Brookings: Experts - Michael E. O'Hanlon

Rebalancing the U.S. Military in Asia and the Pacific

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Sun, 09 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

According to some, the U.S. rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region in recent years is a bold strategic shift in national security policy. To many Chinese interlocutors, in fact, the military dimensions of the policy seem directed at them and smack of containment — and they resent it.

In fact, rebalancing represents only a modest realignment of American defense capabilities. Indeed, as the sequestration ax hits the Pentagon budget, whatever increases in capabilities rebalancing was designed to produce are at risk of being neutralized or even outweighed by looming cutbacks.

An informative way to examine the military scope of the rebalancing shift is to estimate its budgetary significance. Specifically, within the annual Pentagon budget of roughly $550 billion a year (excluding war costs), one might ask, “What* is the dollar magnitude of the rebalancing?’ In other words, roughly speaking, how much more of that $550 billion are we now allocating to the Asia-Pacific region than before?

How to calculate this figure? Although some of the steps listed below arguably predated the new policy, I would summarize the chief military effects of rebalancing as follows:

Rotating up to 2,500 Marines at a time through Darwin, Australia, on training and presence missions;
Adding 14 long-range missile defense interceptors to bases in Alaska (oriented toward the North Korea threat) and a THAAD missile-defense battery to Guam (these measures followed the main rebalancing decision but can be logically linked to it);
Adding perhaps three more attack submarines to be home-ported in Guam;
Basing four of the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore;
More generally, allocating 60 percent of total Navy assets to the Pacific Fleet rather than the 50 percent commonly devoted previously.

Each of these shifts can be translated into an average annual cost and then summed to determine a total estimate of the rebalancing’s military significance.

If a Marine unit of 2,500 were permanently based in Australia, it might represent some $500 million of annual expenditures, in terms of the average cost of equipping, training and paying that force for that time. Prorating some construction costs to establish facilities in Australia over, say, a 10-year period might drive that average yearly figure to $750 million.

The additional missile defense capabilities represent some $2 billion in one-time procurement costs — averaging over a 20-year period makes for $100 million a year — plus operating costs of an additional $200 million annually (these include salaries as well as routine maintenance and support). Together, that adds $300 million a year overall to the bill.

The average annual cost of a single Littoral Combat Ship might total $50 million. That makes for $200 million for the eventual deployment of four ships, or a total of $300 million once construction costs for berths in Singapore are averaged in, too. Placing three more attack subs on Guam might correspond to an average of $500 million a year. Taken together, these new homeport arrangements might have a dollar value of $800 million for a grand total so far of just about $2 billion in reallocated annual expense.

That leaves the big enchilada — the reassignment of naval assets so that 60 percent will now be in the Pacific. An upper bound on the dollar significance of this shift can be calculated as follows: Since the Navy’s annual budget is about $150 billion and some two-thirds of that (or $100 billion) is for the deployable Navy, we need to take 60 percent of $100 billion now and compare it with 50 percent of $100 billion before. The net is a $10 billion increase (though there is potentially some double counting here due to the attack submarine and Littoral Combat Ship estimates as previously noted).

The bottom line is this: In round numbers, the rebalancing may be in the process of swinging $10 billion to $12 billion or a bit more in annual Pentagon expenditures to the Asia-Pacific region.

This shift is hardly insignificant — though it hardly represents a tectonic change, either. Indeed, in recent years, China’s overall military budget has been growing about this amount each year, whereas the rebalancing was a one-time thing that is not presently scheduled to be followed up by additional policy changes.

On top of all that, sequestration is now promising to take $50 billion out of the Pentagon’s annual budget for the next decade (and the earlier, initial cuts from the 2011 Budget Control Act had already taken out a comparable amount previously). In rough terms, one might break down today’s Pentagon budget as being roughly one-third for Asia-Pacific matters, one-third for the Middle East and one-third for general purposes. Of course, all combat forces are flexible and movable, but in broad terms, this is still not a bad way to paint the overall picture. So one-third of that $50 billion sequestration hit might well come out of capabilities for the Asia-Pacific — maybe a bit less if we are able to protect this region’s capabilities selectively. Whatever the precise number, the key point is that sequestration will very likely cut about as much from our regional capability as the rebalancing will add.

The takeaways here are twofold. First, while the military capacities of a superpower still spending more than half a trillion a year on its armed forces should hardly be trivialized, and while we will modernize forces in the years ahead in ways discussed recently by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the annual Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, the rebalancing itself is not a huge military deal. Policymakers in Beijing need not strongly object and should not feel “contained.” Second, however, for those who think that sequestration is having no appreciable effect on American military posture, they should think again. Perhaps the rebalancing was not needed in the first place or was not needed for very long in any event. But it cannot be sustained on its original terms in the face of such steep Pentagon budgetary reductions, if they are sustained.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: POLITICO

Image Source: © Cheryl Ravelo / Reuters

Susan Rice: Team Player

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 05 Jun 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Susan Rice, who President Barack Obama today named his new national security advisor, will do well in her new role. I am confident of that. She will of course face challenges, often on problems where there are no good or easy answers—starting with Syria and Iran. She will be helping a president who is leading a war-weary nation with a nearly trillion dollar deficit and numerous domestic woes that compete for his time and attention, as well as the country’s resources. And the partisan problems in Washington won’t make life any easier.

But in taking on all of this, Rice has a number of strengths. Some are well known—her experience at the United Nations, her expertise on handling Iran and North Korea sanctions issues there (and thus working with Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and others on such problems), her previous service in government. To me, however, one set of strengths stands out as a major and often underappreciated aspect of Rice’s character and personality—the ability to build and lead a team.

I saw this firsthand when Susan led then-Senator Obama’s foreign policy team in 2007 and 2008 during his first campaign for president. I was her colleague down the hall—but also a Hillary supporter, as well as a supporter of the surge in Iraq. So we were not by any stretch of the imagination aligned on all matters.

And that’s one of the reasons my admiration for her efforts grew by the month over that period. Even though Hillary was the juggernaut within the Democratic Party, and the presumed nominee, Susan helped create a network of top-notch foreign policy analysts and advisors to help a freshman senator prepare himself for a severe set of tests in taking on the former first lady and New York senator. Indeed, rather than try to run away from foreign policy, Obama decided to try to make it one of his strengths. I did not agree with him (or with Susan) on every issue, starting with the surge in Iraq. But they were very well prepared, well-disciplined in their messaging, and generally cogent in their worldview. After defeating Hillary, they then took on and defeated a great American, war hero, and extremely impressive senator, John McCain, in the general election.

Much, if not most, of the credit for the Obama operation must go to the candidate himself. But there is no doubt that Rice ran a very tight ship on foreign policy. And while there were some elbows thrown now and again, they were generally within the rules of spirited and vigorous debate. There was little to no impugning of any opponent’s character or motivations—only sharp disagreement on a variety of policy issues. The approach of the Obama team was generally fair and serious.

Because the national security advisor position is largely about making a team serve the president—and the nation—thoughtfully and well, I believe Rice is generally well suited to the task ahead. To be sure, the administration will have to be willing to shake up its previous assumptions and conventional wisdom on issues like Syria, where current policy is largely failing. And challenges such as these will no doubt test Rice in other ways. But her preparedness on a huge range of issues, as well as her ability to coordinate, motivate, and discipline a large and often unruly set of bureaucratic actors, is in my mind quite solid.

I wish Susan well, and I am glad Obama made a choice to name a national security advisor who is well-placed not just to serve the president, but to serve the interests of America as well.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Global Public Square, CNN.com

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Toward a Successful Outcome in Afghanistan

General John Allen, Michèle Flournoy and Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 31 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Summary:

The United States can still achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan if it maintains and adequately resources its current policy course – and if Afghan partners in particular do their part, including by successfully navigating the shoals of their presidential election and transition in 2014. The core reasons for this judgment are the impressive progress of the Afghan security forces and the significant strides made in areas such as agriculture, health and education, combined with the promising pool of human capital that is increasingly influential within the country and that may be poised to gain greater influence in the country’s future politics. However, the United States and other international security and development partners would risk snatching defeat from the jaws of something that could still resemble victory if, due to frustration with President Hamid Karzai or domestic budgetary pressures, they were to accelerate disengagement between now and 2014 and under-resource their commitment to Afghanistan after 2014.

Afghan partners need to understand their role in this process, too, for the international support on which they depend will surely be contingent on a reasonable level of electoral integrity and political progress. Pakistan has an important role to play as well, in its willingness to pressure the Taliban sanctuaries still allowed to exist on its soil – though Islamabad’s present activities, however regrettable in some ways, may not in themselves be enough to derail the mission.

It is highly desirable that Washington and Kabul clarify and solidify their commitment to a enduring partnership as soon as possible. This would reduce incentives for hedging behavior in Afghanistan and Pakistan and contribute to a constructive atmosphere for the campaigns leading up to the crucial April 2014 Afghan presidential election.

Read the full report »

Authors

General John Allen
Michèle Flournoy
Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: Center for a New American Security

Image Source: © Andrew Burton / Reuters

The State of the Marine Corps: A Conversation with Commandant James Amos

Wed, 29 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 29, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

As more U.S. Marines come home from Afghanistan, attention is turning to the impact of general budget cuts and those related to sequestration, as well as future strategy in a world full of security threats. For the Marine Corps, this raises issues of force structure, near-term combat readiness, weapons modernization plans, overseas basing and a range of other topics.

On May 29, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings hosted General James F. Amos, commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Amos has been the commandant of the Marine Corps since 2010 after serving as assistant commandant since 2008. Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings and author of the new book Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget (Brookings Press, 2013), moderated a question and answer session following the commandant’s remarks.

President Barack Obama’s Counterterrorism Speech Nails it on Drone Strikes

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 24 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

President Barack Obama’s counterterrorism speech Thursday did not deliver any radical policy changes or huge revelations, but it was well done nonetheless. It explained his reasoning behind the use of certain techniques of warfare including drone strikes and Guantanamo detentions, even as he also promised to minimize the use of these methods in the future and try to move towards a world in which the 2001 authorization for war against al Qaeda and affiliates would no longer be needed. It was an intelligent blend of the tone of his more idealistic speeches, such as the Cairo address of June 2009, with his more muscular messages like the December 2009 Nobel Prize acceptance speech.

But one section of his speech is worth particular focus – the use of armed unmanned combat vehicles or drones. Even though President Obama did not specify exactly how drone strikes would change in the future, and did not provide a great deal of new information about them, the modest amount of detail he did provide was welcome. That is because U.S. drone strikes are badly misunderstood around the world, a point underscored by a New York Times op-ed today contained the following statements:

“...the C.I.A. has no idea who is actually being killed in most of the strikes. Despite this acknowledgment, the drone program in Pakistan still continues without any Congressional oversight or accountability.”

Such statements are incorrect and inflammatory, causing problems for example in U.S.-Pakistani relations. Indeed, even so-called “signature strikes” have typically been conducted only after a great deal of surveillance of a given site, very robust establishment of the fact that such a site is an enemy headquarters or related facility, and considerable care in ensuring that noncombatants are not present (and as Obama said, Congress is “briefed on every strike that America takes”).

Read the full article »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Bosnia May Offer Road Map for Syria

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Edward P. Joseph — Thu, 23 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The international community needs a better strategy for the intractable war in Syria. Washington and Moscow are jointly pushing for an international conference that would bring representatives of the Assad regime and the opposition to the table. The question is, if the sides show up — which is not clear at the moment — how likely is it that they will agree on a deal? And if they do agree on a deal, who will ensure that it doesn’t dissolve into more bloodletting? We believe that any deal is likely to require, among other things, international peacekeepers and that the world is going to have to start getting used to the idea.

There is no doubt that the U.S. has critical interests at stake in Syria. A key state in the heart of the Middle East is being devastated by a war that will soon have killed 100,000, already has forced more than 1 million into neighboring states, and that increasingly provides opportunities for Al Qaeda-linked groups to establish bases. The involvement of regional actors, the pressure on an already overstressed Iraq and the presence of highly lethal chemical weapons only underscore the risks. President Barack Obama, leading a war-weary nation, has been understandably reluctant to intervene militarily just to satisfy the urge to “do something.” But diplomacy alone may not be enough for a conflict that, increasingly threatens to engulf its neighbors. The Assad regime has been buoyed by recent gains, while the opposition appears more divided and ineffectual, except for radical elements whose prominence feeds the regime’s narrative that is defending Syria against “terrorists.”

We need an approach that increases military pressure on the brutal Assad regime so that it becomes obvious to all that President Bashar Assad cannot possibly hang on to power. At the same time, we need a concept for an eventual peace settlement that offers some hope to his fellow Alawites — and other allied minorities in Syria — since they will otherwise fear retribution at the hands of the opposition and therefore fight to the death. Assad must go, but the preponderance of Alawites need a vision for a way they can be safe and secure in a future Syria, if we wish to persuade them and their chief foreign supporter Russia to go along with our plan. We need bigger sticks and better carrots — without assuming a major role in the war, given what we have experienced in Iraq as well as Afghanistan.

And we have been here before. The conditions mentioned here are similar to what transpired in Bosnia two decades ago. The Bosnia recipe is, in fact, the best first approximation to what we should be trying to accomplish in Syria. After two years of war and hesitation, the United States, with allies, intensified its engagement, unifying and building up the flagging Bosniak and Croat forces. NATO conducted sustained airstrikes, and then diplomacy produced a peace accord that gave the Serbs territory while introducing outside peacekeepers to provide security. Alas, just as in Syria, roughly 100,000 died and many hundreds of thousands were displaced before this happened, but the Dayton accords ultimately ushered in a peace that has lasted to this day.

The parallels between Syria and Bosnia are instructive. As with President Barack Obama in regard to Syria at present, the Clinton administration keenly wanted to avoid getting involved in Bosnia. Fearing a quagmire, the administration was ambivalent about its own proposal to lift the arms embargo. In turn, the arms embargo froze an unfair advantage into place in Bosnia, as it has done in Syria. And just as in Syria, the administration’s initial focus was mainly on providing humanitarian aid along with limited training and support for covert material shipments for the weaker side (ironically, then facilitated through cooperation with Iran).

Gradually, as President Bill Clinton recognized the growing risks of protracted fighting, particularly its impact on NATO, U.S. policy changed. Washington worked to end the war between Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats and helped the two forge a military alliance that could take on the Bosnian Serb Army. U.S. and allied pressure on the United Nations finally gained NATO the authority to carry out sustained airstrikes. And, of course, Washington took the lead in diplomacy, bringing the parties to Dayton, Ohio, to end years of futile peace talks and hammer out the agreement that ended the war. That diplomatic triumph brought with it an obligation on the part of the United States to deploy ground troops to enforce the peace. American forces numbered 20,000 out of NATO’s initial force of somewhat more than 50,000, though the relative U.S. contribution declined over time (as did the overall size of the force, which has by now withdrawn from Bosnia).

Does the success of the Dayton Peace Agreement mean that a similar approach could work in Syria? No two situations are identical, but the experience in Bosnia is a reminder that tailored outside intervention — the kind that induces the parties not just to talk but to compromise — can end seemingly hopeless conflicts, saving thousands of lives in the process.

The parallels have their limits. With the risk of chemical weapons, possible implosion of allies like Jordan and explosions in Iraq, the United States has far greater interests in ending the conflict in Syria than it ever did in Bosnia. At the same time, the risks associated with intervention also are larger. The opposition in Syria is more fractious and difficult to control than the Bosnian and Croat armies, which closely heeded direction from Washington. Another major difference with Bosnia is the role of Russia, which is more wedded to the Assad regime than it was to Bosnia’s Serbs. American activism in Bosnia did not provoke Russian obstructionism, but the situation is tougher in Syria. The challenge for Washington is to find a way to change the military balance on the ground without alienating Moscow.

The first step must be to build the opposition’s military capabilities to change the dynamics on the ground, which have been tilting in the regime’s favor of late. It was intensive military training and political engagement by the United States and its allies that helped transform Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats from bitter enemies to effective Federation allies. It was the rapid advance of the Federation army — together with NATO air power — that brought humbled Serbs to bargain seriously at Dayton. Russia ultimately accepted the painful realities in Bosnia. Nor will it be blind to battlefield dynamics in Syria. If the Assad regime again begins to suffer severe setbacks, Moscow is more, rather than less likely to work with most of the rest of the world to produce a peace agreement. This is particularly the case if the setbacks come at the hands of a Free Syrian Army trained intensively by the United States and its partners, instead of jihadis allied with Al Qaeda.

While the United States has provided some military training, and U.S. diplomats have worked tirelessly with Syria’s fractious opposition, these efforts have not borne fruit. Achieving Bosnia-level success will take a far more concerted effort, at higher levels and with attention-getting military hardware and training for the Free Syrian Army. It is possible that, at some point, Arab League and NATO airstrikes may be needed as well, though it would be preferable not to begin with such an approach. When the tide turns on the ground, so will Moscow’s position on Syria, in all likelihood, increasing the chances for a settlement.

However, an eventual settlement in Syria won’t be as clear-cut as the Bosnian map agreed to at Dayton. Assad has given every indication that he intends to fight at all costs to keep Alawites in Damascus. Syria’s other central cities, though the sites of fierce fighting, still contain a range of sects and ethnicities. And it would be highly desirable that they stay that way if Syria is to remain a unified country.

In Bosnia, NATO’s mission was vastly simplified by the population separation that had taken place during the war. Despite the growing sectarian complexion to the conflict in Syria, and the enormous population displacement, cleansing of the ruling Alawite minority by the opposition has been remarkably infrequent. And rebel leadership has worked across confessional lines in a number of Syria’s towns to rebuild integrated communities. Still, there is no guarantee that this will last. As such, a peace deal will require international peacekeepers.

After the experience in Iraq and the fatigue from Afghanistan, no one seriously expects the United States to send the preponderance of any foreign troops to Syria to implement a peace agreement. But someone is going to have to do it, and America will have to play a leading role. Without U.S. participation on the ground, other nations, including our much-needed European allies, will not step up to help implement the agreement. Forces from Muslim countries would have to take the lead in patrolling the most sensitive and dangerous area, sparing the U.S. from exposure to the improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks that are part of the new Middle East landscape. Russia may wish for a role, too.

There is a long way to go before Bosnia can really be a model for Syria — and before we can get to a peace deal. But we need to start thinking in terms of an integrated, long-term approach that provides a realistic path to a peace settlement as well as an exit strategy. Protecting our interests in Syria will require more than diplomacy.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Edward P. Joseph

Publication: POLITICO

Image Source: © Omar Ibrahim / Reuters

Civil Wars and Syria: Lessons From History

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Sean Zeigler — Wed, 22 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Most of the international debate about Syria policy focuses on how to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.

Options for NATO states and key Arab League partners include everything from enlisting Russia’s help in a diplomatic approach, with a conference now envisioned for early June, to arming the rebels to perhaps even supporting them with limited amounts of airpower. Removing Assad, however, would no more end the Syrian conflict than overthrowing Saddam Hussein in 2003 brought stability to Iraq. The United States must create a more integrated overall strategy.

Not just the Iraq example, but broader scholarly studies on civil war onset and recurrence suggest that should the House of Assad fall, the likelihood of continued bloodshed in Syria will remain uncomfortably high.

Studies indicate that more than a third of all civil conflicts have some form of relapse after they end. Though there is much disagreement about the particular causes of war renewal, certain factors are widely recognized as relevant. Many are present in the current Syrian context.

First, the human cost of the Syrian conflict is already high. To date, roughly 80,000 deaths are attributed to the war. In contrast to the “war weariness” adage that longer and bloodier conflicts are eventual precursors to peace, violence tends to beget more violence. The more intense a conflict, the greater the risk it will reignite down the road, according to a host of literature on the subject.

This argues against the likelihood that, even if Assad falls or flees, remaining partisans will quickly make peace among themselves.

Second, so-called existential wars are hard to stop. Fights for regime change and control of the state can quickly evolve into all-or-nothing contests. Even if different groups pledge to work together and share power once an ancien regime is displaced, it is difficult for them to trust each other, given the high stakes they are fighting for. Contesting the government’s legitimacy can also shrink any potential scope for future bargaining and compromise.

Third, weak political institutions do not bode well for a country’s chances of stability in the wake of a civil war. The Syrian government, built around the Baath party and the Assad family, does not have a great deal of institutional depth. While the effect of political structures on war recurrence is debated, there is some agreement that only more consolidated democracies can avoid renewed conflict. Political participation often lowers the likelihood that disaffected citizens will take up arms once wars are over. Autocracy, therefore, is generally more associated with both civil war onset and recurrence.

Finally, when wartime coalitions are tenuous and factionalized, the odds of conflict recurrence increase considerably. This is particularly true in Syria, with its dozens if not hundreds of insurgent groups.

These factors indicate that supporting the overthrow of the Syrian regime, perhaps through directly arming rebels, may invite sectarian conflict to widen, not subside. Understanding these complicating factors is key to building any chances of peace.

So where to go from here? There are a number of options beyond the increasingly unspeakable – standing aside while Assad’s forces try to win the war, or at least take back most of the country.

One option is to acknowledge all the above, accepting the brutal logic of civil warfare and deciding not to do much about it. This could mean relegating Syria to become the next Somalia, if and when Assad falls.

Over time, the huge number of insurgent groups now operating in Syria might merge into a more modest number. But the warfare could resemble the protracted militia combat witnessed until recently in Somalia – or in 1990s’ Afghanistan. Beyond its disastrous humanitarian implications, this approach would also allow a sanctuary for terrorists to develop in the heart of the Levant and on the borders of five countries now crucial to the United States — Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq.

A second option is to go in strong with a multinational ground invasion force, capable of imposing consolidation on the opposition and order on the country. But as we learned in Iraq, this is easier said than done – and is likely to involve more than 100,000 foreign troops, taking casualties at a likely rate of dozens a month for several years. It is a nonstarter.

The most amenable strategy, therefore, is some form of political settlement followed by deployment of a smaller (but significant) international force to help monitor the deal and cement the peace. This could involve a simple power-sharing formula with a strong central government, as well as a guarantee of safe passage out of the country for Assad.

Given the degree of sectarian animosity and distrust now prevalent in Syria, this peace accord might have to resemble the Bosnia model, with a relatively weak central government and autonomous regions. Each region would be run predominantly by one confessional group or another, but with strong protections for minority rights. Multiethnic major cities in the country’s center would have to remain multiethnic in any case.

Accepting a number of foreign boots on the ground will be asking much of the international community. Yet there is probably no other way to do it given where Syria is today and what we know about civil wars.

The alternative, if not a regionalized war, is some type of victor’s justice followed by a distinct possibility of conflict renewal.

Done right, the multinational approach would not have to require more than 10,000 to 20,000 Americans, as perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent of a total force starting in the range of 50,000 or so. It should have large contributions from Turkey, Arab League states, NATO Europe and possibly Russia too.

Getting to this kind of deal may require more military help for the opposition in the short term. But President Barack Obama’s reluctance to provide arms or airpower support is understandable in the absence of a strategy that considers the question of what comes after Assad has fallen.

We need to fashion that strategy. Scheduling a conference, reasonable though it may be, and hoping for the best is not enough.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Sean Zeigler

Publication: Reuters

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Options for Reducing Nuclear Arms

Wed, 22 May 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Recent visits to Moscow by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Secretary of State John Kerry appear to have injected a more positive tone to U.S.-Russian relations, as Washington and Moscow prepare for meetings between Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin in June and September. Further nuclear arms reductions beyond those mandated by the New START Treaty, now in its third year of implementation, appear to figure high on the U.S. agenda. What sort of additional nuclear reductions, if any, should the United States now pursue?

On May 22, the Arms Control Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore the possibilities for further nuclear reductions, looking at the spectrum of possibilities. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon moderated a discussion with Global Zero Co-Founder Bruce Blair, National Institute for Public Policy President Keith Payne and Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, co-author with O’Hanlon of the recent Brookings Focus Book, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Press, 2012).

Audio

Options for Reducing Nuclear Arms

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20130522_reducing_nuclear_arms_transcript

Sequestration and U.S. Defense Spending: Healing the Wounded Giant

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Mon, 13 May 2013 12:50:00 -0400

Sequestration cuts to the U.S. defense budget have started to affect military contracting and training. Such changes may be fine in the short term, but costly in ways beyond dollar figures in the long term. In his new book Healing the Wounded Giant, Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon focuses on the question of how much could be cut from the defense budget if done right. In this video Q&A, O'Hanlon provides examples of two areas where cuts can be made: ground forces and procurement of the F-35 combat jets. He also predicts what Secretary Hagel will propose for the defense budget and how it has the potential to help strike a fiscal deal.

Video

Sequestration and U.S. Defense Spending: Healing the Wounded Giant

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

How to Cut the Pentagon Budget Better Than Sequestration Does

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Mon, 13 May 2013 15:16:00 -0400

A deeply flawed conventional wisdom is developing that despite warnings from former defense secretary Leon Panetta and others that the sky would fall if sequestration occurred, automatic spending cuts are not so bad after all. By this logic, not only should the cuts in defense as well as domestic “discretionary” accounts continue, but it would also be okay to implement automatic and across-the-board cuts in the next fiscal year, too, starting in October.

Yet the path we are on is far from acceptable.

While some of this year’s roughly $46 billion in defense cuts from sequestration reflect reasonable pruning, many of the reductions are not sustainable. Savings from policies such as dramatically reducing training for most military units this summer are not catastrophic if done once, but they cannot be continued without fundamentally jeopardizing military readiness.

Then there are savings that appear real but are not, such as deferred overhauls of major weaponry and deferred maintenance at bases. We can put off some repairs, but most will have to be done eventually — and may be more expensive if deferred. Then there are savings made on the backs of those with limited ability to make their voices heard: furloughs of civilian government employees top this list. In addition to being highly disruptive to government operations, these furloughs suggest that federal workers are second-class citizens (even as members of Congress can keep their entire paychecks for the year). Graduating students at public policy schools and other worthy individuals are being denied opportunities to work for the federal government due to hiring freezes.

Together, these temporary savings, faux savings and unfair savings represent at least half the $46 billion in cutbacks that the Defense Department is experiencing.

The military budget can be cut beyond the initial reductions from the 2011 Budget Control Act. But continued sequestration or reductions of comparable magnitude such as those resulting from the Simpson-Bowles proposals go too far. Such plans tend to make sweeping claims that, because defense spending remains reasonably high by historic and international standards, it can be cut much further. This reasoning is too vague for a world in which crises continue throughout the broader Middle East, U.S. forces remain engaged in Afghanistan, North Korea continues to nuclearize, and China continues its rise. It is time to get specific about further defense cuts.

Read the full article »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Romeo Ranoco / Reuters

Bosnia Lends Clue To Syria Strategy

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 03 May 2013 15:04:00 -0400

The recent hullabaloo over Syria's alleged use of chemical weapons is appropriate at one level but surreal at another. When a dictator such as Syrian President Bashar Assad has already killed tens of thousands of his own people with the most brutal and indiscriminate of tactics, the fact that he might have harmed a few dozen more with sarin gas, while horrible, does not radically change the complexion of the conflict.

That President Obama has said Syria's use of chemical weapons would constitute crossing a "red line," means he will have to act. If U.S. intelligence eliminates any remaining doubts about the use of chemical weapons, the United States will probably have to retaliate -- perhaps with cruise missile strikes against whatever Syrian army unit did the deed.

But what about the broader problem? Is the United States, already weary of wars, burdened by debt, and chastised by the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, going to stand aside indefinitely in this war?

Obama's critics want him to "do something." They refer to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, or the more successful Libya intervention of 2011, and demand that the U.S., along with other NATO states and the Arab League, find a way to end the carnage. Arm the rebels, establish a no-fly zone, set up safe areas for internally displaced persons and refugees.

Indeed, I tend to support these kinds of ideas myself, and the president is reportedly considering providing some arms to some of the insurgents more seriously than he did before.

Before entering war

Even so, Obama is right to be wary of putting U.S. credibility on the line when there is no clear exit strategy. The Syrian insurgency is a motley bunch that includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists. The overthrow of Assad would no more end Syria's war than the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 brought peaceful bliss to Iraq.

We need a debate about the right exit strategy in Syria before we enter into the war. The right model is neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan nor Libya, but the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Two decades ago, we watched similar killings for a couple years in the nation that had broken away from Yugoslavia, until international outrage and battlefield dynamics converged to make a solution possible. We bombed Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian militias, then forced him into a deal that created a "soft partition" of Bosnia.

It wasn't perfect, but 18 years later, Serbs, Muslims and Croats have not gone back to war.

Syria could be harder because the insurgents are so fractured. But by offering the various factions help -- not only now on the battlefield, but also later as they try to rebuild Syria once Assad is gone -- we can establish influence and leverage. This will not be easy and will hardly guarantee a great outcome. But it is far more promising than the trajectory we are on.

With a Bosnia-type approach, Assad's Alawite minority would keep a section of the country, most likely along the coast, where local police would be the main security forces. Assad himself would have to step down and ideally would go into exile. Kurds would keep similar sections of the country in the north. The main central cities would be shared.

Establish basic rights

And, of course, minority rights would be enshrined in the deal. In other words, having different parts of the country run primarily by one group or another would not be an invitation to further ethnic cleansing or killing.

Yes, this plan does imply a number of U.S. peacekeepers on the ground, perhaps comparable in number to the 20,000 who began the job in Bosnia in 1995. The United States should, however, commit to such a deployment only if other countries, including Arab states and Turkey, provide the majority of peacekeepers. In fact, we should seek pledges of international participation before moving to any direct U.S. involvement in the conflict.

With international participation, combined with a fair-minded idea for a peace accord later, Washington and other key capitals might also finally convince Moscow that there is no hope for putting Humpty Dumpty back together again. We need Russia's help to push Assad out and get this kind of settlement.

It is time to get realistic about our options in Syria and to get beyond the impulse just to "do something." We need a comprehensive approach that includes a viable exit strategy. The Bosnia model provides the best first draft for such a plan.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: USA Today

Image Source: © Yazan Homsy / Reuters

Healing the Wounded Giant : Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Fri, 03 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 120pp.

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Sequestration and U.S. Defense Spending: Healing the Wounded Giant

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Sequestration and U.S. Defense Spending: Healing the Wounded Giant

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Barack Obama may have survived a tenuous economy and a bitter political campaign to secure another four-year term as president, but major partisan debate and division remain. As a Democratic White House and a (majority) Republican House of Representatives tangle perilously close to a “fiscal cliff,” vital priorities hang in the balance. In this, the newest entry in Brookings’ long line of defense budget analyses, Michael O’Hanlon considers the best balance between fiscal responsibility and national security in a period of continued economic stress.

O’Hanlon believes that savings in the range of what Obama proposed in 2012 are the right goal for defense cost reductions in the coming years. He explains why cuts of the magnitude required by sequestration, and those suggested by the Bowles-Simpson and the Rivlin-Domenici plans for greater fiscal health, are too deep on strategic grounds, particularly in light of America’s rebalancing toward Asia and ongoing turbulence in the Middle East.

Excerpt from the book:

"It is important not to latch onto some strategic fad to justify radical cuts in the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. For two decades, since Operation Desert Storm, some have favored “stand-off” warfare featuring long-range strikes from planes and ships as the American military’s main approach to future combat. But it is not possible to address many of the world’s key security challenges that way—including scenarios in places like Korea and South Asia, discussed further below, that could in fact imperil American security. In the 1990s, advocates of a so-called “military revolution” often argued for such an approach to war. But the subsequent decade proved that even with all the progress in sensors and munitions and other military capabilities, the United States still needed forces on the ground to deal with complex insurgencies and other threats."

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Read an op-ed on U.S. Defense Spending from Michael E. O'Hanlon, in The Washington Post »

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Fund - Don't Cut - U.S. Soft Power

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Gen. David Petraeus — Tue, 30 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The president’s budget proposal is now on the streets of Washington, D.C. Currently, it would protect funding for the State Department and the Agency for International Development and related activities from further cuts. The combined annual budget for development aid, security aid and diplomacy has averaged close to $60 billion over the past half decade. That is now slated to decline to about $50 billion, partly due to reduced war-related costs. But this amount could come under intense scrutiny. Moreover, if there is no grand bargain between the president and the Congress, sequestration could force reductions of a further 10 percent.

Such an outcome would be bad for our nation’s security. As each of us has testified on Capitol Hill in past years America’s ability to protect itself and advance its global interests often depends as much on its “softer” power as it does on our nation’s armed forces. For example, though Latin American countries were themselves primarily responsible for their progress, the headway many of them made in stabilizing their countries in recent years has been a big plus for American security, too — and American aid had a role in that progress. That is part of why we have supported a budget deal that would repeal sequestration and achieve most further deficit reduction through savings in entitlement spending with similar increases in revenue generation. Implicit in our approach was the thinking that lawmakers should avoid the temptation to gut foreign aid just because it generally lacks a strong constituency in the United States.

America’s spending on development and diplomacy and security aid — the so-called 150 account — has strengthened under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. That has been a positive and long overdue development. Funds for diplomacy and development were starved in much of the 1990s. Some of the reductions in that earlier period were warranted, admittedly, as aid then was not always as productive as it might have been.

Today, we are arguably doing a good deal better. Various forms of development assistance and aid have, in fact, produced impressive results on a host of fronts in recent years. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a major initiative of Presidents Bush and Bill Clinton and now President Obama, has played a significant role in helping to turn the tide against the HIV/AIDS epidemic — even if more work remains to be done. Development assistance has also helped more than 600 million people move out of extreme poverty, achieving one of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals several years before the 2015 target date.

Moreover, as John Podesta has recently written, in this century alone, aid has helped reduce the global childhood mortality rate by one-third — impressive, even if only halfway toward the U.N. goal for 2015. The maternal mortality rate has been reduced by almost half, as well. And progress has been seen in other sectors — such as agriculture, energy and other realms, including many in the combat zones where each of us spent considerable time in the past decade.

America deserves considerable credit for much of this progress, as the U.S. is the world’s largest aid contributor, at roughly $30 billion in 2012. The United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan round out the rest of the top five donors, each providing from $10 billion to $15 billion a year. But relative to our economy’s size, America does not do more than its fair share; it provides just 0.19 percent of gross domestic product in development aid, similar to Japan’s level but less than half that of the three big European donors listed above, and less than a third the U.N. goal of 0.7 percent of GDP. Private donations improve our net national position somewhat, but only to an extent. The State Department budget is still less than 5 percent of the military’s — and the number of Foreign Service officers worldwide is less than half the number of soldiers in a single Army division.

Given our military contributions to international stability and the global economic growth that results from that stability in various areas, American foreign aid doesn’t need to grow substantially. But it should not be cut further. Consider some of the ideas we might want to consider in the years ahead. These should not be unconditional offers of help but would require the right kind of cooperation from key nations abroad whose future stability is central to our own security:

A possible deal to help Egypt revive economic growth and service its debt after a two-year economic downturn following its Arab Spring; this would be contingent on President Mohamed Morsi respecting the Egyptian constitution and helping us with Middle East peace;

A possible proposal to help Pakistan reinvigorate its energy sector, which currently holds back the country’s growth and compromises its quality of life; this would be contingent on Pakistan contributing more to security in the region and to pursuing reforms that reduce disincentives for significant private initiatives in the energy arena;

A major push with other donors to help countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo reform and strengthen their security forces;

Aid for transitional governments in Libya, Yemen and Mali, and perhaps someday Syria, to get on their feet so they can stabilize, develop security forces, police their own territories and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuaries;

Ongoing help in future years for Afghanistan’s government provided that it takes steps toward better governance and a sound election in 2014.

This agenda need not break the bank; even taken together, development aid and assistance and these initiatives would not remotely add up to another Marshall Plan. But this discussion suggests that our security will be improved by sustaining foreign aid in the years ahead rather than by making further cuts.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Gen. David Petraeus

Publication: POLITICO

Image Source: © Akhtar Soomro / Reuters

How U.S. Cities Can Protect Themselves Against Bombing Attacks

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Roughly a decade ago, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, FBI director Robert Mueller predicted that the United States would soon face the kinds of frequent small-scale bombings perpetrated frequently abroad by Hamas and Hezbollah. He considered the attacks nearly certain.

For a decade, Mueller was wrong--and I’m sure he was more than happy about it. Boston, however, has sadly and belatedly proven him right, at least to a degree. But how can we lower the odds of similar attacks in the future?

Of course, other attacks big and small have occurred in the western world during the past 10 years—above and beyond the very frequent ones in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now Syria. There was the train attack in Spain in 2003, and then the London subway bombings in 2005. There have been various attempted attacks in the United States, particularly during the past five years, most of them thwarted—the Zazi New York subway attempt of 2009, and the “underwear” bomber" later that year on a plane approaching Detroit; the 2010 Times Square bombing; the printer-cartridge attempted bombing on cargo aircraft. And of course we have had numerous mass shootings, America’s own form of large-scale terroristic violence. Of these, the Ft. Hood shootings in 2009 were linked to al Qaeda but others generally were not.

So terrorism and large-scale violence have never really gone away. But the Boston bombings are still somewhat unusual for their lethality and success in America. In scale they are nothing like Oklahoma City, of course, but they were worse than the infamous 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing. And it has been quite a while since those two tragedies, as well as the first World Trade Center attacks of the same time period and of the 9/11 attacks themselves. So there is a certain surprise in a successful bombing on U.S. soil, even though after we think about it for a while, most of us are probably not that shocked that it could happen again.

Despite all the efforts since 9/11 and before on the intelligence and homeland security fronts, some attacks will get through (even if we also stop a lot of them before they happen). This is not because anyone has let down their guard; it is because the materials needed to make bombs (or shoot up public places) are not that hard to access.

While we do not need another big push to harden the country and beef up internal defenses--we continue to spend three to four times as much per year on such efforts as we did prior to 9/11—some targeted improvements are in order.

A number of specific vulnerabilities can still be identified in U.S. homeland defenses that could be addressed without busting the bank or infringing excessively on American liberties. I would rank greater protection for toxic chemical plants, better security for cargo airplanes as well as large private jets, and even more random inspections including with K9 dogs on trains and subways and at stadiums and large theaters near the top of any list.

But given the specifics of this attack in Boston, one particular issue should perhaps come to the fore—whether most local police departments are doing enough against terrorism. I do not mean in any way to suggest the Boston police were lax, or that the Patriot’s Day attacks could have necessarily been prevented by any reasonable change in procedures. But it remains a fact that few cities have done even proportionately as much as New York to introduce counterterrorism into the routine workings of their police departments.

Gotham has hundreds of officers assigned to this job. They do things like figure out which high-profile streets to close and which buildings to protect with extra effort (including asking building owners to use shatterproof glass in lower floors, monitor cars parking in below-ground garages, and elevate air intakes above street level so they cannot be easily accessed by the wrong people).

But beyond that, New York’s finest try to sniff out specific crimes, and specific groups or individuals, before they strike. They develop intelligence information on suspicious groups within their jurisdiction and, at times and with reasonable cause, investigate their actions or dealings or associations. They often roll up plots before they can be hatched. And in the end, this is the only way to do business—the only method by which the odds work in our favor, rather than against us.

The FBI has joint terrorism task forces in numerous cities around the country but these are not enough. Only police forces really know their cities and can really use their instincts to determine when a shady actor or character is more likely a terrorist than a regular criminal. We need to make the counterterrorism mission more a part of their regular work than is often the case in America today.

Uncle Sam can incentivize this kind of effort with steps like offering matching funds to police departments that wish to create counterterrorism units. More generally, we need to use a moment like this to reopen the debate and ask if there is a bit more we can realistically do to lower the odds of the next attack happening soon—and being even worse, perhaps, than the Boston one.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Publication: The Daily Beast

The Stakes for America in the Race to Replace Karzai

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Michèle Flournoy — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 13:08:00 -0400

Afghanistan has held two presidential elections since 2001. Hamid Karzai won both, but the most recent (in 2009) was marred by irregularities such as stuffed ballot boxes and acrimony between Mr. Karzai and the international community. The Afghan constitution demands that Mr. Karzai step down next year, and by most accounts that is his intention. Who will succeed him?

On a recent trip to Afghanistan, almost everyone we spoke to highlighted next April's presidential election as a make-or-break event for the country—including its ability to fend off the Taliban and avoid backsliding into civil war.

What should be the international community's role over the next 12 months? Although the United States and other key outside nations shouldn't and won't try to pick a winner, they should do what they can to ensure that the next elections are freer and fairer than the last. Since the U.S. has promised at least $5 billion a year in future aid (for half a decade or more) and is considering spending $10 billion a year or more on a post-2014 military presence, Americans in particular have a stake in the electoral process and outcome.

Put more bluntly: If Afghans either hold a fraudulent election or elect a corrupt future leader, the odds of the U.S. Congress providing the expected aid are slim to none. This is also the case for other countries. The U.S. should, therefore, voice its views now rather than simply cut off aid later if the election goes badly.

Read the full article »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Michèle Flournoy

Publication: Wall Street Journal

North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN and cspan.org. Click here to watch online.

In the past months, North Korea has issued a series of threats and provocative actions, from testing a nuclear device and conducting a missile launch—in contravention of multiple United Nations resolutions—to cancelling the armistice ending the Korean War and threatening a new war against the United States and South Korea. Harsh rhetoric from North Korea is nothing new, but some observers feel that the recent threats represent real danger. Others claim that they reflect internal dynamics in North Korea and that the crisis will pass.

On April 15, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the policy priorities for the United States in dealing with North Korea during and after the current crisis. Brookings experts debated the threat to the United States and its allies and analyzed steps that the United States can take to mitigate the danger, including sanctions, engaging allies and neighbors in the region, nonproliferation efforts and, if necessary, responding to aggressive actions by North Korea.

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North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

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20130415_north_korea_priorities_transcript

Getting Kim Jong Un's Attention

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 09:19:00 -0400

Nothing about the international response to North Korea's third nuclear test in February or subsequent provocations has been unreasonable. The crisis is entirely of Pyongyang's making. But it is possible that the hard-line approach taken by Washington, Seoul and other capitals to the North Korean bluster, brinkmanship and bombast has been far less than optimal.

We need a firm policy. North Korea must pay a price for its irresponsible and dangerous behavior, and know that the world is united in standing against it. The resolve must begin with the U.S.-South Korean military alliance but extend to other nations, most notably China, North Korea's only ally and main benefactor.

But there are a couple of problems. One is that China is uneasy about jeopardizing stability next to its borders and only goes along with sanctions reluctantly. Indeed, one possible explanation for North Korea's behavior is that it is seeking to spook leaders in Beijing so severely that they will be even more averse to applying any further sanctions, perhaps after another North Korean nuclear test.

And the worse this crisis gets, the more it increases the odds of North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong Un, further entrenching himself in hard-line positions from which it will be difficult to backtrack later. Among other things, it would raise the odds that he will seek to accelerate and expand nuclear weapons production activities.

We need a more creative policy should there be another crisis or a substantial worsening of this one (beyond a firing of a medium-range missile, for example). More sanctions might be needed. But new sanctions should sunset automatically, say after two years, unless Pyongyang tests another bomb, expands nuclear production or carries out another aggressive act leading to loss of life.

The key sanctions that could still be imposed would affect basic trade and aid in basic consumer goods, largely what China and North Korea exchange. Most sanctions to date are on banking, technology and the assets of certain individuals.

Temporary sanctions accomplish several goals. They constitute a firm response themselves. But because they do not last forever, they provide an incentive for better North Korean behavior. They also give a nod to China's worry that strong-armed international action against the Kim regime, however justified, is risky. Chinese leaders may or may not be right, but there can be little doubt this is how they think.

At this point it is too late to turn existing, permanent U.N. sanctions into temporary ones without any North Korean concessions, as that would reward Pyongyang's behavior. But we do need to look for ways to de-escalate this crisis. We also need to look for ways to more generally contain the downward trajectory of Pyongyang's relationship with the outside world. As bad as things are now, they can get worse if the regime reactivates its plutonium-producing reactor or expands its suspected uranium enrichment, with the possibility that bombs could be sold abroad.

Although the U.S. position on key issues should stay firm, we should also be willing to talk with North Korea at any point. Beyond that, Washington needs to signal a willingness to engage in a much broader discussion leading to a road map for a comprehensive deal. Right now, Pyongyang shows little interest in internal reform. It needs to be encouraged to move in the direction that China, Vietnam and now Myanmar have taken: reform from within. And the U.S. should work closely with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia to develop a truly coordinated strategy to steer North Korea in this direction.

The regime need not commit up front to relinquishing every nuclear weapon for this kind of deal to begin. But if it is willing to stop producing nuclear arms, gradually scale back its military and begin to reform and ultimately dismantle its gulag system of labor camps and penal colonies, Washington should make it clear that U.S. and international help can extend to much broader economic and technical assistance as well as a comprehensive peace deal.

This may sound like strange talk in the middle of such an acute crisis. But it is partly because the U.S. has no clear strategy for navigating the relationship with North Korea that small crises can metastasize, and that Kim, listening to his hard-line generals, may decide that he has no option but to double down on the juche (self-reliance) Stalinist system that his grandfather and father have built, and on their extremely dangerous confrontational policies toward the West. We need to create a light at the end of the tunnel, even if the light will be very faint for some time to come.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Mike Mochizuki

Publication: Los Angeles Times

An American Future Filled with Promise

Michael E. O'Hanlon and Gen. David Petraeus — Mon, 08 Apr 2013 12:29:00 -0400

As politicians in Washington focus on reining in America’s worrisome deficit, they tend to have attitudes of doom and gloom. They convey fears of shortchanging future generations, overtaxing workers, depriving the needy, killing the fragile economic recovery and failing to make crucial investments.

This narrative contains elements of truth. But it is too pessimistic and contributes to our psychological and political paralysis, reinforcing convictions held by members of both parties that they must not yield on core principles, lest the country’s future be compromised. There is, however, a more positive and more accurate reality. The United States could be on the threshold of a period of remarkable progress. It has a number of unique opportunities, including:

An energy revolution. We are the world’s largest producer of natural gas, with a 100-year supply, and we are on track to become among the largest producers of crude oil.
A manufacturing revolution. We are rapidly developing robotics and 3-D printing, areas in which the United States is among the world’s leaders.
A revolution in life sciences. Genetics and stem-cell technology offer great potential in fields such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals and fundamentally new approaches in medicine.
The IT revolution and the transition to cloud computing, in which we are also leading.

Read the full article »

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon
Gen. David Petraeus

Publication: The Washington Post

America's Care in the Use of Force (and Use of Drones)

Michael E. O'Hanlon — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 11:36:00 -0400

American University professor Akbar Ahmed’s new book, The Thistle and the Drone, is elegant and erudite in many ways. He demonstrates a rich historical and anthropological understanding not only of his native Pakistan but of other tribal societies around the world relevant in the broader “war against terrorism.” He cautions wisely about the geostrategic dangers that can result if Washington is seen as using force disproportionately or carelessly in ways that hurt innocent people in these areas. Ahmed is right to question whether the United States needs to reassess its approaches in these matters.

However, as someone who has followed these same issues myself, albeit from a somewhat different vantage point as a national security scholar with close ties to the U.S. military and intelligence community, I have a different perspective on several of the issues Ahmed raises. In some of his specific arguments, Professor Ahmed is not fully fair, accurate, or up to date.

He makes insufficient effort to understand trends in drone warfare including the huge progress that the United States has made in minimizing civilian casualties. While mistakes are sometimes still made, I believe after following the use of drones closely for years that the United States Armed Forces take a great deal of care in their use of force. It is dangerous for Ahmed to suggest otherwise, since in doing so he can fuel the very fires of hatred and distrust that he decries.

For example, in Afghanistan, ISAF forces have made extraordinary efforts to reduce their use of firepower, and accidental or inadvertent strikes now account for less than 10 percent of all civilian fatalities there according to UN figures. This is still far too many—a few hundred a year—but it is incredibly precise by the standards of warfare. Indeed, under General McChrystal three years ago, some NATO troops felt they were even being asked to accept greater personal risk to themselves and their fellow troopers when engaged in firefights so as to ensure maximum safety for Afghans. NATO troops do not fire on Afghan homes or other buildings unless in dire peril, and their care has produced a huge improvement in our track record.

In Pakistan, U.S. forces have had essentially a zero-casualty policy for at least three years. Attacks are not made if there is any realistic risk to civilians—with only a partial exception if al Qaeda’s top two or three leaders might be in the crosshairs. Yes, mistakes have been made. But these have been extremely rare. Peter Bergen tallies the number of accidental deaths of innocents as well under 10 percent of the total in recent times. To be sure, critiques are warranted, and we can afford to scale back our use of force now that bin Laden is dead, top al Qaeda leadership in general is decimated, and some key Haqqani leaders are out of the picture (we have already reduced the pace of attacks substantially, as Bergen’s data repeated at www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex show). But the insinuations that we have not been extremely careful and have not tried to learn further lessons along are simply incorrect.

Ahmed goes further. On p. 39 of his book, he even says that "There appears to be a deliberate attempt by official agencies in the war on terror to obfuscate and distort." This is a big charge that he makes without substantiation or specificity.

There are a few other specific matters where dissent is warranted, as well. On p. 305 he suggests that many if not most American scholars blame Islam and its basic nature for terrorism. This is not accurate. Far more American scholars go out of their way to argue just the opposite in the last 12 years.

On p. 309 he actually suggests that a mainstream strand of American national security thinking wants to "eradicate Islam." This is, frankly, a preposterous and irresponsible allegation.

On p. 311 he suggests that it was a serious idea to carpet bomb Muslim villages with videos of Baywatch, and that Americans would take such nonsense seriously. Perhaps here Ahmed is being tongue in cheek, but in light of his other arguments, I couldn’t tell. I hope so!

On p. 313, he says that al Qaeda is now blamed for every outburst of violence around the world, and that Americans live on pins and needles because of fear of another attack. In fact, most Americans have moved on. They worry far more about the economy. In national security terms, recent policy has focused as much on the so-called rebalancing towards Asia, and the problems with North Korea. More than anything else, though, what typifies the current American public policy debate is less paranoia over al Qaeda than Americans' growing isolationism. Ahmed would have been more fair to criticize the country for its indifference towards the Syrian civil war than for hypervigilance towards militants.

Finally, on p. 319, Ahmed suggests that anthropologists were brought into U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking to help determine how to properly torture Muslim prisoners. This too is wrong.

Ahmed is a remarkable scholar who has made big contributions, but on the above matters, I simply disagree.

Authors

Michael E. O'Hanlon

Examining North Korea’s Recent Heated Rhetoric

Strobe Talbott, Richard C. Bush III, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jonathan D. Pollack — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 15:04:00 -0400

As the United States and South Korea undertake joint military exercises, North Korea has responded with harsh rhetoric, saying that its people are “burning with hatred” for the United States. Brookings President Strobe Talbott leads a discussion with Richard Bush, Michael O’Hanlon, and Jonathan Pollack focusing on the latest saber rattling by North Korea and exploring the intentions of Kim-Jong Un, North Korea’s young leader.

Strobe Talbott: Do you think that the current bluster (and more) from Pyongyang represents more of what we’ve seen before from North Korea or is there a real danger of conflict? If the latter, what should the U.S. be doing to prevent that terrible prospect and what would happen if it comes to blows?

Michael O’Hanlon: I recently wrote on the subject in Politico following the third nuclear test in an effort encourage the U.S. against overreaction given Kim Jong-Un's youth and inexperience—and his potential for moderation/change as he ages (I hope!). My proposal was to make any additional sanctions temporary, partly as a way to induce Chinese support and partly as an incentive to North Korea not to test again (since the new sanctions would only sunset in the event of no further tests or big provocations).

But, of course, that's not quite the same as an answer to your question. In light of the above thinking, my own druthers would be to make any upgrades in our capability quietly—even secretly—so as not to provoke the action-reaction cycle we are now in (e.g., sending F-22 aircraft to bases in South Korea to improve the effectiveness of any initial air strikes, but not telling anybody except Seoul).

Richard Bush: The consensus opinion among specialists is that North Korea’s recent actions are the same old-same old, the typical way North Korea responds to U.S.-ROK exercises every year. Specifically, because the regime portrays the exercises as a segue for a U.S.-ROK attack, even nuclear attack, then it must make at least verbal threats about what it will do when that war happens. The intensity this time may have been dialed up a bit because Kim 3.0 is feistier than his father was, but it's a question of degree.

What may happen (or may not) is a limited conventional strike at the DMZ, against a ROK naval ship, or against one of the West Sea Islands (like the one that preceded our November 2010 visit to Seoul). The ROKs have pledged retaliation, which does create the problem of escalation, but how it might play out is speculative at this point.

Talbott: Thanks, Richard. Most convincing and, to a point, reassuring.

O’Hanlon: Yes, to a point, indeed. "Consensus among specialists" is not always a concept I find reassuring, though! I am glad, Richard, that you seem willing to deviate somewhat from that consensus yourself (at least to some extent). This is probably the same old-same old….until it's not, that is. I actually do worry that the U.S. default approach of tit-for-tat with North Korea (and the imposition of additional, permanent sanctions after the third test), while of course morally defensible, may exacerbate the situation in this particular case—which feels somewhat different to me than past periods of bluster.

Talbott: Interesting point, Mike. I’d be interested in your assessment of Kim-Jong Un, or Kim 3.0 as Richard calls him. His recent rhetoric and actions show that he is willing to test the boundaries of what is internationally acceptable. But, I had the impression that he was subject to a lot of supervision from the North Korean military, meaning he doesn't have much autonomy, especially, one hopes, when it comes to declaring the Korean War back on and taking other actions that would significantly escalate the situation.

O’Hanlon: Right and Kim-Jong Un wants to be friends with Dennis Rodman and he grew up largely in Europe—and he doesn't strike me as the suicidal type, so I'm hoping that someday he'll want to be the next leader of a "reform from within" movement as in Vietnam years ago, Burma of late, etc. Obviously a long-shot concept at the moment though....

Jonathan Pollack: The reality is that we don't really know very much about what animates Kim 3.0, so we must infer from what we can observe about his behavior. He seems very much like Kim Il Sung and may even be modeling himself on his grandfather. (He has his physicality and extroversion; even his body language seems reminiscent of the grandfather.) Very few foreigners have met 3.0. The Chinese blessed his succession at an early date (November 2010, as I recall), when a then serving member of the Politburo Standing Committee was on the podium with young Mr. Kim. So far as I can determine no senior Chinese official has met with him since then, and he has not been invited to visit China. In contrast to the distinct warming in China-SK relations (including several messages between Xi Jinping and Pres Park), there is a decided coldness/distancing in China-NK relations. I think Beijing early on calculated that there was a potential opening with 3.0 (as did we—witness the abortive February 29 agreement), but this seems largely a dead letter at this point.

The most troubling possibility is that he is very full of himself, listens to few others, and is now consorting regularly with the North Korean military leadership. Despite some early hopes for reform in the North, he has now wrapped himself in the "military first" rhetoric every bit as much as his father did. Worse yet, he has a successful satellite launch and another nuclear test under his belt, with clear expectations that more could be in the offing.

As I wrote in the Foreign Policy program’s Big Bets-Black Swans project, there needs to be a much more determined effort by the United States and ROK to deal fully with China in the event that things go from bad to worse in Korea. Now is definitely the time, lest we find ourselves in an acute crisis. That said, North Korean propaganda always spikes whenever the U.S. and the ROK are in the middle of major exercises, so perhaps the latest campaign will subside as the exercises wind down next month. But the tone and threats are particularly worrisome at present - even they are intended largely for domestic effect.

O’Hanlon: That's an excellent point, Jonathan, if I may say so (the focus on consultation with China).

I can't disagree with any of the analysis, and of course, you know the dynamics in the region very well. However, I still would venture to say that our February 2012 hopes (just two months into 3.0's rule, when he still hadn't even turned 30 years old as I recall) were unrealistically optimistic that early in his tenure within a Stalinist system, and we should remember how unlikely glasnost and perestroika would have seemed (or Chinese and Vietnamese economic reform) a few years before they occurred. But that's a footnote, not a central argument, of course.

Pollack: I and a few others met with the State Department’s Glyn Davies immediately after the signing the 2/29/12 agreement. He remained very sober about the possibilities—and that it seemed too good to be true. Davies was careful not to oversell the agreement, which, in the end, blew up two weeks later.