Brookings: Experts - Barry Rabe

The Climate Change Rebound

Barry Rabe and Christopher P. Borick — Mon, 04 Mar 2013 16:23:00 -0500

Barack Obama has rediscovered climate change. During the last month President Obama has used both his Second Inaugural Address and State of the Union speech to implore the nation to increase its efforts to combat global warming. The President has never expressed doubt about the existence of human induced climate change but he said very little about the issue after the 2010 Senate collapse of proposed climate legislation. Instead, he has turned to use of executive powers to reduce emissions, whether through vehicle fuel economy standards or application of the Clean Air Act to some greenhouse gas emissions. But climate change has become far more visible in the second round of the Obama presidency.

Notably, Obama's retreat on this topic corresponded not only with policy reversals but also with decreased levels of public belief that climate change was occurring. Between 2008 and 2010, the National Surveys on Energy and the Environment (NSEE) from the University of Michigan and Muhlenberg College found a 20 point decline in the percentage of Americans who believed there is solid evidence of global warming.

National Survey on Energy and the Environment (NSEE)

"Is there solid evidence that the average temperature on Earth has been getting warmer over the past four decades?"

	Fall 2008	Fall 2009	Spring 2010	Fall 2010	Spring 2011	Fall 2011	Spring 2012	Fall 2012 (early)	Fall 2012 (late)
Yes	72%	65%	52%	58%	55%	62%	65%	68%	67%
No	17%	20%	36%	26%	32%	26%	24%	21%	22%
Not Sure	11%	15%	13%	16%	12%	12%	11%	11%	12%

But as American acceptance of global warming rebounded in 2012 to levels approaching the peak level of belief that was found in 2008, Obama has once again taken a more aggressive public stance regarding the need for government action to address the issue. In particular, he has attempted to make a direct connection beteween recent American experience with weather and the larger issue of climate change. The president's State of the Union pitch to Americans noted: "It’s true that no single event makes a trend. But the fact is the 12 hottest years on record have all come in the last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, floods -- all are now more frequent and more intense. We can choose to believe that Superstorm Sandy, and the most severe drought in decades, and the worst wildfires some states have ever seen were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can choose to believe in the overwhelming judgment of science -- and act before it's too late."

These points from the President dovetail with the results of the Fall 2012 versions of the NSEE that surveyed Americans both before and after Superstorm Sandy. The NSEE surveys find that Americans are increasingly connecting severe weather and extreme conditions such as powerful storms and the major droughts of 2012 with the presence of global warming. So the President appears to be responding to this linkage in making the case for expanded policy engagement.

It seems clear that the president’s renewed commitment to addressing global warming has been buoyed by the growing consensus among Americans that climate change is real. What is less clear is the level of commitment that the public itself has for measures to address global warming. The fall version of the NSEE did find continued public support for policies such as increased vehicle fuel economy standards and renewable energy portfolios but very mixed public support for such policy options as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade. With a less unified public behind these options how aggressive will the White House be in pushing a policy approach that includes tax measures? And what did he mean in his State of the Union address in endorsing a "market-based" approach, unless it was one of the very policies he has not embraced post-re-election? So the President is clearly back in the climate arena but it remains unclear just what that means. This may hinge in part on just what the weather brings in the coming seasons of his second term.

Authors

Barry Rabe
Christopher P. Borick

Publication: Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

Image Source: © Shannon Stapleton / Reuters

The Political Viability of Carbon Taxation

Barry Rabe — Wed, 05 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Economists of nearly all methodological and ideological stripes concur that the best way to attempt to stave off the worst impacts of climate change is through some form of taxation on the carbon content of fossil fuels. This idea has been around for a long time. Its latest manifestation includes some form of carbon tax in order to raise government revenue as part of a grand bargain to avoid the pending fiscal cliff.

Of course, such taxes are almost invariably dismissed as political impossibilities, leading to consideration of sub-optimal policy back-ups. But is some form of carbon taxation really a political non-starter?

Findings from the Fall 2012 National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE), a partnership between the University of Michigan and Muhlenberg College, suggest that there may be greater support for such a step than is commonly assumed. It found that a narrow plurality of respondents support "a policy to reduce greenhouse gases by increasing taxes on the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas for energy."In this scenario, 29 percent were strongly supportive, 19 percent were somewhat supportive, 13 percent were somewhat opposed, and 33 percent were strongly opposed. See the CLOSUP/NSEE report released today.

This hardly suggests a huge groundswell of support. Indeed, support drops further when a specific price tag for the tax is added, one that would increase fossil fuel costs by 10 percent. But these findings are generally more supportive of a carbon tax than in previous years and in most comparable studies that ask some version of this question.

In turn, it is also quite possible that public support for a proposed tax can be influenced mightily by how the revenue is used. Dwight Eisenhower realized this nearly a half-century ago in linking the original federal carbon tax, via the gasoline excise tax, to development of highway infrastructure. And governors do this all the time on a wide range of taxes.

So the NSEE posed a scenario in a separate question whereby respondents were informed that a carbon tax was established but they were given the option to either repeal the tax or instead pursue one of five distinct options for revenue use.

Guess what? Tax repeal only finished second, with 21 percent support. The runaway winner was using all the funds for renewable energy research, with a total of 36 percent support. The only other option to crack double-digits was using all the funds to reduce the federal deficit, placing third with 16 percent support.

Table 5

Preferences for Use of an Increased Federal Tax on Fossil Fuels

Response	Percentage
Use all of the funds created by the tax for renewable energy research	36%
Repeal the tax	21%
Use all of the funds created by the tax to reduce the federal deficit	16%
Use all of the funds created by the tax to provide tax rebate checks to citizen	8%
Use all of the funds created by the tax to support highway and bridge repairs	6%
Use all of the funds created by the tax to reduce payroll taxes by equal amounts	5%
Not sure	10%

Question: "Now, if the federal government enacted a tax on fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas, which of the following options do you most prefer?"

The NSEE found a very similar set of responses when exploring possible increases in the federal gasoline excise tax, which has remained unchanged at 18.3 cents per gallon since 1993. Perhaps the politically unthinkable step of raising prices on fossil fuel use becomes more feasible if the public weighs possible revenue uses as part of the bargain, grand or otherwise.

Authors

Barry Rabe

Image Source: © Ina Fassbender / Reuters

Economics of Carbon Taxes

Barry Rabe — Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:16:00 -0500

The idea of enacting a carbon tax to address climate change and fiscal woes may be as plausible as relying on new leadership to steer the Chicago Cubs to their first world championship in over a century.

But now that another baseball season has come and gone with no changes on the North Side of Chicago, national fiscal season emerges with yet another return to the question of imposing some form of tax on some forms of fossil fuel. In this case, could such a tax be part of a fiscal cliff deal?

The carbon tax idea has been around for a long time, backed by an extensive and ideologically diverse set of economists. This includes prominent economic advisors going back to every presidential administration since that of Richard Nixon, though their public embrace of the idea tends to increase markedly after departure from public office. Even diverse think tanks are getting back into the act, reflected in yesterday’s “economics of carbon taxes” summit at the American Enterprise Institute.

Indeed, that illustrates the main rap against carbon taxes: Good economics, awful politics, public policy non-starter. Why take a risk on the best available policy option when the political costs are likely to be severe? And why not revert to third- or fourth-best policy options that obscure the costs and thereby curry greater favor? The avalanche of state and local climate initiatives over the past decade largely reflect this pattern, with carbon tax aficionados most likely to note much earlier experience from the Nordic countries as their models.

But that is not the entire story. Indeed, perhaps the most prominent example of a carbon tax in the past decade involves one Canadian province. Like the United States, Canada produces a very high rate of per capita greenhouse gas emissions. Like the United States, it has struggled mightily to formulate any federal policy on climate change. But Canada is a very decentralized federal system and some provinces have operated outside the conventional policy box, just like some states under American federalism.

Enter British Columbia. If this province seceded from Canada and joined the United States, it would clearly be a blue coastal state, somewhat akin to neighboring Oregon and Washington. But this is hardly a case in which environmental advocates seized power and imposed their will. Key design elements and features follow:

Center-right Political Push. The push for a tax that would steadily ramp up to $30 per ton of carbon dioxide over a four-year period came from the Liberal Party, the center-right governing party. It faced stiff opposition from the left-center New Democratic Party, which endorsed virtually every climate policy option except a tax. This was approved in 2008, the Liberal Party won subsequent re-election, and continues to hold power despite a change in its premier. The tax reached its peak of $30 in January 2012, roughly equivalent to 27 cents per gallon on gasoline and also applied to other fossil fuels. (See Shi-Ling Hsu’s The Case for a Carbon Tax for a fuller discussion)

Targeted Revenue Use. Most of the focus on carbon taxes has emerged from the economics community, looking at competing designs and likely economic consequences. Far less attention has been paid to how revenue might be allocated—and whether or not that makes a political difference. British Columbia systematically linked cost-imposition (the tax) with public benefits. This began with a small rebate check to all citizens but followed with a revenue-neutral approach that involved a commensurate reduction in other provincial taxes. There is ample precedent in the United States for linking new energy taxes to demonstrable benefits, ranging from Dwight Eisenhower’s use of gasoline excise revenues to Sarah Palin’s allocation of funds from her oil windfall profits tax overhaul in Alaska.

Rapid Implementation. Imposition of the first wave of the tax was almost immediate, building on established tax platforms and necessitating virtually no staff expansion. Indeed, the overseeing minister faced a 15 percent salary penalty if key implementation requirements were missed. This is greatly at odds with many other climate policies, such as California which is about to enter its seventh year of deliberation on how to implement its cap-and-trade program and how to use any revenues generated via auction.

Measurable Impacts. The best analysis to date suggests that the tax has had a demonstrable impact on reducing fossil fuel use and emissions. In turn, the province has experienced higher GDP growth than the average rate among provinces during this period, confirming the Nordic experience that a unilateral energy tax can coincide with economic growth.

No other province or state has rushed in to replicate the British Columbia model and it may remain a single-case fluke in North America. But if carbon taxes ever shift from the agenda of former public officials to current ones (including newly-elected ones facing a fiscal cliff), it offers numerous lessons on political feasibility. These might prove particularly useful for newly-elected officials eager to avoid a fiscal cliff. Even the Chicago Cubs need to get ready for next year, just in case.

Authors

Barry Rabe

Image Source: © Nguyen Huy Kham / Reuters

Fracking, Legislation and the Court

Barry Rabe — Mon, 06 Aug 2012 12:21:00 -0400

The ink was barely dry on far-reaching new Pennsylvania legislation to regulate hydraulic fracking practices before a state appellate court recently overturned key provisions as an unconstitutional encroachment on traditional land-use policies.

This ruling serves as a reminder that few governance issues are as contentious as governmental battles over land-use decisions. Federal and state policies that restrict land-use preferences have routinely been assaulted by waves of litigation, many aiming to return authority to private and local hands.

But many of the very organizations so outraged by top-down governmental control have been remarkably quiet as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted far-reaching legislation that dramatically shifted one major form of land-use from local to near-total state control. This is why last week’s decision by the Commonwealth Court to overturn key legislative provisions will only serve to draw more attention to this issue, as a larger national debate likely begins on all facets of governance related to fracking.

In this case, the issue involves state desire for maximal extraction of natural gas through hydraulic fracking techniques. Pennsylvania was the “Saudi Arabia of oil” before Saudi Arabia was formed, dominating world production in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries (to learn more, read Daniel Yergin’s book, The Quest). Aggressive use of fracking in the Marcellus Shale may well provide the state a route back to an energy-intensive economy, one also offering some significant environmental benefits given the upsides of natural gas.

But the Pennsylvania legislature and Governor Tom Corbett went off the deep end earlier this year by enacting Act 13, a sweeping statute covering many aspects of fracking governance. Among the most significant provisions was a remarkably detailed and complex set of measures designed to strip local governments of basic land-use controls long protected under Pennsylvania’s planning code that emphasizes local authority.

These new provisions include tight constraints on how localities may address such issues as restricting vehicle access routes, well site operation hours, conditions for site screening and fencing, or limiting structural height or noise from facility operations. Every aspect of this legislation was designed to establish uniform land-use approaches to fracking operations, even in densely-populated areas. It severely constrains local governments and private land-holders from making independent judgments.

The state went even further by blocking local authority to challenge any state regulatory decisions related to shale gas permits and threatening localities with immediate loss of their share of “local impact fee” revenues in the event of any local encroachment on state authority. Indeed, this legislation is a model for its ability to look at every conceivable regulatory provision as a venue for shifting authority from private and local hands toward state regulatory agencies.

The passage of Act 13 in March led to a near-immediate turn to the courts by local governments. This included expressions of support for the challenge from legislators who had just voted in favor of the bill but began to see immediate impacts back home. The Commonwealth Court’s majority opinion concluded that Act 13 “violates substantive due process because it does not protect the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of neighborhoods and makes irrational classifications.”

Invariably, the state will appeal and the battle will continue in Harrisburg and elsewhere. But this case serves as a reminder that many basic governance issues related to shale gas are largely in state hands. Surveys suggest that the citizens of Pennsylvania would prefer a very different state policy approach, though they are generally supportive of continued pursuit of shale gas development.

For decades, states have argued that they were engaged in a “race to the top,” finding creative ways to integrate local land-use and environmental protection needs with economic and energy development opportunities. Thus far, Pennsylvania appears to be racing in the opposite direction.

How much authority should state governments have in determining land-use decisions linked to energy development? Should they treat all proposed energy sources, from shale gas drills to wind turbines, in the same way?

Authors

Barry Rabe

Image Source: © Claudia Daut / Reuters

American Belief and Policy in Climate Change: Spring 2012 NSAPOCC Findings

Christopher Borick and Barry Rabe — Mon, 11 Jun 2012 11:20:00 -0400

Barry Rabe and Christopher Borick present findings from their Spring 2012 National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change survey in two papers.

The first, "Public Views on Climate Policy Options," present highlights on the issue of public support for a range of climate policy options. It finds that Americans tend to be opposed to those kinds of policies most commonly endorsed by economists, namely taxes and emission trading mechanisms that utilize market principles in attempting to achieve cost-effective reductions. In contrast, Americans tend to support those kinds of policies least commonly endorsed by economists, including a range of regulatory programs related to energy development, industrial emission controls, and vehicular fuel mandates.

The second paper, "Continued Rebound in American Belief in Climate Change," highlights the relatively high number of Americans that indicated there is solid evidence of global warming, countering declines in belief levels that occurred in Spring interviews following winter seasons in 2010 and 2011. This contrast with past spring results corresponds with substantially varied winter weather in most parts of the United States in recent years; the 2010 and 2011 winters produced record snowfall in many areas whereas the 2012 winter season ended up as one of the most mild in the last century. This correlation of weather variation and changing levels of belief is accompanied by additional evidence that Americans are linking weather events and experiences to their views on the existence of climate change.

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Authors

Christopher Borick
Barry Rabe

Image Source: © Mike Hutchings / Reuters

Americans Cool on Geoengineering Approaches to Addressing Climate Change

Barry Rabe and Christopher P. Borick — Wed, 30 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Given the political and economic challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, there is growing interest in finding alternative methods of dealing with climate change. In a new paper, Christopher Borick and Barry Rabe look at the American public's attitude towards using geoengineering solutions as a means to combat global warming. Highlights from their findings include:

High levels of doubt among U.S. residents about the ability of society to adapt to a hotter climate and deep concerns about the safety and effectiveness of geoengineering options.
Two out of every three Americans said that they do not agree that we should shift attention away from trying to stop global warming and instead focus on adaptation.
Most Americans also reject the notion that adaptation to global warming will be relatively easy for humanity to achieve.
A solid majority of Americans do not believe that scientists will be able to find ways to alter the climate to limit problems caused by global warming.

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Americans Cool on Geoengineering Approaches to Addressing Climate Change

Authors

Barry Rabe
Christopher P. Borick

Belief in Global Warming on the Rebound: Fall 2011 National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change

Christopher P. Borick and Barry Rabe — Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:14:00 -0500

As 2012 begins, a growing number of Americans believe global warming is occurring. This is one of the key findings from the latest National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change (NSAPOCC).

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Other highlights include:

More Americans than ever are pointing to experiences with warmer temperatures as the main reason they believe global warming is occurring.
For Americans who believe that climate change is occurring, factors beyond weather (such as: declining polar species) appear to be having the greatest effect on convincing an individual that the planet is warming.
Nearly 80% of Democrats believe in global warming, while Republicans are almost evenly split with 47% seeing evidence of increasing global temperatures.

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Belief in Global Warming on the Rebound: National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change

Authors

Christopher P. Borick
Barry Rabe

Climate Compared: Public Opinion on Climate Change in the United States and Canada

Christopher P. Borick, Erick Lachapelle and Barry Rabe — Mon, 11 Apr 2011 15:35:00 -0400

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the key findings report for the National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change and the National Survey of Canadian Public Opinion on Climate Change.

The following report summarizes results drawn from national level surveys in the United States and Canada that examine public perceptions regarding various aspects of climate change. Since 2008, the National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change (NSAPOCC) has examined the perceptions and preferences of residents of the United States regarding their views on the existence of climate change and potential policy approaches to address global warming. In order to gain comparative perspective on climate change matters in Canada, the National Survey of Canadian Public Opinion on Climate Change (NSCPOCC) accompanied the most recent version of the NSAPOCC. This report provides insight into the evolution of American public opinion regarding climate matters while producing direct comparisons between the views of the American and Canadian publics on matters pertaining to climate change and its mitigation.

KEY FINDINGS

After experiencing significant declines in the level of belief that global warming is occurring between the fall of 2008 and spring of 2010, American belief rebounded slightly in late 2010, but remained well below the levels observed in 2008.
Belief in climate change among Canadians substantially outpaces belief in this phenomenon among residents of the United States.
For residents of Canada and the United States that believe that climate change is occurring there is general belief that this constitutes a very serious problem.
In the United States an individual’s partisan affiliation is the most important determinant of their views on the existence of global warming, with Democrats significantly more likely than Republicans to believe that the Earth is warming.
Partisan affiliation is also associated with individual views on global warming in Canada, with Conservative Party supporters significantly less likely than supporters of all other parties to believe the Earth is warming.
Among the cohort of Americans and Canadians who believe in climate change there is significant division on the root causes of global warming, with most believers pointing to both human activity and natural factors as contributing to increasing world temperatures.
Americans remain highly divided on claims that scientists are manipulating climate research for their own interests, with most Canadians rejecting such claims.
While placing the primary responsibility for addressing global warming on the federal government, a majority of both Canadians and Americans believe that state/provincial and local governments share responsibility for addressing this problem.
Canadians expressed a higher degree of willingness to pay for increased production of renewable energy resources than their American counterparts.

While most Americans do not support such policy options as cap and trade and carbon taxes, a majority of Canadians indicated that they would support such policy options even if they imposed increased costs of up to $50 per month in energy expenses.

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Authors

Christopher P. Borick
Erick Lachapelle
Barry Rabe

Greenhouse Governance : Addressing Climate Change in America

Barry Rabe, ed. — Tue, 17 Aug 2010 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2010 382pp.

Public deliberation over climate change has traditionally been dominated by the natural and physical sciences. Is the planet warming? To what degree, and is mankind responsible? How big a problem is this, really? But concurrent with these debates is the question of what should be done. Indeed, what can be done? Issues of governance, including the political feasibility of certain policies and their capacity for implementation, have received short shrift in the conversation. But they absolutely must be addressed as we respond to this unprecedented challenge. Greenhouse Governance brings a much-needed public policy mindset to discussion of climate change in America.

Greenhouse Governance features a number of America's preeminent public policy scholars, examining some aspect of governance and climate change. They analyze the state and influence of American public opinion on climate change as well as federalism and intergovernmental relations, which prove especially important since state and local governments have taken a more active role than originally expected. Specific policy issues examined include renewable electricity standards, mandating greater vehicle fuel economy, the "adaptation vs. mitigation" debate, emissions trading, and carbon taxes.

The contributors do consider the scientific and economic questions of climate policy but place special emphasis on political and managerial issues. They analyze the role of key American government institutions including the courts, Congress, and regulatory agencies. The final two chapters put the discussion into an international context, looking at climate governance challenges in North America, relations with the European Union, and possible models for international governance.

Contributors: Christopher Borick (Muhlenberg College), Martha Derthick (University of Virginia), Kirsten Engel (University of Arizona), Marc Landy (Boston College), Pietro Nivola (Brookings Institution), Paul Posner (George Mason University), Leigh Raymond (Purdue University), Walter Rosenbaum (University of Florida) Ian Rowlands (University of Waterloo) Henrik Selin (Boston University), Stacy VanDeveer (University of New Hampshire)

Advance Praise for the Book

“Greenhouse Governance addresses a profound national challenge: the linkage between U.S. climate governance, our national and international policies regarding energy, and our ever-present obligations involving our national security. Every citizen has a duty to learn about these present and future contingencies; this book is a valuable resource.”
—Senator John Warner (R-Va., retired)

“With international climate negotiations at an impasse, the responsibility to address climate change continues to fall to national, state, and local governments, many of which have demonstrated tremendous leadership and creativity. This timely volume brings together prominent experts to examine policy experience to date, both within the United States and beyond its borders. The result is invaluable insight into climate governance that works, as well as pitfalls to be avoided by U.S. policymakers.”
—Kathryn Harrison, University of British Columbia

“Climate change is one of the most complex and intensely debated issues of our day. Recognizing a need for comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis, the Miller Center of Public Affairs convened top scholars from political science, law, and history for the national conference which led to the publication of Greenhouse Governance. I know of no other treatment of the subject that more thoroughly or practically presents the big-picture implications of climate change governance concerns and the strategies for addressing them.”
—Gerald L. Baliles, former Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Barry Rabe

Barry G. Rabe is professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and professor of the environment in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts at the University of Michigan. He is also a nonresident scholar in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.

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Energy and Climate Change 2010: Back to the Future

Tue, 18 May 2010 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 18, 2010
9:00 AM - 4:30 PM EDT

Atrium Hall
The Ronald Reagan Building
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC

International negotiations in Copenhagen last December marked a turning point in the prospects for a global agreement on climate change. The talks were successful on some critical areas—such as an unprecedented number of domestic reduction pledges from both developed and developing countries as well as pledges to reduce emissions from deforestation and initial commitments for financing—but many daunting challenges remain to be tackled in 2010 at the national and international levels. Perhaps the most important results of Copenhagen are the implications for the future of the United Nations process on global warming and the necessity for economically sound U.S. domestic action to reduce carbon emissions.

Meanwhile, despite some progress, efforts have stalled to forge a bipartisan congressional agreement this year on climate change legislation that would combine limits on carbon emissions with incentives for other energy sources.

On May 18, the Brookings Institution held a forum on energy and climate policy. Brookings President Strobe Talbott welcomed participants and Brookings Managing Director William Antholis moderated a panel on international climate diplomacy. Offering the administration perspective, Todd Stern, special climate envoy at the Department of State, provided one keynote address, and David Sandalow, assistant secretary for policy and international affairs at the Department of Energy, delivered a second. Congressional Budget Office Director Douglas Elmendorf offered remarks at lunch.

Read Todd Stern's prepared remarks » (pdf)

View Doug Elmendorf's presentation at cbo.gov » (pdf)

Video

Transcript

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Todd Stern

Special Climate Envoy, Department of State

Moderator: William J. Antholis

Managing Director, The Brookings Institution

Eileen Claussen

President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change

Introduction and Moderator: Daniel H. Yergin

Co-Founder and Chairman, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

David B. Sandalow

Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy

Moderator: Shirley Jackson

President, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Jonathan Epstein

Counsel, Office of Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)
Professional Staff Member, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Barry Rabe

Professor of Public Policy, Gerald Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan
Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Moderator: Ted Gayer

Co-Director, Economic Studies

Douglas W. Elmendorf

Director, Congressional Budget Office

Dallas Burtraw

Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future

Michael Wara

Assistant Law Professor, Stanford University

The Climate of Belief: American Public Opinion on Climate Change

Christopher P. Borick and Barry Rabe — Wed, 06 Jan 2010 09:47:00 -0500

Executive Summary

Climate change has gained enormous visibility during the past year, reflected in a range of American policy initiatives leading up to the international deliberations in Copenhagen. The Environmental Protection Agency has designated carbon dioxide as an air pollutant and issued an endangerment finding that could generate federal regulation of emissions. Far-reaching climate legislation passed the House of Representatives in June 2009 and has since moved to the Senate for consideration. President Barack Obama has negotiated an intergovernmental agreement designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. The president also pledged specific emission reduction targets as part of the American bargaining position at Copenhagen, though the recent summit produced very modest agreements. At the same time, a wide range of state and local government climate policies continue to be adopted and many are now being implemented.

But what does the American public think about the issue of climate change and possible policy responses? Have these views changed over time? We have tracked American public opinion on this issue for several years and are particularly attentive to any shifts between 2008 and 2009 in this year’s National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change. Known as the Muhlenberg-Michigan study, this opinion research reflects ongoing collaboration between the Muhlenberg College Institute of Public Opinion and the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan. This report will provide brief introduction to some of the key findings from our latest study, with a much longer analysis to be included in the forthcoming Brookings Institution Press book, Greenhouse Governance: Addressing Climate Change in America, edited by Barry Rabe.

The 2009 version of this survey drew from a telephone survey of 988 American adults who were interviewed between September 21 and November 20 of 2009. This followed a period of intense media coverage of climate change and various policy initiatives domestically and internationally. The latter stage of our survey period also coincided with the media frenzy surrounding the hacking and disclosure of e-mail communications between some prominent climate scientists that has raised questions about the rigor and transparency of climate research. This also overlapped a period in which a few other surveys reported some significant shifts in public attitudes from prior years, as well as competition for public attention with other issues such as the economic contraction, medical care reform, and foreign policy.

This report presents three sections on key findings from the 2009 survey. First, we examine whether Americans believe that global temperatures are increasing, and if so, what is causing this change. Second, we explore public views on a range of possible policy interventions and possible engagement by various levels of American government. Third, we consider a pair of policy options that have received considerable attention at the federal level in the past year, namely a carbon cap-and-trade program and taxation of the carbon content of fossil fuels.

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Authors

Christopher P. Borick
Barry Rabe

The Complexities of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Policies: Early Lessons from the States

Barry Rabe — Thu, 09 Oct 2008 12:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

Trading of emissions under a cap-and-trade regime continues to receive prominent attention as a possible approach to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to climate change. This model draws heavily on earlier American experience with conventional pollutants such as sulfur dioxide. It has been embraced by a wide range of policy analysts and activists as a policy tool that can harness market forces and deliver substantial reductions at relatively low cost. The European Union has already launched such a system, known as the Emissions Trading Scheme, and the 110th Congress has featured considerable debate over comparable approaches, most notably the Climate Security Act sponsored by Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and John Warner (R-VA). But well before any federal legislation can be enacted, much less implemented, at least one regional cap-and-trade program, involving ten Northeastern states, has already begun operation through an initial auctioning of carbon allowances on September 25. In turn, thirteen other states, located in the Pacific West and the Great Lakes Basin, are considering similar strategies. This poses many important issues of federalism, as the federal government begins to play catchup with states and will have to give thought to sorting out federal and state responsibilities. But the Northeastern experiment also affords an early glimpse into an American effort to launch a carbon cap-and-trade regime, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Many accounts of emissions trading programs simply assume that such policies self-implement since they are “market-based” and because of the widely-heralded success of the American trading program for sulfur dioxide. This account notes the considerable achievements to date in the multi-state RGGI process but also highlights important implementation challenges that face it as well as any plausible federal adaptation of a carbon cap-and-trade program in coming years. The lack thus far of serious federal-state dialogue over possible forms of intergovernmental collaboration or possible federal policy learning from early state experience may only accentuate the difficulties of future policy development and implementation.

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Barry Rabe

The Climate of Opinion: State Views on Climate Change and Policy Options

Christopher P. Borick and Barry Rabe — Tue, 16 Sep 2008 12:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

The 2008 presidential race may be the first in which the candidates’ positions on climate change have some influence on electoral outcome. Barack Obama and John McCain have already carved out policy proposals, reflecting the growing saliency of climate change issues among voters on the left and right. While the 110th Congress will likely adjourn with little done on the environment, legislators—trying to position themselves and their committees for lead roles in the next Congress—will ultimately have to respond to the growing number of Americans concerned about global warming. However, the next U.S. president and Congress, as in previous years, will likely struggle to formulate a response.

Ironically, at a time when federal institutions are giving expanded attention to the issue, state governments have already taken a lead role in most areas of American climate policy development. State policy responses include mandating increases in energy from renewable sources, reducing carbon emissions from vehicles, and developing cap-and-trade policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from utilities and major manufacturers. Therefore, any future federal policy has the opportunity to learn from real state experience, including public receptivity to policy.

A good deal of research has attempted to discern the public’s views on climate change, which was reviewed in an earlier Issues in Governance Studies paper. But much of the existing analysis has focused on national samples and averages, and does not take into account state or regional variation. Nor has it weighed federalism concerns, namely support for federal as opposed to state-based policy strategies.

Based upon a telephone survey conducted in late 2007, this paper examines public attitudes towards climate change, with particular emphasis on policy options, in Michigan and Pennsylvania—two states deemed major battlegrounds for McCain and Obama.

In addition to looking to states for possible policy solutions, Washington must also confront several questions, including how to design and implement policies with states that have very different levels of capacity and patterns of emissions growth. It must also contend with a blizzard of demands for special treatment from key interests, ranging from established vehicle manufacturers to entrepreneurial proponents of new technologies designed to save energy. All this will likely unfold amid concern over spikes in energy prices, including gasoline, which could be further influenced by new climate initiatives. As a result, there is no guarantee of federal action at any point in the near future, leaving the possibility of continuing state domination of this policy area for some time to come.

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Christopher P. Borick
Barry Rabe

A Reason to Believe: Examining the Factors that Determine Americans’ Views on Global Warming

Christopher P. Borick and Barry Rabe — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 12:00:00 -0400

Executive Summary

During the past two years, public perceptions of global warming have shifted significantly in the United States. A number of 2007 national surveys reveal that Americans increasingly acknowledge global warming’s existence and believe anthropogenic factors are its cause. Another national survey in spring 2008 shows that the number of Americans who believe that there is significant evidence of global warming may have declined. These shifts in public opinion have been widely discussed in the media and academia, but little is actually known about what drives individual views on global warming. Do personal experiences impact views (e.g. hotter temperatures in their state)? Does existing evidence presented in national media (e.g. melting glaciers), scientific projections (e.g. computer modeling), dramatic experiences (e.g. disastrous hurricanes or award-winning films), or some combination of these factors influence public beliefs?

This report, the first of a two-part series, seeks to measure the relative impact of an array of factors on individual perceptions of global warming. Results from a telephone survey of 1,500 individuals in multiple states indicate that individual experiences and existing evidence influence belief in global warming more than scientific projections or single event occurrences such as Hurricane Katrina. Numerous individual characteristics (e.g. partisan affiliation, gender, age) also affect belief in global warming A later report, which draws from this survey analysis, will examine public receptivity to a range of policy options available to policymakers at both federal and state levels.

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Christopher P. Borick
Barry Rabe

Can Congress Govern the Climate?

Barry Rabe — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0400

A branch of the federal government has taken a major decision on the future of American climate change policy. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded, through its decision in Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, that the executive branch must revisit its unwillingness to define carbon dioxide as an air pollutant. In this case, the Bush Administration offered a vigorous defense that it was under no obligation to do so. In contrast, a sizable intergovernmental cast took the opposite stance, led by the Massachusetts Attorney General and backed by counterparts from ten other states. Even localities entered the fray, as large-city mayors endorsed amicus briefs designed to persuade the court to mandate federal action.

Consequently, virtually every branch and level of the American government was engaged in this case. Conspicuous by its absence was the legislative branch of the federal government. Ironically, the Supreme Court case was focused in large part on an attempt to divine Congressional intent some seventeen years ago. At that point, Congress enacted its most recent amendments to the Clean Air Act but left ample room for debate as to whether carbon dioxide could be added to the lexicon of air pollutants as scientific understanding of its role in climate change matured. Since that 1990 enactment, Congress has offered remarkably few formal utterances on climate change, essentially delegating the lead role in American climate policy development to the Bush Administration and to state-level officials from Sacramento to Concord.

In many respects, this case mirrors a larger pattern of Congressional inaction on issues of profound intergenerational consequence. Congress has struggled mightily in recent decades to reach any semblance of consensus on a host of environmental and energy concerns, including those with relevance to climate change. This paper will attempt to examine some of the stumbling blocks to prior Congressional engagement as well as highlight particular policy and governance challenges for any future Congressional attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In turn, it will conclude by highlighting some starting points whereby the 110th Congress might begin to reverse this trend and begin constructive deliberation, drawing from previous models and unique opportunities presented by the current context.

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Barry Rabe

Publication: New York University John Brademas Center for the Study of Congress

What Will it Cost to Fight Global Warming?

Barry Rabe — Thu, 22 Feb 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Many scientists say immediate action is needed to stop global warming. Brookings nonresident senior fellow Barry Rabe joins economists on NPR's Talk of the Nation to argue whether the benefits of any realistic solutions are worth the costs and whether we can afford to stop global warming.

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Barry Rabe

Publication: NPR's Talk of the Nation

Second Generation Climate Policies in the American States: Proliferation, Diffusion, and Regionalization

Barry Rabe — Tue, 01 Aug 2006 00:00:00 -0400

Nearly 15 years after its ratification of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and a decade after its negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States federal government has maintained its posture of climate policy disengagement. Congress has rejected a series of legislative proposals that would have established modest targets for containing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions from major sources. The Bush Administration remains tightly scripted, endorsing further research and voluntary reductions, but nothing more. Even British Prime Minister Tony Blair's push for some American flexibility on the issue, in conjunction with his leadership of the G8 nations and push for new climate initiatives, got a cold shoulder in Washington.

This familiar tale, however, fails to provide a complete picture of evolving American engagement in climate policy. Indeed, at the very time federal institutions continued to thrash about on this issue, major new initiatives were launched with bipartisan support in such diverse state capitals as Sacramento, Carson City, Santa Fe, Austin, Harrisburg, Albany, and Hartford. Even Blair has gotten in on the federalism act, negotiating transatlantic climate partnerships with California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger rather than with a governor-turned-president like George W. Bush.

As of August 2006, more than half of American states could be fairly characterized as actively involved in climate change, with one or more policies that promise to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Virtually all states have begun to at least study the issue and explore very modest remedies. A growing number of these states are every bit as engaged on multiple policy fronts as counterparts in European capitals. These state programs are beginning to have some effect on stabilizing emissions from their jurisdictions. Indeed, many states are major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, with considerable potential for reduction. If the fifty states were to secede and become sovereign nations, thirteen would rank among the world's top forty nations in emissions, including Texas in seventh place ahead of the United Kingdom. So if it is globally consequential when other nations establish climate policies, state engagement is more than a matter of environmental trivial pursuit.

There are, of course, profound limitations on what American states, acting individually or collectively, can do to reverse the steady growth of American greenhouse gas releases of recent decades. States face enormous constitutional constraints, including prohibitions against the negotiation of international treaties and restrictions on commercial interstate transactions. This paper will consider the historic role of American states in national policy development and particular drivers that seem pivotal in the climate case. It will also examine state climate policy evolution, with particular attention to new trends that have emerged in the past few years. Finally, we will consider possible limitations facing state-driven policy and opportunities for these statehouse-level developments to continue to expand and ultimately define a unique American response to this enormous policy challenge.

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Statehouse and Greenhouse : The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy

Barry Rabe — Wed, 11 Feb 2004 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2004 240pp.

Recipient of the 2005 Lynton Keith Caldwell prize for the best book on environmental politics and policy.

Few public policy issues seem as hopeless as global climate change. Mounting evidence shows that accumulating levels of greenhouse gases are already beginning to alter climate patterns, and this only intensifies concerns about long-term dangers. In turn, potential policy remedies appear feckless. Prospects for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are highly uncertain even among nations that have ratified the accord. At the national level, the United States, which is the leading source of greenhouse gases, remains completely disengaged from the Kyoto process. Increasingly, other developed nations severely criticize the United States for its perceived failure to engage this issue.

But a quiet yet growing trend for state governments to assume a leadership role in reducing greenhouse gases suggests that a far more robust process for American policy development is under way. Conventional analyses assume that climate change can only be addressed by international regimes and national governments. However, many states have developed active, multi-faceted programs to address carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases within a diverse array of policy sectors, including energy, environmental protection, transportation, natural resources, and agriculture.

In Statehouse and Greenhouse, Barry G. Rabe examines this evolving policy process. He devotes particular attention to the factors prompting so many states to take significant steps toward greenhouse gas reduction. These states cut across regions and traditional partisan divides; agency-based policy entrepreneurs appear to be central players in developing policy ideas and forming viable coalitions. Rabe argues that this recent flurry of experience can move the debate over climate change from hyperbole to the realm of what is politically, economically, and technically feasible. He also offers alternatives for future policy development. These would build on recent state initiatives and actively engage them in long-term policy formation and implementation.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Barry Rabe

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Statehouse and Greenhouse: The States Are Taking the Lead on Climate Change

Barry Rabe — Fri, 01 Mar 2002 00:00:00 -0500

Washington's role in greenhouse gas reduction remains as unclear today as it was in the late 1980s, when a convergence of research and steamy summers thrust the matter of climate change onto the national agenda. Although Vice President Al Gore personally negotiated key elements of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton-Gore administration never seriously pursued Senate ratification of the treaty. George W. Bush entered the White House last year voicing general support for addressing climate change, but he quickly withdrew the United States from direct involvement in ongoing post-Kyoto deliberations. It took him more than a year to offer any indication of what might follow. His Valentine's Day 2002 recommendations may buy him some political cover but are at best a fig leaf, likely to have little impact on greenhouse gas releases even if approved and implemented.

Ironically, while Washington has continued to stumble on the global warming issue, a number of states have launched constructive efforts to lower emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases. Independently the states have passed more than three dozen laws—many during the past two years—establishing specific strategies. These strategies involve formal commitments in virtually every sector that can influence such heat-trapping gases, including electricity generation, air pollution regulation, transportation, forestry and natural resource preservation, and agriculture. The action at the state level has received remarkably little attention from environmentalists, journalists, or scholars, yet it includes elements of a new "policy architecture" for reducing effluents that the new Bush proposals ignore.

Policy for a Different Kind of Environmental Problem

International environmental agreements have a very mixed track record, particularly when it comes to implementation. In general, the more stakeholders, the greater the difficulty of monitoring and assuring compliance; the larger the economic dislocations, the greater the likely resistance to implementation. The Kyoto Protocol's scope of intended collective action is truly stunning, making it as complex an international agreement as has ever been negotiated in any sphere of public policy.

Protocol tinkering has continued, without input from the U.S. government, most notably in 2001 meetings in Germany and Morocco. Representatives of some 165 nations are trying to carve out rules of engagement for the much smaller subset of industrialized nations that would pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Alas, American disengagement has provided a visible stage for widespread denunciation of the United States. At the same time, each round of international discussion results in more deal-cutting—on everything from more favorable measurement of "carbon sinks" to reduced targets for select nations—and exposes more potential loopholes. It also remains unclear whether, even if they ratify the agreement, many nations will take its implementation seriously.

Turning to the States: The Realm of the Possible

American states provide particularly fertile ground for policy innovation in climate change. First, many are quite large in terms of population, physical size, and resources devoted to environmental protection. They also spew a lot of harmful emissions. Indeed, if the American states were counted as sovereign nations, approximately half would rank among the top 60 national emitters of greenhouse gases around the globe. The annual carbon dioxide emissions of Texas, for example, exceed those of France. Indiana's exceed Indonesia's, and Georgia's exceed Venezuela's.

Second, states already have considerable jurisdiction over many spheres of environmental and energy policy with direct relevance to the climate change problem. State rules affect electricity rates, land use, waste management, and transportation. States also implement many federal environmental laws, issuing more than 90 percent of all environmental permits and conducting more than 75 percent of all enforcement actions.

Third, a growing body of scholarship suggests that far more innovation in American environmental and energy policy now emanates from the statehouses than from Congress. States now dominate policy formation in pollution prevention and cross-media regulatory integration, an exigency long neglected in Washington.

State governments, of course, vary markedly in their commitment to protecting the environment. The most active states in climate change policy are those along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, but others too are redefining policy. The leading states tend not to be dominated by one political party; in fact, many of their most important initiatives have been enacted with bipartisan support, offering potential political lessons for federal policy. Often, affected industries have welcomed the opportunity to "claim credit" for early reductions and have not found adjustment costs particularly onerous.

Comprehensive Cuts: New Jersey

In 1998, then-governor of New Jersey, Christine Whitman (now chief of the Environmental Protection Agency) became the only North American political official obligated to implement the Kyoto Protocol. That year Whitman issued an executive order setting a goal of reducing the state's greenhouse gases by 3.5 percent below 1990 levels by 2005. If New Jersey succeeds, it would be in line to reach the larger cuts pledged under Kyoto by decade's end. To meet its commitment, New Jersey is using a comprehensive strategy coordinating every relevant state department or agency, from agriculture to transportation. Perhaps most noteworthy, the New Jersey Greenhouse Gas Registry facilitates intrastate crediting and trading of carbon dioxide emissions. The state expanded the registry in 1998 through a formal agreement with the Netherlands, sanctioning emission trading projects between an American state and a European nation. More recently, the state is trying to link more flexible approval of industrial permits with corporate pledges to reduce greenhouse gases.

Standards for New Plants: Oregon

Oregon has undertaken a decade-long search for ways of reducing its contributions to global warming. Its most important action derives from a series of laws signed by Democratic Governor John Kitzhaber establishing a formal standard for carbon dioxide releases from new electric power plants. Oregon has received many proposals for new facilities, particularly small- to moderate-sized plants that burn the most benign fossil fuel, natural gas. The new standard requires that carbon emissions from any new power plant proposed for operation in Oregon must be at least 17 percent below those of the most efficient natural gas-fired plant now operating in the United States. Proposed plants may meet this standard either by developing more efficient technologies or by purchasing carbon dioxide offsets through the Oregon Climate Trust, which is empowered to pursue carbon dioxide mitigation projects. Initial Climate Trust projects include solar rural electrification, geothermal heating, reforestation, and methane reuse from coal mines and sewage treatment plants.

Standards for Established Plants: Massachusetts

Whereas Oregon has concentrated on new energy facilities, Massachusetts has focused on some of its most established—and significant—greenhouse gas sources. In April 2001, Republican Governor Jane Swift issued regulations that establish carbon dioxide caps for six power plants that collectively produce 40 percent of the state's electricity. Each must reduce its carbon dioxide releases 10 percent below late 1990 levels by 2004-06. Options for attaining compliance include changing fuel or generating technologies, swapping carbon dioxide reduction credits with other plants in the state, or investing in off-system reductions. Several other states, including Illinois, New Hampshire, and New York, have been actively considering their own versions of this approach.

Looking Ahead

It is possible that the federal government will soon shift gears on climate change, developing a comprehensive and creative policy. It is also possible that the Chicago Cubs will reverse a near-century of futility and win the next World Series. Neither prospect seems plausible.

In the meantime the United States would be well advised to build on the best practices emerging at the state level. Congress and the executive could begin by requiring annual reporting on greenhouse gas releases and establishing formal metrics for banking and trading projects. They might also follow the lead of Massachusetts and its counterparts, expanding the "multipollutant" definition to include greenhouse gases and emulating the most promising state reduction strategies.

It might also be desirable to link the climate change question with the question of how to divide federal and state responsibilities for environmental and energy policy. Although virtually every study on the "future of environmental policy" since the first Earth Day in 1970 has recommended finding more rational ways to allocate these responsibilities, the old hodge-podge of intergovernmental duties and tensions persists.

The Clinton administration attempted some decentralization by offering to negotiate National Environmental Performance Partnership agreements with states. The goal was to spur more innovation and measurable performance improvements by offering states greater flexibility in regulatory compliance and in spending federal grant dollars. More than 40 states participated in some fashion, although it is not clear that they or the federal government have yet devoted much energy or creativity to this process.

The Bush administration could take this tool and invite states, individually or regionally, to outline a more state-based approach to climate change policy. It could challenge groups such as the National Governors Association, Environmental Council of the States, and National Association of State Energy Officials to weave a state-based strategy on greenhouse gas reductions into a larger compact on regulatory federalism. As long as performance measures were established—and goals attained—states could receive far more latitude than under traditional regulation. They could actively engage in interstate emissions trading, possibly making expanded use of interstate compacts or even state-to-nation trading as is now being examined between New Jersey and the Netherlands as well as a cluster of New England states and Maritime provinces.

Such a devolution of leadership would, in effect, reflect the policy reality of the past decade. Tapping into the experience of the states in setting realistic climate change policy—while recognizing its current limits—might finally move us beyond the fractious debate of the past decade.

Authors

Barry Rabe