Brookings: Experts - Turan Kayaoğlu

A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation's Evolving Human Rights Framework

Turan Kayaoğlu — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is uniquely well placed to advance human rights in the Muslim world, but has repeatedly failed to fulfill that potential. Under the reformist leadership of Ekmelledin Ihsanoğlu, can the organization’s rights agenda move beyond traditional obstacles, namely members’ focus on state sovereignty and the debate over the role of sharia? Could the recently established Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights (IPCHR) form the basis of a robust international human rights regime for the Muslim world?

In a new paper published by the Brookings Doha Center (BDC), former visiting fellow Turan Kayaoğlu discusses how the OIC can become a more effective proponent of human rights. The paper, A Rights Agenda for the Muslim World? The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s Evolving Human Rights Framework, describes the changing approach and tenor of the OIC’s rights policy.

Based on extensive interviews with senior OIC officials, the paper takes a close look at the organization’s various human rights instruments and notes a shift in its approach. Recent mechanisms – most importantly the IPHRC – have dropped a former emphasis on the centrality of sharia. The OIC’s traditional understanding of state sovereignty, however, has remained intact and led to important shortcomings in the new body. This paper demonstrates how the IPHRC can nevertheless grow into an effective promoter of human rights, and offers recommendations on how the international human rights community can assist in that process.

Download » (English PDF)
Download » (Arabic PDF)

Downloads

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

American Muslims are Celebrating, But They're Nervous as Well

Turan Kayaoğlu — Sun, 19 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Today is the first day of Eid Al-Fitr—a three-day celebration that follows the month of Ramadan during which Muslims fast during the day. Recently several factors made American Muslims nervous and fearful. Eid is a good time for the society to make Muslims feel at home in America.

In Western Washington, Eid started with a communal prayer in 35 mosques as well as in rented secular spaces such as Seattle’s Washington State Convention Center. A typical Muslim congregation reflects the American mosaic: a recent refugee from Syria may pray next to a black who traces her roots into slavery; a Turk prays next to a Latino; a Somali immigrant next to one from Bosnia.

Racially diverse, proud for completing their fasting marathon and dressed in their traditional clothes, a Muslim congregation will resemble the Olympics’ closing parade.

Eid is a bittersweet time. We celebrate the passing of a physically demanding time; yet we also miss Ramadan because it is not just about fasting but is also a time to prioritize the spiritual, familial and social.

For American Muslims, this Eid is bittersweet in another sense as well. A 2011 Gallup study showed that about six out of 10 Muslim Americans believe that they are thriving in America and that their standard of living has increased in the last two years, even amidst our poor economy. Yet at the same time, while Muslims are following the same process of integration that other groups throughout U.S. history have followed, anti-Muslim sentiments have worryingly increased.

Three recent developments have heightened American-Muslims’ anxiety. First is the escalating attacks on mosques – seven in the last two weeks alone. In Morton Grove, Ill., and Hayward, Calif., someone shot a pellet rifle at Muslim houses of worship. In Lombard, Ill., another threw a homemade bomb, and pig legs were thrown at a mosque in Ontario, Calif.

Mosques in places such as North Smithfield, R.I., and Oklahoma City have been vandalized. The worst incident was the burning of a mosque to the ground in Joplin, Mo.

According to the Council on American Islamic Relations, in 2010 there were 13 acts of violence and 31 acts of vandalism against mosques. If the number of attacks of the last two weeks is any indication, this year will set a record.

A second reason for our anxiety is elections and the rhetoric that often goes with them. Some politicians rely on polarizing rhetoric to gain support. We are painfully aware that the temptation to pander to small but vociferous anti-Muslim groups has been significant in the past.

Because of their real or (mis)perceived religious identity, both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney may want to avoid the topic of religion. Neither, however, will be likely to speak out on the mistreatment of Muslims. What is worse, Obama’s alleged “Muslimness” will likely be used as part of attack ads financed by some super PACs, making Muslims collateral damage of the anti-Obama campaign.

As a member of a once persecuted minority, Romney may empathize with Muslims and show courage and speak out about their mistreatment. More likely, though, he’ll avoid any topic that could draw attention to his religion.

A third reason for our rising anxiety is the horrific murder of six Sikhs in a Wisconsin temple by a white supremacist. This attack could be considered an anti-Muslim attack as much as anti-Sikh because many anti-Sikh actions are based on a mistaken belief that Sikhs are Muslims. For example, when a Sikh gas station owner was murdered in Arizona four days after 9/11, the attacker thought he was a Muslim.

A cursory glance at America’s history reminds us that Muslims are not the first religious group to face attacks for its religion. Baptists, Catholics, Jews and Mormons have all at times faced severe discrimination, before finding their places in America’s religious landscape. Time after time America’s commitment to religious tolerance and liberty has been tested and proved.

Reversing an anti-Muslim trend will not happen by itself. It depends on Good Samaritans to defend America’s religious freedom against fear-mongering. Small gestures can go a long way, such as wishing Muslims you see a “Happy Eid!” (It’s pronounced eed.)

During Eid, American Muslims have a lot to celebrate. We hope that in the future there is even more to celebrate.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: The News Tribune

Image Source: © ERIC THAYER / Reuters

Turkey: Not a Leader for Democracy in the Middle East

Turan Kayaoğlu — Sat, 19 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The Turkish foreign policy elite have updated the country’s foreign policy vision for the Middle East: Turkey will now promote democracy and human rights there. While this is a lofty objective, Turkey is both intellectually and politically ill-equipped for it.

Until the advent of the Arab Spring, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (JDP) followed a “zero problems” policy towards its neighbors in the region. Turkey’s dynamic economy (17th largest in the world) and pro-Palestinian stance, combined with the JDP leaders’ overt religiosity and the popularity of Turkish soap operas, made Turkey a power to be reckoned with in the Middle East. Buoyed by this success, Turkey began attempting, with varying success, to solve its decades-old regional issues.

Until recently, Turkish leaders had not hesitated to cozy up to Middle Eastern autocrats as a way to pursue better relations. The Arab Spring changed all of that, and forced Turkey to side with the streets against the palaces and shelve its “zero problems” policy.

Turkey’s new foreign policy framework responds to the conundrum presented by the popular uprisings throughout the region by altering its focus. In a recent policy brief published for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Center For Strategic Research, Tarık Oğuzlu calls the new approach “Version 2.0 of Turkey’s ‘Zero Problems With Neighbors’ policy.” He argues that, driven mostly by normative and humanitarian concerns, Turkey will now strive to have zero problems not necessarily with the governments of neighboring countries but with its people. Oğuzlu hopes that “the years ahead will witness a ‘democratic touch’ in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, reflecting the spirit of Turkey’s liberal democratization process already underway at home.”

Moreover, in a separate policy brief published in April, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu details what he calls ‘Turkey’s vision-oriented foreign policy.’ He elaborates: “we will not keep silent on oppression by autocratic leaders and will act in tandem with the international community to end it”; “we will not take steps that will alienate us from the hearts and minds of our region’s people;” and “we will work towards the establishment of a more peaceful and prosperous regional order and support people’s quest for basic human rights and democracy.”

However, Turkey lacks the intellectual and political capital necessary to promote human rights and democracy in the region. Unlike the “zero problems” policy which Turkey earlier relied on its economic power, Version 2.0, would have Turkey rely on soft power. Harnessing the power of persuasion requires in-depth knowledge of the complexities of Middle East politics. The Turkish elite’s post-Ottoman neglect of the region and its later reliance on the Cold War categorizations has left Turkey ill-equipped to know the region’s peoples, histories, and true concerns. Apart from those who learn classical Arabic for religious reasons, few Turkish intellectuals understand Arabic, with the overwhelming majority relying exclusively on Anglo-American sources for information on the Middle East.

Ideological certainties have often substituted for critical scholarship when it comes to the Middle East. Salvaging Western writings for ideological ammunition, Turkish secularists quickly attribute the region’s problems to its lack of an Atatürk, while pro-Islamic conservatives (and leftists) blame Western imperialism for troubles in the Middle East. What’s worse, a wide range of Turkish society enjoys Arab countries’ troubles as these are seen as divine retribution for the Arab revolts against the Ottoman Empire.

Turkish foreign policy think tanks, which have mushroomed in the country under the JDP’s rule, offer little help in correcting these flaws. Many bought into the JDP’s grandiose image of Turkey’s regional leadership, and for the most part, have quickly given credit to the government for foreign policy successes and blamed external factors for any failures. Without a serious critical self-reflection and analysis of the region, Turkey will not be able to lead the region to democracy and human rights.

If that wasn’t enough, Turkey’s own democratic and human rights shortcomings offer an even bigger reason for why it is ill-equipped for such a role. Admittedly, since coming to power in 2002, the government has improved many aspects of Turkish democracy, such as civilian control over the army and the expansion of Kurdish rights—but these are not enough. Additional legitimate Kurdish demands continue to fall on deaf ears. The 216th Article of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), which bans “fomenting hatred and enmity among the public” and “insulting religious values,” continue to be used to silence dissidents and critics of Islam. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom in its 2012 Annual Report controversially categorized Turkey as a “Country of Particular Concern” for religious freedom, a category reserved for the worst.

International assessments of Turkish democracy and human rights reveal a disturbing picture. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2011 Democracy Index ranks Turkey 88th out of 167 countries, while the Global Economic Forum’s 2011 Global Gender Gap Index ranks Turkey as 122nd out of 135 countries. According to Freedom House, while political rights and civil liberties in Turkey improved under the JDP, Turkey is still a partially free country. These rankings are not indicators for a promoter of democracy and human rights. Turkey is just not in a position to credibly portray itself as a regional leader on these issues.

This is not to say that Turkey cannot eventually show leadership in enhancing democracy and promoting human rights in the region. Such leadership is deeply needed and Turks have much to offer in terms of moderation, modernization and secularization, if not outright democratization. However, foreign policy elites should heed Atatürk’s famous dictum, which is paraphrased as: “democracy at home; democracy in the world.” Putting one’s house in order should precede promoting democracy and human rights abroad.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Al Arabiya News

Assessing Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Region: Domestic Factors and External Influences

Wed, 09 May 2012 18:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 9, 2012
6:00 PM - 7:30 PM EDT

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On May 9, 2012, the Brookings Doha Center hosted a policy discussion with Birol Başkan, Assistant Professor at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Turan Kayaoğlu, BDC-QU Visiting Fellow, and Sinan Marufoğlu, Associate Professor of History at the Department of Humanities at Qatar University. The panel focused on the domestic and foreign policy components that have influenced Turkey’s actions in the Middle East. The discussion was moderated by Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, and attended by members of Qatar’s academic, business, media, and diplomatic communities.

Sinan Marufoğlu began the discussion by speaking about Turkey’s historical role in the region. The long history of Ottoman rule over the Arab world, he argued, had given the Turks a deeply rooted and detailed knowledge of Middle Eastern society and politics. For much of recent history, the Ottoman Empire had been the guarantor of regional security against threats from both the east and the west.

In the post-Ottoman era, Turkey has tended to look westward, distancing itself as much as possible from the Middle East, Marufoğlu continued. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, however, a “Turkish Spring,” similar to today’s Arab Spring, emerged. That period witnessed fundamental changes in policies under Prime Minister Erdoğan, as his government reformulated relationships through its “zero problems” foreign policy.

Marufoğlu went on to say that the Middle East is still going through a transition and stressed that we have yet to see a new balanced Turkish foreign policy. He explained that a political cadre in Turkey has been working “to promote peace and strengthen economic, cultural, and political ties with the region.” This effort conflicted, however, with Turkey’s long-standing ties with certain authoritarian regimes. This was most clear in the case of Syria, where despite efforts develop a political relationship and expand trade ties, Ankara has now turned against the Asad regime. Ultimately, Marufoğlu explained, Turkish foreign policy seeks to keep a distance from crises, yet tension with Iran and Israel makes this impossible.

Birol Başkan spoke about the effect of Turkish domestic politics on its foreign policy. He began by talking about the structure of the Turkish government, remarking that Erdoğan had been blocked from assuming his role as prime minister in 2003 after winning the election. Başkan said this incident illustrated the strangeness of Turkey’s political environment, characterized by an often hostile division between the secular military and judiciary on the one hand and the elected officials on the other. Despite the antagonism of the military elite however, Erdoğan has become massively popular, winning two consecutive elections with an increasingly large proportion of the vote. The decreasing influence of the military had been demonstrated, Başkan said, in the court case raised against the plotters of a failed military coup – the first time such action had been taken.

As a result, Başkan explained, the military is demoralized and therefore less likely to support Erdoğan’s foreign policy on the ground through military means. Başkan dubbed Turkey a “toothless wolf” – a strong diplomatic player that cannot extend any real hard power. In Başkan’s view, Turkey “cannot flex its muscles to make its demands respected by others.” Though civil-military relations have improved, Turkey is still facing a principal agent problem: the main political player cannot rely on the military to institute his wishes. Compounding this problem, Erdoğan has made himself a global politician, creating a dangerous disconnect between person and country. This begs the question, Başkan stated: when Erdoğan’s popularity decreases, will that of Turkey follow?

Turan Kayaoğlu began his remarks with a description of Turkey’s zero-problem foreign policy. This vision, he explained, was torn apart by the Arab Spring, as Turkey now aims to promote democracy and human rights in the Middle East. Kayaoğlu cited Tarık Oğuzlu’s reference to the new policy as “Zero Problems 2.0”: rather than having no problems with governments of the region, Turkey will now try to have no problems with the people of the region. Kayaoğlu cited a policy brief published by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in April in which he describes “Turkey’s vision-oriented foreign policy.” Kayaoğlu likened this new policy to the Bush’s ideas about the need for democracy promotion in the region.

Kayaoğlu argued, however, that Turkey does not have the political or intellectual capital necessary for a major pro-democracy push. Indeed, the zero problems policy relied on Turkey’s economic power, not its political or intellectual capital. Kayaoğlu pointed out that Turks need to know much more about the Middle East if they hope to promote democracy there, claiming that they tend to rely on Western sources for knowledge of the Middle East. He said that most think tanks in Turkey are affiliated with the government or are influenced by government policy. There has not been a genuine push to understand the region, Kayaoğlu charged, and some even see its problems as a sort of retribution for having rejected Ottomanism. The Turkish view of the Arab world is further complicated, he said, by its own ideological fault-lines.

Though Turkey ranks 17^th in the world in terms of economic power, Kayaoğlu explained, its rankings are not nearly as high in terms of adherence to human rights or democracy. As such, it cannot hope to be a promoter of democratic values, he argued. Although Kayaoğlu cited limited domestic reforms, he said further change is needed. For example, the Turkish law still penalizes insulting Turkishness and Islam. The Global Economic Forum’s 2011 Global Gender Gap Index ranks Turkey as 122^nd out of 135 countries. According to Freedom House, although political rights and civil liberties in Turkey improved under the AKP, Turkey still is still a partially free country. These statistics, Kayaoğlu argued, do not suggest that Turkey can or should be a promoter of democracy in the Middle East.

Turkish Ambassador to Qatar Emre Yunt objected to Kayaoğlu’s remarks, calling them a one-sided attack and arguing that the government’s side should be represented in the conversation. He added that the Turkish military is legally bound to carry out government orders and that, as a member of NATO, Turkey has a great deal of hard power. Turkey is not involving itself in Syria, he stated, because it is not Turkey’s place to use its military to impose regime change. Yunt also cited Erdoğan’s immense popularity in the region as proof of Turkish influence there.

Moderator Salman Shaikh then questioned the significance of Turkey’s alleged lack of hard power, saying it could be argued that soft power is more important in today’s world. Başkan answered that, as a realist, he believes that no impact can be made without hard power. He also asked what tangible results have been achieved through Turkish soft power. Popularity of the leadership is not enough, he emphasized. Başkan stated that Qatar may ultimately have been more successful in terms of its influence in the region, as it has played a role in solving issues in Sudan and Lebanon, partly due to its lack of financial constraints.

Another question concerned whether Turkey’s EU aspirations had affected its foreign policy outlook. Marufoğlu answered that Davotoğlu’s foreign policy strategy depends on its engagement with both the East and West. When Turkey faces the East and improves relations there, it will have more power, and the EU will take its membership bid more seriously, he said.

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Birol Başkan

Sinan Marufoğlu

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

It’s Time to Revise The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam

Turan Kayaoğlu — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

To the surprise of many, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has shown a new commitment to advancing human rights by establishing an Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission within the organization. In the Commission’s first meeting in Jakarta, Secretary General Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu asked the 18-member Commission in his opening address to “review and update OIC instruments, including the Cairo Declaration [of Human Rights in Islam]…” If the Commission intends to indeed advance human rights, then the Cairo Declaration is the first among these instruments in need of serious revision.

In 1990, the OIC approved a document that is now referred to as the Cairo Declaration in an attempt reconcile the concept of human rights and Islam. The Declaration protects many of the universal human rights: it forbids discrimination; supports the preservation of human life, supports the protection of one’s honor, family, and property; and affirms the human right to education, medical and social care, and a clean environment.

From an international human rights perspective, the controversial nature of the Cairo Declaration lies in its claim of adherence to Shari’ah. Its preamble affirms that“fundamental rights and universal freedoms are an integral part of [Islam]” and these rights and freedoms are “binding divine commandments” revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the Quran. The central role of Shari’ah can be clearly seen in the Declaration’s articles. Article 22 states that “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to principles of Shari’ah.” Article 12, affirms that “every man shall have the right, within the framework of Shari’ah, to free movement” (nothing is said about every woman). Articles 24 and 25 further makes Shari’ah supreme by asserting that Shari’ah is the Declaration’s “only source of reference.”

Such shorthand and cursory use of Shari’ah gives rise to four important shortcomings. The first is that it renders the document too restrictive. Shari’ah represents an extensive moral and legal code, and limiting rights such as free speech to a Shari’ah compatible framework of values would essentially render free-speech meaningless. Furthermore, the document is rendered ambiguous., as it does not specify what constitutes Shari’ah. Given the diversity of opinions on the subject across time and between and within madhabs (schools of Islamic law), it is impossible to know what rights are protected.

Interestingly, the declaration empowers states, not individuals. In the modern world, Shari’ah has increasingly become integrated in states’ domestic legal systems. In the absence of any international authority to decide on Shari’ah, the Cairo Declaration effectively diminishes the universality of human rights by relegating them to the discretion of governments.

Finally, the declaration conflicts with international human rights. The document provides only a subordinated status to religious minorities and also prohibits conversion from Islam. It also presents glaring evidence of discrimination against women, as it provides the right to freedom of movement or marriage only to men.

These shortcomings render the Declaration useless at best and at worst harmful for human rights. Not surprisingly, the only people who take the document seriously are critics of Islam who invoke it to argue the religion’s incompatibility with human rights. Muslim advocacy groups, scholars on Islam and human rights, and even the OIC Secretary General İhsanoğlu have either ignored the declaration or have avoided defending it publicly.

As part of OIC’s new reform agenda, the Human Rights Commission presents a unique opportunity for genuine revision of the Cairo Declaration. Such revision will not only signal the OIC’s commitment to human rights, but could also increase theits legitimacy and prestige among Muslims and in the international community, adding much-needed credibility to the new Commission. For the revision process is off to a good start as it has already mobilized the relatively strong NGO community in the Muslim world. Under the leadership of MAZLUMDER, a Turkish-Islamic human rights NGO, more than 230 such organizations from 24 OIC members appealed to the OIC to “ensure space for civil society participation in the Commission and follow a process that is consultative and inclusive of civil society at all levels.”

Efforts at revision should aim to usher in a period of genuine dialogue about how Islam can enhance modern international human rights and not necessarily conflict with it. The Islamic legal and intellectual heritage provides a much stronger basis from which to engage with the liberal-secular precepts of modern international human rights. Drawing on that tradition and discarding the Cairo Declaration could deliver an Islamic Declaration on Human Rights that Muslims deserve, where its “Islamic” character can be invoked to protect more rights than those provided by similar human rights instruments, not fewer.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

Secularism in Turkey: Stronger than Ever?

Turan Kayaoğlu — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Massive uproar in Turkey over the government’s role in religious education shows that despite fears the nation is on the verge of abandoning its secular past, a version of secularism has actually gained traction in Turkey, even among pro-Islamic conservative elites.

Controversy began last month when an opposition deputy from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) filed a lawsuit against a new regulation aiming to level the playing field for students of the Turkish imam-hatip (a type of secondary school with a religious curriculum along with the standard curriculum) in university exams. Turkey’s powerful Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—an imam-hatip graduate—responded to the lawsuit January 31, stating that his government wants to “raise a religious youth.” Within a week, Turkish secularists and conservatives alike had hurled a barrage of criticism at the Prime Minister, accusing him of abandoning secularism and dangerously meddling with religion.

For secularists, Erdoğan’s statement was a revelation of his true colors. The leader of CHP called him a “religion-monger,” and the staunchly secular teachers union Eğitim-Sen claimed Erdoğan had for the first time publicly admitted his hidden agenda. Criticism also proved rampant in academic circles, which put forth a petition within 24 hours of Erdoğan’s statement. Signed by over 2,000 individuals, it reads: “[O]f Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Alawite, Shafi'i, religious and nonreligious, atheist and agnostic backgrounds, all joined with a firm belief in secularism, [we] find your recent remarks about raising a religious and conservative youth most alarming and dangerous.” Each of these statements reflects liberal beliefs, which argue that a state policy to raise a religious youth is undemocratic, let alone impractical because millions of Turkish people have embraced secular lifestyles for decades.

Perhaps the most biting criticisms of Erdoğan’s remark were accusations of hypocrisy based on the contrast between his statement on January 31 and one he made on Egyptian TV last September, when he stated: “As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan I am a Muslim but not secular. But I am a prime minister of a secular country. People have the freedom to choose whether or not to be religious in a secular regime.” This statement, representative of Erdoğan’s long-standing political tendency toward secularism, renders his recent statement seemingly contradictory.

While opposition from secular and liberal corners was expected, more surprising was similar opposition in pro-Islamic media. In pro-government Bugün, columnist Gülay Göktürk noted, “These words did not befit Erdoğan at all.” She continued: “no one has the right to convert this society into a religious one, or the opposite.” In Zaman, the leading conservative daily, commentator Tamer Cetin asserted that because of the diversity of religious interpretations, focus should be on common ethical values, not religious ones. Further, regular columnist Mümtaz’er Türköne said raising a religious youth is actually dangerous for religion, as formal and public indoctrination would cheapen a religion which requires intimate and private connection to God. All argued that religious education should be left to civil society and parents’ demands.

This overwhelming consensus among elites reflects a broader trend in Turkey, whereby religious segments of Turkish society have increasingly accepted secularism throughout the rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which Erdoğan heads. According to a study conducted by the left-leaning Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), despite the relatively stable level of religiosity in Turkey, the percentage of people who want a religious state has actually plummeted from 25% in 1996 to 9% in 2006. And a recent poll conducted by Konsensus Research concluded that only 34% approved of Erdoğan’s January 31 statement.

While Turkey’s religious communities are deeply interested in raising a religious generation and society, they object to this becoming a state policy. For these religious groups, secularism appears to constitute not secularization of behavior or society, but rather secularization of state law and policy, such that religious education is conditioned on parents’ choices. Pro-Islamic conservatives’ overwhelming preference for civil society to supply religious-based education implicates they have grown to accept the separation of state and religion.

Turkey’s widespread secular consensus forced Erdoğan to make a rare political retreat. On February 6, he accused critics of misinterpreting his statement, and reaffirmed a commitment to liberty and democracy. He further asserted that his government would not impose any policy against the people’s wishes. Therefore, not only is the public majority’s consensus on secular government undeniable, but so too is the strength of the majority’s voice as Turkey’s politics move forward.

In a time when the Arab uprisings have brought Islamists to the power, Turkish religious groups’ embrace of secularism during rule by a pro-Islamic party shows growing consensus around secularism in Turkey. Whether or not the same will happen in newly formed governments of other Arab countries under majority-Islamist rule is yet to be seen, but growing factionalism in groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood suggests the Turkish trend may be upheld.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Today's Zaman

Turkey Should Do More to Protect its Christians

Turan Kayaoğlu — Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

In a surprising and controversial move, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in its 2012 Annual Report released on Thursday recommended that the U.S. State Department categorize Turkey as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) for religious freedom, a category reserved for the worst such as Iran, China and Saudi Arabia.

This claim should be taken with a grain of salt since five of the commission’s nine members and the State Department, which has the final say, have already distanced themselves from the report’s conclusion about Turkey. If not as a result of a bureaucratic glitch, Turkey’s inclusion in the suggested list of CPCs shows the power of the anti-Turkey lobby in the capital. The Turkish government vehemently, and rightly so, rejected the report’s characterization of religious freedom in Turkey.

Despite my skepticism over how the report characterizes religious freedom in Turkey and its overall conclusion, there is also some truth to it. Certainly, Turkey does not belong in the same category as Iran, China and Saudi Arabia when it comes to religious freedom. Unquestionably, the lot of Christians in Turkey has improved under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). But it is not enough; the government has done little to genuinely care for and help Turkey’s Christians maintain a dignified presence in Turkey.

Sadly, Christianity is endangered in Turkey. What used to be a large and vibrant Christian community has now been reduced to one-tenth of 1 percent of the population over the past century. Growing up in the historically Christian neighborhood of Kurtuluş, Istanbul (only two to three miles from Kasımpaşa where the prime minister grew up), I have witnessed the disappearance of Christians from Turkey. This historically Christian quarter has been “Turkified” since the 1930s. Its original name, Tatavla, was changed to Kurtuluş (independence) to honor the Independence War and to remind Kurtuluş’s residents -- then mostly Greek Christians -- that they lost the war.

Resettling Tatavla with Muslim residents

The name change came after the burning of a significant portion of the neighborhood in 1929. The municipality did little to stop the fire and used the rebuilding as an opportunity to resettle the neighborhood with Muslim residents. Subsequent waves of attacks and discrimination against Christians (wealth tax of 1942; September 6-7, 1955 mob attacks on non-Muslim shops; the intensification of the Cyrus problem; and the conflict over the Aegean Sea) resulted in Greeks fleeing Turkey in large numbers, turning Kurtuluş into a Muslim-majority neighborhood in the 1960s.

My family unwittingly contributed to the Islamization of the neighborhood. When my father bought a house in Kurtuluş in 1977 in order to move my family to Istanbul from eastern Turkey, a Greek eager to migrate to Greece sold it to him. Not all Greeks were able to sell their homes, however; many simply abandoned them, leaving the neighborhood full of empty or illegally occupied houses. I do not know the exact statistics, but my street-soccer team consisted of eight Muslims and five Christians (Greeks and Armenians). We came to recognize the difference in religion in the form of the colored eggs we were given on Easter, and we returned the favor with sacrificial meat during the Feast of the Sacrifice (Kurban Bayramı) in which some Christian families would occasionally participate by sacrificing their own sheep or goat.

This pleasant picture of Christians doing their best to mix in with the new Anatolian neighbors was coupled with old Christians increasingly dying in their homes in isolation, the abandoned houses becoming decrepit and the overall spirit of the neighborhood’s Christians becoming broken and battered. Among my five Christian soccer mates, only one stayed in Turkey while three migrated to Europe and one committed suicide.

Despite the USCIRF charge, the conditions of Christians have actually been improving under the AKP. I could see this in one of my last visits to my neighborhood. My neighborhood church opened its long-closed gates; I saw people carrying their crosses and Santa Claus look-a-likes hanging on ladders outside of windows in high rises, and one day on a street corner I was even offered a copy of the New Testament.

Moreover, the AKP is not to blame for the most outrageous crimes against Christians the USCIRF lists, such as the murders of Catholic priest Father Andrea Santoro in 2006 and Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul in 2007, as well as three employees of a Protestant publishing house in 2007. These crimes came from ultranationalist circles linked with the Turkish “deep state” forces within the security and military forces. Christianophobia is prevalent in parts of the Turkish state. During my military service in 2005, I sat and listened to a military colonel’s lengthy conspiratorial seminar to 3,000 men about how the US is using missionaries to Christianize and control Turkey and how the Greek Orthodox patriarch is collaborating with Greece to turn Istanbul into Constantinople.

For their part, mainstream Turkish pro-Islamic groups have treated Christians well. The Gülen community initiated some inter-faith meetings and the AKP government eliminated the most abusive treatment towards Christians such as ultranationalists’ harassment of them. Yet there is still more to be done, such as opening the Halki Seminary and returning all confiscated properties of Christian foundations, as well as providing more support to Christian schools and churches and rewriting history textbooks to recognize Christians’ contribution to Turkey.

We should protect Turkey’s Christians and foster the growth of their cultural and religious presence for several reasons. First, it is our duty towards this land, its history and people. Christianity is an integral part of our rich Anatolian fabric. Can we think of Istanbul without Hagia Sophia or Cappadocia without its underground churches? St. Paul of Tarsus belongs to Anatolia as much as Yunus Emre, Constantine as much as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, Santa Claus as much as Hodja Nasreddin and the Nicean Creed as much as Rumi’s Sufism.

Secondly, the protection of Christians is also demanded by the European Union. Turkey must fulfill EU demands in order to travel down the road to EU membership and also to support Turkey’s claims that European countries should protect the rights of Turkish minorities and combat Islamophobia.

Third, we owe this to Turkey’s religious minorities who have been discriminated against for far too long. These minorities, have been loyal citizens of Turkey since the establishment of the republic despite having their human rights and dignity violated, while struggling to save their culture and identity. More importantly it is the right thing to do. The Quran asks us to treat others well and so do all of the human rights treaties Turkey has signed.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Today's Zaman

American-Muslim Relations Can Improve

Turan Kayaoğlu — Thu, 15 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The Assad regime’s violent crackdown on the Syrian opposition has led to a surprising development: The United States and segments of the Islamic world are now working together in the United Nations Security Council to authorize humanitarian intervention.

Even in the midst of the ongoing crisis, meanwhile, some Muslim groups have rejected this effort because of their wholesale disapproval of any American involvement. This stance is based on a skewed characterization of American relations with the Islamic world, built largely on post 9/11 narratives. The current situation, however, offers a new platform for cooperation that should be embraced, not rejected.

First of all, there is no denying that many aspects of U.S. policy have fed Muslim and Arab mistrust and hatred of America. US involvement in the Middle East has been driven by support of dictatorial regimes or interventions aimed at advancing its strategic position and securing oil supplies. Furthermore, since the birth of the State of Israel, the United States has committed itself to the Zionist ideal, often over the plight of displaced Palestinians; the price has been the loss of support among Muslims across the world. For much of the American public, meanwhile, the “war on terror” has been, in fact, a war on Islam.

America’s complex relations with Muslims, however, cannot be reduced to only these negative instances. There also are many examples of U.S.-Muslim collaboration and, today, evolving interests are drawing the two closer together. For every example of American imperialism, there is a counter example of a U.S. ”anti-colonial” policy. For example, it was the US pressure that compelled Britain and France to end their occupation of the Suez in 1956. U.S. support of the mujahideen helped end Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the 1980s. More recently, American-led intervention ended the massacre of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Various U.S. interventions in the interest of religious freedom have been helped Muslim minorities, as in the case of Chinese Muslims. The State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report 2010 criticized the actions of Chinese authorities, ranged from forceful removal of Muslim women’s headscarves and confiscating passports to preventing Muslims from going on Hajj and imprisoning activists and their family members. If the lot of Chinese Muslims improves in the future, no doubt they will owe much to American pressure on China.

Of the 7 million American Muslims, two out of three are foreign-born. Some came to the U.S. as refugees. These groups include well-known cases from Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia, as well as lesser-known groups such as the Cham Muslims from Cambodia and Meshket Turks (Ahiskalilar) from Central Asia. True to its historical legacy, the United States has continued to provide a haven for Muslims fleeing persecution, conflict and war.

American-Muslim collaboration during the Arab Spring has further strengthened this relationship. While Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation ignited large-scale protests in Tunisia, dispatches between American diplomats and autocratic leaders of the Middle East, revealed by WikiLeaks, described extensive palace corruption, providing additional fuel to the protests.

In Egypt, the initial American reluctance to call for the ouster of long-standing ally Hosni Mubarak gave way to US President Barack Obama’s cautious support for protesters and stern warnings against the use of violence. Taking this approach to support the Arab Spring one step further, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged that the United States would work with Al-Nahda in Tunisia “because America respects the right of the Tunisian people to choose their own leaders.” Collaboration between the Arab League and the U.S. on Libya offers a final example in which the NATO-led intervention saw U.S. forces fighting alongside those of several Arab countries.

Overall, the Obama administration has shown balanced leadership throughout the past year’s events. The administration’s overly cautious attitude signaled a shift from the forceful intervention of the Bush era to genuine dialogue and calculated engagement with a range of groups in the region, including Islamists.

This fresh American approach appears to be well received by Muslims. As the Brookings 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll indicated, favorable views of the United States in the region stand at 26 percent. While still low, this is a significant increase from 10 percent in 2010. Moreover, 24 percent of those polled believed the US played a constructive role in the Arab Spring, placing it behind only Turkey and France.

American involvement in Muslim affairs in general — and during the Arab Spring, in particular — clearly cannot be characterized as simply having a malevolent intent. This is not to say that the climate of relations between Muslims and America has reached optimal warmth, nor that a Libya-like intervention in Syria conducted by Muslim states and America would be sure to succeed. But it is time to reject the shortsighted reactionary position that intervention is suspicious solely because the US supports it. Ending bloodshed should be the priority — not preventing American involvement at any cost.

Authors

Turan Kayaoğlu

Publication: Global Post