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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" media="screen" href="/~d/styles/rss2full.xsl"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" media="screen" href="http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~d/styles/itemcontent.css"?><rss xmlns:a10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:feedburner="http://rssnamespace.org/feedburner/ext/1.0" version="2.0"><channel xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><title>Brookings: Experts - Cesare Merlini</title><link>http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?rssid=merlinic</link><description>Brookings Experts Feed</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400</lastBuildDate><a10:id>http://www.brookings.edu/rss/experts?feed=merlinic</a10:id><pubDate>Sat, 25 May 2013 15:51:19 -0400</pubDate><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic" /><feedburner:info uri="brookingsrss/experts/merlinic" /><atom10:link xmlns:atom10="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" rel="hub" href="http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/" /><feedburner:emailServiceId>BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic</feedburner:emailServiceId><feedburner:feedburnerHostname>http://feedburner.google.com</feedburner:feedburnerHostname><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{90F6B6FD-9DC9-48AF-AF61-B950789178A5}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/WwhKD6CPelU/arabsocietyinrevolt</link><title>Arab Society in Revolt: The West's Mediterranean Challenge </title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;img src="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2012/arabsocietyinrevolt/arabsocietyinrevolt/arabsocietyinrevolt_2x3.jpg" alt="Cover: Arab Society in Revolt" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Brookings Institution Press 2012 268pp.
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;p&gt;For every pithy conceptualization of complex events, there are additional lenses through which to examine them. One of the several virtues of this book is precisely that it brings different perspectives to bear on the complexity, diversity, and uncertainty of recent and current events in the Arab world. The thirteen authors concentrate on the critical social forces shaping the region&amp;mdash;demography, religion, gender, telecommunication connectivity, and economic structures&amp;mdash;and they are painstakingly analyzed and evaluated.&amp;mdash;from the foreword by Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Arab Spring will be remembered as a period of great change for the Arab states of North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Facing fundamental transitions in governance, these countries are also undergoing profound social, cultural, and religious changes. The European Union and the United States, caught unprepared by the uprisings, now must address the inescapable challenges of those changes. How will the West respond to these new realities, particularly in light of international economic uncertainty, EU ambivalence toward a &amp;ldquo;cohesive foreign policy,&amp;rdquo; and declining U.S. influence abroad? &lt;i&gt;Arab Society in Revolt&lt;/i&gt; explains and interprets the societal transformations occurring in the Arab Muslim world, their ramifications for the West, and possible policy options for dealing with this new world. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Arab Society in Revolt&lt;/i&gt; examines areas of change particularly relevant in the southern Mediterranean: demography and migration, Islamic revival and democracy, rapidly changing roles of women in Arab society, the Internet in Arab societies, commercial and social entrepreneurship as change factors, and the economics of Arab transitions. The book then looks at those cultural and religious as well as political and economic factors that have influenced the Western response, or lack of it, to the Arab Spring as well as the policy options that remain open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Arab Society in Revolt&lt;/em&gt; received a favorable review in &lt;a href="http://lettura.corriere.it/debates/se-allah-diventa-individualista/"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Corriere della Sera&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/186453"&gt;Watch a video of the book's launch event in November 2012 &amp;raquo;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			ABOUT THE EDITORS
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;h5&gt;
			&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;
		&lt;/h5&gt;&lt;div&gt;
			
		&lt;/div&gt;&lt;h5&gt;
			Olivier Roy 
		&lt;/h5&gt;&lt;div&gt;
			Olivier Roy is professor at the European University Institute in Florence, directing the Mediterranean program at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and is a senior researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research.
		&lt;/div&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Downloads
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2012/arabsocietyinrevolt/arabsocietyinrevolt_chapter"&gt;Sample Chapter&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2012/arabsocietyinrevolt/arabsocietyinrevolt_toc"&gt;Table of Contents&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ordering Information:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;{9ABF977A-E4A6-41C8-B030-0FD655E07DBF}, 978-0-8157-2396-7, $28.95 &lt;a href="http://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/ecom/MasterServlet/AddToCartFromExternalHandler?item=9780815723967&amp;amp;domain=brookings.edu"&gt;Order&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;{B98DCBB0-3580-4D55-ABD4-AB91E00585E6}, 978-0-8157-2397-4, $28.95 &lt;a href="http://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/ecom/MasterServlet/AddToCartFromExternalHandler?item=9780815723974&amp;amp;domain=brookings.edu"&gt;Order&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/WwhKD6CPelU" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Wed, 18 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400</pubDate><dc:creator> Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy , eds.</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2012/arabsocietyinrevolt?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{CF4CCD21-BEB1-4711-9F00-3656D01A9002}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/i5d-yqZ2fEQ/07-italy-bastasin-merlini</link><title>Previewing Italian Prime Minister Monti's White House Visit</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;In his meeting with President Obama on February 9, the new Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti will be in a position to present his counterpart with details of Italy&amp;rsquo;s dramatic turnaround&amp;mdash;one that has a reasonably good chance of transforming the country from a euro area basket case into the potential keystone of a solution for Europe&amp;rsquo;s crisis. In less than three months, Monti has actually remodeled the political environment and the economic fabric of his country. In doing so, he has also become a major actor on the European stage.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;As announced by the White House, the two leaders will discuss not only Italy&amp;rsquo;s situation, but also Europe&amp;rsquo;s policies including&amp;nbsp;&lt;a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/23/statement-press-secretary-visit-prime-minister-monti-italy"&gt;&amp;ldquo;the prospect of an expansion of Europe&amp;rsquo;s financial firewall.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a&gt; The broadening of the discussion to Europe should not come as a surprise. As a policymaker Monti is unusual, having gained his governance experience not in national politics, but mainly in the European institutions, as a two-term EU Commissioner. Accordingly, his chief feature as Prime Minister seems to be a combination of national and supranational priorities that favor each other. His role and expertise could therefore represent a game-changer for the euro area, with implications extending beyond Europe. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Mario Monti was nominated Prime Minister on November 16, 2011, at arguably the most dramatic juncture of the euro area crisis. At the time, the White House branded his mandate as a &lt;a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/11/21/press-briefing#transcript"&gt;&amp;ldquo;significant responsibility at a critical time&lt;/a&gt;." An internationally renowned economist, Monti was chosen after Silvio Berlusconi&amp;rsquo;s troubled government finally unraveled, threatening to bring Italy into default. Despite being parachuted into the position from outside the political arena, he and his ministers were granted unprecedented political backing by the Italian Parliament. The proposed government received a vote of confidence of 556 to 61 in the Chamber of Deputies and 281to 41 in the Senate. All three major political groupings, ranging from the right, center, and left of the center (including Berlusconi&amp;rsquo;s party), voted in favor of the new executive, giving it full democratic legitimacy. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
In his first weeks as head of government, Monti introduced a massive fiscal package and got the Parliament to approve an ambitious pension reform. The sum of fiscal corrections deliberated in 2011 amounts to some 6% of GDP. The pension reform has also already been implemented. The austerity package shocked most political observers and economic analysts by its severity, but it sailed through Parliament with an overwhelming majority of about seven in ten MPs. Although Monti&amp;rsquo;s popularity in the Italian public opinion declined after the fiscal package, it climbed back in January and is currently between 60 and 70%&amp;mdash;three times as popular as his predecessor was just before his resignation. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
By implementing the requirements spelled out by the European institutions, Italy is now on track to balance its budget in 2013. After that, the famously high public debt (about 120% of Italy&amp;rsquo;s GDP) should decline more or less automatically, given the forthcoming constitutional provision for a balanced budget as required by the &amp;ldquo;fiscal compact&amp;rdquo; that was approved at the EU Summit on January 30. Moreover, in the first weeks of 2012, the Prime Minister, who also holds the Treasury portfolio, introduced a set of liberalizations aimed at increasing the depressingly low level of potential growth of the Italian economy and is now preparing an extensive reform of the labor market. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
With these credentials, Monti has been able to join Merkel and Sarkozy in the frequent series of consultations among the leaders of the larger EU countries. However, rather than just taking a third seat at the table, the Italian leader aims to add a communitarian and integrative perspective to the Franco-German directorate. A widely noted &lt;a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a209e0b2-4769-11e1-b847-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kr8xRu6R"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Financial Times &lt;/em&gt;article&lt;/a&gt; went as far as saying that the euro&amp;rsquo;s destiny depends on Monti&amp;rsquo;s success, and vice-versa, while a number of observers in the media find that he seems to speak as president of the EU Commission as well as Italy&amp;rsquo;s Prime Minister. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
In fact, one could even talk of a &amp;ldquo;Monti method&amp;rdquo;, with reference to his habit of employing the perspective of the interlocutor in order to prove his own points. His defense of central bank autonomy and of fiscal rigor, which puts him in a special relationship with Germany, is a case in point. As an EU Commissioner, he could use the German Ordoliberal arguments (on the virtues of a well-regulated market economy) to force that country to advance the liberalization of its tightly protected national service sector. Back in 2000 he pointed the EU Commission&amp;rsquo;s finger against the special status of the Landesbanken, which would later play a key role in the euro crisis. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Something similar happened vis-&amp;agrave;-vis the United States. A staunch Atlanticist as well as a believer in the virtues of market economy, Commissioner Monti imposed from Brussels the respect of competition rules on such American corporate giants, as Microsoft, General Electric and Honeywell, hence earning the famous brand of Super-Mario (now occasionally extended to another Italian&amp;mdash;Mario Draghi). &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Prime Minister Monti, after setting Italian fiscal policy on the right course in compliance with the tight schedule and strict rulebook imposed by the creditor countries, is now in position to call for a more ambitious economic policy for the euro area, and for the entire Union, including also the full implementation of the internal market of goods and services, Monti&amp;rsquo;s favorite objective. The EU Council&amp;rsquo;s recent commitment on the issue of growth to complement fiscal rigor, reflects Monti&amp;rsquo;s influence. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Moreover, a policy course supporting the economic growth of the euro area is fully shared by Washington. As such, it could even appear in the common statement issued at the end of the meeting, along with the aforementioned &amp;ldquo;firewall&amp;rdquo; provision the EU should put in place to counter market instability in the euro area. This has been a sensitive issue in the United States, where it has been previously difficult to consider providing any financial support&amp;mdash;either directly or indirectly via the IMF&amp;mdash;for a troubled Europe, despite the fact that even China may be taking it into consideration. The results of the February 9 meeting will also be scrutinized for suggestions of possible U.S. participation in a financial backstop for the euro area. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
The risk that Italy will not be able to refinance its debt is considered the make-or-break case for the eurozone. Italy is commonly considered too big to be saved even for those euro-partners that have stronger fiscal positions. Consequently, it is essential for the euro area as a whole that Italy manages to refinance its huge obligations in the next months. More specifically, between February and April, Italy will have to roll over 140bn euro of government bonds that are coming to maturity, almost half of the total for the full year. From this perspective one can easily understand Monti&amp;rsquo;s urgency for a stronger European &amp;ldquo;firewall&amp;rdquo; behind the debt of the euro area countries. A stronger financial backstop, which would have to be topped off by Germany and the other surplus countries, would de facto provide the symmetrical argument for him to maintain parliament&amp;rsquo;s support at home and the necessary popular backing for the reforms that are modernizing the country. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Mario Monti is branded a &amp;ldquo;tecnico&amp;rdquo; in Italy, meaning that he is not elected. The President of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, used his prerogative to make him a member of Parliament before appointing him as prime minister. However, the technical label remains, both domestically and internationally, often with an implicitly negative overtone. This reflects a recent peculiar development, at a time of spreading populism, to disparagingly downgrade as bureaucrats and technocrats certain effective policy makers who were once respectfully called "civil servants"&amp;mdash;or in French, &amp;ldquo;commis de l'Etat&amp;rdquo;. It is conveniently forgotten by populists today that the European Community, now the Union, was a brainchild delivered by a technocrat named Jean Monnet. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
The talks between the economist and technocrat Italian PM and the U.S. President will not be confined to the current economic challenge for Europe and the West at large, however central it will be. Italy's policies in its near neighborhood will be on the agenda as well, starting with the Balkans, but focusing on North Africa, where Italy&amp;rsquo;s restored role and the right combinations of bilateral channels and joint western approaches are needed to stem a failure of the Arab awakening. Such a failure may affect stability as well as jeopardize development and cross-cultural dialogue in the Mediterranean. Mario Monti, who will be accompanied by the former ambassador to the U.S. and now foreign minister, Giulio Terzi di Sant&amp;rsquo;Agata, will likely be in favor of reinforcing EU communitarian initiatives on the basin&amp;rsquo;s southern shores and in the Middle East at large, including Syria, rather than the intergovernmental French-inspired Union for the Mediterranean that failed to play a useful role following the uprisings of 2011. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Rome&amp;rsquo;s perspective, however, is bound to focus also on more distant geo-political areas such Russia and the Gulf, as a consequence of its acute interest for energy supplies. A greater transparency in these two sets of relations is desirable, along with a more integrated approach by the Europeans and a closer consultation across the Atlantic, ahead of possible crisis situations. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Finally, NATO. In the light of the uncertain outcome of its action in Afghanistan, where Italy is actively engaged, the organization may find itself in search not only of a strategy, whether "smart" or else, but also of a purpose, as was the case at the end of the cold war. The European-led operation in Libya, benefiting from a decisive Italian contribution more than it was perceived, was smaller and yet more successful and infinitely less costly than those in western Asia. Thus some lessons may possibly be drawn from it. The summit scheduled for next May in Chicago may provide an opportunity for an assessment and possibly for a reappraisal. Going back to the Monti government&amp;rsquo;s domestic standing, it is worth noting that the parties opposed to Monti in the Italian parliament also happen to be against the country&amp;rsquo;s participation in NATO missions and even against UN peace-keeping operations having an Italian contingent. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
Mario Monti&amp;rsquo;s bilateral with Barack Obama on February 9 is the first such face-to-face meeting at the White House with an Italian top official since the May 2010 visit by the head of state Giorgio Napolitano. After the meeting, Napolitano went to Capitol Hill to address a bipartisan group of congressmen. His message at the time was that the euro was not about to crumble, as several American observers were predicting, and that Italy would do its homework to help prevent the collapse from happening. The remarks sounded rather optimistic to many. In effect this week the new Italian Prime Minister will be in Washington and New York to tell his American interlocutors that Italy&amp;rsquo;s homework is actually being done and that the euro, however shaken, will overcome the crisis. &lt;br&gt;
&lt;br&gt;
A durable solution to the financial instability in the euro area, however, still remains to be found and depends on the success of the EU negotiations on the &amp;ldquo;firewall&amp;rdquo;. &lt;br&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/bastasinc?view=bio"&gt;Carlo Bastasin&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?view=bio"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/i5d-yqZ2fEQ" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2012 17:39:00 -0500</pubDate><dc:creator>Carlo Bastasin and Cesare Merlini</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/02/07-italy-bastasin-merlini?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{A494EF62-630C-45B3-9061-1394E3387073}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/oth0f7En0po/02-religion-governance-merlini</link><title>Religious Revival and Megatrends in Global Security, Economy and Governance</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;Over the recent past, two veins in political science have been prospering. One is related to the power shift taking place at the world level due to the rise of Asia and the decline of the West (including the United States, its number-one-power status notwithstanding) in a context of high interdependence among nations, with consequent acute problems of global governance. The other is related to the apparently growing role of religion in a globalized and increasingly populated world and the consequent decline, possibly the end, of the secularist approach to the handling of public affairs, including international relations.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Often the two lines of analysis appear to run independently of each other, as if geopolitics and the institutions of the world were indifferent to the spread of religion, and the so-called &amp;lsquo;God&amp;rsquo;s return&amp;rsquo; was indifferent to the changing fabric of the international system. The purpose of the paper is to try to explore interrelations and, when appropriate, make connections between the two.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
		Downloads
	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/12/02-religion-governance-merlini/1202_religion_governance_merlini"&gt;Download Full Paper&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?view=bio"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/oth0f7En0po" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Dec 2011 12:46:00 -0500</pubDate><dc:creator>Cesare Merlini</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/12/02-religion-governance-merlini?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{EFA8D826-4690-44DD-85A5-6313CE01CF1B}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/kLX1tGeiLFo/obama-foreign-policy-merlini</link><title>Obama's Foreign Policy: Adapting to Facts on the Ground</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction: &lt;br&gt;
&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;
When toward the end of February, President Obama was so reluctant to go beyond sanctions against Muammar Qaddafi and establish a no-fly zone over Libya, he was seen as a hesitant leader worldwide. But Obama and a few very close advisers around him knew something that the rest of us did not know. Flying objects of various kinds were zooming their sights on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and the circle drawn by the CIA around Osama bin Laden was getting tighter and tighter. Thus, it was not simply that &amp;ldquo;of all countries in the region there, our real interests in Libya are minimal,&amp;rdquo; as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroftwas reported as saying. The big hoped for event, bound to establish Obama&amp;rsquo;s image as Commander-in-Chief, was to happen elsewhere and develop in such a way as to translate the broad and vague &amp;ldquo;war on terror,&amp;rdquo; launched by his predecessor, into a very specific and very symbolic achievement: the killing of the mastermind of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, just a few months ahead of the tenth anniversary of 9/11.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Eventually, Ambassador Susan Rice did vote for the UN Security Council resolution introduced by Britain and France, once the crucial protection of the Libyan civilians (those rebelling) was added to the no-fly prescription. Until then it was openly opposed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. But U.S. participation in military action has remained limited, almost unwilling. For once the Europeans &amp;ndash; in contrast to how they dealt with Slobodan Milosevic &amp;ndash; were taking action, thoughwith their customary divisions, including the surprising German abstention along with Russia and China in the UN Security Council vote.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
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	&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2011/5/obama-foreign-policy-merlini/05_obama_foreign_policy_merlini"&gt;Download Full Article&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?view=bio"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Publication: Longitude
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/kLX1tGeiLFo" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2011 00:00:00 -0400</pubDate><dc:creator>Cesare Merlini</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/05/obama-foreign-policy-merlini?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{8BD7356E-F307-45F9-ACC7-E45C31CD812F}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/lbE4GEGxB2U/international-relations-merlini</link><title>A Post-Secular World?</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction:&lt;/strong&gt; The past two decades appear to have been marked by a return or revival of religion on the international scene. Christians in the United States are wielding powerful and visible, sometimes decisive, influence in the political sphere. More Muslim women are taking up the headscarf to mark their identity in their native or adopted countries. Israel seems increasingly to be becoming a Jewish state. And since it is always tempting to read such phenomena as trends and extrapolate them into the future, a picture has emerged of a world turning post-secular, as it is becoming post-Western. Several authors link the growing activism and visibility of private religious or ecclesiastic organisations with the rise of religious fundamentalism and the related attempt to impose a chosen reading of basic scriptures on the conduct of public affairs. The two developments do seem to be taking place at the same time, but a closer look suggests that they are often distinct and occasionally contradictory, at least as far as the three major monotheistic faiths are concerned.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Christian Metamorphosis &lt;br&gt;
&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;
Christianity is undergoing a profound transformation. The traditional European churches, both Catholic and Protestant, appear to be approaching their twilight hour, despite the spiritual richness of certain circles. There are,&amp;nbsp;to be sure, occasional high-profile and successful media events, but ordinary worship services are increasingly deserted and pollsters who ask about faith are receiving fewer and fewer positive answers. The paedophilia scandal, affecting the Catholic Church in particular, has been another downward step in an already adverse trend. The Vatican may continue to enjoy some political influence, mainly in Italy, but the original Christian connotations of many centrist parties in Western Europe have to a large extent faded. The cases of the Orthodox churches may differ for local reasons, but their roles have been relatively marginal in the fate of Christianity as a whole. The decline of traditional European Christianity, moreover, inevitably reduces proselytism abroad, raising questions about the fate of its past missionary vocation. This decline has been paralleled over the last few decades by the rise of neo-Protestant confessions &amp;ndash; Evangelists, Pentecostalists and others &amp;ndash; which have displayed an impressive capacity to reach people and raise funds. These groups epitomise the Christian contribution to the global religious revival. They are successful in Latin America, Africa and East Asia, but their cradle was, and their driving force remains, in North America, especially the United States. While the American constitution famously provides for the separation of state and church, the political influence of neo-Protestant organisations grew substantially during the last quarter of the twentieth century, first domestically under the influence of popular TV preachers, and then internationally. The trend continued through the first decade of the present century. The American way of proselytism has spread worldwide, promising God&amp;rsquo;s help for earthly wealth and health and making ample use of the media, commercial slogans and private funds. The triumphant mega-church model is now being introduced to emerging Brazil and poor Nigeria; while it has been flourishing for some time in industrialised South Korea. Thus, although some depict this Christian transformation as a shift of its main focus and influence from the northern hemisphere to the southern, following demographic dynamics and in parallel with the decline of the West, it has in fact not been so much a transfer southward as a shift westward, from Europe to America.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;h4&gt;
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		&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2011/4/international-relations-merlini/04_international_relations_merlini"&gt;Download Full Article&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
	&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		&lt;h4&gt;
			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?view=bio"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Publication: Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
	&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/lbE4GEGxB2U" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Thu, 28 Apr 2011 13:20:00 -0400</pubDate><dc:creator>Cesare Merlini</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/04/international-relations-merlini?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">{8D36B08A-6D46-4063-8A94-999B393A2F29}</guid><link>http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~3/RGqRBd9glEI/08-european-union-merlini</link><title>Europe on the International Scene: A Union of Necessity After a Union of Choice?</title><description>&lt;div&gt;
	&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Editor's Note: The following is an excerpt from Cesare Merlini's chapter in &lt;/em&gt;The European Union in the 21st Century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty &lt;em&gt;(Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies/CEPS, 2009), a volume edited by Stefano Micossi and Gian Luigi Tosato.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Thus far the role of the European Union (formerly, the Community) on the international scene has been largely passive, in the sense that it has been less the outcome of policies or political will than the consequence of its very existence. The EU has been a conspicuous and expanding reality, an area of prosperity and the sum of important or at least not irrelevant states. Moreover the Union has been an atypical player in the world system, because of the implicit, irreversible peace among its member states, and because of its unparalleled and unprecedented hybrid of federal and intergovernmental institutions – a model possibly to be copied in other contexts. The magnetic effect on neighbouring states has been remarkable and has led to the view that the EU has so far exerted its geopolitical influence mostly through enlargement, in particular with the latest accession of ten plus two countries. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;With respect to enlargement to include Eastern European countries formerly belonging to the Soviet empire or even the Soviet Union itself, it may be noted, by the way, that it has taken place while the West has seen its global presence and influence shrinking and/or declining. This applies particularly to the Asian continent, with the unsuccessful wars the US has fought in it, following the historical demise of the European empires. In other words a sort of counter-cyclical Western expansion has been achieved through the attractiveness of its institutions, above all the EU but also NATO, rather than through the action of its armies. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The perception of the EU as an international player by its shear existence, not only in economic terms (the euro, trade, competition law) but also, at least potentially, in political terms is also gaining ground abroad. Robert Kagan, for instance, an analyst not generally known for his softness vis-à-vis the Europeans, who he famously said are from Venus while the Americans are from Mars, subsequently wrote that the European Union is a "geopolitical miracle" that “in its own way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, channeling German, French and British ambitions." Former Italian Foreign Minister D’Alema likes to recall a meeting he had, together with two other European leaders, with Chinese President Hu Jintao, who told them, "We are a great power that will be called upon (during the first half of the 21st century) to manage Chinese-American bipolarism" – at which point, realising he was addressing a group of Europeans, he added, "Obviously, Europe will also be there,... if it is united."&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe-21st-century-perspectives-lisbon-treaty"&gt;Download a complete copy of &lt;em&gt;The European Union in the 21st Century: Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty&lt;/em&gt; at ceps.edu »&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;
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			Authors
		&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;ul&gt;
			&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.brookings.edu/experts/merlinic?view=bio"&gt;Cesare Merlini&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
		&lt;/ul&gt;
	&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div&gt;
		Publication: Centre for European Policy Studies
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&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/BrookingsRSS/experts/merlinic/~4/RGqRBd9glEI" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description><pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2009 12:43:00 -0500</pubDate><dc:creator>Cesare Merlini</dc:creator><feedburner:origLink>http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/12/08-european-union-merlini?rssid=merlinic</feedburner:origLink></item></channel></rss>
