Brookings: Experts - Mirette F. Mabrouk

The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

With violent protests following the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, and calls for a new unified government amid dire comments about the stability of Egypt, the world’s attention is again on President Morsi and his country. This follows a tumultuous period last month, when Egyptians went to the polls and ratified a new constitution. The document, criticized as hurried, incomplete, and lacking in consensus is enormously contentious.

In the Saban Center’s newest Middle East Memo, The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution, nonresident fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk gives a broad overview of the new constitution, and provides context and analysis for specific sections.

Mabrouk outlines several ways in which, she argues, the document is shaky on the protection of freedoms and rights, particularly those of women, some religious minorities and minors. Mabrouk also encourages analysts to stop viewing this situation as an Islamist/ secular divide, arguing that idea is too simplistic, and lacks the context for greater understanding of Egypt’s domestic politics.

Download » (PDF)

Downloads

The View From a Distance: Egypt’s Contentious New Constitution

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: © Stringer Egypt / Reuters

Taking Stock: Have the Square’s Demands Been Granted?

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 24 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was originally published by Tahrir Squared.

Nobody said it would be easy. But it is probably fair to assume that the majority of the people who crowded into Tahrir Square two years ago, and those who filled squares all over Egypt, had little idea of how difficult things might get.

At the time, there were few signs of the domestic turmoil, economic instability and the social polarization that would grip the country. In addition to the millions who took to the streets, the revolution was supported by many more millions who provided moral and material support, in terms of food, money and medicine for the revolutionaries. Egyptians, for the first time in many decades, were bound together, regardless of religion, gender or ethnicity, by their hope and aspirations for a better country. The cry that resonated above all was the one that would epitomize the revolution: “Bread, Freedom and Social Equality.” Two years, one dissolved Islamist-dominated parliament, an elected Islamist president and a contentious new constitution later, the fervor has died down and it is time to take stock of where we stand on these demands.

Bread.

Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat and most of it makes its way into subsidized bread. Traditionally, subsidized bread has been the mainstay of Egypt’s poor and both former presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak learnt that a shortage in supply was the one sure way to trigger mass riots. The 2012/2013 budget shows that the subsidy will be at just over 24 PT per loaf, the highest yet. In his big October 6th speech, President Mohamed Morsi boasted of an 80 percent improvement to Egypt’s bread services. He did not mention where this figure came from or from what criteria it involved but it is unlikely that a large swathe of Egyptians (many of whom voted for him) would agree with him. Since the revolution, and indeed, since Morsi took office, sporadic shortages have resulted in outbreaks of violence in bread queues, especially in Upper Egypt. The government has already floated the idea of liberalizing the price of flour and introducing a new, better quality loaf at twice the price. It remains to be seen how a people who cannot afford a 5PT loaf will greet a 10PT loaf.

However, bread can also be a metaphor for a country’s health and Egypt isn’t doing too well. Since the revolution, the country’s growth has plummeted from almost 7 percent to about 1.6 percent. The political turmoil disrupts business and a newfound national enthusiasm for striking hasn’t helped. Foreign investors have shied away; Egypt’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the first quarter of 2012 limped in at around $218 million, compared to just over $2 billion during the same time in 2011. Unemployment is officially at 12.6 percent. However, figures change. The current deficit of around 11 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) might be sound bad but it was once 17 percent in the early 1990s and just under 8 percent before the revolution. The problem is that so far, despite the promises of our first democratically elected president, there doesn’t appear to be a plan to tackle the problem. The situation is further complicated by the fact that it’s uncertain who’s making the tough economic decisions. While Egypt has a government, it is uncertain how much influence it actually wields, in comparison to that of the elite of the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi’s party. And, as it turns out, running a charity organization for eight decades does not necessarily qualify one to run a country. As a senior banker recently told the Washington Post, “they don’t have the right calibre of people to do the job.” Nor do they seem to want to take advice; at a recent seminar at a major regional economic think tank which pulled together cabinet personnel and independent observers, not one Islamist economic advisor was present, despite having been invited.

Freedom

Last November, prominent Salafi leader and Al-Nour party member Yasser Borhami praised the new constitution, saying that it “included full restrictions which never existed in earlier Egyptian constitutions.” He was especially keen on Article 10 which states that “the state and society shall be keen on preserving the authentic characteristic of the Egyptian family.” “This,” he said, “is an extremely important article since it places restrictions on freedom of thought, expression and creativity.” An endorsement of this kind does not spell good news for any rights activist.

The new constitution is classically ambiguous about freedoms. Article 45 guarantees the freedom of thought and opinion. However, Article 44 prohibits insulting messengers and prophets, without defining what constitutes an insult, while Article 31 prohibits insulting anyone at all. An offending article on gender rights, which said that women were equal to men as long as it didn’t contravene Shariah was dropped. However, the remaining article mentions only equality, without gender, therefore failing to guard against gender bias, particularly in light of the fact that Article 10 specifies that the state “shall balance between a woman’s obligations towards family and public work.” It is not the state’s job to lay out what women’s obligations are, particularly when it so conspicuously refuses to do so for men. The result will be that relevant legislation will have to ensure that any occupation a woman may pursue will not conflict with her ability to “balance between family and public work.” Considering that an estimated 30 percent of Egyptian households are supported exclusively by women, this clause represents not only gender bias but a dangerously unrealistic view of the labour market, particularly in the informal sector.

Our new constitution explicitly permits child labour after school-leaving age (14) although children younger may also work, providing the work is “suitable for their age.” Religious freedom has been limited to Jews, Christians and Muslims; the constitution doesn’t recognize any other religions. Egypt’s Bahai population have already heard from the minister of education that since they don’t belong to this club, their children are not entitled to public education (despite their paying taxes).

Egypt’s labour unions, a main proponent of the revolution, have also felt the noose tightening. Following his November 22nd constitutional declaration, Morsi quietly ratified a law that might help bring Egypt’s fractious and independent labour unions to heel. It places an age cap of 60 on all board members of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation and allows the (MB) minister of manpower to appoint new members if a seat becomes vacant - if, for example, a board member were over 60.

However, the biggest squeeze has been felt by the media; since Morsi’s election in late June there have been 24 cases brought against media people for of defamation and insulting the president. For reference, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information says there have been 14 such cases over the past 115 years.

It may be the one area of public life where the Brotherhood have exceeded expectations.

Social Equality.

A major criticism of the former regime was that while the country saw growth, very little wealth ever made its way down the ranks. The “trickle-down theory” of economics, which supposes that wealth and economic benefits provided by government to businesses and the wealthy will “trickle down” and benefit poorer members of society, improving the economy as a whole, just didn’t work in Egypt. However, two years later, under a new government, there is little evidence that this is going to materialize any time soon. It isn’t simply that the economy is in tatters. There are deeper problems, among them that Egypt’s much vaunted new constitution is based on the 1971 document. There are several problematic holdovers but one of the most damaging is that the new constitution fails to correct the emphasis on central government. While article 188 of the new constitution allows for the election of local councils, 190 says that their decisions may be overturned by the central government if it is in “the public interest.” An article in an earlier draft, which attempted to redress the gross financial disparity between governorates, never made it into the document Egyptians ratified. As a result, poverty will continue to be most widespread outside Cairo.

The above issues are further complicated by an unstable security situation—with a police force that refuses to reform but has failed to recapture its pre-revolutionary grip on the country—and a chaotic political scene. Two months away from new parliamentary elections, Egypt’s fractious opposition are still ignoring two years’ worth of lesson and failing to put aside ideological differences and personal greed. It is not surprising that despite the Brotherhood’s steadily declining performance at the polls and a reputation tarnished by greed and violence, a senior MB member recently predicted that it would gain 55 percent of the seats at upcoming elections.

The picture, however, is nowhere near as dark as it seems from the above. It must be remembered that while the results might not have been universally popular, Egypt had its first ever democratically elected parliament and civilian president. And Egyptians have learnt much over the past two years. They have learnt that dictators fall and that public accountability is a right and not a campaign slogan. They have learnt that the Brotherhood’s charity comes at a price. That the Army remains the country’s main power broker and that its concern for Egypt is often tempered by its own interests. That the opposition are slow to learn, and slower yet to capitalize on that learning. But perhaps the most important lesson is one that has been absorbed by all the players; Egyptians have learnt that there is strength in numbers, and at the end of the day, they must rely on themselves.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Tahrir Squared

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

The Trust Deficit in Egypt

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Tue, 27 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Mohamed Morsi may be a new president but he’s developing a very steep learning curve. Last Thursday, possibly buoyed by his success in negotiating a ceasefire in Gaza, Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi released a new constitutional declaration giving himself almost unlimited, if supposedly temporary power. The declaration says that any law or decision issued by the president is exempt from revocation by any other party or institution. It also says that the existing Shura or Senate Council and the much-beleaguered Constituent Assembly may not be dissolved by any court order, thereby preempting verdicts, expected early next month, on both bodies.

More disturbingly, in Article 6, he has given himself the power to employ all “necessary procedures and measures” needed to confront any “danger threatening the January 25 revolution, the life of the nation, national unity, safety of the nation, or curbing state institutions in performing their roles." That sounds like an emergency law.

Contrary to the claims of his many detractors, Morsi is not acting in a vacuum. As far as its democratic transition is concerned, the country is in a state of near paralysis. The democratically elected parliament was dissolved on a technicality of the electoral process, leaving Egypt with no legislative body, and the economy is buckling at the knees. If the Islamist-majority Constituent Assembly were to be dissolved, the democratic transition would be delayed for an unknown period. As of the beginning of the week, less than a third of the Assembly remained, the rest having walked out. The draft of the constitution that it has produced was unacceptable, for one reason or another, to a spectrum of members, comprising liberals, secular, Christians, feminists and human rights and labor activists. However, Egypt’s opposition has failed, miserably, to put aside its own differences and come up with a cohesive front.

The current constitutional declaration clearly states that if the constituent assembly fails to complete its task in the allotted time (six months, about to run out) then Morsi would have to personally appoint a new one. Given the open rejection of the current formation, the chances of any assembly he appoints achieving favor, or, more importantly, success, are extremely slim. It would be another misstep.

Read the full article »

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Atlantic Council

Image Source: © Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Muslims Need to Find a Better Way to Protest

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 20 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In this op-ed from Egypt Independent, Mirette Mabrouk writes that in light of creative works that offend audiences of different religions, Muslims have a duty to object to works that offend them, but must do so in non-violent ways.

In 1987, the American artist Andres Serrano won an award from the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art for his photograph entitled “Immersion (Piss Christ).” It depicted a small plastic crucifix submerged in what appeared to be a yellow liquid. Serrano later said the liquid was his own urine.

The photograph wasn’t displayed in public for another two years, and when it was, it predictably set off a storm among devout Christians. Complicating what was already a volatile issue was the small matter that the US$15,000 award had been partly sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts, a United States government agency that offers support and funding for artistic projects. In other words, the U.S. taxpayer had helped fund a picture of Christ in a glass of urine.

There was an outcry throughout the U.S. — Serrano received hate mail and death threats and, when the photograph was exhibited abroad, it was vandalized both in Australia and France.

But no one died. The U.S. embassy was not torched in either country, despite the American government being a sponsor of the work.

Western galleries and cinemas are full of art and films denigrating Christ, God and various other tenets of the Christian faith. Mel Gibson’s “The Passion of the Christ” offered what many thought was an incredibly unflattering portrait of Jewish characters but while there was much anger, irate Jews did not scale his garden walls setting fire to his shrubbery. Or put a bounty on his head.

Last week, U.S. embassies were attacked in Benghazi, in Cairo, in Tunis and Khartoum. While the facts remain unclear, it appears that the attacks were originally instigated by Salafis, hardline Muslims with their own agendas. What is clear is that the storming of the embassy in Libya led to the deaths of four people, among them the ambassador, Christopher Stevens, by all accounts an Arabist who was attached to Libya and its people.

The initial reason given for the attacks was that Muslims were livid over a film, “Innocence of Muslims,” that mocked the Prophet Mohamed, allegedly made by an Israeli-American named Sam Bacile. It later transpired that the film is little more than a trailer with astonishingly bad production value and the actors involved claimed they had been duped, not realizing they were making a film about Islam. And according to reports Bacile is apparently Californian, an Egyptian Copt, with a criminal record to boot.

By now it has become a cliche to say that the riots weren’t really about the film, but rather about other domestic grievances. This is almost certainly true; there are multiple facets as to who was demonstrating and why, but that’s another discussion. For the purposes of this discussion, however, one fact is very clear: there is no doubt that the film produced precisely the reaction that its makers must have intended. Once again, Muslims around the world reacted violently to someone expressing an opinion which runs contrary to theirs. In Egypt, Islamist President Mohamed Morsy, the first Egyptian president who actually has to take public opinion into consideration, played populist politics. Assessing that parliamentary elections might be around the corner, he pandered to popular opinion. It took him over a day to denounce the attacks in Cairo. Egypt’s consul general in New York tweeted that the president had asked that the American authorities take legal action against the filmmakers. This move could only be a populist one since the president must be perfectly well aware that there are no legal measures to be taken. The first amendment of the American constitution protects freedom of expression and religion. Hate speech may be reviled, but it’s legal. The only exception is if the speech is likely to directly incite violence.

The timing of the attacks is horrific (or excellent, depending on one’s viewpoint), coming as they do on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks and so close to the American presidential elections. There are few things which limit an administration’s ability to exercise diplomatic leeway like an election. And apart from the abhorrent nature of the attacks, they have handed Islamophobes cutlery and a napkin. The Arab Spring, they say, has accomplished nothing more than exposing the true, barbaric face of religious extremism. The eyes of the world are upon us and we’re not a pretty sight.

While the situation is anything but simple, there are a few facts that we need to grasp.

The first is that no one owes us anything. Non-Muslims do not have to automatically understand, or appreciate, that some Muslims are so devout that they would die, or worse, kill, for their religion and their Prophet.

The second is that holding governments responsible for the actions of individuals is both reductive and counter-productive. Every time there is an Islamist terrorist, we expect non-Muslims to understand and appreciate that these are the actions of an isolated fanatic few, from among a global population of 1.6 billion Muslims. If one follows this line of reasoning, why would we hold the United States ransom for the actions of a convicted criminal? Or indeed, for any Islamophobic speech, incident or film? If the National Endowment for the Arts gave a prize to a photograph depicting Christ submerged in urine in a country where Christians make up approximately 75 percent of the population, what entitles Muslims to demand the criminalization of what they consider to be blasphemy?

And finally, no one is suggesting that we don’t make a stand. When the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten printed 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet in 2005, the Pakistanis bombed the Danish Embassy. The Syrians, Lebanese and Iranians, among others, started fires at embassies in their countries. In Egypt, we stopped buying Danish butter — a far better idea.

Objection and protest is often at its most effective when it is non-violent, as proved by Gandhi and the U.S. civil rights movement. If Muslims object to any form of misrepresentation they have a duty to object. They also have a duty to do so in any number of ways which will not insult the faith they treasure. It is doubtful that any of those perpetrating violence to defend the Prophet’s honor remember that he insisted on not harming or insulting those who had harmed or insulted him.

In less esoteric terms, Muslims have a duty to object in way which will not bring the roof crashing down on the heads of Muslim minorities.

We do not have a monopoly on vilification. And the sooner we develop thicker skins and start dealing with the fact the better it will be, for everyone.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Egypt Independent

Bad News for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 13 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

You would never know there had been a revolution. Within the slightly grimy walls of Egypt's state-owned media buildings, it's business as usual. Observers would be forgiven for thinking the state television and papers are there largely as a public address system for whoever actually has their hands on the country's steering wheel.

Over the 30 years leading up to the 2011 popular uprising, state media took its cue from Hosni Mubarak's gatekeeper, the diminutive but terrifying Safwat el-Sherif, former minister of information. Post January 25, state media and papers backed the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the country's ruling military council. Last week, in a nod to the democratic process, it was the turn of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Egypt's upper house of parliament, the Shura Council, announced the appointments of the new editors, setting off a storm of angry protest among journalists, led by the Journalists' Syndicate, who insisted that the Islamist-dominated council had essentially rigged the selection process and assigned their own men to do its bidding.

There are 55 state-owned publications in Egypt under eight publishing institutions. Since 1979, they've been the responsibility of the Higher Press Council, majority-owned by the Shura Council (51 percent Council to 49 percent employees). Previously, editors-in-chief had been selected by the minister of information who presented the names to the Shura Council which ratified them in session. The arrangement guaranteed a lack of any press freedom since the Shura Council, like the People's Assembly, was overwhelmingly dominated by the National Democratic Party (NDP). The editors were political appointees and expected not so much to toe the party line, as to carve it into the ground for all to note. In March 2011, there was a shake-up, which saw most of these editors unceremoniously replaced by those who were perceived as supportive of the revolution. The appointments were understood to be temporary until the new ones, scheduled for this year, would be chosen from a list of candidates fulfilling preset criteria. Since the new Shura Council is as overwhelmingly dominated by Islamists -- mostly the MB's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) -- as the old one was by the NDP, the new appointments have been awaited with trepidation.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

The Precarious Position of Women and Minorities in Arab Spring Countries

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Fri, 01 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Anyone fearing for women’s rights these days should have been at the third plenary session of Brookings’ U.S. Islamic World Forum in Doha yesterday. On social change and the power of non-state actors, the panel pulled off a double whammy: both Tawwakul Karman and Zainah Anwar were present.

Karman is a Yemeni activist who founded Women Journalists without Chains. She is also the youngest Nobel Laureate ever and only the second female Muslim. She originally started campaigning for journalistic reform in 2007 and then continued to up the ante and was a pivotal figure in the protests that saw the fall of former President Aly Saleh. Her struggle is especially relevant in light of the fact that Yemen is one of the world’s poorest countries with, according to UN metrics, the worst record on gender equality.

Anwar is Malaysian, a founder of Sisters in Islam and the Director of Musawah, a global movement for equality and justice in Muslim countries.

It is one of those sad dichotomies of life that Islam is a religion which has accorded myriad rights and privileges to women but that Muslim-majority countries have a poor track record on gender equality. The Arab Spring revolts initially held great promise for women, who were at the forefront of demonstrations and fighting in every one of the countries touched by the upheavals. Since then, women feel there has been a steady movement to shove them to the back of the line.

In some cases, this is a literal comment: in Yemen’s Change Square, the epicenter of the revolt, there used to be a rope sectioning off the men from the women during the demonstrations. It’s now a wooden platform with a metal door. Women in some countries feel they have more to lose than others. Tunisia has been at the forefront of regional gender equality; its 1956 personal status code granted equality to men and women and legalized divorce and abortion- 19 years before abortion was legal in France, which Tunisia is often accused of following blindly. The post-revolutionary parliamentary elections saw women making up 28% of the national assembly (48% of the bloc gained by the Islamist party Ennahda). However, women fear that the Islamists will start to curtail their freedoms.

In Egypt, women have even more to worry about. They make up a miserable 2 percent of the People’s Assembly. Among the female deputies, Azza AL-Garf has become a national celebrity for her pronouncement on women’s duties. For women, she favors female genital mutilation and embroidery. There has been a steady stream of attempts to overturn legislation perceived to be in women’s favor. Among them is a divorce law granted in Islam which took over 1400 years to see the light of day in Egypt. It allows a woman an uncontested divorce and Islamists claim that it tears at the fabric of society and was only passed to please former first lady Suzanne Mubarak. They were stymied by both Al-Azhar’s legislation department and the Shariah legislation department of the Constitutional Court which both affirmed that the law was Islamic and constitutional. The National Council for Women, a governmental body, is constantly under attack for ‘undermining the fabric of society,’ clusters of bearded men often picketing silently outside its gates.

The assault on liberties is not limited to gender. In the midst of economic, social and political upheaval, minority rights are in serious danger. The excuse often given is, considering the long list of very real dangers, civil liberties are a luxury, not a priority. Egypt’s Coptic Christians, an estimated 10% of the population, are feeling threatened by the rising Islamist tide. Following the presidential elections, there were what can only be construed as attempts to stir up more sectarian strife, by claiming that Egypt’s Copts had voted en masse for former Mubarak aide and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik, thereby selling out the revolution. The claims conveniently ignored the fact that the greatest number of Shafik votes came from the Delta region, which has a minimal Coptic electorate. The governorates with the highest Coptic presence were one by the Nasserite candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi and the Muslim Brotherhood and leading candidates, Mohamed Mursi.

Other religious minorities, like Egypt’s tiny Shiaa or Bahaai populations are likely to feel even more threatened.

The rights of women and minorities are not luxuries. They are not matters that may be safely put away until one has the time to deal with them. They are intrinsic to the fabric of any stable, democratic society and if the countries of the Arab Spring truly want, or deserve, democracy then they must concentrate on citizenship, rather than populism. Listening to Karman and Anwar speak, I was struck by the fact that those wishing to marginalize women are likely to find it much more difficult to do than it was to unseat despotic regimes. It remains to be seen whether the same will hold true for minorities.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: Paul Morse

Egypt's Difficult Choice: The First Round Is Over, Now Comes the Hard Part

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Tue, 29 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Elections are vastly complicated affairs, the dominant characteristic of which appears to be unpredictability. Egypt’s presidential election in 2012 was no exception to this rule, and took everyone by surprise.

Of the 13 candidates, there were five frontrunners, arguably representing three different camps: 1) The Islamist camp, represented by Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi; 2) the “filul” camp, or remnants of the former regime, led by former Egyptian Foreign Minister and Arab League head Amr Moussa and former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik; and 3) the “revolutionary camp” represented by moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and Nasserite Hamdeen Sabbahi. Aboul Fotouh managed to straddle both camps through his “something for everyone” approach. A former Brotherhood Guidance Bureau member who finally split with the group over his decision to run for president, he gained a widespread following through his brand of moderate, inclusive Islam and liberal politics.

For months beforehand, most opinion polls predicted similar results. They placed Moussa as front-runner, with Aboul Fotouh hot on his heels, Shafik panting to keep up and Mursi lagging far behind. Sabbahi made discreet but insistent appearances at the back of the line, although he did keep edging closer to Morsi. There were some variations on this theme, with Moussa and Aboul Foutuh jockeying for first place but generally a run-off was expected between the two.

The televised presidential debate between the two presumptive front-runners— the Arab world’s first —is widely perceived to have damaged both their chances. Moussa’s performance was panned as arrogant and elitist and Aboul Fotouh came across as significantly more Islamist than he had in previous campaign appearances. The fact that the Salafists had just declared their backing for him didn’t do Aboul Fotouh any favors with his liberal constituency. Undecided voters who had been leaning toward Aboul Fotouh or Moussa in opinion polls began rapidly jumping ship.

The election that finally took place on May 23 and 24 yielded a result that has been widely hailed as Egypt’s worst-case-scenario (at least from the standpoint of liberals and revolutionaries): a run-off between the Brotherhood’s Morsi and Hosni Mubarak’s former right-hand man, Shafik. Those who did not vote for either candidate are paralyzed, caught between a candidate they do not want to vote for and one they feel they cannot vote for out of loyalty to the ideals of the revolution. The Egyptian electorate is rapidly polarizing into two camps and widespread abstentions are expected during the run-offs.

Of the many lessons learned in the first round, the first and most obvious is that it does not appear possible to obtain accurate polling data on Egyptian voters. The two frontrunners falsely projected by most polls came in at fourth and fifth position. Worse still, Sabbahi—placed in fourth or fifth position in every single poll—soared ahead, not only beating Moussa and Aboul Fotouh but roundly trouncing Morsi in areas traditionally considered Islamist strongholds like Alexandria. Sabbahi eventually placed third, a respectable showing for an underdog whose campaign resources and advertising budget were dwarfed by Morsi’s and Shafik’s.

The second lesson is that —contrary to popular assumptions — the Brotherhood does not have Egypt in its pocket. Morsi has been dismissively referred to as “El-Stibn” or “The Spare Tire” since the Brotherhood’s first-choice candidate, Khairat El-Shater, was disqualified by a court ruling, leaving the uncharismatic Morsi to fill in as a back-up. The organization itself is suffering from a huge loss of support as a result of lackluster performance in Parliament (where it controls 43 percent of the seats in the lower house), perceived collusion with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and tepid support for the revolution. The naked attempt at a power-grab during the formation of a Constitutional Assembly earlier this year exposed the group to public censure and ridicule, as did its failed attempt to withdraw confidence from Prime Minister Kamal Ganzouri’s cabinet. While the Brotherhood’s extraordinary mobilization tactics and overwhelming voter outreach network ensured that Morsi finally came out ahead, they gained less than half the votes they had won during the Parliamentary elections a mere six months ago. To add insult to injury, Shafik rode to victory in Sharqeya, Morsi’s hometown.

Shafik’s strong following could only have come as a huge surprise to those who have cocooned themselves from public opinion. While both Egypt’s liberals and its Islamists have been stridently vocal, neither has managed to draw in what is referred to as “the silent majority.” There was overwhelming national support for the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime but Egyptians have since been battered by the results: economic hardship resulting from a sharp downturn in Foreign Direct Investment, plummeting tourism revenues, and a newly timid and inefficient police force whose inaction has resulted in soaring crime. Shafik’s approach—and appeal—were direct. The Islamists have not delivered, the liberals have yet to offer anything tangible, and Shafik’s pledge to restore order, attack crime, and bring life back to “normal” was one that resonated powerfully with Egyptians who have lost patience with continued insecurity and unrest.

Shafik’s success has opened up deep fissures in Egyptian society, polarizing the country into perceived pro-revolution and anti-revolutionary camps. More disturbingly, there have been attempts to whip up sectarian divisions, with claims that Egypt’s Coptic Christians voted exclusively for Shafik. Absent among the strident calls, however, has been a willingness among either the liberals or Islamists to take responsibility for having failed to put forward a viable alternative.

Both Moussa’s and Aboul Fotouh’s poor showings were surprising (especially the latter’s, partially attributed to a betrayal by the Salafists whose promised votes failed to materialize) but no performance was more surprising than Sabbahi’s. Lacking the deep pockets and strong campaign teams of the other candidates, he nevertheless came from behind to snatch third place. His success does not, as has been suggested, represent a secret Egyptian yearning for a return to Nasserism. It represents a not-so secret Egyptian yearning for decent leadership: his supporters represent a broad cross-section of society who are simply looking for a competent policy maker capable of unifying and inspiring a nation in transition.

After the results, Sabbahi’s supporters submitted an appeal to the Supreme Presidential Electoral Committee (SPEC), as did Aboul Fotouh and Moussa, alleging electoral fraud. However, the committee has already released final results and declared that the run-off will be between Morsi and Shafik, and its findings cannot be appealed under the electoral law.

The elections also proved that pluralism has finally come to Egypt’s political sphere. Voters queued for up to seven hours, in some cases, refusing to give up or go away when procedural hitches stretched the waiting time. While the turnout was less than expected (only 46 percent compared to 62 percent in the parliamentary elections) the presidential election was fiercely contested and voters bucked all stereotypical expectations. The weeks leading to the run-off are likely to be strained and possibly violent, but Egyptians have already won. They have won the right to elect a leader, rather than have one imposed, to play a role in their future, rather than simply be dictated to. They have learnt the power of the ballot box and while the next president might represent a new faction, he will have to realize that it is no longer business as usual.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Atlantic Council

Image Source: © Ammar Awad / Reuters

In Egypt, Round One of the Elections Is Over. Now What?

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

In the wake of consistent rigging over the past 60 years, it’s hardly surprising that everything about these elections, from the spectacularly inefficient organization by the High Elections Commission (HEC) to the behavior of the parties competing, has been so eccentric. At this point, however, those Egyptians (and international observers) who are susceptible to panicking — presumably secular liberals and ethnic and religious minorities — should take a deep breath and consider the significantly more practical question: “Now what?”

That’s probably a question that everyone needs to mull over because it is time to take stock. As far as I can see, here’s where we stand.

More than 60 percent of seats voted on so far will go to Islamist candidates. Anyone who is surprised at the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) did well has not been paying attention over the last 80 years or so. Admittedly, their performance — an estimated 40 percent — has exceeded even their expectations (I personally would have capped their gains at around 30 percent, which is why you should never listen to analysts). The tepid success of the liberal parties was entirely to be expected. Over the months leading up to the elections they have presented the Egyptian voters with a sorry, splintered front. Unable or unwilling to take the long view, they have failed to coalesce or address the voters in any relevant manner. It might have been more efficient if there had been fewer newspaper editorials (in a country with a 30 percent illiteracy rate) and more street campaigning. While the Egyptian Bloc alliance (Free Egyptians and Egyptian Democrats) made a surprisingly decent showing, placing right behind the ultra-conservative Salafi Nour Party, the dismal performance of Egypt’s oldest liberal party, the Wafd Party, was a huge shock to many.

The biggest surprise, however, has been the runaway success of the Nour Party, which has raked in around 20 percent of the seats, posing a tough challenge to the combined liberals forces. Its success is terrifying liberals and minorities due to the party’s extremist views on women, minorities and personal freedoms.

It’s something of an odd situation because the upcoming parliament might not have any legislative power. It’s possible that it may be dissolved if the new constitution calls for such a move. Ostensibly, its main, potentially vital, task will be to help elect the constitutional committee that will rewrite Egypt’s constitution. This is where matters can potentially get very messy.

Power in Egypt currently lies with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). It would be difficult to overemphasize the extent to which the SCAF has whittled away public support for itself. Shortly before the elections, it presented the country with what became known as the Selmy Document (after Deputy PM Aly al-Selmy, who was unlucky enough to have to present it). The document was essentially a supra-constitutional charter, which enshrined the power of the military, protecting its budget from pesky civilian oversight and giving it control over the writing of the new constitution. According to the document, only 20 members of the 100 would have been elected by parliament, with the rest essentially coming from Mubarak-era institutions. The SCAF also had the power to ask for revisions and refer them to the Constitutional Court; one part of the judiciary that was also a Mubarak-era institution. However, the document did have its supporters, mostly among secular elites who saw it as a way of keeping the Islamists on a leash. The “it’s us or the Islamists” approach had worked out well for the former regime, and the SCAF apparently sees no reason to change a popular tune. Of course, this is why fascist governments were elected in Germany and Italy during the 1930s; they appeared cuddlier than the communists.

The Selmy document bears a great deal of responsibility for the November Tahrir uprising. Although massive public mobilization resulted in the SCAF announcing that presidential elections would take place in June 2012 (a year earlier than last announced), the document has still not formally been withdrawn.

So what happens next? The Brotherhood has no equal in terms of grass roots organization, and that includes all the former political parties. It has shown tremendous strength of will, risking popular disdain by refraining from joining the Tahrir uprisings; it had its eye on the elections and refused to be swayed. However, it has never ruled. Even when it won 20 percent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections, it was carefully denied any opportunity to influence policy-making by the National Democratic Party (NDP). It has gone to great lengths to reassure secular parties that it intends to rule by example rather than by imposing draconian religious law. It has said that it will work with secular parties and indeed formed an alliance with several before the elections. On matters of finance and economy, with the exception of an emphasis on social justice, it doesn’t actually differ all that much from the NDP.

However, that was when overwhelming success was a probability. Now that it appears a certainty, the promise of finally attaining what’s been denied it for almost a century is apparently making the Brotherhood tremble. The party contested significantly more seats than it had first promised to; it saw secular members of its alliance flee before the elections. It leapt up and insisted that the majority in parliament had the right to appoint the cabinet. In its excitement, it appears to have forgotten that this is an utterly moot point since Egypt actually has a presidential system and not a parliamentary one; parliament doesn’t pick the cabinet. It has since recanted. However, it seems very likely that the amount of weight the Brotherhood throws around will be directly proportional to the number of votes it gets. And that it will go head to head with the SCAF, which it has carefully avoided doing.

The Brotherhood has to make some difficult choices. Once the excitement of an obliging ballot box dies down, it will have to decide what to do about the Salafis. By aligning with them, it increases its parliamentary influences but risks alienating the secular parties and the West. And winning the elections will put the burden of fixing Egypt’s considerable ails on its shoulders. Under that kind of pressure, it will not do to alienate swathes of your population or foreign investors.

The liberal parties, if they are to emerge with any significant voice in parliament need to regroup, coalesce and run fewer candidates to avoid splitting the vote. And they must be willing to work with the Brotherhood, if only to make it easier to marginalize the Salafis, who have expressed no interest in democratic reform. Above all, all the parties need to put Egypt first, rather than short-term political gain. And that’s the one thing that none of the parties seem to be able to grasp.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Egypt Independent

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Recalibrating the Egypt-Israel Relationship

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 21 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Introduction:

There is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worry about demons will tend to run into them. Like much folk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; the likelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears to be exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever since Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt on February 11, 2011, the demon named “Now What?” has been keeping the Israeli government up at night. On August 18, it finally leapt up at them.

That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses, as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat, near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civilians and soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackers from a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed to notice, or ignored, that they were shooting over the Egyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyptians— an officer and two enlisted men—were killed and another three later died of their wounds. Israeli minister of defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestinian groups for the assault, made comments to the effect that the attacks were largely Egypt’s fault as there had been a major security collapse in Egypt since the former regime had been ousted six months earlier.

The way matters unfolded over the next few days pointedly illustrated the answer to a question that had been asked repeatedly both by international media and the Israeli government since Hosni Mubarak’s ouster: What did Egypt’s January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? The simplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual. The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changed and both countries will have to navigate new waters carefully and wisely.

Downloads

Download the Full Memo

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Image Source: ï¿½ Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Military Might in Egypt

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 24 Oct 2011 00:00:00 -0400

I learnt a new word the other day: “stratocracy.” That’s a ruling system where the state is ruled directly by the military. Apparently, it’s rather different from a military dictatorship, where power merely resides with the military.

I might be hazy on the distinction but I don’t think I’m having too much trouble assessing the current situation. The military holds the reins and it shows no signs of giving them over to any other drivers any time soon. It’s not that I suspect that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) want to remain in power for ever. They merely want to consolidate their power completely. The army does not trust, nor has it ever trusted, civilians to take those reins, and anybody who thought otherwise must be suffering something of a rude awakening now.

When former President Hosni Mubarak stepped down in February of this year, he ostensibly ceded power to the army. In actual fact, it’s almost certain that it was the army that took the final decision and asked him, politely, to step aside. The events of the last nine months have been so momentous that people forget a basic fact: the military has ruled this country for over 60 years. Hosni Mubarak, much like Anwar Sadat before him and Gamal Abd El-Nasser before him, were the customer service section of the military. Of course, regardless of how one feels about them, Sadat and — even more so — Nasser, were leaders in their own, indisputable rights, but they were still military men. However, removed from the everyday stench of corruption and abuse, the army remained above the fray. During the decades of war, Egyptians always held the army in high regard, and that regard carried over into peacetime. And when it supported the 25 January revolution, the army effectively purged itself of any wrongdoing, stepping forward to safeguard Egypt’s people and her institutions.

On 12 February, the day after Mubarak stepped down from — or was shoved off — his pedestal, a SCAF spokesman saluted the martyrs of the revolution (the first time the military had ever saluted civilians) and pledged to oversee the transition to a civilian government elected by the people. The timeline suggested was six months, which struck many as somewhat unrealistic. The idea was that they would help usher in parliamentary elections, followed by presidential ones. Somewhere in between, a constitution was to be re-written, guided by the results of a referendum on amendments to the 1971 Constitution, to be held in March.

The problems started when the SCAF assigned the writing of those constitutional amendments to a committee that it had hand-picked without any reference to anyone else. At no point did the army provide a plan B — what would happen if the people of Egypt said they did not approve those amendments. At any rate, they were approved by a resounding 77 percent of the vote. At the time, the SCAF made an announcement to quash rumors about delaying the presidential elections until 2012.

Seven months later, the SCAF imposed a new timetable, with presidential elections possibly to be held as late as mid-2013.

During the course of those past nine months, there has been a gradual erosion of national confidence in the army. It was slow, at first: a constitutional declaration that followed hot on the heels of the referendum; a staggering rise in the number of military trials for civilians – an estimated 12,000 so far, almost four times the number under the former regime; increasing allegations of torture by army personnel; the harassment and censorship of journalists critical of SCAF; a refusal to lift the Emergency Law, despite earlier promises to do so.

Three weeks ago, during a demonstration by several thousand Copts protesting the burning of yet another church, a mêlée of violence left 28 dead, many crushed under a military armored personnel carrier, which appeared to actively chase them down, a soldier firing an automatic firearm from its turret. The army, which had promised that it would never raise a hand against Egyptian civilians, appeared to have broken that promise. In a press conference several days later, two SCAF members insisted that it had not been the army that was shooting, because its soldiers “carried no live ammunition.” The army regretted the loss of life profoundly, the generals said. But they did not apologize. An apology carries an implicit admission of responsibility, and that, they said, lay at the door of violent protestors, fifth columnist instigators, and the always-popular “foreign hand.” In other words, the responsibility was anyone’s but their own. The incident, one of the worst instances of public violence in the country’s recent history, indicated, at the very least, a startling incompetence.

Months ago, the creeping worries could be allayed by telling ourselves that it wasn’t that the SCAF had any ulterior motives; they were simply new to civil administration. They were, to put it kindly, bunglers, not power-seekers. However, at this point in time, several things have become clear. The army has no desire for rapid, expansive, change. Far from it. It fared well under the old system and it needs to tread very carefully to check that this new democracy lark doesn’t upset its apple cart. That translates into deliberately sluggish policies, constantly mulled over by a puppet government that appears largely incapable of taking any decisions on its own.

To complicate matters, the SCAF appears to court favourites among the political parties. Indeed, it often behaves much like a political power itself, dividing to conquer. Nor does it have to suffer the irritating drawback of having to please its party or any constituency. It pleases itself. And the leading political parties have all played into the SCAF’s hands, squabbling over electoral issues while ignoring the most problematic issue: holding the SCAF to a timeline detailing the transfer of power.

This shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone who’s paid attention to the army, discreet though it has always been. The protection it offers has always been heavily laced with condescension. The combination of an honest need to protect the country from incompetent civilian bunglers and the need to maintain power produce a powerful motive to delay any transfer of authority.

All this begs the question: now what? The army’s ascension to power was legitimate and the way it relinquishes it must be equally legitimate. The March amendments covered the presidency, and it is easier to hold new presidential elections than have the country leaderless until a constitution is written. More to the point, that constitution must ensure that once a civilian administration takes power, it may not be tossed aside by the military. Egypt’s new constitution must be written quickly and it must be written without any military preconditions. The army may be the supreme protector, but it is not supreme. It is an institution that serves this country, much like the judiciary and the police. That means it must be accountable. Exceptionalism was the rule under the old order. It has no place in the new one.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Publication: Egypt Independent

2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tue, 12 Apr 2011 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 12-14, 2011

Washington
DC

On April 12-14, 2011, the Government of Qatar, the Brookings Institution and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted the eighth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, convening for the first time in Washington, D.C. at this critical moment in Middle Eastern political history.

The U.S.-Islamic World Forum is a platform for dialogue at the highest level featuring leading U.S. and Muslim public officials, business leaders, scholars, journalists and commentators. Long seen as the world’s premier policy event for leaders with stakes in the global Muslim community, the Forum has a history of fostering unique, positive relationships between policymakers, business, cultural and religious leaders from across the Muslim World and the United States.

This year’s discussions focused on the rapid, turbulent change in the Middle East and implications for Muslims around the world.

There were five plenary sessions on topics such as civil society, the Libyan crisis, and the media.
Watch videos and read more about the plenaries »

Ten rountables held discussions on the Middle East peace process, the role of youth in the Arab Spring, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and many other issues.
Watch videos and read more about the roundtables »

Five working groups were convened to discuss and recommend action on issues in U.S. relations with the Islamic world, which were summarized in a paper published by the Brookings Institution. They are as follows:

Muslim-Majority and Muslim-Minority Communities in a Global Context
Humera Khan, Executive Director, Muflehun
Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America

Disconnected Narratives Between the United States and Global Muslim Communities
Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, Senior Vice President, APCO Worldwide
Anne Hagood, Managing Editor, The Layalina Review and The Chronicle, Layalina Productions

Higher Education Reform in the Arab World
Katherine Wilkins, Vice President for Communications, AMIDEAST

Building Capacity and Developing Leadership among American Muslims and Their Organizations
Brie Loskota, Managing Director, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, University of Southern California
Nadia Roumani, Co-Founder and Director, American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute, University of Southern California

The Role of Entrepreneurship and Job Creation in U.S.-Muslim Relations
Ahmed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, and Director of Strategic Partnerships and Communications, Silatech
Mohamed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies

Forum Highlights:

Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton » (state.gov)

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks at the 2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Washington, D.C.

Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, and Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu.

Time Magazine Editor and CNN host Fareed Zakaria moderates a panel with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Judeh, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey Ibrahim Kalin, and U.S. Senator John Kerry.

(images courtesy of Paul Morse)

Video

Event Materials

The Elusive Myth of Democratic Egyptian Elections

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Mon, 08 Nov 2010 13:04:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

Later this month, Egyptians will go to the polls, or attempt to, in order to vote in the country’s parliamentary elections. The elections will unlikely be a democratic affair in the Western sense. In fact, opposition candidates, voters, citizen groups—essentially everyone other than government representatives—are fully expecting the elections to be a violent and rigged episode. For easy reference, one can look to the June elections for the Shura Council, or upper house of Parliament, in which the governing National Democratic Party (NDP) managed to land 80 out of a possible 84 seats. Those elections were marked by violence and allegations of rampant violations.

Elections in Egypt are not generally democratic, they do not necessarily reflect the will of the people, and they will invariably usher in a house in which the NDP has an unshakeable majority. More so, the elected body has very little control over the government and none over the president, who, thanks to some creative constitutional amendments in 2007, can dissolve the Parliament at will. Election results are apparently so preordained that many have questioned the wisdom of participating at all. Opposition groups, among them the National Alliance for Change (NAC), led by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head and current political reformer Mohamed ElBaradei, have been calling for a boycott. ElBaradei told reporters at a Ramadan Iftar meeting on September 7 that voting “would go against the national will.” Many political analysts and some members of the opposition have echoed the belief that participation in the elections only gives credence to a fundamentally flawed system and perpetuates the state myth of a democratic nation.

The above argument certainly has its merits, but it misses the point. Elections in Egypt are not about who wins seats—that is usually a foregone conclusion. They are about the “how and the what,” in the sense that they are oases of political activity, demand, and dissension in an otherwise arid climate. In that way, every election fought represents losses and gains for the respective participants in ways that invariably influence the following elections. Also, the ballot boxes can yield surprising results—as in the case of the 2005 elections when the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained a jawdropping 88 of 454 seats in the elections for the lower house. This outcome certainly would not have come about if the Brotherhood had not participated. To be sure, there are also significant, detrimental changes that happen as a direct consequence of the elections, among them constitutional amendments designed to hobble the opposition’s ability to field candidates and campaign. Still, for opposition parties and movements, boycotting the elections is the equivalent of throwing away the only political participation they have. It would mean relinquishing any visibility or influence and it would mean admitting to their supporters that they are essentially mere window dressings in the democratic façade. Arguably, this is a reason why these elections have only ever been boycotted once, in 1990. The Egyptian political arena is one where contestants scrabble for the smallest patch of ground. The high moral ground simply does not figure into it.

Downloads

Download Full Report - English

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

The Gaza Flotilla Fiasco: A View From Cairo

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 03 Jun 2010 16:25:00 -0400

If President Barack Obama were hoping for a triumphant, or even merely hopeful, anniversary to his Cairo speech, when he reached out to the Muslim world, he’s in for a disappointment.

Tuesday’s raid by Israeli commandos on a flotilla of ships bearing humanitarian aid to Gaza is unlikely to help US diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.

Press coverage in Egypt has been expansive; the front pages of dailies have been swamped with stories of the attack, the language more florid than usual. The state-owned Al-Ahram put the number of dead at 16 while Al-Masry Al-Youm claimed 20. There have been heated demonstrations throughout the country and the International Union of Scholars has called for more demonstrations on Friday, June 4.

The Egyptian government has come under criticism before for keeping the Rafah border crossing into Gaza closed and turning back humanitarian aid. However, it was unthinkable that the government would not rear back from the kind of backlash that this incident is already causing. President Hosni Mubarak condemned Israeli aggression and promptly announced Tuesday evening the immediate and indefinite opening of the Rafah crossing, to ease Palestinian suffering. The Egyptian government was deeply embarrassed by the fracas and will undoubtedly keep as much distance as possible. Considering it is one of two Arab countries which have a signed treaty with Israel, this deep unease will not work in Israel’s favour.

Tuesday’s papers referred to it as a "massacre," and said there was widespread international condemnation. However, by Wednesday morning, most people on the street had read that the U.S. had stymied a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel. Although the resolution did call for a lifting of the blockade, the final text merely condemned "the acts" which had led to loss of life. Apparently not content with watering down the resolution, the U.S also reportedly attempted to block demands at the Security Council for an international inquiry—it said that it would be satisfied with an Israeli inquiry. To Arabs, that’s inexplicable. To use an Egyptian saying, it’s like give the keys of the dairy to the cat.

The White House statement was even more vague than the UN one. Apart from emphasizing the “importance of learning all the facts and circumstances” the president expressed regret at the loss of life “and concern for the wounded, many of whom are being treated in Israeli hospitals.”

It would be difficult to explain the amount of repugnance that last statement is generating here in Cairo. Singling out that Israeli hospitals are caring for the wounded suggests to Cairenes that Washington either is unaware of, or is merely unconcerned with, regional feeling on this matter. For Arabs reading this statement, it merely indicates a U.S. president who not only has failed to even mildly censure Israel for what is perceived here as hijacking and murder of civilians, but who praises the Israelis for providing medical care.

Nor has Vice President Joe Biden’s remarks go down well. Biden insisted during a television interview that the raid was “legitimate” and then asked: “What’s the big deal?”

For a great many Arabs, the big deal is that they already feel that the United States is incapable of being objective in anything to do with Israel and are sick of what they view as a dangerously hypocritical double standard. This general anger may foment specific acts of violent reprisal. Less than three months after General David Petraeus noted that “Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnership with [regional] governments and peoples,” many Arabs are wondering if this is the wisest reaction the Obama administration—which promised a new relationship with Muslim world—can come up with?

As far as Arabs are concerned, it looks like business as usual. President Obama seems well on the way to squandering the reservoir of hope and trust he accrued after his Cairo speech. For many Arabs, he has degenerated from a man whose words were inspirational to one whose words have become empty. After all his rhetoric on reaching out to the Muslim world and fairness in the Middle East Peace Process, to Arab eyes, Israel can continue to act with total impunity and the U.S. will continue to support Israel whatever outrages it commits. For a great many in this part of the world, that perspective makes the U.S. complicit in those acts.

While the intricacies of diplomacy have been many a strong man’s undoing, the perception of blind support for Israel in this incident is utterly inexplicable to the Arab world. If this view is allowed to remain the common wisdom among Arabs, it will undermine the United States’ credibility as a legitimate partner in the Israeli-Palestinian talks and could compromise any future efforts towards a just Middle East Peace. Many Arabs are asking how the U.S. expects to be taken seriously as a partner if it is perceived to be little more than a camp-follower. This change in perception is especially unfortunate since people in the Middle East were starting to become hopeful that the U.S. recognized that stabilizing the region was in America’s best interests—and that unconditional support of Israel might not be in the best interests of either.

America has repeatedly disappointed the Arab world in recent decades, particularly when it comes to Palestine. When Israel was bombing Lebanon in 2006, Washington held back a ceasefire to allow the Israelis to destroy Hezbollah. The Israelis failed to do that, but they did kill over 1,000 Lebanese civilians, and the U.S is widely viewed here as complicit in their deaths. It is perceived to be complicit in the deaths of another 1,000-2,000 civilians in Gaza from Israeli attacks. It is perceived as complicit in the fact that four of every five Gazans are entirely dependent on humanitarian aid, thanks to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. And Washington’s handling of matters in the last few days are likely to ensure that it is seen as complicit in this matter as well.

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

Egypt’s Evolving Media Landscape and its Role in Domestic Politics

Mirette F. Mabrouk — Thu, 20 May 2010 15:53:00 -0400

Introduction:

Today’s diverse forms of media are following an ancient tradition. In ancient civilizations, governments and members of the ruling classes always utilized various forms of public broadcast to inform the general public of news that it deemed acceptable. In ancient Egypt, noblemen kept scribes to maintain records and to inform the uneducated masses of noblemen’s successes and intentions. Ancient Roman public criers dispensed announcements (along with advertising) to the plebeians in public squares and forums. In an early effort to reach as large an audience as possible, announcements were also posted at the crossroads of three different roads (hence the origin of the word “trivia”).

Announcements in this form have always given rise to dissenters. Graffiti was a traditional form of opposition (even when the public was illiterate), the likes of which have been left on walls and in caves for historians to interpret. Roman politicians, thought to have behaved dishonorably in office, were mercilessly lampooned on the walls of the city. Though the graffiti was considered a defacement of property and was often lacking in artistic value, it was undoubtedly read.

A millennia and a half later, every government-approved newspaper article or television report has an independent paper or website actively critiquing it. Dissent is not new. It is just now more efficiently disseminated.

Downloads

Download Full Paper - English

Authors

Mirette F. Mabrouk

How Egypt’s Changing Media Landscape is Influencing Domestic Politics

Tue, 28 Jul 2009 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 28, 2009
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Saul Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036

Although Egypt’s media has been under tight government control since 1952, the technological and social changes of the past decade or so, in addition to a growing need for democratic reform in the country, have led the media to test the limits of state control. The results have been a newly revitalized and surprisingly liberal political dialogue. However, in spite of the excitement generated by this new media activism, its existence remains frail and tenuous and if it is to flourish, it will need careful nurturing.

The Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World was pleased to host Ford Foundation Visiting Fellow Mirette Mabrouk in a discussion about the changing landscape of Arab media and its effect on Egypt’s domestic politics. Mirette Mabrouk is editor-at-large with the American University in Cairo Press, founding publisher of The Daily News Egypt, and a frequent commentator in the Arab press.

Transcript

Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

The Democracy Function: How Egypt’s Changing Media Landscape is Influencing Domestic Politics

Wed, 06 May 2009 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 6, 2009
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

Somers Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Media in Egypt has long been under tight government control. Over the past decade, however, the landscape has been changing rapidly with the arrival first of private satellite television, then independent and non-partisan newspapers, and finally, the internet and new media. Despite vigorous and determined suppression, it has become increasingly difficult to stem the growing tide of free speech. The result has been a surge of political activism, fueled to a great extent by both access to information and the ability to disseminate it.

The Saban Center at Brookings’ Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World was pleased to host Ford Foundation Visiting Fellow Mirette F. Mabrouk to talk about the changing landscape of Arab media, and its effect on Egyptian domestic politics. Mirette Mabrouk is editor-at-large with the American University in Cairo Press, founding publisher of The Daily News Egypt, and a frequent commentator in the Arab press.