Brookings: Experts - Anne W. Kamau

A Theoretical Framework for Kenya's Central Bank Macroeconometric Model

Maureen Were, Anne W. Kamau, Moses M. Sichei and Moses Kiptui — Fri, 17 May 2013 10:29:00 -0400

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the theoretical framework for the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) macroeconometric model. In addition, it highlights the theoretical base for the model’s main behavioral equations. The justification for the model relates to its usefulness in aiding the policymaking process at the CBK. It is expected that the model will support the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and Research Department in further understanding how the economy works through the complex interactions of various economic agents. The conduct of monetary policy requires fairly accurate analyses and forecasts backed up by sound economic theory and a rationale ensuring that effective monetary policy is formulated and implemented. In this regard, the model will provide consistent short-term forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as economic growth and inflation. In addition, the model will be helpful in evaluating the impact of various shocks and policies on the economy. The MPC may also use the model as an instrument to help in structuring its communication with the public on the rationale behind its decisions.

This paper is organized as follows. The rest of Section 1 discusses the type of macro model developed, Section 2 presents the model’s logical and theoretical framework and illustrates the linkages between the monetary submodel and the other blocks of the model, Section 3 discusses the theoretical foundations of the model’s behavioral equations, and Section 4 concludes.

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Authors

Maureen Were
Anne W. Kamau
Moses M. Sichei
Moses Kiptui

Image Source: © Antony Njuguna / Reuters

The African Union Can Do More to Support Regional Integration

Michael Rettig, Anne W. Kamau and Augustus Sammy Muluvi — Fri, 17 May 2013 16:39:00 -0400

Earlier this May in Cape Town, South Africa, economists at the World Economic Forum reaffirmed that regional integration will play a key role in unleashing the continent’s growth potential. More than 10 regional economic communities (RECs) are working toward this goal in Africa, but the main framework behind this effort is the African Economic Community (AEC). The AEC was established by the Abuja Treaty in 1991 and ratified in 1994. The treaty aims to build the AEC gradually through harmonization, coordination and effective integration of Africa’s RECs, eight of which have been chosen as “pillars” of the AEC. It proposes the establishment of a continental free trade area (CFTA) by 2017, and integration of the RECs into a single customs union with a common currency, central bank and parliament by 2028. The Abuja treaty does not lay out precise, top-down steps for achieving this goal, but the African Union (AU) and the RECs have defined their relationship in working toward the AEC in the 2007 Protocol on Relations between the AU and the RECs. Towards this end, the Africa Union has embarked on various programs at the regional and sub-regional level to promote integration. Indeed, at the January 2012 AU Summit, heads of state from around the continent renewed this mission by agreeing to speed up plans for economic integration. The tone of the 2012 Summit implied an ambitious AU agenda of promoting and coordinating African integration and its accompanying benefits more quickly than before.

Like the European Union, the AEC would enjoy increased intra-African trade, improved self-sufficiency in meeting Africa’s import demand, lower poverty levels and a more peaceful interdependent existence. However, in contrast with these grand plans to move toward a CFTA, Africa’s RECs are grappling with numerous challenges. Though it is the responsibility of the RECs and individual countries to implement protocols and integrate, the AU Commission is charged with monitoring the continent’s integration process. The integration process has remained slow despite numerous efforts and working committees formed by the AU to coordinate the RECs, suggesting more work remains to be done. Now, many RECs have missed their target dates for implementing customs unions and common market requirements. For the RECs to achieve integration objectives and a CFTA to still take hold by 2017, the AU may have to play a more active role. Indeed, as the AU celebrates its 50th anniversary this May, the progress made and challenges encountered by Africa’s RECs offer valuable lessons as to how the AU can best act to improve integration, development and growth moving forward. Consider the progress of two RECs from Central and East Africa.

The East African Community (EAC) is composed of five countries in East Africa: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The EAC has achieved considerable milestones, having established a customs union in 2005 and a common market in 2010. It is scheduled to move to a monetary union by November of this year and ultimately to a political federation by 2017. In addition, the EAC has taken steps towards further economic integration by signing a free trade agreement with two other RECs, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). This progressive tripartite agreement eases the transitional problem of states’ memberships in multiple RECs and therefore multiple sets of requirements and regulations. Despite this progress, the EAC has not fully implemented their Common Market Protocol. While the EAC has made tremendous progress in eliminating tariffs, poor infrastructure and other non-tariff barriers remain. Lack of roads, railways and energy networks add to cost of doing business and make it difficult to increase intra-African trade and attract investment in the region. Moreover, neither the EAC nor the AU has effectively explained the benefits of economic integration to citizens, so the democratic leaders of member states do not feel pressure to improve their progress. In addition, national governments fear a loss in tax revenue, and, despite the elimination of border tariffs, different domestic tax rates still exist within the EAC. Indeed, harmonizing the various economic policies in the EAC has been challenging. As a result, member states are struggling to converge their macroeconomic policies in the prescribed time. Most notably, as the EAC has achieved its successes and struggled with its challenges, the AU’s efforts have barely influenced the integration process in the region.

Another REC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), was first formed in 1983 and remained mostly dormant for 16 years until 1999. The group suffered first from states’ unwillingness to pay much-needed fees, and later from a war between some of its member states. Once the ECCAS began operating, it faced renewed challenges from competing economic communities—Rwanda left the group in 2007 to focus on its COMESA and EAC memberships. Unlike the EAC, which includes Kenya, the ECCAS lacks a high-growth country to provide leadership and capital in supporting regional infrastructure and pushing trade liberalization efforts. As a result, the ECCAS remains a group of states of varying levels of development focused on their own self-interests. The AU has an opportunity to educate the member states and apply informal pressure to make progress. In spite of these challenges, the ECCAS has achieved some successes. Many ECCAS members utilize a single currency, and capital moves freely across borders. Steps have been taken to eliminate tariffs as well, though these have yet to be fully implemented. The ECCAS has enjoyed more success in tackling peace and security—leading peace operations in the Central African Republic on two occasions and laying the foundation to host one of the AU’s planned Standby Forces. Indeed, the AU has been effective and proactive in assisting with these security gains (and also throughout the continent), yet the role of the AU in assisting with ECCAS’s economic integration successes has not been visible.

As the African Union reflects on its achievements 50 years since its creation, it should balance its successes in minimizing African conflict with the importance of doing more to promote economic integration. While addressing flashpoints of violence is an important short-term necessity, increasing intra-African trade, building an African consumer base, and networking African interdependence may offer great long-term promise. These are all steps toward the same goal of a prosperous and peaceful Africa. While the AU does not have the authority to overcome poor capacity, a lack of political will, or other challenges that African countries and RECs may face or bring to the table, it can and should better follow its mission in encouraging integration.

Under the 2007 Protocol, the AU is directly charged with working to facilitate and implement regional integration. If the AU hopes to realize its goal of a united Africa by 2028, it must better engage the continent’s RECs and assist in resolving the numerous obstacles they face. It should consider expanding its efforts to coordinate regional initiatives within low-capacity countries and work to ensure that future programs are better targeted and more visible. Further, the AU should exercise leadership in countries that seem not to have the domestic political will to move towards integration. It could also move from biannual meetings to more common ones and more vigorously assist in mobilizing resources and coordinating their application toward regional infrastructure projects to boost trade. The AU could even consider launching voluntary international governance initiatives, such as a two-term limit for political leaders or the teaching of a common language base. It can also more closely oversee and facilitate the long and difficult negotiations of protocols, and may use scorecards and penalties while monitoring their implementation to ensure that states feel pressure to meet their benchmarks. A continental free trade area in Africa holds as much potential as the one seen in Europe, but achieving success of this goal by 2017 will require the African Union to engage its regional economic communities more robustly.

Authors

Michael Rettig
Anne W. Kamau
Augustus Sammy Muluvi

Image Source: © Thierry Gouegnon / Reuters

Six Major Decision Points for Uhuru Administration

Eric Aligula and Anne W. Kamau — Sun, 12 May 2013 16:18:00 -0400

On March 4, 2013 Kenya successfully concluded elections under the new Constitution, ushering in new leadership in a devolved form of government.

President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto are faced with the surmountable but difficult task of revamping economic growth and implementing the new supreme law while seeking to deliver on promises made to Kenyans during their campaign.

The new government is faced with a tight resource environment within which to manoeuvre, hence the need to carefully identify priorities that will facilitate the quantum leap of the economy in the next five years, including measures to achieve an appropriate balance between private and public sector investments in the economy. Kenya’s economic performance in the last five years has been on the upswing from its low 2008 performance, but still faces some challenges. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, the economy grew at 5.8 percent, 4.4 percent and 4.5 percent per annum, respectively.

It is projected to grow at an annual rate of 5.1 per cent, 6.0 percent and 7.1 percent in 2013, 2014 and 2015. However, these growth rates remain below the psychological 10 per cent per annum target which is also under the national development blueprint Vision 2030.

As a matter of fact, this administration has promised a double-digit growth rate. Government resources are stretched with a rising wage bill estimated at Sh458 billion, which is about 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP).

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Authors

Eric Aligula
Anne W. Kamau

Publication: Business Daily

Image Source: © Marko Djurica / Reuters

Africa Answers: Five Questions for Lawrence Bategeka about Uganda’s New Oil Law

Anne W. Kamau and Andrew Westbury — Wed, 01 May 2013 15:10:00 -0400

Earlier this month, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed into law the “Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013.” This bill establishes how Uganda will govern its new oil resources and clears the way for what is certain to be extensive commercial production. Passage of the new bill also ends an extended period of public scrutiny about the new law, during which the international community and Ugandan civil society groups expressed grave concerns about transparency in the sector and future use of oil revenues.

We recently discussed the bill and its ramifications with Lawrence Bategeka, acting principal research fellow at Ugandan think tank Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC). EPRC is an excellent resource on Uganda’s oil industry and the general economy of East Africa. You can follow them on Twitter at @EPRC_official. Brookings recently held a joint conference in Kampala with EPRC on natural resource management in East Africa.

Please read Lawrence’s answers to our questions below.

1. What are the implications of signing the new oil bill into law?

LAWRENCE BATEGEKA: Implementation of the National Oil and Gas Policy that Uganda prepared in 2008 required a legal framework. The policy goal is “to use Uganda’s oil and gas resources to contribute to early achievement of poverty eradication and to create lasting value to society.” The two laws—(1) The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013, and (2) The Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing and Conversion, Transportation and Storage) Act 2013—provide the framework for implementation of the National Oil and Gas Policy. These two laws make it possible for industry stakeholders to proceed with the development stage of extracting Uganda’s new oil and gas resources since roles and responsibilities for every stakeholder are now well defined. Uganda should begin to see increased foreign direct investment in its oil and gas sector. However, Ugandans will have to wait until around 2016 to start seeing revenues from oil extraction since there is a minimum period of time it will take to accomplish each stage (e.g., a minimum of three years is required for the construction of an oil refinery).

2. Oil was discovered in Uganda a while back but to date there have been no revenues from the new discoveries. Has the delayed signing of the bills had any impact in delaying revenues from the oil industry?

BATEGEKA: Yes, the delayed enactment of the laws adversely impacted Uganda’s progress in oil and gas production and therefore delayed the realization of oil revenues. Uganda discovered oil and gas in 2006, but seven years later oil production has not yet started. It is prudent to note that the country would not move forward without a legal and regulatory framework. As such, the delay allowed Uganda to understand the oil and gas industry and thus try to avoid the mistakes that other oil-rich African countries have made. The first lesson learned is that operating outside the law would have raised issues of accountability and transparency, which could have possibly led to the “Dutch Disease Syndrome.” The second lesson is that, when civil society organizations work closely with lawmakers, there is likely to be more public debate and engagement on oil matters. This is attributed to the fact that the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill was the most debated piece of legislation with nearly eight caucuses of the ruling party and an unprecedented use of the media by both those in support of and opposed to the bill. The third lesson is that the political institutions and culture in place have a key bearing on Uganda’s natural resource path regarding the management and utilization of the oil and gas resources.

3. Uganda’s public finance bill will state how oil revenues will be used in the country. Will expediting the signing of this bill have any impact?

BATEGEKA: The public finance bill is yet to be passed by parliament for assent by the president.

Expediting the public finance bill in its current form will have adverse effects due to inconsistencies with the current Public Finance Act and other regulations. In addition, there is lack of general consensus among all stakeholders on the various clauses pertaining to the management and sharing of oil revenues, the intergenerational fund, the creation of oil districts and the distribution of royalties, among others. While the proposed law aims at reforming the public finance sector and provides for fiscal and macroeconomic policies, the public perception is that the debate on the policy may be tilted away from oil issues and emphasis on transparency and accountability or vice versa. Furthermore, the proposed bill is silent on penalties for the abuse of public funds which was clearly emphasized in the current Public Finance Act (now being repealed). The proposals to increase the threshold for supplementary budget from the 3 percent currently provided for in the Public Finance Act to 10 percent in the new draft bill raises suspicions, considering that currently much of the supplementary budget is about 85 percent allocated to State House. If approved, this clause is bound to sideline Parliament as regards approval of what the funds should be spent on.

4. In view of regional integration initiatives going on across Africa, have the bills incorporated the regional integration initiatives? Why or why not?

BATEGEKA: None of the legislation has incorporated regional initiatives or perspectives. The enactment of the laws was based on the National Oil and Gas Policy, which was prepared for Uganda. It only tacitly takes into consideration regional integration initiatives especially from the perspective of building an oil refinery to serve the energy needs of some countries in the region. Since the National Oil and Gas Policy was prepared in 2008, there are other regional developments in the oil and gas industry that may require cooperation from other countries. The laws enacted do not inhibit nor do they enhance cooperation among countries in the region in matters of oil and gas development.

The bills are silent on the competition between countries partly because they feed into the security paradigm. It is also envisaged that negotiations among countries would make the oil production process slower than it already is. There is strong desire to speed up production and realize returns on investment. The government of Uganda has considered floating its oil refinery shares to regional states including East African Community partner states in order to generate funds for the construction of the proposed refinery.

5. Has the discovery of oil in Uganda had any significant shift in the structure of the Ugandan economy?

BATEGEKA: The discovery of oil is yet to have a significant shift in the structure of the Ugandan economy. Uganda’s economy remains largely agricultural and rural. Much of the labor is still employed in agriculture (66 percent of population) and the sector contributes 22 percent to GDP. The largest contributor to GDP is the services sector at 51 percent. However, due to the speculation of oil revenues, the mid-western part of the country where the oil was discovered has experienced an increased inflow of potential investors. As a result, there is now demand in this region for services such as banking, accommodation, food and transport, among others. In response, some local entrepreneurs in the Hoima and Buliisa districts have opened up small hotels, restaurants and recreation facilities to tap into these new opportunities. The government has recently released its Vision 2040 Strategy in which oil and gas are projected to partially finance the transformation of Uganda from peasantry to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years.

Authors

Anne W. Kamau
Andrew Westbury

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Creating Jobs Where Institutions Matter: Addressing South Africa’s Unemployment Problem

Anne W. Kamau and Andrew Westbury — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 16:30:00 -0400

The South African think tank the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) at the University of Cape Town recently conducted some thoughtful analysis on what exactly occludes employment in South Africa. According to DPRU Director Haroon Bhorat, “Institutions matter and nowhere more so than within the labor regulatory environment.” Under the auspices of South Africa’s Labor Relations Act, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) is charged with handling all employment disputes in the country. Each year, this group manages nearly 5,300 such claims, with cases ranging allegations of wrongful dismisals to contract violations and requests for wage increases. DPRU’s analysis of these claims indicates empirically that the faster these disputes can be resolved, the more jobs created in the market. In contrast, when these are drawn out, employment rates suffer severely. Indeed, according to the DPRU working paper, Do Industrial Disputes Reduce Employment? Evidence from South Africa, even slight changes with the efficiency of CCMA processes can produce dramatic results. For example, DPRU estimates that a 1 percentage reduction in the agency’s own efficiency index effectively terminates employment for nearly 2,702 South Africans.

Fortunately, the CCMA is actually quite capable. A majority of cases are adjudicated within approximately one month, and the high usage rates of the system demonstrate “the accessibility and legitimacy of the institution”. Unfortunately, despite the crucial role the CCMA plays in South Africa’s labor market, the entity is under-resourced. CCMA is currently funded on the “basis of previous financial year’s caseload”, which allow for little flexibility when the volatility of the current world economy precipitates increase layoffs or other unforeseen market action. Either way, more secure funding and better support of the CCMA seems almost a prerequisite for increased employment in South Africa. The DPRU writes in their working paper, A Nation in Search of Jobs: Six Possible Policy Suggestions for Employment Creation in South Africa: “That an institution as central to labor market efficiency in the country as the CCMA needs to worry about cash flow is an example of a labor market rigidity which can be avoided.” With South Africa suffering from nearly 25 percent unemployment, funding institutions seems like a simple step that can support both workers and employers.

For more information, you can also read recent commentary on South Africa’s rapid economic growth but continued challenges with inequality by scholars from the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative and DPRU in the February edition of Yale Global Online.

Authors

Anne W. Kamau
Andrew Westbury

Image Source: © Siphiwe Sibeko / Reuters

Perspectives on Kenya’s Presidential Election: Reflections from 2007

Anne W. Kamau — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 12:00:00 -0500

In just about one week, Kenyans will cast their ballots in the 2013 presidential election. This historic event has provoked intense emotions across the country, with many citizens experiencing a rare combination of hope for the future and anxiety about the past. Earlier this week, my colleague Mwangi S. Kimenyi and I discussed Kenya’s national mood with Karuti Kanyinga, professor at the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi. Our conversation recounts personal experiences from the tragic post-election violence of 2007, as well as what we believe has been progress made to reconcile and heal the people of Kenya.

We hope you enjoy this, and Kwaheri, and kila la heri Kenya!

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African Experts Discuss the Region's Top Issues in 2013

Anne W. Kamau — Fri, 21 Dec 2012 12:00:00 -0500

Each year, the Africa Growth Initiative uses the occasion of the New Year to preview events and trends that are anticipated to shape Africa in the coming year. And this year’s Foresight Africa report— a collection of short briefs on what our scholars see are the major issues for Africa in 2013— seeks to continue this tradition.

In support of this year’s Foresight Africa, I recently interviewed scholars from five leading think tanks in Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda, asking them to identify the biggest challenges facing their respective countries in the year ahead, and how these issues will likely impact relations with the United States and the welfare of their citizens. Their responses touch on similar themes of governance, youth employment, and how economic growth can better support the continent’s broader development goals.

We are interested to hear your thoughts on what you see as the top issues for Africa in 2013 as well as your feedback on our report. You can join the conversation on twitter using the hashtag #ForesightAfrica and please tune in to our live webcasted event on January 9, where we will delve into these issues with a group of leading Africanists.

We look forward to hearing from you and, on behalf of the Africa Growth Initiative, happy New Year!

Anne W. Kamau

Uganda

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Foresight Africa: Uganda

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Anne W. Kamau

Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2013

Tue, 18 Dec 2012 12:14:00 -0500

Africa starts 2013 with hope and optimism. Africa has dropped its mantle as a “doomed continent” and has weathered several global economic crises fairly well. Today, the continent is a land of opportunity both for Africans and international investors. Many now see the region as “emerging Africa” because of the positive changes that have taken place and continue to take place across the continent.

Africa has changed, moving from economic stagnation to above 5 percent GDP growth on average. The continent is now home to some of the fastest growing economies in the world: Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. This growth has helped build a burgeoning middle class, which has created new markets for goods and services. Investors focused on tapping into these new markets in Africa are likely to find it easier to do business there than ever before as African governments are working to reduce transaction costs. In addition to growing consumer markets, African countries have discovered additional natural resources. If managed properly, these resources could help spur further economic growth and development for the region and improve the lives of millions.

Such an optimistic outlook for the continent means that African and global policymakers must get ahead of the challenges and opportunities for an important year of decision-making. Since 2010, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) has asked its scholars to assess the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. This year, AGI experts and colleagues have identified what they consider to be the key issues for 2013 and ways to leverage opportunities so that Africa can continue its “emerging” momentum. The following briefs in the Foresight Africa collection are meant to create a dialogue on what matters in Africa for 2013, and it is our hope that this dialogue will continue through the year.

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More than Just Sending Money Home: Engaging the Diaspora as a Priority for Africa's Development

Anne W. Kamau and Mwangi S. Kimenyi — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 16:57:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This chapter is part of the 2013 Foresight Africa full report, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. Read the full report here.

Africa’s large diaspora has mainly been seen as an asset to African countries only in terms of remittances. However, the African diaspora population is untapped human capital, underutilized as a source of investment, support and human capital, and a resource for advocacy and political pressure.

Anne Kamau and Mwangi S. Kimenyi offer ways for African policymakers to better engage diaspora members in the year ahead. African governments should take the time and effort to know what their diaspora looks like so that they can target it more effectively. African banks should look to diaspora members as potential clients. Also, by building effective and targeted lobbying and advocacy groups, African governments can empower their diaspora in their host countries to influence foreign policies that impact Africa.

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Labor Strikes Are Becoming a Rising Concern across Africa

Anne W. Kamau — Thu, 18 Oct 2012 15:34:00 -0400

Since the start of this year, the number of labor strikes by workers in both the private and public sectors has been on the rise across Africa. About 280,000 teachers and over 10,000 lecturers have gone on strike in Malawi, Kenya and Swaziland. All of these strikes have been over wage disputes and millions of students have been affected. The university and college strike of 8,000 lecturers in Kenya affected about 200,000 students preparing for their October exams.

The public health care sector that serves the majority of Kenya’s 40 million people has also been affected by labor strikes recently. About 2,300 doctors went on a three-week strike over wage disputes and poor working conditions. During that time, several patients died in hospitals since only a few doctors went into work to handle emergency cases.

Africa’s private sector is not immune to these labor strikes. In fact, it has recently been hit hard by ongoing labor disputes and walkouts. For example, investor confidence in Namibia has fallen as a result of the many ongoing strikes across the country. The country’s broadcasting cooperation staff was on strike for a full week making the airwaves silent. Agribank workers went on strike for two weeks paralyzing banking operations and only returned to work after a wage increase of 8 percent was agreed upon. Recently, South Africa’s mining sector was slowed by a six-week long strike of thousands of Lonmin company workers. The Lonmin strike not only caused a surge in global platinum prices by 1.3 percent, but also led to deaths of 45 people, 34 of which were a result of clashes with the police while the rest were because of clashes between rival unions. The strikes in South Africa have now spread to the country’s gold mining companies, shutting down all seven of Anglogold’s mines in the country and two of Gold Fields’ mines.

Sub-Saharan Africa is not the only part of the continent experiencing these problems. After the democratic uprisings that brought an end to Mubarak’s rule in Egypt, a series of labor strikes followed. The country’s textile industry—a key economic driver in Egypt—was badly hurt when over 30,000 workers staged a week-long strike over insufficient wages. Around the same time, the Egyptian ceramics industry also saw strikes with workers from private companies.

The rising number of strikes across Africa, especially in the public sector, is a cause for concern given their operational scale, the costs involved and their length of time.

Many of the strikes in the public sector are driven by wage disputes. Often, African governments can be discriminatory in the way they award wage increases for its civil servants. In other instances, African governments have reneged on promises of wage increases or reforms. For example, Kenyan members of parliament in the past have increased their own salaries while keeping the salaries of civil servants the same. The Kenyan government also promised to carry out reforms in the public health care sector, improve working conditions and increase wages for doctors, but then never followed through.

For the most part, these strikes have been effective in achieving resolutions for the grievances of workers, albeit at high costs. Lives have been lost, revenues have suffered and learning hours have been wasted.

When a wave of labor strikes paralyzes public sector services, the government is often to blame. A government is responsible for ensuring that resources are prioritized and shared fairly across sectors and that civil servant wages are synchronized equitably. For many African countries, some unnecessary disruptions to the provision of public services could be avoided if wage increases for all civil servants were factored in from the onset of budgeting process. In the private sector, companies have the responsibility to ensure that workers are properly paid and working conditions are safe and sanitary.

At the same time, the power of labor unions may need to be kept in check—especially unions of essential emergency professionals, such as doctors and nurses. But there must be a careful balancing act since the collective bargaining rights of workers and unions need to be protected as well.

The rising number of labor strikes in Africa is a wake-up call for African governments to consider the following: First, look at labor markets with a renewed interest to revise laws governing the role and powers accorded to collective bargaining unions with a view to streamline them. Second, revise minimum wages, wage increases and dispute resolution policies in line with the latest economic developments in the country and international standards to ensure fairness and equity. Third, ensure that negotiations involving unions that represent essential emergency professionals do not break down and go to strike since people’s lives could be at stake. Finally, deliberately incorporate wage increase policies in the national budgeting process. These reforms would go a long way in minimizing the growing number of strikes across Africa.

Authors

Anne W. Kamau

Image Source: © SIPHIWE SIBEKO / Reuters

What the U.S. Should Know About the South African Economy

Anne W. Kamau and Haroon Bhorat — Wed, 25 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

South Africa is Africa’s largest economy and holds considerable diplomatic and political influence throughout the continent. Along with Brazil, India, China and Russia, South Africa is one of the powerful BRICS nations and is considered the “gateway” for investment in Africa. Still, its economy is facing a range of challenges, including rigidities in the labor market, high unemployment, the perception of rising corruption and, increasingly, nationalization of economic affairs. Africa Research Fellow Anne Kamau talks with Haroon Bhorat, director of the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town, about U.S.-South African relations, the South African economy, and the trends that will shape the future of Africa’s largest economy.

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What the U.S. Should Know About the South African Economy

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Anne W. Kamau

Around the Halls: Celebrating Nelson Mandela's 94th Birthday

Tue, 17 Jul 2012 12:59:00 -0400

On July 18, Former South African President Nelson Mandela celebrates his 94th birthday. In honor of Mandela, the Africa Growth Initiative reflects on his leadership, global influence, and dedication to the fight for democracy and equality for all races.

Mandela’s Imprint on South African Politics
John Mukum Mbaku, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

As we celebrate Nelson Mandela’s birthday this month, it’s good to remind ourselves of this great leader’s indelible imprint on global governance in general and the South African political economy in particular. Mandela had a dream for his beloved South Africa, which had been ravaged by state-sanctioned racial bigotry under apartheid. He saw all the peoples of South Africa—various African ethnic groups, descendants of European settlers and Asian immigrants, and peoples of mixed race—as his brothers and sisters, all citizens of a nonracial, nonsexist, modern South African state. Unlike most so-called nationalist leaders in other parts of the African continent who fought against colonial oppression, Mandela did not seek to replace Afrikaner-imposed tyranny of apartheid with institutional structures that would allow African ethnic groups to exploit others. Yet today some people fear that Mandela’s dream has been betrayed and that the “rainbow” nation that he fought so hard to found is gradually descending into some type of apocalyptic society.

What these defeatists fail to recognize is that Mandela and his peace-loving compatriots have established a country with institutional arrangements that protect the fundamental human rights of all citizens and enhance their ability to live together peacefully. First, a Constitution written through a participatory and inclusive process has provided the foundation for the country’s laws, which are designed to protect citizens’ rights and enhance peaceful coexistence. Second, unlike many other countries in Africa, the separation of powers guaranteed by South Africa’s Constitution has been realized in practice. As a consequence, the judiciary is not subservient to the executive. And third, the country maintains many effective private and public structures through which citizens can engage those who govern them.

Despite what the critics say, governance in South Africa, unlike that in many countries on the continent, today is characterized by a general adherence to the rule of law. Also, many South Africans, especially the young, still believe in Mandela’s dream and are not willing to give in to the naysayers. A diverse middle class, which even includes people from historically marginalized and deprived groups, has emerged in South Africa. And these citizens have been engaging the political elite, effectively serving as a check on the government. Hence, South Africa has good prospects for peaceful coexistence and sustainable development, and most South Africans continue to believe in Mandela’s dream of a peaceful nation, free of racial bigotry.

President Nelson Mandela’s Foreign Policy: Noble Intentions in Challenging Times
Witney Schneidman, Nonresident Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative
Andrew Westbury, Assistant Director, Africa Growth Initiative

When Nelson Mandela was sworn into office as South Africa’s first postapartheid president, the country’s expectations for him could not have been higher. Yet his immediate demands were not exclusively domestic. South Africa’s new president was seen to possess an unprecedented international influence to promote peace, and he felt a strong personal conviction to reorient South Africa’s apartheid-era foreign policy. For years, the country maintained a deliberate destabilization strategy to disrupt neighboring governments and liberation movements, which Mandela estimated left “two million dead and inflicted an estimated $62.45 billion of damage on the economies of our neighbors.” Despite noble efforts, the foreign policy that emerged under Mandela was generally inconsistent, with national interests and the pressures of the presidency testing his core convictions. President Mandela’s 94th birthday provides an opportunity to look back at the decisions and dynamics that shaped his approach to international relations.

Even before his presidency, Nelson Mandela was eager to reverse South Africa’s isolated position. He articulated a new approach to international relations, guided by the key principles of the promotion of human rights and democracy through nonviolent and multilateral measures, as well as a need to maintain diplomatic and economic solidarity with other African nations. The president wrote: “These convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly five decades, apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations.”

President Mandela’s approach to foreign policy was tested when a contested trial in Nigeria resulted in a death sentence for activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Following Saro-Wiwa’s execution, Mandela was the first world leader to demand an oil embargo against the Nigerian junta. However, his resolve was challenged when he found his commitment to human rights in conflict with his preferred strategy of multilateral engagement. As one of the world’s largest oil producers, Nigeria was able to effectively counter calls for sanctions, and many African governments were particularly reluctant to press the military regime. Without an international consensus, Mandela found his policy on Nigeria frustrated by his need to maintain solidarity with his African counterparts. His call for sanctions was later dismissed in favor of diplomatic engagement through the Organization of African Unity.

The year 1998 was another challenging time for Mandela’s foreign policy. In August, he maintained his commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict, calling for diplomatic rather than military intervention from the Southern African Development Community to stop the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the time, this position precipitated strong rebukes from some of the community’s member states. In particular, the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, sank to personal attacks, arguing that “age has taken its toll” on Mandela.

Despite this peaceful strategy, also in 1998 South Africa authorized a poorly coordinated military intervention to avert a coup in neighboring Lesotho. The ensuing chaos left nearly 60 dead and precipitated riots in Lesotho’s capital, Maseru. Worse still, the intervention perpetuated regional resentment against South Africa’s role as big brother, an outcome strongly divergent from Mandela’s goal of African solidarity. South African interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lesotho illustrated the gap between Mandela’s principles and foreign policy realities.

As president, Mandela was ultimately responsible for South Africa’s foreign policy; however, it is difficult to attribute all actions to him. For example, the Lesotho intervention occurred while both he and the deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, were abroad and the minister of home affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, served as acting head of state. But there is no doubt that the presidency tested Mandela’s convictions and his ability to consistently implement policy. As he turns 94, he still deserves credit for replacing the destructive policies of the apartheid era with those of nonviolence, cooperation and attention to human rights.

Mandela’s Attempts to Create an Equal Opportunity Society
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Analyst, Africa Growth Initiative

South Africa’s economic situation is currently less than ideal. The African National Congress (ANC) says that much work still needs to be done to ensure progress. Of particular concern is the persistence of large income inequalities and high rates of joblessness among the youth. Mandela’s birthday, which is also designated as a day of service, provides an excellent opportunity to reflect on actions to address some of the economic challenges that the country currently faces. Mandela’s hope was for the establishment of a nation that extended equal opportunities to all its people while maintaining high rates of economic growth. Though his policies were not perfect, he made large-scale economic reforms. His creativity offers an admirable example as South Africa continues to tackle inequality.

When Mandela became president in 1994, most people had been excluded from the benefits of past economic success. The minority white population (13 percent) was estimated to possess about 86 percent of the country’s land and 90 percent of its wealth. Whites earned, on average, 10 times more than blacks. Mandela faced the massive challenge of incorporating this disenfranchised majority while redeveloping a globally competitive economy. As the ANC put it in its Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994, “We cannot successfully build the economy while millions do not have homes or jobs. And we cannot provide homes and jobs without rebuilding the economy.”

In addition to these domestic issues, the country’s economy had mostly stagnated—during the previous decade, average annual growth had been only about 1 percent, mostly a result of the years leading up to Mandela’s presidency, when South Africa had been increasingly isolated from the global economy under sanctions against apartheid. Mandela’s party, the ANC, had been debating policies of nationalization, so even as he entered office foreign investors and trading partners were hesitant about the country’s future economic policies.

Mandela’s presidency was marked by two significant efforts that showed his dedication to relieve these domestic economic tensions and to reassure the international community that South Africa was ready to again be a trustworthy economic partner. The first, the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), focused on alleviating the disenfranchisement caused by apartheid through increased government expenditures on education, health, housing and social welfare. At the same time, it also aimed to actually decrease the government’s deficit by remaining as fiscally conservative as possible.

Because the goals of the RDP ended up being difficult to attain, a second effort—the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy— attempted to further liberalize the economy to create jobs and promote investment, trade and growth. Though its ambitious goals were not met during Mandela’s presidency, they set a precedent by balancing attempts to solve the pressing problem of inequality and low job prospects while also pursuing macroeconomic stability and global reintegration.

Though South Africa still faces many economic issues, since Mandela it has remained a strong economic force on the continent with great potential. It is the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa and its biggest intraregional importer and exporter—in 2010, it exported more than $12 billion worth of goods and imported $7 billion worth of goods from the rest of the continent. The Economist notes that it is the biggest source of foreign investment for other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mandela’s economic legacy has ensured that South Africa first sought to reverse the effects of its history of disenfranchisement while also remaining an economic powerhouse and trusted investment destination on the continent.

Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Lessons for Leaders
Witney Schneidman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant, Africa Growth Initiative

The celebration of Mandela’s birthday and the international day of service in his honor provide an opportunity to reflect on how he became a great leader and public servant. The experiences of both Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi, who probably had the biggest influence on Mandela’s leadership style, provide key lessons. Gandhi—who, as the liberator of India, was Mandela’s primary role model—worked as a lawyer advocating for the rights of Asians in South Africa, where he developed his method of civil disobedience. Likewise, Mandela also worked as a lawyer defending the rights of native Africans against the apartheid regime.

In Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India, Joseph Lelyveld recounts how Mandela saw Gandhi’s nonviolent protest strategy as a model for the initial code of conduct within the African National Congress and its mass protests against apartheid. Mandela also cited Gandhi as influencing the ANC’s difficult decision to take up arms after having resisted violence since its founding in 1912. In Time magazine, Mandela quoted Gandhi: “Where choice is set between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence. . . . I prefer to use arms in defense of honor rather than remain the vile witness of dishonor.” Indeed, Mandela and the ANC used force in seeking to end apartheid—yet they used sabotage against government facilities rather than attacks against civilians “because it did not involve the loss of life and it offered the best hope for future race relations."

Both Gandhi and Mandela were imprisoned for their struggles. Yet prison was where key negotiations with their oppressors began. Mandela’s conversations with prison guards helped him to understand the complexities of interracial relationships and the need for forgiveness. And though Gandhi himself was repeatedly imprisoned by the British, he extolled the ability to forgive. Mandela’s supreme example of forgiveness was given after his 27 years of imprisonment ended—as he related in an interview: “I did hate them for quite a long time. After all, they abused me physically and emotionally. They separated me from my wife, and it eventually broke my family up. . . . [But I] realized one day, breaking rocks, that they could take everything away from me, everything, but my mind and heart. Now, those things I would have to give away, and I simply decided I would not give them away.”

Due to these experiences of Mandela, influential leaders have marveled at his strong yet compassionate leadership style. Amazingly, Mandela’s Robben Island prison guards were invited to his inauguration as president. And later he showed the same humility in dealing with the failure of his administration to deliver on its initial promises of increased jobs and housing. During his presidency, he had the opportunity to make economic decisions that could have unfairly disadvantaged the white populations and accelerated efforts to meet the ANC’s goals for increased black ownership. However, he chose an inclusive, slower strategy that embodied his awareness as a leader concerned with the needs of all constituencies.

Finally, Mandela and the apartheid movement inspired people to give service to South Africa. And Mandela continues to motivate leaders to serve via Mandela Day, when individuals, groups and communities give 67 minutes of service to make their world a better place. The number “67” was chosen because Mandela “gave 67 years of his life to fighting for the rights of humanity” before officially retiring. Thus, on Mandela Day, volunteers around the world participate in diverse activities, ranging from school cleanups to health walks, and distribution of supplies to rural students. Hopefully, Mandela, as well as Gandhi, will continue to inspire great leaders today on Mandela’s birthday and on many Mandela Days to come.

Nelson Mandela’s Nobel Peace Prize
Anne Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

In celebrating Mandela’s birthday, we focus on his great achievements and contributions to the world. From childhood, he was destined for greatness. He was born into a royal family, educated in good schools, and went on to become a political leader. Then his political activities sent him to prison for 27 years. From prison to presidency of post apartheid South Africa and today, he has become one of the world’s most honored and recognized statesmen—having been given many important awards, such as the Nobel Peace Prize, which drew international attention to his legacy of egalitarianism and reconciliation.

In 1993, Mandela, a black nationalist, and F. W. De Klerk, the former last white president of apartheid South Africa, were named co-winners of the Nobel Peace Prize for the role they played in ending apartheid and transforming South Africa into a democratic republic. The Nobel committee, when presenting the prize, applauded Mandela and De Klerk for “having chosen reconciliation rather than the alternative, which would inevitably have been an ever more bitter and bloodier conflict.” Though De Klerk and Mandela were former enemies, they chose to work together to make possible the peaceful transformation of a government that practiced racial segregation into one that practiced democracy and equality for all races.

Earlier, Mandela was at the forefront of the fight for democracy in South Africa. He suffered injustices on behalf of his people as he worked to end the oppressive apartheid regime built on racism. Yet, upon becoming president, he chose to put away bitterness and not dwell on the wounds of the past but to focus on rebuilding his nation. He demonstrated what it means to be true statesman and a leader worth emulating. Today, South Africa enjoys the fruit of his struggle. It is a democratic state and a gateway to Africa.

Mandela—whose name transcends age, race, religion and culture—continues to stand for peace. Thus, on July 18, his birthday, now commonly known as “Mandela Day,” people around the world perform community service and thus contribute to making the world a more peaceful place. Mandela, a Nobel laureate, will go down in history along with Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, Martin Luther King Jr. and other peacemakers who fought nonviolently for human rights.

Authors

Image Source: Reuters

One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

On July 9, 2012, South Sudan will celebrate its first anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. The January 2011 referendum effectively ended the prolonged, violent confrontation between the Republic of Sudan and the territories that would ultimately gain independence as South Sudan. This development marked an important stage in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In addition to regulating relations between the two feuding parties from 2005 to 2011, the CPA also implemented the framework for the creation of two separate nations. Despite the success of the CPA in guiding South Sudan’s path to independence, the young nation must now address a myriad of challenges related to its domestic policies as well as continued hostilities with the Republic of Sudan.

As international observers applauded the CPA’s success, the people of South Sudan also celebrated the birth of their nation with high expectations. Independence brought with it hope for a better future and the opportunity to build a united developmental state. Revenue from valuable oil resources, which were a primary source of the conflict between the two nations, gave South Sudan the opportunity to invest in the development of its natural and human resources. Additionally, formal separation was expected to end the long-standing conflict with the Republic of Sudan. However, these expectations were tempered by the many restraints that came with establishing conditions for sustained economic growth and improving the delivery of public goods and services.

After many years of brutal civil war, South Sudan emerged with extremely poor infrastructure and a population with limited human capital. More importantly, the country was born with weak institutions that were not suited to the delivery of sustainable economic growth and development. Finally, while the people of South Sudan were largely united in the war against Khartoum, the country is to a large degree ethnically fragmented, with each group seeking to maximize its own objectives—a process that has significantly weakened the ability of the government to work toward national integration.

South Sudan’s first year of independence has been fraught with major challenges, like the continuing struggle with the Republic of Sudan over their common border. These conflicts have become top priorities for the country, impeding the ability of the government to concentrate on economic growth and human development.

The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution has been following developments in South Sudan in order to offer independent policy proposals that can translate into sustainable economic growth and development, effective delivery of public services, and the building of institutions for a united and peaceful nation. This collection of policy briefs seeks to highlight some of the important issues that have affected South Sudan during the country’s first year of independence and identify policy areas that both South Sudan and the international community must emphasize in order to enhance the nation’s ability to achieve peace, economic growth and human development. It is important to note that many of the policy recommendations offered by the various briefs are similar even though each brief was based on independent analysis. This is due primarily to the fact that many of the issues faced by South Sudan lend themselves to similar solutions.

South Sudan’s Quest for Regional Integration

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

South Sudan’s economy is relatively small and extremely underdeveloped. Access to markets, especially in the East Africa region, is critical for the country’s growth and development. Anne W. Kamau describes South Sudan’s eligibility for joining the East African Community (EAC) and outlines the short- and long-run costs and benefits of joining the community.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

@ Brookings Podcast: Challenges for Women in the African Economy

Anne W. Kamau — Fri, 11 May 2012 16:37:00 -0400

In many African countries, women still cannot own land or resources, a significant barrier to their ability to start businesses and take advantage of the continent’s economic potential. Fellow Anne Kamau explores their plight.

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Challenges for Women in the African Economy

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Challenges for Women in the African Economy

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Anne W. Kamau

South Sudan: Resolving the Oil Dispute

Anne W. Kamau and Witney Schneidman — Fri, 23 Mar 2012 13:35:00 -0400

How the government of South Sudan resolves the multi-billion dollar dispute with the Republic of Sudan over oil transit fees will have a significant impact on the ability of the new government in Juba to rebuild the war-torn nation. In January, Juba closed down the daily production of 350,000 barrels of low sulphur crude, which is normally sent through a 1,600kms pipeline from the oil fields in South Sudan to export terminals in Port Sudan and on to refiners in China and the global market. For a country that relies on oil revenues to fund 98 percent of its budget, this is a high stakes maneuver. At issue is decades of mistrust and hostility between Juba and Khartoum and, more immediately, the amount of transit fees to be paid for the oil to flow from south to north.

Khartoum wants to be paid $36 a barrel for multiple fees, including transit, transportation, processing and marine terminal usage. South Sudan has offered to pay a transit fee of between $0.63 and $0.69 for each of the two pipelines in addition to third-party fees of between $5.50 and $7.40 per barrel. In addition, Pagan Amum, South Sudan’s lead negotiator, has accused Khartoum of stealing nearly six million barrels of oil, worth more than $600 million. Even though South Sudan controls the oil extraction, the government needs to play its hand carefully to avoid a protracted loss of production and revenue while it travels through the Republic of Sudan’s territory.

Juba, nevertheless, seems prepared to take a hard line with Khartoum. In an interview with the BBC, South Sudan’s Vice President Reik Machar said that “we will definitely freeze our activities on development” and that for the next 30 months the government would be able to provide basic services, including salaries for the military of 100,000 without oil revenue. Moreover, the Finance Ministry announced that it has foreign exchange reserves to cover imports up to one year, although other analysts contend that three to six months is more likely.

The view in South Sudan is that production can remain closed until alternative pipelines are constructed to the ports at Lamu, Kenya and through Ethiopia to Djibouti. On March 2, the governments of South Sudan and Kenya broke ground on a 2,000kms pipeline to Lamu in what ultimately is envisioned to be a $24.7 billion project that will transform the border region between the two countries and Ethiopia. However, the financial and logistical implications of this project are daunting, especially since China, the U.S., the EU, India and Japan, among others, have not committed to provide any financing which increases pressure on Juba to come up with the resources. Moreover, officials in Juba are improbably hopeful the Lamu pipeline can be completed in 10 to 18 months.

Past experiences in Africa, demonstrate that such infrastructure projects often take much longer to complete than initially planned. For example, once the initial social, environmental, political and financial hurdles of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline were cleared—which took several years—a consortium led by ExxonMobil, Chevron and the World Bank spent four years and $3.7 billion to construct the 1,000kms pipeline between the two countries. The 1,768kms Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which links the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, required three years and $3.9 billion for construction—after about a decade of political wrangling between neighboring states. More recently, a Chinese company spent 18 months constructing a 400km pipeline from Nairobi to Eldoret in Rift Valley, Kenya – at which pace the South Sudan-Lamu pipeline would take over seven years to complete.

South Sudan’s plans to have a northern pipeline alternative operational in the near-term are unrealistic and experts say it will take at least three years and cost $4 billion to construct the project. Furthermore, activists in Lamu, a UNESCO world-heritage location, have already filed for an injunction in Kenya’s courts to prevent construction until environmental safeguards are in place.

Over the long term, there are genuine benefits to building a pipeline that frees South Sudan from reliance on Khartoum’s infrastructure. Not only would such a pipeline generate a stable source of revenue for South Sudan but it would help to deepen the nation’s integration into the East African market.

In the near-term, however, Juba needs to focus on resolving its Gordian Knot with Khartoum by securing the borders of Abeyi and protecting its territory against attacks in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan from the Republic of Sudan as well as address the impending citizenship problem. On April 8, a transition period will end and South Sudanese who live in Sudan will be classified as foreigners, and vice versa. With an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 South Sudanese living in Sudan, this issue could easily become a conflict flash point.

In addition to the other challenges raised by South Sudan’s recent independence, efforts made by the African Union to resolve the issue of oil fees between the north and south have remained unresolved. Several weeks ago, South Sudan withdrew its offer to pay Khartoum $2.6 billion over four years to resolve the Abeyi dispute and other issues. The African Union mediation team has proposed that South Sudan give the Republic of Sudan a direct cash transfer of $5.4 billion, plus transit fees worth up to $1.1 billion, to provide for the export of oil through 2014 and to compensate Khartoum for the loss of the South. Juba has rejected this.

After 22 years of war in which South Sudan emerged victorious, it is understandable that the leaders in the south believe they can overcome extraordinary odds, and that time is on their side. Incidents such as the February 29 aerial bombing of the El Nar oil field only increase South Sudan’s hostility to the north. The challenges of governance and economic development are very different, however, from those faced by a liberation movement waging war. The people of South Sudan inevitably will want the benefits of independence, such as improved education, health care and job creation, no matter how popular Juba’s hard line against Khartoum may currently be.

South Sudan needs to find a solution in its stand-off with Khartoum that will generate much needed revenue, not only to deliver an “independence dividend” of investment in an improved quality of life for its citizens, but also to leverage financing for the pipelines to Lamu and Djibouti. One strategy would be to restart production and place all revenues in an internationally managed escrow or trust account. Juba could then leverage these funds for development while Khartoum would receive payments when specified obligations are met, perhaps related to citizenship or other security issues. Whatever agreement is reached, a pact with Khartoum will nonetheless require statesmanship on Juba’s part. Such an action would be a clear signal that South Sudan’s number one priority is investing in the welfare of its own people.

Authors

Anne W. Kamau
Witney Schneidman

International Women's Day: Women in Development

Fri, 02 Mar 2012 11:10:00 -0500

Thursday, March 8 is International Women's Day and this year's UN theme for the day is "Empower Rural Women—End Hunger and Poverty."

At the Brookings Global Economy and Development program, my colleagues and I analyze different aspects of development and the fight to end global poverty. Empowering women and girls by providing them access to good quality education and learning opportunities is a critical part of my research and the broader challenge to end poverty in developing countries.

In honor of International Women's Day, we have put together a few short videos on the theme of "Women in Development." We will be posting one video a day until International Women's Day on March 8.

In each video, a different Brookings scholar discusses how issues of gender impact global development and poverty. We also answer some personal questions, such as "what woman has inspired us most" and "what has been the biggest challenge we have faced related to our gender."

We hope that you will find these videos as useful contributions to this year’s celebration of International Women’s Day.

– Rebecca Winthrop

Anne Kamau:

Pamhidzayi Berejena Mhongera:

Mwangi Kimenyi:

Katherine Sierra:

Rebecca Winthrop:

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Around the Halls: 2012 Senegal Presidential Election

Fri, 10 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Later this month, Senegal will hold the most contentious presidential election since the introduction of a multi-party democratic system in the 1980s. Notwithstanding who wins, the election is bound to have far-reaching implications on the future of the nation. Senegal has long been held as an example of good leadership and stability in West Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa: It has escaped military rule and managed to have peaceful and democratic transition of power. Yet, the events leading to the 2012 election suggest that its record of democracy may be tainted if not completely negated. Scholars from AGI and its partner in Senegal, the Consortium for Social and Economic Research (Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), discuss the forthcoming election.

What are the key issues and implications of Senegal's upcoming presidential election? Join the conversation on Twitter using the #AGISenegal hashtag and register for our February 16 event on Senegal's election, a turning point for democracy and economic growth.

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President Abdoulaye Wade’s Controversial Re-election Bid
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

A major contentious issue in Senegal has been whether it is constitutional for the incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade to run for office again. Wade has been a glowing example of a victorious former opposition figure who managed to peacefully obtain office from the then longstanding incumbent. However, his most recent re-election campaign has caused many of his admirers and supporters to doubt his commitment to democratic ideals. Popular opinion in the country – also widely held by the international community – appears to be that he should not run for another term.

President Wade came to power in 2000 after defeating incumbent, Abdou Diouf who held power from 1981 to 2000. Wade had been an opposition candidate in four presidential elections before he was finally elected in 2000. He was then re-elected in 2007 with 56 percent of the vote in a crowded field of 15 candidates. In 2001, during the beginning of his first term, the constitution was amended, which limited the presidents to two terms and reduced the length of each term from seven to five years. In 2009, he indicated that he would run again in 2012 as the amendments came into effect after he took office, but many consider such a move to be in contravention of the constitution. However, it was not official until January 27, a month before the scheduled election, when the Constitutional Council cleared Wade to run for a third term, a move that dismayed the electorate and triggered riots.

Recent public opinion surveys of likely Senegalese voters show declining support and trust of President Wade and his government:[1] in a 2008 survey, a majority of respondents felt that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.[2] Most telling was that 74 percent of respondents agreed or agreed very strongly that, “The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.” Recently there have been concerns over Wade’s actions, which are seen as undermining democracy and weakening his political opponents, including his suggested appointment in the end of last year of two leading opposition figures, who are now running for the presidency, to ministerial positions and the arrest of a the rival socialist party youth leader. In the summer of 2011, Wade declared plans to change the constitution, lowering the required proportion of votes needed for a first round presidential election from 50 percent to 25 percent, a move likely intended to improve his chances of winning the election. These actions warrant concerns as to whether Wade will continue to erode the gains made in advancing democracy in Senegal if he wins another term.

What is at Stake in Regards to Senegal's External Relationships?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, President, Schneidman & Associates International, Special Guest, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

Several of Senegal’s key external relationships could be jeopardized if the elections scheduled for February 26 do not go well. In 2009, according to World Bank figures, Senegal’s net Official Development Assistance was nearly 8 percent of GDP. Last year when the government of Malawi reacted violently to public protests over an increase in food prices, the U.S., the UK and other donors suspended assistance due to an alleged deterioration in political freedoms and the death of at least 19 protestors.

Election observers from the EU, Senegal’s largest donor, have already arrived in the country and have expressed concerns about the transparency of the process used to determine the eligibility of candidates. The observers have also remarked on the use of force against opposition protestors.

U.S.-Senegal relations have been “excellent” over the past several years, but Washington has voiced apprehension about backsliding on government transparency. Two weeks ago, in reference to the upcoming elections, State Department Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland said “the [statesmanlike] thing to do would be to cede to the next generation, and we think that would be better.” This was echoed by Deputy Secretary of State Chris Burns at the African Union summit and a letter to Wade from the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Africa.

The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact to Senegal requires countries to uphold political freedom performance indicators. Thus, it may be the first assistance to be suspended if there is a drop in the current level of democracy. Trade relationships, including membership in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and broader assistance are at stake if the election results in a reduction of political liberties for the Senegalese public.

The Economic Community of West African States has also sent election observers to Senegal. One of the observers, Ambassador Bassir from Sierra Leone, said, “whatever affects Senegal negatively, will no doubt spill over in the sub region and that a lot rest[s]on ECOWAS to ensure that the government, actors and the citizenry as a whole, take the necessary measures to prevent any such ugly situation.”

The Youth Vote in Senegal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium of Economic and Social Research
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

According to the World Bank, Senegal has started to recover from the global economic slowdown that started in 2009; however, the aftermath of the crisis on the current macroeconomic conditions continue to put strain on the youth population. Senegal’s energy sector has performed poorly and tourism and remittances have begun to suffer from the eurozone crisis, keeping the West African nation below the expected 4.6 percent average sub-Saharan growth rate. Senegal, once a leader in the region in terms of economic performance, is falling behind other top performers, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Small gains in growth for Senegal are not translating into improved employment opportunities for young people.

The youth population (ages 15-24) is feeling the brunt of these adverse economic conditions. The Consortium of Economic and Social Research (CRES) in Dakar indicates that youth are blocked from many employment opportunities due to a policy of increasing the retirement age and a hiring freeze in the public sector. Additionally, sectors driving growth have intensive capital requirements, such as information and communications technology (ITC) and infrastructure and youth often have difficulty gaining access to start-up capital and credit to participate in these needed markets. Thus, young people are pushed toward working in the informal sector, migrating out of Senegal, or participating in illegal activities. In response, young Senegalese have created a movement called “Y’en a marre”, or enough is enough, to express their frustrations with the economic situation, lack of amenities, government corruption and the rise in food and fuel prices. Youth effectively protested Wade’s first attempt at constitutional tampering last year, and have already begun to protest the announcement of Wade as an official candidate via the youth dominated group “Movement of the 23rd” or M23.

If Wade is re-elected, frustrated youth might see current economic conditions as cause for large scale revolt. What is particularly disturbing is that neither the outgoing government nor a new government stemming from the opposition seems well equipped to face massive youth unemployment. The recently adopted Social and Economic Document of Policy 2012-2015, which succeeds the Strategic Documents for the Reduction of Poverty (DSRP) of the 2000s, dedicates only minor support to the unemployment issue. Even though the opposition parties denounce youth unemployment, they have not proposed concrete solutions to reduce it significantly.

Senegal’s Electoral Institutions and Prospects for Democracy
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

Holding elections does not necessarily strengthen democracy if the electoral processes are weak and subject to manipulation by the executive or any other branch of government, or allows the government to favor one candidate or party. Recent protests following the ruling of the Constitutional Council concerning the eligibility of the incumbent president to seek re-election for a third term reflects poorly designed electoral institutions that are likely to weaken democracy.

Besides the Constitutional Council, other electoral institutions in Senegal include the Ministry of the Interior and the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (or La Commission électorale nationale autonome – CENA). The Constitutional Council is made up of five judges appointed by the president and has the final say on matters relating to the constitution – including determining eligibility for the presidency, confirming the announcement of the CENA, and ruling on challenges related to the elections. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of the election logistics and CENA is supposed to provide autonomous oversight for the electoral process. Both the Constitutional Council and the Interior Ministry are heavily influenced by the executive. CENA is somewhat influenced by the executive as the president confirms its members, but they are initially nominated by independent sources for their integrity and unbiased opinions. Technically the CENA was established by a law so its existence is less permanent and continues at the “discretion of the legislature,”[3] and as mentioned, it still ultimately reports its results to the Constitutional Council for confirmation.

Following his re-election in 2007, Wade appointed an entirely new Constitutional Council in 2008 raising suspicion that it was to ensure his eligibility for a third term. The recent ruling on Wade’s eligibility to contest another presidential term seems to confirm those suspicions. Evidently, the executive has a firm control or influence over the functioning of the electoral institutions, making them inadequate to further democracy. Truly independent electoral institutions are a requirement for smooth and democratic transitions of government. A post-election priority should therefore be reforming the electoral institutions.

What Might Influence Electoral Choices in Senegal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Research Assistant

To a large extent, voting in sub-Saharan African countries tends to be influenced by the primary loci of identification: ethnicity, religion or region. Simply, identity politics often dominate issue politics, like the state of the economy. In the past, voting in Senegal has not been primarily on the basis of identity. AfroBarometer data confirms the viewpoint that generally voters’ ethnic identity is not the leading determinant of voting and research indicates that, “Senegal is a country in which ethnicity plays little or no role in politics.[4]” Religion is seen as something that unites the electorate, with around 94 percent of the population identifying as Muslim. The Islamic brotherhoods in the country are seen as transcending ethnic divisions [5] and political leaders, similarly, have support from multiple Islamic brotherhoods or sects. However, the upcoming election could reveal some clear voting patterns along specific identities and issues. As shown in a companion piece, there is the possibility of candidates instigating divisions based on ethnicity and religious sect for lack of more relevant differences in the presidential contestant agendas.

In the upcoming election, rural-urban voting patterns may also emerge. Senegal’s population is divided almost evenly between urban and rural areas. Perceptions of the economy also vary based on region. Rural voters surveyed have a slightly less favorable view of the economy with around 10 percent more people indicating that the current state is “bad” or “fairly bad” than those surveyed in urban areas. Additionally, almost half of rural residents state that their living conditions are worse or much worse than the rest of the Senegalese population, versus 21 percent in urban areas. These differences in perceptions of well-being could influence voting patterns--opposition candidates may do better in rural areas if they have a convincing message of change.

Another voting pattern that may emerge is that of the Senegalese Diaspora. As of 2000, there were 15 different countries where Senegalese could vote externally. A 2007 study indicates that external voters account for between 4 and 5 percent of the total vote in Senegalese elections. In 2000, the majority of external voters continued to support the incumbent, Abdou Diouf, and could have had significant influence if the second round had been a close runoff. In a close election, the Diaspora vote could indeed be pivotal.

Finally, younger voters have been more opposed to Wade’s re-election bid. They are more likely to vote for opposition as persistent problems of youth unemployment plague the country and the current government lacks a plan for addressing the situation.

Senegal’s 2012 Election: Towards a Replay of Ivory Coast?
Julius Agbor, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

Although Senegal’s election differs from the Ivory Coast in that there is no armed rebel opposition involved in the election or a North (Muslim) vs. South (Christian) regional divide, the circumstances surrounding this election points very much towards an Ivorian post-election scenario. A companion piece by Mwangi Kimenyi and Zenia Lewis discusses the structural problems created by the lack of independence of the electoral institutions in Senegal. Perhaps a more subtle problem is the potential for post-election conflict in Senegal similar to the Ivory Coast during 2010-2011, which stemmed from the ambiguities arising from the overlapping jurisdictions of the various electoral bodies.

These conflicting jurisdictions in Senegal could trigger confusion with the potential for post-election violence. In the Ivory Coast, although the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was in charge of the organization and supervision of the elections, it could only publish tentative results that were subject to the approval of the Constitutional Council – which also handled all disputes resulting from the electoral process. The confusion then resulted from significant disparities between the figures earlier announced by the Electoral Commission and those officially proclaimed by the Constitutional Council. In Senegal, this is also likely to happen in event that the official results proclaimed by the Constitutional Council contrast with those reported by the (supposedly) Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA). This could especially incite violence due to the widened rift of trust between Senegalese people and Senegal’s political institutions following the controversial ruling in favor of the candidacy of incumbent President Wade by the Constitutional Council. The cases of Senegal and Ivory Coast point to general weaknesses in electoral systems and institutions in former French colonies. Going forward, there is need for these and many other African countries to invest in building electoral institutions that are clear of jurisdictional overlapping and at the same time independent of any branch of government. Unless such an unambiguous electoral framework is built, elections will not serve to entrench democracy but may instead trigger chaos as seen in Ivory Coast.

Neglect of African Indigenous Institutions and the Fragility of Senegalese Democracy
Olumide Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow
Anne W. Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The decision by President Wade to seek a third term in office remains the most contentious issue in the Senegalese elections and one that is likely to trigger a post-election crisis.

It is now a pattern that African countries appear to be stable democracies for a while and slide into constitutional crisis thereafter and most of the crises are associated with tenure elongation ambitions of incumbent presidents. Senegal is unlike other African countries where elections are contests between ethnic groups for state resources. The unifying force of the Senegalese Islamic brotherhood has served to mitigate ethnic divisions, [6] which is particularly important since over 90 percent of the population is Muslim. The Senegalese constitution also allows for a strong central government, and President Wade has taken numerous steps to even make the presidency stronger. This consolidation of power at the center is antithetical to ethnic diversity and is the undoing of many democracy projects in African countries. Moreover, such centralization of power is beginning to take its toll on Senegal. There are indications that opposition candidates and President Wade are beginning to appeal to ethnic groups and specific segments of Islamic organizations for support. With this, Senegal may follow many African countries that are mired in ethnic or religious competition.

Successful and stable democracies in Africa have reformed constitutions and redesigned governance institutions to reflect indigenous collective choice apparatuses. These involve extensive decentralization and devolution of power and recognition of the role of tribal chiefs in the governance process. For example, Botswana – cited as the most stable democracy in Africa – is organized into a federation of autonomous tribes ruled by tribal chiefs, who are also permanent members of the House of Chiefs, which plays an advisory and oversight role in government. Similarly, the Ghanaian constitution created the House of Chiefs at every level of government and empowers the chiefs to play their traditional roles and pursue the interests of their constituents. These arrangements guarantee substantial degrees of autonomy and self governance to the tribal groups and a relatively weak central government. Countries where the center remains powerful may initially appear stable, but such stabilities will always be short-lived.

The Senegalese constitution, like most African constitutions, is far removed from the history of the indigenous people. Simply inheriting a constitution and amending it will only increase the level of animosity and instability. Instead, Senegal needs to rework its constitutions in ways that decentralize power and incorporate its indigenous people in the governance process.

Footnotes

[1] AfroBarometer Report

[2] 53 percent of respondents thought that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.” (36 percent stating often, and 17 percent stating always, while 25 percent said never/rarely and 25 percent said they didn’t know)

[3] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[4] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews, 2009. “Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research.”

[5] Dennis Galvan, 2001. “Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia.”

[6] The Casamance region lying to the south of the Gambia river is excluded from this description.

Dans les couloirs : L'élection présidentielle 2012

Ce mois-ci, le Sénégal va procéder à l'élection présidentielle la plus litigieuse depuis l'introduction d'un système démocratique à plusieurs partis dans les années 80. Quelque soit le gagnant, l'élection aura certainement des conséquences à long terme sur l'avenir du pays. Depuis longtemps, le Sénégal donne l'exemple d'un pays stable et bien gouverné en Afrique de l'Ouest et en Afrique subsaharienne : il a échappé au régime militaire et a réussi la transition pacifique et démocratique du pouvoir. Pourtant, les événements qui ont abouti à l’élection 2012 suggèrent que sa réputation en tant que pays démocratique n’est pas vraiment méritée et peut même se révéler entièrement incorrecte. Les experts universitaires de MGA et de son partenaire au Sénégal, (le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), parlent des prochaines élections.

Quels sont les enjeux et les implications de la prochaine élection présidentielle du Sénégal? Rejoignez la conversation sur Twitter en utilisant #AGISenegal hashtag et inscrivez-vous à notre rencontre du 16 février sur l'élection sénégalaise, tournant historique pour la croissance démocratique et économique.

Réélection controversée du président Abdoulaye Wade
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

L'une des questions les plus importante au Sénégal est de savoir s'il est constitutionnel pour le Président Abdoulaye Wade de se représenter. Wade représente le bon exemple d'un ancien membre de l'opposition qui a gagné l'élection et a réussi une transition pacifique en remplaçant un président sortant qui était là depuis fort longtemps. Cependant, au cours de sa plus récente campagne électorale, plusieurs de ses admirateurs et partisans ont pu douter de son engagement en faveur des idéaux démocratiques. D'après l'opinion publique dans le pays – partagée également en grande mesure par la communauté internationale, il ne devrait pas briguer un autre mandat.

Le Président Wade fut élu en 2000 après avoir battu le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, qui avait gouverné de 1981 à 2000. Wade avait été candidat de l'opposition pendant quatre élections présidentielles avant d'être finalement élu en 2000. Il fut ensuite réélu en 2007 avec 56 % des voix dans une arène encombrée, comprenant 15 candidats. En 2001, au début de son premier mandat, la constitution fut modifiée, limitant les présidents à deux mandats et réduisant la durée de chaque mandat de sept à cinq ans. En 2009, il signala qu'il pourrait se représenter en 2012 du fait que les modifications n’étaient entrées en vigueur qu’après sa prise de fonctions, mais beaucoup considèrent que cette démarche violerait la constitution. Ce ne fut toutefois que le 27 janvier, un mois avant l'élection, que le Conseil constitutionnel autorisa Wade à se représenter pour un troisième mandat, ce qui consterna l'électorat et engendra des émeutes.

Des sondages récents d'électeurs sénégalais montrent une diminution du soutien et de la confiance du président Wade et de son gouvernement :[7] Dans un sondage datant de 2008, la majorité des personnes interrogées ont indiqué qu'à leur avis, le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. [8] En outre, 74 % des personnes interrogées ont convenu et certaines ont même vivement affirmé que « la Constitution doit limiter le président à deux mandats au maximum. » Récemment, on a exprimé des inquiétudes au sujet de certaines actions de Wade, ayant pour résultat de saper la démocratie et d’affaiblir ses opposants, notamment sa suggestion en fin d’année dernière de nommer deux personnes importantes de l’opposition (actuellement candidats à la présidence), à des postes ministériels et l’arrestation d’un jeune leader socialiste du parti opposant. Au cours de l'été 2011, Wade a indiqué son intention de modifier la constitution, diminuant la proportion de voix nécessaires pour un premier tour des élections de 50 à 25 pour cent, geste sans doute calculé pour améliorer ses chances de remporter les élections. Ces actions soulèvent des inquiétudes quant à la question de savoir si Wade continuera à saper les progrès de la démocratie au Sénégal s'il remporte un autre mandat.

Qu’est-ce qui est en jeu à l'égard des relations extérieures du Sénégal ?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, Présidente, Schneidman et Associates International, invitée spéciale, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Plusieurs des relations externes clés du Sénégal pourraient être compromises si les élections prévues pour le 26 février ne se déroulaient pas bien. En 2009, selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, le pourcentage net de l'aide au développement officiel du Sénégal était proche de 8% du PIB. L'année dernière, lorsque le gouvernement du Malawi a réagi violemment à des protestations publiques dues à une augmentation des prix de l'alimentation, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et d'autres donateurs ont suspendu leurs aide, en déclarant que les libertés politiques s'étaient détériorées et qu’au moins 19 manifestants avaient été tués.

Des observateurs de l'UE, le plus grand donateur du Sénégal, sont déjà arrivés dans le pays et ont exprimé des préoccupations sur la transparence de la démarche employée pour déterminer l'admissibilité des candidats. Les observateurs ont également observé l'emploi de la force contre les manifestants de l'opposition.

Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Sénégal sont « excellentes » depuis plusieurs années, mais Washington a exprimé des appréhensions à propos d’un recul de la transparence du gouvernement. II y a deux semaines, au sujet des élections à venir, le porte-parole du Département d'Etat, Victoria Nuland, a déclaré « qu'il serait sage de faire place à la nouvelle génération, et nous pensons que ce serait mieux. » Cela a été repris par le Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint Chris Burns lors du sommet de l'Union africaine et dans une lettre adressée à Wade par le sous-comité sénatorial des Etats-Unis sur l'Afrique.

Le U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact pour le Sénégal exige que les pays respectent les indicateurs de performance en matière de liberté politique. C'est pourquoi c'est probablement la première aide à disparaître en cas de baisse du niveau de la démocratie. Les relations commerciales, y compris l'appartenance à l'African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) et l'augmentation de l'aide sont en jeu si l'élection entraîne une réduction des libertés politiques du public sénégalais.

La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest a également envoyé des observateurs au Sénégal. L'un des observateurs, l'ambassadeur Bassir du Sierra Leone, a déclaré : « tout ce qui a des répercussions négatives sur le Sénégal s'étend aussi par contagion vers le Sud et la CEDEAO détient une grande responsabilité pour s'assurer que le gouvernement, les acteurs et les citoyens dans leur ensemble, prennent les mesures nécessaires pour éviter ce genre de situation. »

Le vote des jeunes au Sénégal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium de la recherche économique et sociale
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Selon la Banque mondiale, le Sénégal a commencé à se remettre du ralentissement économique qui a débuté en 2009. Toutefois, les conséquences de la crise sur les conditions macroéconomiques actuelles continuent à mettre la pression sur la population des jeunes. Le secteur de l'énergie au Sénégal se porte mal; quant au tourisme et aux envois de fonds, ils ont commencé à subir les conséquences de la crise dans la zone euro. Tout cela a fait baisser la moyenne du taux de croissance des pays en-dessous de la moyenne subsaharienne prévue de 4,6 %. Le Sénégal, auparavant en tête de la région en matière de performance économique, se classe maintenant derrière d'autres acteurs très performants comme l'Ethiopie, le Nigeria et le Mozambique. Les petits gains de croissance au Sénégal ne se traduisent pas par des améliorations d'emplois pour les jeunes.

La population des jeunes (de 15 à 24 ans) est la plus touchée par ces conditions économiques défavorables. Le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale (CRES) de Dakar indique que de nombreux emplois ne sont pas accessibles aux jeunes en raison d'une politique d'augmentation de l'âge de la retraite et d'un arrêt de l'embauche dans le secteur public. En outre, les secteurs en croissance comme ceux de la technologie de l'information et des communications (ITC), ont de grandes exigences de capitaux et d'infrastructure et les jeunes ont souvent du mal à obtenir l'accès au capital de démarrage et les crédits nécessaires pour participer à ces secteurs. De ce fait, les jeunes sont forcés de se tourner vers les secteurs non officiels, d'émigrer ou de participer à des activités illégales. En réaction à ces difficultés, des jeunes sénégalais ont créé un mouvement désigné « Y'en a marre », afin d'exprimer leurs frustrations face à cette situation économique, du manque d'infrastructures, de la corruption du gouvernement et de l’augmentation des prix de l’alimentation et de l'essence. Les jeunes avaient protesté contre la première tentative de manipulation de la constitution par Wade l'an dernier ; ils ont déjà commencé à protester contre l'annonce de la candidature officielle de Wade par le biais du mouvement « Mouvement du 23 juin » ou M23, dominé par les jeunes.

Si Wade est réélu, la frustration des jeunes pourrait s’exprimer par une révolte à grande échelle. Ce qui est surtout inquiétant, c'est que ni le gouvernement sortant ni un nouveau gouvernement d'opposition ne semblent en mesure de gérer l’énorme taux de chômage parmi les jeunes. Le nouveau document de politique économique et sociale (2012-2015) qui succède aux documents stratégiques pour la réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) des années 2000, ne consacre qu'un soutien mineur à l’enjeu du chômage. Bien que les partis d’opposition dénoncent le chômage des jeunes, ils n’ont pas proposé de solutions concrètes pour le réduire de façon efficace.

Les institutions électorales sénégalaises et les perspectives démocratiques
Mwangi Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Le fait de tenir des élections ne renforce pas nécessairement la démocratie si le processus électoral est faible et soumis à des manipulations de l'exécutif, ou de toute autre branche du gouvernement ou s'il est permis au gouvernement de favoriser un candidat ou un parti. Les protestations récentes à la suite de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel, concernant l'admissibilité du président sortant à se faire réélire pour un troisième mandat, reflètent des institutions électorales mal conçues, et il est probable que la démocratie en sera affaiblie.

Hormis le Conseil électoral, les autres institutions à ce sujet incluent le Ministère de l'intérieur et la Commission électorale nationale autonome, (la CENA). Le Conseil constitutionnel se compose de cinq juges nommés par le président et celui-ci a le dernier mot en matière de constitution, y compris la détermination de l'admissibilité des candidatures, la confirmation de la déclaration de la CENA, et les décisions en cas de difficulté au cours des élections. Le Ministère de l'intérieur est chargé de la logistique des élections et la CENA doit superviser le processus électoral de manière autonome. Le Conseil constitutionnel et le Ministère de l'intérieur sont tous deux extrêmement influencés par l'exécutif. La CENA est quelque peu influencée par l'exécutif car le président confirme ses membres, mais ces derniers sont initialement nommés par des sources indépendantes et connus pour leur intégrité et leurs opinions impartiales. Techniquement, la CENA a été créée par une loi, si bien que son existence n'est pas aussi permanente et qu’elle survit à la « discrétion de la législature, »[9] et comme évoqué ci-dessus, elle transmet toujours ses résultats au Conseil constitutionnel qui doit les confirmer.

A la suite de son élection de 2007, Wade a nommé un Conseil constitutionnel entièrement nouveau en 2008, soulevant des soupçons que c'était pour assurer son admissibilité à un troisième mandat. La décision récente à ce propos semble confirmer ces soupçons. Il est évident que l'exécutif contrôle et influence fortement le fonctionnement des institutions électorales, les rendant inadéquates à la démocratie. Il est indispensable que les institutions électorales soient véritablement indépendantes pour que les transitions de gouvernement se produisent de façon disposée et démocratique. Après les élections, ce serait donc une priorité de réformer les institutions électorales.

Quelles seraient les influences des choix électoraux au Sénégal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Dans une grande mesure, le droit de vote dans les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne est influencé par les points principaux d’identification : selon l'origine ethnique, la religion ou la région. Tout simplement, la politique identitaire domine souvent la politique de résolution des problèmes, comme l'état de l'économie. Auparavant, le vote au Sénégal ne s'est pas fondé principalement sur la politique identitaire. Les donnés de l'afrobaromètre confirment qu'au Sénégal l'ethnicité des électeurs ne constitue pas l'élément déterminant des élections et les recherches indiquent que « le Sénégal est un pays où l'ethnicité ne joue pratiquement aucun rôle en politique.[10] La religion unifie l'électorat, qui comprend 94 pour cent de musulmans. Les fraternités musulmanes du pays transcendent les divisions ethniques [11] et les chefs politiques, de même, sont soutenus par de multiples fraternités ou sectes musulmanes. Malgré tout, les prochaines élections pourraient révéler des schémas électoraux basés sur des identités et des problèmes spécifiques. Comme le montre une publication qui fait pendant à celle-ci, il est possible que certains candidats créent des divisions fondées sur l'ethnicité et la secte religieuse en l'absence de différences plus pertinentes dans les programmes des candidats à la présidence.

Au cours de l'élection à venir, des schémas de vote ruraux-urbains pourraient aussi apparaître. La population du Sénégal est divisée de façon quasi égale entre les zones urbaines et rurales. La perception de l'économie varie aussi selon la région. Les électeurs ruraux ont un point de vue légèrement moins favorable de l'économie, avec 10 pour cent d'entre eux indiquant que l'état actuel des choses est « mauvais » ou « assez mauvais », par rapport aux sondages des zones urbaines. En outre, près de la moitié des résidents ruraux déclarent que leurs conditions de vie sont pires ou bien pires que celles du reste de la population sénégalaise, contre 21 % dans les zones urbaines. Ces différences de perception du bien-être pourraient influencer les schémas de vote et les candidats de l'opposition pourraient avoir de meilleurs résultats dans les zones rurales s'ils transmettaient un message convaincant de changement.

On pourrait voir apparaître un autre modèle de vote, celui de la diaspora sénégalaise. En 2000, il y avait 15 pays différents où les sénégalais pouvaient voter à l’extérieur de leur pays. Une étude de 2007 indique que les électeurs externes comprennent entre 4 et 5 pour cent du vote des élections sénégalaises. En 2000, la majorité des électeurs externes a continué à soutenir le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, et ce soutien aurait pu faire la différence si les résultats avaient été serrés au second tour. Si l'élection était serrée, les votes de la diaspora pourraient vraisemblablement faire la différence.

Enfin, les jeunes électeurs ont tendance à s'opposer à la réélection de Wade. Ils voteraient probablement pour l'opposition en raison des problèmes constants de chômage et du fait que le gouvernement actuel n’ait pas de programme défini pour résoudre la situation.

Élection de 2012 au Sénégal : Même scénario qu’en Côte d'Ivoire?
Julius Agbor, Chargé des recherches africaines, Africa Growth Initiative

Bien que les conditions de l'élection au Sénégal diffèrent de celles de la Côte d'Ivoire, vu l'absence de rebelles armés ou d'une division régionale entre le Nord (musulman) et le Sud (chrétien), les circonstances entourant cette élection ressemblent beaucoup à un scénario postélectoral ivoirien. Un texte de Mwangi Kimenyi et Zenia Lewis qui fait pendant à celui-ci traite des problèmes structuraux créés par le manque d'indépendance des institutions électorales au Sénégal. Mais il existe un autre problème plus subtil : c'est la possibilité d'un conflit après les élections comme c'est arrivé en Côte d'Ivoire au cours des années 2010-2011, du fait des ambiguïtés découlant du chevauchement de compétence des différents corps électoraux.

Ces conflits de compétences au Sénégal pourraient créer des confusions et déclencher des scènes de violence à la suite des élections. En Côte d'Ivoire, bien que la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) ait été chargée de l'organisation et de la supervision des élections, elle ne pouvait publier que des résultats provisoires soumis à l'approbation du Conseil constitutionnel, qui était également responsable de traiter tous les différends découlant du processus électoral. La confusion a ensuite découlé des anomalies importantes entre les chiffres annoncés auparavant par la Commission électorale et ceux qui ont été proclamés officiellement par le Conseil constitutionnel. Au Sénégal, c'est aussi susceptible de se produire au cas où les résultats officiels proclamés par le Conseil constitutionnel diffèrent de ceux signalés par la Commission électorale nationale (soi-disant) autonome (CENA). Cela serait particulièrement susceptible d'inciter à la violence en raison du fossé se creusant de plus en plus entre le peuple sénégalais et les institutions politiques du pays, à la suite de la décision controversée du Conseil constitutionnel en faveur de la candidature du président sortant. Les cas du Sénégal et de la Côte d'Ivoire indiquent les faiblesses générales des systèmes électoraux et des institutions dans les anciennes colonies françaises. A l'avenir, il est indispensable pour ces pays et beaucoup d'autres pays africains de créer des institutions électorales ne pouvant pas se prêter à ces chevauchements de compétences et qui seraient en même temps indépendantes de toute branche du gouvernement. A moins qu'on ne crée ce genre de structure électorale non ambiguë, les élections ne serviront pas à renforcer la démocratie, mais plutôt à déclencher le chaos comme on l'a vu en Côte d'Ivoire.

Négligence des Institutions autochtones africaines et la fragilité de la démocratie sénégalaise
Olumide Taiwo, Chargé de recherche de l'Afrique
Anne W. Kamau, Chargée de recherche, Africa Growth Initiative

La décision du président Wade de solliciter un troisième mandat demeure la question la plus brûlante des élections sénégalaises, susceptible de déclencher une crise postélectorale.

Il apparaît maintenant que les pays africains suivent la tendance suivante : ils semblent être démocratiquement stables pendant un certain temps et glissent ensuite dans une crise constitutionnelle ; la plupart de ces crises sont associées aux désirs des présidents sortants de prolonger leurs mandats. Le Sénégal est différent des autres pays africains où les élections se transforment en luttes entre groupes ethniques pour s'approprier les ressources de l'état. La force d'unité de la fraternité musulmane a minimisé les divisions ethniques, [12] ce qui est particulièrement important, du fait que plus de 90 % de la population est musulmane. La constitution sénégalaise prévoit également un gouvernement centralisé et puissant et le président Wade a pris de nombreuses mesures pour rendre la présidence encore plus forte. Cette centralisation du pouvoir s'oppose à la diversité ethnique et mène à leur perte de nombreux projets démocratiques dans les pays africains. En outre, une telle centralisation du pouvoir commence à exercer ses ravages sur le Sénégal. Selon certaines indications, les candidats de l'opposition et le président Wade commencent à faire appel au soutien de groupes ethniques et de segments spécifiques d'organisations islamiques. En suivant cette voie, le Sénégal pourrait suivre l'exemple de nombreux pays africains embourbés dans des conflits ethniques ou religieux.

Les démocraties stables et prospères en Afrique ont réformé leurs constitutions et revu leurs institutions de gouvernance afin de refléter leur appareil de choix collectif indigène. Pour se faire, il faut effectuer une décentralisation poussée et un transfert des responsabilités et reconnaître le rôle des chefs de tribus dans le processus de gouvernance. Par exemple, le Botswana, cité comme le pays dont la démocratie est la plus stable d'Afrique, est organisé en une fédération de tribus autonomes dirigées par des chefs de tribus qui sont également membres permanents de la Maison des chefs et qui assument un rôle de conseil et de supervision au sein du gouvernement. De même, la constitution du Ghana a créé la Maison des chefs à chaque niveau du gouvernement et donne le pouvoir à ces chefs d'assumer leurs rôles traditionnels et de favoriser les intérêts de leurs électeurs. Ces arrangements garantissent des niveaux d'autonomie importants et d'auto-gouvernance aux groupes tribaux et un gouvernement central relativement faible. Les pays dont le gouvernement demeure centralisé peuvent sembler stables au début, mais cette stabilité ne dure pas longtemps.

La constitution sénégalaise, comme celles de la plupart des pays africains, est très éloignée de l'histoire des peuples indigènes. Le fait d'hériter et de simplement modifier une constitution ne fait qu'augmenter le niveau d'animosité et d'instabilité. Au contraire, le Sénégal doit refonder ses constitutions afin de décentraliser le pouvoir et de faire participer ses peuples indigènes au processus de gouvernance.

Notes

[7] Rapport de l'afrobaromètre

[8] 53 pour cent des personnes interrogées pensent que le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. » (36 pour cent ont indiqué souvent, 17 pour cent ont indiqué toujours, tandis que 25 pour cent ont indiqué jamais/rarement et 25 pour cent ont dit qu'ils ne savaient pas)

[9] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[10] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews. 2009, "Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research."

[11] Dennis Galvan. 2001, "Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia."

[12] La région de Casamance située au sud du fleuve Gambie est exclue de cette description.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Abdoulaye Diagne
Anne W. Kamau
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Zenia Lewis
Witney Schneidman
Jessica Smith
Olumide Taiwo