Brookings: Experts - Tanvi Madan

Premier Li Keqiang of China Goes to India

Tanvi Madan — Sat, 18 May 2013 14:00:00 -0400

On Sunday, Chinese premier Li Keqiang heads out from Beijing for his first visit abroad in that role. His first stop: India. He’s probably wishing the trip had taken place about a month and a half ago. At that time, there was a sense in India that the new leadership in China was reaching out to India for a number of reasons. Over the last month, however, temperatures rose in the Himalayas, as the long festering China-India boundary dispute flared once again. The good news for those interested in stable Sino-Indian relations: the two governments seem to have got past the recent incident. They continued to communicate throughout the crisis. Pre-scheduled China-India talks on Afghanistan were held in the midst of the crisis—their first such dialogue focused on the subject. Chinese and Indian military officers held a border meeting. The Indian foreign minister traveled to Beijing. And Li’s visit is going ahead. The bad news: The border incident reinforced the mistrust that many in India feel toward China and its intentions. Furthermore, it was a reminder that despite increased engagement, bilateral differences have the potential to stall, if not, reverse progress toward more stable relations. Li’s challenge: to get the relationship back on a positive trajectory and begin to convince a skeptical Indian public that the border incident was not representative of the new Chinese leadership’s approach toward India. Overall, the premier has his work cut out for him.

Before mid-April, many observers of Sino-Indian relations noted that under the new Chinese leadership there seemed to be an “upswing in relations.” Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed a five-point formula to improve ties with India. The two countries agreed to discuss Afghanistan. “Positive vibes” were detected at Xi’s subsequent meeting with Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Durban. The Chinese government indicated that Li soon planned to travel to India.

This trend did not surprise observers. After all, there were enough reasons for Beijing to seek a stable relationship with India: economic ties, cooperation in the multilateral realm and a desire to limit India’s burgeoning relationships with the U.S. and Japan (reports indicated that Chinese officials were eager for the premier to visit India before the Indian prime minister headed to Tokyo in late May), as well as other countries in the region. There were also reasons for the political leadership not to want the relationship with India to deteriorate: such as preoccupation with China’s eastern maritime disputes and the North Korean situation, as well as the need for stability in the region with the impending American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

What did surprise observers was the border incident. Former U.S. deputy secretary of state James Steinberg, who was in India as the crisis played out, said “I don't know what the Chinese leadership is up to…confronting India and Japan, especially when they have been trying to build strong bilateral relations...The Chinese leadership should understand, it will not benefit them in the long run.” The opacity of Chinese decision-making meant that various theories were floated about why Chinese troops had taken the unusual step of setting up camp across the Line of Actual Control (LAC): differing perceptions of the LAC; “a rush of testosterone by local officers;” in response to India building up its border infrastructure; the desire of the People's Liberation Army to assert authority; the result of an internal political power struggle; Chinese expansionism; or Chinese strategic designs against India. One observer contended that a clear motive was near impossible to pinpoint: that “Chinese foreign policy is an enigma wrapped in a mystery.”

Since the resolution of the crisis, Beijing has tried to press a “reset” button, trying to return the relationship to its pre-crisis trajectory. The Chinese ambassador to India unusually took to the editorial pages of an Indian newspaper to emphasize, “To strengthen good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation with India is China’s strategic choice and established policy which will not change.” Chinese officials indicated that greater efforts should be made toward a boundary settlement.

The Chinese government also signaled that the choice of India as the premier’s first stop was very deliberate and a sign of the importance Beijing placed in the Sino-Indian relationship. Hosting an Indian youth delegation, Li put a personal spin on the choice, noting the “the seeds of friendship sown” when he visited India 27 years ago—a trip that he said left a “lasting impact.” Beyond trying to win hearts and minds, he also seemed to want to appeal to Indians’ pocketbooks, talking about the economic benefits of greater ties. Finally, he pointedly mentioned experiencing the “warmth and hospitality of Indian people.”

That hospitality will certainly be forthcoming on the part of key policymakers in the Indian government. Delhi has its own reasons for seeking stable relations with Beijing. Thus, Indian officials had joined their Chinese counterparts in playing down the border incident and seeking to resolve it speedily. Since it’s been resolved, both sides have sought to highlight their success in defusing the crisis, pointing to that as a sign of progress in the relationship. During that visit, they will work toward agreement on certain issues. Expectations are that there will be developments on the economic front. China-India watchers will also be looking for any sign of progress on the border and Brahmaputra river issues.

Among the Indian public, the welcome for Li is likely to be cooler. The recent tensions at the border—heavily covered in the Indian media—reinforced negative impressions of China among many in the Indian public. Many—even beyond the public—will take with a larger grain of salt the new Chinese leadership’s assurance that it intends for China to rise peacefully, be a responsible state, and seek good relations with India. The crisis has reinforced the narrative that has prevailed in many quarters since the 1962 China-India war: that China only understands strength; that while Beijing’s leaders say China and India “must shake hands,” they cannot be trusted—that one hand held out might just be a precursor to the other stabbing one in the back.

The border incident has also kept the focus on bilateral differences and even beyond the border issues there are many of those: China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors, its Indian Ocean ambitions, the overall lack of trust, cyber-security concerns, Tibet, the diversion of the waters of the Brahmaputra, a trade imbalance and restricted market access in China for Indian companies, the sense that China does not respect India and/or that it will seek to prevent India’s rise and, significantly, China’s relationship with Pakistan, which, of course, is Li’s second stop.

The incident also seemed to strengthen the hands of those inside and outside government who are skeptical of China’s intentions towards India and weakened the voices of those urging engagement with that country. Furthermore, the crisis negatively affected the credibility of the Indian government on issues related to security broadly and China in particular. This matters because significant bilateral progress on crucial fronts will require concessions from both sides—concessions that might now be harder for the Indian government to sell on its side.

Overall, that’s a lot of mistrust and skepticism to turn around in one visit. But if Li Keqiang wants to see the relationship prosper, the trip is a good time to start trying on two fronts. First, substance: progress on key issues will go a long way in building trust. Second, style: Li should take the opportunity to introduce himself and reintroduce the new Chinese leadership not just to Indian government officials and private sector leaders, but also to the Indian public—for it might be tempting to dismiss public sentiments, but they will play a key role in setting the limits of the relationship.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Image Source: © China Daily China Daily Information Corp - CDIC / Reuters

John Kerry’s Indian Image: Moving American Policymakers Beyond "Pro" and "Anti" India

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 17 May 2013 15:17:00 -0400

Later this summer, US Secretary of State John Kerry will visit India for the US-India Strategic Dialogue. Before and during his visit, many observers in India will likely try to assess whether Kerry is "pro-" or "anti-" India. This is not surprising. In the narrative of US-India relations, there has always been a hall of fame and a hall of shame. Praise was heaped upon "heroes" — such as President John F. Kennedy and US ambassadors to India Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Blackwill — for being pro-India. President Richard Nixon and secretaries of state John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger found themselves on the anti-India "villains" list. More recently, Kerry and Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel have been labelled anti-India or pro-Pakistan. However, this focus on whether policymakers are pro- or anti-India is limiting at best and harmful at worst. It can lead to an exaggerated view of the extent of the impact of one individual's personal bias and obscure more complex motivations and drivers of policymaking.

Conclusions about policymakers' biases have often been based on one or more statements made or one or two high-profile decisions taken. It is crucial, however, to focus on individuals' track records. Take Nixon. He has often been tagged as anti-India. In the early-to-mid 1950s, when he was vice-president, Nixon indeed had little patience for non-alignment and was a proponent of military aid to Pakistan. By 1957, however, he was internally arguing for greater economic aid to India. He made his view public too, asserting that "what happens in India... could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin."

In 1967, long before people were talking about the next century being an Asian century, Nixon also laid out the importance of Asia and how that continent's future would largely be shaped by four "giants" — China, India, Japan and the US. Writing at a time when there was much pessimism in the US about India and the Indira Gandhi government, Nixon noted with sympathy that India's "present leaders at least are trying... in exceedingly difficult circumstances" to move forward and doing so in a democratic context. Once in power, his administration did make the infamous one-time exception to provide military assistance to Pakistan, but he vetoed recommendations for a larger, more sustained package.

The pro/ anti-India narrative also does little to explain change. Why, in 1972-73, did Nixon and Kissinger work to rebuild the relationship with an India they disliked? Or, why did policy towards India change over the course of the Clinton administration with a similar set of policymakers? The narrative also assumes individuals' views stem from an inherent dislike or love for India, rather than circumstances or worldviews. It does not often recognise that individuals can change — and that Indian words and actions can shape views of India. Biographers of Indira Gandhi proclaim, often approvingly, that she treated Nixon badly in 1967, without any consideration of whether that treatment might have affected his views of India and her.

Furthermore, the narrative cannot explain how policymakers can make some statements and decisions that are "pro" India and others that are not. As Rajeev Sharma has noted in the case of Kerry, and Dhruva Jaishankar on Hagel, one can identify instances when these supposedly "not-India-friendly" individuals have supported legislation helpful to India — the India-US nuclear deal, for example.

In narratives of India-US relations, these simplistic conclusions are not restricted to depictions of US policymakers. Nehru is often portrayed as anti-US, even though he was perhaps the first to use the term "natural partners" to describe the bilateral relationship. Others insist on identifying Indira Gandhi as pro-Soviet, ignoring instances such as her resisting for two years her advisers' entreaties to sign an India-Soviet treaty.

This is not to say that personalities don't matter. They do, but their role needs to be put in context. They can facilitate cooperation or exacerbate conflict. They can help determine the policy option chosen. Personal relationships, too, matter. However, personalities are not the only factor — or often the primary one — determining policy and consideration of their role should go beyond discussions of the pro- or anti-Indianness of particular policymakers.

The pro/ anti India narrative often neglects to consider whether and how much the "pro" or "anti" policymaker influences policy broadly, and policy towards in India in particular. Cabinet members' or ambassadors' roles and influence are not the same as those of presidents. Moreover, it sometimes overlooks actors involved in shaping policy and the policy debate outside the White House and state department.

Instead of focusing on whether key policymakers are anti- or pro-India, it would be more worthwhile to assess which individuals are making policy; their role and influence in the policymaking process, especially relative to other policymakers, and their proximity to the president; and the nature of interaction between policymakers. Furthermore, it is crucial to analyse the worldviews of key actors; their perception of US interests and preferred strategy for achieving them; whether they see a role for India in that strategy and, if they do, is it as potential spoiler or supporter. Finally, it is essential to think about what India can do to build enough constituencies for the relationship in the US and ensure its own importance so that bilateral relations do not depend on — and are not thought to revolve around — one or two individuals.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: The Indian Express

Image Source: © B Mathur / Reuters

Prepare for the Unknowns: India's Black Swans

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Imagine the breaking news headline: Revolution in Riyadh. The scenario: The House of Saud, which has ruled Saudi Arabia for years, has been overthrown. Closer to home, think about what China going off the rails would look like-and portend for India. These are just two of the "Black Swans" that foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution recently identified as deserving the attention of the U.S. government, along with a series of Big Bets that the administration should make in President Obama's second term. These black swans are low-probability, high-impact events that can have a dramatic impact on the plans and policies of a country. The idea behind this project was to identify potential events, suggest ways to prevent them if possible and prepare for them if they occur. With American involvement in a number of countries in the world, it might seem natural to undertake such exercises in the United States. It is essential, however, that such thinking take place in India -- whose global interests and involvement are growing -- as well.

Just a glance at the black swans that Brookings scholars envisioned indicates how each of them could affect India's interests. The collapse of the Saudi monarchy would bring instability in a country that is India's largest oil supplier and critical to its economy. It is also the location of two of Islam's holiest sites. The spillover into other countries in the region that is not just the source of most of the crude oil and natural gas that India imports but is home to a large number of Indians, will also have major ramifications. A Eurozone collapse would have a significant impact on the Indian economy. A China-U.S. confrontation or especially a direct military conflict between them over Korea -- though seemingly distant from India's area of operations and interest -- would change the geopolitical context in which India is operating. A confrontational Chinese leadership, driven by popular nationalism and desire for regime survival into war, could have serious consequences for India. Domestic revolution in China could also affect not just India's geopolitical interests but its economic ones as well; it could also lead to significant changes in the Tibet dynamic. Finally, a dramatic rise in sea levels could devastate India's coastal areas where about a fifth of its population resides.

One could dismiss these scenarios as far-fetched, but ignoring such possibilities entirely can be risky. India itself has felt the brunt of black swans -- for instance, the Dalai Lama's escape to India in 1959 or the black swan triple whammy in 1990-91 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. India has also benefited from some black swans -- for example, from two crucial ones that Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who generated the black swan theory, laid out in his book The Black Swan: the development and spread of the computer and the Internet.

India could face black swans again: A serious and sudden deterioration of the situation in Tibet. A climate change-caused catastrophe in Bangladesh with thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people trying to cross over into India. A major cyber attack with uncertain origins. A disintegration in Pakistan with the "loose nuke" problem becoming real. A collapse in the price of gold. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement -- a black swan that could throw up challenges or opportunities for India.

Black swans are not always negative and do not necessarily have a negative impact. As my Brookings colleague Govinda Avasarala notes, a major breakthrough in grid-level battery storage developed in India that could make solar and other intermittent forms of energy instantly economic could be one such "positive" black swan. This development would not only change India's energy picture, it would change the debate on and the available solutions to the climate change challenge. It would also put India at the forefront of the next big technology revolution.

It is important to think about such black swans, consider ways of preventing them if they are negative ones and facilitating them if they are positive, and lay out ways of coping with them. Government agencies can do some of this thinking. Indeed, recently, at a talk organised by RAW, former president Abdul Kalam highlighted the need for the country's intelligence apparatus to be prepared for black swans. Policy planning staffs can also undertake such exercises. Government agencies, however, are often burdened or overburdened with day-to-day priorities, with little time, inclination or resources to undertake such thinking. Therefore it is outside government -- in think tanks, universities and the corporate sector -- that such thinking about black swans, as well as forecasting, scenario planning and war gaming can and must take place. Such exercises do not necessarily require classified information. They do require time, resources, expertise and, most importantly, imagination.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: India Today

Image Source: © Rafiquar Rahman / Reuters

Recent Political Developments in India: The Other Leadership Transition

Thu, 14 Feb 2013 15:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 14, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

While the world’s attention has been focused on leadership elections and selections in countries like China, Israel, Japan and the United States, recent political developments in the world’s largest democracy also warrant attention. Although national elections will not take place in India until 2014, recently there have been crucial state elections and party leadership changes, and elections in ten states are due over the next year. Rahul Gandhi has been elevated to the position of vice president of the Congress party, further stoking discussions about his role in the party and government. The potential impact of the recent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) presidential elections on the party’s direction over the next few years is still being debated. Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi’s third electoral victory in state elections has once again sparked questions about his prime ministerial aspirations and chances. Speculation also continues about the national political prospects of others like Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar and Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chauhan.

On February 14, the India Project at Brookings hosted a discussion on these recent political dynamics in India, as well as their potential impact on the policy debate and political developments over the next year. Panelists included Sadanand Dhume, resident fellow at American Enterprise Institute, and Milan Vaishnav, an associate in the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brookings Fellow Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project, moderated the discussion.

China's Marathon is India's Triathlon

Tanvi Madan — Mon, 04 Feb 2013 11:00:00 -0500

Steve Rattner’s observation in The New York Times a couple of weeks ago that India had lost the race to China came on the heels of a year or more of global hand-wringing about India and its prospects. That had followed a few years of internal and external observers feting India as the next big thing. It brought to mind Heidi Klum’s weekly quip on Project Runway, “in fashion, one day you’re in, the next day you’re out.” If one wants to keep track of whether India is in or out, up or down, losing or winning “the race,” one only has to take a look at the latest Economist cover story or survey report headline on India. In 2004, “India’s Shining Hopes” were dazzling the world. A year later, India had been elevated to China levels with the newspaper declaring “The Tiger in Front.” By 2006, the newspaper was asking “Can India Fly?” with the answer a couple of years later being that unfortunately India was still “An Elephant, Not a Tiger.” Just a year later, however, there was “Good News from India” and a year after that the newspaper was laying out “How India’s Growth Will Outpace China’s.” Alas, by 2012, the newspaper, disappointed by developments in India, wistfully proclaimed that India needed to be “In Search of a Dream.”

These kind of report cards, rankings and ratings of India generate much interest, especially when the country’s progress is juxtaposed against that of China. Thus, predictably, Rattner’s piece laying out his view of the result of the economic race between China and India received some attention. Most of the responses tended to focus on whether or not India was losing or had lost the economic race. A different question, however, needs to be asked: Is that the only race India is in and the only race that those cheering for India want that country to win? Because it’s not that India doesn’t have the same “eye on the prize” as China does, as Rattner argues; it’s that the prize is different. Indeed, the race is different.

A few years ago, Indians and Indiawallahs might have “taken offense” – what Manu Joseph has called “India’s favorite spectator sport” – to a greater extent to Rattner’s declaration. Slowing economic growth and governance challenges, however, have reinforced the realization that victory parades are premature and the nation-building project that started six and a half decades ago continues. Many agree that India is indeed losing the race at the moment, at least the one that Rattner writes about: the economic one and, more narrowly, the infrastructure one. Some have even argued that he is late to this discovery and India lost the economic race a while back. Others have pointed out that the race isn’t over yet or that India started from behind and will catch up. Some have criticized Rattner for emphasizing growth at the expense of democracy. Yet others have responded with “what race?” either asserting that China and India haven’t been in the same league for the last three decades, or that comparisons should not be made because it’s like comparing apples and oranges.

It is perhaps futile to demand that people cease and desist from comparing the two Asian giants. Some have tried. Indian Finance Minister P. Chidambaram recently dismissed comparisons between the Chinese and Indian economic situations as irrelevant, saying that the countries faced different problems. Yet, his own prime minister has compared India’s banking system (favorably) and its scientific research achievements (unfavorably) with those of China. On the other side of the aisle, Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi has compared his state’s progress with that of China, as have Indian corporate leaders. At the recently concluded Jaipur Literary Festival, a panel (“The Elephant Paradigm, the Dragon Paradox.”) was devoted to comparing the two, with panelist Gurcharan Das saying that India was a soup and China a salad, and Nandan Nilekani noting that a good diet required both.

Neither the idea of a “race” between China and India is new nor is the hope on the part of many in the West that India win that race. It is a concept and comparison that predates Rattner, Francis Fukuyama, Niall Ferguson, Pankaj Mishra, Raghav Bahl and Tarun Khanna and Yasheng Huang. 60 years before Rattner’s piece, in The New York Times Magazine, Barbara Ward, then of The Economist, laid out “The Fateful Race between China and India,” pitting an authoritarian and a democratic country against each other in a development race that the whole world was watching. American policymakers interested in aiding India used the idea to lobby for assistance arguing, as historian Nick Cullather noted, that while there was an arms race and space race, the development race was the third and “deciding heat in a Cold War triple crown” and the U.S. needed to help India win. The idea did not get mainstream support till the second half of the 1950s. As Washington watched the battle unfold beyond Europe for hearts, minds and stomachs, the idea stuck that if Soviet-backed China succeeded while democratic India failed economically, it would be a victory for communism. If, on the other hand, the U.S. could help India win the development race versus China, it could demonstrate to the “uncommitted” world that democracy and development could co-exist and thrive.

By 1957, the “competition between Communist China and India” was enshrined in official U.S. documents and linked to American national security. NSC 5701 explicitly stated that it was in the U.S. national interest to strengthen India because, “A strong India would be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in an Asian context and would permit the gradual development of the means to enforce its external security interests against Communist Chinese expansion into South and Southeast Asia.” This argument laid the basis for years and billions of dollars of aid to India over the next few administrations. It enjoyed bipartisan support, with then Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard Nixon both advocating for aid for India on these grounds. The latter, emphasizing the significance of the competition, even asserted, “what happens in India…could be as important or could be even more important in the long run, than what happens in the negotiations with regard to Berlin.” Initially, this aid was designed to help India win the race; over time, as Indian performance lagged, it was designed not just to prevent India from losing the race, but from falling off the racetrack. Eventually, frustration about this performance led to "India fatigue" and the cheerleading squad – and, with it, aid – dwindled.

The race was not just a Western concept. In 1951, it was the editor of a leading Indian newspaper who laid out in Life magazine the idea that China and India were “two testing grounds” and that the results had Cold War implications. Over the next decade and a half, Indian government officials, private sector leaders and public intellectuals used this idea of a China-India competition to attract aid. They also worried about the implications of the race at home. While Indian policymakers often denied there was a race underway, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accepted that comparisons between India and China were inevitable. In the 1950s, he acknowledged the “great test:” if his government did not “deliver the goods…democracy will then be in peril…Then people may think of totalitarian methods…” He wasn’t the only one making the comparison to the country next door, with many in India complaining about its progress lagging behind that of China. Nehru’s responses would be familiar today: he highlighted the progress that India was making, noted that democracy made development more difficult, emphasized China’s problems, noting that its statistics were exaggerated, and asserted that China’s failures were not as evident because of the lack of openness, but that “the lid” would come off and “terrible criticism” would emerge later. Overall, he stated that development might take longer, but it would be more sustainable in a democracy, which was “the sounder way of doing things.”

More recently, Indian leaders have cited the hare-tortoise or the sprint-marathon analogies to argue that it’s only a question of time or distance, but India will eventually win. But the issue that Nehru brought up decades ago and Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar has brought up more recently – democracy – leads to the question of whether China and India are in the same race at all. If one must put it in sporting terms, the question is whether China is running a marathon while India is participating in a triathlon—one where it is not running, swimming and riding sequentially, but simultaneously, competing in an economic development race, a democratic one, as well as a social one.

India’s progress should be assessed on each of those fronts, even though final results might take a while to come in. Perhaps it is harder to track democratic and social progress. Perhaps statistics are easier to pick and choose from and quote than “the rhythm and sensibility” of countries are to measure. Perhaps the fact that there is nothing monochromatic about India makes it frustrating to assess. And perhaps developments in India lend themselves to different interpretations. Rattner’s piece makes this evident. For example, you can see the government’s response to the protests after a horrific gang-rape as a sign of concern or you can see peoples’ response as one of hope. You can see Mukesh Ambani’s billion-dollar home as a symbol of wealth disparity and limited economic mobility or, as Dhruva Jaishankar of the German Marshall Fund noted, given Ambani’s father’s modest beginnings, you can see it as a sign of the economic mobility that is possible. Or you can see both. Regardless of the difficulty of tracking the triathlon, it is important to look at more than just the economic race India is running. Investors looking for short-term returns might be focused on just that race, but neither Indians nor those who want it to really win should. After all, those who want India to win – and, as Rattner notes, there are many in the West who “fervently” hope that it does – are rooting for that country because it is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy and not despite it. Democracy should not be used as excuse for not developing. But development without democracy is not a prize India should want to win.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Image Source: © Vivek Prakash / Reuters

Water: Asia’s New Battleground?

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:30:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2013
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EST

Saul Room/Zilkha Lounge
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Security concerns in Asia focus today on maritime and territorial disputes in Northeast Asia, yet the potential for conflict over access to fresh water across the continent may be equally dangerous. Asia's exploding demand for water makes it the most water-scarce continent per capita. Many of its water sources cross national boundaries, creating the potential to raise international tensions as water becomes less available. The water security challenges facing China and India in particular may have consequences not just for the two rising powers, but also for Asia as a whole. How policy-makers manage that demand and deal with cross-border water conflicts deserves greater attention.

On January 24, the Asia Society and the India Project at Brookings hosted a discussion on the water security challenges facing Asian nations, with a particular focus on China and India. Discussants also highlighted how water security challenges interact with those involving energy and food security, disrupting economies, governments and environments and imposing further hardships on the poor. Panelists included Brahma Chellaney, professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, and Jennifer Turner, director of the China Environment Forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The Asia Society also recognized Chellaney for his receipt of the 2012 Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award for his book, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Georgetown University Press, September 2011).

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The India Investment

Tanvi Madan — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The U.S.-India relationship is broader and deeper than it has ever been. On a bipartisan basis, U.S. policymakers believe that, overall, it benefits American interests. But the danger is that it will suffer from Indian and American inattention. Tanvi Madan drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What actions can the U.S. take to continue engagement with India’s policymakers?
How will issues like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and others affect the U.S.-India relationship?
What is “India fatigue” and what can the U.S. and India do to fight it?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Tanvi Madan

Your administration has made the correct judgment that the rise of India and its increasing role and influence in the international system benefit U.S. interests. This assessment has been articulated repeatedly and enjoys bipartisan support. While Indian policymakers have not been as vocal, their actions have indicated that they too recognize the importance of the bilateral relationship. U.S. relations with India are broader and deeper today than they have ever been. The danger to the relationship is that it will suffer from inattention – on the Indian side, because of the lack of bureaucratic and political capacity, and policymakers’ domestic preoccupations; on the U.S. side, because of the lack of a crisis or a single high-profile initiative focusing bureaucratic and political attention, and other more-pressing domestic and international concerns. Furthermore, the return on the U.S. investment in India will likely only manifest itself in a major way in the medium to long term. That, combined with political and economic circumstances in India, might lead to “India fatigue” in the United States.

Recommendation:

You have already made a bet on India. In your second term, as you try to shape the emerging global order in a liberal direction, India’s role will become ever more important because of its size, geostrategic location, economic potential and democratic institutions. Accordingly, you need to ensure that your administration stays invested in that bet and perhaps even ups the ante. In many instances, it is India that needs to put more chips on the table. However, there are steps that the United States can take to help increase the momentum, as well as shape the context in which Indian decisions are made. These include working with Indian counterparts to implement existing agreements, conclude current negotiations, and explore new areas of collaboration, in particular in the energy and education sectors. Your administration should also signal sustained commitment to the relationship through continued consultations, high-level visits and timely personnel appointments. Active efforts are also needed to encourage movement on the Indian side, increase public outreach and facilitate the consolidation and creation of constituencies for the relationship beyond government.

Background:

The relationship with India has been one of the little-heralded foreign policy successes of your first term. The momentum, however, will not sustain itself. Along with the danger of drift, there is likelihood that bilateral differences rather than achievements will take center stage. Past irritants are likely to re-emerge. Your administration and the Indian government successfully navigated the tricky Iran sanctions-Indian oil imports issue last year. However, if the situation with Iran worsens and conflict breaks out, Delhi and Washington might find themselves on opposite sides. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan, in the context of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, might create another area of potential difference. The United States has recently encouraged Indian involvement in Afghanistan and a U.S.-India-Afghanistan trilateral is in place. There are already concerns in India, however, that the U.S. desire to assuage Pakistan to facilitate the Afghanistan withdrawal might lead to a reversal of that position. There are also concerns that the United States will be less likely to pressure Pakistan on counter-terrorism issues related to India. Any renewed drive for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) might spark bilateral strain as well. U.S.-India relations have changed since the debate over the CTBT in the 1990s. But the CTBT issue could once again lead to contention between the two countries, which will not be restricted to the private sphere. Finally, as you carefully calibrate the relationship with the new leadership in Beijing, dormant Indian concerns about a G-2 or Sino-U.S. condominium will also likely arise again.

Avoiding drift and the dominance of differences will necessitate getting more deliverables from the numerous U.S.-Indian official dialogues. This means implementing agreements that have already been reached. In some cases, the major obstacles to implementation lie on the Indian side — the civil nuclear agreement is one such example — but there are others where the United States needs to act, including in the defense and technology areas. The expeditious completion of negotiations on other agreements would also help, including those related to bilateral investment, as well as defense technology and trade. These agreements have the potential to create opportunities for the U.S. private sector to invest in India and generate jobs here at home. It can also create new constituencies for the relationship, including at the state level, in both countries and demonstrate that the United States is interested in strengthening

India’s economy and security, as well as those of the United States. New assessments will be needed of other areas in which there can be substantive cooperation: space, maritime, and cyber-security offer opportunities. The United States and India should try to move from consultation in these areas to joint initiatives. An updated feasibility study on a free trade agreement with India could also clarify the desirability of moving on that front.

While diplomatic, defense and economic engagement get the most attention, cooperation elsewhere could bear fruit, particularly in the energy and education sectors. Your administration’s efforts should include urging Indian reform of its higher education sector to allow the participation of American universities. Meanwhile, research collaboration, academic exchanges, and university linkages should be facilitated, and you should encourage India to review visa procedures to facilitate more American citizens studying and working there. U.S. immigration reform that includes addressing the question of the mobility of high-skilled workers could strengthen the U.S. hand in encouraging these changes. On the energy front, the administration should work to allow the export of natural gas to India, while explaining that this is not the major solution that many in India seem to think it is. Furthermore, there should be additional progress on cooperative clean energy initiatives and the opening up of the energy infrastructure sector in India to greater U.S. investment.

Progress in these areas will require difficult domestic decisions for the Indian government. Yet recent statements and actions from Delhi have shown that it recognizes the magnitude of the problems and the need for foreign investment and cooperation. Progress on these issues would also encourage engagement from state governments, corporations, civil society and individuals on both sides. Finally, while offering opportunities for the American people and corporations, these initiatives would also help build physical and human capacity in India, and demonstrate U.S. investment in India’s future.

The quality of bilateral interaction will also need to improve further. As personnel change on the U.S. end and, potentially, on the Indian side, there is a need to ensure that the level of trust and workinglevel cooperation that has been established is not lost. The relationship requires White House attention and coordination, which would be facilitated if an official responsible for India policy is appointed. Furthermore, India-related positions across government need to be filled speedily and not left vacant as they were in some high-profile instances in the first term. This is especially important since post-Afghanistan withdrawal and with the possible consolidation of South Asia bureaucracies, there is a danger that India will revert to being seen in the government as just another South Asian country. India’s involvement in the rest of the world is only going to increase. If the United States does not continue to engage with it on regional and functional issues outside South Asia, it will miss an opportunity to cooperate and increase the possibility that India will hinder U.S. interests.

There is a continuing need for attention and commitment at senior levels. You could make evident your personal interest by visiting India during your second term, making you the first U.S. president to visit India twice. A reciprocal visit from the Indian prime minister should also be encouraged. Such visits would be especially important if there is a change in leadership at the top in India.

An overarching challenge is how to facilitate movement with India without stepping on Indian sensitivities and becoming an issue in Indian domestic politics. First, your administration should continue to share with the Indian government your concern that “India fatigue” will make further progress on our end harder. India will need to help cultivate constituencies in the United States that support the relationship. In certain instances, pressure will be called for; ideally, it should be applied privately. Second, through a more vigorous and consistent public outreach effort in India, your administration needs to explain the content and objectives of its policies and agreements, as well as how India benefits. If the United States does not fill the vacuum, others will do so with misinformation or disinformation. Such an effort should also engage critics and, while keeping the sitting government informed, opposition leaders.

Conclusion:

You will need to manage the differences that the United States will continue to have with India and not underestimate the difficulties India’s rise might create for some U.S. interests, for example at the U.N. or in global trade talks. However, your judgment that the United States and India are natural partners and that the benefits of India’s rise outweigh any costs remains sound. But the relationship needs continued nurturing. It also requires sustained buy-in from legislators, corporations and individuals who have been key in driving the relationship; more recently their support has been flagging. Importantly, India needs to do its part too. It is likely that it will. India is concerned about an economic slowdown and the security situation in its neighborhood, especially involving China and Pakistan.

It also continues to aspire to a greater role on the world stage. And Indians realize that the United States can play a critical role in helping India achieve its security and economic goals to an extent that perhaps no other country can.

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Continuity and Change in Beijing: India-China Relations

Tanvi Madan — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Over the last year, there have been leadership transition processes in four of the five permanent UN Security Council members. In East Asia, leadership elections or selections will have taken place in China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan over 2012. The transition in China has perhaps raised the most questions about whether it will lead to policy continuity or change. This is not just because of the high leadership turnover or because it is a once-in-a-decade process. It is also because, as a result of China's growing influence in the world and interactions with other countries, including India, what happens in Beijing does not stay in Beijing.

What has actually transpired there? The 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held last month, selected members of its Central Committee. That body selected members of the elite Politburo, seven of whom were chosen to be in the Politburo Standing Committee (psc). From that key ruling body, Xi Jinping has been appointed party general secretary, the first among equals in what is a collective leadership system, and designated president. He and designated premier Li Keqiang are likely to remain on the psc till 2022. Overall, the turnover in party leadership has been significant and, over the next few months, further changes will take place at the central and provincial government levels.

This turnover has led to much discussion abroad about the potential impact on China's foreign policy. It is rare to hear the phrase "I don't know from foreign policy pundits, but it is an oft-heard one in response to questions about the attitudes of the leaders who will be taking over in Beijing. Significant turnovers in leadership in any country give rise to questions about policy implications. Experts on Chinese domestic politics highlight a few reasons why these are especially difficult to answer in China's case. First, in one-party systems like that of China, individuals do not rise to the top by publicly standing out from the crowd. Their worldviews, policy preferences and leadership styles are, thus, relatively unknown. Second, in a system that has been labelled "one party, two coalitions, how factional politics will play out in the various leadership bodies is also uncertain. Third, while psc members are no strangers to officialdom, having held positions at the central or provincial levels, they have not been part of the foreign policy apparatus and their views on international affairs are not evident. Another reason for the uncertainty at the moment is that the transition is ongoing. Government appointments will only be formalised in March 2013 when the National People's Congress meets and when we will also get a clearer sense of the foreign policy leadership team.

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Tanvi Madan

Publication: India Today

Image Source: © B Mathur / Reuters

The Foreign Policy Debate: Key Issues and Omissions

Tue, 23 Oct 2012 10:30:00 -0400

On October 22, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney met in the last presidential debate of 2012, this time focusing on foreign policy. Read the reactions to the debate by Brookings Foreign Policy experts: Justin Vaïsse looks at Romney’s caution regarding military interventions and what the debate reveals about the foreign policy mood of American public opinion; Feng Wang analyzes current U.S.-China relations and the candidates’ statements on trade and political dialogue with China; Steven Pifer examines the U.S.-Russia relationship and how each candidate plans to approach Russia if elected; Tanvi Madan comments on the omission of India from the debate, and the importance of addressing the U.S.-India relationship in the future. Diana Negroponte evaluates Romney’s statements on Iran and Afghanistan.

It's Official: Come Home, America
Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy

The striking thing about Republican nominee Mitt Romney's position in this third presidential debate was how much he retreated from the military assertiveness he seemed to have embraced so far. Of course, he reaffirmed his support for a strong military and for increasing the defense budget. But consider this:

Romney did not call for a no-fly zone in Syria, as many hawks like Max Boot have suggested. He did not call for Congress to pre-authorize military action in Iran, as some of his neoconservative advisers like Elliott Abrams have advocated. He didn't criticize Obama for relying excessively on drone strikes instead of human operations, a choice that hampers the collection of intelligence by obliterating sources of information, as many critics of the president like Charles Krauthammer have rightly charged. He didn't qualify his endorsement of the 2014 deadline in Afghanistan by saying that he would consider the situation on the ground and ask the generals, like he had before.

Instead, Romney insisted that America's purpose "is to make sure the world is peaceful. We want a peaceful planet... I want to see peace... We don't want another Iraq. We don't want another Afghanistan." As for military action, it is "the last resort. It is something one would only, only consider if all of the other avenues had been tried to their full extent."

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Beyond Trade with China
Feng Wang, Director, Brookings-Tsinghua Center and Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center

In their last presidential election debate on October 22^nd, both President Obama and Governor Romney acknowledged that China as a partner, and put economics on the top of their agenda for their China policy. For relations between the world’s largest and the second largest economies, such a stand from both candidates is assuring.

When asked about his plan to designate China the status of currency manipulator on day one of his administration, Governor Romney stood by his promise and also explained why he believed that China might not want to enter into a trade war with the United States: the trade disparity between the U.S. and China. China exports much more to the U.S. than vice versa, and China therefore needs the U.S. market more than the U.S. does.

Whether China chooses to have a trade war with the U.S. may depend more than the economic calculations Governor Romney laid out, as economic decisions are rarely made on economic considerations alone. A designation of the currency manipulator status, after the Chinese RMB has appreciated substantially over the last few years, will not only set the new tone of the U.S.-China relations, should Governor Romney enter the White House in January 2013, it could well have ramifications that can cloud the U.S.-China relations for an extended time period, a year or more, which will not help a recovering U.S. economy.

As with the U.S., China is under a leadership transition. A new Chinese leadership will be fully in place by March 2013, with the transition beginning in public two days after the U.S. presidential election, on November 8^th in Beijing, when the Chinese Communist Party begins its 18^th National Congress. The emerging Chinese leadership would not want to appear "soft" when faced with a gesture from a new U.S. administration that is seen as not fully justified and overtly hostile. Domestic politics here in China, hence, will almost certainly affect any decisions that the new Chinese leadership will make. If there is any doubt about such a prospect, the recent chilling of Sino-Japanese economic relations resulting from the island territory dispute is a fresh reminder.

Governor Romney and Russia as America’s Geopolitical Foe
Steven Pifer, Director, Arms Control Initiative and Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

In last night’s debate with President Obama, Governor Romney again reiterated that Russia is America’s major geopolitical foe. To be sure, the U.S.-Russia relationship faces tough issues; Vladimir Putin will not be easy to deal with and has taken Russia backwards on democracy. But the bilateral relationship is more complex than the governor suggests. U.S. and Russian interests converge on certain issues, and cooperation on those questions makes eminent good sense.

One explanation for the governor’s view may be a political calculation that taking a strong stance against Russia plays well with a segment of the American electorate. Both countries seem to suffer something of a lingering Cold War hangover. Indeed, during his presidential campaign late last year and early this year, Mr. Putin played the anti-U.S. card in a thinly veiled appeal to the conservative part of his Russian constituency.

But the fact remains: whoever sits in the Oval Office in 2013, he will seek Moscow’s help on key questions. Take Afghanistan. Russia the past three years has permitted the United States and NATO to move manpower and supplies—including lethal military equipment—through Russia and Russian airspace to Afghanistan. Washington will want to ensure that it continues to have that access, or is Mr. Romney prepared to depend solely on the Pakistanis, who cut the supply routes to Afghanistan last year following the killing of Osama bin Laden?

Moscow has not come as far as Washington would like in pressuring Tehran, but it has come further than anyone would have predicted a few years ago. The Russians in the UN Security Council supported stronger sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, including an embargo on all arms sales. That came at a price for them; they ended up cancelling a previously concluded sale of sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran. Planners in the U.S. and Israeli air forces, which could be called upon to carry out strikes against Iran, undoubtedly appreciate that they would not have to contend with the S-300. Would Mr. Romney be prepared to see that Russia cooperation unravel?

The Obama administration’s "reset" in Russia policy was based on a calculation that showing a readiness to take account of some Russian concerns, for example, with regards to nuclear arms control, could produce Russian support on questions such as Afghanistan and Iran. Maintaining Russian help on these questions, which will be at the top of the White House in box next year, will be important.

Managing the complex U.S.-Russia agenda has never been easy. The governor has criticized the reset and called for showing more backbone and less flexibility in dealing with Moscow. That might make for good campaign rhetoric, but as with most international relationships, Washington must take account of at least some of the other country’s interests if it seeks that country’s support. The challenge is to find a balance between cooperation where interests converge while defending U.S. positions where positions differ. Simply reiterating time and again that Russia is America’s geopolitical foe does not appear to recognize that complexity.

Just Breathe: Why Sometimes Not Being Mentioned in a Debate is a Good Thing
Tanvi Madan, Director and Fellow, The India Project

Following the foreign policy debate between President Obama and Governor Romney last night, there was much comment about the omission of a number of countries and issues. Among the Indian Twitterati – as well as others in the Twitterverse – there was some consternation about the fact that neither candidate mentioned India. Laments followed about what this said about the state of the U.S.-India relationship and about the importance of India. Viewed through a different prism, however, India should probably be glad that it was left out of the discussion last night.

Consider the countries that did get mentioned the most (leaving aside Mali): Afghanistan, China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Syria. They are either countries (a) on which the two candidates disagree, (b) considered to be in crisis or a threat to U.S. national security, and/or (c) seen as important to mention because they are perceived by the candidates as resonating in crucial swing states like Ohio (China) and Florida (Israel).

Seen in this context, Indians and advocates of India might want to breathe a sigh of relief that it was not mentioned. For one, there aren't major disagreements between the candidates on India: if anything when India has come up in this campaign cycle, it has been mostly in the context of who has done more (or less) to maintain and further support the U.S.-India relationship. Second, it is a good sign for India that it is not seen as being in crisis. To remember what that was like, think about the time when it was most often brought up in discussion as being part of the "most dangerous place in the world." India is also not seen as a threat. China was the large Asian country that was portrayed as threatening—either to U.S. jobs at home or to American economic and security interests around the world. Advocates of India and U.S.-India relations should probably be glad that, unlike the rise of China, India’s rise was not mentioned by the moderator just before he asked, "What do you believe is the greatest future threat to the national security of this country?" Finally, in previous campaigns when India has come up as a political issue, it has been in the negative (think outsourcing and the Obama campaign labeling then-Senator Clinton as the Democratic senator from Punjab in the 2008 primaries). Indian-Americans, while more and more politically active and seen by both parties as increasingly important to court, have not reached the stage where they are seen to mean the difference between a swing state being in the D column or the R column. So, positive shout-outs to India in the political context weren’t likely to be high on the priority list of either candidate. Advocates of U.S.-India relations should be thankful that India at least did not come up in the negative, with China instead taking the heat on outsourcing.

Overall, there were some other omissions that were more surprising – the Eurozone crisis and the pivot/rebalancing towards Asia among others. In a debate where a country like China was only mentioned 10-15 minutes before the debate was scheduled to end, the lack of mention of India was hardly a surprise. One can debate the overall quality and range of the foreign policy discussion yesterday, but the omission of India from the discussion should not spark another round of doubt and hand-wringing about the U.S.-India relationship. There’s a broader case to be made that India needs to think about what it needs to do to maintain its importance to the U.S. and that it can’t take this importance for granted. Even if it had been a critical or long-term ally, however, this would not have guaranteed a mention. After all, think about how much—or rather how little—countries like Australia, Britain, Japan and South Korea came up.

New Realism Emerges in the Third Presidential Debate
Diana Villiers Negroponte, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Latin America Initiative

Much of what the candidates debated last night was “old hat.” We knew ahead of time of foreign policy positions long held, as well as those which had evolved. But there were two pieces of news:

First, Governor Romney supported bilateral talks with the Iranians. Our mission in Iran “is to dissuade Iran from having a nuclear weapon through peaceful and diplomatic means.” He welcomed “potentially having bilateral discussions with the Iranians to end their nuclear program.” The exchange indicated that such a dialogue maybe underway, although President Obama denied newspaper reports of such talks. Romney reiterated his call for tighter sanctions, diplomatic isolation and called for the international community to indict Ahmadinejad for his genocidal rhetoric against Israel. What he did not discuss was his support for, or objection to, the International Criminal Court in which such an indictment might be presented. Romney’s support for bilateral negotiations indicates awareness of the need to counter Iran through a wider range of options.

Second, Governor Romney stated that he would leave no U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. “I will bring our troops out by the end of 2014…our troops will come home at that point.” No longer would Romney wait to hear from senior military advisors. Now, he supports President Obama’s decision to withdraw combat troops in 2014. What remains uncertain is whether a residual force of trainers and logisticians would remain under a Status of Forces agreement that is still to be negotiated.

Both news items indicate that the realism which should accompany a potential Commander in Chief has settled upon Romney’s shoulders. Both candidates are conscious of the global role that the U.S. assumes. Neither candidate shared U.S. national security interests with multilateral institutions, or allies. Neither was isolationist. Instead, we saw two robust men project U.S. power in a way that may disturb our friends because it indicated that the U.S. is ready to act unilaterally when necessary.

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Red or Blue: Is a Republican or Democratic President Better for U.S.-India Relations?

Tanvi Madan — Sat, 01 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

There had been a “little bit of retreat, little bit of backsliding” in US-India relations under the Obama administration, noted Mitchell Reiss, an advisor to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, last week. He emphasised that a Romney administration would “restore” relations. These comments provide fodder for the view that Republican presidents have generally been better than Democratic ones. This narrative, however, does not really hold up.

Given how often one hears the assessment that Republican presidents are better for India, it is easy to forget how recent this belief is. Historically, the opposite view has been held, with many in India cheering when Democrats won. There was more support for India among Democrats through the 1960s, but backing for India was not restricted to one side of the aisle. Republicans like President Eisenhower came to support India, especially in its development race against China. Republicans in the Congress also joined Democratic presidents in passing aid legislation for India. In the narrative of US-India relations, however, credit for any bonhomie was given to Democrats. Policymakers like John F. Kennedy and Chester Bowles were considered heroes in the pantheon of US-India relations, while Republicans like John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon were seen as villains.

The more recent contention that Republican presidents are better for India can be traced to the perception that the Clinton administration, for years, emphasised non-proliferation above all else in its relations with India and to the landmark India-US nuclear deal signed under the Bush administration. For about the last decade and a half, however, three different presidents have proclaimed that a strong relationship with India is in US interests. Barack Obama has not shown any sign that he is “anti-India.” Some have pointed to his rhetoric about Bangalore and the invocation of India in campaign ads attacking Romney on the issue of outsourcing. These ads, however, are not generated because the administration is anti-India or wants to limit US-India economic ties, but because certain aspects of Romney’s business background appear to make him vulnerable. Neither an Obama nor a Romney administration will make policy on the basis of whether its key policymakers are anti- or pro-India. In both cases, policy will be based on the perception of US interests and India’s role in helping achieve them.

Regardless of which party wins later this year, major agreements like the nuclear deal are unlikely to be repeated. Even if a potential Romney administration makes concessions to India of the kind made under the nuclear deal, they are likely to come with higher expectations. Republicans have based their support of India on certain assumptions: shared democratic values, shared interests, especially vis-a-vis China, and the potential of India as a market for American capital and goods. If India is not seen to cooperate with the US on the last two fronts, Republican policymakers are likely to question the value of India.

A change in administration is not a pre-requisite for change to occur. The Clinton administration’s approach toward India, for example, changed over time. The Bush administration, which came to office emphasising the need to prioritise India, spent considerable time building a relationship with Pakistan. Earlier Indian complaints that the Obama administration was building relations with China at the expense of India have been subdued by the declaration of a US “pivot” to Asia. Evolving strategic circumstances can change an administration’s priorities. Changes in personnel or positions when a president gets re-elected can also bring in people with different backgrounds, worldviews and styles.

In Washington today, there is support for a strong relationship with India across party aisles. The major task ahead is to maintain the momentum and follow through on the various agreements reached under the last three administrations — which will require effort on both sides, regardless of who wins the elections. This approach does not preclude significant change; it may indeed lay the basis for it.

Authors

Tanvi Madan

Publication: The Indian Express

Image Source: Eric Thayer / Reuters

Sanctions on Iran: Implications for Energy Security

Fri, 29 Jun 2012 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 29, 2012
9:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
Falk Auditorium
1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Next month, international economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran will intensify dramatically. Although Iran has been the target of various U.S. and multilateral sanctions throughout most of the past three decades, the latest measures are the most severe in history. These actions have been credited with reviving Iran’s interest in negotiations with the world, but they have yet to persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, and are creating new challenges for the international coalition that has sought to constrain Iran. They also pose new uncertainties for energy markets and the international economy at a precarious period in the global recovery and the U.S. presidential campaign.

On June 29, Foreign Policy at Brookings will hosted a discussion assessing the wide-ranging implications of the Iran sanctions regime and considered the prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120629_sanctions_iran

The Future of Energy Security

Tue, 23 Jan 2007 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 23, 2007
2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Three factors are dramatically affecting international energy markets: the rise of China and India as major global economic powers, the continued growth in U.S. energy demand, and instability in key oil-exporting regions. Prospects for stable production are increasingly linked to internal political issues and the regional ambitions of major suppliers. As energy security is becoming a more important factor in countries' national security and economic development calculations, these dynamics will affect the global balance of power.

On January 23, Brookings hosted the inaugural Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series event with a panel comprised of leading energy experts who have written extensively on these issues. The goal of the series is to present research findings and analyze the implications of the actions of three key energy-consuming nations: China, India, Japan, and a major producing nation, Russia.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20070123

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Peter C. Evans

Director, Global Oil, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

Tanvi Madan

University of Texas at Austin, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs

Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: India

Tanvi Madan — Wed, 01 Nov 2006 00:00:00 -0500

Growth demands energy. It is no wonder that India—with an economy expected to grow at over 5 percent a year for the next twenty-five years—has developed a ravenous appetite for energy. India is the world's fifth largest consumer of energy, and by 2030 it is expected to become the third largest, overtaking Japan and Russia.

The country's demand for oil alone is expected to increase at an average rate of 2.9 percent annually over the next quarter century. Yet India has only 0.4 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, and domestic production is expected to remain constant, if not decline. Absent the discovery of major reserves—which most analysts view as unrealistic— it is clear that India will remain a net importer of oil. If consumption follows the current trajectory, India is also projected to run out of coal, its primary source of energy, in forty years. Its domestic natural gas reserves are limited as well.

India's import dependence has intensified concerns that without reliable, affordable energy it will be unable to sustain high economic growth. India imports (to varying degrees) its three major sources of energy, and its dependence on imported oil is expected to increase even further. The situation is complicated by a number of factors: 1) major oil suppliers are in unstable regions in the Middle East and Africa; 2) oil prices are high, spurring higher gas prices; 3) geopolitical uncertainty stokes fears of a possible supply disruption and volatility in oil prices; 4) slow market reform has limited investment; and 5) few or no viable energy alternatives currently exist: India's civilian nuclear program has regularly fallen behind schedule and large-scale development of hydroelectricity generation facilities has been stymied. Development of nonconventional energy sources has progressed, but their use is currently limited.

This report, a study of India's energy demands and policymaking, was written by Tanvi Madan, formerly a senior research analyst at the Brookings Institution and currently a Harrington Doctoral Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin. Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen also contributed to this monograph, as did Sidney Kwiram, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, and Arti Trehan of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

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