances. At some point the North will demonstrate that it has this capacity.

Another major challenge is the North’s propensity to proliferate nuclear technology and materials.  Pyongyang has a demonstrated track record in this regard, and as its technical capabilities improve there is reason to be concerned that the regime will once again be tempted to share its know-how, or work with others in the development of nuclear weapons.

As we reflect on the complicated and difficult history of past denuclearization negotiations with North Korea (negotiations that have seen the United States and others offer significant inducements to Pyongyang), another challenge the international community may face is the possibility that there is no inducement or package of inducements that can deter North Korea from continuing its single-minded pursuit of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. If everything that might be offered has been offered, and if it has not succeeded in convincing the DPRK not to pursue nuclear weapons, what does that say about the future of negotiations with Pyongyang?

Meanwhile, we are faced today with the absence of a diplomatic dialogue process that might stop, or even slow, North Korea’s pursuit of a greater nuclear weapons capability. The Six-Party Talks have been in suspense for six years and the failed U.S.-DPRK “Leap Day” dialog in early 2012 left a bitter taste in the mouths of U.S. negotiators, who appear determined not to go down that path again.

Where does this leave us — the United States, China, and Japan — at this juncture? What are the implications of these challenges for us?

When North Korea does finally demonstrate that it has the credible capacity to do what it has threatened to do – use nuclear weapons against regional targets – it will have a profound effect on the region:

• It will change the security calculus and perceptions of many of the region’s actors, who will now have to take into account a new dimension of threat and instability.
• It will raise concerns among North Korea’s neighbors about their vulnerability to intimidation and nuclear blackmail by Pyongyang.
• It will raise questions among United States allies about the U.S. deterrent and about the assurances they have received from Washington to come to their defense.
• This could, in turn, spark a debate in Seoul and Tokyo about whether the ROK and Japan need to consider developing their own deterrent.
• Uncertainty among U.S. allies and partners will require the United States to make its deterrent commitments and assurances even more explicit.
• It will also probably require the United States to take other measures, including new missile defense-related deployments, as well as conduct additional exercises and consider the deployment of other necessary technologies and forces in order to provide adequate deterrent capabilities in the region and reassure U.S. allies and partners.
• Despite U.S. assurances to the contrary, some of the steps that the United States might take may be perceived by the PRC as directed at China or as a way of neutralizing China’s own strategic forces, using the pretext of a North Korean threat. This could undermine trust between the United States and China and seriously complicate bilateral relations.

This presentation has sought to highlight the increasingly complicated nature of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions – a threat that shows every sign of becoming more serious in the months and years to come. The prospect that this threat could also roil intra-regional relations, as well as undermine peace and stability in the region, is quite real.

If nothing else, perhaps today’s discussion will offer an opportunity for American, Japanese, and Chinese experts to exchange views about how to more effectively contend with this rising challenge. It is not for this author to tell the Chinese and Japanese colleagues gathered here today how their governments could work better together and with the United States to deal with this challenge. But let me suggest in closing that it is essential that we do so, including by working together to convince Pyongyang that it cannot succeed in its attempt to pursue economic modernization and nuclear weapons development. If we can demonstrate solidarity in showing Pyongyang that its game plan is unachievable, we may also be able to convince the DPRK that its only real choice is a negotiated end to its nuclear weapons ambitions.