Brookings: Experts - Bessma Momani

Our Job Deficiency: A Challenge to the IMF-World Bank

Bessma Momani — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 14:12:00 -0400

At the IMF-World Bank meetings this past week, there were plenty of assessments of the state of the global economy that described the post-2008 recovery as anemic. Only a few went so far as to claim that the global economy is comatose. Yet, despite general agreement on the diagnosis, there was little consensus on how to solve the problem. Deciding on what tools and policies to use to stimulate growth is vital if we are going to cure the global economy of persistent enervation.

For a number of years, we've been led to believe that fiscal consolidation or austerity -- code for cutting government budgets -- is the best way to stimulate economic growth. Supposedly, it triggers a virtuous cycle: by increasing the confidence of the private sector, it spurs investment, which leads to economic growth, which further increases confidence, which in turn fuels more growth. It is this fiscal belt-tightening that eventually improves the health of the entire economy. So we are told by influential economists.

The highly prominent Harvard University's Rogoff-Reinhart thesis in 2010 which claimed to show that in highly indebted countries, economic growth will cease or retreat once a magic threshold debt level of 90 per cent of GDP is passed, is but one example among many studies that have been used to support this theory of "expansionary austerity." Now it seems that these two economists were omitting important data points and even succumbed to a simple coding error, which casts doubt on their analysis, and on the theory of expansionary austerity itself.

Fiscal consolidation can sometimes lead to economic growth; whether it will depends on a slew of other important variables such as interest rates (when they've already reached the zero lower-bound), the type of exchange rate in place (a floating exchange rate can help dampen the effects of fiscal contraction); and how supportive external demand is for an economy's goods and services. In the case of Canada in the 1990s, the country was fortunate that it undertook fiscal consolidation with the support of these three variables. For some countries this may not be the case, so we should be cautious of blanket arguments in favour of fiscal consolidation.

To be fair, Rogoff-Reinhart never did explicitly claim causation, only correlation. Note that the the Rogoff-Reinhart findings -- even if the original results still held -- tell us very little if low growth leads to high debt (think Japan) or if high debt leads to low growth (think Greece). This, however, did not stop influential policymakers and politicians like former Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Paul Ryan and European Commissioner Olli Rehn from taking these findings and spinning them to support their own political agendas.

The sole point however is not whether some growth occurs -- it is what kind of growth that should concern us; for growth that results from consolidation is more often anemic than vigorous. Moreover, economic growth alone is not a satisfying benchmark to measure the economy's recovery and future prospects. We need to ask: How do we get economic growth that is inclusive? And what indicators will tell us we're on the right track? "Inclusive" in this context is code for JOBS, and jobs are what we need to be tracking most closely. What is the point of having overall economic growth if this doesn't translate into people working and their wages increasing over time? Without job creation, we cannot increase consumption and generate the tax revenues needed to make important investments in education, health, R&D, and infrastructure, which taken together are prerequisites for long-term economic growth. In other words, without jobs, we get stuck on an anemic economic growth path. This is where we are now, and this is what needs the attention of world policymakers.

Indeed if there are any policy "heroes" of the Great Recession, they are the major central banks of the developed world. These institutions have proven remarkably adept at putting a floor under asset values, and a ceiling above credit spreads. But even with recourse to all this "unconventional" monetary policy, policymakers have still failed to put a ceiling above what truly matters: the unemployment rate. I hope that at the next IMF-World Bank meetings, job creation will be at the top of the agenda. And I hope that we will take the Rogoff-Reinhart thesis as a reminder that what's needed are careful assessments of what each country can do to create jobs, not a one-size-fits-all fiscal fix.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: OpenCanada.org

Image Source: © Yuri Gripas / Reuters

Is Russian Peter Being Used to Pay the Cypriot's Paul?

Bessma Momani — Thu, 21 Mar 2013 13:46:00 -0400

Cyprus, a small island of one million people, has very large banks. In fact, the banks have the wealth of eight times the entire Cypriot economy.

Obviously, this doesn’t add up and that’s because Cyprus has become an offshore financial centre, offering a haven for money transfers, money laundering, and Internet banks. Foreigners from Russia, worth nearly €20 billion, have been attracted to these lax rules in setting up bank accounts that accompany low corporate tax rates.

Not surprisingly, 40 percent of all Cypriot bank deposits are foreign owned making them an easy target to raise funds. But there’s another reason that the Cypriot government has chosen this route. The perception of European Union (EU) countries is that some of these Russian depositors may be shady characters linked to either criminal activity or government cronies that deposited corrupt funds.

Few democratic EU creditors, particularly the Germans who face an upcoming election, want to bail out Cypriot banks to safeguard Russian assets.

Few democratic EU creditors, particularly the Germans who face an upcoming election, want to bail out Cypriot banks to safeguard Russian assets. Not especially when the EU already has a less than friendly relationship to strongman Putin, who played musical chairs with his now prime minister and who unabashedly supports the despised Syrian regime.

The troika creditors, the EU, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, will only give Cyprus money needed to recapitalize its distressed banks if it can reduce their overall debt burden to 60 percent of GDP and raise €5.8 billion. There are few state assets or valuables that can be used to raise the funds needed.

Usually, governments have forced its own creditors, like those holding government bonds, to take a “hair cut” by then returning less on the interest or principal that was promised. Raising taxes on citizens to generate government income has been another common route taken in previous EU bailout. But with such a small population, this isn’t an easy way to raise the necessary funds.

The Cypriot plan would have required all depositors to forgo nearly seven to 10 percent of their deposits toward the government debt write-down.

This levy presents a first of its kind in managing the contemporary EU debt crisis; in 1990, Italy had a similar bank tax but the amount was less painful at 0.06 percent. The Cypriot plan would have required all depositors to forgo nearly seven to 10 percent of their deposits toward the government debt write-down. This measure would face a number of potential legal contentions, as the EU passed a 2008 depositors insurance law that guaranteed up to €100,000 in each bank account.

This is why the Cypriot legislature, sitting for only a month, rejected the plan and may reconsider the universal application of the government levy and instead apply this only to those accounts over €100,000. Protecting these smaller mainly domestic depositors, this might then raise the percentage on large, presumably foreign, depositors to even 15 percent. No wonder Russian President Putin said this was “unfair, unprofessional and dangerous.”

For the first time, the small island of Cyprus, with less than two percent of the European economy, might be shifting the burden or passing the buck on to Russia. Wealth and international politics at play...

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: CIGI

Image Source: © John Kolesidis / Reuters

The Human Cost of the Iraq War Outweighs All Others

Bessma Momani — Wed, 20 Mar 2013 13:51:00 -0400

In the 10 years that have passed since the invasion of Iraq, an endless number of lessons have been drawn by military strategists, diplomats, politicians, and public relations analysts from what was, at almost every stage, a complete and utter fiasco. The continuing debates over what Iraq has taught us — is intervention ever the right policy? Can the perils of "nation-building" ever be overcome? What does an effective counter-insurgency strategy involve? — are important, but their value is diminished when they forget what drives them: the human cost of the war.

The Iraq War left behind five-million Iraqi orphans, took more than 100,000 Iraqi lives, forced four- to five-million Iraqis to flee their homes and communities, displaced ancient Iraqi minority groups, and devastated much of Iraq's infrastructure and economy.

These are the human and material costs of an unwarranted war. And they are not one-time losses. These costs will continue to accrue year after year, generation after generation. For what will be the life story of an Iraqi orphan who lost everything in the war? How will the traumas of her childhood impact her future relationships — to her spouse, her children, and her community? What will the refugee children who cannot remember a childhood in Iraq and have only the memories of extended family or strangers to use in building their own narrative, rely upon for a sense of identity and history? What will all the Iraqi Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaean parents tell their children when they ask about their homeland, knowing they will likely never return? These are not the costs and lessons of war that military strategists and political analysts emphasize, but they are painfully real to many Iraqis today.

There can be no question that the tragedy of Iraq did not end with the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Iraq is still plagued by political and social chaos. The country has been torn apart by inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic conflicts that erupted into the space created by flawed U.S. policies. The destruction of the central Iraqi government's authority made one sectarian group the boogeyman for all of Hussein's past atrocities, and the writing of ethnic and religious cleavages into the foreign-guided constitution entrenched political bargaining based on the lowest common denominator of Iraqi identity.

For those who may not remember, or have never known, this is not the Iraq that so many of its people knew before the war. As has been the case in so many other conflicts, 'pure' ethnic or religious identities were imposed on Iraqis to fit various political agendas. Many Iraqis were of mixed background before the war; having a Sunni mother, a Shiite father, and a Christian aunt by marriage was never 'out of the ordinary' before 2003, particularly in soon-to-become violence-ridden Baghdad. That this diversity has now been almost entirely obscured is a testament to the extent to which Iraq identity has been distorted by the war. Still, while many Iraqis lament the end of the intra-communal harmony that existed under dictatorship, they would not wish to return to the draconian ways of the Saddam Hussein regime.

Some apologists for the invasion of Iraq say that 2003 was an early chapter of the Arab Spring -- that the American-led regime change in Iraq encouraged many others in the region toward democratic revolutions. But this is a false comparison. Iraq was not like the other countries of the Arab Spring where the people rose up against dictatorship. Iraq did not experience a genuine uprising authored by the Iraqi people but a top-down, externally-driven political exercise. Now, imagine that the social and political revolution that swept the Arab countries in 2013 had transformed Iraq, instead of the U.S.-led invasion of 2003. How many lives could have been saved and changed for the better?

This anniversary will be taken by many as an opportunity to reflect on questions of "legitimate intervention." Comparisons will inevitably be made to the situation in Syria today, comparisons which make it all the more important to remember the real lessons of the 2003 war in Iraq: The costs of war are immense, and never just material, and only the people of a country have the right and power to initiate a legitimate revolution.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: OpenCanada.org

Image Source: © Carlos Barria / Reuters

(Re)branding Amman: A "Lived" City's Values, Image and Identity

Bessma Momani and Luna Khirfan — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:01:00 -0500

ABTRACT

By addressing two separate branding exercises for Amman, Jordan, we investigate the links between the city's image and the visual image of its brand. We build on previous research by proposing a theoretical framework that combines city branding, Canter's theory of place and Kevin Lynch's Image of the City. We test this theoretical framework by contrasting the development of Amman's city brand in 2002 and its rebranding exercise in 2009. We address, first, how Amman's brand(s) and image(s) are linked, and second, how the city brand and its image influence and are influenced by the values Ammanis ascribe to their city. We find that while it incorporated intensive promotional campaigns and place-making interventions, the 2002 branding exercise excluded the residents of Amman; the ensuing brand image therefore failed to correspond to the residents’ perceived values of Amman. Conversely, Amman's 2009 branding exercise aspired for an inclusive process (‘inward branding’), which allowed the new brand and its ensuing image to be ‘lived’ by and to ‘enliven’ Ammanis. We thus trace how Amman's 2009 branding effort achieved more success among residents than the multidimensional branding exercise of 2002 simply by capturing the intricacies between residents’ affective perceptions and the new brand image.

Read the full article on Palgrave Journals »

Authors

Bessma Momani
Luna Khirfan

Publication: Palgrave Journals

Image Source: © Muhammad Hamed / Reuters

Why Egypt Needs Space from Morsi

Bessma Momani — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 10:19:00 -0500

As Egypt’s democratically elected president, one would hope that Mohamed Morsi would have a finger on the pulse of the Egyptian people. Unfortunately, he’s looking more and more out of touch. An online campaign has begun, with typical good Egyptian humour, to nominate Morsi to win a trip to space – a place where Egyptians hope he might gain some perspective on his role in Egypt’s earthly troubles.

The president has announced that the parliamentary elections originally slated for February 23 will now commence on April 22 and likely won’t be competed until June 16. Due to a shortage of election monitors, Egyptians will head to the polls in four stages. Holding elections over a number of months will improve transparency, but supervisors will still have their hands full. Egypt’s political and economic climate as of late can only be described as chaotic.

The factors behind the current impasse have grown depressingly familiar: a near-bankrupt economy; worsening political gridlock; a deeply frustrated public that is venting its anger at the ineffectiveness of the current government with increasing frequency and violence; and restless security institutions whose actions have done little to mitigate the political situation, and even less to dispel fears of what may come if the civilian-run order falls apart. President Morsi is struggling to find a way out of this mess – the delayed elections are just one indicator among many.

To be fair, Morsi inherited an economic, political, and social system in complete disarray after decades of neglect and corruption under Mubarak. After the revolution, Egyptians had high, arguably unrealistic expectations that a democratically elected government would clean up the mess – piling garbage would be removed from the sewers, the country’s infamous traffic problems would be solved, corrupt and inefficient judges would be replaced by honest, fair-minded ones, and heavy-handed police brutality would be reined in.

But when it came to designing and implementing the policies necessary to fix these problems, the democratically elected government found itself stuck with the financially and morally bankrupt institutions of the old regime. Institutional reform would have to precede many of the everyday changes demanded by Egyptians.

Morsi acknowledged that reforming the system and its core institutions – which despite their decaying state, remain key sources of national pride – was necessary, and that it would be challenging. But, as the months have passed, he has not risen to occasion. Instead, he has prioritized strengthening his own authority, supposedly to better safeguard the reform process. Whether or not this proves to have been a legitimate path to take, it has become clear that Egypt’s infrastructure, education, food and agriculture, housing, police, security, and legal systems (to name only a few) need to be overhauled completely, not merely reformed.

Unfortunately, Morsi has done much to entrench the worst of the problems that besieged the country post-Mubarak. Months of delay and political manoeuvring have led to widespread public disillusionment with the government. And not just in Egypt – in the U.S. Congress, skeptical voices are growing louder in debates over the provision of aid. Global cynicism is reflected in the dramatic decline of the country’s tourism-related income over the last two years, an industry on which a quarter of the Egyptian economy depends.

Morsi’s personal style, or lack thereof, has encouraged perceptions that Egypt is a black comedy stuck on rewind. His performances have become painfully reminiscent of Arab leaders past. When he takes the megaphone and yells at his people, telling them what they are doing wrong without suggesting how to put things right, it is boring at best. More disturbingly, he now seems content to rely on the discourse of the past – the blaming of an unknown and ominous enemy for the country’s ills – to legitimize his policies, instead of offering a vision for the future.

For many diehard revolutionaries, the solution to this uninspiring situation is “Down with the regime!” This slogan has a good track record so far – Egyptians brought down a 30-year-old autocracy in 18 days – but perpetual protests will not solve the country’s problems. Going to the polls should be the most effective way for Egyptians to bring about change, but whether or not this holds true will depend on who chooses to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Nobel laureate Mohammed El-Baradei of the National Salvation Front has called for a public boycott of the elections, and other opposition figures are now debating the option. This is the wrong path to take – a boycott would not help Egypt move forward. One can see why the NSF might prefer to derail the elections rather than face Morsi squarely. The opposition movement is fragmented, fragile, and has shown little evidence of new ideas. Its raison d’etre appears to be its leaders’ dislike of Morsi, with some going as far as to claim that Morsi has no political legitimacy. But such claims will do little to further the opposition’s goals if they are not accompanied by efforts to build up the movement’s own governance credentials.

The opposition needs to buckle down and recognize a real opportunity when it sees one. It needs to put forward future-minded candidates who will declare their determination to fix Egypt’s problems with a single voice strong enough to drown out the uninspiring messages coming from Morsi’s megaphone. If the opposition works hard to find alternative ideas that can win votes at the polls, they will do far more good for Egypt than if they harangue voters from the sidelines. The parliamentary elections could be a turning point, but not if the opposition sits back, complains, and boycotts.

Morsi is now being lambasted for having no charisma and no vision – a fairly dramatic shift from the early days of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power. To be fair, he had only a small window to repair the damage wrought by Mubarak, but he failed to use it effectively. With each passing day, the public is becoming less prepared to let another window go by.

The president now has a growing number of critics who don’t want to see his party dominate the next parliament. In fact, they want him to leave, to a galaxy far, far away. A boycott will hardly make this more likely.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: OpenCanada.org

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

Egypt and Iran: A Rapprochement Is Unlikely

Bessma Momani — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 16:24:00 -0500

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Cairo to attend a meeting of the Organization of Islamic States has sparked speculation that a warming trend in Iranian-Egyptian relations could realign Middle East alliances.

After all, this week’s historic trip not only follows Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi’s first visit to Iran, which took place last August when he attended the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, but also Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s visit with Morsi in January. Both regimes claim inspiration from political Islam and presumably have a shared sympathy with the Palestinian cause.

The reality, though, is that their strategic interests are still worlds apart.

Diplomatic exchanges between Iran and Egypt were conspicuous by their absence for more than 30 years. After the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the new government in Tehran displayed great animosity toward Cairo for giving asylum to the deposed Iranian monarch, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. And as a key ally of the United States, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak shunned the Islamic Republic. Indeed, he often touted the strategic value of his government in keeping Islamists at bay, both at home and in the wider region.

When the Egyptian people demanded the overthrow of the western-backed Mubarak, the Iranian government relished the symbolic and historic irony that Mubarak fell in 2011 on the same date — Feb. 11 — that the Shah had been stripped of all power in 1979. Iran even took credit for Egypt’s Arab Spring revolution, preferring to call it an Islamic revolution. It claimed Mubarak’s overthrow was a defeat for western-backed governments in the Middle East and a victory for populist Islamists who took their cue from Iran. Thus for Ahmadinejad, the trip to Cairo has great symbolic value. He is the first Iranian leader to visit Egypt since the Islamic Republic was created and, to Ahmadinejad, the Egyptian revolution is his to claim.

But few Egyptians see their revolution as externally inspired. To them, it was a homegrown movement built on their socio-economic frustrations with a corrupt government. So while the Iranian press reported the warm reception extended to Ahmadinejad, the Egyptian press reported Morsi’s chiding of Iran for Tehran’s continued support for the Assad regime in Syria.

Similarly, while the Iranian press reported that Ahmadinejad wanted to foster unity with Egypt to further the Palestinian cause, the Egyptian press reported that both the head of the leading Sunni Islamic seminary of Al-Azhar and the Egyptian prime minister warned Ahmadinejad not to undermine security in the Persian Gulf region. These differences are not just rhetorical, but speak to the divergent strategic interests these leaders have in the region and at home.

Ahmadinejad is an outgoing president who will not be allowed to stand for a third term. But his desire to influence the June 2013 election is strong, illustrated by his manoeuvring to weaken his political adversaries. For their part, Ahmadinejad’s opponents blame him — his governing style and his policies — for some of the economic hardship the Iranian people have endured. One way for Ahmadinejad to deflect domestic attention from the flailing economy is to claim ownership of the revolutions sweeping the Arab Middle East.

Egypt’s Morsi needs to quell real public anger over his consolidation of power and the new contentious constitution. With a foreign exchange reserve that is rapidly dwindling and a deteriorating economy highly dependent on tourism and trade in the Suez Canal, Morsi is turning to Egypt’s wealthy benefactors in the Gulf — players like Saudi Arabia and Qatar — while continuing to receive $1.3 billion in military and economic aid from the U.S. Furthering an alliance with Iran would do little to tame Egypt’s domestic economic troubles. And with Egyptians firmly in support of the Syrian people’s desire to overthrow Assad, Iran offers Morsi little ideological comfort.

So beyond the warm exchange of greetings for the cameras, the icy relationship between these two historic powers in the Middle East remains. Morsi and Ahmadinejad’s shared Islamist political ideologies will do little to change the hard strategic realities — at home and in the region — that keep them apart.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: Toronto Star

Egypt: A Crisis of Confidence

Bessma Momani — Wed, 30 Jan 2013 17:06:00 -0500

January 25 marked the two-year anniversary of the revolution that overthrew Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. This charged event alone would have been enough to cause tensions in the streets; the same-day release of court verdicts on the soccer clashes in Port Said Stadium last February made a flare-up inevitable. The chaos that has spread since that poorly-timed decision however is being driven by something more fundamental: a deep crisis of confidence.

Egypt’s citizens are taking to the streets again – for different reasons – with one message: We no longer have confidence in the Morsi government to steer us forward.

In Tahrir Square, the usual crowd of liberals and secularists has returned to familiar territory, replicating scenes from the now-infamous 18 days of riots that overthrew Mubarak’s 30-year dictatorship, but there are two key differences: Chants of “down with the regime” are directed toward the elected president, Mohamed Morsi, and members of the underground movement of anarchists called the Black Bloc, dressed in black and wearing ominous balaclavas, have joined the protestors.

Missing from the tinderbox in Tahrir Square is a group of soccer hooligans and fans of Cairo’s Al-Ahly team. During the 2011 riots, they were often the first to spill into Tahrir Square, usually for no good political reason: They were there simply to disturb the peace and have their team in red show off their colours. This year, however, they are rejoicing in the sombre sentences handed down by the judges dealing with the cases resulting from last February’s soccer match riot.

After Port Said’s Al-Masry team beat Cairo’s Al-Ahly team in a 3-1 soccer match on Feb. 1, 2012, Port Said fans stormed the field. The chaos on the field was compounded by lax security, locked stadium gates, local frustrations, and local government incompetence that many Cairenes, at the time, blamed on the Egyptian military, which was in charge of the country. Al-Ahly fans felt that the military was getting back at them for supporting the revolution and for making trouble in Tahrir Square. Seventy-two people were killed in the stadium riot that left Al-Ahly fans calling for vengeance and justice.

The verdicts of the past weekend could not have been delivered at a worse time. The trials found many Port Said fans and residents guilty of murder, and gave them the death penalty. Families and residents of Port Said and coastal towns nearby responded by rioting; over the decisions themselves and the sloppy judicial procedures that preceded them. They also questioned the timing of the entire chain of events, as in their minds, why wouldn’t the Morsi government orchestrate the timing of the decision so as to keep Cairo’s Al-Ahly fans off the streets on the revolution’s anniversary weekend? Now, Morsi has retaliated for the riots by calling for a month-long state of emergency and curfew for Port Said and other coastal towns.

This increasingly out-of-control situation is not just a series of unfortunate coincidences. Soccer and politics in Egypt are both running amuck because the country is proving unable to gather the political momentum necessary to move forward smoothly, and stop lurching from crisis to crisis.

Despite having won the Africa Cup of Nations in 2006, 2008, and 2010, Egypt did not even qualify for the 2012 regional soccer competition. Sadly, there’s little chance that Egyptians will have reason to regain confidence in their country’s performance, whether on the pitch or in the political arena, anytime soon.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: OpenCanada.org

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Between Caution and Controversy: Lessons from the Gulf Arab States as (Re-)emerging Donors

Bessma Momani and Crystal Ennis — Mon, 28 Jan 2013 15:26:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2012. A paid subscription is required to access.

ABSTRACT

The history of Gulf donorship, its trajectory and underlying motivations, continues to be an understudied aspect of foreign aid. While the Gulf Arab states are not new donors, their manner of regional coordination, branding, and aid management are distinct. Often helping fellow countries of the South, particularly Arab and Muslim countries, these countries have moved towards stronger private sector involvement and into social spending programmes. Owing to their oil wealth, Gulf Arab states' are increasingly generous and yet they are also cautious after 9/11 about how and by whom their aid is channelled. Nevertheless, with oscillations in oil prices, continued controversy over rising Islamism post-Arab-Spring, the future of Gulf aid remains a valuable subject of study.

Read the full article »

Authors

Bessma Momani
Crystal Ennis

Publication: Cambridge Review of International Affairs

Image Source: © Stephanie McGehee / Reuters

Demand for Arab "Strongmen" Weaker Than Ever

Bessma Momani — Fri, 18 Jan 2013 13:17:00 -0500

As we mark the two-year anniversary of the Arab uprisings, we see plenty of figurative post-mortems on the Arab leaders, or strongmen, that have been usurped by the masses. But what can we learn from these revolutions about the Arab people and the type of government they seek? How do these uprisings complicate the theory of “Arab exceptionalism” (as it was once described in polite academic and analytical circles)? This term, I’m afraid, was not intended as a compliment: Many analysts of the Middle East talked about how the Arab world was “exceptional” to the experience of democratization – and, implicitly, to modernization – thanks to resilient authoritarian political structures. In other words, Arabs were really good at constructing systems that revolved around security institutions, and that relied on nepotism and cultish adoration of the leader by the masses to surive.

I have never found this argument helpful in explaining the politics of the region, not least because it typically descended into cultural arguments about how the Arab people want strongmen, respect the abuser, or simply view “might as right.” It is an academic theory that has always been too reminiscent of cultural psychologist Raphael Patai’s 1973 book, The Arab Mind, which provided lessons on how to dominate the Arab people, and implied that such lessons were legitimated by the behaviour of Arabs themselves. When Seymour Hersh wrote his exposé in The New Yorker about the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, he noted that Patai’s book was the inspiration behind the Bush neo-conservatives’ modus operandi for containing the Arab people. The book, like Abu Ghraib, is a reminder of how the Arab people have been dehumanized as they’ve been poked and prodded by outside analysts.

So, what does this theory that the Arab people want strongmen have to do with the Arab Spring?

In my opinion, the Arab Spring has debunked this theory once and for all, as Arabs have shown the world they are looking for the complete opposite of strongmen. The uprisings were devoid of charismatic leaders, and none have captured the imagination of the various revolutions thus far. Indeed, the international community has at times made loud calls for the revolutionary groups to find leaders so external powers would have interlocutors.

Frankly, the Arab people are not searching for new larger-than-life leaders. They are not looking for someone to take to the podium and rhyme off speeches that try to restore confidence with rhetoric and empty promises. Arabs do not want to pay deference to strongmen, real or perceived – they are fed up with omnipotent leaders. So, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi gave his speech to the nation, and when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stood in front of the Damascus Opera House to give his statesmen a lesson in geopolitics, they were out of sync entirely with the dynamic of the revolutions.

Today, the people of the Arab world want technocrats, functionaries, and doers to lead them. Long-winded speeches and convoluted ideological arguments are not satisfying to a class of educated, well-traveled, and increasingly cosmopolitan people. Greater and greater numbers of Arabs are calling on leaders to effectively formulate and implement policies – they want reforms in every sense of the word. Fiery nationalist speeches that may have been enough to spark hope in days past now only fan feelings of frustration.

In many ways, this is the reason for the Arab uprisings: It is a process resulting from the increased education, urbanization, and empowerment of the Arab people. It is hard to tell a generation of young, educated people that because someone else commands the megaphone and has a stick to back it, they ought to acquiesce. The actions of this generation disprove any thesis that Arab societies are predisposed to dictatorship and stagnation. The Arab Spring should put an end to “Arab exceptionalism”, and to the idea that we are merely waiting for alternative Arab strongmen to replace the ones that have been forced out.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: Canada International Council

Image Source: © Ahmed Jadallah / Reuters

How Many More Syrians Must Die?

Bessma Momani — Sun, 06 Jan 2013 10:39:00 -0500

As a political analyst, I can comprehend the plausible geostrategic and political reasons to explain why, despite international recognition for the Syrian National Coalition, the reality on the ground will change little. And why, despite the over 60,000 Syrians killed, the red line for the international community remains the use of chemical weapons.

The use of chemical weapons sets a dangerous precedent in a region with significant stockpiles and plenty of conflict. By labeling this as the red line, international governments are trying to send a warning signal to all regional players about the boundaries of acceptability.

I can also understand the Obama administration’s quick move to identify the extremist group, Jabhat al-Nusra, a terrorist organization. At one level, the move can be seen as a strategy to quell a testy Congress that had become obsessed with the government’s failure to predict a blowback of radicals in Libya who took the life of state department employees. Recognizing the Nusra Front as a terrorist organization, before the U.S. government acknowledged the Syrian National Coalition as the recognized representative of the Syrian people, reassured Congress—and the world—that the Obama administration would not ignore extremist forces.

At the same time, the U.S. has resisted labeling the Assad army as a terrorist organization, a move that has enormous implications if there is a negotiated solution to the end of this crisis. The U.S. government is keenly aware that it failed in Iraq by encouraging de-Baathification following the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Keeping the Syrian army off a terrorist list will allow some elements of the brass to play a “legitimate” role in a new Syria and encourage more defections within the armed forces and Assad regime in the coming months.

But, these so-called geopolitical explanations are also excuses for inaction.

The sad truth is that many more Syrians will die and the international community, including us analysts, will find plenty of reasons to justify inaction. None of these reasons will comfort Syrians who remain perplexed by why the world ignores their plight, day after day. Over half a million people have fled the country, an average of over 800 a day, with millions of others trapped and internally displaced. There is an unknown number of political prisoners, but estimates of 25,000 are noted, being held in Assad army camps. Many Syrians I’ve interviewed estimate that nearly 20 children have been killed nearly every single day in Syria over the past two years.

But, while the geopolitical considerations for inaction are many, reasons to act are plenty as well. Inaction can lead to long-term consequences. Thirty-six percent of the Syrian population are children under the age of 14, and 24% of the population is between the ages of 14-24, according to the World Bank. Not only is their education interrupted, but they are living without homes and with increased hopelessness. The long-term psychological damage on an entire generation of Syrians has yet to be played out.

Syria is being destroyed, one beautiful city after another, right before our eyes. Schools, hospitals, parks, private businesses, and entire public infrastructure are completely gone. There are fewer homes and places of work for Syrian refugees to return to, with each passing day.

Already, this instability is spilling into Lebanon. Already, this helplessness has taken root in extremism. It’s been too long that we’ve tried to justify our ‘Syria strategy’.

How many Syrians must die for the world to act?

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: Syria Deeply

Feeling Confused About Egypt? You're Not Alone

Bessma Momani — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 14:23:00 -0500

Since Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi announced his constitutional decree on November 22, there has been dramatic unrest in Cairo. Morsi's supporters and opponents have been staging their own demonstrations and clashing violently in the streets.

Morsi's decree gave him sweeping powers and was meant to stop the judiciary from disbanding the constituent assembly, which, stacked with Islamists, was writing the draft of the constitution. Morsi's initial decree extended the drafting time by two months. When it appeared that judges would challenge Morsi further, the constituent assembly finished writing the constitution in a one-day marathon session.

Egyptian people are historically proud of their (albeit decaying) institutions. Unhappy with how the constitution was rushed through and forced upon them, opposition forces came together and demanded Morsi repeal the constitutional declaration and postpone the referendum.

At that point, the army, which had been trying to stay out of the limelight since Morsi's election, weighed in and delivered an ominous warning: If parties don't "dialogue," then "dark days" may be ahead. If this were a veiled threat of a coup d'état, it would pit the army against Morsi supporters, who, by all accounts, can come out in the hundreds of thousands when called upon.

Still calling for a referendum on Dec. 15, Morsi met with a second tier of less-prominent opposition forces this weekend and rescinded (or, in actuality, just reworded) the controversial presidential decree. So, now Egyptians have a choice: to vote "Yes" to the constitution in the Dec. 15 referendum and hope that the sloppily worded, patronizing, and, at times, overly ambitious constitution will undergo amendments, or to vote "No" -- a choice that the president says would lead to another election in two months for a new constitutive assembly that would write another draft constitution.

These are difficult options to stomach for most Egyptians. The people are disheartened by how their country has quickly swayed into chaos and lawlessness, and by the endless announcements of revolutionaries and government supporters.

To make matters worse, an opposition movement called the National Salvation Front -- a group comprised of prominent figures like Mohamed ElBaradei and Amr Moussa -- has called for Morsi to postpone the referendum. Morsi and his supporters have accused the opposition of being a front for foreign intervention, comprised of cultural and economic elites that are in cahoots with the media to bring down the democratically elected Islamist government. To Morsi, the constitutional referendum is the chance to bring true democracy to Egypt and rid the upper political ranks of secular elites.

In contrast, most of Morsi's opponents want nothing less than his (figurative) head. Their passionate calls for the removal of former president Hosni Mubarak have been redirected completely to calls for Morsi to leave. Morsi's speech to the nation was another patronizing and demoralizing experience for the people who threw out Mubarak and vowed never to accept another pharaoh. Topping off the instability that Morsi's moves have provoked is a looming domestic economic crisis, all of which has left Egyptians confused, frustrated and furious.

My favourite tweet from an Egyptian activist over the weekend sums up the intense uncertainty many are feeling: "if you are not confused about Egypt, then you are not paying enough attention."

Egypt is in turmoil and circumstances have pushed all sides to extreme and hardened positions. Nothing will convince Morsi that the referendum should not be held, and nothing will convince opposition groups to renew their faith in his leadership.

The country is in turmoil and polarized by two interpretations of what ought to be the future of Egypt, leaving Egyptians to choose between despair and disorder -- hardly a real choice.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: The Huffington Post Canada

Should Egypt's President Morsi Be Given a Chance?

Bessma Momani — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 14:18:00 -0500

Well before Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi issued his presidential decree to override the judiciary, Egypt was polarized between (albeit a generalization) lslamists and liberals/secularists. Although the president won through a free and fair electoral process back in June, this president already had a thin margin of support -- he won only on a second round, and with only 51 percent of the popular vote. In the first round of presidential voting, Morsi's support was even thinner. It could be interpreted, then, that the country remains deeply committed to liberal -- and, arguably, secular -- principles. The fact is, though, that the Morsi government was democratically elected, and democracy is about a free and fair process, not about achieving one's preferred outcome.

The Egyptian president had a legislature that was also democratically elected in a free and fair process. This legislature was overwhelmingly composed of Islamists -- both members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafists' Noor Party. Under orders of the military, the judiciary suspended the legislature and argued that the legislature had no right to sit without a constitution in place.

Nevermind the absurdity of the judiciary ruling taking place a year after the legislature was elected. The truth is, the judiciary was stacked with Mubarak-era cronies that not only distrusted the Islamists, but also feared that the legislature would continue the witch-hunt against Mubarak cronies and turn their eyes toward the inefficient and corrupt judiciary. Morsi has also promised to retry the Mubarak-era cronies and those found to be innocent of killing revolutionary protesters in 2011. This offended the judiciary further, but garnered support among Islamists.

Undeterred, when Morsi was elected without a sitting legislature, he set out to create a constituent assembly that mirrored the ideological leanings of the sacked legislature to get on with the business of writing a constitution. Again, Morsi played by the rules and tasked the assembly with finalizing a constitution so that a new legislature could be elected into power next spring.

The judiciary again threatened to dissolve the constituent assembly because it was comprised of too many Islamists -- even though the Freedom and Justice Party constituted only 40 per cent of the assembly. This takes us to the current presidential decree, which strips the judiciary of power to undermine the authority of the constituent assembly. The president has argued that this measure is temporary, and will only be in place until February, when the constituent assembly will finish its task, and when there will be a general referendum on the draft constitution.

Herein lies the problem: the judiciary does not trust the Morsi government -- or the Islamists, for that matter. Secularists and liberals, including many judges and lawyers, fear that the Morsi government will not give up power in February. Moreover, the quality of debate in the legislature and the constituent assembly is indeed on the border of ridiculous, and is unattractive to most liberal and secular Egyptians.

Understandably, there is fear that the Islamists will want to take their new consolidated power to put some archaic ideas and laws into the constitution. Hence, liberals and secularists have supported the judiciary in its threat to suspend the constituent assembly, and have taken great issue and sought to protest against Morsi's consolidation of power. This is where we are today.

Morsi is not right to usurp the judiciary, and his opponents do not have the right to usurp the general will by suspending the constituent assembly. Morsi may have felt justified to challenge the corrupted judiciary, but again, democracy is about a free and fair process, not about achieving one's preferred outcome.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: The Huffington Post, Canada

With Gaza Ceasefire, Egypt's Morsi Becomes A Serious Player

Bessma Momani — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 16:55:00 -0500

The world’s eyes are now on Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi as he struggles to sustain what many consider an act of diplomatic acrobatics: stopping the violence in Israel and Palestine.

On Wednesday, Mr. Morsi brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas after eight days of shelling and devastation that led to the deaths of 162 Palestinians and six Israelis. That is quite a feat, considering that President Morsi has been on the job for six months, he was not the first choice of his political party, he does not have clear presidential prerogatives because the Egyptian constitution has yet to be ratified, and he is hampered by an Egyptian military that maintains an ominous and watchful eye on politics.

It is notable, then, that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Mr. Morsi’s “personal leadership” in brokering this difficult ceasefire. Has President Morsi’s diplomatic adroitness broken the pessimistic bent found in some media outlets – some of which have referred to the period following the Arab Spring as an Islamist Winter?

Well, I think it should. Egypt’s brokering of this ceasefire should remind us of how an Islamist-led government can be an effective actor in Middle East relations. Egypt’s elected Muslim Brotherhood government has continued to respect its peace treaty with Israel, despite the pessimism of Mr. Morsi’s critics.

This is not to say that Egypt has continued its modus operandi in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After all, in the midst of the onslaught on Gaza, Mr. Morsi sent his prime minister, Hesham Kandil, to the conflict’s ground zero to lend moral support to Hamas. In contrast, Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak would have turned the other way, hoping the Israelis would get the dirty job done quickly while paying lip service to the Palestinian people.

Cairo’s role in the ceasefire is not only as a broker and a guarantor. Egypt has also agreed to open its border crossings with Gaza to allow the trade of people, food and goods, to help relieve Israel’s economic and humanitarian siege. This will be welcomed by Mr. Morsi’s domestic and regional champions, who sympathize with the plight of Gazans.

Yet this is not without potential problems. Egypt will need to stop the transport of Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets from Sudan through its territories and under the notorious Gaza border tunnels. Moreover, while there is wide public support in Egypt for lifting the siege on Gaza, there is also support for stopping the emboldened Sinai Bedouins from both attacking the Egyptian army, as they have done in recent months, and from smuggling illicit goods along the routes of the Sinai Peninsula.

In the 1950s, the populist government of Gamal Abdel Nasser served as the Arab Middle East’s de facto regional hegemon, and was arguably a trailblazer in relations with developing countries. Has Egypt returned to its past glory days of being the bona fide leader of the Arab world?

Well, don’t hold your breath. The truth is, Egypt has an enormous set of domestic problems to deal with, and both its people and government have little or no ambition to be a regional leader. It is still a poor country with rampant unemployment, high prices, high illiteracy, a stricken tourist sector that accounts for 25 per cent of the economy, and failing public infrastructure.

Historical circumstances have turned Turkey and Qatar into the new regional brokers, and President Morsi’s successes will not return Egypt to its Nasser days. Nevertheless, despite the death and destruction of the past eight days and the tenuous terms of the ceasefire, there is good reason to highlight the responsible actions of Egypt’s democratically elected Islamist president.

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: The Globe and Mail

The Real Winner of Israel vs. Gaza? Syria's Bashar al-Assad

Bessma Momani — Thu, 22 Nov 2012 15:37:00 -0500

Analysts and pundits will be all over themselves trying to find a "winner" in this conflict between Gaza and Israel. Admitting that those who have been killed and maimed from this conflict find this discussion wholly insensitive, I have to say that it is neither Hamas, Netanyahu, nor Morsi who are the clear winners.

Some will argue that Hamas was able to lift the economic blockade on Gaza and therefore won. Others will note that Netanyahu will likely now cement his right-wing coalition to victory in January elections. I myself have argued that Morsi is now viewed as an international statesman thanks to his involvement in brokering a ceasefire. But the real winner of these terrible eight days is Bashar al Assad.

While the world's cameras and attention were turned to Gaza and Israel (and rightfully so), the Syrian regime sustained its killing of Syrians at the usual pace of over 100 civilians per day. Yes per day. Not only did Assad gain from having the media shift focus to one of the longest enduring conflicts of the region, the Syrian dictator also benefited from returning the anti-colonialist narratives to deciphering the Middle East.

For the past 20 months, Assad has reminded his followers that those behind the Syrian rebellion against his government are a collusion of American, Israeli, Turkish, and Qatari interests. Not to go into the absurdity of such a coalition of non-likeminded governments, this is a narrative that sticks in parts of the Middle East where there remains deep suspicions about foreign policy toward the region. In a previous article I argued that the Arab Spring had shaken many Arabs' view of their own agency -- which I think was a refreshing thing. Don't get me wrong, it is easy to understand why Middle Easterners see themselves as perpetual pawns in a larger chess game of international players -- because, indeed they have been in the past and will likely be so again in the future.

So expect to see Assad -- and the Iranian government for that matter -- giving speeches in the next few days in order to appeal to the heartstrings of Arabs and Muslims that they should not turn their eye away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If one does as told, they'll forget that as of today Assad has killed 40,000 Syrians and unfortunately we are still counting...

Authors

Bessma Momani

Publication: The Huffington Post Canada