Brookings: Experts - Nigel Purvis

Millennium Challenge Corporation Advances Environmental and Social Standards

Nigel Purvis and Michael Wolosin — Wed, 31 Oct 2012 12:39:00 -0400

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) recently announced the formal adoption of the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability. The MCC has from its beginning taken a rigorous approach to environmental and social safeguards, and this amendment to its Environmental Guidelines is an important additional step forward. As it continues, the MCC should ensure that these new performance standards are supported by a strong and transparent implementation framework and should undertake a broader effort to fully incorporate poverty-environment links into MCC decision-making frameworks.

By adopting the best-in-class IFC standards, the MCC increases the likelihood that every project undertaken by partner countries with MCC funding will advance its mission of poverty reduction through sustainable economic growth without sidelining or generating unintended consequences for the very populations it intends to support. People living in poverty are most likely to depend on the environment for a substantial portion of their income [1] and are least likely to already have a seat at the table for decision-making about government development projects. This decision should also simplify compliance for partner countries by harmonizing MCC requirements with global standards.

These are important and laudable steps forward, reaffirming and strengthening MCC’s clear commitment to environmental and social sustainability. MCC’s Environmental and Social Performance team (recently renamed from “Environmental and Social Assessment”) deserves kudos for prioritizing this effort over the past year.

The work isn’t done yet, however. There are a number of questions that MCC should ask itself—if it hasn’t already—and MCC’s champions in the administration, congress and civil society should pay close attention to the answers. We divide these questions into two categories—those focused on ensuring strong implementation of the new performance standards and those focused on taking a more up to date approach to the links between poverty and environment in MCC decision-making frameworks.

Ensuring a Strong Implementation Framework

The adoption of high quality safeguard policies does not ensure, by itself, risk reduction. Without a strong implementation framework, partner countries have little incentive to pursue strong standards. What type of implementation framework will ensure that these new, stronger performance standards translate into better on-the-ground results? Clear and well-communicated answers to the following questions are needed:

What formal policies are in place at MCC that will ensure adequate application of the standards? In terms of content, the IFC standards are clearly high-quality. In the IFC context, the standards themselves are embedded in a sustainability framework that includes a formal policy statement and a transparency component. The MCC’s Environmental Guidelines play a somewhat parallel role to the IFC formal policy statement, including a strong statement [2] adopting the standards that is almost exactly parallel to the IFC’s own formal policy statement. But, at the same time, there are caveats in the MCC guidelines (e.g., “to the extent consistent with these guidelines and any applicable additional guidance issued by MCC from time to time”) that may allow exceptions.

What is the division of responsibility between the MCC and developing country implementers for meeting the standards? The guidelines state quite clearly that “the projects MCC finances under a compact will be developed and implemented in a manner consistent with the [IFC] environmental and social performance standards.” But the MCC itself doesn’t implement projects itself—partner governments do—so ensuring that this directive happens is actually quite complex. It appears that the MCC (just like the IFC) is well-positioned to ensure that the client has an environmental and social management system in place, but it isn’t as clear how they will actually ensure that the performance standards are adequately implemented. Admittedly, there are real tensions between developing country ownership of projects and strong oversight by the MCC—but this seems like a pretty big implementation gap. When will due diligence be performed by MCC? At what level of detail? What will happen if due diligence standards are not being met? What mechanisms are in place to allow third parties to bring complaints to the MCC—not just the client country—if it appears that standards are not being implemented sufficiently? What are the accountability mechanisms? These are important questions that MCC will need to address more transparently as it begins to implement this new policy.

What is the operational role of environmental and social specialists during compact development? The Environmental and Social Performance (ESP) team at the MCC generally gets involved early in compact development and has a respected seat at the table. But is their role one of providing advice, or do they have formal authority in decision-making? For example, if ESP specialists provide input to the compact development team suggesting that a project is high risk, can that recommendation be overturned by others on the team? This issue is down in the weeds, but is a critical loophole that was identified by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (the accountability mechanism for the IFC) as one of the main reasons for poor performance standard implementation in the case of IFC loans to Wilmar Group for establishment of palm oil plantations in Indonesia.

Incorporating Environment in MCC Decision-Making Frameworks

Even a strong and well-implemented risk-reduction program can’t achieve what is required for truly sustainable poverty reduction through economic growth. As a recent fact sheet on Environmental Sustainability in MCC programs explained, “the environment and natural resources must be valued and managed well to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction”—in other words, a “do-no-harm” safeguards approach isn’t enough. How could MCC decision-making frameworks shift to more fully incorporate consideration of the economic value nature provides to people? One way is to start by answering the following three questions:

Is a better indicator needed for the country selection process to rate whether countries manage their natural wealth sustainably for the benefit of people? The current Natural Resources Protection indicator measures whether a country is protecting at least 10 percent of each terrestrial biome within its borders. This is a narrow concept of natural resource protection that focuses solely on the area of land formally categorized as protected and misses how these and other landscapes may be sustainably managed. Landscapes that are protected on paper may not in fact be well-managed, and much of the natural resource base of a country may lie outside these areas in working landscapes such as forests, streams, agricultural areas and fisheries. In the years since this indicator was adopted, there have been advances in assessing the value of ecosystem services and natural capital that could allow a much more sophisticated approach. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the World Bank and TEEB project have each estimated the value of natural wealth and/or ecosystem services for countries around the world—but to date, no annual indicator is available.

How could the MCC more explicitly and systematically consider natural wealth in its constraints analyses? The MCC’s publically available guidance on constraints-to-growth analyses makes no mention of valuing and accounting for natural wealth. Including this calculation could impact which sectors and projects move to the top of the list as the biggest constraints to growth. More explicitly including a valuation of natural wealth within constraints-to-growth analyses will no doubt require a little outside-of-the-box thinking and be very context specific. But as the pioneer of analyses at the cornerstone of the Presidential Policy Directive on global development and the Partnership for Growth program, it is incumbent upon the MCC to ask the hard questions to ensure that these analyses are considering the full range of economic constraints to growth—including things like environmental degradation.

How and when can the MCC include the economic value of natural wealth and the environment in its program evaluation processes? The MCC assesses the economic impact of its projects by calculating an economic rate of return (ERR) and invests only in projects that return greater than 10 percent to beneficiaries. Truly pursuing “green growth” will require measuring the “green” side of growth—by estimating and including in the ERR calculation the returns that projects generate by avoiding environmental degradation or by rehabilitating natural wealth. These projects can lower heath care costs, improve water quality and security, increase agricultural productivity and safeguard traditional sources of income—all very real economic growth and poverty reduction outcomes. The MCC’s guidance on calculating ERR leaves the window open for including these impacts, but they are rarely included in practice, and there is no policy or guidance that encourages capturing these benefits. Granted, this is not methodologically simple. However with clearer guidance to make this a priority for calculation of ERRs process, the MCC could update its ERR analyses to better reflect the full suite of economic returns from its projects—even those that may be harder to measure.

In summary, the MCC deserves real kudos for strengthening its environmental and social standards by adopting the IFC performance standards. But this is no time to rest. There is still much to do to ensure that these new performance standards are supported by a strong and transparent implementation framework and to take consideration of the environment beyond a safeguards approach to operationalize the recognition that environment and poverty truly are intertwined in MCC’s partner countries.

[1] For examples, see: the World Resources Institute’s 2005 report “The Wealth of the Poor;” and the 2010 Synthesis Report by The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB).

[2] Compare IFC Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, Paragraph 22: “IFC will only finance investment activities that are expected to meet the requirements of the Performance Standards within a reasonable period of time. Persistent delays in meeting these requirements can lead to loss of financial support from IFC.” to the following paragraph in the MCC Environmental Guidelines: “MCC seeks to ensure, through its due diligence and implementation oversight efforts, that Compact activities it finances are implemented in accordance with the requirements of the IFC Performance Standards. MCC will only support Compact activities that are expected to meet the requirements of the IFC Performance Standards within a prescribed timeframe.”

Authors

Nigel Purvis
Michael Wolosin

Image Source: © Fayaz Kabli / Reuters

Sink or Swim: The Economic Impacts of an International Maritime Emissions System for Greenhouse Gases on the United States

Nigel Purvis and Samuel Grausz — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 11:08:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

Ships are a significant and growing source of GHG emissions. They currently represent 2.7 percent of global CO2 emissions (870 million metric tons), and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) projects the emissions will rise between 120 and 210 percent by 2050. This makes current shipping emissions approximately equivalent to the emissions of Germany. The GHG emissions are primarily carbon dioxide, but also include nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), though in very small quantities relative to CO2.

The IMO has recently advanced towards regulating GHG emissions. In 2011, it issued standards for energy efficiency for new and modified ships, which directly impact their GHG emissions. The standards mandate a 30 percent reduction in fuel consumption and thus greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, and the IMO expects this will reduce emissions from ships by 180-240 million metric tons annually by 2020. IMO has also proposed voluntary measures to improve the energy efficiency of existing ships through better operations8 and is in the process now of figuring out mandatory emissions regulations for existing ships, the status of which we review below.

In addition to the IMO, the European Union solicited input earlier this year on how to regulate emissions from all ships calling in European ports. European law mandated this action as the IMO had not finished a global program by the end of 2011. The European Union proposed a number of options in the solicitation, such as the inclusion of ships in their Europe-wide cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This follows on the EU’s similar move to include aviation emissions in the EU ETS at the beginning of 2012, a decision currently opposed by many non-European airlines and other countries.

Beyond the IMO and Europe, reports issued by the World Bank and IMF, comments by Bill Gates and language agreed to at the U.N. Climate Negotiations in 2012 all identified shipping emissions as a target for both emissions reductions and raising revenue to address climate change in developing countries. This is in line with the long standing desire of the climate change community to raise revenues from maritime emissions regulations and transfer those revenues to developing countries to help them reduce their emissions and prepare for accelerating climate change. These revenues would help developed countries meet the goal of mobilizing $100 billion per year in such financing agreed to at the 2009 Conference of Parties meeting in Copenhagen. So far, the world has made relatively little progress towards meeting that goal, with only $30 billion pledged.

The position of the United States on these policies will likely decisively impact whether they succeed or fail. U.S. leaders, however, currently lack the necessary analyses on which to base their opinions. Only a few studies have attempted to model the benefits and costs of a global maritime emissions regime and none of the studies have focused on the impacts of the policy on the United States.

This study begins to fill this gap by analyzing the impacts of a global system to reduce maritime GHG emissions, such as that being considered by the IMO, on the United States. We examine the potential benefits of such a policy, including avoided climate change, economic growth, preparation for climate change impacts in developing countries and reductions to health impacts from non-GHG emissions.

We compare these benefits in general terms to the potential costs of such a policy. Specifically, we use a simple economic model to estimate the changes in prices and demand for U.S. imports and exports Sink or Swim The Economic Impacts of an International Maritime Emissions System for Greenhouse Gases on the United States resulting from such a policy. These results are used to indicate the likely impacts for the U.S. economy and inform decisionmakers on whether such a policy is in the best interest of the United States.

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Authors

Nigel Purvis
Samuel Grausz

Image Source: Yuriko Nakao / Reuters

The G-20’s Development and Climate Goals: Innovations in Shipping

Thu, 24 May 2012 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 24, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

In 2009, President Barack Obama and leaders of other developed countries committed to mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 to help developing countries confront climate change. However, in an era of fiscal austerity, it is clear that national contributions will need to be supplemented by innovative sources of finance to meet this goal. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund recently released a report on how the shipping industry could be one of these innovative sources of financing. The Mexican government is also expected to engage other governments on innovative, long-term sources of climate finance at the upcoming G-20 summit in June, offering a real opportunity for achieving this goal.

On May 24, Global Economy and Development at Brookings, Oxfam America, World Wildlife Fund and ActionAid will host a discussion on how mechanisms in the shipping industry can be designed to mobilize new public resources to help developing countries confront the climate crisis while reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. Panelists will include Ambassador Charles Rudolph Paul, Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the United States of America; Michael Keen, deputy director of the Fiscal Affairs Department at the International Monetary Fund; Nigel Purvis, president and CEO of Climate Advisers; and Heather Coleman, senior policy advisor at Oxfam America. Brookings Senior Fellow Katherine Sierrawill moderate the discussion.

After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.

Participants

Panelists

Katherine Sierra

Ambassador Charles Rudolph Paul

Nigel Purvis

Michael Keen

Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department

Heather Coleman

Oxfam America

Indonesia’s Green Prosperity

Nigel Purvis and Michael Wolosin — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 10:39:00 -0500

On November 19, 2011, in Bali, Indonesia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed a new partnership agreement with the Government of Indonesia providing more than $600 million of U.S. aid through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). More than half of these investments are dedicated to “green prosperity”—the sound idea that sustainable natural resource management and clean energy technologies accelerate economic growth and poverty alleviation.

What does this mean in practical terms? New U.S. funds will help Indonesia make wiser land-use decisions by, for example, guiding future palm oil plantations away from pristine rainforests and toward abandoned, degraded lands, which are abundant. These “land swaps” hold enormous potential. While palm oil plantations on degraded lands require higher up-front investments (and are therefore uncommon without government intervention), over time plantations on degraded lands are usually more productive and profitable than palm plantations grown in newly deforested and drained peat lands.

The United States can provide affordable bridge loans and long-term financing, and technical assistance to help local communities map surrounding lands, clarify land-rights and develop community-supported strategies. In so doing the United States can help Indonesia increase economic growth, strengthen its democracy, reduce illegally logging, respect the rights of forest-dependent communities, conserve threatened tropical forests and orangutans, and reduce a major source of climate pollution.

Investments in renewable energy—such as modest sized hydropower projects and geothermal power plants—are also contemplated in the new green prosperity program and can also provide important benefits. Affordable, clean electricity in rural communities spurs business development and lays the foundation for long-term growth by enabling school children to study in the evenings.

The green prosperity program represents an important milestone in Indonesia’s own development and a step forward in modernizing U.S. foreign aid programs.

Nowhere is green growth a more pressing need than Indonesia. Natural resources are a major part of the Indonesian economy, but Indonesia’s runaway deforestation and wetland destruction, driven by illegal logging and unchecked expansion of oil palm and pulpwood plantations, threaten Indonesia’s social stability, national security, environment, health, and future economic growth.

For a long time Indonesia’s forest economy has been notoriously inefficient and corrupt, with profiteering and resource exploitation often trampling the rights of the rural poor. Pulp, paper, timber, and oil palm companies and powerful syndicates have routinely seized the ancestral lands of local communities [1]. The resulting dislocation, economic and upheaval exacerbate social tensions by further marginalizing the struggling rural majority.

Across Indonesia overbuilt pulp and paper mill capacity is driving illegal logging, causing the disappearance of old-growth native forests and costing the government nearly $2 billion in lost tax revenue annually [2]. Rapidly expanding palm oil plantations also are taking the place of healthy forests and wetlands. Deforestation in Indonesia is so prevalent that at current rates of destruction, old-growth native forests could disappear within 30 years [3] with devastating consequences for the poor, wildlife and the world’s climate [4]. Indonesia is the third-largest greenhouse gas emitter, behind only China and the United States [5], and destructive land-use practices account for 85 percent of Indonesia’s emissions, while the resulting oil palm and forest products sectors contribute less than 8 percent to its GDP [6]. Fires caused by the draining of peat-land soils are not only an exceptionally large source of emissions, but also result in economic losses estimated at $4 billion annually, causing major health problems in local populations through smoke inhalation [7] .

In this context, Indonesia’s decision to focus the bulk of new U.S. foreign aid resources on sustainable land-use and clean energy is a cause for hope. Indonesia deserves credit for prioritizing not just growth, but green growth in its partnership with the United States.

The investments announced by Secretary Clinton are also in America’s vital national interest. Indonesia’s strategic importance to the United States is difficult to overstate. As the world’s most populous Muslim nation, its third largest democracy, and an example of religious tolerance in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is an essential partner in promoting democracy, and combating Islamic extremism and terrorism. The United States has major economic and military interests in the shipping lanes around Indonesia, where close to half of the total global merchant fleet capacity transits. Indonesia is a major U.S. trade partner ($18 billion annually) with a large and growing economy (18th largest globally with 5 percent annual growth).

The Millennium Challenge Corporation deserves recognition for responding to Indonesia’s growing interest in green prosperity, and for understanding the essential role that natural resource management and renewable energy play in the MCC’s objective of poverty reduction through sustainable economic growth. The MCC has a strong tradition of investing only in projects that achieve a high rate of economic return for local communities (at least 10 percent) and this green prosperity program is designed to ensure the same. In short, the MCC is innovating while staying true to its mission.

Of course, success is far from guaranteed. Mismanagement and corruption are deeply embedded in Indonesia’s land-use sectors, and entrenched interests will fight against efforts to increase transparency and rationalize natural resource decisions. Indonesia will need to sustain the political will to overcome these challenges at all levels of government.

The MCC will also need to continue innovating by more fully and accurately measuring the economic benefits of proposed green prosperity investments. The MCC should measure not only the immediate jobs and income its projects create but also the broader societal benefits of proposed investments. Well-designed projects that avoid pollution and environmental degradation can lower heath care costs, improve water quality and security, increase agricultural productivity, and safeguard traditional sources of income (such as fruits, nuts and other forest products). These very real benefits must not be ignored, and recent advances in modern economics mean they no longer need to be.

Regardless of the challenges ahead, we must welcome the new bilateral compact between the United States and Indonesia to seek out a new, green prosperity. It’s the right vision and a good start.

[1] Chip Fay and Martua Sirait, in Which Way Forward?: People, Forests, and Policymaking in Indonesia, 2004.
[2] USAID, Growing Conflict and Unrest in Indonesian Forests, 2004; Human Rights Watch, Wild Money, 2009.
[3] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
[4] U.S. Census Bureau and World Bank.
[5] United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; World Resources Institute.
[6] The National Development and Planning Agency of Indonesia (Bappenas), Reducing carbon emissions from Indonesia’s peat lands, 2009.
[7] The Indonesian National Board on Climate Change, Fact Sheet – Carbon Emissions and Development, 9-6-2010.

Authors

Nigel Purvis
Michael Wolosin

Image Source: Â© Candida Ng / Reuters

The World Bank and Coal Aid

Abigail Jones, Nigel Purvis and Andrew Stevenson — Mon, 10 Oct 2011 10:40:00 -0400

World Bank staff and management proposed to phase out lending for new coal generation projects in middle-income countries in an initial draft of the institution’s new ten-year energy sector lending strategy. One argument advanced by proponents of the restriction is that these projects typically have no trouble attracting private sector finance, and thus, the World Bank’s involvement provides no additional development benefit.

An independent analysis confirms these facts and shows that less polluting coal plants have been built in roughly two thirds of the middle-income countries that generate coal-fired power. Additionally, the vast majority of these plants have been built with private sector finance alone. Close scrutiny of financial data provides a clear reason for this trend. The weighted average cost of capital for a typical coal generation project in nations without a World Bank loan is roughly 13 percent, while the rate of return is roughly 18 percent over 20 years. Because energy projects can readily attract private capital to finance coal-fired power stations with the same proven technologies used in developed countries to minimize greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution, the World Bank should allocate scarce multilateral development funding for other pressing investments that cannot attract private capital as easily.

INTRODUCTION

World Bank staff has spent the last several years drafting a new strategy that will provide high-level policy guidance for energy sector lending decisions over the next decade. The World Bank’s Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)—a subset of the board of directors—discussed a draft strategy in April that was leaked to the public by several media outlets. However, CODE did not approve the draft strategy and the World Bank is undertaking consultations with member governments to determine a way forward.

The 100+ page draft strategy places strong emphasis on both providing energy access to the poor and promoting an environmentally sustainabe energy sector. The draft includes quantitative targets for energy access and the percentage of clean energy in the World Bank’s lending portfolio, and introduces new greenhouse gas accounting requirements that will be phased-in over the next several years.

One of the most important and controversial provisions in the draft strategy is a ban on lending for new coalfired power plants in specific categories of World Bank client countries. The ban covers all countries that qualify for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), including “blend” countries that also receive loans from the International Development Association (IDA). This includes middle-income countries, ranging from India, China, Brazil and South Africa to Vietnam and Pakistan. IBRD offers loans with better terms than commercial lenders, including longer payback and grace periods. The ban on new coal generation lending does not cover the poorest (IDA only) countries or efficiency improvements for existing coal plants in middle-income countries.

The ban on new coal generation projects in middle-income countries sharply divided nations at the CODE meeting. Middle-income countries argued that placing restrictions on projects for specific groups of countries is unprecedented, and that countries should be allowed to choose their own energy pathways. Developed countries argued that middle-income countries are easily able to attract private capital for new coal plants, and thus, World Bank lending provides no additional development benefit.

This report evaluates the argument advanced by developed countries and describes our initial findings.

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Authors

Abigail Jones
Nigel Purvis
Andrew Stevenson

Image Source: Â© Jason Lee / Reuters

Climate Change and Global Poverty : A Billion Lives in the Balance?

Lael Brainard, Abigail Jones and Nigel Purvis, eds. — Sun, 01 Mar 2009 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2009 250pp.

Climate change will inflict damage on every continent, but it will hit the world's poor disproportionately hard. Whatever hard-fought human development gains have been made may be impeded or reversed by climate change as new threats emerge to water and food security, agricultural production and access, and nutrition and public health.

Climate Change and Global Poverty: A Billion Lives in the Balance? draws on expertise from the climate change and development communities to ask how the public and private sectors can help the world's poor manage the global climate crisis. Increasingly, climate change and development are two sides of the same coin. Effective climate solutions must empower global development by improving livelihoods, health, and economic prospects, while poverty alleviation itself must become a central strategy for both mitigating emissions and reducing global vulnerability to adverse climate impacts.

Contributors include Jessica Ayers (London School of Economics), Manish Bapna (World Resources Institute), Ian Burton (University of Toronto), Joshua Busby (University of Texas), Thea Dickinson (Clean Air Partnership), Elliot Diringer (Pew Center on Global Climate Change), Kristie Ebi (ESS, LLC), Ned Helme (Center for Clean Air Policy), Saleemul Huq (International Institute for Environment and Development), Michael Jenkins (Forest Trends), Heather Kaplan (Oxfam America), Vinca LaFleur(WestWingWriters), Heather McGray (World Resources Institute), Robert Mendelsohn (Yale), Jane Nelson (Harvard), Anthony Nyong (African Development Bank), Raymond Offenheiser (Oxfam America), Atiq Rahman (Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies), and DavidWaskow (Oxfam America).

A Brookings-Blum Roundtable Project

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Lael Brainard

Abigail Jones

Abigail Jones is a research analyst with Brookings Global.

Nigel Purvis

Ordering Information:

{9ABF977A-E4A6-41C8-B030-0FD655E07DBF}, 978-0-8157-0281-8, $24.95 Order
{B98DCBB0-3580-4D55-ABD4-AB91E00585E6}, 978-0-8157-0381-5, $24.95 Order

The Case for a Climate Protection Authority

William J. Antholis and Nigel Purvis — Tue, 27 Jan 2009 09:35:46 -0500

In his inaugural address, President Barack Obama warned that “there are some who question the scale of our ambitions, who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans.” As the economic crisis deepens, pressures grow on Obama to defer campaign pledges and lighten his agenda with Congress. That is clearly the case when it comes to addressing energy security and climate change. Yet the president’s instincts are right: Postponing major action — however painfully complicated this set of domestic and international negotiations may appear — would be a major mistake.

Obama can move forward now by working with Congress to create a new Climate Protection Authority — a constitutionally sound way of having the president and Congress work together on complex international undertakings.

Former House Majority Leader Dick Gephardt — a man who knows Congress and who favors immediate action on these issues — recently described the task of transforming domestic and international energy policy as “the single most difficult political transaction in the history of mankind.” We must fundamentally reshape how we light and heat our homes, offices and factories and how we power our planes, trains and automobiles. We also must try to simultaneously lower our dependence on oil from Russia, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia; reduce the amount of coal burned in China and India; and increase the amount of rain forest saved in Brazil and Indonesia.

From a policy standpoint, we must do all this quickly. The longer we wait to reduce our energy dependence and stabilize the Earth’s climate, the more we put our economy, security and environment at risk.

From a political standpoint, acting quickly is also essential. Domestically, the president’s public approval and congressional majorities may never be as high. And the fragile consensus that has emerged among environmentalists and many businesses for regulating greenhouse gases could fade if the economy continues to worsen. Internationally, Obama must quickly solidify the global goodwill that greeted the November election. His mettle will be tested in December, when the international community is scheduled to gather in Copenhagen, Denmark, to negotiate a replacement for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. To reclaim global leadership, the United States must show the world proof that it has the political will to curb greenhouse gases.

A Climate Protection Authority would make these tall tasks easier. Here is how it would work.

First, in consultation with Congress, the president would decide that future climate and energy agreements are to be approved by the United States by statute rather than as treaties. Statutes require a majority in both houses of Congress, whereas treaties require two-thirds of only the Senate. Federal courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of bicameral statutory approval of international pacts. In fact, the United States enters into more international agreements this way than by treaty, including some arms control agreements and environmental pacts and almost all trade deals.

Second, Congress should spell out in cap-and-trade legislation the conditions necessary for U.S. participation in new climate and energy agreements. For example, it should describe the role we envision for China, India and other major developing countries.

Third, cap-and-trade legislation should preapprove new climate and energy agreements that meet these congressional preconditions. Agreements that do should come into effect for the United States either without further congressional review or pursuant to the streamlined approval process Congress has used for most trade agreements.

The arguments for a Climate Protection Authority are strong.

Like trade and arms control agreements, energy and climate pacts are lengthy to negotiate, hard to undo and negotiated in successive “rounds.” And like trade talks, climate negotiations resemble the constant tinkering of domestic legislation far more than the long-lived treaties that the founders envisioned.

The Constitution gives a special role to the House on economic issues. Major energy legislation and negotiation will affect every sector of the economy and should come before the full Congress, not just the Senate.

Other nations would be more likely to meet our terms, for they have come to distrust our treaty-making process. These countries are reluctant to make politically difficult concessions only to see the United States stay out of the agreement in the end. By preapproving agreements that meet enumerated statutory conditions, the path to U.S. participation would become clear and U.S. negotiators would be able to extract needed concessions.

It’s unrealistic to think Congress has the time and attention to take up domestic legislation and an international agreement separately (in whatever order). The right approach is to link them now.

Obama and Congress together have an opportunity to overhaul U.S. energy policy and build a durable global framework for protecting the climate. Given the challenges involved, they would be wise to create a Climate Protection Authority that moves the domestic and international transactions in tandem now.

Authors

Publication: Politico

Climate Dèjà Vu

Nigel Purvis — Mon, 10 Dec 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Admirably, Europe has led the world on climate change. Yet, unless Europe learns from the Kyoto experience, the world may miss its chance to avert a severe climate crisis.

Ministers from 190 nations are gathered now in Bali, Indonesia, to complete by week’s end a roadmap for negotiating the next global climate change treaty. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012 and new international arrangements are urgently needed.

Chancellor Merkel and other European leaders have stressed the importance they attach to completing the climate roadmap now and finalizing the new treaty in 2009. Europe favors an agreement that would obligate all developed countries to reduce emissions 30% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, with less stringent but nonetheless meaningful contributions from developing nations.

President Bush’s concept of an acceptable climate treaty is one built around non-binding pledges, with each nation pursuing whatever mix of policies it chooses to adopt. Europe is right to reject the Bush proposal as totally inadequate. Fortunately, American climate policy will improve when President Bush leaves office in January 2009, regardless of which political party wins the White House. But for now the U.S. position may present an obstacle to securing a good roadmap in Bali since all decisions there must be made by consensus.

And the United States is not the only problem for Europe. While developing nations increasingly understand that the risks of climate change outweigh the costs of climate action, they are also worried about fairness. Per capita emissions in developing nations remain relatively low and many of these countries lack the means to do much on their own. Even rapidly industrializing nations such as China and India, which are among the world’s leading climate polluters, are seeking written assurances in Bali that the next climate treaty will contribute to their sustainable development rather than constrain their economic growth.

Does this negotiating dynamic seem familiar – Europe at odds with the United States, China and India asking for more time and special favors? It should. In 1995, the international community met in Berlin to draft the terms of reference for what would become the Kyoto Protocol. Then, China and India sought Europe’s help in resisting American demands that all major emitters limit their emissions. In Berlin, European negotiators sided with developing nations in exchange for their support for the Kyoto process and for help in pressing the United States to do more. Many in Europe believed China and India where right in calling for developed countries to set an example by reducing emissions first. Seeing they were diplomatically isolated on this point, U.S. negotiators backed down and the so-called ‘Berlin mandate’ explicitly ruled out new climate commitments by developing nations. Reaction in the United States to the Berlin mandate was so negative that the Kyoto Protocol never really had a chance. In fact, the U.S. Senate unanimously adopted a resolution rejecting the approach taken in the Berlin mandate several months before the Kyoto treaty was even finished.

This time around European policy makers insist that advanced developing nations must also take action. Yet, in the heat of the negotiations this week European negotiators may be tempted to characterize in rather soft terms what is expected of China and India in exchange for support from these key nations for completing the roadmap in Bali and endorsing Europe’s call for legally binding emission targets for developed nations. In fact, at last month’s preparatory meeting to the Bali conference European environment ministers were reported to have explored a bargain of this nature. Striking such a deal in Bali would be dangerous for several reasons.

First, the urgency of the climate problem requires strong action by all major emitters. The world simply cannot afford to give China and India assurances that they will not be asked to make some sacrifices. Given their state of development and limited responsibility for climate change, all developing nations deserve help and market-based incentives hold great promise. But fundamental policy and industrial reforms are also necessary to avoid uncontrollable emissions growth in advanced developing nations. A spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go down, but sugar alone does little to cure an illness.

Second, any suggestion of a sweetheart deal for China and India could provoke an American backlash. Whether fair or not, the Bali framework could be characterized by influential voices in the United States as an unacceptable repeat of the Kyoto process, even if the Bush administration endorsed it. A strong negative attack on the Bali process now could make it difficult for the United States to join the new climate treaty and might also undermine the real progress being made in the Congress toward a mandatory national emissions target.

Third, the United States is far more likely to join the new climate treaty if the contributions of all major emitters, including the United States, China and India, are worked out with the active participation of the next U.S. President. To secure U.S. participation Europe needs a new President to champion an eventual deal as his or her own, and that cannot happen easily if the die is cast in Bali.

Finally, there is no need to get specific in Bali about what China, India or the United States need to do. A strong international consensus exists for opening new climate negotiations. While every nation would like the Bali roadmap to give it an edge in the negotiations that will follow, no nation will block agreement on a roadmap that leaves all options and directions open. A stronger agreement will be easier to negotiate later.

Europe was right to move forward with Kyoto despite U.S. opposition, and it should not bow to America now. But if Europe wants the United States to join in, it must consider the political consequences of deciding too much too quickly. By leaving key issues open now Europe would create space for the next U.S. President to join the call for strong action by all major emitters. In contrast, another Berlin mandate, or the suggestion that rapidly developing nations need not make any sacrifices, could set back global climate diplomacy another decade, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Authors

Nigel Purvis

Publication: Süddeutsche Zeitung

Recipe for European Climate Leadership

Nigel Purvis — Sat, 17 Nov 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Tomorrow, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – this year’s recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, along with Al Gore – will issue its most comprehensive scientific assessment. Five years in the making, the IPCC 4^th Synthetis Report describes in chilling detail the seriousness of the climate crisis and the urgency of action. Governments will take up the report when they meet in early December in Bali, Indonesia, to decide what international arrangements should follow the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. Decisions made now will influence not only the next decade of global warming diplomacy but possibly also our chance of averting catastrophic climate change.

Predictably and unfortunately, European leaders and President Bush continue to champion fundamentally different approaches. Under the Bush plan for post-2012, each nation would decide for itself whether and how to reduce its emissions, new international commitments would not be legally binding and U.S. emissions would continue to grow for years. Europe is right to reject this approach as inadequate and to press for ambitious, measurable and binding commitments from industrialized nations, along with less stringent but no less meaningful engagement by China and other rapidly developing countries (whose per capita emissions and income remain relatively low). Given this seemingly unbridgeable divide, here’s how Europe should proceed.

Lead at home. The world is watching to see if Europe’s internal policies match its foreign policy rhetoric. Europe’s stated willingness to reduce its emissions 30 percent by 2020 if other major emitters also act is an important gesture. But all European nations (not just Britain, Sweden and Germany) must demonstrate preferably before Bali that they have the political will to actually deliver on climate promises.

Do not wait for Godot. Europe now understands that there will be no Nixon-goes-to-China moment. George Bush will end his Presidency on the wrong side of climate history by resisting domestic carbon regulation and fighting firm international commitments. The next U.S. administration, regardless of political party, will be better. With further prodding, the Congress may soon enact national climate legislation similar to Europe’s emissions trading system. Europe should negotiate in Bali in good faith and remain open to worthwhile new ideas but it must look beyond the Bush administration.

Focus on the U.S. Congress. Getting the United States to ratify a new global agreement is less urgent than convincing the Congress to enact domestic laws that would actually reduce America’s emissions. In the U.S. political system, domestic laws are more easily enacted and enforced than international treaties. Plus, U.S. domestic action is a precondition for a meaningful global agreement involving all key nations. Not only will China, India and possibly even Japan reject potentially costly action if the U.S. continues to dither, but the U.S. Senate will resist approving any new climate treaty until national laws are in place.

Think beyond targets. Europe is right to insist on substantial, measurable and enforceable climate commitments. But Europe should remain open to new types of commitments, such as agreements on energy efficiency, renewable energy and deforestation. These narrower efforts can complement and, for certain categories of countries, substitute for Kyoto-style national emission targets. A mix of commitments would better reflect the diversity of national circumstances.

Don’t just think globally. Climate change is a global problem that requires more than just global solutions. Europe should embrace ‘layered’ or ‘bottom up’ cooperation, including agreements made among smaller groupings of countries. A bilateral agreement that linked a future U.S. emissions trading system to Europe’s existing carbon market would enhance global cooperation rather than undermine it. The United Nations should remain the global climate forum – the place where countries judge whether arrangements in place are adequate and equitable.

Insist on action by China too. Rapidly developing nations, such as China, India and Brazil, ought not to be held to the same standard as richer nations. However, Europe must not let these emerging economies off the hook in Bali simply for the short-term benefit of either isolating the United States or reaching a global consensus that creates the illusion of progress for the European public. Developing nations are vulnerable to climate change and they do not wish to be seen as impeding progress. These nations also will benefit financially from participating in global carbon markets. Industrialized nations must condition market access by developing nations on new commitments and real action. If Europe is firm now and America comes around soon as expected, rapidly industrializing nations will do their fair share.

Be patient. If consensus on these terms is not possible in Bali, Europe must be prepared to defer major decisions on the shape of the next U.N. climate treaty until after the Bush administration ends in January 2009. Political conditions around the world for a strong climate framework will improve when U.S. policies also improve. Europe’s call for concluding a new agreement in 2009, therefore, is not realistic or helpful. A new American president will need time to gain the Senate’s approval of a new senior negotiating team and new climate policies. Other nations will then need time to react the American proposals. Still more time will be required to work out concrete treaty provisions. This calendar is highly unfortunate but unavoidable.

Admirably, Europe wants to lead on climate change. Despite the obvious need for urgent action, patient and adaptive European diplomacy will best serve the world.

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Nigel Purvis

Publication: Financial Times Deutschland

The Real Importance of the Kyoto Treaty

Nigel Purvis — Wed, 15 Dec 2004 00:00:00 -0500

After seven years in critical condition, the Kyoto global warming treaty has a new lease on life, thanks to its recent ratification by Russia. Supporters and skeptics alike agree that the treaty will not solve the climate problem. Its environmental limits are meager, expire in 2012 and do not apply to developing nations, where global warming emissions are growing most rapidly. Kyoto's true importance rests in what it tells us about America's changing relationship with the world and the future of climate change diplomacy.

Kyoto demonstrates that America's allies are increasingly shaping the international agenda without it. When the Bush administration rejected Kyoto in 2001, it assumed that other nations would follow suit, but more than 120 nations have ratified it.

While Europe's inability in the 1990s to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans reinforced its junior partner status on security matters, Kyoto shows that Europe can lead in other areas. The European Union, fresh from its successful eastward enlargement, feels increasingly confident as an international peer of the United States on nonmilitary matters. Complying with Kyoto may prove more difficult than Europe envisions, but Europe has achieved what it regards as a major foreign policy victory and this signals the growing risk of an even sharper-edged trans-Atlantic rivalry.

Kyoto also illustrates the fact that the international community questions more than ever America's moral authority and its commitment to universal values, including environmental stewardship. Anti-Americanism is already on the rise in "old Europe" because of Bush's policies on Iraq. U.S. resistance to action on global warming only solidifies America's image abroad as a nation of parochial, selfish and wasteful SUV drivers. Although America remains the brightest beacon of freedom, it must treat seriously the perception abroad that its light has dimmed.

Kyoto's rebirth reaffirms, in addition, that climate change will remain a permanent fixture of international diplomacy, thus signaling to U.S. industry that strong federal action is inevitable even as Bush's re-election lengthens its current reprieve. The coming into force of the treaty increases pressure on the United States to lead even as it remains outside the treaty's ambit. The United States, after all, is responsible for just under a quarter of global climate emissions. Opposition from industry to mandatory domestic climate action will not dissipate overnight, but Kyoto's implementation abroad will demonstrate the true cost of climate policies and help U.S. policymakers determine what action is economically feasible.

Finally, Kyoto makes it more likely that over the next decade Europe will use trade policy to push the United States toward stronger climate action. The European Parliament has debated taxing U.S. imports to protect domestic manufactures from foreign competitors who are not subject to climate change costs. The World Trade Organization has made clear that when an environmental trade restraint is enacted to implement a multilateral environmental agreement such as Kyoto, the restraint is more likely to withstand scrutiny.

Given Bush's unalterable opposition to the treaty, the United States is unlikely to rejoin international talks anytime soon. That matters less, however, than whether the United States begins to take seriously its responsibility to lead the world through strong new domestic climate policies. Leaving aside the environmental rationale for Kyoto, the treaty's entry into force is a warning of the political and economic risks to the United States of continued inaction.

Authors

Nigel Purvis

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Climate Change and the L20: Options for Non-Emission Target Commitments

Nigel Purvis — Mon, 20 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400

This paper was presented at a workshop convened by the University of Waterloo's Center for International Governance Innovation and the University of Victoria's Center for Global Studies. The workshop took place on September 20, 2004, at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on behalf of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin. The purpose was to stimulate discussion over how a leaders summit of the group of 20 nations composed of the major developed and developing countries, including the United States, the European Union, Japan, Russia, China and India, could further international efforts to combat global climate change. The paper is structured as a background document for a hypothetical communiqué that world leaders could accept. The ideas in the paper represent the authors assessment of what leaders of the twenty great powers could accept politically rather than the ideal solutions for global warming.

The L20 should address climate change primarily through non-emission based approaches for several reasons. First, alternatives to emission targets could compliment national emission targets taken under the Kyoto Protocol and elsewhere. Even the strongest advocates of emission targets accept that other policies are needed to ensure maximum progress by all parties. Second, non-emission based commitments could become a useful alternative to or substitute for emission targets beyond Kyoto, should those efforts fail to gain support. So far only nations accounting for less than a quarter of global emissions have accepted legally binding national emission targets. While the political will for emission targets should grow over time, resistance in the United States, Brazil, China, India and other key L20 nations will not evaporate quickly and this provides a strong reason to consider alternative policies.

Perhaps most importantly, the L20's comparative advantage on climate change is as an innovator. The L20 heads of state could link climate change to a larger set of issues, and in this way reframe the international problem in ways that key nations view as far more relevant to their national interests than the narrow question of emission levels. In contrast to heads of state, specialized climate change bodies lack authority or competence over many important policies that influence global warming, such as trade, investment, foreign aid and energy policy. Work on emission targets, moreover, will continue in climate forums even absent intervention by the L20. The best use of the L20 would be for it to take up new approaches beyond emission targets.

The L20 could examine any number of non-emission based forms of international agreement. Three ideas that might be amenable to meaningful quantitative commitments or targets are presented below in some detail—renewable energy standards, biofuel policies, and clean energy trade liberalization. Also discussed briefly at the conclusion of this paper as possible areas for L20 cooperation is climate science and clean energy research.

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Nigel Purvis

Publication: Post-Kyoto Architecture: Toward an L20?

The Evolving U.S. Politics of Climate Change

Nigel Purvis — Thu, 09 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400

Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here with you today. I'm very grateful to the organizers of this symposium for inviting me here to share some thoughts on what's happening in the United States on the issue of climate change, what the implications of the domestic politics of climate change are for the international regime, and options for the future.

My subject is inherently more political and less quantitative than the very excellent presentation provided by Dr. van Elsen earlier, so forgive me if I provide only some general slides and offer just some comments based on my own practical experience as a career diplomat and negotiator on the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 until the Marrakesh Conference in 2001.

I'd like to begin by saying that I'm sympathetic to people who, when they purchase a book, like to open the last page and find out how it ends. So let me give you a few thoughts about where I'm going and that will provide a little bit of context about the comments I'll be making. The punch-line, or conclusion, of my presentation is that there's a lot happening in the United States and it's real cause for optimism. If we examine where we thought we might have been shortly after President Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, I think most commentators would agree that we've gone farther in the last two years than we would have predicted. So that's very encouraging.

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Nigel Purvis

Publication: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies and the National Institute for Environmental Studies Open Symposium, ""International Climate Regime Beyond 2012: Long-Term Goals and Near-Term Actions""

Building a Transatlantic Biotech Partnership

Nigel Purvis — Wed, 01 Sep 2004 00:00:00 -0400

Reproduced by permission of Issues in Science and Technology (Fall 2004).

The United States and Europe continue to turn up the heat in their long-simmering biotech stew. In May 2003, the Bush administration initiated a challenge within the World Trade Organization (WTO) to Europe's five-year de facto moratorium on approving new genetically modified (GM) seeds for planting in Europe. Although Europe subsequently approved a small number of new GM imports, the United States maintains that Europe's markets remain closed to U.S. farmers. In April 2004, the European Union (EU) implemented new regulations that require mandatory labeling of all GM food and food products sold in Europe, despite U.S. claims that labeling is costly, unworkable, and unscientific. Further conflict seems inevitable.

Yet as ugly as the GM food fight remains, it may well be just the beginning of a potentially much larger cultural conflict over biotechnology. Scientific advances soon will force the international community to confront the ethical, economic, environmental, and governance challenges presented by human biotechnology (including cloning and research on embryos), the creation of transgenic animals by mixing DNA from different species, and a raft of other almost unimaginable developments. Just as the United States and the European Union have chosen different paths on GM food, they might do so on biotechnology in general. The results could stall trade liberalization and economic growth, derail international efforts to manage the biotech revolution wisely, and erode further the shared sense that people in the United States and Europe have common values, interests, and objectives. All this, in turn, could undermine the very notion of a transatlantic community.

Although these risks are real, broader fallout between the United States and Europe over biotechnology is avoidable. Both sides must strengthen international cooperation on biotech science, establish an international body for setting biotech standards, and work toward a global consensus by addressing the needs of developing nations. Minimizing international conflict over the unfolding biotech revolution is possible, but only if action begins now.

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Nigel Purvis

Publication: Issues in Science and Technology

U.S. Climate Policy: Toward a Sensible Center

Thu, 24 Jun 2004 09:00:00 -0400

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June 24-25, 2004

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Register for the Event
Joint Conference sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change

The Brookings Institution and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change co-hosted a major conference that brought together senators, CEOs, top federal and state officials, and other prominent leaders to debate the future of U.S. policy on climate change.

There is growing recognition in Washington that the climate challenge and proposed policy responses bear directly on critical U.S. interests both at home and abroad. The stakes go well beyond the environment and economy to issues such as energy security and international cooperation. With the fate of international climate efforts in question, and with debate escalating in Congress and state houses over climate and energy policy, there is both the need and the opportunity to break the political logjam and forge a national consensus on U.S. climate policy.

By providing a prominent forum for influential voices from the public and private sectors, this conference aimed to stimulate the kind of discussion and debate needed to produce a responsible, bipartisan U.S. climate policy balancing economic, security, and environmental concerns.

Featured conference speakers included:

Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy
C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics
James L. Connaughton, Chairman, White House Council on Environmental Quality
Representative Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md.)
Donald Kennedy, Editor-in-Chief, Science
U.S. Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.)
U.S. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.)
Michael Morris, Chairman, President, and CEO, American Electric Power
John Rowe, Chairman and CEO, Exelon Corporation
Larry Schweiger, President & CEO, National Wildlife Federation
Stephen Timms, Energy Minister, United Kingdom
James Wolfensohn, President, The World Bank
R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton

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The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System

Joshua Busby and Nigel Purvis — Sat, 01 May 2004 00:00:00 -0400

Reproduced by permission of The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (May 2004).

This memo explores the security implications of climate change. Presented below is a summary of the adverse impacts of climate change, an analysis of their security implications, and policy recommendations for strengthening the United Nations' capacity to respond to climate-related security threats.

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Joshua Busby
Nigel Purvis

Publication: Environmental Change and Security Project

Global Poverty and Global Development: Is the United States Doing its Part?

Tue, 20 Apr 2004 14:30:00 -0400

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April 20, 2004
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM EDT

Stein Room
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC

A new report by the World Economic Forum's high-level Global Governance Initiative shows that global efforts to reduce poverty, protect the environment, ensure human rights, and improve health and education are lagging badly. What is America's responsibility in filling the gaps in achieving the Millennium Goals?

On the eve of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund Spring meetings, a panel of experts from the Brookings Institution will examine whether the United States is living up to its international commitments and how policymakers can ensure that America is doing its fair share.

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Renewing Transatlantic Climate Change Cooperation

Friedemann Mueller and Nigel Purvis — Mon, 19 Apr 2004 00:00:00 -0400

The ideas presented below were developed during a high level dialogue among like-minded politicians, business leaders, energy experts and climate change negotiators from both sides of the Atlantic. The dialogue was organized by The Brookings Institution and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Robert Bosch Foundation. The views expressed in this document are solely those of the chairmen and do not represent a consensus of the dialogue participants or its supporters.

While the United States and Europe continue to disagree on many aspects of climate change policy, the gap among policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic is narrowing. More and more American policy makers, including state and local officials and some members of Congress, agree that climate change is a serious problem that warrants the adoption of economically and environmentally sensible regulation. Increasingly, Europeans are concerned about the economic cost and competitiveness consequences of climate policy, even as they renew their commitments to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. So while significant difference remain, including over the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, important avenues exist for renewing transatlantic cooperation in 2005 and beyond.

Outlined below are (1) proposed pillars for future transatlantic cooperation, (2) summaries of issues on which transatlantic disagreement continues and (3) several concrete policy recommendations for governments in the United States and Europe. These recommendations are intended to be implemented simultaneously and comprehensively.

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Friedemann Mueller
Nigel Purvis

Publication: High Level Transatlantic Dialogue on Climate Change

Europe and Japan Misread Kerry on Kyoto; Global Warming

Nigel Purvis — Mon, 05 Apr 2004 00:00:00 -0400

Is Senator John Kerry the answer to European and Japanese prayers on global warming? Perhaps, but contrary to international expectations, President Kerry would not get the United States into the Kyoto Protocol.

When it comes to the environment, President George W. Bush and John Kerry are like oil and water. The environment is a bottom-rung priority for Bush, while Kerry has the greenest voting record in the U.S. Senate and speaks passionately about global warming. On the campaign trail, Kerry characterizes Bush's unilateral rejection of Kyoto as evidence of the Texan's high-handed, shortsighted and arrogant foreign policy. Kerry's new environmental plan states flatly that "John Kerry will reinsert the United States into international climate negotiations." Little wonder European and Japanese politicians are counting on Kerry to revive U.S. support for Kyoto. But those hopes are misplaced.

First, the United States could not comply with the Kyoto requirements even if it tried. Kyoto would require the United States to reduce its climate emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. U.S. emissions are already more than 12 percent above 1990 levels and are rising with no end in site. Even U.S. environmentalists who believed Kyoto's U.S. target was achievable in 1997 concede that it is beyond reach today.

Second, even a watered-down version of Kyoto would have a difficult time in Congress during a Kerry presidency. The U.S. Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to approve treaties. Just last fall, a majority of senators rejected a bipartisan climate-change proposal sponsored by two former presidential candidates, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman, despite the fact that the bill was far less ambitious than Kyoto. Although some version of the McCain-Lieberman bill might pass the Senate in a few years, securing the two-thirds majority needed for ratification of a new climate treaty would take longer. Navigating the more hostile House of Representatives—whose approval is essential for implementing legislation needed to give treaties teeth—would be an even larger challenge. In the House, opposition to action on climate change has been a badge of honor for conservatives, who are expected to solidify their control over that body in November regardless of who wins the White House.

Third, Kerry himself says that he will advance "alternatives to Kyoto" after the United States enacts comprehensive domestic climate-change regulation, including rules for a new domestic financial market for emission credits. Kerry understands that the Senate rarely approves international agreements, particularly environmental treaties, unless they are based on prior domestic action. The international agreement to repair the "ozone hole," which the United States joined easily, for example, was modeled on a pre-existing U.S. law. Kyoto, however, was an international solution imported before the development of a consensus national policy. Little wonder it became a political piñata. Chalk it up to American hegemony, leadership or arrogance, as you please, but the United States tends to treat international pressure to ratify treaties that diverge from U.S. laws the way most people handle spam e-mail—by ignoring it.

Europe and Japan should continue prodding the United States toward a more responsible climate policy, but counting on the United States returning to the Kyoto bargaining table is not the best approach. What should they do instead? Foremost, they must meet their global warming commitments, regardless of whether Russia ratifies Kyoto and thereby brings the treaty to life. Despite grumblings from some quarters, Europe and, to a lesser extent, Japan are on the verge of adopting meaningful and farsighted market-oriented climate strategies. Following through on promises to reduce emissions would symbolize European and Japanese political commitment to the global environment and demonstrate to U.S. industry that fighting climate change can be affordable.

Second, Europe and Japan should press the United States to regulate carbon and other greenhouse gases under U.S. domestic law. America's domestic action matters more than its international promises.

Third, Europe and Japan should challenge the United States to increase funding for international clean-energy research and development programs and for engaging major developing countries by pledging to match any new U.S. climate change expenditures (beyond what Bush has already announced) up to an additional $10 billion a year. These programs help fight global warming by creating a new generation of cleaner, more efficient automobiles and electricity power plants at home and abroad. Any of these steps would influence U.S. policy more than pleas to rejoin what many Americans view as a slow and politically tainted United Nations negotiating process.

On global warming, Bush is on the wrong side of history. Europe is not, but its focus on the Kyoto process as the vehicle for engaging the United States is unhelpful. While the climate policies of the United States would improve with a Kerry presidency, Kyoto is not in the cards for the United States, regardless of who sits in the White House. Europe should move ahead with its Kyoto-based plans, but it should also develop some parallel approaches that America could find appealing.

Authors

Nigel Purvis

Publication: International Herald Tribune

Global Challenges for U.S. Energy Policy: Economic, Environmental, and Security Risks

Fri, 05 Mar 2004 09:30:00 -0500

Event Information

March 5, 2004
9:30 AM - 5:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

International security, domestic energy production, and environmental protection are often discussed separately, but rising global energy demand has implications for a range of issues, including security, economics, and the environment. There is growing recognition, particularly since September 11, of the security dimensions of energy consumption and the economic costs of high energy prices. Global warming also remains a serious concern, but solutions to one policy arena may exacerbate problems in others.

In an effort to build a national consensus on addressing the global dimensions of U.S. energy policy, the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, and the National Commission on Energy Policy co-sponsored a bipartisan, one-day conference on energy and the global environment that brought together national political leaders, business executives, and foreign policy experts.

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John Holdren

Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy, Harvard University; Co-Chair, National Commission on Energy Policy

James A. Placke

Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

R. James Woolsey

Former Director, CIA; Member, National Commission on Energy Policy

Guy Caruso

Administrator, Energy Information Administration

John Felmy

Senior Economist, American Petroleum Institute

Jason Grumet

Executive Director, National Commission on Energy Policy

Kyle McSlarrow

US Deputy Secretary of Energy

Phil Sharp

Congressional Chair, National Commission on Energy Policy, former US Representative, Indiana

Bill Reilly

Co-Chair, National Commission on Energy Policy, Former EPA Administrator

Daniel Yergin

Chairman, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

Strobe Talbott

President, Brookings Institution

Christopher DeMuth

President, American Enterprise Institute

Controlling the Costs of Transatlantic Climate Change Policies

Laurence Tubiana and Nigel Purvis — Mon, 01 Mar 2004 00:00:00 -0500

This is one of four papers prepared for the US-EU High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change sponsored by the Brookings Institution, the German Institute for Security Affairs (SWP) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, held at Villa Vigoni, Italy, October 2003. This paper builds on a forthcoming publication by Joseph Aldy, Richard Baron and Ms. Tubiana prepared under the auspices of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change for its 'Beyond Kyoto' series.

Uncertainty

Our understanding of climate change and the costs or benefits of various policy responses is imperfect. Today's models provide only crude estimates about the economic consequences of alternative global warming scenarios. Judgments about the benefits of climate policies rest on uncertain predictions about the adverse regional effects of global warming. Likewise, estimates about their costs rely on potentially shaky assumptions about the rate of technology change, innovation and social adaptation. With such uncertainty it is no wonder that differences of opinion exist.

The question for policy makers is how to deal with this uncertainty. Some maintain that uncertainty argues for delaying costly action to spare the economy until more is known. Others argue that the risk of irreversible and possibly catastrophic climate change more than justifies decisive action as an insurance against the unknown. The reasonable middle ground on which most Americans and Europeans agree is that the risk of dangerous climate change is real enough to warrant genuine action now that can be pursued without unduly harming the economy.

Controlling the cost of fighting climate change, therefore, is of critical political, economic and environmental importance. Keeping the cost low is key to securing the broadest possible political acceptance, both at home and abroad. A high cost approach, in addition, would detract from the pursuit of other important priorities, such as health care, job creation, education and national security. Cost-effective climate strategies, moreover, are needed to ensure that any resources devoted to climate policy actually achieve the maximum environmental benefits.

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Laurence Tubiana
Nigel Purvis

Publication: INTACT Working Group Policy Papers

Brookings: Experts - Nigel Purvis

Millennium Challenge Corporation Advances Environmental and Social Standards

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Sink or Swim: The Economic Impacts of an International Maritime Emissions System for Greenhouse Gases on the United States

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The G-20’s Development and Climate Goals: Innovations in Shipping

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Indonesia’s Green Prosperity

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The World Bank and Coal Aid

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Climate Change and Global Poverty : A Billion Lives in the Balance?

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Lael Brainard

Abigail Jones

Nigel Purvis

The Case for a Climate Protection Authority

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Climate Dèjà Vu

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Recipe for European Climate Leadership

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The Real Importance of the Kyoto Treaty

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Climate Change and the L20: Options for Non-Emission Target Commitments

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The Evolving U.S. Politics of Climate Change

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Building a Transatlantic Biotech Partnership

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U.S. Climate Policy: Toward a Sensible Center

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The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System

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Global Poverty and Global Development: Is the United States Doing its Part?

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Renewing Transatlantic Climate Change Cooperation

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Europe and Japan Misread Kerry on Kyoto; Global Warming

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Global Challenges for U.S. Energy Policy: Economic, Environmental, and Security Risks

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Controlling the Costs of Transatlantic Climate Change Policies

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