A personal journey through some of the darkest moments of the cold war and the early days of television news

Marvin Kalb, the award-winning journalist who has written extensively about the world he reported on during his long career, now turns his eye on the young man who became that journalist. Chosen by legendary broadcaster Edward R. Murrow to become one of what came to be known as the Murrow Boys, Kalb in this newest volume of his memoirs takes readers back to his first days as a journalist, and what also were the first days of broadcast news.

Kalb captures the excitement of being present at the creation of a whole new way of bringing news immediately to the public. And what news. Cold War tensions were high between Eisenhower’s America and Khrushchev’s Soviet Union. Kalb is at the center, occupying a unique spot as a student of Russia tasked with explaining Moscow to Washington and the American public. He joins a cast of legendary figures along the way, from Murrow himself to Eric Severeid, Howard K. Smith, Richard Hottelet, Charles Kuralt, and Daniel Schorr among many others. He finds himself assigned as Moscow correspondent of CBS News just as the U2 incident—the downing of a US spy plane over Russian territory—is unfolding.

As readers of his first volume, The Year I Was Peter the Great, will recall, being the right person, in the right place, at the right time found Kalb face to face with Khrushchev. DATELINE MOSCOW sees Kalb once again an eyewitness to history—and a writer and analyst who has helped shape the first draft of that history.

       

Born in Berlin, he fled from Nazi Germany in 1938, spent six years as a student in England, and reached the U.S. as a refugee in 1944. After serving in the Army, including as a member of the American occupation forces in postwar Germany, he completed his education at Johns Hopkins University and embarked on a career in diplomacy. He served 25 years in the State Department and National Security Council where, in the words of Ambassador Winston Lord, “his guiding star was patriotism, the special kind shared by immigrants.”

Seven years after his death, the Brookings Institution, where he spent 32 years as a guest scholar, has published a festschrift — a written compendium of memories — by distinguished figures who knew him well. On November 18, Brookings hosted an event with some of Sonnenfeldt’s closest collaborators to honor his memory.

       

It was totally unintentional.

At an off-the-record gathering of American ambassadors in December 1975, the counselor of the State Department was credited with creating a new and highly controversial policy toward Eastern Europe — a “doctrine,” no less.

Three months later, when it was leaked and dramatically christened the “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine,” all the doors of hell opened in Washington. GOP conservatives instinctively denounced it and its author, Helmut “Hal” Sonnenfeldt. Was the U.S. quietly abandoning its support of the “captive nations” of Eastern Europe, a promise it loudly proclaimed in the 1950s? A flustered President Gerald Ford demanded an explanation; he knew nothing about this new “doctrine.” An embarrassed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one of Sonnenfeldt’s closest friends and associates, was furious, finally coming up with some loosely-worded mumbo jumbo suggesting that Sonnenfeldt did not quite mean what he was quoted as saying. Quite the opposite. “What he meant to say,” Kissinger later explained, “is that if you let things develop, they will eventually secede,” meaning the Eastern European satellites would “eventually” break away from Moscow’s control and again become independent nations. And this would happen without war.

What Sonnenfeldt had casually conveyed to the ambassadors, not in the form of a written speech but as helpful reflections on policy, was his understanding of a vision he and Kissinger shared about the future political evolution of Russia’s Eastern European satellites. “It must be our policy,” Sonnenfeldt reportedly said, “to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one.” And what, you might have (justifiably) asked, does that mean?

Years later, Sonnenfeldt often laughed when he was asked to explain his use of such words as “evolution” and “organic.” “Some graduate student is going to have a lot of fun with it,” he joked. At the time, he knew he was delving into sensitive diplomatic terrain, but like his friend the secretary of state, Sonnenfeldt enjoyed supreme self-confidence, loving the limelight and showing off his genuine brilliance. He might have deliberately used scholarly words and language to leave everyone mighty impressed, but not necessarily better informed, about policy. He certainly was not proclaiming a new “doctrine.” Better than anyone, he knew that if a new “doctrine” were to be proclaimed, it would not have been Sonnenfeldt who did the proclaiming — it would have been Kissinger.

When Washington responded in grumbling confusion about the newly leaked “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine,” “Kissinger’s Kissinger” — as Sonnenfeldt was often described — had to explain that “we do not accept” the Eastern Europeans as a “sealed-off, exclusive presence for anyone,” meaning in this case the Soviet Union. An instinctive hardliner, Sonnenfeldt strongly believed that the Eastern Europeans would “eventually” become democratic and independent — and the sooner the better. But he sidestepped the option of war to achieve that objective.

A more meaningful explanation of American policy toward Eastern Europe was actually articulated a few months earlier, on August 1, 1975, when 35 nations from East and West signed the Helsinki Accords, promising two mutually contradictory goals: first, to assuage Moscow’s chronic fears, non-intervention in the internal affairs of all nations; and second, to satisfy the Sonnenfeldts of the West, demonstrable democratic reform in all of them, specifically those under Soviet domination. Sonnenfeldt was one of the principal actors driving the Helsinki Accords to completion. It was a highlight of his career.

Even so, Sonnenfeldt was often hounded by a handful of congressional conservatives who simply did not trust him. His name, attached to this fictitious “doctrine,” only deepened their suspicions that he was reaching too far, pushing too hard. They remembered that in 1973, when Sonnenfeldt’s friend, George Shultz, was being promoted from budget director to secretary of the treasury, he wanted to appoint Sonnenfeldt to be his deputy secretary — but they killed the appointment, claiming he had leaked top-secret information to the press. In part, armed with this excuse, the FBI tapped Sonnenfeldt’s home phone, a sure sign of official distrust, but found nothing to confirm their suspicions. Interestingly, neither the tap nor that chronic distrust blocked Sonnenfeldt from being named to a top White House position, in which he served honorably for years. He was Kissinger’s principal authority on East-West relations, focusing on the Soviet Union, a rather significant job in the midst of the Cold War. In time, he was widely recognized as a key figure in helping to conceive and negotiate historic nuclear arms control agreements between the two superpowers, which became the basis for the overall policy of détente.

In early 1972, during the Vietnam War, détente was put to one of its most severe tests: Could President Nixon bomb North Vietnam while also arranging a summit with the Russians? Nixon considered canceling the summit so he could intensify the bombing, so committed was he to ending the Vietnam War on his terms. In White House deliberations, Sonnenfeldt argued he could have both — the summit and the bombing — and he proved to be right. The Russians ultimately blinked. For them, it was more important to improve relations with the United States than to help Hanoi.

Sonnenfeldt had apparently developed a good feel for how Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev would react to American actions, rhetoric, and diplomacy. Sometimes the issue was war or peace; at other times it was real estate.

Yes, real estate.

For example, in 1972, Sonnenfeldt accompanied Kissinger on a boar-hunting expedition with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. He did well. “With those telescopic sights on the Russian guns,” Sonnenfeldt recalled, “it was almost impossible to miss.” It remains a super-secret at the State Department how many boars Sonnenfeldt actually killed, but it is a known fact that Brezhnev, though he tried time and again, failed to kill a single boar. Embarrassed, the aging Soviet leader could find solace only in boasting about his modern hunting lodge, which was equipped with a movie theater and a huge garage for his many luxurious cars. How much would this hunting lodge cost in America?, he wanted to know, pride and curiosity consuming him. Kissinger guessed, “about $400,000.” That was the wrong guess. Brezhnev, for an instant, looked decidedly disappointed, at which point Sonnenfeldt broke in. “No, much more than that,” he exclaimed with confidence, though in fact he had no genuine familiarity with real estate prices in the U.S. “At least $2 million,” he pronounced.

What was important at that moment was that Brezhnev, ill and irritable, began to smile, and the world was spared a dip of unknown seriousness in U.S.-Soviet relations. With what might have been described as a little white lie, or exaggeration, Sonnenfeldt the diplomat had saved the day.

       

On Wednesday, Oct. 17, Kalb debuted his book at Brookings and was joined by veteran journalist Dan Rather for a discussion about its main themes. The two journalists explored how Trump has delegitimized the American press and why we should fear for the future of American democracy.

After the session, speakers took questions from the audience.

       

Shortly after assuming office in January 2017, President Donald Trump accused the press of being an “enemy of the American people.” Attacks on the media had been a hallmark of Trump’s presidential campaign, but this charge marked a dramatic turning point: language like this ventured into dangerous territory. Twentieth-century dictators—notably, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao—had all denounced their critics, especially the press, as “enemies of the people.” Their goal was to delegitimize the work of the press as “fake news” and create confusion in the public mind about what’s real and what isn’t; what can be trusted and what can’t be.

That, it seems, is also Trump’s goal. In Enemy of the People, Marvin Kalb, an award-winning American journalist with more than six decades of experience both as a journalist and media observer, writes with passion about why we should fear for the future of American democracy because of the unrelenting attacks by the Trump administration on the press.

As his new book shows, the press has been a bulwark in the defense of democracy. Kalb writes about Edward R. Murrow’s courageous reporting on Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “red scare” theatrics in the early 1950s, which led to McCarthy’s demise. He reminds us of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s reporting in the early 1970s that led to President Richard Nixon’s resignation.

Today, because of revolutionary changes in journalism, no Murrow is ready at the battlements. Journalism has been severely weakened. Yet, without a virile, strong press, democracy is in peril.

Kalb’s book is a frightening indictment of President Trump’s efforts to delegitimize the American press—and put the future of our democracy in question.

       

Marvin Kalb, a nonresident senior fellow and veteran journalist, discusses his new book “Enemy of the People: Trump’s War on the Press, the New McCarthyism, and the Threat to American Democracy,” and why President Trump’s attacks on the media are a cause for concern.   

Also in this episode, David Wessel reflects on the government’s response to the financial crises 10 years ago and introduces work the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy is doing around the anniversary. 

Related content: 

Enemy of the People

Trump is winning!

Enemy of the People: Marvin Kalb addresses President Trump’s attacks on the press and judiciary

Day 1: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis

Day 2: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis

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Thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo with assistance from Mark Hoelscher, and to producers Brennan Hoban and Chris McKenna. Additional support comes from Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, Camilo Ramirez, and Emily Horne.

Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on Apple Podcasts, send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

The Brookings Cafeteria is a part of the Brookings Podcast Network.

       

Shortly after assuming the awesome powers of the presidency, Donald J. Trump declared war on the American press. With a torrent of insulting tweets, he has accused reporters of being the “enemy of the American people,” using a phrase familiar to 20^th century dictators but unprecedented in a democracy. Reporters are also, in his judgment, “very unpatriotic,” “disgusting and dishonest people,” who indulge in “fake news.” How many so indulge, you ask? Ninety-one percent, he responds. Only 9 percent can be trusted, and they all work for FOX News.

Trump’s goal, transparent as it is dangerous, is to demean, humiliate, and undermine the credibility of the mainstream press, one of the pillars of American democracy. To an alarming extent, he appears to have succeeded, especially among members of the Republican Party, which currently controls the levers of power in the U.S. government.

The impact could be catastrophic, producing a constitutional crisis more profound than the Watergate scandal.

For example, if the special counsel, Robert Mueller III, produces a formal charge of “obstruction of justice,” or, possibly, proof of “collusion,” “conspiracy,” or “cooperation” with the Russians during the 2016 presidential campaign; or if a newspaper points unmistakably to Trump being engaged in illegal money laundering; or if a judge concludes Trump has indeed violated the emoluments clause of the U.S. Constitution (unlikely though that may be), Trump has now positioned himself, with a wave of the hand, to dismiss any and all of this as nothing more than “fake news” disseminated by “failing” and “corrupt” news organizations—none of it, in any case, to be taken seriously, all of it, the work of the “Trump Derangement Syndrome.”

Because Trump has bewitched the Republican Party, magically converting it into his own plaything, there is a strong likelihood that a substantial majority of Republicans, in and out of Congress, will accept his argument, and do nothing, leaving Trump able to escape the consequences of his many failings, even though the evidence would likely point to his complicity and guilt. And, in this context, where then is the rule of law, the idea that no man stands above the law, another pillar of American democracy?

Of course, the Democrats would object powerfully, but, short of votes on Capitol Hill, they would be unable to launch impeachment hearings, or effect policy. The 91 percent of the media that Trump described as “fake news” would continue to produce superb reporting on one Trump malfeasance or another, but these reports would have little effect. Cable news commentators would, on FOX, rally to the president’s defense, while those on MSNBC would continue to eviscerate him, just as they have been doing since his inauguration. But, magically, Trump would likely bob and weave and somehow duck the noose of political punishment.

The press has always been central to the president’s strategy: he’s mesmerized by it but at the same time repelled by it.

Once upon a time, 30 or 40 years ago, CBS’s Walter Cronkite was able to close his evening newscast with the tag line “…And that’s the way it is,” and most of his viewers would believe him. He was “the most trusted man” in America. Today there is no Walter Cronkite. Over the years, for many reasons, the general public has begun to distrust much of what they see, hear, and read on the news. According to a recent Gallup poll, only 32 percent of Americans now have a “great or fair” amount of trust in the press. Twenty years ago, it was 55 percent. Seventy-three percent believe that, thanks to the wild world of social media, there is now more inaccurate information floating around than ever before. So, what can be trusted? Trump skillfully plays into this netherworld of bewilderment and confusion.

Though 85 percent of Americans still believe “freedom of the press is essential to American democracy,” significant percentages now also believe the government should have the right to crack down on the press in ways decidedly antithetical to the 1^st Amendment. For example, 48 percent of Republicans agree with Trump that the press is, in fact, “the enemy of the American people,” according to a recent Ipsos poll. (Remarkably, 12 percent of Democrats and 23 percent of Independents also agree.) Forty-three percent of Republicans now think the president should have the power even to shut down news organizations that, in his judgment, have “engaged in bad behavior.” In Trumpese, that means covering him with a critical, skeptical eye, the proper role for a journalist.

The short-term consequences of Trump’s apparently successful management of the media are dangerous; the long-term consequences are simply frightening.

One example of the short-term danger: covering a Trump rally these days opens reporters, now more than ever, to jeers, middle finger insults, and threats of violence. Many have to be protected by their own ”security guards.” CNN’s Jim Acosta, who covers the White House, said he was “very worried” by the “hostility whipped up by Trump.” MSNBC’s Katy Tur told her viewers that she has been threatened with “rape”—and worse. A reader warned Times columnist Bret Stephens, “once we start shooting you fu—ers, you aren’t going to pop off like you do now.”

Long term: not just in the United States, but in many other countries, too, the Trump message of suspicion and hostility toward the press has spread—and with it, a global turning away from democracy and toward authoritarianism. Trump did not create this rightwing movement, but he is riding its crest; and because of the power of his office, he is driving it to new heights of acceptability.

Democrats may object to this behavior, but their minority status in Congress (and best hope in 2018 to capture only one chamber) limits their ability to respond effectively. Republicans, dependent on the voters who Trump has hypnotized with his anti-media rhetoric will not dare challenge the head of their party on this point, for fear of hurting their own political fortunes.

By his fiery anti-press rhetoric, President Trump has undermined American democracy, opening the door to a constitutional crisis.

       

Once they were heard from, in the early 1990s, and their voices projected a clear sense of national unity and power.

Led by Republican President George H. W. Bush, the United States pulled off one of the great diplomatic coups in recent history—the peaceful reunification of Germany, with Moscow’s cooperation, and then crushed an Iraqi attempt to subjugate Kuwait by sending 500,000 troops to the Middle East. No one at the time questioned America’s fierce determination. By word and action, Bush and his senior advisers spoke the language of national pride and resolve.

Where are they now? Why their silence?

At another moment of international doubt and disruption, in which Russia plays a central role, and President Donald Trump plays a baffling role, we hear little to nothing from both Bush 41 and George W. Bush and their senior aides.

They are all Republicans.

Are they proud of their president, also a Republican? Or offended by him and his policy? If so, why not speak out? Why their silence?

These are all tough and experienced people, all actors on the world stage. None is a political novice. Bush 41 was surrounded by a very able cast of characters: James Baker as Secretary of State, Dick Cheney as Secretary of Defense, Brent Scowcroft as National Security Adviser, Colin Powell as Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Robert Gates as Deputy Director of the CIA, General Norman Schwartzkopf as commander of U.S. forces in the Mideast. World War II veteran Robert Dole led Republicans on Capitol Hill. Bush 43 could rely on Cheney as Vice-President, Powell as Secretary of State, Gates as Secretary of Defense, Condoleezza Rice as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.

We hear an occasional whimper of disagreement with Trump’s policy toward Vladimir Putin’s Russia from Republican congressional leaders, all apparently fearful of upsetting the president’s vaunted “base.”

But where are the Bushes? Powell? Gates? Rice? Rumsfeld? Cheney? Scowcroft? They are not running for office. They are “appalled,” we’re told behind a cupped hand, by Trump’s mad Russia antics, and yet they remain silent, as if in a church of party purity.

Joe Scarborough of “Morning Joe” fame, once a Republican congressman from Florida, asks in amazement about the 71 percent of Republicans, who continue to support the president’s odd relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

He concludes “the Republican Party […] no longer deserves to survive.”

Columnist Michael Gerson wonders whether the president is “wittingly advancing the interests of a hostile power” in managing America’s dealings with Russia.

He asks: What is our current policy?

In the past, a form of sensible internationalism has usually prevailed in GOP policy. In 1952, most Republicans rebelled against isolationism and elected Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1980, Gerson continues, many Republicans rejected Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik and embraced Ronald Reagan’s vision of America as the “city on a hill,” the natural home of freedom and democracy.

And now?

Trump bewilders all Republicans; yet an overwhelming percent still supports him and his Russia policy, even if they do not really understand it. The desire of congressional Republicans to retain control of the House and Senate appears to be more important to them than the national interest. While a deplorable position, it is still politically understandable. They want to be re-elected, and they love the perks of power.

Other Republicans might enjoy the weirdness of a Trump presidency, seeing it as another episode of NBC’s “The Apprentice” show, and appreciating the fruits of continued economic growth.

But where are the voices of the traditional Republican foreign policy establishment?

Gates? Rice? Powell? The others?

Does their silence suggest that they are now more loyal to Trump and the GOP than to the national interests they so valiantly and successfully defended while in office?

Why do they remain silent?

They know better than many others that the nation is currently in desperate need of sensible guidance. More silence now only means more acquiescence to a faulty and dangerous policy.

If they were to break their silence now, they might encourage their timid congressional colleagues to speak up. Now is the time for honest talk.

If not now, when?

       

In honor of the United Nations World Press Freedom Day on May 3, former and current journalists in the Brookings community weighed in on the importance of a free press, threats facing journalists in the U.S. and abroad, and what the rise of “fake news” means for the future of journalism.

       

Nonresident Senior Fellow Marvin Kalb discusses his experience as a diplomatic attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in his recent book, “The Year I Was Peter the Great.”

Also in this episode, David Wessel shares lessons learned from a recent event with former Fed Chairs Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. Finally, Alan Krueger discusses his new paper with Eric Posner on three reforms for protecting low-income workers from monopsony and collusion.

Related content:

The Year I Was Peter the Great

Janet Yellen: 10 quotes on her past and the economy

A Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion

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Thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo with assistance from Mark Hoelscher, and to producers Brennan Hoban and Chris McKenna. Additional support comes from Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, Rebecca Viser, our intern Steven Lee, Camilo Ramirez, and David Nassar.

Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on Apple Podcasts, send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

The Brookings Cafeteria is a part of the Brookings Podcast Network.