Brookings: Experts - John Mukum Mbaku

Oil and Gas Management for Inclusive and Sustainable Development: An East African Regional Forum

Thu, 07 Mar 2013 11:15:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This report recaps the East Africa Regional Forum on oil and gas management for inclusive and sustainable development in Africa held on January 23-24, 2013, and jointly organized by the Economic Policy Research Centre, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and the Africa Growth Initiative.

Recent discoveries of commercially viable deposits of oil and gas in Uganda and Kenya, as well as ongoing efforts to improve and make oil production in South Sudan more efficient, have brought to the fore the need to revisit national policies for the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas reserves and the allocation of the revenues obtained from such activities. Informed discussions based on research and evidence on how best to efficiently and effectively manage East Africa’s natural resources are of critical importance at this stage of the development of these resources.

Thus, in order to deliberate on and critically explore these issues, leading policy think tanks in East Africa—the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), Uganda; Kenya Institute for Public Policy and Analysis (KIPPRA); and Centre for Strategic Analyses and Research (C-SAR), South Sudan—in collaboration with the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., organized the two-day Forum on the Management of Oil and Gas Resources for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Africa. The forum brought together 114 delegates from the East Africa region to deliberate on how to efficiently manage their oil and gas reserves.

The delegates engaged in rigorous debate about the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas, the efficient and equitable management of oil revenues and the management of the environment. Their particular focus was on how regional cooperation can enhance the efficient utilization of the region’s resources. In addition to sharing their experiences about managing an oil-based economy, they emphasized the importance of openness and transparency in the design and implementation of policies for the management of this nascent sector.

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Reassessing the Arab Awakening: Prospects for Deepening and Institutionalizing Democracy in North Africa in 2013

John Mukum Mbaku — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 10:56:00 -0500

Introduction

Two years ago today, Egyptians erupted in joy and jubilation after Omar Suleiman, then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s vice president and intelligence chief, announced that Mubarak had resigned as president and handed all authority to a council consisting of high-ranking military officers. Mubarak was ousted by an 18-day revolt led by young Egyptians and which had begun less than a month after a similar dictatorship in neighboring Tunisia had been toppled. The young Egyptians, spearheading the revolution, were proud to announce to the world that: “This is a revolution for all Egyptians; there is no room for a single group’s slogans, not the Brotherhood’s or anybody else,” (The New York Times, February 11, 2011). Even U.S. President Barack Obama chimed in and declared that “Egyptians have made it clear that nothing less than genuine democracy will carry the day” (Ibid). Yet two years after Mubarak was ousted, the “people’s revolution” has degenerated into a struggle by President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party to create a new autocracy in Egypt. The country is currently being torn apart by violent confrontations between restless, unemployed (and to a certain extent), hopeless, urban youth, and an Islamist government that is perceived as increasingly authoritarian and unwilling to establish institutional arrangements capable of encouraging positive economic transformation and fostering peaceful coexistence, especially in terms of protecting the rights of minorities.

Where it all began

The revolutionary fervor that swept this part of the world began on December 17, 2010 with the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor, Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi, who was protesting his humiliation at the hands of local government regulators. The tragic death of Bouazizi created a new economic, social and political awakening among Tunisians who subsequently took to the streets to demand the ouster of their authoritarian ruler, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The latter was eventually forced out of office on January 14, 2011. Tunisia is scheduled to have presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2013. The hope is that the new government will bring together all of the country’s relevant stakeholders and undertake the type of institutional reforms that could finally provide the country with effective permanent governance structures—that is, those that guarantee the just rule of law.

Many groups within these countries, especially women and ethnic and religious minorities, fear that even though the new regimes came into being through democratic means, they are likely to reject democracy as soon as they have consolidated their political positions.

Tunisia’s new revolutionary awakening eventually spread to other countries in North Africa, as citizens took to the streets to demand that their governments restore and respect their fundamental rights. This movement, commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring,” resulted in the demise of brutal authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Elections that have been considered fair and free by both local and international observers have been carried out in all three countries and each now has a democratically elected government. However, many groups within these countries, especially women and ethnic and religious minorities, fear that even though the new regimes came into being through democratic means, they are likely to reject democracy as soon as they have consolidated their political positions. Marc Fisher of the Washington Post reports, for example, that in Tunisia, many so-called YouTube preachers are preaching sermons that reject the new democracy and its various institutions, such as elections. These preachers argue that “[d]emocracy’s freedom is absolute,” and that “We don’t accept that. In our religion, freedom is limited to the freedom God gives you.” (The Washington Post, April 28, 2012). There is fear that governments in these countries are likely to yield to radical Islamist groups and favor the adoption or retention of non-democratic institutions.

On February 6, 2013, Chokri Belaid, a secularist and staunch critic of the ruling Islamist-led government of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, was assassinated. This cowardly act, perpetuated on a man who had persistently criticized the increasing Islamization of the country’s revolution and had favored the retention of a secular state, only reinforced the beliefs of many Tunisians that Islamists have effectively hijacked their revolution and are endangering their fundamental freedoms. Tunisians have already protested in the wake of Belaid’s funeral prompting the Prime Minister to state that he would dissolve the current government and hold elections.

The priority

For 2013 and beyond, citizens of these countries must ask themselves whether the events of the Arab Spring sufficiently transformed the critical domains—the political, administrative and judicial foundations of the state—enough to provide institutional arrangements that are capable of (1) adequately constraining the state so that civil servants and political elites would not continue to behave with impunity; (2) enhancing peaceful coexistence of each country’s diverse population groups and minimizing the infringement of group rights by either state- or non-state actors; and (3) promoting the type of entrepreneurial activities that can create the wealth that each country needs to fight poverty and improve living conditions, especially for historically marginalized and deprived groups and individuals (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, and ethnic and religious minorities). As the evidence has since shown, the events that took place in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were simple regime changes and not the type of institutional transformations that would have produced truly new political and economic systems. Take Egypt, for example: The Mubarak-era governance architecture—characterized by its failure to guarantee and uphold the rule of law, and which was used effectively by the ancien régime to oppress, exploit and infantilize the Egyptian people—is still firmly in place.

On November 22, 2012, Morsi, who had been elected to guard, as well as help, deepen and institutionalize the country’s democracy, placed himself above the law—he issued a decree that effectively granted him immunity from judicial review or oversight, (The New York Times, November 22, 2012). Criticism and condemnation of Morsi’s extra-constitutional act was swift and almost universal. Some members of the opposition argued that Morsi had established an “absolute presidential tyranny” and that “Egypt [was] facing a horrifying coup against legitimacy and the rule of law and a complete assassination of the democratic transition,” (Ibid). It appeared that Morsi, who, together with his Freedom and Justice Party, had come into power with a reformist mission, which was expected to successfully guide the country’s transition to democratic governance, was now reverting to some of the extra-constitutional practices that had characterized the Mubarak regime. Although Morsi later agreed to limit the scope of his November 22, 2012 decree, his actions do not bode well for the institutionalization of democracy in Egypt.

It is difficult not to see that the once dynamic and progressive Egyptian revolution has now degenerated into a struggle by Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party to entrench a post-Mubarak dictatorship in the country.

In January 2013, violent demonstrations broke out in the cities of Port Said, Suez, and Ismailiya after a court sentenced 21 football fans to death for the February 2012 riot that resulted in the death of over 70 people. Many of the people engaging in the violent demonstrations following the court decision argued that they had been “scapegoated” for the events of February 2012. Ironically, Morsi, who earlier had ignored the country’s legal and judicial system and proceeded to grab power for himself, was telling the rioting Egyptians to respect the court ruling. In response, the Egyptian president declared a state of emergency in the three cities and imposed a 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew for 30 days. The president subsequently invited the opposition to a national dialogue but opposition leaders soundly rejected the offer as essentially “cosmetic” and threatened to continue supporting further protests unless the government meets certain demands, including the formation of a more inclusive government and constitutional reforms. Many in the opposition want the recently ratified constitution discarded and another one developed through a more participatory process. It is difficult not to see that the once dynamic and progressive Egyptian revolution has now degenerated into a struggle by Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party to entrench a post-Mubarak dictatorship in the country. On January 30, 2013, amid warnings from the Egyptian military, a unified opposition invited the president to form a government of national unity as a way to put a halt to the violence. However, even if such a government is formed (as of this writing, Morsi has rejected the idea), and the violence is temporarily halted, the larger problem of institutional dysfunction will remain.

With respect to Libya, the brutal attack of U.S. diplomatic staff and property in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi was a manifestation, among other things, of a revolution that had failed to adequately transform the critical domains and provide the country with institutional arrangements capable of guaranteeing the rule of law. Benghazi was the cradle of the Libyan “revolution” and yet, since the ouster of the ancien régime, the government in Tripoli has been unable to maintain full control of the country. Perhaps more important is the fact that the aspirations of many of those Libyans who participated in the grassroots revolution for freedom and increased participation in the economy, remain unfulfilled—in fact, many of them remain homeless, jobless and without any opportunities for self-actualization. Additionally, relations between Tripoli and Washington, D.C., one of the Libyan revolution’s strongest supporters, have deteriorated since the Benghazi incident.

The importance of reassessing the awakening

Today, many citizens of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are not satisfied with the outcomes of their “revolutions.” It is obvious that a significant amount of this frustration is related to the failure of the revolutions to secure certain critical goals—to reconstruct and reconstitute anachronistic and dysfunctional state systems and provide legal and judicial systems capable of guaranteeing and protecting citizens’ fundamental rights, including protecting citizens from violent attacks by state- and non-state actors, as well as enhancing their ability to engage in the creation of the wealth that they need to meet their obligations and improve their living standards.

Whereas the Arab Spring re-awakened the yearnings of citizens of several North African and Middle Eastern countries for democratic institutions that guarantee the just rule of law, they nevertheless failed to provide such political dispensations. Part of the problem lies in the fact that what started out as people-centered revolutionary uprisings designed to reconstruct and reconstitute dysfunctional state structures remain a work in progress. Tunisia has scheduled elections for 2013 and the hope is that those elections will produce a government that will lead the reconstruction project. Both Egypt and Libya have new governments but leadership in both countries is yet to put before the people any credible programs for reconstructing and reconstituting the anachronistic and dysfunctional state structures.

The policy imperative for 2013

Egyptians, Libyans and Tunisians must demand that their newly elected governments allow the people’s revolutions to continue and achieve their ultimate goal—effective reconstitution of anachronistic and dysfunctional state structures that have been used by previous governments to oppress, exploit and infantilize the people. State reconstruction, through democratic (i.e., bottom-up, participatory, inclusive and people-driven) constitution-making should be the top priority for 2013. It is only through such a process-driven approach to constitution-making that the peoples of these countries can provide themselves with institutional arrangements that adequately constrain civil servants and political elites, provide an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth, and significantly enhance the ability of the various groups that live in each country to coexist peacefully. While some of the new governments appear to favor some form of “controlled democracy” or “theocracy,” it is important for citizens to recognize that without institutional arrangements that guarantee the just rule of law (i.e., one that is consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments), they will continue to suffer from the same types of ills that provided the impetus for the revolutions that began in 2010—impunity and venality in the public sector, extremely high levels of poverty and material deprivation, violence—perpetuated by either state- or non-state actors—against vulnerable groups, and a general failure by the government to respect the people’s fundamental rights. Thus, instead of seeking for themselves positions in the government, opposition elites should push for full and inclusive nationwide dialogue on constitution making so that the country can avail itself of a constitution that reflects the values of all relevant stakeholder groups.

Authors

John Mukum Mbaku

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South Sudan: Searching for a Credible Development Path

John Mukum Mbaku — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 15:14:00 -0500

Framing the issue

South Sudan’s independence from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011 was met with joy, trepidation and many challenges. Despite the fact that South Sudan is endowed with significant amounts of natural resources, the country faces many obstacles. These include a population suffering from significantly high levels of poverty and deprivation; extremely low levels of human capital accumulation; food insecurity; poorly developed economic infrastructure; pervasive bureaucratic corruption; a failure to deal with various internal security problems, some of which arise from violent mobilization by groups that consider themselves marginalized by the government in Juba; and continued conflict with the Republic of Sudan, especially on border issues. Although today, February 4, marks the stated completion date of the withdrawal of South Sudanese forces along its border with Sudan, South Sudan has failed to remove its troops.

South Sudan’s independence provided the new country with many opportunities to improve human development. However, in order for the peoples of South Sudan to translate these opportunities into sustainable development, the new government must bring about genuine institutional reforms. At independence, citizens of the new country had hoped that Juba would provide the wherewithal for all of the country’s relevant stakeholder groups to build and adopt institutional arrangements capable of adequately constraining state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political elites) and preventing them from behaving with impunity. Unfortunately, the government is yet to undertake the necessary reconstruction and reconstitution of the anachronistic and dysfunctional state structures inherited from the Khartoum-based regime. South Sudan’s civil society, which is supposed to pressure the government to undertake the necessary institutional reforms, remains extremely weak and fragile and is currently unable to adequately serve this critical role. While a private media is gradually developing, it has not yet achieved the ability and independence to function as an effective check on government, as well as put pressure on the government to fully perform its constitutionally assigned functions.

The failure of South Sudanese citizens to engage in democratic institutional reforms to provide themselves with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law has left the government unable to effectively manage ethnic and religious diversity, minimize corruption and public financial malfeasance, and provide the enabling environment for the creation of the wealth that can be used to fight poverty and enhance human development.

The failure of South Sudanese citizens to engage in democratic institutional reforms to provide themselves with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law [1] has left the government unable to effectively manage ethnic and religious diversity, minimize corruption and public financial malfeasance, and provide the enabling environment for the creation of the wealth that can be used to fight poverty and enhance human development. One, of course, can argue that the type of institutional reforms being suggested can only be accomplished with time. While that may be true, it is still the case that South Sudan cannot progress without appropriate institutional arrangements.

At a recent forum on oil and gas management in East Africa, held in Kampala, Uganda and organized by Brookings’ Africa Growth Initiative in cooperation with partners in Africa—the Economic Policy Research Center (Uganda), Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (Kenya), and the Center for Strategic Analyses and Research (South Sudan)—participants considered “constructive engagement” between government and a country’s relevant stakeholders as the most important way to enhance efficient and equitable management of natural resources. However, for such engagement to be productive, all parties have to be fully informed and that requires, at the very least, that government operate in an open and transparent fashion. Such engagement is especially critical for South Sudan where continued distrust of the government by various groups has fueled violent and destructive mobilizations. Some of this ethnic-induced violence is responsible for the country’s inability to attract investment and place itself on the path to sustainable development.

Grand corruption: a manifestation of institutional failure

According to an article by David Smith, published in The Guardian on June 5, 2012, South Sudan President Salva Kiir sent a letter dated May 3, 2012 to “75 current and former senior government staff” accusing them of stealing as much as $4 billion from the national treasury. In the same letter, President Kiir demanded that the money be returned and reminded the officials of the sacrifices made by many South Sudanese during the struggle for independence. According to Smith’s article, Kiir had declared: “We fought for freedom, justice and equality,” unfortunately, “once we got to power, we forgot what we fought for and began to enrich ourselves at the expense of our people.” The president added that “[p]eople in South Sudan are suffering and yet some government officials simply care about themselves.” Economists have long recognized self-interest as an important motivator for the behavior of individuals, whether they are in economic or political markets. As argued by Brennan and Buchanan in The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, “man’s natural proclivity is to pursue his own interests and that different persons’ interests almost invariably come into conflict.” Thus, each society must design and adopt rules or what Adam Smith (1887) calls “laws and institutions” that coordinate the activities of individuals and provide for the peaceful resolution of any conflict arising from socio-political interaction. Perhaps, more important, is the fact that these laws and institutions serve as constraints on the state and effectively minimize the ability of civil servants and politicians to engage in any form of opportunism (e.g., corruption and rent-seeking). One cannot depend on the capacity of individuals—specifically those who serve in government and have responsibility for managing public funds—to love and care for their fellow citizens as a mechanism to prevent corruption and public financial malfeasance and enhance efficient public financial management. As President Kiir has already discovered, appeals to nationalism and patriotism are not sufficient as incentives to prevent public officials from engaging in corruption and other extra-legal schemes to enrich themselves. On the other hand, openness and transparency in government operations and communications would have a greater impact on corruption than the appeals that are coming out of the presidency. Unfortunately, South Sudan authorities continue to follow a policy of opacity, supposedly for reasons of national security.

Resumption of oil production

Shortly after South Sudan gained independence, the new country suspended production in its rich oil fields because of disagreements with the Republic of Sudan over charges for using Sudanese pipelines to transport the oil to export markets. South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan signed an agreement on various post-secession issues, including the common border, security and economic relations, according to the United Nations News Center, on September 27, 2012. The Government of South Sudan subsequently announced that oil production would resume by year’s end. However, various problems continue to prevent both South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan from resuming oil production. First, the two countries have still not withdrawn their armed forces from the disputed border area, effectively preventing South Sudan from getting its oil to export markets. Second, while in September 2012, both countries had agreed to set up a demilitarized buffer zone around the oil fields located on the border, this has not yet been accomplished and the area remains heavily armed. Third, Khartoum continues to insist that it would not resume oil production until all security arrangements between the two countries are completed. Finally, Khartoum has accused Juba of providing support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North), which had supported South Sudan during its fight for independence and which now controls part of Sudan’s side of the border. Many observers, including important players such as the President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, have stated that direct talks and cooperation between Juba and Khartoum are critical for the achievement of the peace necessary for the resumption of oil production and the promotion of economic growth and development. However, there is progress. In mid-January, Juba announced a withdrawal of its military forces from the border area and hoped to complete the process by today, February 4, 2013. Juba hoped that Khartoum would act similarly, allowing the buffer zone to be established and, should that happen, the way could be cleared for oil production to resume. Unfortunately, South Sudan has not even begun to withdraw.

Given the fact that oil revenues account for as much as 90 percent of public revenues for the Government of South Sudan, resumption of production should significantly increase the flow of revenues into the national treasury. This development would have significant implications for public financial management, an area that is traditionally ripe with opportunities for corruption and other forms of malfeasance. Unfortunately, the country’s present set of institutional arrangements is not capable of adequately constraining civil servants and politicians and preventing them from plundering oil royalties. In the short run, the government must fully implement and pay fidelity to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. This will require the country to abandon opacity and, instead, follow a policy of openness and transparency in public financial management. Such an approach would significantly enhance the ability of the government to minimize the various forms of grand corruption, which are usually endemic to public sectors characterized by significant levels of secrecy. However, in the long run, the government must provide all relevant stakeholders with the facilities to engage in comprehensive institutional reforms to create governance institutions that guarantee the rule of law.

A new anti-corruption campaign?

The government of President Kiir has launched a new anti-corruption campaign, which has included a decree demanding that all public officials submit a declaration of assets to the country’s anti-corruption commission. One can immediately recognize two problems with this program: First, presidential decrees—an essentially top-down approach—are not the most effective way to deal with as pervasive a problem as corruption. Like many other problems that this young country faces, dealing effectively with corruption requires the adoption of a participatory and bottom-up approach to policy design and implementation—this is part of the constructive engagement that participants at the AGI-sponsored Kampala forum spoke of. Second, during the last several decades, many African countries have taken similar elite-driven, top-down approaches to corruption control, including asset declaration and the prohibition of public officials from engaging in entrepreneurial activities while in office, and none have worked. In fact, civil servants and political elites in these countries have been able to easily subvert these constraints, by, for example, placing their assets in the names of relatives and forming business enterprises in which they remain silent partners. With the advent of electronic funds transfer, it has become relatively easy for civil servants and politicians to place their ill-gotten gains outside the purview of the government. In fact, as President Kiir’s letter indicated, a lot of the money stolen from South Sudan’s national treasury has “been taken out of the country and deposited in foreign accounts,” as noted in the Smith article in The Guardian. It is generally believed in Juba that a lot of the stolen money either now resides in Kenyan financial institutions or has been used to purchase real property there. In any case, the money is out of the reach of South Sudan authorities and, unfortunately, Juba does not have the capacity to recover these badly-needed funds.

The challenge for 2013

South Sudan faces a lot of challenges in 2013. Despite the agreement signed between the two countries in September 2012, the border issue remains essentially unresolved. However, the decision by Juba to unilaterally withdraw its army from the border should improve opportunities for setting up the buffer zone, which is necessary for the resumption of oil production.

Minimizing destructive ethnic conflict, achieving food security, providing employment opportunities for restless urban youth, improving the country’s economic infrastructures, diversifying the economy and reducing its dependence on oil, and generally placing the country on the road to sustainable economic growth and development remain major problems. It is important, however, to emphasize that South Sudan will remain in its underdevelopment trap until such a time that it provides itself, through democratic (i.e., bottom-up, people-driven, participatory and inclusive) constitution-making, with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law. For, without a set of laws and institutions that adequately constrains civil servants and politicians, the latter will continue to consider themselves above the law and behave with impunity. Hence, the most important challenge for the government of South Sudan in 2013 is the reconstruction and reconstitution of the post-colonial state through democratic constitution making to provide institutional arrangements that (i) adequately constrain the state (and hence, prevent its custodians—that is, civil servants and political elites—from engaging in the various forms of opportunism), (ii) provide effective mechanisms for the management of ethnic and religious diversity, (iii) create an enabling environment for entrepreneurial activities and the creation of wealth, and (iv) generally improve the country’s ability to participate in and benefit from the global economy.

Footnote

[1] While the “rule of law” is a complex concept, some of its important elements include “supremacy of law”—that is, all citizens are subject to the law, including those who serve in executive, legislative and judicial positions; judicial independence; openness and transparency in government operations; and protection of human rights. If, for example, there is a constitutional guarantee of the supremacy of law, then those who serve in government (e.g., civil servants and politicians) would find it difficult to act with impunity and engage in behaviors such as corruption and rent-seeking to enrich themselves.

References

Boswell, Alan, “American Expelled from South Sudan for Anti-corruption Work,” The Miami Herald, August 20, 2012, accessed on November 1, 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/20/162893/american-expelled-from-south-sudan.html.

Brennan, Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985, ix.

Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London: T. Nelson and Sons, 1887, 40.

Authors

John Mukum Mbaku

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Building Opportunities: Addressing Africa's Lack of Infrastructure

John Mukum Mbaku — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 16:59:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This chapter is part of the 2013 Foresight Africa full report, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. Read the full report here.

Today, intra- and inter-African trade is being hampered by a lack of appropriate physical infrastructure. In fact, the failure of many rural inhabitants in African countries to efficiently access urban markets via farm-to-market roads has made it very difficult for these citizens to improve farm productivity through specialization and trade. Past efforts to improve infrastructure in Africa have too often been hindered by political opportunism and unclear objectives.

John Mukum Mbaku analyzes past and present efforts to increase Africa’s infrastructure capacity. In addition to smart project planning, innovative financing solutions, and regional cooperation, Mbaku calls for institutions that adequately constrain each country’s civil servants and political elites, and minimize their ability to act with impunity.

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John Mukum Mbaku

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The Problem of Political Transitions in Africa: The Cameroon Question

Julius Agbor and John Mukum Mbaku — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 10:45:00 -0400

Political transitions in francophone sub-Saharan Africa have consistently been problematic due in part to the fact that incumbent heads of state have been obsessed with retaining political power for life. For example, Omar Bongo (Gabon), Félix Houphouët Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Gnasssingbé Eyadéma (Togo) and Lansana Conté (Guinea) remained presidents of their respective countries until they died in office. Except in Gabon, where the death of President Bongo resulted in a peaceful transfer of power to his son, transitions in the other countries were accompanied by a significant level of political violence.

For example, in Togo, just hours after the death of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the military violated the constitutional provision requiring the Speaker of the Togolese National Assembly to take over power in the event of a vacancy in the presidency by appointing the late president’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, interim president. Faure later contested and won a highly controversial election later that year. An even more destabilizing scenario occurred in Guinea following the death of President Lansana Conté in 2008. Just a few hours after the announcement of the death of the president, the young soldier Moussa Camara seized power, dissolved the government, and suspended the constitution and all republican institutions. Guinea then plunged into deep political chaos for almost two years until the 2011 democratic elections.

Will Cameroon [1] be able to avoid the violent and contested transitions of these countries if current President Paul Biya, age 79 and in power since 1982, dies in office? In spite of his various public pronouncements that he would democratize Cameroon’s politics, Biya has twice (in 1996 and 2008) manipulated the constitution to allow him to prolong his term in office. Also, although Cameroon officially became a multiparty state in 1992, under Biya’s leadership the country has not conducted a presidential election in which the opposition has had a fair chance of defeating the incumbent. While the opposition bears some blame for its ineffectiveness, there is no question that Biya has used the power of incumbency as well as his control of various institutions such as the national media, the Supreme Court and the National Assembly to ensure his success at the polls. Thus, many observers believe that political transition in Cameroon is likely to result only when Biya dies or is removed from office by a military coup d’état. Each of these options, unfortunately, has extremely destabilizing consequences for Cameroon and the sub-region.

Given Cameroon’s current institutional arrangements, two major concerns regarding presidential succession exist. One of these concerns is legal and the other political. On the legal front, the Cameroon 2008 Constitution has a number of ambiguous provisions that could easily be exploited by opportunistic military officers. Take, for example, Article 6(4), which states, “Where the office of President of the Republic becomes vacant as a result of death, resignation or permanent incapacity duly ascertained by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate assumes function as interim president for a period not less than 20 (twenty) days and not more than 40 (forty) days, during which fresh presidential elections will be held, at which the interim president is not eligible to run.”

The problem here is that Cameroon has neither a Constitutional Council nor a Senate despite the fact that Article 6(4) has existed since 1996.

Later articles attempt to fill these voids: Article 67(3) stipulates, “[t]he National Assembly shall exercise full legislative power and enjoy all Parliamentary prerogatives until the Senate is set up,” while Article 67(4) states, “[t]he Supreme Court shall perform the duties of the Constitutional Council until the latter is set up.”

Yet, the nonexistence of the Senate and Constitutional Council does not play well for a country whose institutions lack legitimacy and where ethno-linguistic and regional tensions are rife. The distrust that the Cameroonian public has for the Supreme Court and the National Assembly increased significantly when the former failed to annul a glaringly flawed presidential vote in October 1992 and when the latter hastily amended the constitution in 2008 to allow Paul Biya to run for a third consecutive term as president. These concerns about the legitimacy of political institutions in Cameroon could encourage opportunistic military officers to declare a constitutional crisis in the event of a vacancy in the presidency and seize power. Such action could plunge the country into prolonged political violence as happened in Guinea.

On the other hand, the present latent struggles for capture of the presidency of Cameroon, notably between the Muslim-dominated North and the Christian-dominated South, coupled with secessionist threats by the minority English-speaking Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which has been clamoring for independence from the rest of French-speaking Cameroon, add complexity to an already thorny political transition process.

The political transition process in Cameroon is further complicated by the absence of a validated country-wide electoral register. Following the controversial presidential elections of October 2011, the Cameroon government embarked on a reform of the electoral system, notably by dissolving the then-existing electoral register and replacing it with a biometric system. Yet Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)—the organ in charge of organizing elections in the country—recently claimed that it will take a minimum of one year to finalize the new biometric system for elections, which is why the tenure of legislators and municipal councilors scheduled to end in 2011 has been extended until late 2013. Given the current state of affairs, in the event of a vacancy in the presidency, and even if there is a peaceful transition to an interim president, Cameroon will face political crisis as a result of its inability to hold national elections within the short window stipulated by the constitution.

In many respects, political transition in Cameroon is too important to be allowed to go wrong given the wide-ranging implications that this transition might have for the entire Central Africa sub-region. First, Cameroon plays host to the central bank of the countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC). Second, Cameroon is a major exporter of food and energy to several neighboring countries, notably Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Nigeria, which means that a political and eventual economic crisis in Cameroon would negatively impact these countries. Similarly, the Cameroonian port of Douala is the largest in the sub-region and serves Cameroon’s two resource-rich but land-locked neighbors, Central African Republic and Chad. Third, the war against terrorism and insecurity related to growing Islamic fundamentalism across central Africa would be much more difficult to manage if one of the few remaining politically stable countries in the region—Cameroon—also descends into political violence. It is important then, for the African Union and other global actors to take an interest in Cameroon’s transition and make certain that the process is undertaken democratically and peacefully.

To diffuse any eventual constitutional and political crisis in Cameroon, the Cameroon people should demand, first, that the government immediately provide the two institutions prescribed by the Constitution—the Senate and the Constitutional Council. In this light, the recent amendment of the constitution making it possible for senatorial elections to be held even without a complete country-wide electoral register is welcome. Second, the Cameroon people should intensify their demands for institutional reforms to provide the country with credible democratic institutions, namely, a truly independent electoral body and a constitution that effectively guarantees the rule of law and separation of powers. Such an institutional structure will ensure a peaceful transition and provide for the type of political stability that is critical for trade and economic growth not just in Cameroon but also in the sub-region. France and the United Kingdom—Cameroon’s historical and traditional benefactors—and the United Nations, should support the efforts of Cameroonians to force their government to effect the necessary reforms.

[1] Note that the polity that is Cameroon today is not strictly a francophone country. Today’s Cameroon is made up of the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration which gained independence on January 1, 1960 and took the name République du Cameroun (Republic of Cameroon) and the former UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British administration which gained independence in 1961. Although the country’s present governance institutions are influenced significantly by the French constitutional model, which the République du Cameroun adopted when it gained independence in 1960, the country’s British institutional heritage remains strong and quite relevant.

Authors

Image Source: © Akintunde Akinleye / Reuters

Around the Halls: Celebrating Nelson Mandela's 94th Birthday

Tue, 17 Jul 2012 12:59:00 -0400

On July 18, Former South African President Nelson Mandela celebrates his 94th birthday. In honor of Mandela, the Africa Growth Initiative reflects on his leadership, global influence, and dedication to the fight for democracy and equality for all races.

Mandela’s Imprint on South African Politics
John Mukum Mbaku, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

As we celebrate Nelson Mandela’s birthday this month, it’s good to remind ourselves of this great leader’s indelible imprint on global governance in general and the South African political economy in particular. Mandela had a dream for his beloved South Africa, which had been ravaged by state-sanctioned racial bigotry under apartheid. He saw all the peoples of South Africa—various African ethnic groups, descendants of European settlers and Asian immigrants, and peoples of mixed race—as his brothers and sisters, all citizens of a nonracial, nonsexist, modern South African state. Unlike most so-called nationalist leaders in other parts of the African continent who fought against colonial oppression, Mandela did not seek to replace Afrikaner-imposed tyranny of apartheid with institutional structures that would allow African ethnic groups to exploit others. Yet today some people fear that Mandela’s dream has been betrayed and that the “rainbow” nation that he fought so hard to found is gradually descending into some type of apocalyptic society.

What these defeatists fail to recognize is that Mandela and his peace-loving compatriots have established a country with institutional arrangements that protect the fundamental human rights of all citizens and enhance their ability to live together peacefully. First, a Constitution written through a participatory and inclusive process has provided the foundation for the country’s laws, which are designed to protect citizens’ rights and enhance peaceful coexistence. Second, unlike many other countries in Africa, the separation of powers guaranteed by South Africa’s Constitution has been realized in practice. As a consequence, the judiciary is not subservient to the executive. And third, the country maintains many effective private and public structures through which citizens can engage those who govern them.

Despite what the critics say, governance in South Africa, unlike that in many countries on the continent, today is characterized by a general adherence to the rule of law. Also, many South Africans, especially the young, still believe in Mandela’s dream and are not willing to give in to the naysayers. A diverse middle class, which even includes people from historically marginalized and deprived groups, has emerged in South Africa. And these citizens have been engaging the political elite, effectively serving as a check on the government. Hence, South Africa has good prospects for peaceful coexistence and sustainable development, and most South Africans continue to believe in Mandela’s dream of a peaceful nation, free of racial bigotry.

President Nelson Mandela’s Foreign Policy: Noble Intentions in Challenging Times
Witney Schneidman, Nonresident Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative
Andrew Westbury, Assistant Director, Africa Growth Initiative

When Nelson Mandela was sworn into office as South Africa’s first postapartheid president, the country’s expectations for him could not have been higher. Yet his immediate demands were not exclusively domestic. South Africa’s new president was seen to possess an unprecedented international influence to promote peace, and he felt a strong personal conviction to reorient South Africa’s apartheid-era foreign policy. For years, the country maintained a deliberate destabilization strategy to disrupt neighboring governments and liberation movements, which Mandela estimated left “two million dead and inflicted an estimated $62.45 billion of damage on the economies of our neighbors.” Despite noble efforts, the foreign policy that emerged under Mandela was generally inconsistent, with national interests and the pressures of the presidency testing his core convictions. President Mandela’s 94th birthday provides an opportunity to look back at the decisions and dynamics that shaped his approach to international relations.

Even before his presidency, Nelson Mandela was eager to reverse South Africa’s isolated position. He articulated a new approach to international relations, guided by the key principles of the promotion of human rights and democracy through nonviolent and multilateral measures, as well as a need to maintain diplomatic and economic solidarity with other African nations. The president wrote: “These convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly five decades, apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations.”

President Mandela’s approach to foreign policy was tested when a contested trial in Nigeria resulted in a death sentence for activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Following Saro-Wiwa’s execution, Mandela was the first world leader to demand an oil embargo against the Nigerian junta. However, his resolve was challenged when he found his commitment to human rights in conflict with his preferred strategy of multilateral engagement. As one of the world’s largest oil producers, Nigeria was able to effectively counter calls for sanctions, and many African governments were particularly reluctant to press the military regime. Without an international consensus, Mandela found his policy on Nigeria frustrated by his need to maintain solidarity with his African counterparts. His call for sanctions was later dismissed in favor of diplomatic engagement through the Organization of African Unity.

The year 1998 was another challenging time for Mandela’s foreign policy. In August, he maintained his commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict, calling for diplomatic rather than military intervention from the Southern African Development Community to stop the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the time, this position precipitated strong rebukes from some of the community’s member states. In particular, the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, sank to personal attacks, arguing that “age has taken its toll” on Mandela.

Despite this peaceful strategy, also in 1998 South Africa authorized a poorly coordinated military intervention to avert a coup in neighboring Lesotho. The ensuing chaos left nearly 60 dead and precipitated riots in Lesotho’s capital, Maseru. Worse still, the intervention perpetuated regional resentment against South Africa’s role as big brother, an outcome strongly divergent from Mandela’s goal of African solidarity. South African interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho illustrated the gap between Mandela’s principles and foreign policy realities.

As president, Mandela was ultimately responsible for South Africa’s foreign policy; however, it is difficult to attribute all actions to him. For example, the Lesotho intervention occurred while both he and the deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, were abroad and the minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, served as acting head of state. But there is no doubt that the presidency tested Mandela’s convictions and his ability to consistently implement policy. As he turns 94, he still deserves credit for replacing the destructive policies of the apartheid era with those of nonviolence, cooperation and attention to human rights.

Mandela’s Attempts to Create an Equal Opportunity Society
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Analyst, Africa Growth Initiative

South Africa’s economic situation is currently less than ideal. The African National Congress (ANC) says that much work still needs to be done to ensure progress. Of particular concern is the persistence of large income inequalities and high rates of joblessness among the youth. Mandela’s birthday, which is also designated as a day of service, provides an excellent opportunity to reflect on actions to address some of the economic challenges that the country currently faces. Mandela’s hope was for the establishment of a nation that extended equal opportunities to all its people while maintaining high rates of economic growth. Though his policies were not perfect, he made large-scale economic reforms. His creativity offers an admirable example as South Africa continues to tackle inequality.

When Mandela became president in 1994, most people had been excluded from the benefits of past economic success. The minority white population (13 percent) was estimated to possess about 86 percent of the country’s land and 90 percent of its wealth. Whites earned, on average, 10 times more than blacks. Mandela faced the massive challenge of incorporating this disenfranchised majority while redeveloping a globally competitive economy. As the ANC put it in its Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994, “We cannot successfully build the economy while millions do not have homes or jobs. And we cannot provide homes and jobs without rebuilding the economy.”

In addition to these domestic issues, the country’s economy had mostly stagnated—during the previous decade, average annual growth had been only about 1 percent, mostly a result of the years leading up to Mandela’s presidency, when South Africa had been increasingly isolated from the global economy under sanctions against apartheid. Mandela’s party, the ANC, had been debating policies of nationalization, so even as he entered office foreign investors and trading partners were hesitant about the country’s future economic policies.

Mandela’s presidency was marked by two significant efforts that showed his dedication to relieve these domestic economic tensions and to reassure the international community that South Africa was ready to again be a trustworthy economic partner. The first, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), focused on alleviating the disenfranchisement caused by apartheid through increased government expenditures on education, health, housing and social welfare. At the same time, it also aimed to actually decrease the government’s deficit by remaining as fiscally conservative as possible.

Because the goals of the RDP ended up being difficult to attain, a second effort—the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy— attempted to further liberalize the economy to create jobs and promote investment, trade and growth. Though its ambitious goals were not met during Mandela’s presidency, they set a precedent by balancing attempts to solve the pressing problem of inequality and low job prospects while also pursuing macroeconomic stability and global reintegration.

Though South Africa still faces many economic issues, since Mandela it has remained a strong economic force on the continent with great potential. It is the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and its biggest intraregional importer and exporter—in 2010, it exported more than $12 billion worth of goods and imported $7 billion worth of goods from the rest of the continent. The Economist notes that it is the biggest source of foreign investment for other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mandela’s economic legacy has ensured that South Africa first sought to reverse the effects of its history of disenfranchisement while also remaining an economic powerhouse and trusted investment destination on the continent.

Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Lessons for Leaders
Witney Schneidman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant, Africa Growth Initiative

The celebration of Mandela’s birthday and the international day of service in his honor provide an opportunity to reflect on how he became a great leader and public servant. The experiences of both Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi, who probably had the biggest influence on Mandela’s leadership style, provide key lessons. Gandhi—who, as the liberator of India, was Mandela’s primary role model—worked as a lawyer advocating for the rights of Asians in South Africa, where he developed his method of civil disobedience. Likewise, Mandela also worked as a lawyer defending the rights of native Africans against the apartheid regime.

In Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India, Joseph Lelyveld recounts how Mandela saw Gandhi’s nonviolent protest strategy as a model for the initial code of conduct within the African National Congress and its mass protests against apartheid. Mandela also cited Gandhi as influencing the ANC’s difficult decision to take up arms after having resisted violence since its founding in 1912. In Time magazine, Mandela quoted Gandhi: “Where choice is set between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. . . . I prefer to use arms in defense of honor rather than remain the vile witness of dishonor.” Indeed, Mandela and the ANC used force in seeking to end apartheid—yet they used sabotage against government facilities rather than attacks against civilians “because it did not involve the loss of life and it offered the best hope for future race relations."

Both Gandhi and Mandela were imprisoned for their struggles. Yet prison was where key negotiations with their oppressors began. Mandela’s conversations with prison guards helped him to understand the complexities of interracial relationships and the need for forgiveness. And though Gandhi himself was repeatedly imprisoned by the British, he extolled the ability to forgive. Mandela’s supreme example of forgiveness was given after his 27 years of imprisonment ended—as he related in an interview: “I did hate them for quite a long time. After all, they abused me physically and emotionally. They separated me from my wife, and it eventually broke my family up. . . . [But I] realized one day, breaking rocks, that they could take everything away from me, everything, but my mind and heart. Now, those things I would have to give away, and I simply decided I would not give them away.”

Due to these experiences of Mandela, influential leaders have marveled at his strong yet compassionate leadership style. Amazingly, Mandela’s Robben Island prison guards were invited to his inauguration as president. And later he showed the same humility in dealing with the failure of his administration to deliver on its initial promises of increased jobs and housing. During his presidency, he had the opportunity to make economic decisions that could have unfairly disadvantaged the white populations and accelerated efforts to meet the ANC’s goals for increased black ownership. However, he chose an inclusive, slower strategy that embodied his awareness as a leader concerned with the needs of all constituencies.

Finally, Mandela and the apartheid movement inspired people to give service to South Africa. And Mandela continues to motivate leaders to serve via Mandela Day, when individuals, groups and communities give 67 minutes of service to make their world a better place. The number “67” was chosen because Mandela “gave 67 years of his life to fighting for the rights of humanity” before officially retiring. Thus, on Mandela Day, volunteers around the world participate in diverse activities, ranging from school cleanups to health walks, and distribution of supplies to rural students. Hopefully, Mandela, as well as Gandhi, will continue to inspire great leaders today on Mandela’s birthday and on many Mandela Days to come.

Nelson Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize
Anne Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

In celebrating Mandela’s birthday, we focus on his great achievements and contributions to the world. From childhood, he was destined for greatness. He was born into a royal family, educated in good schools, and went on to become a political leader. Then his political activities sent him to prison for 27 years. From prison to presidency of post apartheid South Africa and today, he has become one of the world’s most honored and recognized statesmen—having been given many important awards, such as the Nobel Peace Prize, which drew international attention to his legacy of egalitarianism and reconciliation.

In 1993, Mandela, a black nationalist, and F. W. De Klerk, the former last white president of apartheid South Africa, were named co-winners of the Nobel Peace Prize for the role they played in ending apartheid and transforming South Africa into a democratic republic. The Nobel committee, when presenting the prize, applauded Mandela and De Klerk for “having chosen reconciliation rather than the alternative, which would inevitably have been an ever more bitter and bloodier conflict.” Though De Klerk and Mandela were former enemies, they chose to work together to make possible the peaceful transformation of a government that practiced racial segregation into one that practiced democracy and equality for all races.

Earlier, Mandela was at the forefront of the fight for democracy in South Africa. He suffered injustices on behalf of his people as he worked to end the oppressive apartheid regime built on racism. Yet, upon becoming president, he chose to put away bitterness and not dwell on the wounds of the past but to focus on rebuilding his nation. He demonstrated what it means to be true statesman and a leader worth emulating. Today, South Africa enjoys the fruit of his struggle. It is a democratic state and a gateway to Africa.

Mandela—whose name transcends age, race, religion and culture—continues to stand for peace. Thus, on July 18, his birthday, now commonly known as “Mandela Day,” people around the world perform community service and thus contribute to making the world a more peaceful place. Mandela, a Nobel laureate, will go down in history along with Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Martin Luther King Jr. and other peacemakers who fought nonviolently for human rights.

Authors

Image Source: Reuters

South Sudan One Year After Independence

Thu, 28 Jun 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 28, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Almost one year ago on July 9, the world welcomed the Republic of South Sudan as Africa’s newest independent nation. This joyous occasion was immediately followed by concerted efforts on the part of the South Sudanese government and its international partners to address complex and longstanding development challenges, including effective natural resource management, poverty reduction, gender equity, and peace building with Sudan. As South Sudan approaches the anniversary of its independence, assessing its first year commitments and the progress to date is a critical step for national development efforts and effective collaboration between the country and its international partners.

On June 28, the Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at Brookings hosted a discussion on the opportunities and obstacles for South Sudan at its one-year anniversary of independence. Panelists included: Ambassador Princeton Lyman, U.S. special envoy to South Sudan and Sudan; AGI Nonresident Senior Fellow John Mukum Mbaku; John Prendergast, co-founder of the Enough Project; Peter Ajak, founder of the Centre for Strategic Analyses and Research in Juba; and Professor Nada Mustafa Ali, faculty member at the New School for Social Research. Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi S. Kimenyi, director of AGI, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

You can follow the conversation on this event on Twitter using the hashtag #AGISouthSudan.

Video

One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

On July 9, 2012, South Sudan will celebrate its first anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. The January 2011 referendum effectively ended the prolonged, violent confrontation between the Republic of Sudan and the territories that would ultimately gain independence as South Sudan. This development marked an important stage in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In addition to regulating relations between the two feuding parties from 2005 to 2011, the CPA also implemented the framework for the creation of two separate nations. Despite the success of the CPA in guiding South Sudan’s path to independence, the young nation must now address a myriad of challenges related to its domestic policies as well as continued hostilities with the Republic of Sudan.

As international observers applauded the CPA’s success, the people of South Sudan also celebrated the birth of their nation with high expectations. Independence brought with it hope for a better future and the opportunity to build a united developmental state. Revenue from valuable oil resources, which were a primary source of the conflict between the two nations, gave South Sudan the opportunity to invest in the development of its natural and human resources. Additionally, formal separation was expected to end the long-standing conflict with the Republic of Sudan. However, these expectations were tempered by the many restraints that came with establishing conditions for sustained economic growth and improving the delivery of public goods and services.

After many years of brutal civil war, South Sudan emerged with extremely poor infrastructure and a population with limited human capital. More importantly, the country was born with weak institutions that were not suited to the delivery of sustainable economic growth and development. Finally, while the people of South Sudan were largely united in the war against Khartoum, the country is to a large degree ethnically fragmented, with each group seeking to maximize its own objectives—a process that has significantly weakened the ability of the government to work toward national integration.

South Sudan’s first year of independence has been fraught with major challenges, like the continuing struggle with the Republic of Sudan over their common border. These conflicts have become top priorities for the country, impeding the ability of the government to concentrate on economic growth and human development.

The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution has been following developments in South Sudan in order to offer independent policy proposals that can translate into sustainable economic growth and development, effective delivery of public services, and the building of institutions for a united and peaceful nation. This collection of policy briefs seeks to highlight some of the important issues that have affected South Sudan during the country’s first year of independence and identify policy areas that both South Sudan and the international community must emphasize in order to enhance the nation’s ability to achieve peace, economic growth and human development. It is important to note that many of the policy recommendations offered by the various briefs are similar even though each brief was based on independent analysis. This is due primarily to the fact that many of the issues faced by South Sudan lend themselves to similar solutions.

Image Source: © Adriane Ohanesian / Reuters

South Sudan’s First Anniversary

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

On July 9, 2012, South Sudan will celebrate its first anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution has been following developments in South Sudan in order to offer independent policy proposals that can translate into sustainable economic growth and development, effective delivery of public services, and the building of institutions for a united and peaceful nation.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Efficient and Equitable Natural Resource Management

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

John Mukum Mbaku and Jessica Elaine Smith suggest ways in which South Sudan can enhance the equitable and efficient allocation of its natural resources, minimizing the “resource curse”, and use its enormous resources to promote sustainable economic growth and development. They emphasize that the government must manage the oil sector as one part of a greater transparent, comprehensive program to develop a well-integrated national economy and reject the colonial-era Nile Waters Agreements.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

The Anti-Corruption Agenda

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

John Mukum Mbaku and Jessica Elaine Smith contend that the key to effective public financial management is budgeting. Specifically, they advise the government to maintain budget comprehensiveness and to make certain that civil servants and political elites are well-constrained by the law to minimize corruption and waste.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Why Wasn't it Africa that Found Charles Taylor Guilty?

Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku — Thu, 26 Apr 2012 14:12:00 -0400

For far too long, dictators and warlords who have inflicted extensive atrocities on the African people have gone unpunished. This is true when one looks at the scale of crimes against humanity committed across the continent in the recent past in places such as Sudan, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

But this record of impunity is changing, thanks to the long arm of international justice. Increasingly, Africans suspected of committing crimes against humanity are under investigation by the international criminal court and a few have already been charged and are awaiting trial. International intervention has far-reaching implications on the continent, especially regarding governance and reform of judicial systems.

On Thursday Charles Taylor, warlord turned president of Liberia, was convicted of aiding and abetting war crimes by the Sierra Leone special court in The Hague. The court was established in 2002 to try those who bore the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity during the prolonged conflict in Sierra Leone. Taylor was convicted in connection with offences including murder, rape, sexual slavery and using child soldiers. It was alleged that Taylor was responsible for these crimes through his support of rebels fighting in Sierra Leone. The prosecutor alleged that Taylor was personally responsible for these crimes because he was involved in the planning, instigating and commissioning but the court found him not guilty of direct personal responsibility for the atrocities carried out by rebels.

Read the full article on The Guardian »

Authors

Publication: The Guardian

Securing a Productive South Sudan

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:48:00 -0500

John M. Mbaku and Jessica Smith assess forthcoming challenges for South Sudan in 2012. They recommend a broad set of policy interventions to help South Sudan manage the common pool resources of water and oil.

Publication: Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012

The Future of the Democratic Republic of Congo

John Mukum Mbaku — Fri, 14 Oct 2011 15:19:00 -0400

At a recent event on the upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), John Mukum Mbaku stated that the future of the DRC must be decided by the Congolese. He argued that while outside help is needed, only the Congolese people know the real issues facing the country, and therefore they must be the ones making the final decisions on which next steps to take.

Mbaku also discussed foreign missions in the country, saying that the programs are not providing the Congolese with the opportunity to articulate their views on the future of the DRC, and that solutions imposed by outsiders, no matter how well-meaning, will not be successful.

Authors

John Mukum Mbaku

South Sudan: Avoiding State Failure

Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku — Fri, 08 Jul 2011 11:41:00 -0400

On July 9, 2011, South Sudanese citizens will celebrate and the community of nations will welcome the birth of a new nation. For the diverse nationality and ethnic groups that make up this new nation, independence will mark the culmination of a long and bloody struggle for autonomy from economic, social and political domination and oppression by Khartoum. The independence of South Sudan is an important milestone of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that, for some time, looked no more than an idealistic dream. Credit for this outcome is and must be widely shared. Most importantly, we must congratulate the leaders and the people of both the North and the South who, against insurmountable odds, have persisted in the implementation of the CPA. But, there are other important players—individuals, as well as regional and international organizations—that have been pivotal to the process. Thus, the independence of South Sudan does indeed reflect evidence of the good that can emerge even in dire situations when humanity works collectively for peace.

But, as we celebrate on this occasion, it is important for the world and especially the people of South Sudan not to be complacent in their nation building efforts. The independence we celebrate could also pave the way for state failure. For, although independence comes with many opportunities for economic and political development of the South, it also brings many challenges. How well the people of South Sudan utilize these opportunities to bring about positive change and deal with the challenges will determine whether South Sudan evolves into a development-enhancing state or a failed one.

Although the new nation will be born with many opportunities, it will also face a myriad of challenges. It is endowed with a significant amount of natural resources, which include large reserves of oil and a significant amount of arable land. Neighbors in the East African community are willing to work and support the new nation and establish strong trade linkages. Predictably, donors will flood the country with offers of support and prospective investors, seeking opportunities to maximize profits, will bring with them badly needed technology, as well as create jobs for the country’s restless youth. Well-managed and coordinated, these opportunities promise to boost economic growth and raise the quality of life in the country. However, these opportunities are dwarfed by the challenges that confront the new state. First, peace with the North is still not a done deal. Second, the new nation is also characterized by very low quality of life—poor health status, extremely high poverty rates, low levels of educational attainment, food insecurity, inadequate or nonexistent infrastructure, just to name a few. Finally, both the North and the South will contend with a huge debt burden—over $38 billion, most of which is in arrears. All these challenges will require careful management and planning if South Sudan is to transform itself into a development-oriented state.

Nevertheless, the most important challenge facing South Sudan is creating a united nation. How South Sudan deals with harmonizing the claims of the various stakeholders and ethnic groups is the single most important determinant of whether it succeeds or fails as a nation. South Sudan will need significant help from the international community in the form of development aid, debt relief, and new flows of foreign direct investment. However, if the new country’s diverse groups do not engage in a participatory and inclusive process of nation building, the inflow of these resources will fail to have any positive impact on national standards of living. As part of the effort to create a united South Sudan, the people must establish institutional arrangements that enhance entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth. It would be instructive for South Sudanese to remind themselves that Sudan deteriorated into a failed state because its leaders, since independence in 1956, have consistently rejected any efforts to build a consensual state.

Avoiding the Original Sin: Failure to Create a Consensual State

The agreement that brought Sudan to independence in 1956 deepened and institutionalized the hegemonic control of the largely Christian South by the Islamic North. In the summer of 1955, as an omen of what was to come, disgruntled southern army units went on a rampage and destroyed various symbols of northern oppression. The government reacted extremely harshly, executing as many as seventy southerners for inciting a rebellion. The brutality of the government’s response to the revolt did not, however, pacify the South. In fact, many soldiers who mutinied in Torit refused to surrender to their northern superiors. Instead, they went into hiding with their weapons and launched what many analysts believe as the beginning of the modern Southern struggle for self-determination.

As Sudan prepared for independence, it was clear that Southerners were completely dissatisfied with what was emerging from the hastened decolonization project—a set of institutional arrangements that were specifically designed to enhance the ability of the North to dominate the South in all domains. For one thing, Southerners favored constitutional federalism, a system of government that they believed would enhance their ability to maximize their values, as well as minimize political and economic domination by a Muslim-controlled government in Khartoum. In addition, Southerners desired a secular government in order to avoid government-supported Arabization and Islamization. Unfortunately for Southerners, the decolonization project was hasty, elite-driven, top-down, non-participatory and controlled entirely by ruling elites in Khartoum and their Egyptian benefactors—southern participation in the process of designing the new country’s institutional arrangements was either nonexistent or totally ineffective. As a consequence, two constitutional issues that were important to Southerners—federalism and the nature of the character of the state—were never resolved. These two issues were to shape and dominate the contours of the conflict between the North and the South in the post-independence period. Shortly after independence, Muslim-controlled northern political parties forced the central government in Khartoum to dissolve the Constituent Assembly so that it would not be able to engage in a robust discussion about the issue of federalism. A unitary government was instituted and the three southern provinces were granted token and totally ineffective representation in the central government.

From 1956 to 2011, the Muslim-dominated northern Sudan controlled the destiny of the peoples of the South, from the cradle to the grave. Although northern exploitation of the South goes as far back as the slave raids of the nineteenth century, the instruments of post-independence oppression were forged during the hasty, opportunistic and top-down decolonization project, which began shortly after World War II. The failure to fully and effectively engage the South in the process of transforming the critical domains allowed the Muslim-dominated North to set up all institutional arrangements for the new country. This allowed them to turn governance structures into instruments of violence against Southerners. The outcome was a southern region whose traditions, customs, cultures, languages, and values were made subordinate to Arabic, Islamic and other northern values and its development potential allowed to wither or exploited only for Northern benefit. Over the years, Southerners came to recognize violent mobilization as the only way to free themselves from northern-induced servitude. But, the same can happen in South Sudan if some groups are excluded from full participation in all aspects of life.

Below we briefly examine some lessons that the new South Sudan must keep in mind as it seeks to create a consensual state, one that can enhance their ability to live together peacefully and create the wealth that they need to meet rising public obligations and improve the quality of life for all citizens.

1. Building a locally-focused, development-oriented constitution

The constitution defines and structures the limits of governmental power. It creates legislative, executive, and judicial powers and places appropriate limits on them. The limitations on the exercise of government power may come in the form of individual or group rights against the government and, depending on the nature of the society in question, or as favored by many developing societies, including those in Africa, the right of each ethnic or nationality group to its economic, social and cultural development. Such a constitution, obviously, did not exist in Sudan as indicated by the fact that a significant amount of the violence directed at groups in the South actually came from the government. To make sure that the constitution is relevant to the people whose lives it is supposed to regulate, it must reflect their values—which can be achieved only if the process of compacting the constitution is participatory, inclusive, bottom-up, and people-driven (i.e., democratic). This is the most important lesson that South Sudan can learn from its years of oppression under the government in Khartoum. By effectively disenfranchising Southerners and preventing them from participating fully and effectively in constitution making, the northerners were able to produce laws and institutions that greatly enhanced their ability to oppress the South. Should the South allow the laws and institutions for the new country to be developed through a similar top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory system, it would end up with institutional arrangements that do not reflect the values of the diverse nationality and ethnic groups that make up the country. The outcome is most likely to be the same type of violent ethnic mobilization that has characterized Sudan since 1956 as groups within the new country, who feel marginalized and deprived resort to violent mobilization in order to either improve their levels of participation and minimize further marginalization or exit and form their own polity. It is only through democratic constitution making that South Sudan can secure institutions that would enhance peaceful coexistence, promote the creation of wealth, but at the same time, adequately constrain the state.

2. Constitutional guarantee of economic freedom

Economic freedom is one of the most important determinants of the quality of a country’s institutions. In a country in which economic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed and protected, citizens have the right to contract and can engage freely in exchange. Economic freedom enhances efficient allocation of resources, maximizes the creation of wealth, and contributes significantly to the alleviation of poverty. The failure to constitutionally guarantee economic freedom has been a very important obstacle to entrepreneurship and wealth creation in the African countries. In fact, at independence, these countries, including Sudan, actually adopted institutional structures that stunted entrepreneurial activities among various groups, significantly reducing the ability of these groups to contribute to national economic growth. The failure of many Southerners to participate fully and effectively in the Sudanese economy constituted part of the conflict that existed between the North and South and provided the impetus for the war of liberation. Through democratic constitution making, the citizens of South Sudan can compact and adopt a development-oriented constitution, which guarantees economic freedom, enhances the ability of all its citizens to engage in wealth-creating activities. This is the most effective way to attack poverty.

3. Ensuring a common South Sudan citizenship

South Sudan must create a concept of citizenship that is in line with the modern state structure—the person and property of the individual must be secure, not only in his or her so-called ancestral home but outside of it. This will minimize the type of discrimination and capricious and arbitrary treatment that Southerners who migrated to the North suffered at the hands of state and non-state actors. Thus, citizenship in the new country, unlike what it was in the Khartoum-dominated Sudan, must be fully portable. Each citizen must be able to migrate internally or exit one political jurisdiction within the country and enter another without the requirement or need to assert citizenship in the new political jurisdiction in order to participate in and benefit from economic and political activities. Thus, regardless of their ethno-regional origins, South Sudanese citizens should be able to establish residency in any of the political sub-divisions that make up the country and suffer no discrimination based simply on the fact that the individual is not an indigene of the political sub-division in question. Citizenship based on consanguinity and geography must be rejected in favor of citizenship based on association. Only when the peoples of South Sudan accept such an holistic approach to citizenship will peaceful coexistence be assured to every citizen so that they can fully and effectively participate in economic development of their new country.

With the birth of their new nation, South Sudanese can escape the burden of living under Khartoum-engineered tyranny. However, in order to ensure peaceful coexistence and sustainable development, they must create a consensual state. This can be accomplished only if all relevant stakeholders are enfranchised and granted the facilities to participate fully and effectively in constitution making. Through democratic constitution making, the peoples of South Sudan can secure for themselves a constitution that adequately constrains the state (i.e., it minimizes the ability of civil servants and politicians to engage in any form of political opportunism, such as rent seeking and corruption), provides market participants with incentives that encourage engagement in productive activities, provides structures for the peaceful resolution of conflict, and generally promotes the peaceful coexistence of all of the nation’s diverse nationality and ethnic groups.

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Elections and Violence in Nigeria: The Question of Citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa

Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku — Thu, 28 Apr 2011 16:08:00 -0400

Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria’s ruling civilian and military elites have never engaged their fellow citizens in the type of robust civil discourse that would have allowed them to confront the critical issue of citizenship. Nigeria’s regular incidences of violence, most of which seem to flair up after an election, do have something to do with how Nigerians see the issue of citizenship.

According to news reports, violence from political and religious conflict has killed more than 2,000 people in and around the city of Jos. The people targeted are usually members of immigrant groups that have settled in the area and are said not to belong to the geographic region where the fighting is taking place. During one particular violent outbreak in Jos in which Christian villages were sacked and burned and over 200 people were killed, observers claimed that the massacres were carried out by Muslims in retaliation for previous attacks against them, which left over 300 dead. In the disputed villages around Jos, Muslims (who are mostly Hausa or Fulani) claim that the territory is theirs by virtue of possession, but other groups argue that they are the true citizens (“native sons” or “sons of the soil”) of these farmlands by virtue of their ancestry.

Although the 1999 Nigerian constitution guarantees each citizen the right to free internal exit as well as the right to settle in any part of the country, the issue of what constitutes Nigerian citizenship has never been put to rigorous open discussion. Section 41(1) of the constitution states that “[e]very citizen of Nigeria is entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof, and no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit therefrom.” Section 42(2) states that “[n]o citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth.”

The violence that erupted in Kaduna State following the release of the results of the presidential election that took place on April 16 was just the latest in a series of violent attacks by various groups who believe strongly that “home” does not mean Nigeria but the individual’s so-called “ancestral land” within the country. In order to win the election, a candidate had to obtain a majority of the votes cast, as well as receive at least 25 percent of the votes cast in two-thirds of the country’s 36 States. Mr. Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian southerner, easily reached that threshold in 31 states in an election that was declared by both the national electoral commission and international observers as largely free and fair. The electoral commission declared Mr. Jonathan the winner and shortly afterward, homes of his supporters, churches and police stations were set ablaze in the northern cities of Kano and Kaduna, leaving many dead.

Nigerian legal philosopher Olufemi Taiwo argues that although post-independence politicians have sought to create a common citizenship, they have neglected to engage the people in a discussion of citizenship and “what citizenship involves in terms of rights, duties, immunities, privileges and forbearances for its bearers.” As observed by Taiwo, for citizenship to be meaningful and have any value, “it must prevail over the entire territory of the country for which it exists, without regard to how many nationalities and ethnicities are to be found therein.”

Nigeria’s constitution prescribes three ways through which an individual can acquire Nigerian citizenship: by birth, by registration and by naturalization. Yes as evidenced by recent chaos in Nigeria, citizenship outside one’s ancestral land is insecure and can be stripped arbitrarily. Many Nigerians believe that various geographic parts of the country should be left exclusively for the benefit of the so-called “indigenes” or “native sons” or “sons of the soil.” In essence, the idea of a shared common citizenship that goes beyond one’s ethnic group and place of birth in line with the constitution is deficient. As a result, the concept of internal exit—the right to locate oneself anywhere within the geographic boundaries of Nigeria and have one’s person and property protected by both national and local laws—really does not exist in the country today. For example, while a Yoruba from Lagos State can migrate to Kaduna, he is likely to encounter serious opposition from indigenes if the new migrant (or stranger in local jargon) attempts to run for public office or purchase property in the state.

The Issue of Citizenship and African Countries

The issue of citizenship is not just a Nigerian problem but one that characterizes most of Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in Kenya, a country, which has also recently encountered post-election violence, that violence was related to unresolved grievances by groups that believed that their rights to their ancestral lands were being infringed or usurped by members of other groups that had settled on those lands. While these people who have settled outside their ancestral homes are Kenyans, they are not considered full citizens of these regions. Likewise, failure to develop the concept of common citizenship is behind the bloody ethnic struggles that have killed many Ivorians since 2002. Like other Africans, when Ivorians gained independence in 1960, the county’s leaders never engaged its people in the type of robust civil discourse that would have allowed them to deal with the critical issue of citizenship. As a consequence, the bloody civil war, which started in 2002, was fought over the issue of citizenship. A law enacted shortly before the country’s 2000 presidential election required all presidential candidates to have both their parents born in the Ivory Coast. This was a slap in the face of many northern Ivorians, including presidential candidate, Alassane Ouattara, whose parents are said to be immigrants from Burkina Faso.

As long as the issue of citizenship is not appropriately resolved, conflicts will continue and it will be difficult to achieve the economic growth targets that these African countries have set for themselves. Africans must focus their attention on creating a concept of citizenship that is in line with the modern state structure—the person and his or her property must be secure, not only in the so-called ancestral home but also outside of it.

Citizenship in a modern state is characterized by its portability—the ability to exit one political jurisdiction within the polity (a local government area, a state or province) and enter another without the requirement to assert citizenship in the new political jurisdiction in order to participate in and benefit from economic and political activities. Thus, a Nigerian citizen who migrates from Lagos State to Kano State should, after a reasonable time period, be able to acquire residency in Kano and the rights, privileges, immunities and burdens available to other Kano residents. Regardless of their ethno-regional grouping, Nigerian citizens should be able to establish residency in any of the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory and suffer no discrimination based simply on the fact that he or she is not an indigene of the state or territory in question. Such genuine citizenship, characterized by portability, does not currently exist in Nigeria or in many other African countries.

Portability of citizenship is even more important now that many African countries have adopted or are evaluating adoption of new federalist constitutions. While these decentralized structures serve to diffuse executive powers, they could generate more conflict should they dilute the concept of citizenship. What the recent bloody clashes in Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria teach us is that Africans must work together to engage in a robust discussion of what it means to be a citizen of their countries. In order for violence to stop, there is need to collectively reject the concept of citizenship based on consanguinity and geography and instead embrace a citizenship based on association. Only when Africans accept this holistic approach to citizenship will peaceful coexistence be assured to every citizen so they can fully and effectively participate in the economic development of their respective countries.

References and further reading:

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Ethnic Diversity and Liberty: The African Dilemma (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997).

John Mukum Mbaku, Institutions and Reform in Africa: The Public Choice Perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

Olufemi Taiwo, “Of Citizens and Citizenship,” in Akibá, O. (ed.), Constitutionalism and Society in Africa (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 55-78.

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What Next for Ivory Coast?

Mwangi S. Kimenyi and John Mukum Mbaku — Fri, 08 Apr 2011 09:46:00 -0400

The genesis of authoritarianism

In 1956, France implemented a series of institutional reforms that effectively allowed its African colonies to opt for integration with France instead of pursuing autonomous existence as independent states. Just two years later, France, under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, offered the colonies, under the auspices of the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, free association as autonomous republics within the Communauté française (French Community). Guinea was the only territory in France’s so-called Afrique noire to vote “Non” to de Gaulle’s proposal. Ivory Coast voted “Oui” as its elites saw Guinea’s total rejection of de Gaulle’s offer as not very pragmatic. Of course, within the new community, France would retain senior status and the former colonies would come in as junior partners.

Nevertheless, leaders of the Francophone African colonies soon realized that they could opt for independence and still retain close and productive ties with France. Thus, following the lead of the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration, which gained independence on January 1, 1960, Ivory Coast withdrew from the French Community and on August 7, 1960, declared its independence. However, it was not until October 31, 1960 that the National Assembly adopted a constitutional draft.

The new constitution, like those of virtually all former French colonies in Africa, was remarkably similar to the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth Republic. The new Ivorian constitution rejected parliamentarianism and created institutions that had a remarkable resemblance to those of France. Most important is the fact that the new constitution established a Guallist system of government with an imperial presidency that lacked effective checks on the power of the executive. Although the constitution created a Supreme Court, the latter had no power of judicial review, executive control and domination of the court was assured mainly because the President of the Republic was also the appointing authority of the head of the Supreme Court. In essence, the constitution subordinated the judiciary system to the imperial president, the same person who was supposed to guarantee the court’s independence. The imperial presidency, with extremely “vague affirmative statements of rights,” as well as strong and repressive institutions, produced, in Ivory Coast, as was the case in other Francophone African countries, an authoritarian system of governance (Alexander 1963).

The state as the president’s personal property

To appreciate as to why Ivory Coast has descended into such an orgy of violence over who should become president, it is important to understand the role played by the president in the country’s political economy. There is no better way to gain such an understanding than to take a look at the one person who shaped that institution into what it is today: Félix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of Ivory Coast. Like his counterparts in other Francophone African countries, he believed that certain specificities of his country such as extreme ethnic diversity, high levels of poverty and material deprivation, a young and illiterate population eager to benefit from the fruits of independence, and a society stunted by many years of colonialism, could not afford to be governed by a limiting constitution. In addition, he believed that only the country’s elite, which had been educated and trained in France, possessed the “skill and understanding necessary to move the society forward.” Ivory Coast, at independence, was essentially a stagnant society, ravaged by many years of French colonial exploitation, challenged by the existence of several ethnic groups, each with its own language, customs and culture, and even legal systems. The impetus for national integration, as well as “[t]he force and direction of change,” Houphouët-Boigny believed, had to emanate from the government, where most of the French-educated elite resided (Alexander 1963).

Thus, at independence, Houphouët-Boigny rejected a limiting constitution, which could have minimized effective exercise of many of the oppressive tendencies that later characterized his many years in office. He rejected federalism, which deprives the central government of its tyrannous strength and allows for a more effective management of ethnic diversity and the separation of powers, which serves to fragment the central government power in particular and significantly minimizes state tyranny. Like other Francophone presidents, Houphouët-Boigny created a sophisticated political craftsmanship that allowed him to have total control over all structures of governance. His government relied exclusively on the state structures, which he had inherited from the French and perhaps, more importantly, he retained a significant number of French bureaucratic and commercial technocrats. Houphouët-Boigny believed in unbridled capitalism, but his was not the type of resource allocation system that enhanced the ability of Ivorians to engage in wealth creation. Houphouët-Boigny established and maintained a patronage system that allowed him to monopolize all political spaces within the country. The system came to represent the most important and perhaps the only avenue for self-enrichment in the country (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).

Houphouët-Boigny engaged in a form of ethnic balancing in appointing people to his cabinet—all ethnic groups were represented in the government but not those who were independent thinkers. Rather he appointed those who were prepared to serve devotedly without questioning their ruler. The state, under Houphouët-Boigny, evolved into an “administrative-technical agency devoid of structures of representation or participation” and degenerated simply into a structure for the private capital accumulation activities of the president and his benefactors—the government is the personal property of the president, devoid of politics; it is only he who represents the people, and it is only he who can be critical of government policies.

Looking ahead in Ivory Coast

In 2010, presidential elections, which had been postponed several times since 2005, were finally held. The main contestants were incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara. The Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared that Outtara had captured 54.1 percent of the votes in the run-off, while President Gbagbo had received only 45.9 percent. While the IEC and the international community recognized Outtara as the winner and hence, the country’s new president, the Constitutional Council disagreed and sided with the incumbent president, declaring him the winner. It is unlikely that Gbagbo would survive the pressure to surrender the presidency, especially given the fact that most of his military and political supporters have abandoned him, the international community has recognized Ouattara as the country’s legitimate president, and forces loyal to Ouattara have captured all but only a few neighborhoods of Abidjan. The question, of course, is: What is next for Ivory Coast?

Ivory Coast is in a worse state of fragility now than was the case before the elections. The situation could deteriorate to state failure unless there are well coordinated interventions to prevent the diffusion of force to fragmented groups which could result in serious consequences on human right abuses. While the United Nations and France have played a crucial role in what-is-all-but assured ouster of Gbagbo, their role in peacekeeping and nation building could be complicated as they are not considered as neutral actors by Gbagbo supporters. It is now time that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) stepped up to the plate and played their rightful role. Broad peacekeeping strategies, including disarming of the errant soldiers and militia groups, should be the first priority towards the rebuilding of the state and preventing a humanitarian crisis.

Even as Quattara takes over leadership, governing the state will be complicated by the fierce divisions that have been solidified by the conflict over the last few months, more so because both sides have been involved in imparting atrocities. The new government must seek to negotiate a political settlement that will encourage the divided populace to come together. It is therefore important that even the losing side be granted a role in the governance of the country. The principle of inclusiveness must be adhered to in order to start the healing process.

In the longer run, the solution to the current problems lies in engaging the people in an inclusive constitutional-making process. Like virtually all African countries, the main source of Ivory Coast's present problems, is the failure of the decolonization project to transform the critical domains (bureaucratic, cultural and economic) and make them more suitable and relevant to post-independence governance and resource allocation. Had the decolonization process fully engaged all of the country’s relevant stakeholder groups, the country’s various ethnic groups could have had the opportunity to determine the type of relationship they wanted to have with their neighbors; resolve property rights issues associated with or related to their lands which had been forcefully alienated to French mercantile companies during the colonial period; deal with important issues, such as citizenship and what the latter means for participation in economic and political markets; and generally secure laws and institutions, which would have provided tools for peaceful resolution of conflict and enhanced the peaceful coexistence of groups.

Instead, the decolonization process in Ivory Coast, like that in other African countries, was dominated and controlled by the colonial government and French entrepreneurs and commercial leaders resident in the colony together with a small group of urban-based indigenous elites, led by Houphouët-Boigny, all of whom had been educated in France, had resided and worked in France, and adopted French customs and values. These elites, totally imbued with foreign values, adopted a top-down, elite-driven, non-participatory approach to constitution making, effectively disenfranchising Ivorians and preventing them from determining their own institutional arrangements. Houphouët-Boigny and his government failed to engage the Ivorian people in democratic constitution making. Instead, they adopted a “thinly disguised” copy of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, effectively imposing on Ivorians a set of foreign laws and institutions, which while they have enhanced the ability of the president and his benefactors to amass enormous personal fortunes, they have failed to reflect Ivorian specificities and hence, have not been able to deal effectively with the multifarious governance and resource allocation issues that have forced the country into a series of bloody confrontations.

The Ivorian imperial presidency is very tempting—it provides the holder with the power to preside over an enormous cache of resources. Should Ouattara take over government and continue with business as usual, the violent ethnic mobilization that has characterized the country’s political economy during the last several years will continue. What then should the new president do in order to bring peace to the country?

What the post-Gbagbo Ivory Coast will need are governance structures that will enhance the peaceful resolution of conflict; promote indigenous entrepreneurship and wealth creation; and ensure peaceful coexistence of all the country’s diverse population groups. Such laws and institutions can only be secured through a democratic (i.e., bottom-up, people-driven, participatory and inclusive) constitution-making process. This approach to constitution making will make certain that the laws so compacted will be relevant to all Ivorians and reflect their values, interest, customs and cultures; benefits to gainers will be maximized and costs to losers will be minimized; the resulting constitution will be seen by all of the country’s diverse population groups as a legitimate tool for governance, significantly improving governance and minimizing the costs of compliance; the people will accept the constitution and claim it as their own, effectively enhancing governance in the post-constitutional society; governance will be viewed by the majority of citizens as democratic and based on their values; and critical issues such as citizenship, which have created problems for governance during the last several decades, will be examined thoroughly and settled.

Upon taking office, President Ouattara must create an environment within the country that promotes and enhances dialogue, open debate, accommodation and the political-give-and-take that is necessary for participatory and inclusive constitution making. This approach to constitution making, unlike that adopted at independence, will situate the reform process within popular forces and away from the control and domination of opportunistic elites; it will bring critical issues that are relevant to the well-being of Ivorians to the center of the debate—hence, vexing issues of language (what role will traditional languages play in education, especially at the local level), nationality, identity and citizenship, gender, property rights especially of land, and resource allocation, will take center stage in constitutional deliberations.

In addition to producing laws and institutions, which are locally-focused and hence reflect the people’s values, the participatory and inclusive process may also provide other salutary benefits to Ivorians. First, the process can provide a therapeutic effect on civil society, enhancing the ability of the latter to grow and become a respectful participant in governance. Second, in participating in the process of compacting the nation’s constitution, civil society organizations will gain new confidence and a new sense of empowerment—these organizations are expected to become important checks on the new democratic government. Third, the inclusive and participatory constitution making process will revive the spirit of open debate that had been squashed by colonialism and completely extinguished by Houphouët-Boigny’s autocratic rule. Fourth, the public would be able to engage in a cathartic denunciation of the ancien régime, which had imprisoned, exploited and marginalized them. Fifth, ethnic groups, which would be able to participate fully and effectively in the process, will be able to air their differences in public without resorting to destructive mobilization. Finally, democratic constitution making may be the first real effort to engage all the Ivorian peoples in a national debate on governance and the choice of an economic system. Inclusive and participatory constitution making represents an effective way for Ivorians to come together and undertake a total reconstruction of their critical domains and make them more suitable to their needs, as well as prepare their country for peace and prosperity.

References and further reading

Alexander, A. S., Jr., “The Ivory Coast Constitution: An Accelerator, not a Break,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1963), p. 297.

J. F. Clark, J. F. “The National Conference as an Instrument of Democratization in Francophone Africa,” Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 11 (1994), pp. 304-335.

Hadloff, R. E. (ed.), Côte d’Ivoire: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. xv, xxvii.

Jackson, R. H. and C. G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkely: University of California, 1982), p. 145.

Kimenyi, M. S. and Mbaku, J. M. (eds), Institutions and Collective Choice in Developing Countries (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

Mbaku, J. M., Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 54.

Mbaku, J. M. and J. O. Inhovbere (eds.), The Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: The Continuing Struggle (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

Victor T. LeVine, “The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1997): 183-184.

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Foresight Africa: The Continent’s Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011

Tue, 11 Jan 2011 16:17:00 -0500

Before the recent global economic crisis, African countries experienced one of the longest periods of economic expansion. Although Africa weathered the crisis much better than many other regions, its economies remain fragile and daunted by the challenge of achieving sufficiently high growth rates. Yet, there are also many opportunities that offer hope for African countries to achieve sustainable growth in 2011.

In this report, experts from the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings examine some of the key issues that will matter for Africa in 2011 and beyond. They provide brief overviews of the issues and give policy recommendations to African governments and development partners on how to leverage the opportunities for prosperity, while anticipating and overcoming challenges that could derail Africa’s growth.

Read the full report »

Brookings: Experts - John Mukum Mbaku

Oil and Gas Management for Inclusive and Sustainable Development: An East African Regional Forum

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Reassessing the Arab Awakening: Prospects for Deepening and Institutionalizing Democracy in North Africa in 2013

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South Sudan: Searching for a Credible Development Path

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Building Opportunities: Addressing Africa's Lack of Infrastructure

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The Problem of Political Transitions in Africa: The Cameroon Question

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Around the Halls: Celebrating Nelson Mandela's 94th Birthday

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South Sudan One Year After Independence

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One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

South Sudan’s First Anniversary

Efficient and Equitable Natural Resource Management

The Anti-Corruption Agenda

Why Wasn't it Africa that Found Charles Taylor Guilty?

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Securing a Productive South Sudan

The Future of the Democratic Republic of Congo

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South Sudan: Avoiding State Failure

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Elections and Violence in Nigeria: The Question of Citizenship in Sub-Saharan Africa

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What Next for Ivory Coast?

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Foresight Africa: The Continent’s Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011