Brookings: Experts - Jonathan D. Pollack

The U.S. and China: A New Kind of Great Power Relationship?

Wed, 12 Jun 2013 14:00:00 -0400

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June 12, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Last weekend’s meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping at the former Annenberg Estate in California presented the two leaders with an opportunity to address a wide range of pressing issues, from flash points in the Korean peninsula to climate change and the global economy. To China’s leaders, this meeting contributed to the development of a “new kind of great power relationship,” a concept that has been heavily promoted in recent months in state media and official pronouncements.

On June 12, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted Madame Fu Ying, the spokeswoman for the China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the chair of the NPC’s Foreign Affairs Committee. As an experienced career diplomat and former vice minister of Foreign Affairs, and now the spokesperson for China’s national legislature, Ambassador Fu has played a unique role in both conducting foreign policy and explaining national policies to Chinese and foreign media. In her comments, she discussed the U.S.-China relationship in the wake of the Annenberg meeting and offer a Chinese perspective on the direction of U.S.-China relations. Senior Fellow Jonathan D. Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, gave introductory remarks.

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The U.S. and China: A New Kind of Great Power Relationship?

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China and the U.S.: A Little Big Summit

Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 06 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

President Obama and China's new leader, Xi Jinping, convene this week in Rancho Mirage for their first face-to-face discussion as presidents. It is a summit without precedent in Sino-American relations. Both leaders agreed to informal discussions very different from the highly structured agendas generally associated with presidential meetings.

Detached from the diplomatic protocol and elaborate preparations of most summits and physically far removed from both capitals, the two days of meetings have a very different objective. Little heed will be paid to the "deliverables" often used to measure success or failure in discussions between heads of state. By focusing first on understanding each other and the challenges both countries face, the two hope to achieve a comfort level that will enable larger achievements over the longer run.

The range of issues confronting the two presidents is daunting. Among the top-tier issues they must address: mounting suspicions in each country about the other's strategic intentions; an increasingly troubled security environment extending from the Korean peninsula to the East China and South China seas; the prospect of an open-ended U.S.-China military competition in the Pacific; illicit Chinese cyber intrusions designed to acquire the technology and corporate secrets of U.S. firms; and major differences over economic strategy. Enhanced collaboration on clean energy and climate change also remains largely unfulfilled.

Paradoxically, the relationship between America and China is far more extensive and interactive today than at any point in the last four decades. But the two countries have yet to realize a shared concept of global and regional order to govern 21st century politics, economic development and international security. Without such a concept, both countries could retreat into narrow self-interest that would deny the possibility of a larger political transformation that both claim to seek.

The two nations have relied on formulaic characterizations of their respective strategies that neither leadership finds persuasive or reassuring.

China, for example, repeatedly espouses the goal of peaceful development and insists that it does not seek to exclude or diminish U.S. leadership in Asia. The United States argues that it seeks to rebalance its global strategy to reflect the shifting center of economic and strategic gravity to Asia and the Pacific, while insisting that this is not code for inhibiting China's longer-term regional role. But neither puts much credence in the other's preferred bumper sticker.

In recent months, both leaderships have begun to discuss a more inclusive bilateral framework to forestall heightened competition or overt antagonism. However, without sustained cooperation on vital issues, any new strategic concept will lack relevance.

Three issues seem likely to be uppermost on the U.S. agenda: more meaningful cooperation to inhibit North Korean risk-taking and Pyongyang's heightened pursuit of nuclear weapon and missile capabilities; rules of the road to curtail cyber espionage; and more equitable rules governing Sino-American trade and investment, including the ability of U.S. firms to gain fuller and fairer market entry in China. In the U.S. view, these goals will test China's readiness to move beyond words of assurance as it pledges to pursue a new concept of major power relations.

In turn, China wants the U.S. to demonstrate a commitment to a future regional order that fully legitimizes China's role. But neither president can expect to dominate the terms of debate. Both must impart a shared commitment to address the pressing issues that threaten to undermine the prosperity and stability that Asia and the Pacific have long enjoyed — or the opportunity to achieve a larger transformation in bilateral relations will be lost.

Obama, mindful of his compressed opportunities as a second-term president, knows that he has a limited window within which to build relations for the longer term. Barring ill health or political upheaval within China, Xi has a 10-year time frame. He also seems a far more assured, self-confident politician than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. But he must demonstrate that he can grasp the opportunities for a genuine change in bilateral relations.

Xi faces a prodigious array of political and economic challenges that will test his capacity to shape China's future. He also must build an internal political coalition able to counteract the self-aggrandizing behavior of powerful domestic constituencies, assuming he has the will to do so.

China may seem an economic and strategic juggernaut destined to emerge as the world's largest power, but on-the-ground realities suggest otherwise. Unmet middle-class expectations for more individual autonomy, public alienation over the nation's unequal distribution of wealth and widespread corruption, and mounting public demands for clean air and safe food and water bespeak the growing demands of a society experiencing unprecedented change and pressures from below.

The meetings in Rancho Mirage will require a level of candor and mutual legitimation from both leaders seldom achieved in summitry. The outcome will reveal much about the capacity of both presidents to transcend suspicions and move toward a larger transition in international relations.

Whether they are able to seize the possibilities remains to be seen, but the process must begin with the unprecedented conversations taking place this week.

Authors

Jonathan D. Pollack

Publication: Los Angeles Times

Image Source: © Gary Cameron / Reuters

Top Five Issues President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping Should Discuss

Richard C. Bush III, Cheng Li, Jonathan D. Pollack, Eswar Prasad and Ian Wallace — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 15:23:00 -0400

President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet in California later this week, where they are scheduled to hold in-depth meetings on a wide range of issues in the U.S.-China relationship. Brookings experts identify the top five topics the two leaders should discuss: cybersecurity, North Korea, China's foreign investment, China's new government and East and South China Seas dispute.

1. Cybersecurity

All countries engage in some form of spying, but China’s cyber-spying on American industries is especially threatening. If China refuses to curtail the practice, Ian Wallace explains, the U.S.-Sino relationship could be profoundly undermined.

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Cyber-security: Putting China on Notice

2. North Korea

North Korea’s brinksmanship is disturbing to the region and problematic for the Chinese government, which is often asked to calm the country down. China agrees that North Korea needs to change, notes Jonathan Pollack, director of the China Center at Brookings.

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North Korea: China's Problem

3. China's Foreign Investment

China’s foreign investment is staggering and continues to grow. China’s dollars also buy political influence around the world and could even hinder U.S. industrial growth. It may be unsettling but there’s little the U.S. can do. Eswar Prasad has the details.

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China's Foreign Investment: Purse Strings and Political Power

4. China's New Government

The tension between the U.S. and China is largely fueled by their respective desire to reach the same goal: they both want to be the world’s preeminent power; but Cheng Li says this isn’t as ominous as it sounds.

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The U.S. and China: Mutual Respect, Mutual Fear

5. East and South China Seas Dispute

Maritime rights have been a long-festering problem affecting several countries in the East Asian region. It’s an issue that can destabilize the neighborhood or the world and could possibly lead to war as Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, explains.

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East and South China Seas Disputes

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Obama, Xi and North Korea: The Long Overdue Conversation

Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 10:30:00 -0400

When President Obama meets with President Xi Jinping this week in California, North Korea will feature prominently on the agenda. Xi seems prepared to engage in a serious discussion of this endlessly vexing and worrisome issue. For decades, Pyongyang has defied external pressure to alter its behavior, exploiting fissures among neighboring powers and the United States while sustaining pursuit of nuclear weapons development. But the North’s repeated threats of recent months and its open defiance of Xi Jinping have done more damage to its relations with China than perhaps any event since North Korean agents assassinated a substantial portion of South Korea’s cabinet on a visit to Burma in October 1983.

Leaders in Beijing now openly acknowledge that North Korea’s actions and weapons programs directly jeopardize Chinese vital interests. This has not been easy for China to admit, but better late than never. President Obama no longer needs to chastise Beijing (as he once did to Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor) about China’s “willful blindness” toward the DPRK. Beijing is also pursuing closer relations with the Republic of Korea, irrespective of the North’s heated objections to such ties. This process will culminate with the state visit of South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, to Beijing later this month.

The discussions between Obama and Xi will enable a long overdue conversation about the dangers posed by North Korea, and how both countries (in conjunction with the ROK) weigh the risks to their collective interests. It represents a major test of whether China’s declared interest in a new pattern of major power relations is a serious policy initiative and not simply a slogan designed to reassure the outside world.

This post has been modified.

Authors

Jonathan D. Pollack

Image Source: © Gary Cameron / Reuters

The U.S., China and Africa: Pursuing Trilateral Dialogue and Action

Mon, 13 May 2013 14:30:00 -0400

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May 13, 2013
2:30 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With six of the ten fastest growing economies in world, sub-Saharan Africa is attracting both American and Chinese investors. The growing importance of sub-Saharan Africa to the global economy has made the region a focal point for the differing policies of the United States and China. China recently pledged significant financing to Africa over the three year period from 2012-2014, while the U.S. looks to extend the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act ahead of schedule. Despite the opportunities and growth in the region, the U.S., China and Africa all face shared and separate challenges in the areas of security, trade, investment, foreign policy, and natural resource extraction and management.

On May 13, the Africa Growth Initiative and the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, with the Institute for Statistical, Social, and Economic Research at the University of Ghana and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, hosted a discussion to examine the relationships among the U.S., China and African states. This forum was the first in a series, which brings a balanced perspective to the examination of the challenges and opportunities for trilateral dialogue and action.

North Korea through Chinese Eyes

Tue, 23 Apr 2013 03:30:00 -0400

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April 23, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:30 PM CST

School of Public Policy and Management Auditorium
Brookings-Tsinghua Center

Beijing, China

North Korea’s threats against the outside world have reached new heights in recent months, triggering mounting concern across Northeast Asia about the possibilities of instability, crisis and even war. Yet there is nothing especially unusual or new in North Korean statements and actions, even if its recent behavior seems particularly extreme and worrisome. Its conduct reflects the isolation and deep frustrations of leaders in Pyongyang, the persistence of dynastic rule in North Korea, its economic weakness in relation to its neighbors (especially the Republic of Korea) and the unwillingness of outside powers to legitimate the DPRK’s claims to status as a nuclear-armed state.

On April 23, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center hosted a public event for Dr. Jonathan Pollack, senior fellow and director of the John Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Pollack is a specialist on East Asian international politics and security. His latest book, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security, was published in May 2011 by Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In his remarks, Pollack briefly reviewed North Korea’s political history and assessed how Chinese views of the DPRK have shifted in recent years, and then weighed in on how North Korea’s future could affect Northeast Asia as a whole and U.S.-China relations in particular.China is now on the road to redefining its interests on the peninsula and its relationship with North Korea, and to striking discreetly a balance among the various stakeholders, as Pollack indicated.

Ms. Meng Bo, associate director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center gave the opening remarks for the event. Professor Wang Dong from Peking University shared his insights on North Korea from the perspective of a Chinese scholar. After the program, Dr. Pollack answered questions from the audience.

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North Korea through Chinese Eyes

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The Road Ahead for China’s Economy

Tue, 16 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

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April 16, 2013
9:00 AM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

In recent years, China has increasingly confronted new challenges in economic policy, including rising labor costs, low household consumption, rapid urbanization and inefficient domestic investment. While it is now widely acknowledged in Beijing that major structural adjustments are needed to address these issues, implementing serious reforms pose major challenges for the newly installed leadership.

On April 16, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings and China’s Caixin Media Group hosted a conference to examine the daunting challenges confronting China’s new leaders. The morning panels featured a discussion of the financial sector as well as the relationship between the domestic agenda for financial reform and China’s evolving strategy for outbound investment. The afternoon panels took a close look at the political obstacles to implementing major economic reform in areas such as tax policy, the household registration system and land transfers, as well as explore the impact of environmental and natural resource constraints on China’s economic growth.

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North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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April 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN and cspan.org. Click here to watch online.

In the past months, North Korea has issued a series of threats and provocative actions, from testing a nuclear device and conducting a missile launch—in contravention of multiple United Nations resolutions—to cancelling the armistice ending the Korean War and threatening a new war against the United States and South Korea. Harsh rhetoric from North Korea is nothing new, but some observers feel that the recent threats represent real danger. Others claim that they reflect internal dynamics in North Korea and that the crisis will pass.

On April 15, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the policy priorities for the United States in dealing with North Korea during and after the current crisis. Brookings experts debated the threat to the United States and its allies and analyzed steps that the United States can take to mitigate the danger, including sanctions, engaging allies and neighbors in the region, nonproliferation efforts and, if necessary, responding to aggressive actions by North Korea.

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North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

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Examining North Korea’s Recent Heated Rhetoric

Strobe Talbott, Richard C. Bush III, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jonathan D. Pollack — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 15:04:00 -0400

As the United States and South Korea undertake joint military exercises, North Korea has responded with harsh rhetoric, saying that its people are “burning with hatred” for the United States. Brookings President Strobe Talbott leads a discussion with Richard Bush, Michael O’Hanlon, and Jonathan Pollack focusing on the latest saber rattling by North Korea and exploring the intentions of Kim-Jong Un, North Korea’s young leader.

Strobe Talbott: Do you think that the current bluster (and more) from Pyongyang represents more of what we’ve seen before from North Korea or is there a real danger of conflict? If the latter, what should the U.S. be doing to prevent that terrible prospect and what would happen if it comes to blows?

Michael O’Hanlon: I recently wrote on the subject in Politico following the third nuclear test in an effort encourage the U.S. against overreaction given Kim Jong-Un's youth and inexperience—and his potential for moderation/change as he ages (I hope!). My proposal was to make any additional sanctions temporary, partly as a way to induce Chinese support and partly as an incentive to North Korea not to test again (since the new sanctions would only sunset in the event of no further tests or big provocations).

But, of course, that's not quite the same as an answer to your question. In light of the above thinking, my own druthers would be to make any upgrades in our capability quietly—even secretly—so as not to provoke the action-reaction cycle we are now in (e.g., sending F-22 aircraft to bases in South Korea to improve the effectiveness of any initial air strikes, but not telling anybody except Seoul).

Richard Bush: The consensus opinion among specialists is that North Korea’s recent actions are the same old-same old, the typical way North Korea responds to U.S.-ROK exercises every year. Specifically, because the regime portrays the exercises as a segue for a U.S.-ROK attack, even nuclear attack, then it must make at least verbal threats about what it will do when that war happens. The intensity this time may have been dialed up a bit because Kim 3.0 is feistier than his father was, but it's a question of degree.

What may happen (or may not) is a limited conventional strike at the DMZ, against a ROK naval ship, or against one of the West Sea Islands (like the one that preceded our November 2010 visit to Seoul). The ROKs have pledged retaliation, which does create the problem of escalation, but how it might play out is speculative at this point.

Talbott: Thanks, Richard. Most convincing and, to a point, reassuring.

O’Hanlon: Yes, to a point, indeed. "Consensus among specialists" is not always a concept I find reassuring, though! I am glad, Richard, that you seem willing to deviate somewhat from that consensus yourself (at least to some extent). This is probably the same old-same old….until it's not, that is. I actually do worry that the U.S. default approach of tit-for-tat with North Korea (and the imposition of additional, permanent sanctions after the third test), while of course morally defensible, may exacerbate the situation in this particular case—which feels somewhat different to me than past periods of bluster.

Talbott: Interesting point, Mike. I’d be interested in your assessment of Kim-Jong Un, or Kim 3.0 as Richard calls him. His recent rhetoric and actions show that he is willing to test the boundaries of what is internationally acceptable. But, I had the impression that he was subject to a lot of supervision from the North Korean military, meaning he doesn't have much autonomy, especially, one hopes, when it comes to declaring the Korean War back on and taking other actions that would significantly escalate the situation.

O’Hanlon: Right and Kim-Jong Un wants to be friends with Dennis Rodman and he grew up largely in Europe—and he doesn't strike me as the suicidal type, so I'm hoping that someday he'll want to be the next leader of a "reform from within" movement as in Vietnam years ago, Burma of late, etc. Obviously a long-shot concept at the moment though....

Jonathan Pollack: The reality is that we don't really know very much about what animates Kim 3.0, so we must infer from what we can observe about his behavior. He seems very much like Kim Il Sung and may even be modeling himself on his grandfather. (He has his physicality and extroversion; even his body language seems reminiscent of the grandfather.) Very few foreigners have met 3.0. The Chinese blessed his succession at an early date (November 2010, as I recall), when a then serving member of the Politburo Standing Committee was on the podium with young Mr. Kim. So far as I can determine no senior Chinese official has met with him since then, and he has not been invited to visit China. In contrast to the distinct warming in China-SK relations (including several messages between Xi Jinping and Pres Park), there is a decided coldness/distancing in China-NK relations. I think Beijing early on calculated that there was a potential opening with 3.0 (as did we—witness the abortive February 29 agreement), but this seems largely a dead letter at this point.

The most troubling possibility is that he is very full of himself, listens to few others, and is now consorting regularly with the North Korean military leadership. Despite some early hopes for reform in the North, he has now wrapped himself in the "military first" rhetoric every bit as much as his father did. Worse yet, he has a successful satellite launch and another nuclear test under his belt, with clear expectations that more could be in the offing.

As I wrote in the Foreign Policy program’s Big Bets-Black Swans project, there needs to be a much more determined effort by the United States and ROK to deal fully with China in the event that things go from bad to worse in Korea. Now is definitely the time, lest we find ourselves in an acute crisis. That said, North Korean propaganda always spikes whenever the U.S. and the ROK are in the middle of major exercises, so perhaps the latest campaign will subside as the exercises wind down next month. But the tone and threats are particularly worrisome at present - even they are intended largely for domestic effect.

O’Hanlon: That's an excellent point, Jonathan, if I may say so (the focus on consultation with China).

I can't disagree with any of the analysis, and of course, you know the dynamics in the region very well. However, I still would venture to say that our February 2012 hopes (just two months into 3.0's rule, when he still hadn't even turned 30 years old as I recall) were unrealistically optimistic that early in his tenure within a Stalinist system, and we should remember how unlikely glasnost and perestroika would have seemed (or Chinese and Vietnamese economic reform) a few years before they occurred. But that's a footnote, not a central argument, of course.

Pollack: I and a few others met with the State Department’s Glyn Davies immediately after the signing the 2/29/12 agreement. He remained very sober about the possibilities—and that it seemed too good to be true. Davies was careful not to oversell the agreement, which, in the end, blew up two weeks later.

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China’s Rise: Assessing Views from East Asia and the United States

Fri, 29 Mar 2013 09:00:00 -0400

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March 29, 2013
9:00 AM - 1:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

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The opportunities and challenges presented to East Asia by China’s rapidly increasing international stature, economic influence and military heft have been thrown into sharp relief over the last few years. Escalating tensions over a series of maritime territorial disputes have contrasted with a marked improvement in cross-strait relations and with efforts by China to pursue free trade agreements with ASEAN countries as well as Japan and South Korea. Until recently, however, scholars who follow this issue have not had access to survey data that might allow them to draw more specific conclusions about the attitudes of other East Asians towards the rise of China.

On March 29, the John L. Thornton China Center and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, the Program for East Asia Democratic Studies of the Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University, and the Institute of Arts and Humanities of Shanghai Jiaotong University will host a half-day conference to address this question. At the conference, panelists will present data from the Asian Barometer Survey and compare these findings with prevailing survey data in the United States. Leading experts from both sides of the Pacific will weigh the potential implications of these studies for future relations between China and other East Asian countries and for U.S.-China relations.

After each set of presentations, speakers will take audience questions.

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Getting it Wrong on North Korea and Nuclear Reductions

Steven Pifer and Jonathan D. Pollack — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:13:00 -0500

Arms control critics wasted no time citing North Korea’s nuclear test as a principal reason why the United States should avoid further nuclear arms reductions. On February 12, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon stated: “It is also unfortunate that on the same day the president of the United States plans to announce further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons, we see another hostile regime unimpressed by his example. U.S. security cannot … afford even more cuts to U.S. defense capabilities, such as our nuclear deterrent.”

It may make for a nice sound bite, but the argument does not stand up to serious scrutiny. The current U.S. arsenal numbers between 4,600 and 5,000 nuclear weapons, many of which sit atop intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of launching within minutes. The North Korean stockpile, by contrast, is estimated at eight to ten weapons, though it seems intent on increasing these numbers.

If the president tomorrow chose to cut the U.S. nuclear arsenal by 50 percent, it would still be 200-300 times larger than North Korea’s. The United States also possesses a wide array of conventional deep strike weapons that could inflict devastating damage on North Korea should it contemplate an attack on South Korea, Japan or U.S. regionally deployed forces. And, despite its claims, North Korea lacks a demonstrated capability to strike the United States with a nuclear warhead.

North Korea’s nuclear defiance is deeply troubling, and its latest test warrants heightened multilateral measures to inhibit Pyongyang’s efforts to increase its arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively. The leaders in the North appear to believe that their nuclear weapons can legitimate the country’s power and entitle it to enhanced international status. These claims are rooted in a deeply adversarial nationalism that has defined North Korea since the earliest years of the state. By claiming undiminished U.S. hostility, it seeks to rationalize the country’s acute isolation and economic dysfunction to its beleaguered citizens.

North Korea is well practiced at identifying the United States as its “sworn enemy.” If anything, additional reductions in the number of warheads in the U.S. inventory would weaken the case Pyongyang seeks to make to justify its nuclear pursuits. But the driving imperatives of its nuclear program reflect its domestic needs and vulnerabilities, not the aggregate numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The nuclear cuts reportedly under consideration by the administration—such as reducing the New START limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads to 1,000-1,100—would hardly embolden North Korea or any other state to challenge the United States in a manner different than it does now. Moreover, Pyongyang is undoubtedly aware that the remaining inventory of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons was unilaterally withdrawn from the Korean peninsula more than two decades ago.

If the United States, with a nuclear arsenal 15 times larger than that of any country other than Russia, is not prepared to reduce further, can it credibly argue that other nuclear weapons states should not build up or that other countries should not acquire nuclear arms? Further reductions, on the other hand, would bolster the ability of U.S. diplomacy to persuade third countries to increase pressure and sanctions on nuclear outliers such as Iran and North Korea. In the three years since New START was signed, American diplomats have had ample success in getting other countries to increase sanctions on Iran.

A nuclear-armed North Korea undoubtedly represents a serious threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia. But that is no reason to argue that Washington should not pursue the next stage of nuclear arms reductions with Russia.

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North Korea's Nuclear Tests: A Persistent, Deliberate Process

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

North Korea continues to develop an arsenal of nuclear weapons despite the concerns and condemnations from neighboring countries and Western powers. Scientific reports about this week’s blast suggest that the bombs could be growing more sophisticated and dangerous. Richard C. Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and Jonathan Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, take a closer look at North Korea’s nuclear program and the message it sends.

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North Korea's Nuclear Tests: A Persistent, Deliberate Process

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The Implications of North Korea's Third Nuclear Test

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 09:37:00 -0500

We do not yet know how much North Korea has advanced its nuclear weapons program as a result of today’s test. Specialists are intensely curious about the fissile material used (plutonium or enriched uranium) and the design of device. Pyongyang claims that the latest test was of a smaller, lighter weapon, and the available seismic data indicates an appreciably greater explosive yield than either of the prior tests. The North is undoubtedly making progress, and it is not too early to assess the implications of this test – and the successful ballistic missile launch in December – for the interests of all countries immediately affected by the detonation.

Kim Jong Un very likely sees himself as the big winner from today’s test. Kim became North Korea’s top leader following the death of his father Kim Jong Il fourteen months ago. His principal goal since then has been to establish his own personal legitimacy and preserve that of the Kim Royal Family. In that regard, securing progress on the missile and nuclear programs is the coin of the realm.

For the United States and Japan, the two tests confirm past judgments about Pyongyang’s long-term intentions. That is, the DPRK is intent on acquiring the ability to strike the continental United States as well as Japan with nuclear weapons, an objective that no package of outside incentives is likely to prevent. The stakes are high. Should North Korea succeed in its quest, it will significantly destabilize the security of Northeast Asia and increase the dangers of proliferation to other regions.

Some will fault Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul for not having engaged Pyongyang to head off the tests of recent months, but there is little or no evidence that Kim Jong Un would have been any more responsive to engagement than his father. Instead, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea have sought in recent years to “sharpen North Korea’s choices,” between sustaining its nuclear and missile programs, in contrast to heightened economic and political benefits with the international community. All three states will likely respond to today’s test by seeking to tighten sanctions. There is ample room to improve the implementation of existing measures, and new financial sanctions are available (see the current Iran menu). But a question lingers, are we indeed shaping North Korea’s choices or is it shaping ours?

The third nuclear test puts China’s new leadership on the hot seat. Under its previous leader Hu Jintao Beijing had multiple objectives in its North Korea strategy: restrain DPRK provocations; limit the impact of multilateral sanctions so that they do not stabilize the North Korean regime; provide economic support to Pyongyang to enhance stability and encourage better behavior; and facilitate a diplomatic approach for managing the problem, if not solving it. By testing in defiance of China’s wishes, Pyongyang has once again demonstrated that it has a very different agenda. It is betting that Beijing’s threats of punishment (as under Hu Jintao) are all bark and no bite. In effect, it is testing China’s new paramount leader, Xi Jinping. Will he cooperate with Washington in tightening sanctions and withdraw material and political benefits to Kim Jong Un? Or will Xi accommodate to a new status quo? Those questions will occupy the Beijing leadership during the Chinese New Year holiday.

The DPRK’s action probably has the greatest impact on South Korea’s president-elect, Park Geun-hye, who will be inaugurated on February 25^th. Madame Park had campaigned on the premise that the North Korea policies of the current president, Lee Myung Bak, had been too tough and one-sided. She had proposed the creation of a “trust-building” process with Pyongyang and a focus on areas of potential mutual benefit. Much of the South Korean public supported that stance when they cast their votes. With today’s nuclear test, Kim Jong Un has signaled that any acts of accommodation must come solely from the South Korean side, thus putting Madame Park on the defensive. Her initiative is now very unlikely to get off the ground. Any claims that the test was directed against outgoing President Lee will ring hollow to the new president, compelling her to rethink her approach to future dealings with the North.

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Image Source: © Kim Hong-Ji / Reuters

Will North Korea Test Again?

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Sat, 26 Jan 2013 09:00:00 -0500

The script of North Korea's latest threat to conduct another nuclear test is depressingly familiar. Pyongyang first tests a long-range ballistic missile, usually justified as a satellite launch. An international debate then ensues over the reasons for the test. Was it conducted for purely domestic considerations? Is it a way to secure food or economic assistance? Is it an attempt to convince the United States to enter into bilateral negotiations or is it yet another step in building a nuclear deterrent despite intense international opposition? The UN Security Council then responds with varying degrees of condemnation and punitive actions. North Korea takes umbrage, first threatening and then carrying out a nuclear test. The international community responds with even more severe warnings not to do it again. North Korea hunkers down, and finds ways to circumvent sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Whether China has done enough to restrain North Korea is then hotly discussed in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and even in China.

But the script doesn’t always work out this way. Last April there was a missile test and then no nuclear test, even though there were apparent preparations at the test site. Whether Pyongyang acts on its threat to test may be a function of how much China is willing to pay to break the cycle, or possibly Beijing's warnings of severe negative consequences in its relations with Pyongyang. Our best educated guess is that there will be another nuclear test this time, but it is impossible to be precise about when. The warnings this time suggest it will not be a plutonium device, as in 2006 and 2009, but one that utilizes highly enriched uranium as the fissile material. Moreover, North Korea intimates that the explosive yield of this test could be much greater than that of either of Pyongyang's previous tests.

The reasons for Pyongyang's renewed brinksmanship are probably "all of the above." Kim Jong Un, who brought the military down several pegs after succeeding his father, may need to provide some compensation in the form of additonal missile and nuclear testing. Pyongyang certainly would like to secure more aid from China in order to mitigate its dire economic circumstances. But Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo are wholly unwilling to negotiate on North Korean terms. North Korea, therefore, seeks security by ultimately acquiring the ability to strike the continental United States with nuclear weapons. It seems almost inconceivable that North Korea would undertake such an attack, which would be an act of national suicide. But Pyongyang believes that the United States would be less likely to ever contemplate an attack on the North once it possesses credible nuclear capabilities.

An additional factor concerns the inauguration of South Korea’s new president, Madame Park Geun-hye. Madame Park will be sworn into office on February 25. She has proposed a North Korea policy that maintains deterrence, but seeks to probe North Korean intentions in a "trust-building" process. If North Korea tests a nuclear device either before Park’s inauguration or in the months that follow, it seems highly unlikely that she would be able to proceed with the engagement part of her strategy. Madame Park has already made clear that she regards nuclear weaapons in the North as wholly unacceptable. Pyongyang may nonetheless see value in testing South Korea's new president at the ouset of her tenure in office. By all accounts, Mme. Park means what she says, thus ensuring that the grim North Korean nuclear saga will persist, leaving security on the peninsula and the region even more endangered.

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Image Source: © KCNA KCNA / Reuters

Confrontation Over Korea

Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

North Korea’s severe internal crisis has impelled the United States and China to prepare to intervene in the North, even though neither Washington nor Beijing wants to re-ignite that conflict. Jonathan Pollack wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What are the ways Washington should engage with China to avoid conflict over North Korea and ensure the security of South Korea?
How can China and the United States promote stability in the Korean peninsula?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Jonathan D. Pollack

There is a serious risk of an acute U.S.-China confrontation or even a direct military conflict over Korea. Neither Washington nor Beijing seek this kind of conflict, but North Korea’s severe internal crisis has impelled the United States and China to prepare to intervene in the North, both to protect their respective vital interests and to forestall larger risks to the peace. Pyongyang has a long record of lashing out at neighboring states (especially our South Korean ally) to warn outside powers against any possible intervention in its internal affairs. But this threat now encompasses the potential use of nuclear weapons. Any possible nuclear use by North Korea, even if undertaken within its own borders, represents an acute danger to the region as a whole. If Washington and Beijing fail to coordinate and communicate, we could face the possibility of a U.S.-China confrontation almost unimaginable in its consequences.

Recommendation:

To reduce the risks of a confrontation with China over North Korea, you should instruct your administration to pursue four objectives with Beijing:

1. For both sides to disclose information on the location, operation and capabilities of each other’s military forces that could rapidly intervene in North Korea;
2. To share intelligence on the known or suspected locations of North Korea’s WMD assets, especially its nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings;
3. To initiate planning for the evacuation of foreign citizens in South Korea; and
4. To discuss possible measures to avoid an acute humanitarian disaster among North Korean citizens seeking to flee their country.

Background:

The immediate need for the United States and China is to discuss North Korea and control the risks of conflict well beyond what the U.S. has attempted with Beijing in the past. In addition, we need to cooperate to mitigate the potential dangers to American and Chinese citizens living or working in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to reduce the risks of a direct clash between U.S. and Chinese forces to as close to zero as possible. This will require discussions on military deployments and operations unprecedented in their scope and candor. South Korea must also be part of this conversation.

Despite repeated incidents and potential crises over the decades, the U.S. has been able to maintain an uneasy, heavily-armed peace on the peninsula. In 1972, President Nixon reminded Premier Zhou Enlai that the United States and China fought once in Korea, and that both countries must ensure that this never happens again.

However, deterrence no longer suffices to constrain Pyongyang. North Korea’s citizens are now fleeing in large numbers across the 38th Parallel and into China, and the regime’s very survival is at stake. The internal crisis means that the North Korean leadership is prepared to do whatever it deems necessary to prevent a final meltdown of the regime. Since the 1990s, the U.S. has sought to open a serious conversation with Beijing about the possibility of a major crisis on the peninsula, but China’s leaders (perhaps to avoid offending leaders in Pyongyang or perhaps out of deep suspicions of American intentions) have repeatedly refused to enter into such discussions. But the long-feared crisis is at hand. Unless Washington and Beijing are prepared to discuss these issues directly, the prospect of a second Sino-American confrontation on the peninsula becomes a distinct possibility.

The United States presently has 28,500 active duty personnel deployed in South Korea, and can surge another several hundred thousand personnel onto the peninsula in the event of a major military contingency. Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States and the ROK began to augment longstanding war plans embodied in variants of OPPLAN 5027 with additional planning for abrupt internal change in the North, now addressed under OPPLAN 5029. Until now, Washington and Seoul have tried to secure the borders of the North in an effort to stem any massive flows of North Korean citizens across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). China has undertaken comparable steps to seal its much more porous border with the North. But the current crisis threatens to overwhelm both sides, and Beijing appears alarmed by evidence of the northward redeployment of U.S. and ROK forces. The risks of misperception and miscalculation have increased greatly. American moves are not intended to pose threats to China, but to address the mounting risks of instability in North Korea spilling outward. The U.S. should communicate this fully and openly with China, simultaneously seeking clarification of Chinese plans and intentions.

The safety and security of North Korea’s WMD assets are the uppermost concern of the United States. The command and control arrangements in North Korea are under increasing stress, and it is no longer clear that the central authorities retain full control over the operation of all military units. Any loss of control could create incalculable risks to both the United States and China. It is imperative that you undertake urgent consultations with Beijing to ensure that neither the U.S. nor China misconstrues the other’s actions and plans. Equally important, the United States, China, and Russia have shared interests as nuclear weapon states to prevent any leakage of nuclear materials, technology or completed weapons beyond North Korea’s borders. At the same time, you should convey to Beijing that it must unambiguously warn Pyongyang of the potential consequences of any nuclear use or threatened nuclear use. North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons is a major worry under all circumstances, but to undertake a test under crisis conditions represents an intolerable risk.

Threats to the lives and well-being of foreign citizens in the ROK also warrants urgent consultation and expanded cooperation between the United States and China. According to South Korean government data, there are 1.4 million foreigners in the country at present. These include 130,000 American citizens as well as nearly 30,000 in-country military personnel. Nearly half of the foreigners residing in South Korea (670,000) are from China. The upheavals since the Arab spring have sobered leaders in Beijing to unanticipated risks to Chinese citizens living abroad. The scale of the crisis unfolding in China’s backyard is altering the calculus of Chinese officials. Equally important, China has major capabilities for evacuating foreign nationals. There are now 200 flights a day between cities in South Korea and cities in China, as well as ferries that regularly traverse the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf. These create possibilities to mitigate the potential risks to foreign nationals – Chinese, American, and others - that will be incalculably less effective in the absence of active cooperation with China.

Finally, the humanitarian needs cannot be ignored. China has long conveyed strong opposition to the responsibility to protect (R2P), but R2P in the context of acute instability in North Korea should concentrate the minds of leaders in Beijing. This will be as much China’s problem as it will be for any other state. Though the U.S. should not hesitate to bring this issue to the United Nations, there is every reason for private consultations with Beijing, ideally led by the ROK. Seoul will bear a disproportionate burden for dealing with the aftermath of the crisis. But Chinese interests are also deeply engaged. It cannot stand in the way of managing the consequences.

Conclusion:

For more than two decades, the United States and South Korea have tried to address the implications of instability in North Korea, all the while as China has sought to maintain an arm’s length posture and preserve North Korea’s existence as a separate state. But the unraveling of the North is no longer a hypothetical possibility. The United States and China have a compelling shared interest that the immediate crisis not morph into something far worse, and this must be your bottom-line message to leaders in Beijing.

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Jonathan D. Pollack

Maritime Security: Calming the Eastern Seas

Richard C. Bush III, Bruce Jones and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia that is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for resources is destabilizing the maritime domain in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What should the U.S. do to encourage China, Japan, and others to avoid conflict?
How can agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War serve as a guide for regulating interaction at sea?
How can cooperation in the Arctic serve as a model for multilateral cooperation in East Asia?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack

Maritime East Asia is becoming increasingly dangerous. The past 12 months have seen a series of crises and spats in the East China Sea and South China Sea that threaten to spiral out of control. The twin sources of danger are 1) how regional actors conduct maritime operations to assert and/or defend claims to territory and natural resources’ rights; and 2) their weak capacity to conduct crisis management under domestic nationalistic pressures. The United States risks becoming entangled in conflicts among countries that are its friends and partners.

Recommendation:

You have the opportunity to mitigate the danger of future physical clashes by mounting a concerted diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned jointly to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms in the near term and to promote more institutionalized risk-reduction measures in the medium term. This will both serve U.S. interests in avoiding unnecessary entrapment and foster an environment conducive to cooperative exploitation of resources.

This could be pursued both at the regional and international levels. During the Cold War, the United States concluded risk-reduction agreements with the Soviet Union to regulate the interactions of its naval ships and air force planes. There has been recent work by the United Arab Emirates, Australia and India to foster better exchange of lessons, build private and public sector capacity, and share information about crisis-mitigation tools at the international level; diplomatic efforts to build on this could provide useful context to regional efforts and minimize a sense that China is being singled out.

Background:

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for hydrocarbon, mineral and fishery resources among regional actors is destabilizing the maritime domain. For resource reasons, China, Taiwan and Japan each claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands northeast of Taiwan while China, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian countries claim various land forms in the South China Sea. Conflicts have become more intense in recent years because China is acquiring the seaborne capabilities to assert its own claims and challenge those of others. Growing nationalist sentiment in all countries pressures leaders to take strong stands and eschew compromise. Physical clashes have occurred, which have illustrated the weak crisis management capacity of the countries concerned. In this environment, the prospect for mutually-beneficial cooperation in the exploitation of resources is low (international energy companies, for example, are reluctant to undertake major projects in contested areas).

The United States takes no position on which country owns which land form. But Washington has strongly advocated the freedom of navigation for all countries, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and using international law in addressing questions of sovereignty and resource exploitation. China’s recent and more assertive behavior in defining and advancing its claims — still non-violent but decidedly coercive — has been contrary to those U.S. interests.

In addition, treaty obligations threaten to entangle the United States in specific ways. The U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty applies to all territories under Japan’s administrative control, which includes the Senkaku Islands. According to the long-standing American position, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines does not apply to land forms in the South China Sea, but it does apply to “Philippine vessels.” At a minimum, these legal commitments create the potential for a “tail wags the dog” situation. In a crisis, they entail the fundamental credibility of the United States to stand by allies.

The proximate source of the current danger is the physical clashes and standoffs between vessels of the claimant countries, which are growing more common. Although none has crossed the threshold of loss of life, that may be only a matter of time. Clashes at any level are not in the U.S. interest, because they force the United States to choose among countries with which it seeks good relations. Trying to mediate the underlying territorial disputes would be a fool’s errand, and your administration should not try. Nor should you try to facilitate resource-sharing agreements among the claimant countries as long as the current fevered environment continues.

But the United States has both the need and the opportunity to facilitate a reduction in the probability of physical clashes and the attendant tensions — to the benefit of all. Your administration should continue to counsel restraint among the contenders (China has deservedly become the main target of such demarches). In the near term, it should mount a diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms jointly. In the medium term, it should promote more institutionalized riskreduction measures to regulate the operations of their maritime agencies.

The United States created such mechanisms with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to regulate interaction at sea and in the skies over Berlin. Current and retired U.S. naval and air force officers are a repository of experience on how to conduct conflict-avoidance and risk-reduction measures. The United States should also explore ways to root these efforts in a global framework, drawing on lessons from the management of the Arctic, which has been something of a good news story for international cooperation in recent years.

At this juncture, Japan is quietly willing to develop a conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime for the East China Sea. The ASEAN states are committed to concluding a binding code of conduct with China for the South China Sea for that same purpose. But China has been reluctant and has erected obstacles to a cooperative and stabilizing solution. Beijing has insisted that it will not talk to Japan until Tokyo is prepared to acknowledge that a territorial dispute over the Senkakus exists (Japan is reluctant to do so because it fears that such acknowledgment will be followed by a Chinese demand for negotiations). Concerning the South China Sea, China has used its close ties with Cambodia to delay and deflect any action on a binding code.

Your administration can play a behind-the-scenes role in breaking these logjams. You should start with engaging Beijing’s new leader and stressing to them that China should have little interest in suffering the reputational effects of its coercive behavior or the problems that come with a true crisis. Instead, it is in China’s interests to step back from these conflicts and focus on what is really important. A conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime is a low-cost, face-saving way to do that. Second, as an inducement to China and in return for strongly supporting Japan on such a regime, you should urge Tokyo to bifurcate its position on the Senkakus: retain its de jure position that the islands are Japan’s (so no dispute exists), but acknowledge that de facto other states have their own positions which they are free to present in the course of negotiations on other issues. Concerning a South China Sea code of conduct, you should first firm up support among claimant and other like-minded countries for a code of conduct that is strong enough actually to avoid conflict and reduce risk. Next, with their concurrence, you should suggest to China that if it continues to block a code by splitting ASEAN, the claimant countries and others that support a strong code will, with the support of the United States and others, have no choice but to negotiate with China as a “coalition of the willing.”

Conclusion:

The United States has absolutely no interest in going to war to protect the honor of friends and allies over small rocks and islands. Should it become necessary to contend with China to protect U.S. interests in East Asia and to buoy the confidence of American friends, it should be over a more consequential issue. With a modest yet concrete effort, you have the opportunity to reduce the salience and danger of an issue that will only inflict more headaches. Stabilizing the situation in East Asian waters will mitigate the danger of future clashes and also foster an environment in which cooperative exploitation of resources is more likely.

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China’s Rise and U.S. Strategy in Asia

Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor’s note: The paper first appeared in Look East, Act East: Transatlantic Agendas in the Asia Pacific, a report by European Union Institute for Security Studies. Read an excerpt below.

China’s ascendance as a major power and its implications for the world economy, global governance and international security continues to be a source of major debate. The scope and rapidity of China’s ascent have placed China at the centre of deliberations over international strategy. There are few historical precedents for the spectacular pace of China’s economic advance, and the growth of its comprehensive national power has generated considerable unease. At the same time, by the acknowledgment of its senior leadership, China’s overall development remains ‘unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.’ The extreme concentration of economic and political power in the hands of state-owned enterprises, glaring income inequality and pervasive corruption, industrial overcapacity fuelled by local and provincial interests, widespread environmental degradation and an underdeveloped legal and institutional framework highlight the consequences of unregulated growth presided over by highly protected elites almost entirely removed from public scrutiny. To numerous observers, the lack of accountability and transparency and the inability or unwillingness of central leaders to address the inequities of Chinese development reveals a system in disarray.

China’s international position provides an instructive parallel to many of these in¬ternal concerns. After decades of uninterrupted economic growth, China’s global footprint is inescapable. All states recognise the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy, but many remain wary about China’s grudging, partial accommodation to extant international norms. Chinese leaders repeatedly emphasise their fundamental commitment to peaceful development and heightened cooperation with outside powers. But China’s self-protective stance on a range of international issues and rising nationalist sentiment underscore the gap between China’s declared aspirations and its actual behaviour. Sadly, long-submerged historical disputes have resurfaced in other Asian states as well, renewing volatile animosities that threaten to destabilise the region.

At the same time, Chinese strategic specialists argue that the established powers (particularly the United States) are unprepared to accord China genuine legitimacy as a major power, openly accusing the US of seeking to constrain or undermine China’s rise, either unilaterally or in concert with others. There is a receptive popular audience within China for such arguments. The corollary to these expressed grievances is that outside powers must acknowledge and accommodate to China’s growing strength, rather than vice versa. But other Chinese commentators contest these arguments, contending that enhanced international status requires China to develop normative authority appropriate to its growing economic and military power. Underlying these academic debates are deep, unresolved questions about how Chinese leaders and citizens envision long-term relations between China and the outside world, which are closely linked to China’s internal political and social evolution.

China’s rise and its consequences for the international and regional order are not solely issues for regional actors or the United States to contemplate, nor are the outcomes of this process foreordained. China’s economic imprint is global rather than regional. Growing numbers of Chinese nationals now live and work across the Greater Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and various sub-regions of Asia. Its diplomatic and corporate profile is evident across all continents. China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations, military-to- military relations, and naval diplomacy is also increasingly diverse, and deemed a quiet success story by the military leadership.3 Thus, lasting accommodation is best realised through mutual political and strategic understandings and development of shared international norms, but none of this will come easily, or soon.

As major centres of global power with a shared stake in an inclusive, rules-based international system, America and Europe have long sought to address the risks and opportunities associated with China’s rise. However, policy coordination between the US and EU is far from satisfactory, in part reflecting their asymmetric roles in Asia and the Pacific. America retains a dominant security position in the region but there is no equivalent involvement by European states. In addition, there is widespread concern in European capitals that American preoccupation with the rise of China and a nascent Sino-American strategic competition have supplanted traditional US policy interests in Europe. But neither the US nor the EU wishes to see an erosion or breakdown in existing security arrangements on which the region’s prosperity and stability have long depended. The need for enhanced American and European consultations over China’s longer-term future and the parallel need to craft complementary US and European policy approaches (without fuelling Chinese perceptions of malign intent) is thus a pressing political and strategic issue that warrants far more attention.

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Jonathan D. Pollack

Publication: European Union Institute for Security Studies

The United States, China and Maritime Asia

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 17, 2012
2:00 PM - 5:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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The ascension of new leaders in China coincides with mounting tensions in the East China and South China seas, posing serious risks to the regional maritime order. Amid these disputes and uncertainties, China’s new leaders and the Obama administration are attempting to define the road ahead in Sino-American relations. The risks posed by China’s increasingly tense relations with its maritime neighbors are worrisome, and add to the complexities and potential consequences for the future of the U.S.-China relationship.

On December 17, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion on China’s maritime disputes and the future of U.S.-China relations featuring leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and maritime strategy, and an address by The Honorable Kevin Rudd, the 26th prime minister of Australia and former minister of foreign affairs.

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The United States, China and Maritime Asia

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Event Materials

Initial Thoughts on the North Korean Missile Test

Jonathan D. Pollack — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 13:00:00 -0500

The NORAD press spokesman has confirmed the evident success of the missile launch: “Initial indications are that the missile deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit.” This success occurred after four previous failures beginning in August 1998.

Unlike the previous attempted missile launch last April, North Korea did not publicize its plans internally, though following the test it broadcast the news to a domestic audience. The success is an undoubted boost to the domestic legitimacy of Kim Jong Un. It comes within the 2012 calendar year, during which time the leadership pledged that it would “open the gate” to becoming a prosperous and powerful state, even though it remains almost desperately poor and internationally isolated. The regime also claims a successful test demonstrates its capacity to defy international condemnation and advance its scientific goals, supposedly for peaceful purposes. It has achieved this success before South Korea could test an advanced missile of its own, with the launch of the latter now delayed into 2013.

The test comes one week before the South Korean presidential election. Most observers assumed that North Korea would not test a missile in advance of the election, lest it weaken the electoral prospects of the opposition party candidate, Moon Jae-in. (Most polls show the ruling party candidate, Madame Park Gun-hye, with an appreciable lead, though a few polls are still within the margin of error.) Public opinion in South Korea is notoriously volatile, but the test further weakens Moon’s election prospects, though it is unlikely to prove decisive. If anything, Pyongyang may have concluded that Moon’s election chances were already diminishing, so why not proceed with the test?

The US appears to have been caught flat footed by the test. On December 10, North Korea announced that because of various technical problems it was expanding the launch window until late December and there were even some reports that it was disassembling the missile. This may have convinced some officials that there was no imminent possibility of a test. It took the NSC press spokesman more than four hours to release a brief, formulaic statement criticizing the test. If Pyongyang was intent on deceiving the outside world about its plans, it succeeded brilliantly.

The bigger risks for Pyongyang concern its relations with China. The US, Japan, and South Korea have already called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, since the North’s test are in direct violation of Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which prohibit North Korea from undertaking any rocket tests “using ballistic missile technology.” Since North Korea announced on December 1 that it would attempt another satellite launch, there have been persistent reports that the Obama Administration would seek to impose even harsher sanctions, even though North Korea is probably already the world’s most heavily sanctioned state. The US thus seems very likely to put great pressure on China to agree to additional sanctions. In recent weeks, the Chinese have openly cautioned the North Koreans from undertaking another test, without signaling what China would do should Pyongyang decide to test. Beijing’s first comments on the test had an ominous tone: “all parties concerned should stay cool headed and refrain from stoking the flames so as to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control.” How China chooses to respond will be the first foreign policy challenge for the newly installed Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

The possibility of another nuclear test also looms as a distinct possibility. When the UNSC condemned the attempted missile launch last April, North Korea warned of unspecified countermeasures and there were clear indications of additional tunneling activity at the North’s nuclear test site. Since Pyongyang undertook nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 following UNSC actions, it appeared that would again test, but it refrained, perhaps under major pressure from China, its primary economic and political benefactor. Late last week, the North Korean Foreign Ministry renewed a previous warning that “various circumstances compel us to completely review the nuclear issue.” China clearly disapproves of the North’s missile launches, but it may simply tolerate them and move on. Another nuclear test, however, would be a qualitatively different affront to China, and would underscore Beijing’s inability to prevent Pyongyang from embarking on exceedingly risky steps. Should there be another nuclear test, China’s newly installed top leaders would face a major challenge both in regional security and in US-China relations. This bears very careful watching.

The immediate impulse in some quarters will be to conclude that NK now has the means to reach the continental United States with a nuclear warhead, but this seems very premature. We simply don’t know whether North Korea has been able to miniaturize a nuclear weapon. It is nonetheless a significant technical accomplishment that advances North Korea toward such a goal, if the ability to reach the United States with a nuclear weapon is the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program. However endangered and vulnerable North Korea might first seem, it repeatedly finds ways to punch above its weight, endanger regional security, and defy the international community.

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Jonathan D. Pollack