Brookings: Experts - Ahmet T. Kuru

Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists?

Ahmet T. Kuru — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Islamist parties assume power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, many – in both the West and the region – have turned to the experience of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) for lessons on negotiating the relationship between Islam and the state.

The “AKP model,” it is argued, occupies the middle ground between the “assertive secularism” of Turkey’s past, and the marriage of religion and politics seen in countries such as Iran. Given striking differences, however, between Turkey, with its Kemalist past, and the Arab world, where “secularism” itself is sometimes almost taboo, can the AKP’s experience really be an effective model? Will Islamists in deeply conservative Arab countries even see it as desirable?

In a policy briefing from the BDC, Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a Model for Arab Islamists?, Visiting Fellow Ahmet T. Kuru explores the relationship between Islamism and secularism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Kuru writes the continued rise of the AKP and its embrace of a “passive secularism” that effectively advances Islamic values provide an important and potentially attractive example for Arab Islamists. The differences between the Arab and Turkish contexts, he argues, need not inhibit the adoption of certain aspects of the AKP model. Rather, the dividends brought by the AKP’s pragmatism and the party's success in pursuing Muslim politics without seeking an “Islamic” state may yet encourage Arab Islamists to follow a similar path.

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Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Egypt’s Transition Two Years Later: A Turkish Perspective

Ahmet T. Kuru — Tue, 29 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

I was probably the only one wearing a tie in the Tahrir Square on January 25, 2013—the anniversary of the revolution. Different groups were gathering in the late afternoon while I was giving an interview to TRT (Turkey’s public TV) about my observations of post-revolution Egypt during my 11-day stay in Cairo. I had the opportunity to conduct interviews with 20 Egyptian politicians, activists, and scholars. I asked them questions around three main subjects: 1) How do you explain the revolution, why 2011 and why not before? 2) Are you satisfied with the aftermath of the revolution? and 3) What do you think about the future alliance between Egypt and Turkey in terms of having a shared policy toward the Middle East?

There was a near consensus on the first question. My interviewees emphasized similar clusters of reasons: the Tunisian revolution set an example; the Mubarak regime was 30 years old (or in fact the “regime” was 60 years old) and the Egyptian people (who are normally very patient) were fed up with corruption and failed policies; Mubarak alienated not only the wider public but also the military by preparing his son Gamal as his successor; social media equipped young people with new opportunities to get organized (by the way, I do not know the cost during the revolution but cell phone services are now quite cheap in Egypt); the demonstrations in Tahrir Square were at first led by diffuse groups with no hierarchy, but three days later the Muslim Brotherhood joined and substantially increased the number of protesters; and Al-Jazeera played a major role by its nearly nonstop broadcasting of the demonstrations.

As someone who had heard some Turkish leftists depict the Arab Spring as an “American conspiracy,” it was surprising how the role of the United States was so negligible and inconsistent during the Egyptian revolution, according to my interviewees.

The answers to the second question (on the aftermath of the revolution) were much more diverse. It would be wrong to categorize them into two groups—the opposition to and supporters of President Mohamed Morsi. Many of my interviewees were critical of Morsi but their reasons diverged considerably. For some, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood constitute an Islamist threat to Egypt. A professor warned me that “the Muslim Brothers are not like the AKP [Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party]” but “they are like Erbakan’s parties.” He also reminded me how Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was welcomed in Egypt as a hero in his September 2011 visit, but after he asked Egypt to embrace a secular state, his popularity among Islamists quickly dissipated.

Beyond the issue of Islamism, some who had positions in the old regime criticized the Brotherhood for being radical in terms of the speed of change (e.g., pushing the Constitution too quickly without even consulting with the Vice President). Others, however, criticized the Brotherhood for being too slow and compromising toward the old regime, having secret agreements with the military, and letting the old regime survive financially.

The role of the military figured prominently in my conversations. A formerly senior member of the Brotherhood told me with pride: “It took you [Turks] twenty years to solve the problem of civil-military relations, but we did it in two years.” By contrast, many opposition figures noted that this would be a naïve claim; the military still has the power to interfere in politics and continues to play a substantial role in the Egyptian economy.

Besides these specific criticisms, one major argument of the opposition was that Morsi lacked projects and initiatives for solving Egypt’s social and economic problems. They also point out that the Muslim Brotherhood is full of medical doctors and engineers; but includes very few lawyers and social scientists. Yet even the critics admit that the opposition parties do not have such projects or initiatives either.

Even on the issue of democracy, it was unclear to me whether some opposition figures were all that much better than the Brotherhood politicians. For me, the dissolution of an elected parliament by a politicized court decision is nothing but a “judicial coup d’état.” Turkey was saved from such a coup in 2008 and Egypt experienced it in 2012. Yet some opposition members seem to whole-heartedly support the court decision.

In debates about Egypt’s domestic politics, Salafis appear to have a puzzling position. On the one hand, they are blamed for pushing the Brotherhood to be more radical (e.g., inserting Al-Azhar into the constitution as a consultative body on the matter of Sharia and rejecting a female quota in parliamentary elections). On the other hand, they are perceived to be divided and changeable. Several interviewees stressed that it was good to see Salafis in Egyptian party politics for the sake of normalization, in comparison to Tunisian Salafis who largely remain outside of the political system and prone to violence.

My third and last question was on foreign relations, especially those with Turkey. In general, the Egyptian elite seems to be focusing on internal problems and willing to restrain its regional ambitions. Regarding Turkey, nearly everyone I spoke to expressed a desire to have better relations with Turkey than during the time of Mubarak. They would like Turkey to support Egypt domestically, in the economic realm for instance, rather than pursuing joint initiatives in the broader region. This is one reason why the Egyptian elite seems hesitant to take a more pro-active stand against the Assad regime in Syria. Another reason is that there is still a tendency to put Israel at the center of foreign policy issues and they regard Assad as, at least historically, part of the anti-Israel bloc.

I also realized the extent to which Egyptian elites continues to have some misperceptions about Turkey. As an example, several of them tried to convince me in vain that Erdoğan is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Turkey branch.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Image Source: © Amr Dalsh / Reuters

Turkey, Syria, and the United States

Ahmet T. Kuru — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

There is a public debate in Turkey about the government’s policies toward the Syrian crisis.

The main argument by the critics is that the government is following American directions in these policies. According to this argument, the Arab Spring in general, and the Syrian revolution in particular, are results of an American project of creating a new order in the Middle East. There are at least three problems in this argument.

First, there is no monolithic American approach toward the Arab Spring. The experts of the US foreign policy would acknowledge how the US policies toward the Arab Spring have been mostly ad hoc, inconsistent and with unexpected results. US domestic politics is more divided on this issue.

For example, a few days ago Louie Gohmert, a Republican US representative from Texas, gave a speech in the Congress to criticize President Barack Obama’s policy toward the Arab Spring. He claimed that Obama was establishing a “second Ottoman Empire” by allowing Islamists to take over and leaving the isolation of Israel in the region.

Gohmert’s speech does not simply mean a personal opinion, but reflects some conservatives’ view of the Arab Spring. For them the Arab Spring implies the replacement of allies, such as Hosni Mubarak and Zine Ben Ali, by radical Islamists.

Second, those who reduce the Arab Spring into a US conspiracy seem to ignore the recent history of the Middle East, especially the brutal suppression of the Syrian opposition by Hafez al-Assad in the 1980s.
Since then, the persecution of the opposition in Syria has persistently continued. I spent two months in Damascus in 2008 and 2010. The people’s fear of the regime was clearly observable even in those years, when Bashar al-Assad was regarded as a “liberalizing” figure. Thus, the uprising in Syria has long historical and deep societal roots.

Moreover, the reductionist view of the Arab Spring as if it was planned by the United States, describes Arab peoples as docile bodies who cannot act on their own. In fact, in various Arab countries, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition was organized to a certain extent, and people bravely revolted to end the dictatorial regimes.

Third and last, it is Turkey, and not the US, that pushes for increasing international intervention in Syria in the framework of either the UN or NATO. For various reasons, such as the upcoming presidential elections, the fatigue produced by the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and Israel’s reservations, the United States is reluctant to fulfill Turkey’s demands.

Turkey is right in providing active support to the people of Syria. There are historical, cultural and humanitarian reasons that require Turkey to act like that. Beyond idealistic reasons, realpolitik also obliges neighboring countries and global powers to take initiative in order to stop the massacre in Syria. In the near future, the post-Assad Syria will be a friend of those who supported the Syrian people and will not forget who backed the Assad regime during this crisis.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Today’s Zaman

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Book Review - The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations

Ahmet T. Kuru — Sat, 06 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

One may argue three law-like generalizations in political science: “no bourgeois, no democracy,” “democracies do not go to war with each other,” and “natural resources are a curse.” Although each of these highly contested arguments is important, the last one has the broadest impact—the negative effects of oil, natural gas, and mineral production go beyond authoritarianism and have economic, military, and societal consequences. Recently, some important publications have challenged the “resource curse” argument, creating doubts about these negative effects. In this regard, Michael Ross’ book[1], The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton University Press, 2012) is an extremely timely work. It not only responds to these critiques but also provides a consistent set of explanations about oil and its effects on authoritarianism, patriarchy, inter-state and civil wars, and economic underdevelopment.

Ross has already written path-breaking articles on these issues and this magnum opus brings together his previous contributions with updated data, revised arguments, and fresh perspectives. Unlike his earlier publications, Ross’s analysis focuses on oil and natural gas, sometimes referring to both as only “oil,” and consistently leaves mineral production aside. His data show how the importance of oil will persist, if not increase, in the near future: “the global market for oil and other liquid fuels will rise from 86.1 million barrels a day in 2007 to 110 million barrel a day in 2035; the market for natural gas will rise from 108 to 156 trillion cubic feet” (p. 251).

Regarding the scope of "Insight Turkey," it would be meaningful to begin with the importance of the book for studies on the Middle East, in particular, and the Muslim world, in general. According to Ross, the Middle East is regarded as exceptional for becoming wealthier “without becoming democratic” and “without making much progress toward gender equality.” Some scholars and pundits blame Islam for these conditions, but Ross links these problems to oil: “most of the world’s petroleum is found in countries with Muslim majorities…; in 2008, Muslim-majority countries—making up about 23 percent of the world’s sovereign states—exported about 51 percent of the world’s oil and held 62 percent of its petroleum reserves” (p. 231).

Ross particularly concentrates on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region when analyzing patriarchy. He argues that oil is the main reason for gender inequality in MENA countries. His general argument draws on the counterfactuals from other regions where patriarchy has been weakened, such as in East Asian cases, as a result of women’s participation in the industrial labor force. In contrast to agriculture, which is mostly a maledominated family business, work in the industrial sector has resulted in women’s increasing participation and influence in economic, social, and eventually political life. In most Middle Eastern countries, however, oil income has resulted in the weakening of export-oriented manufacturing industries, due to the appreciation of national currency, in addition to other negative effects such as increased spending (collectively what is referred to as the “Dutch disease”). This development has minimized the need and opportunity for women to work because the oil sector is not labor intensive. Ross cites Saudi Arabia as an example: “…oil and gas account for 90 percent of the country’s GDP. Yet the entire petroleum and mineral sector employs just 1.6 percent of the active labor force, and 0.35 percent of the total population” (p. 45). Moreover, in oil-rich countries, government allocation of rents to families and high salaries for husbands who work for government have also diminished the financial incentive for women to work. There is also minimal material motivation in the service sector, which provides lower salaries to mostly immigrant male workers. The result is the persistence of patriarchy in oil-rich MENA countries. Ross also clarifies this argument by comparing oil-rich Algeria and oil-poor Morocco; he shows that Algeria has higher gender inequality despite the fact that it has had several progressive socialist governments and higher GDP per capita and that Morocco has a traditional monarchy and lower GDP per capita.

Although the analysis of patriarchy depicts oil as a barrier to the advancement of the industrial sector, the chapter on development shows that oil does not prevent GDP growth. Instead, oil states, where oil income per capita is over $100, “have grown at about the same rate as other countries” (p. 221). The puzzle, Ross notes, is “why the oil states have had normal growth rates, when they should have had faster than normal economic growth, given their enormous natural wealth” (p. 189). In terms of GDP per capita, oil-producers show by and large slower growth rates due to their rapidly growing populations. Ross links this fact to his argument about patriarchy: oil production consolidates patriarchy, and this leads to high fertility and population growth.

The role of oil is more clearly visible in conflicts and authoritarianism. In his analysis of oil and armed conflicts, Ross stresses the importance of civil wars, because, from 1989 to 2006, out of 122 conflicts in the world, 115 were civil wars (p. 146). In his words, “Since the early 1990s, oil-producing countries have been about 50 percent more likely than other countries to have civil wars” (p. 145). Examining authoritarianism, Ross emphasizes that until 1980, oil-rich developing countries were very similar to their oilpoor counterparts, in terms of having authoritarian regimes. Today, however, the oil-rich countries “are 50 percent more likely to be ruled by autocrats” (p. 1). Oil even makes low-income democracies more likely to move to authoritarianism. The only exception is Latin America, where oil-rich several countries became democratic. Ross points to the fact that these countries already had democratic experiences before massive oil production began. Yet it is also important that the amount of oil income generated in Latin American countries is smaller in comparison to the leading oil states. Therefore, “no country with high levels of oil and gas income successfully became a democracy between 1960 and 2010” (p. 74).

To explain the causality behind this clear correlation, Ross claims that “oil has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spending, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption and incompetence,” (p. 63) because oil revenues are “unusually large, do not come from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden” (p. 6). Ross primarily focuses on the last factor—secrecy. He claims that citizens’ attitude toward the government is primarily based on its spending-to-revenue ratio. In oil-rich countries, governments can hide some of the oil revenues. Given this misinformation, citizens’ perception of governments’ spending-to-revenue ratios become higher than they actually are. This perception is a reason for citizens’ relatively higher satisfaction for and lower opposition to oil-rich governments.

Among Ross’s insightful empirical discussions, the Soviet case, where oil income per capita declined from $3,100 in 1980 to $1,050 in 1991, is particularly noteworthy. In his words, “Oil accounted for 80 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings between 1973 and 1985… After oil prices peaked in 1980, they fell by over 70 percent over the next six years; so did Soviet oil revenues, producing the economic and political crisis that ultimately led to the Soviet government’s collapse” (pp. 83-5).

My main reservation with this important book is about its attempt to replace the causal mechanisms between oil and authoritarianism Ross elaborated in an earlier article[1] with new alternatives. In this seminal article, Ross had explained five mechanisms—taxation, spending, group formation, repression, and modernization effects. Later, he critically re-examined some of these effects in an unpublished paper (“Oil and Democracy Revisited,” 2009), noting a lack of statistically significant relationships with authoritarianism when updated data was used. Thus he ignores most of these effects in the book and instead offers secrecy and governments’ perceived spending/revenue rates as new alternatives to explain how oil production causes authoritarianism (p. 105). I do not think these two can replace the causal relations explained by Ross’s 2001 article for three main reasons.

First, Ross’s 2009 paper did not find statistically significant relations between authoritarianism and two effects—repression and modernization—and did not reach a conclusion on the group formation effect. Rather than neglecting them, the book could have revised these effects. Group formation refers to the fact that in many rentier states (where oil and natural gas constitute over 40 percent of government revenues), there is no bourgeoisie, political society, or media independent of the government. This effect can be assessed with new measurements and data on economic associations, political parties, and media outlets. It is true that rentier states are no different from other autocracies in terms of using repressive police and military forces. Yet the book could still have linked the chapter on authoritarianism to that on conflicts, and showed how oil leads to both armed conflicts and authoritarianism. I agree that oil does not prevent schooling, urbanization, and some other criteria of modernization. Nevertheless, the modernization effect still helps us understand why many rentier states have a very high level of GDP per capita while having moderate or low levels of schooling and health conditions (as documented by UNDP’s Non-income Human Development Index).

Second, although Ross’s 2009 paper revealed taxation and spending effects as statistically significant, the book undermines them by employing an absolute measurement (oil income per capita), unlike in the 2001 article that more correctly used relative measurements—the rates of oil rents vs. taxes in government revenues for the “taxation effect,” and government spending as a ratio of GDP for the “spending effect.” In the analysis of economic development and probably conflicts, where GDP is a dependent variable, I agree that oil income per capita is a better measurement than relative measurements, which can create endogeneity problems (since underdevelopment and arguably conflicts are not separate from lower GDP). Yet in analyzing authoritarianism, relative measurements are much better to test the dominance of oil revenues over state revenues and over the economy. The former is important in order to examine a government’s financial independence from society, and the latter is significant in assessing society’s financial dependence on the government through the distribution of rents. Oil income per capita does not explain any of these two. Regarding the book’s primary measurement, Norway has a higher oil income per capita than Brunei, but this undermines the fact that oil only constitutes over 20 percent of government revenues and over 10 percent of the GDP in Norway, whereas in Brunei it accounts for nearly 90 percent of government revenues and 40 percent of GDP (p. 21, p. 32). There is a categorical difference between oil’s impacts on these two countries’ political regimes, which is not seen in their amounts of oil income per capita. In fact, absolute and relative measurements can be seen as complementary analytical tools. Oil income per capita, which documents the amount of oil revenue per person as an exogenous factor, is crucial for the analysis of development and conflicts, while oil revenue as percentage of government revenue and GDP helps evaluate the role of oil in statesociety relations and authoritarianism.

Finally, the book overemphasizes the role of financial secrecy and the ratio of government spending to perceived government revenues. It is not clear whether these two variables are causes or effects of authoritarianism. Moreover, the second variable is highly subjective: if revenue is calculated with an emphasis on “perception,” why not calculate “perceived spending” too? Aren’t perceptions of government revenues and spending also important in oil-poor and democratic states, such as Greece? Moreover, the difference between oil-rich and oil-poor countries regarding the details of government revenues only exists for experts. Most of people do not know these details in any state. For the recent Occupy Movement in the United States, the idea that the top one percent of the population controls the economy and politics was sufficient for the activists; no further details were needed. In oil-rich countries, the luxurious lifestyles of dynasties/rulers and the costly construction of government buildings are highly visible and widely known. People are aware of the enormous oil revenues spent by corrupt rulers. What people primarily lack is not the details of oil revenue, but the political might to challenge the asymmetrically powerful state machine. People cannot use taxation as leverage against the government, are dependent on government’s spending, do not have independent associations and media, are controlled by the security forces, and lack socio-economic complexity. Secrecy and a perceived revenue/spending ratio cannot replace the causal effects coined by Ross’s 2001 article. On the issue of authoritarianism, that article should still be read and taught as an addendum to the book.

The Oil Curse is a landmark book that brings together explanations about the impacts of oil on various key issues from authoritarianism to patriarchy, from conflict to development. It combines qualitative and quantitative methods in a truly interdisciplinary tour de force of political, economic, and social analyses. The book is an excellent source for policymakers as well as scholars of various disciplines, especially Middle East studies.

Note:
[1] Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” World Politics, April 2001.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Insight Turkey

Turkey, Iran, and the Sunni-Shiite Tension

Ahmet T. Kuru — Thu, 04 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Is Turkish foreign policy becoming sectarian? Those who answer “yes” invoke some recent events: Turkey is hosting the Sunni vice president of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashemi, who was sentenced to death at home; it is supporting the opposition against the Alawite regime in Syria; and several Iranian officials have threatened Turkey over its support of the Syrian opposition.

Turkey’s relations with these three neighbors are deteriorating because of sectarian fault lines, despite Turkey’s maneuvers to avoid a Sunni-Shiite division.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the prime minister of Turkey for about a decade. Until two years ago, Turkey had very good relations with the governments of Syria, Iraq and Iran. The fact that the leaders of these countries were Alawite or Shiite did not prevent Erdoğan from developing close personal relations with them. Erdoğan’s government defended the Bashar al-Assad regime in 2004-2005 against the George W. Bush administration. In 2010, the Erdoğan government risked its relations with Barack Obama’s administration and sparked criticism in Turkey by voting “no” in the UN Security Council to new sanctions against Iran. In 2011, in an unprecedented gesture, Erdoğan visited major Shiite shrines in Iraq.

What has changed lately? During the Arab Spring, Turkey had supported popular uprisings in various countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria, regardless of the sectarian identity of their leaders. But the Assad regime in Syria started to shoot its peaceful protesters. It then began to use its air force on its own cities. Moreover, following the departure of American troops, the Nouri al-Maliki government in Iraq became increasingly sectarian, while Maliki started to make hostile declarations against Turkey. Neither Assad nor Maliki would have dared to do this without the full-fledged support of Iran.

In this tension, Turkey has been in the defensive position while Iran and its allies have been on the offensive. Turkey has, at least relatively more, institutional reasons for self-restraint in comparison to Iran.

Turkey is a secular state. Even though over 85 percent of its population is Sunni Muslim and its Religious Affairs Directorate represents Sunni Islam, Turkey’s secular tradition and legal structure help it refrain from pursuing a sectarian policy. The institutional structure is different in Iran. The semi-theocratic institutional framework in Iran is perfectly compatible with a pro-Shiite foreign policy.

Moreover, Turkey is a multi-party democracy, if not a liberal one. The elected government in Turkey is required to pursue a balanced foreign policy. Conducting a sectarian policy in the Middle East would lead to the mobilization of Alevi and secularist civil society actors in Turkey. It would cost the government to alienate its Alevi citizens, as well as losing risk-averse voters. Iran, on the other hand, has a political regime where elections are neither free nor fair, given the veto power of the

Guardian Council over candidates and serious doubts about manipulated electoral results. Policymakers in Iran, even if they are elected, are not very likely to be moderated by the pressure of the voters or civil society groups.

The alliance between the Assad regime, the Maliki government and Iran surrounds Turkey. Their covert support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is a clear reflection of this siege attempt. The Assad regime is the weakest part of this alliance.

The US invasion and then the puzzling American support for the pro-Iranian Maliki government in Iraq turned Iran into a power broker in the Arab world. Moreover, its conflict with Israel had made Iran popular among some Arab societies, regardless of whether they are Sunni or Shiite. The Iranian support of the Assad regime, however, has ended this popularity. It will also be detrimental to Iran’s long-term relations with its Sunni Arab neighbors.

Sectarian tension in the Middle East is worrisome. Iran can be part of the solution if it stops taking the side of the minority tyranny against the people of Syria.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Today's Zaman

Libya Attacks on U.S. Consulate: Anti-Westernism and Islamaphobia

Ahmet T. Kuru — Sun, 16 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed a few days ago as a result of either a calculated terrorist attack or random violent anti-U.S. protests in Libya.

It is not known yet exactly who the murderers are, but it is not early to explore the global significance of the incident.

The event shows that some Muslims are yet to learn the lesson, despite multiple repetitions since the Salman Rushdie affair a quarter of a century ago. There are still Muslim individuals and groups who are ready to be manipulated by words, drawings or pictures. They have plenty of time to waste on the street, chanting and destroying property. They lack the will to think about the consequences of their “protests.” These young men do not realize that their street demonstrations do not harm the real producers of the anti-Islamic propaganda; instead, they damage the image of Islam and corner Muslim sympathizers in the West.

Moreover, state apparatuses are too weak to control violent demonstrations in some Muslim-majority countries. Worst of all, there are some Muslim religious leaders who call for “a day of rage,” or disseminate and popularize anti-Islamic propaganda — figures who were initially marginal and trivial. This is all good news for Islamophobes and their tacticians.

When Muslims' values are perceived to be insulted, it should be politicians, intellectuals and strategists, rather than radical protesters, who take prudent steps to defend the dignity, rights and interests of their people.

In general, the Muslim world needs to develop mechanisms and institutions to prevent such provocations in the future. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has taken some important steps forward in promoting respectful, civilized and effective ways of fighting Islamophobia. Their diplomatic attitudes, however, have yet to spread at the grassroots level.

Having access to the masses, Muslim religious leaders can play an important role by emphasizing the importance of proactive, positive and constructive actions. They can remind young protesters that, according to Islam, responsibility for our actions is personal, and that every life should be respected and protected.

In Turkey, for example, the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Gülen movement have promoted positive action, civilized criticism and, interfaith dialogue. Their activities have contributed to critical dialogue and mutual understanding between Muslims and the followers of other religions.

The recent incident also shows how counterproductive Islamophobia is. There are politicians and religious leaders in the United States and Europe who, unfortunately, promote Islamophobia. Islamophobes think that they will be better off if the tensions between Muslims and the West become deeper; the Arab Awakening turns into a set of anti-Western, Iranian-type Islamist revolutions, and the Obama administration fails to have better relations with Muslim countries. These Islamophobes are wrong. To make enemies out of 1.5 billion Muslims is too risky for Western countries in terms of their global interests, let alone being immoral and unreasonable.

Western countries need to develop effective mechanisms and institutions to marginalize Islamophobes; that will be consistent with their principle of working against discrimination, as well as serving their interests in different parts of the world. Marginalizing Islamophobes in the West will help diminish anti-Westernism in Muslim countries.

Authors

Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Today's Zaman