Brookings: Experts - Marvin Kalb

The Road to War : Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 280pp.

Not since Pearl Harbor in 1941 has an American president gone to Congress to request a declaration of war. Nevertheless, since then, one president after another, from Truman to Obama, has ordered American troops into wars all over the world. Why no declarations of war? Why has it become so comparatively easy for a president to commit the nation to war? What is Congress’s responsibility? Where is the press? In The Road to War, esteemed journalist and author Marvin Kalb explores these crucial and timely questions.

Rather than formally declaring war, presidents have justified their war-making powers by citing predecessors’ “commitments,” private and public. Many have been honored, but some have been betrayed. From Vietnam to Israel, presidential commitments have proven to be tricky and dangerous. For example, presidents pledged the United States to the defense of South Vietnam; yet none saw the need for a formal declaration of war, and few in Congress or the media chose to question the war’s provenance or legitimacy until it was too late. In the end, the U.S. lost 58,000 Americans—and the war.

Given the extraordinarily close U.S.-Israeli relationship, based on secret presidential assurances, it is remarkable but true that a number of Israeli leaders feel that at times they have been betrayed by American presidents. Kalb, while explaining the origin of this sense of betrayal, raises a profoundly important question: Isn’t it time for the United States and Israel to negotiate a mutual defense treaty? Wouldn’t such a treaty help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and provide American reassurance for Israel in the nuclear standoff with Iran?

The word of a president can morph into a national commitment, the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. Therefore, whenever a president “commits” the United States to a policy or course of action, with or increasingly without congressional approval or national debate, it is time to raise the yellow flag--watch out!

Praise for The Road to War:

“Every road to war is ultimately also a tragedy. Kalb’s concluding chapter, however, offers a timely and important ray of hope: a defense treaty between the U.S. and Israel in the context of a fair peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians might avoid not just one but even two wars. President Obama should read this chapter.”
—Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. national security adviser

“Marvin Kalb has written a fine book that should be required reading for everyone who wants to be president because it underlines what every president seems not to know in the beginning—that it is much easier to get into war than to get out of it. Terrific insight, carefully researched and clearly written.”
—Bob Schieffer, CBS News

“Kalb raises important questions about the unchecked power of presidents to take the nation to war. His provocative proposal for a U.S.-Israeli defense treaty will certainly add to the debate about the future of U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East.”
—Graham Allison, Harvard University

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marvin Kalb

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Why Is Obama Going to Israel—Now?

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 16:30:00 -0400

President Obama’s visit to Israel this week is a big deal. Not because it is expected to lead to a breakthrough in the stalled Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, nor to a unified U.S.-Israeli position on the Iranian nuclear challenge. It is a big deal, simply because it is happening.

A presidential visit to Israel is not routine. Quite the contrary. Since its birth in 1948, only four American presidents have visited Israel—Nixon, Carter, Clinton and Bush II. Obama will be the fifth. Truman, first to recognize Israel, never visited the state; nor did Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Reagan or Bush I.

Israel is hailed as America’s closest ally in the Middle East, but obviously such rhetorical affection, even esteem, has not translated into an Obama visit. Not till now. For example, several months into his first term as president, Obama traveled to Egypt, where he delivered a major speech about American-Arab relations, but then, foolishly, chose not to stop in near-by Israel. That slight, or so it was interpreted in Israel, proved to be a major diplomatic blunder.

So, why go to Israel now? Considering the president’s huge economic and political problems at home, it would surely make more sense for Obama to stay in or near the White House than to whisk off to the Middle East and spend the better part of a week in Israel, the West Bank and Jordan. But off he goes. The president now realizes that if he is to achieve progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, if he is to persuade Iran, through diplomacy, not to build nuclear weapons, if he is to come up with a realistic policy toward crumbling Syria, he must first develop a good, solid, working relationship with Israel, meaning with Israel’s recently-re-elected prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Everyone knows that Obama’s relationship with Netanyahu has been frayed and unusually testy, and it needs dramatic improvement—and needs it now. Trust, so clearly in short supply between these two leaders, must be developed. Commonality of views and policies must be nurtured. Time is of the essence--so fragile is the balance between war and peace in the Middle East. The dangers and differences are obvious.

On Iran: Netanyahu believes that Iran will be able to produce the ingredients for a nuclear bomb late this spring or summer. Obama thinks Iran needs at least another year. The Iran danger requires a coordinated policy, and at the moment that does not exist.

On Syria: Netanyahu wants the U.S. to bomb Syrian rockets on their way to Hezbollah in Lebanon, even if that escalates the already dreadful conflict in Syria. The U.S. appears ready to use its military force in Syria only when President Assad decides to commit his chemical and biological weapons to his war against the insurgents—only, in other words, as truly a last resort. Syria looks like a hot firecracker about to explode and envelop the region, and the U.S. so far remains on the sideline.

On the chronic Palestinian conundrum: Obama’s White House has already made it clear the president will not be carrying any plan for a Palestinian-Israeli agreement, and that’s fine with Netanyahu, who does not seem eager to move on this front anyway.

Obama’s aim on this trip will be to persuade as many Israelis as possible that he is their friend and supporter in any possible conflict with Iran or Arab opponents, and that if the Israelis reach an agreement with the Palestinians, the U.S. will back it fully. This is his hope, his way of extending a hand of friendship and cooperation and reducing the distrust and disappointment many Israelis have felt towards Obama ever since he stiffed them in 2009 after his Cairo speech.

It is often said of Obama that Israel has been, for him, an acquired taste. He did not, and probably still does not, feel an instinctive sympathy for Israel. But he knows now, if he did not earlier, that it is very hard, if not impossible, for an American president to reach across the chasm of Israeli-Arab hostility and arrange an agreement between the two belligerents without first establishing a beachhead of sympathy and understanding with Israel. There is no guarantee that Obama will be able in his second term to midwife a Palestinian-Israeli agreement; but if he is to do so, he knows he must first improve his relations with Israel. Basically, that’s what this journey is all about.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © Ronen Zvulun / Reuters

When Kerry Stormed D.C.

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: Marvin Kalb writes about his time as a CBS correspondent covering the April 22, 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in which John Kerry gave testimony regarding the Vietnam War. This feature was adapted from Kalb's book The Road to War: Presidential Commitments, Honored and Betrayed.

During the Vietnam War, there were many memorable hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but none resonated with the raw power and eloquence of John Kerry’s on April 22, 1971. It was a time of crisis in America—a war seemingly without end for a goal still without clarity, in a country split not only on the war but also on a host of emotional political, cultural and social issues.

When Kerry entered room 4221 of what is now called the Dirksen Senate Office Building, its impressive walls covered with maps and books and with nineteen senators seated behind a huge U-shaped table, he did more than add instant credibility to the dovish cry for Congress finally to do something about ending the war, even going so far as to advocate cutting off funding; he personalized the war that for so many others still seemed a puzzling, costly embarrassment in an unfamiliar corner of the world.

Kerry was a 1966 Yale graduate who had volunteered for duty in Vietnam, where he served honorably, winning two medals for courage and three Purple Hearts. “I believed very strongly in the code of service to one’s country,” he said. By that time, 56,193 Americans had died in and around Vietnam, and campuses were ablaze with antiwar rallies. Many students escaped military service by joining the National Guard or fleeing to Canada.

Dressed in green army fatigues, with four rows of ribbons over his left pocket, the twenty-seven-year-old survivor of dangerous Swift Boat missions leveled a blistering attack on American policy in Vietnam, his New England accent adding a dimension of authenticity to the sharpness of his critique. When he finished his testimony an hour later, he had become, in the words of one supporter, an “instant celebrity . . . with major national recognition.”

Speaking on behalf of more than a hundred veterans jammed into the Senate chamber and more than a thousand others camped outside to demonstrate against the war, Kerry demanded an “immediate withdrawal from South Vietnam.” He came to Congress, and not the president, he said, because “this body can be responsive to the will of the people, and . . . the will of the people says that we should be out of Vietnam now.”

If Kerry had simply expressed this demand, and not amplified it with reports of American atrocities, he likely would have avoided the devastating criticism that hounded him throughout his political career—criticism that eventually morphed into charges of treason and treachery, deception and lies, cowardice and even more lies, undercutting his presidential drive in 2004.

Read the entire feature on The National Interest website»

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Publication: The National Interest

Secretary of State John Kerry Is Visiting Nine Countries but Not Israel. What’s Up?

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 07:00:00 -0500

On February 24, 2013, the new secretary of state, John Kerry, leaves on his first trip abroad. He will visit nine countries, four in Western Europe and five in what is loosely defined as the Muslim, Arab world. But he will not visit Israel, even after intense speculation in Washington that Israel was a certain stop on his itinerary. What’s up?

The question is relevant, because it immediately stirs memories of what happened in 2009. In June of that year, just a few months into his historic presidency, Barack Obama visited Cairo for good and important reasons but then refused to take advantage of geography and make the short hop to Jerusalem. He might at the time have been angry about Israel’s settlements policy. The upshot was that Obama got off on the wrong foot in his dealings with Israel, and nothing much happened in U.S.-Israel relations for the next four years, even as the Mideast neighborhood itself became engulfed in uncertain democracy-building, violent upheavals and what looked like a determined Iranian move toward nuclear weapons.

Therefore, it was assumed that once Obama’s re-election was behind him and dreams of bringing peace to the Holy Land danced before his eyes, he would move quickly to improve relations with Israel, a necessary first step to masterminding a sensible American policy for a region in turmoil. And he did move. The White House announced that Obama would be going to Israel, Egypt and Jordan on March 20. When rumors circulated shortly after John Kerry became secretary of state that he would soon be visiting the Middle East, it was quickly assumed—incorrectly, as it turned out—that Israel would be one of his stops for at least two reasons: first, to show the Israelis that they are not going to be forgotten a second time by the Obama administration; and second, to lay the groundwork for Obama’s visit to Israel.

But Kerry will not stop in Israel. A number of reasons have been advanced, but none that make terribly much sense. First, Israel does not really have a government, since, after recent elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not yet finished the complicated task of forming a new government. Second, since the president is going to be in Israel anyway in late March, what is the point of Kerry being there in early March? It’s argued that it is redundant, or it is putting too much pressure on Israel. Third, it’s Kerry’s way of telling the world that he will not allow the Palestinian-Israeli conundrum to cloud his vision of America’s place in the world. This is all sophisticated nonsense.

No matter the final shape of the new Israeli government, or when it will formally be proclaimed, it will be Netanyahu who will speak for Israel, and his vision and policy that will prevail. If Kerry visited Israel on his extensive maiden voyage, he would have a golden opportunity to set the stage for the president’s visit, in which the secretary will play a part in any case. Remember, in this administration, the secretary of state is not going to set American policy. Obama sets policy. But the secretary can gather information and impressions that will help the president prepare for his Israel visit. Finally, whether the United States likes it or not, the Middle East has a way of capturing everyone’s attention, whenever it chooses to. Imagine Syria splintering apart even more. Imagine another Benghazi type tragedy. Imagine Mali exploding once again. Imagine Iran doing something deliberately provocative, requiring a response of some kind.

Kerry, by skipping Israel, is missing an opportunity to create a better relationship with Israel. That’s too bad, because Kerry could have done what his boss did not do at the beginning of his first administration—namely, ease Israel’s chronic uneasiness by coordinating policy in the Middle East. It’s always easier when the U.S. and Israel are playing from the same sheet of music. Without Israel’s cooperation or at least understanding, the United States cannot do very much to advance the Palestinian issue, and the Arab world has always said that the U.S. can solve nothing in the Middle East without first solving the Palestinian problem.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

Back to the Beginning in the Middle East

Marvin Kalb — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 10:09:00 -0500

Let us, for a moment, imagine what it might have been like in mid-February, 2009, if Barack Obama, then a new president, perhaps a transformational president (he was, after all, the first African-American elected to the job), decided that, in foreign policy, he would focus on the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and, miracle of miracles, produce a breakthrough. Miracles have been known to happen in that part of the world.

Instead of opening his Mid-East diplomacy with a cutting critique of Israel’s cantankerous settlements policy, often considered the third rail of Israeli politics, instead of traveling first to Egypt, where he delivered a warm speech, opening his arms to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but ignoring Israel, which proved to be a stunning blunder, instead of allowing, even encouraging, a discomfiting coolness in Israeli-American relations, instead of monopolizing America’s foreign policy rather than leaving some of the legwork to his secretary of state—instead of all this, if Obama did then what he appears to be doing now, four wasted years later, the Israelis and the Palestinians might be engaging in serious, face-to-face negotiations on a peace treaty by this time. Who knows?

Now, Obama appears to be allowing his new Secretary of State, John Kerry, to play a major role in the sensitive Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, a subject in which the former Senator has a passionate interest. He never allowed his first Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, once his principal opponent in the Democratic race to the White House, to lead an American initiative in this area, to engage in the sort of “shuttle diplomacy” that brought not only results but fame to another Secretary of State, named Henry Kissinger. On his first weekend as the nation’s top diplomat, Kerry made news by telephoning Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, informing both that he intended to visit the Middle East very soon, his way of signaling a new American activism in the region, particularly in the dormant negotiation between these two old antagonists.

Soon thereafter, apparently not by coincidence, the White House announced that the president himself will visit the Middle East on March 20—in other words, to do now what he should have done in 2009, namely, visit Israel, the Palestinian West Bank and, then as a gesture to a tottering ally, Jordan. On this trip, he will not visit Egypt, perhaps because an unstable Egypt may be too dangerous a destination.

According to American experts, Obama wants to focus on two main subjects in his talks with Netanyahu--Iran’s nuclear program and Syria’s convulsing civil war. But Netanyahu, having already talked to Kerry, expects the president to raise another hot topic—namely, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock. Netanyahu told his Cabinet last Sunday that this subject is very much on the president’s mind. “There is no doubt,” Netanyahu is quoted as saying, “this matter will be part of the work of the next government.” The prime minister is in the process of forming a new, broad-based government in Israel, one result of a political shake-up after the recent election that weakened his own base of political support and strengthened new and moderate forces more eager than he to resume negotiations with the Palestinians.

If Obama is, in fact, intent on launching a new American initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, he knows, or should know, that this effort requires a great deal of advance preparation, and little has been done. Realistically, Obama can do little more on this visit to the Middle East than set the stage for the negotiation and then leave it to his secretary of state to do the daunting, detailed legwork, starting with reopening the stalled dialogue between Netanyahu and Abbas. Then the serious work begins. Fortunately, for Kerry, he would have to shuttle only a short distance between Jerusalem and Ramallah, the interim Palestinian capital.

2013 may be the year, theoretically, for the US to pivot to Asia and the Pacific, but it is likely that this strategic pivot may have to be delayed, in part because the Middle East has a way of nipping at America’s heels. The crises in Iran and Syria may demand Obama’s attention this year. No one really knows, or so it seems, but Iran may be on the edge finally of developing a nuclear bomb. Is she six months away, or a year? And what does Obama do? He is on the record as saying the US will stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even using its military power to do so. Syria is absorbed in a civil war of increasing intensity and danger. The US may be changing its policy about providing lethal weapons to the anti-Assad opposition, but everyone asks, who is the opposition? Can it be trusted? Or is it a new incarnation of al-Qaeda?

And then there is the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation, for which guarantees of success can only be described as being in short supply. If even modest success were possible, it would clearly make it easier for the US and Israel to coordinate their strategies on the Iranian nuclear threat and on the unpredictable but deadly civil war in Syria.

Every president seems to harbor a secret dream to bring peace to the holy land. This is now Obama’s turn. In 2009, he started out with such high hopes and expectations and then quickly stumbled. Maybe now, four years later, he will do better. Maybe this is his time. Let’s wish him well.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Mr. Vladimir Putin: Operative in the Kremlin

Wed, 06 Feb 2013 10:30:00 -0500

Event Information

February 6, 2013
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Falk Auditorium
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036

Follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #MrPutin

President Vladimir Putin has been Russia’s dominant political figure for more than a decade, but during this term, the West has learned little about his background and the formative experiences that shape his worldview. In their new book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Brookings, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellows Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy reveal the complex identities of Mr. Putin and argue that an awareness of his real personas is essential to understanding the influence he has had on Russia and what the future holds for the country.

On February 6, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted the launch of Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin featuring a panel discussion to explore how Vladimir Putin has singularly defined Russian leadership and its role in the world in the new century. The discussion featured Hill and Gaddy, who will examine how Putin has turned himself into the ultimate political performance artist and how his identities have shaped the way the political and economic system operates today in Russia.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who served in the U.S. State Department from 1993 to 2001 as ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union and then as deputy secretary, also joined the panel. Brookings Guest Scholar Marvin Kalb, former chief diplomatic correspondent for CBS News and NBC News who first reported from Russia in the 1950s, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. During the discussion, Kalb and Talbott used experiences from their distinguished careers covering Russia to offer perspectives on the sweep of Russia’s modern history that encompasses Putin’s lifetime from the end of the Stalin-era until today.

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Fiona Hill: Putin’s Statist Personality: Restoring the Greatness of Russia

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Fiona Hill: Putin’s Statist Personality: Restoring the Greatness of Russia

A Report Card for Hillary Clinton

Marvin Kalb — Thu, 31 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Hillary Rodham Clinton has just concluded four tumultuous years as secretary of state, and already, as though in anticipation of a possible presidential run in 2016 (not announced but assumed by Washington pundits), she faces a groundswell of criticism about her time as the nation’s number-one diplomat.

The basic line is that she didn’t succeed at anything big. She accumulated enough mileage for first class air travel for the rest of her life—and Bill’s. But she didn’t win a ticket to the Foggy Botton Hall of Fame. Her record of accomplishment, it is asserted, is disappointing. No peace agreement in Afghanistan. Failure in Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. Reset with Russia: a big zero. Syria: a frightening disaster. Benghazi: her biggest embarrassment. And Iran? Further negotiations possible, but nothing on the near horizon to suggest a deal to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Yet, though this record may be bleak, I would still give her an A-, which, in graduate school, is not a bad grade. My reasoning follows:

Secretaries of State are not presidents. She worked for a president who managed foreign policy out of the White House and who dominated the decision-making process. Even if she had preferred a more activist policy in the Middle East, for example, she could not have initiated one without the president’s approval and enthusiasm. Last weekend, in a remarkable TV appearance, Barack Obama, with Clinton at his side, praised his secretary of state as one of the “finest” in American history. He cited the fact that, during her time as secretary, coinciding with his first administration, they together ended the war in Iraq, began to wind down the war in Afghanistan, ousted the Qaddafi regime in Libya and dismantled the “core leadership” of al-Qaeda, which included the stunning killing of Osama bin Laden. One could add that the United States has begun, sensibly, to readjust its overall foreign policy from one focused almost entirely on the greater Middle East to one that recognizes the rising importance of China as a potential adversary and India as a potential ally. The U.S. opening to Myanmar falls into this effort.

Also, not to be under-valued in an age of instant communication, Clinton has represented the United States in a thoroughly appealing way, traveling everywhere, meeting everyone, trumpeting human rights and democracy and winning the admiration of women throughout the world. No small accomplishment. In addition, she helped Obama and Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi cool the flames of war in Gaza. That yielded a ceasefire that was the best anyone could have done in that circumstance.

For any secretary of state who served after Henry Kissinger, secretary of state to Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970’s, the comparison with the irrepressible Kissinger has become almost inevitable. Invariably, Kissinger wins. One reason is that Kissinger came to office with an already finely tuned concept of global power. It was a balance-of-power concept drawn from Klemens von Metternich’s nineteenth-century Austrian playbook—one great power offsetting another; the United States pitted against the Soviet Union, with both struggling for advantage and yet recognizing that in a nuclear world some degree of cooperation was important, even essential.

Another reason for Kissinger’s acclaim was that he worked for a president who, early on, understood and appreciated Kissinger’s approach and who, later on, was so absorbed with his own political survival during the Watergate scandal that he gave his secretary a lot of room to maneuver and negotiate and even steal more than a few headlines. Finally, Kissinger loved the machinations and mysteries of modern diplomacy, and his manipulation of the media was clever enough to win their respect while he achieved a meaningful degree of success in the Middle East and in East-West relations. But he failed miserably, in my view, in Vietnam, where the war continued on his watch, with additional thousands of Americans killed, though he and Nixon knew the war was unwinnable.

Clinton, though highly experienced as a First Lady and New York senator, obviously intelligent and globally recognized, assumed the secretary’s mantle without enjoying either Kissinger’s background as a foreign-policy expert or benefitting from America’s undisputed position as the world’s number one power. Therefore, the inevitable comparisons with Kissinger would seem unjustified. By January 2009, the United States was not necessarily in decline, as some scholars have suggested, but it was clearly tired of its involvement in two long and bitter wars. It conveyed the unmistakable impression of a great power eager to cut back on its global obligations. Time and again, the president stressed the need for “nation building at home.”

Consider also the great recession, which greeted Obama and Clinton on their first day in power. The threat of this recession turning into a depression comparable to the 1930s was so great that the Obama administration had to focus first and foremost on domestic problems rather than foreign policy.

In this context, it was Clinton’s job to keep the world in one piece while Obama spent most of his time trying to re-energize the shattered economy. She did a good job.

I sensed that she wanted to out-Kissinger Kissinger on the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, but she never got the chance. A few months ago, having recently returned from one of her exhausting foreign journeys, she stepped out onto the beautiful backyard patio of the French ambassador’s residence during a book party for a friend. I was the only other person on the patio. She seemed to cherish a quiet moment communing with Mother Nature, but I couldn’t resist the opportunity for a brief chat. I asked if she ever thought about doing a Kissinger-type shuttle in the Middle East. She had tried persuasion, more than a few times, but it hadn’t worked. She nodded and smiled. “Maybe after the election,” she said. I was intrigued. Did she mean she would engage in shuttle diplomacy and try in this way to force an agreement between the two sides? She brushed aside further discussion, but fixing her eyes steadily on mine, she repeated simply, “After the election.” Then she returned to the party.

But then came the election, another trip long-scheduled and impossible to neglect, and then, unexpectedly, a series of infirmities that left her unable to engage any time soon in vigorous foreign travel. During a number of concluding interviews, she hit one point over and over: She needed to catch up on her sleep. She deserves the chance.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

Thank the French, Don't Bill Them

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 25 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The French deserve our thanks for repelling Islamist advances in northern Mali. What they do not deserve is a Pentagon bill for the limited military support we have provided in recent days. Indeed, if it is true, as reported in the French media, that United States has withheld larger deliveries of military assistance until assured of payment, then Washington ought to be ashamed of itself.

In recent days, U.S. transport planes have begun moving French troops and equipment into Mali—two planeloads on Monday, one on Tuesday; and defense secretary Leon Panetta has assured French officials that more can be made available. But the painfully grudging American response to French appeals for help is embarrassing and unbecoming for a superpower supposedly in the vanguard of the struggle against global terrorism.

France is doing the heavy lifting in Mali, because Mali was a French colony and many Frenchmen still live there. It became clear a few weeks ago that Islamist radicals were moving into position to seize the capital city of Bamako. The pathetically inept government of Mali could do little to stop them and requested urgent assistance. The socialist French prime minister, Francois Hollande, though opposed to military intervention and besieged by economic crisis, sent planes, tanks and thousands of troops to Mali. Frenchmen were threatened, and he acted promptly and courageously.

At the same time, Hollande urged neighboring African countries to join French troops in the struggle against Islamist radicals, who for months had been imposing harsh sharia-type law upon northern Mali, amputating limbs, stoning citizens and destroying some of the country’s cultural heritage. Until the French acted, there was a strong possibility that Mali could shortly become an Islamist country governed by al-Qaeda in the heart of central Africa—similar to what Afghanistan was shortly before the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States.

For this reason, the United States has been very concerned about the rise of Islamist fanaticism in Africa in recent years. Religious fanaticism tied to al-Qaeda terrorism make a very volatile, dangerous mix. The United States has even set up a small but elite force of troops and agents to help fight Mali-type insurgencies in Africa. Is this not the time to use it? One hopes, without fanfare, that it is being used.

The United States might have leaped to France’s support in Mali, but it did not. It limited its military assistance, making certain everyone understood that Washington would not send any troops to Mali; making certain, too, that the French understood that they would have to pay for the limited help they were getting from the United States.

After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has no appetite for further military adventures. In his inaugural address on Monday, president Barack Obama triumphantly proclaimed that “the decade of war” is over, meaning the United States has pulled out of Iraq, is pulling out of Afghanistan, and does not want to get into other wars. It needs a rest. The president has often spoken about the need for “nation-building at home.” That is an understandable position—the American economy is just now beginning to emerge from a deep recession, and the American people are tired. But the the United States remains the only genuine superpower in the world. Whether with joy or caution, it will be called upon to make difficult, controversial decisions. It cannot escape that responsibility.

Wars can be called those of choice or necessity. Either way, some may require U.S. military leadership—and certainly military help. Mali may be one of those wars. The French need American help, and they should get it: transportation, intelligence and even, if necessary, small numbers of special forces that are trained to get into a fight, accomplish their mission and get out. The French should get American help, but not the bill for the help; and they should be heaped with praise for taking on a tough task that no one else, including the United States, seemed ready to do.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Joe Penney / Reuters

It’s Called the Vietnam Syndrome, and It’s Back

Marvin Kalb — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 12:30:00 -0500

It had never really left—what was widely referred to as the “Vietnam syndrome”--but it has now returned unmistakably, certain to exercise a major influence on American foreign policy during President Barack Obama’s second term in office. It is the belief, born of brutal experience during the Vietnam War, that never again will the United States gradually tiptoe into questionable wars without a clearcut objective, overwhelming military force, an endgame strategy and, most important, the support of Congress and the American people. In today’s world of terrorist threat and guerrilla war, the Vietnam syndrome means, if nothing else, a fundamental reluctance to commit American military power anywhere in the world, unless it is absolutely necessary to protect the national interests of the country. The Vietnam syndrome is a giant step away from hard-edged policies, such as President George W. Bush’s adventurous plunge into Iraq in 2003, and toward softer-edged policies, such as President Obama has pursued in his measured anti-Qaddafi approach to the Libyan revolution and his careful, arms-length-away attitude to the complicated mess in Syria.

The return of the Vietnam syndrome was most vividly illustrated by Obama’s appointment of Senator John Kerry as Secretary of State and former Senator Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Both men are loyalists, thoroughly devoted to the president, and they are Vietnam War veterans, scarred physically and psychologically by their experiences in a lost war. Both won medals for gallantry in combat; both were also awarded Purple Hearts for wounds suffered during the war. Between the two, they share five Purple Hearts, testimony to their wartime sacrifice.

Kerry was a naval officer, who volunteered for service in Vietnam. His duty was in the torrid Mekong Delta, riding Swift Boats through elephant leaf covered back water rivulets, which hid an enemy always preparing a surprise attack. It was, without doubt, one of the most dangerous assignments in the war. He still carries shrapnel in one leg. Kerry left Vietnam after several months, convinced that his country had made a dreadful mistake and that it was time to pull out of the war. When he returned to the US, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April, 1971, and demanded an “immediate withdrawal” of American forces from Vietnam. “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam?” he asked. “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?” His questions resonated across the country, and he rose to national prominence as an anti-war veteran. He remains anti-war, especially anti-dumb wars that waste American lives and resources.

Hagel was an enlisted man in the US army, fighting alongside his brother, Tom, near the Cambodian border during the worst days of the war. That two brothers would be in the same battle would be exceptional. That each would then save the other’s life would be totally extraordinary, but it happened in April, 1968. Few American families have been more generous in their contributions to the Vietnam war, few more fortunate. Both sons survived their wounds. When Chuck Hagel was being medevaced out of the battle, he turned to an aide and said: “If I ever get out of this, and I’m ever in a position to influence policy, I will do everything I can to avoid needless, senseless war.”

Should Hagel be confirmed by the Senate, where he spent twelve years representing Nebraska as a maverick Republican, he will have the opportunity to influence policy. Kerry will have the same opportunity. As a liberal Democrat from Massachusetts, he served in the Senate for a quarter-of-a-century and, in 2004, ran unsuccessfully for president.

Both he and Hagel know they can influence policy--and they will, advocating a moderate line on Iran, Afghanistan and such turbulent troublespots as the Arab upheaval in the Middle East--but they also know that only the president can and will make the final decisions about war and peace in 2013. But what’s interesting now is that Obama’s two principal advisers on foreign affairs are veterans of a most unhappy war in Vietnam; and as they glance over the globe’s many problems, they are more apt to advance non-military solutions—to ask, for example, how the US can avoid other long, costly, messy wars, such as the ones in Vietnam and Afghanistan, rather than imagine that, with another heavy expenditure of arms and troops, the US can win the wars, big and small, that currently challenge the country.

Obama has often said that it’s time for “nation-building at home.” Kerry and Hagel agree. The meaning may be that Vietnam has returned once more to influence the US to be mindful of the powerful lessons of recent history. Whether the issue is Mali, or Afghanistan, or the South China Sea, it may be better for the US to keep its powder dry until it can be proven, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it must intervene. If by chance the president forgets that lesson, unlikely though that be, he has Kerry and Hagel nearby to remind him of its relevance.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Truman, Eisenhower, and the Fiscal Cliff: A Political Message from Another Era

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 07 Dec 2012 12:26:00 -0500

July 25, 1947 was the time. The White House was the place. Harry Truman, president of the United States, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, soon to be appointed president of Columbia University, were engaged in a remarkable conversation about General Douglas MacArthur, supreme allied commander in Japan. Both knew and distrusted MacArthur, Truman referring to his “superiority complex” and expecting him to make a “Roman triumphal return to the U.S. a short time before the Republican Convention meets in Philadelphia,” and Eisenhower describing him as “ruthless and ambitious.” Truman and Eisenhower believed at the time that MacArthur, more than anything else, wanted to be president, a prospect they both considered a “calamity” for the nation. In private notes, drafted that night in exquisite penmanship, they evoked a time in the American presidency when patriotism seemed to rise majestically over party politics and personal ambition.

Truman invited Eisenhower to the Oval Office for a private talk about James Forrestal, his first secretary of defense (interestingly, Truman spelled Forrestal with one “r” and referred to the job as “Secretary for National Defense”) and General George C. Marshall, whom he had recently appointed as his secretary of state. They also discussed the inevitable subject of national politics, and it was here that their common distaste for MacArthur bubbled easily to the surface.

They both believed that MacArthur was a roaring egotist, so driven by personal ambition that he would do anything to be president. Truman imagined that MacArthur would be drafted by the GOP convention and, as a Republican candidate bedecked by medals and honors, he would probably defeat Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign. The prospect of a MacArthur presidency seemed to frighten both Truman and Eisenhower.

What Truman then proposed to Eisenhower is probably unprecedented in American presidential politics. Let me quote from his evening diary. “I told Ike that if he (MacArthur) did that (return to the US and get the GOP nomination) that he (Ike) should announce for the nomination for President on the Democratic ticket.” Truman then went further, breaking new ground. “I’d be glad to be in second place as Vice-President…Ike and I could be elected.” I don’t believe Truman advanced this interesting proposal so he could cling to power. He described the White House as “a great white jail.”

That evening, Ike noted in his diary that he had had “an astounding talk at the White House at 3:30 this afternoon.” He added: “I stick on my determination to have nothing to do with politics—but I can well understand the calamity that might overtake us if some utterly [here he crossed out the word “incompetent” and wrote in the words “ruthless and ambitious”] person should capture public imagination.” Obviously, in the context, he meant MacArthur. Later, with mirth, I suspect, Ike added the thought: “I wonder whether—5 years from now—H.T. will—or will want to—remember his amazing suggestion.” Five years later, in 1952, Ike, who would have “nothing to do with politics,” accepted the GOP nomination for the presidency.

Still, it is indeed amazing that a sitting president would propose that he voluntarily give up his place on the ticket to someone he believed had a better shot at defeating a political opponent, especially one named MacArthur. It is hard, if not impossible, to imagine such a scenario today, when political polarization has moved the country to the brink of economic “catastrophe,” the word used by many economists, and when personal ambition seems to ride roughshod over the national interest. If Truman could propose giving up the presidency for the good of the country, why can’t Boehner and other GOP leaders give up their opposition to a slight increase in the tax rates? They can afford it.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © Joshua Roberts / Reuters

The Ever-Expanding Definition of an "American": A Tribute to Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Marvin Kalb — Mon, 19 Nov 2012 17:36:00 -0500

I met Hal Sonnenfeldt, my Brookings colleague, in 1961, when I was CBS’s Moscow Bureau Chief, and Hal was a leading Kremlinologist at the State Department. It was, in those days, a big deal for an American Kremlinologist to visit Moscow. The Cold War was growing hot with crises brewing in Berlin and Cuba, and everything about the Soviet Union, from its shaky economy to its powerful military, was of more than passing interest to the U.S. government. For Hal, my Moscow broadcasts were important moments in his day. When he knew he would be visiting the Soviet capital, he informed me of his travel plans, and we arranged an informal meeting. With a friend, he came to our modest apartment in a modern complex of apartment houses overlooking the Moscow River. At first, Hal seemed impressed by the apartment, but when he innocently attempted to step out onto the small balcony in front of the living room, I grabbed him by the arm, screaming "Stop, stop." Later, having "saved" Hal from what might have been a terrible accident, I explained that the last person who tried to get a breath of fresh air on a new Soviet balcony found himself on the sidewalk down below, badly injured from the fall but alive. The balcony had collapsed under his weight. Fortunately, he fell only two flights. We were on the third floor. That was Hal’s first memorable encounter with the reality of Soviet economic progress.

He was a skeptic to begin with, so the balcony experience only confirmed his earlier belief that the Soviet system was a political abomination, from which economic progress was an uncertain outgrowth at best. He did however respect Soviet military power, but it always raised an interesting question in his mind: how can an economic system so profoundly inadequate produce missiles, tanks and bombs that worked? And because so many of them did work, it became an essential task of modern diplomacy to keep them from working—in other words, Hal was a realist who respected Soviet military power and devoted his life to making certain that the swords of both East and West remained in their sheaths.

Hal was born in Weimar, Germany, in the mid-1920's. As a young boy, faced with the rising hatreds of Nazi antisemitism, he was sent to Great Britain, where he was a student during World War II. Baltimore was his next stop. Again, school, but with a slight southern accent. He began to adjust to being an American, a process he considered quite miraculous. The Americanization of Hal Sonnenfeldt quickly included a stint in the U.S. army, which, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, provided Hal with golden opportunities. He spoke German, and the army needed German-speakers. He was smart and ambitious, and he met other German-born Americans with stars in their eyes. One of them, Henry Kissinger, was to become a lifelong friend and colleague.

Hal returned to Baltimore, where he attended Johns Hopkins University. Shortly thereafter, he applied for an intelligence and research job at the State Department. He worked there until Richard Nixon was elected president in November, 1968 and his friend, Kissinger, was selected as Nixon’s National Security Adviser. Within days, Kissinger tapped Hal to join him at the White House, where he became one of Kissinger’s closest aides and advisers. Imagine two German-born immigrant analysts, one with a rather thick accent, working at the White House for the president of the United States!

This was probably Hal’s finest, most satisfying professional years. He was close to the ultimate seat of American power, able to influence the flow of American diplomacy. In the spring of 1972, the United States was bombing North Vietnam, and Nixon was planning an historic summit in Moscow. The betting in Washington was that the Russians would call off the summit. Nixon was ready to roll the dice. Hal worked feverishly to keep both super powers on the road to the summit, despite the bombing. He thought the Russians would proceed with the summit, and he was right.

Hal often was right about the Russians. Often we chatted about Russia and about U.S.-Soviet relations. I never abused the privilege of Hal’s friendship. When he could help me, he did. When he couldn't, he didn't. He was never frightened about talking to a journalist, even though his boss, President Nixon, bugged my phone, tailed me and put me on his foolish "enemies list." Hal understood that his responsibility was to work tirelessly for the best interests of his country, and he always did.

Hal was a proud patriot. Though born in Germany, he never hated Germans, and he felt the deepest pride in his role as an American diplomat par excellence. He befriended a long succession of German diplomats and ambassadors assigned to Washington, DC. They respected Hal, he admired them. He was an extraordinary example of the expansive, all-embracing nature of American patriotism. It was my honor to have had him as a friend and a "source" for more than 50 years. He died peacefully on Sunday, November 18, 2012 after a long illness, leaving behind his beloved Marjorie and their three children.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

An Overture to Romney

Marvin Kalb — Thu, 08 Nov 2012 14:30:00 -0500

Conservative critics, gloomy after their candidate’s defeat, argue that President Obama, despite his impressive win in a struggling economy, has no mandate. That is nonsense. The president has a mandate, or, what former President George W. Bush referred to as “political capital,” to lead the way toward a political reconciliation over the nation’s impending fiscal cliff negotiations—and to do so now, while the glow of his victory still glitters in the political sunrise. No one else can lead, and no one else should lead.

In a way unique to Oval Office occupants, who have run their last political campaign, freshly liberated from normal political constraints, President Obama can now embark on this urgent task by dramatically widening the circle of his inner cabinet and inviting prominent Republicans to join it and, in this way, help him reach an unprecedented bipartisan compromise in the best interests of the country. One such Republican is Mitt Romney, the man he just beat. Though technically the head of his party, Romney is now a man without a job but a man who was, only a few days ago, close to being President-elect. Why not appoint Romney to replace Tim Geithner as Secretary of the Treasury?

This is not so wild an idea, though I can imagine, as you can, the obvious pitfalls. He has major disagreements with the president on economic policy, and he may yet dream about another run for the top job. In addition, Obama may already have promised the job to someone else.

But, if words still have meaning, and if the president remains fixed on striking a major deal before dreaded sequestration sinks its claws into the American economy, Obama is now in a position to make a bold move. The stage, in fact, is set.

When Romney delivered his concession speech, he congratulated the president in an interesting way. Not “congratulations,” with a tip of the hat, and “goodbye,” slipping into the darkness. Romney expressed his love of country in a deep, moving tones, all but asking, perhaps hoping, for another chance to help. When Obama spoke, moments later, he made a special point of stressing the Romney family’s dedication to public service and then, in a broader context, took pride in a political system that prized passionate and powerful differences of opinion. He added, meaningfully, that he had invited Romney to the White House “to talk about where we can work together to move this country forward.”

The following is fanciful, I admit, but stranger things have happened in American political history: Obama, when setting up the Romney meeting, makes certain that Ann Romney is also invited, and suggests they both stay at Blair House. A “reconciliation dinner” is arranged for the same day, and all major Republican and Democratic members of Congress are invited. (Something the president ought to do in any case.) Network cameras are allowed to cover the after-dinner speeches. Obama clearly extends an olive branch, and asks Romney to respond. Both stress the need for compromise, which Speaker Boehner recently embraced while offering his own version. The following morning, in private to avoid any possible embarrassment, the president offers Romney the job. The president makes clear that he is also offering other prominent Republicans important jobs in his transformed Cabinet.

This is a special time in America. A president has been re-elected, and the nation is heading toward a self-generated fiscal crisis, one that is real and frightening. Something dramatic, bold, imaginative, no-nonsense must be done. This is one idea. If you have something better, let’s hear it. But let’s get moving.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: © Jim Young / Reuters

The Third Presidential Debate: A Live Web Chat with Marvin Kalb

Wed, 24 Oct 2012 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

October 24, 2012
12:30 PM - 1:00 PM EDT

Online Only
The Brookings Institution

Washington, DC

The final presidential debate between President Obama and Governor Mitt Romney focused on foreign policy, and each candidate outlined his vision for America’s role in the world during increasingly complex and often dangerous times. The Middle East continues to experience turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, al Qaeda remains an ongoing threat, and emerging competitors in the global marketplace are challenging America’s position in the world economy. Did either candidate emerge a leader on foreign policy? What differences in the candidates’ stated positions should voters take into consideration just weeks before the election?

Brookings expert Marvin Kalb responded to your questions about the debate in a live web chat moderated by Vivyan Tran of POLITICO. Read the full transcript of the chat below.

12:30 Vivyan Tran: Welcome everyone, let's get started.

12:31 Comment from Nicole: Every presidential debate since 1988 has mentioned climate change. Why did you believe the candidates ignored this topic during the debate when it is probably the most important issue the world's facing right now?

12:32 Marvin Kalb: It was a mistake not to ask the question, and it was a mistake that the candidates did not bring it up. No doubt, it is a major issue facing any president, but because it is so loaded with politics, presidents have been reluctant to pursue it. Mistake all the way.

12:32 Comment from Taylor S.: Pundits have been saying that Romney's foreign policy plan shares almost the same ideals and plans of attack that Obama has. Do you think this is accurate? What should the right wing be messaging differently?

12:37 Marvin Kalb: It's rather fascinating, in fact, that Romney sounded during the debate as though he was fully supportive of Obama's policy. But in fact he does have a different slant. He wishes to sound, and act, in a more muscular way. He suggests on Iran that he would be tougher than Obama, but offers no specifics. He suggests he would be tougher on China, but again offers no specifics. He wants to sound more friendly and supportive of Israel, but Obama already is supportive of Israel. So the bottom line is they are likely to follow a similar foreign policy, no matter who is elected.

12:37 Comment from Taylor S.: There was no mention of the Eurozone crisis on Monday's debate, why was that? Is the Euro crisis suddenly not a concern for US foreign policy?

12:40 Marvin Kalb: Again, a big mistake. The question should have been asked by the moderator, or should have been raised by either Romney or Obama. Maybe neither did because they have no solutions to offer. This is primarily a big problem for Europe. The Europeans are struggling with it, but have produced no real solutions. Maybe none is possible until the Europeans are ready to take the next big step—go from economic integration to political integration. Politically, though, this is very difficult to do for any European politician. So the problem hangs, it gets worse and one day it will affect the US.

12:40 Comment from User in VT: Do you think either candidate came out a winner?

12:41 Marvin Kalb: I think Obama came out the winner but the bigger question is—how does that win affect the small group of Americans still undecided? My guess is that Romney's big October 3 bounce has by now flattened and it's a race to the finish now whether Obama can strengthen his small lead in the key swing states. If he can, he wins.

12:42 Comment from Marshall: "Foreign Policy" is so nuanced when you consider cultures, economics, and all the players in any given situation. Do you think debates like Monday's are really a productive forum for exploring such nuanced issues?

12:45 Marvin Kalb: I favor debates. I think they are valuable tools for public education. Yes foreign policy is nuanced, but life is nuanced. A debate provides an opportunity for a limited exposition of the candidates’ views. That's valuable because most Americans do not pay attention to the campaign until September. The debates represent mass education in quick time. I would like to see weekly debates in the last month of the campaign, so each debate is not so important but all the debates could form a good public education on the major issues at hand.

12:45 Comment from Anonymous: Do you think Romney has what it takes to represent America throughout the world?

12:47 Marvin Kalb: Yes I do, but when in office he is going to have to modify his positions, even more than he has up to this point in the campaign, if he hopes to get anywhere on the major issues facing the nation. On foreign policy, he will, I hope, surround himself with good, effective public officials who will help him represent the U.S. in a dignified and intelligent manner. But yes, overall, I think he can represent the U.S.

12:47 Comment from JC: How would you evaluate the news coverage of the debates this year? Do you think media interpretation of debates changes people's opinions of the candidates? Or are people deciding for themselves?

12:51 Marvin Kalb: News coverage is essential to public understanding of the campaign and the candidates. Reporters have done well, but in a very circumscribed way. News organizations do not now have the money to send reporters all over the country. So reporters have to take short cuts. They stay close to their computers and cover the election, virtually, as it's put. But what they report strongly influences public understanding, strongly influences polling, and then it's circular: the polls are taken, the reporters report on the polls, and people get a kind of pre-digested reporting of reality. It's not ideal, but it's the best we have.

12:52 Comment from Guest: The sense I've gotten from pundits is that most Americans do not care enough about foreign policy for the third debate to have made any real difference in the election. What would you say to someone who feels that way about the topic? Thank you.

12:54 Marvin Kalb: I think that is right. Most Americans do not care much about foreign policy, though they should. They especially care during this election cycle about the economy. That's why the candidates returned to the economy even when they were supposed to talk about foreign policy. The shame is that people must learn, somehow, that they are part of the world in a very close way. What happens in Greece affects America, and vice versa, too. We are all wired now—all part of the same globe—whether we like it or not.

12:55 Comment from Abigail : What did you think of the moderation of Monday's debate?

12:56 Marvin Kalb: I have worked with Bob Schieffer for many years. He is a pro, all the way. There were questions I wish he would have asked, but over all he did a very professional job—with dignity and fairness.

12:56 Comment from Ashley M: The debate largely ignored significant portions of the globe and focused on much of the Middle East. Will the next administration's foreign policy do the same, or can we expect more attention to be paid to the US relationship with India, Latin America, Africa, etc?

1:00 Marvin Kalb: You are right—it did ignore large parts of the globe. No doubt, the next president will have to deal with these parts too. But ever since 9/11, the U.S. has been absorbed with the Middle East, and it is likely to continue for a long time. Oil is one reason. But there are many others, including strategic concerns affecting this huge corner of the world. Obama wants to "pivot" to Asia, but he may be forced by events to continue to be absorbed with the Middle East.

1:00 Vivyan Tran: Thanks for the questions everyone, see you next week!

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121024_fp_debate

The Candidates Debate Foreign Policy – The Takeaways

Shadi Hamid, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Ted Piccone, and Marvin Kalb — Tue, 23 Oct 2012 15:00:00 -0400

On October 22, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney met in the last presidential debate of 2012, this time focusing on foreign policy. In this second part of a two part compilation, read the reactions to the debate by Brookings Foreign Policy experts: Shadi Hamid analyzes statements both candidates made on U.S. Middle East policy; Kenneth Lieberthal examines three themes on China both Romney and Obama focused on during the debate; Ted Piccone explores why Latin America was left out of the debate; Bruce Riedel comments on Romney's defense of Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan policy; Marvin Kalb reflects on lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis and how they apply to U.S. foreign policy today.

Discussion of Middle East Would Leave Arabs Confused
Shadi Hamid, Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center and Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
CNN

This debate, if nothing else, showed us that U.S. discourse on the Middle East bears little resemblance to how Arabs see their own region. I joked on twitter that if you had a split-screen of randomly selected Arabs watching, they’d probably be beyond confusion. To begin with, Romney’s foreign policy message crumbled under the weight of its own contradictions. In his October 8speech on the Middle East, he echoed the Bush “freedom agenda” in calling for a more pro-active approach to democracy promotion. But his first response on the Arab Spring suggested an exclusively security-oriented approach, with a region reduced to violence, terrorism, and “tumult.” He cited the free election of an Islamist president in Egypt as an example of the “dramatic reversal in the kind of hopes we had.”

Republicans and neoconservatives, to their credit, once prioritized democracy promotion. But the fact that Islamist parties tend win free elections has rendered “neoconservatism” incoherent. It is simply impossible to support democracy, on one hand, and oppose the rise of Islamists, on the other.

Authors

Publication: The Brookings Institution, CNN, Foreign Policy

U.S. Defense and the 2012 Presidential Election

Mon, 10 Sep 2012 13:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 10, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The full video of this event can be viewed online at C-SPAN.org.

Following the Republican and Democratic national conventions, the fall electoral season kicks into high gear. Among the many issues being debated are those focused on U.S. defense: How would the presidential candidates shape America’s future armed forces? Where do they agree and where do they disagree? Which broader realities, both within their control and beyond it, will affect their decisions on these matters?

On September 10, the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the defense plans of Governor Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama and, more generally, the prospects for the American military and the U.S. defense budget in 2013 and beyond. Panelists included Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, director of research for Foreign Policy at Brookings; Brookings Guest Scholar Marvin Kalb; and Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Senior Fellow Peter W. Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, moderated the discussion.

Video

Haunting Legacy : Vietnam and the American Presidency from Ford to Obama (Revised Edition)

Deborah Kalb and Marvin Kalb — Sat, 01 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2012 364pp.

The United States had never lost a war—that is, until 1975, when it was forced to flee Saigon in humiliation after losing to what Lyndon Johnson called a “raggedy-ass little fourth-rate country.” The legacy of this first defeat has haunted every president since, especially on the decision of whether to put “boots on the ground” and commit troops to war.

In Haunting Legacy, the father-daughter journalist team of Marvin Kalb and Deborah Kalb presents a compelling, accessible, and hugely important history of presidential decisionmaking on one crucial issue: in light of the Vietnam debacle, under what circumstances should the United States go to war?

The sobering lesson of Vietnam is that the United States is not invincible—it can lose a war—and thus it must be more discriminating about the use of American power. Every president has faced the ghosts of Vietnam in his own way, though each has been wary of being sucked into another unpopular war. Ford (during the Mayaguez crisis) and both Bushes (Persian Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan) deployed massive force, as if to say, “Vietnam, be damned.” On the other hand, Carter, Clinton, and Reagan (to the surprise of many) acted with extreme caution, mindful of the Vietnam experience. Obama has also wrestled with the Vietnam legacy, using doses of American firepower in Libya while still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The authors spent five years interviewing hundreds of officials from every post war administration and conducting extensive research in presidential libraries and archives, and they've produced insight and information never before published. Equal parts taut history, revealing biography, and cautionary tale, Haunting Legacy is must reading for anyone trying to understand the power of the past to influence war-and-peace decisions of the present, and of the future.

For all the latest information from the authors and to view their Q&A series, visit the book's website.

Praise for the book:

"What a terrific book! Scrupulously researched and beautifully told, Haunting Legacy proves that try as they might, our past seven presidents have—one after the next—failed to exorcize the ghost of Vietnam. From Ford to Obama...each one has seen the Vietnam War intrude on his campaigns (think draft dodging and swift boating) and his decisionmaking (think military action). It’s a fresh look at late 20th/early 21st century American history."—Lesley Stahl, correspondent for 60 Minutes

"The ghost of the Vietnam War has influenced and haunted two generations of American policymakers. Now, a brilliant two-generation team looks at that legacy in an insightful and fascinating way. This is great narrative history and biography combined to create informative case studies."—Walter Isaacson, president and CEO of the Aspen Institute

"By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome,’ crowed President George H. W. Bush when he repelled Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. He was wrong. The Vietnam debacle continues to haunt America’s political leaders, military men, and population. Marvin Kalb and Deborah Kalb’s account of this phenomenon is studiously researched, vividly narrated, and, above all, highly readable. It will stand as a major contribution to the subject."—Stanley Karnow, author of Vietnam: A History and winner of the Pulitzer Prize

"More than three decades after its end, the Vietnam War continues to influence American attitudes toward sending troops abroad. In readable prose, the Kalbs's book skillfully and perceptively analyzes this haunting legacy from the administration of Gerald Ford to that of Barack Obama."—George C. Herring, author of America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975

"Vietnam continues to be an albatross, circling the White House. In a compelling and totally accessible book, the Kalbs (father and daughter) show how profoundly America’s defeat in Vietnam has affected one U.S. administration after another, over the course of the past thirty-six years. If you wonder whether Vietnam still matters, it does. Read this book and discover why and how."—Ted Koppel, anchor of ABC’s Nightline for twenty-five years

"Haunting Legacy is a gripping, fascinating account of how the Vietnam War has lived on in the psyches of our national leaders and put its stamp on our foreign policy ever since. This powerful and insightful book shows us how that long and painful war has never really ended in Washington."—Elizabeth Drew, political journalist

"A clear-eyed look at the Vietnam War's fateful consequences—especially subsequent wars—up until the present in Afghanistan. It could not be a more timely and thoughtful contribution to the literature."—Jamie Stiehm, Huffington Post

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Deborah Kalb

Deborah Kalb, a freelance writer and editor, worked as a journalist in Washington for two decades, including writing for the Gannett News Service, Congressional Quarterly, U.S. News & World Report, and The Hill.

Marvin Kalb

Ordering Information:

{BEE4D1CC-5E07-4799-AEF4-76EAC977FCEC}, 978-0-8157-2389-9, $19.95 Order
{B98DCBB0-3580-4D55-ABD4-AB91E00585E6}, 978-0-8157-2440-7, $19.95 Order

Obama and Romney's Foreign Policies: Difference in Words, Not Substance?

Marvin Kalb — Fri, 27 Jul 2012 16:26:00 -0400

It may come as a surprise, given the daily drumbeat of political charge and counter-charge, but it is my impression at this stage of the presidential campaign that the positions of the two candidates have begun to overlap on major foreign policy problems. The differences still remain, of course, accented during their dueling speeches before the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars earlier this week. But, as Mitt Romney moves from the primary season, when he had to fight off many tea-party-type challenges, into the more serious pre-convention phase of the campaign, he has begun to soften his positions on a number of issues, realizing that he will soon be officially anointed as the GOP presidential candidate. He knows he has to look and sound presidential. But even in advance of this moment, Romney’s every word, idea, plan or program is being dissected and diagnosed for clues to the shape and substance of American foreign policy in a Romney administration. What will change? What will remain the same? There is no need to hold your breath: my guess is that not that much will change.

President Obama broke no new ground. Aware that, according to recent polls, veterans are more likely to vote for his opponent than for him, the president pointed to his strong support for veterans and to promises-made and promises-kept in his conduct of foreign policy. “You don’t just have my words,” he said, “you have my deeds.” He promised to withdraw American forces from Iraq, and he did; promised to get Osama bin-Laden, and he did; promised to pull American forces out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and he has begun the process. His point, more political than strategic, was that he feels he deserves credit for a successful foreign policy.

At first blush, Romney’s speech to the VFW, his first serious attempt to explain his foreign policy, was an effort to draw clear distinctions between his view of the world and Obama’s—he wanted to come through as “anything other than Obama”; but a closer read suggests he has begun to move his policy on a number of issues closer to the sensible center of the spectrum, closer in other words to where the nation’s foreign policy, under President Obama, currently functions in a world crowded with economic and military upheavals. Then for an even better understanding of the shifting gears in Romney’s emerging policy, all you had to do was attend the overflow Brookings foreign policy discussion a day later. It was covered by dozens of reporters and foreign correspondents. C-Span was also present, along with sixteen other television cameras representing networks all over the world. There were questions about Macedonian, Bosnia, Kosovo, Turkey, China, Japan—the whole world in effect wanting to know what a Romney-led America would think and do.

“The Obama and Romney Foreign Policy Agendas: A Discussion with the Candidates’ Leading Advisers” was the name of this remarkable event, and the advisers were Rich Williamson, a senior adviser to the Romney campaign and a former “special representative” to the Sudan for President George W. Bush, and Michele Flournoy, a senior adviser to the Obama campaign and, until earlier this year, the Under-Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration. Both effectively explained and defended their candidate’s positions and policies, often in spirited exchanges.

Throughout Williamson tried gallantly to differentiate Romney’s approach to the world’s problems from Obama’s, but though his rhetoric was sharper, certainly more political, his basic policy prescriptions were cut essentially from the same cloth.

• On Afghanistan, for example, after months of criticizing Obama for setting deadlines in the war, he now accepted the president’s 2014 deadline for withdrawing American forces, a decision confirmed unanimously by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in May, 2012.

• On the Iran nuclear program, Williamson criticized Obama for failing so far to stop it, but he offered no real evidence that a Romney administration would do any better. Flournoy defended the Obama policy of gradually increasing the pressure on Iran through an unprecedented program of UN-approved sanctions.

• On Syria, Williamson was also critical of the Obama administration’s obvious reluctance to get involved in the civil war there, but again he had no proposals for ousting the Assad regime—at least, none that he offered. Romney would “support” the Syrian rebels, he said, but not with weapons--same as the Obama administration’s position. Flournoy, describing the president’s policy as “pragmatic,” refused to discuss the possibility of American military involvement, or Israeli military involvement.

• On Israel, which Romney will visit this week and which Obama, as President, has not visited, Williamson ripped into Obama for joining a UN chorus of “accusations, threats and insults” against Israel, but on how Romney would advance the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, now in deadlock, Williamson had no fresh ideas. Flournoy argued that policy should not be rooted in travel itineraries—whether he goes to Jerusalem or not. She stressed that Obama’s support of Israel has been, as the president has repeatedly stressed, “ironclad.”

• On Pakistan, a nuclear country on the edge of political disintegration, Flournoy explained the danger and complexity of the problem, and Williamson seemed to agree with her. The big problem has been control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

Time and again, Williamson, in gesture and comment, tried to convey differences with Obama—in words, yes, but in substance, no. He even ended up congratulating Obama’s policy towards India and China, basically because the President, he said, has chosen to follow Bush II’s opening to India and emphasis on human rights in China.

Willliamson described Romney as an internationalist with none of the old-fashioned Republican tendencies towards isolationism, again positioning him in the middle of the policy spectrum. Indeed, he said, Romney is intent on re-establishing America’s central role in the world: the 21st century, like the 20th, would be America’s to lead. He told the VFW that America, under Obama, has been a nation in decline. Obama, in his speech to the VFW, responded, in effect, that such criticism was nonsense. “The United States has been, and will remain,” he said, “the one indispensable nation in world affairs.”

Romney this week visits Great Britain, Israel and Poland, and clearly the 2012 presidential campaign has entered a new phase. Welcome at long last to the beginning of a discussion and debate about the nation’s foreign policy.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: James Glover / Reuters

The Obama and Romney Foreign Policy Agendas: A Discussion with the Candidates’ Leading Advisers

Wed, 25 Jul 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

July 25, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On July 23 and July 24, President Barack Obama and Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney will address the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, laying out their foreign, defense and national security agendas just weeks before the national political conventions. Following his speech, Governor Romney will depart on a multi-country overseas trip, with stops in Britain, Israel, and other possible destinations in Europe. These campaign events come as the crisis in Syria dissolves into civil war, the European economic crisis continues to unfold, and U.S. troops prepare to leave Afghanistan.

On July 25, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion examining the foreign policy, defense and national security agendas of candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, featuring Michele Flournoy, co-chair of the National Security Advisory Committee for Obama for America and Rich Williamson, senior adviser for foreign and defense policy for Romney for President, Inc. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. Brookings Guest Scholar Marvin Kalb moderated the discussion.

After the program, speakers took audience questions.

Watch video from the event at c-span.org »

Read Marvin Kalb's blog post, "Obama and Romney's Foreign Policies: Difference in Words, Not Substance?"

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The Obama and Romney Foreign Policy Agendas: A Discussion with the Candidates’ Leading Advisers

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120725_obama_romney_advisers

Once Critique of the President Stopped at Foreign Policy

Marvin Kalb — Thu, 31 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Once upon a time, in the fairyland of American presidential politics, it used to stop at the water’s edge. A candidate for the nation’s highest office would not criticize a president’s foreign policy, certainly not during the heat of a presidential campaign. Not right, it was thought, for such criticism might be exploited by America’s enemy. As you may have noticed over recent years, that inhibition has melted away, and sadly the American people seem not only not to have noticed but seem to approve of the political combat.

Take Syria, as a good example of the problem.

President Obama clearly does not want to get militarily involved in the worsening crisis in Syria—not now and possibly not ever; not when the U.S. is still fighting in Afghanistan, not when the Pentagon faces further budget cuts that Defense Secretary Panetta describes as potentially “catastrophic,” not when Yemen continues to slide into a messier civil war, and, finally, not in the midst of a re-election campaign that is topic No. 1 at the White House.

And yet, predictably, as the sun will set tonight and rise tomorrow, Obama’s Republican challenger, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, continues to rip into the president’s foreign policy, describing it as “weak” and “feckless” and adding that if he were president, he would be supplying military equipment to the insurgent forces in Syria. “The world looks to America to lead,” he says, “and we’ve been sitting in the back burner hoping things would become arranged in a way that was attractive to the world.” Romney’s main point, clearly, is that, under Obama, America is not leading the world and, under him, it would be. “Frankly,” he concludes, “what’s happening in Syria is unacceptable.”

Agreed. What’s happening in Syria is unacceptable. So what should the world be doing? What should the U.S. be doing? The two questions are linked, because quite often these days the world does nothing unless and until the U.S. does something—namely, by leading the rest of the world into action. At the moment, the president has decided he does not want to further “militarize” the crisis in Syria. He wants to lead the diplomatic offensive, but go no further. In a way, his reasoning makes little sense, in part because arms are already flowing into the rebel forces and, besides, the Syrian regime is heavily stocked with weapons provided by its Russian sponsor over many years.

Moreover, Syria’s strongman ruler, Basher el-Assad, shows no signs of abiding by the disintegrating UN peace plan or of reaching an accommodation with the rebels. He knows that such an accommodation would lead inevitably to his downfall—and clearly he wants to hold on to his power base in Damascus.

Only if Russia decides to lean heavily on el-Assad and force an accommodation with the rebels will there be a political settlement. That being the case, one of Obama’s top priorities now ought to be sitting down with President Putin and somehow producing an acceptable plan for resolving the Syrian crisis. Nothing else seems to hold any promise of success, and even an Obama-Putin summit may do little to ease the crisis.

Short of a political settlement, Syria seems to be drifting into a brutal civil war that in the near future will openly pit Shia against Sunni, splitting the country along religious lines and spilling over national borders into neighboring Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. Then, whether Obama likes it or not, America will be obliged to enter the fray, dangerous from every possible perspective. If Romney wins in November, he too will be saddled with the same crisis. There is no escape from presidential responsibility.

I’m dreaming, I know, but wouldn’t it be wonderful if Romney, as GOP candidate, would seek opportunities to help the president, and therefore help America—support the idea of an Obama-Putin summit, for example—rather than capitalize on a foreign mess such as Syria to present a mixed signal to the world about American policy. Syria, we know, presents an “unacceptable” reality. Editorials in the Times and Post cry out for the U.S. to do something, but both newspapers and Romney are relatively mute on exactly what. Are we as a nation really so bereft of practical suggestions?

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: Brian Snyder / Reuters

A "Good Enough" Exit from Afghanistan

Marvin Kalb — Thu, 17 May 2012 16:17:00 -0400

We don’t talk about “victory” any longer. In Afghanistan, we now talk about “good enough.”

And what does that mean? It means an exit that is politically acceptable to the American people, especially in an election year.

But, before we go any further, let’s doubleback to Iraq for a moment. Remember Iraq? All American combat troops were withdrawn last December, and security was left in the hands of the Iraqi army and police. Now, according to The New York Times, the multibillion-dollar program designed to train the Iraqi police, the biggest U.S. aid program since the Marshall Plan in post-WWII Europe, may come to a crashing halt in December of this year. The reasons are two-fold: the United States cannot afford it, and the Iraqis don’t want it. Apparently, they have had enough of the United States. With neighboring Iran now pushing its own candidate for the key job of Iraq’s top mullah, and with Syria, another neighbor, now crumbling into an ugly civil war, likely to spill over national borders, Iraq’s Shite leaders have begun to look inward, stressing their sovereignty and rearranging their national policies. They now see wisdom in sharply reducing their dependence on the United States, which is not the way the United States had imagined its post-war relations with Iraq. President George W. Bush thought he was building a true democracy in the Middle East, and President Barack Obama, who never approved of the Iraq War in the first place, just wanted to get out of there.

Now, back to Afghanistan, where recent developments in Iraq have relevance and resonance. During his first presidential campaign, Obama pledged that the United States would “win the war” in Afghanistan. But, over the last few years, as he has grappled with the dangers and complexities of the war, he has changed his mind and his policy. Now he wants out of there, too, but his explanatory rhetoric clearly lacks candor. When talking to American troops, he sounds positive and even optimistic. When he acts, though, he looks like a president hurrying to the nearest door. All combat troops—out by the end of December, 2014. All combat operations—over by December, 2013.

This weekend, NATO leaders will convene in Chicago to announce next steps. France’s newly-elected president, Francois Hollande, says he will withdraw all French forces by the end of this year. The British, in a second-dip recession, may soon come to the same decision. Everyone knows that Obama will reduce U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan to 68,000 by the end of this summer.

The Afghan War has become the longest in American history; and when the Afghans we have trained for their own self-defense turn their guns on us, that is a depressing signal that, like the Iraqis, they don’t want us there. Or, if they do, it is to be strictly on their terms. This year alone, 21 NATO troops have been killed by Afghans, trained and equipped by NATO. That’s 14% of total NATO casualties.

Who is kidding whom? Obama wants out but won’t say so. GOP candidate Romney wants to kill the Taliban until they surrender, which is most unlikely. And, after the experience in Vietnam, no American president wants to be sitting in the Oval Office while the United States loses another war.

Result: “good enough.” If the United States can somehow find an exit strategy that is politically acceptable to the American people, then it will seize it. Ask an American official for a clear definition of American policy in Afghanistan, and you are likely to hear the words “good enough.” And then you fill in the blanks.

Authors

Marvin Kalb

Image Source: Omar Sobhani / Reuters