Brookings: Experts - Robert Kagan

American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

Tue, 14 May 2013 09:30:00 -0400

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May 14, 2013
9:30 AM - 11:00 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

For the past decade, a debate has raged about the future of American power and foreign policy engagement. In his new book, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (Knopf Doubleday Publishing, 2013), Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Vali Nasr questions America’s choice to lessen its foreign policy engagement around the world. Nasr argues that after taking office in 2009, the Obama administration let fears of terrorism and political backlash confine its policies to that of the previous administration, instead of seizing the opportunity to fundamentally reshape American foreign policy over the past four years. Meanwhile, China and Russia – rivals to American influence globally – were quietly expanding their influence in places where the U.S. has long held sway. Nasr argues that the Obama administration’s foreign policy decision making could have potentially dangerous outcomes, and, what’s more, sells short America’s power and role in the world.

On May 14, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Vali Nasr for a discussion on the state of U.S. power globally and whether American foreign policy under the Obama administration is in retreat. Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan joined the discussion, which was moderated by Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy.

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American Foreign Policy in Retreat? A Discussion with Vali Nasr

U.S. Needs to Show Egypt Some Tough Love

Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne — Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry need to pay attention to Egypt — now. The most populous Arab country, poster child of the Arab Spring, faces a looming economic crisis and a widespread breakdown in law and order, including increasingly prevalent crime and rape. Either will cripple Egypt’s faltering effort to become a stable democracy.

The Obama administration has treated Egypt primarily as an economic problem and has urged Cairo to move quickly to satisfy International Monetary Fund (IMF) demands to qualify for financing. But there is no separating Egypt’s economic crisis from its political crisis — or from the failures of its current government. Egypt’s economy is struggling, and disorder is rampant primarily because the country’s leaders the past two years — first the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, now President Mohamed Morsi — have failed to build an inclusive political process. Until they do, no amount of IMF funding will make a difference.

Although Morsi won a narrow victory last summer, he has yet to learn what it means to lead in a democratic society. His Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt’s strongest political force, but it does not command a majority of public support. It cannot simply force its will on the nation, especially one still aroused by the spirit of revolution. Morsi can hardly take on urgent tasks, such as the cutting of wasteful fuel subsidies and the reformation of a corrupt interior ministry and police force, when much of the country is against him and ready to take to the streets at the least provocation.

Under Morsi’s rule, Egyptian society has become polarized between Islamists and non-Islamists. Enraging the political opposition late last year, he railroaded through a new constitution that contains inadequate protections for the rights of women and non-Muslims and leaves open the possibility of Islamic clerical oversight of legislation. Ignoring protests about the flawed process by which the constitution was drafted and passed, Morsi is moving ahead to legislative elections based on an electoral law to which the opposition objects. Meanwhile, his government has cracked down on journalists, brought spurious charges against opposition leaders and limited the right to public protests. It is considering legislation that would constrain the activities of non-governmental organizations even more than Hosni Mubarak did.

The increasingly desperate secular opposition parties have formed a “National Salvation Front,” but under the surface they are divided between those who want to force Morsi to compromise and those who want to force him from power. Even though most favor the economic reforms necessary to get an IMF loan, many feel they must mobilize street protests against any Morsi action.

The result is that, with Egypt at the edge of bankruptcy — it has enough reserves to pay for only three more months of food and fuel imports — the government and the opposition are locked in a game of chicken. The economy is sinking, political conflict is rising and the security situation is deteriorating.

Washington’s response to this crisis has largely been business as usual. Just as the United States once clung to Mubarak, the Obama administration has hewed closely to Morsi, offering a visit to Washington and continuing to deliver the annual $1.3 billion in military assistance — including a recent shipment of F-16 aircraft. The administration’s response to Morsi’s majoritarian bullying has been muted. Egypt’s opposition and nonpartisan human rights groups believe, understandably, that Washington has resumed ignoring undemocratic practices so long as the Egyptian government protects U.S. strategic interests. Outside of opening new contacts with the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, there has been no fundamental reassessment of U.S. policy toward Egypt since Mubarak’s removal in 2011. Our military and economic aid packages remain the same — except that nearly all democracy and civil-society assistance has been cut off.

It’s time for a new approach. Both the administration and Congress need to fully review military and economic assistance to Egypt. What does the Egyptian army need to bring security to the Sinai? Probably not F-16s. What conditions should Congress place on aid? Previous packages have appropriately been conditioned on progress toward democracy, but the administration has insisted on a national security waiver and has exercised it to provide the aid regardless of Egypt’s behavior. Perhaps Congress should not permit such a waiver in the next aid bill.

As for Morsi’s planned trip to Washington, it would be better to hold that invitation until he demonstrates a sincere commitment to working with all of Egyptian society and allowing genuine freedom to all citizens. That means supporting a law that meets international standards on regulating civil society, allowing watchdog organizations to operate freely and finally resolving the controversial status of foreign and foreign-funded NGOs. It means ending the persecution of journalists and opposition figures, committing to reform the police and hold them accountable and building a consensus on such critical matters as the constitution and electoral law.

The United States made a strategic error for years by coddling Mubarak, and his refusal to carry out reforms produced the revolution of Tahrir Square. We repeat the error by coddling Morsi at this critical moment. The United States needs to use all its options — military aid, economic aid and U.S. influence with the IMF and other international lenders — to persuade Morsi to compromise with secular politicians and civil-society leaders on political and human rights issues to rebuild security and get the economy on track.

Authors

Robert Kagan
Michele Dunne

Publication: Washington Post

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

State of the World: Obama's Biggest Foreign Policy Challenges

Robert Kagan — Mon, 11 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In a wide-ranging interview with U.S.News & World Report, Robert Kagan discusses the possible direction of U.S. foreign policy during the second Obama administration, and warns that the President’s agenda will be set by the other actors in the international system. Read an excerpt below.

U.S.News & World Report: What is the most imminent challenge of Obama's second term?

Robert Kagan: Syria is probably the thing that's going to be front and center. He obviously is trying to avoid any deeper involvement, but I think it's going to be very difficult to do so as things get worse in Syria and the price of not doing anything gets higher. Coming close on the heels of that is going to be Iran developing a [nuclear] capability.

U.S.News & World Report: How urgent is the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions?

Kagan: It's very urgent. I think the administration understands that they need to find some answer either diplomatically or otherwise. Secretary [of State John] Kerry said the clock is ticking, and I think that means it's ticking this year.

U.S.News & World Report: Should there be direct contact with the Iranian government?

Kagan: They should make clear that Iranians need to take seriously that the United States is willing to have a diplomatic settlement of this problem. If not, [Iran] ought to take very seriously the statements that the president and secretary of state have made about preventing them from having a nuclear weapon.

U.S.News & World Report: What changes should be made in global economic policy?

Kagan: One major goal should be to begin negotiating a free trade agreement with Europe, to broaden the free trade agreements in Latin America in the Western Hemisphere, and move ahead with the trans-Pacific partnership, which is free trade agreements in Asia.

U.S.News & World Report: How has the fiscal crisis affected the American reputation abroad?

Kagan: I do think that an inability to get some control of our fiscal difficulties will cause people around the world to worry whether that will limit our ability to act in the international system.

Read the full interview »

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: U.S.News & World Report

Image Source: © Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

Rand Paul’s Conventional Stance on Foreign Policy

Robert Kagan — Thu, 07 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

People who care about U.S. foreign policy should be grateful for Rand Paul. From his new perch on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in what may be a sign of a future run for the White House, he wants to spark a national discussion about the United States’ role in the world and to challenge what he regards as a broad bipartisan consensus that has gone unchallenged for too long.

That’s all to the good. The upholders of the consensus are too comfortable with their assumptions; indeed, it is not always clear they know what their assumptions are. Americans need to think about what we are doing and why — not just why we are in Afghanistan but also why we are anywhere. What are we trying to do in the world? Paul (R-Ky.) is the spokesman for Americans unhappy with the depth and breadth of U.S. international involvement. It is useful to know what troubles those voters about current policies and what they would propose instead.

Yet if Paul’s speech Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation is any indication, they don’t quite know. Despite presenting himself as a brave dissenter from the reigning orthodoxy, Paul and his attempt at an alternative sound remarkably conventional.

With Polonius-like wisdom, he calls for a strategy that “balances but does not appease,” that is “robust but also restrained.” He does not want America to be “everywhere all the time” or “nowhere any of the time” but thinks that “maybe, we could be somewhere, some of the time.”

He acknowledges that “there are times, such as existed in Afghanistan with the bin Laden terrorist camps, that do require intervention.” But he doesn’t want to put “boots on the ground and weapons in the hands of freedom fighters everywhere.”

Fair enough, but since U.S. foreign policy occurs precisely in the wide space between doing nothing anywhere and doing everything everywhere, these recommendations are not very helpful. How do we determine where and when to act, and in response to what dangers?

Here, too, Paul sounds conventional. He calls himself a “realist,” but unlike many realists, he sees the overriding threat to America as “radical Islam,” which he describes as a “relentless force” of “unlimited zeal,” “supported by radicalized nations such as Iran” and with which the United States is indeed at “war” and will be for a long time. Unlike critics during the Cold War, who argued that anti-communist “paranoia” produced a self-destructive foreign policy, Paul embraces the dominant “paranoia” of the post-9/11 era. He may have a realist’s contempt for the supposed ignorance of the average American, who, he claims, is “more concerned with who is winning ‘Dancing With the Stars.’ ” But he nevertheless shares the average American’s view that radical Islam is today what Soviet Communism was during the Cold War — “an ideology with worldwide reach” that must, like communism, be met by “counterforce at a series of constantly shifting worldwide points.”

Paul believes he is making a big point when he argues that “counterforce” does not “necessarily” mean “large-scale land wars with hundreds of thousands of troops,” nor does it “always mean military action at all.” He is opposed to “limitless land wars in multiple theaters” and prefers that “we would target our enemy; strike with lethal force.” Yet in saying this, he is describing U.S. foreign policy as it has been conducted: Sometimes, though rarely, the United States has dispatched hundreds of thousands of troops; far more frequently, it has not responded militarily at all. When it has, it has tried to target the enemy and strike with lethal force. The one novel suggestion Paul makes is that “when we must intervene with force, we should attempt to intervene in cooperation with the host government.”

Even on Iran, where Paul claims to feel that all dissent is muzzled, he is not much of a dissenter. He insists that containing Iran should not be “preemptively” ruled out, but he does not argue that containment is the right policy, even though many realists do. Instead, he repeats the mantra that “all options are on the table.”

A true dissenter would have the temerity to declare that a nuclear Iran, although unfortunate, is nevertheless tolerable and that the military option ought not to be on the table.

Of course, we are all supposed to know what Paul wants. He wants less — less American involvement around the world, “less soldiers stationed overseas and less bases,” less defense spending, less foreign aid and, above all, less war. He wants a foreign policy that is more restrained, more “reluctant,” more balanced.

The problem is, his speech did not offer a worldview or strategy that necessarily gets us there. What overseas commitments ought to be jettisoned? What dangers must we tolerate? If he wants to pull U.S. forces out of Japan, Korea, Germany, Italy and Turkey, he should say so. Let’s have that debate. But if even Paul is unwilling to rule out military action against Iran, how can we safely equip ourselves with less than might be required to carry out such a mission?

Paul insists that his foreign policy is nothing more than a continuation of the policies of Ronald Reagan. That is a problem, too. Reagan ordered the largest peacetime military buildup in U.S. history, deployed a new generation of nuclear missiles in Europe, tried to build his “Star Wars” missile-defense program and refused to trade it for an agreement to rid the world of nuclear weapons. He toppled dictatorships in the Philippines, Haiti, South Korea and Chile; provided hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to rebels (including radical Islamists) seeking to overthrow regimes in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia; founded the National Endowment for Democracy; and increased foreign assistance spending to the highest levels since the Truman administration. He invaded Grenada, sent troops to Lebanon and bombed Libya. Yet Paul describes Reagan’s foreign policies as the model of the “restraint” he favors.

So what are we to make of all this? Is this the extent of Paul’s dissent from the dominant view he claims to want to challenge? Perhaps we will learn more as this discussion unfolds. Perhaps some of Paul’s Senate colleagues will take up his challenge, draw him out, lay out their own approaches and engage in the public debate that he has begun. For the senator is surely right: This is the debate we need to have.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Gary Cameron / Reuters

A "Plastic Juncture" in World Affairs

Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan — Mon, 21 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As President Barack Obama enters his second term, the state of the world is unsettled. The leading powers are beset with economic crises or are in various states of political transition or gridlock. The Middle East is undergoing political upheaval. Tensions are rising in Asia. The world’s institutions — whether the United Nations, the Group of 20 or the European Union — are weakened and dysfunctional. The liberal world order established after World War II is fraying at the edges.

This time of uncertainty and instability is a moment of opportunity for Obama. When the United States entered World War I, the philosopher John Dewey observed that the world was at a “plastic juncture.” Many progressives believed the unsettled world of their day offered the United States a chance to remold the international system into something better. Americans walked away from that challenge and would embrace it only after a second catastrophic breakdown of world order. Today, we are at another plastic juncture and the president has a unique opportunity to strengthen and extend the liberal world order from which Americans and so many others around the world have benefited.

There is not a lot to show for Obama’s first four years. In fairness, the economic crisis that he inherited made steady concentration on foreign policy more challenging. His predecessor badly bungled the two wars Obama inherited in the Greater Middle East, at great cost in lives and treasure and to America’s reputation. Obama began to restore that reputation, raising America’s profile and deepening its engagement in East Asia.

But most of the major challenges are much as Obama found them when he took office — or worse: from the stalled Middle East peace process and turmoil in the Arab world to Iran’s continuing march toward a nuclear weapons capability to China’s increasing assertiveness. The president’s recent preoccupation with re-election has left much of the world wondering, where is the United States?

For all the talk of American decline, Obama is actually well-positioned to assert global leadership. If he can strike the necessary compromise with the U.S. Congress to address America’s fiscal crisis, the United States could well emerge as one of the world’s most successful and dynamic economies. America enjoys unique advantages: a natural gas revolution that promises soon to make it a net exporter of energy, a superior university system, and an open and innovative economy. The United States remains the only world power with global reach, uniquely capable of organizing concerted international action and serving as a source of security and stability to nations facing threatening neighbors.

How then to take advantage of this plastic moment?

In the security realm, Obama’s primary “big bet” must be to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. The collapse of the nonproliferation regime that would follow Iran’s successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would strike a devastating blow to the international security order. Conversely, if Obama can succeed in achieving meaningful curbs on Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations, he will do much to strengthen nonproliferation as a fundamental pillar of the new liberal global order.

In East Asia, the president’s primary big bet should be on promoting a regional order that encourages China’s new leadership to take a peaceful and productive direction, away from greater reliance on military power in favor of continued economic and political development at home and increasing integration abroad. This will also require deepening America’s Asian alliances and playing a major role in supporting regional cooperation. With India, the world’s largest democracy and the other major rising power in Asia, the next four years will be critical in building a partnership that can serve as another pillar of a new liberal order.

Obama needs to do more to strengthen the liberal economic order. Concluding free-trade agreements with the Asia-Pacific region and Europe would boost U.S. exports and global economic recovery while promoting a broader consensus on the necessary standards to promote free trade and investment. Encouraging the export of American natural gas to key allies and partners in Europe and Asia will help reduce their dependence on Russia and Iran. Leveraging America’s hydrocarbon bonanza to encourage more effective efforts to counter climate change will help promote a greener global order.

Strengthening the liberal political order will require increased efforts to enlist the support of emerging democracies. Nations like Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Mexico have become increasingly influential economically. But they are struggling to find their identity as democratic powers on the international stage. Some are drifting toward a worldview that actually undermines the liberal nature of the global order. At the same time, powerful autocracies like Russia have staked out positions that are antithetical to liberal values — on Syria, for instance. They need to understand that the democratic international community is ready to move on without them.

With revolutions in the Arab world and change afoot in Myanmar, it is time to place the United States again at the vanguard of the global democracy movement. This is not only because democracy is consonant with American values. Across the globe, the United States has strategic, political and economic interests in the spread of stable, liberal democracies. Although democracies in transition can be fractious and unstable, in the end they are more reliable supporters of the liberal world order that Americans seek.

Obama should do more to support the difficult struggle for democracy in the Arab world, including holding the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government to democratic standards and more actively leading the effort to bring about a peaceful democratic outcome in Syria. America’s relationship with Russia should be shaped not only by arms agreements but also by respect for the desires and aspirations of the Russian people. The president should work to strengthen those forces in Russian society that favor economic and political modernization.

Finally, the United States needs a global strategy. It cannot focus on one critical region to the detriment of others. While Obama was right to increase American attention to the vital Asia-Pacific region, there is no safe alternative to continuing to play the key security role in the Middle East and Europe. In the Middle East, many nations look to the United States for protection and assistance. But Europe too deserves continued American attention. Everything the United States wants to accomplish in the world can be better accomplished with the help and cooperation of our European allies.

At the end of World War II, the United States led the way in shaping an international order that, for all its flaws, served the American people, and much of the world, remarkably well. With sustained attention, personal engagement, and a clear vision of a multilateral global order that reflects American liberal values and progressive ideals, President Obama now has the opportunity once again to shape world affairs to the benefit of the United States and mankind.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

A Plastic Moment to Mold a Liberal Global Order

Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

In the next four years, President Obama has a choice about whether to make democracy building and a liberal world order key tenets of his foreign policy plan. Martin Indyk and Robert Kagan wrote this memorandum to the President as part of the Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

Will America turn inward and away from an increasingly unstable world?
How can American take advantage of this plastic moment to mold the emerging global order to best serve the United States and humankind?
Will America launch a new effort to strengthen and extend the liberal world order?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

Editor's Note: An adapted version of this Big Bets and Black Swans memo was published in the New York Times on January 21, 2013.

TO: President Obama

FROM: Martin S. Indyk and Robert Kagan

As you enter your second term, the state of the world is remarkably unsettled. The leading powers are beset with economic crises or are in various states of political transition or gridlock. The Middle East is in a state of political upheaval. Tensions are rising in East Asia. The world’s institutions, whether the United Nations, the G-20, or the European Union, are weakened and dysfunctional, and seem to be pulling apart in the absence of concerted leadership. The liberal world order established after the Second World War — characterized by a free, open international economy, the spread of liberal democracy, and the deepening of liberal, peaceful norms of international behavior — is fraying at the edges.

It is a time of uncertainty and instability for the world, and for the United States; but it is also a moment of opportunity. Almost a century ago, when the United States entered the First World War, the philosopher John Dewey observed that the world was at a “plastic juncture.” He and many other progressives believed that the unsettled world of their day offered the United States and the other democratic powers a chance to remold the international system into something better. Americans walked away from that challenge and would embrace it only after a second catastrophic breakdown of world order. Today, we are at another “plastic juncture.” Will America turn inward and away from an increasingly messy world? Or will we launch a new effort to strengthen and extend, both geographically and temporally, the liberal world order from which Americans and so many others around the world have benefited?

The answer depends very much on how you choose to make use of your next four years in office. Unfortunately, there is not a lot to show for your first four years. In many respects, this is understandable. The economic crisis that you inherited made steady concentration on foreign policy more challenging. The two wars you inherited in the Greater Middle East had been bungled by your predecessor and cost the United States dearly, both materially and in terms of reputation. You began to restore that reputation through your own global appeal and the efforts of your Secretary of State.

You have done especially well in raising America’s profile and deepening our engagement in East Asia. However, so far it is hard to list many durable accomplishments. Most of the major challenges are much as you found them when you took office, or worse: from the stalled Middle East peace process and turmoil in the Arab world to Iran’s continuing march toward a nuclear weapons capability to China’s increasing assertiveness in East Asia. Your understandable preoccupation with reelection has left much of the world wondering: Where is the United States?

For all the talk of American decline from certain quarters, the United States is actually well-positioned for a new era of global leadership. If you can strike the difficult but necessary compromise with Congress that begins to address America’s fiscal crisis, the United States could well emerge as among the world’s most successful and dynamic economies. America enjoys unique advantages in the international economic system: a natural gas revolution that promises soon to make it a net-exporter of energy, a superior university education system and an open and innovative economy that continues to attract the world’s best and most creative young minds. On the international stage, the United States remains the only world power with global reach, uniquely capable of organizing concerted international action and serving as a source of security and stability to nations and peoples facing threatening neighbors.

Recommendations:

How then to take advantage of this plastic moment to mold the changing global order to best serve the United States and humankind? We believe that in the next four years you will have a unique opportunity to shape a multilateral global order that will continue to reflect American liberal values and progressive ideals. This will require your sustained attention, personal engagement, and direction of the national security agencies of the U.S. government. The reward could be a transformational and lasting impact on the international system, which will redound to the benefit of future generations.

In the security realm, your primary “big bet” must be to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. It is hard to imagine a bigger blow to the international security order than the collapse of the nonproliferation regime that would follow Iran’s successful acquisition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, if you can succeed in achieving meaningful curbs on Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations and reinforce this by negotiating another nuclear arms reduction agreement with Moscow, you will do much to strengthen non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament as a fundamental pillar of the new liberal global order.

In East Asia, your primary big bet should be on promoting a regional order that encourages China to develop in a peaceful and productive direction. You have already formulated a credible strategy; now you will need to encourage China’s new leadership away from greater reliance on military power in favor of continued economic and political development at home and increasing economic and political integration abroad. This will mean continuing to deepen America’s Asian alliances, especially with the new leaderships in Tokyo and Seoul; building new partnerships with the nations of the region; and playing a major role in supporting regional cooperation. You should ensure that the rebalancing effort in East Asia goes beyond the military to include all aspects of American power. With India, the world’s largest democracy and the other major rising power in Asia, you have laid a strong foundation but the next four years will be critical in building a partnership that can serve as another pillar of the emerging liberal geopolitical order.

Strengthening the liberal economic order needs to be a higher priority in your second term. Concluding free trade agreements with the Asia- Pacific region and Europe would boost U.S. exports and global economic recovery while promoting a broader consensus on the necessary standards to promote free trade and investment in the global economy. Building the infrastructure and putting in place the policies necessary to export American natural gas to key allies and partners, especially in Europe and Asia, will help reduce their dependence on Russia and Iran. Leveraging America’s hydrocarbon bonanza to encourage more effective efforts to counter climate change can help promote a greener global order.

Strengthening the liberal political order will require increased efforts to enlist the support of emerging democracies. Nations like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey have become increasingly influential economically. But they are struggling to find their identity as democratic powers on the international stage and, in some cases, are punching below their weight. Some are drifting toward a worldview that actually undermines the liberal nature of the global order. At the same time, powerful autocracies like Russia have staked out positions at the United Nations and elsewhere that are antithetical to liberal values — on the issue of Syria, for instance. These autocratic powers need to understand that if they continue their obstructionism, the democratic international community will increasingly move on without them and they will be isolated.

In your first term, you were reluctant to make democracy a centerpiece of your foreign policy. However, with revolutions in the Arab world and political changes in Burma that you have supported, it is time to place the United States once again at the vanguard of the global democracy movement. This is not only because democracy is consonant with American values. In the Middle East, in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe, just as in Burma and the rest of Asia, the United States has strategic, political and economic interests in the spread of stable, liberal democracies. Although democracies can be fractious, and in times of transition unstable, in the end they are more reliable supporters of the liberal world order which Americans seek. The United States needs to do more in support of the difficult struggle for democracy in the Arab world too, including holding the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood government to democratic standards, and more actively leading the effort to shape a positive democratic outcome in Syria and preventing it from descending into chaos or becoming a haven for jihadists and Iranian proxies. America’s relationship with Russia needs to be shaped by strategic arms agreements as well as by respect for the desires and aspirations of the Russian people. You should work to steer Russia in a positive direction, strengthening where you can those forces in Russian society that favor economic and political modernization.

Finally, the United States needs a global strategy. It cannot focus on one critical region to the detriment of others. While you were absolutely right to increase American attention to the vital region of the Asia-Pacific, the United States cannot and should not reduce its involvement in the Middle East or in Europe. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has played the key security role in all three regions at once; there is no safe alternative to that. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where many nations look to the United States for both protection and assistance. But even Europe deserves continued American attention and involvement. Everything the United States wants to accomplish in the world can be better accomplished with the help and cooperation of its European allies.

Conclusion:

At the end of World War II, the United States led the way in shaping an international political, economic, and security order which, for all its flaws, served the American people, and much of the world, remarkably well. Much is changing in today’s world, but the basic requirements of American foreign policy have not. Your great challenge is to seize this plastic moment and apply your leadership to the preservation and extension of the liberal global order for future generations.

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Authors

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 17, 2013
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

President Barack Obama begins his second term at a critical moment in world affairs, facing the many challenges that an unstable world—much of it in turmoil—presents. In response to these many challenges, Brookings Foreign Policy scholars have prepared a Presidential Briefing Book with memos to President Obama that detail the “Big Bets” that he should place in foreign policy, and the “Black Swans”—low probability, high impact events— that could unexpectedly dominate President Obama’s second term. The “Big Bets” include: a nuclear deal with Iran; a new approach to China; securing free trade agreements with Asia and Europe; outlining an Obama doctrine for the use and deployment of drones and cyberweapons; and establishing the United States as a leading energy exporter. The “Black Swans” include: a U.S.-China confrontation over Korea; revolution and war in China; the collapse of the House of Saud; the unraveling of the eurozone; the unraveling of the Palestinian Authority; and the impact of rising seas and climate change-related migration.

On January 17, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of “Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.” The first panel focused on the transformational policies that could shape a new global order. The second panel focused on the low probability, high impact events that might derail the president’s second term agenda. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. David Gregory, host of NBC’s Meet the Press, moderated both panel discussions.

Visit the Big Bets & Black Swans interactive map »

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President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

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Europe through War and Peace: A Nobel Prize and an Uncertain Future

Fri, 07 Dec 2012 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 7, 2012
1:00 PM - 2:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On December 10, the Norwegian Nobel Committee will award its 2012 Peace Prize to the European Union (EU) for its contributions in transforming Europe “from a continent of war to a continent of peace.” After centuries of generating internal and external conflicts, Europe is now a force for global stability, especially through its peacekeeping, development aid and the strengthening of global governance. However, critics have claimed that human rights activists around the world are more deserving, and the American military presence in Europe after World War II should get the real credit for making reconciliation and unification in Europe possible. Moreover, the EU is currently gripped by an economic crisis that threatens its social and political stability.

On December 7, the Center on the U.S. and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion on the European Union’s Nobel Prize, and war and peace on the European continent featuring Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Kagan and EU Ambassador João Vale de Almeida. Brookings Senior Fellow and CUSE Director of Research Justin Vaïsse moderated the discussion.

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Obama's Foreign Policy, Take Two

Robert Kagan — Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: On NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Robert Kagan discusses the foreign policy challenges and decisions that President Obama may face in his second term. Read an excerpt below.

Neal Conan: And Robert Kagan, as well, you know the - one of the concerns is if you supply effective weaponry to the opposition groups, that weaponry will fall into the hands of those jihadists we've been talking about.

Robert Kagan: Well, that's been the concern of the administration for a long time. I'm afraid, though, that, you know, the longer this has gone on, the greater the likelihood that the jihadists are going to be big forces. I think the only thing that I - one of the things that I worry about now is we have not seen the worst that Bashar has to deal out in terms of dealing with the population.

He is not Mubarak, and clearly the Syrian military is not quite the Egyptian military, which refused to fire on the people, ultimately, and whether Mubarak ordered it and they didn't do it or whether he wouldn't even order it, it's not clear. The Syrian air force certainly is already doing this. And I worry about this Internet blackout as a time when he may carry out things that we've haven't even begun to see yet, in which case I think that the United States and the world is going to carry a very heavy moral burden, and we will wind up being forced, as we were for instance after Srebrenica, to take action, maybe sooner.

And then we're not going to be talking about how many, you know, shoulder-fired anti-air missiles are in people's hands. We're going to be in a much bigger situation.

Conan: Are you talking about chemical weapons here?

Kagan: No, I'm talking about the need to respond to massive slaughter that has just reached a stage that the world can't, that we can't and many others can't tolerate anymore. And then we need to start looking at options that don't take six or eight months, and we hope Bashar falls.

Listen to the full broadcast at npr.org »

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: NPR's Talk the Nation

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

United States Can't Pivot Away from Middle East

Robert Kagan — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

The recurrent theme at the Sir Bani Yas Forum, hosted by the United Arab Emirates and Chatham House here last weekend, was, Where is the United States? As the conference opened, Israel had just begun launching strikes in Gaza in response to the missile attacks from Hamas; Syria’s civil war raged with no end in sight; answers to the growing challenge of Iran remained elusive; and the course of Egypt’s political evolution had many concerned.

No one was suggesting the United States could or ought to have all the answers, but among this gathering of Arab, North African, South Asian and European diplomats and international civil servants, the overwhelming consensus was that the superpower is AWOL. The only question was whether the absence is temporary or permanent.

It was impressive to see how much desire there is for a more active U.S. role in the Middle East. There was little talk here of America’s decline as the world’s preeminent power. No one is preparing for a Chinese, Indian or Turkish ascendancy. Not even the Europeans claim that the European Union has the will or capacity to take on a bigger role in the region. The United States remains by far the most important player.

What has people concerned and despairing is not American decline but America’s declining interest — the sense that the Obama administration, and the American people, have about washed their hands of the Middle East.

President Obama was setting off on the first trip after his reelection, and it was to Southeast Asia, a fitting symbol of his proclaimed “pivot.” No one begrudges the United States paying more attention to Asia, but in the Middle East the pivot is seen as an attempt to turn away from this region’s difficult problems. People here believe Obama got burned on the Middle East peace process three years ago and is reluctant to engage again. They see how reticent the United States is to do anything in Syria. Veteran America-watchers complain that neither the White House nor the State Department has a Middle East hand with real clout focusing full-time on the region.

And it’s hard to deny: Many in the United States, not just inside the Obama administration, seem to think American policy needs to be “rebalanced.” The strategic importance of the Middle East is declining, they argue, as the United States grows independent of the region’s oil supply. Obama does little to push back against a growing public perception that there is nothing but trouble for the United States brewing in the Middle East.

When the Arab revolutions first erupted, the Obama White House promised to focus great attention and resources on these world-transforming events. That enthusiasm faded long ago. The administration used to trumpet its success in Libya. But lack of attention and follow-through has damaged even that once-bright spot. The Obama campaign boasted about getting U.S. troops out of Iraq. Beyond that, however, administration officials have little to say about one of the most important nations in the Middle East, still engaged in a historic struggle for democratic change.

The irony, of course, is that every time the Obama administration tries to turn toward Asia, the Middle East drags it back — literally, in the case of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The irony, of course, is that every time the Obama administration tries to turn toward Asia, the Middle East drags it back — literally, in the case of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It’s an illusion to think we will not continue to be drawn into Middle East affairs. The world is no longer neatly divided by distinct regions, if it ever was. Events in the Middle East affect the world, just as events in Asia do. Wherever the United States gets its oil, global energy prices are affected by whether oil flows freely from the Middle East, and U.S. allies in Europe and Asia still depend on that as a main source. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, it will affect not just the Middle East but the global non-proliferation regime. The success or failure of the experiment to marry Islamism and democracy that is playing out in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere will affect politics across the Islamic world, from Morocco to Pakistan to Southeast Asia as well as in Europe. And if Syria collapses, the chances are high that well-armed terrorist groups will gain a foothold in a nation with the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpiles.

The present world order is seamless, and so is the global strategy necessary to sustain it. As one prominent statesman expressed the general puzzlement here, “Can’t the United States walk and chew gum at the same time?” For decades the United States has been able to provide security and remain engaged in three major theaters at once: Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Today those theaters are more interconnected, economically and strategically, than ever.

So let’s by all means give Asia the attention it deserves. But the world won’t afford us the luxury of downgrading the importance of the other two regions. That’s what it means to be a global superpower: We can pivot, but we can’t leave.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Marko Djurica / Reuters

Scapegoating Susan Rice Does U.S. No Good

Robert Kagan — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Since the challenges confronting U.S. foreign policy in President Obama’s second term are going to be significant — with moments of decision looming on Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, the fighting in Gaza and more — it would be helpful to get this next phase started on a reasonably bipartisan footing.

The president should know that there are Republicans willing to work with him in addressing these crises and that he will be stronger overseas if he has broad support at home. But Republicans also need to do their part to show that the partisan sniping of the recent campaign season is over and that they know it is time to get serious again. One place to start would be to back off their promises to oppose the nomination of U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice as secretary of state.

I say this not because I carry a particular brief for Rice. Both she and Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.), the two people most often mentioned for the position, are well-qualified. Were the president to choose either of them, the Senate should vote to confirm.

But the idea that Rice should be disqualified because of statements she made on television in the days after the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, strikes me as unfair. It seems pretty clear now that she based her statements on information the CIA provided at the time. That information proved erroneous, and why the CIA was giving faulty information to senior administration officials remains unclear. I haven’t seen persuasive evidence to support the theory that Rice’s statements were part of a coverup to hide a terrorist attack. The fact that Rice was working from information provided by the CIA would seem to undercut such a theory.

In any case, the big questions concerning the Benghazi attack are not about what administration officials said or didn’t say in the first few days that followed. Any further investigations ought to focus on why the attack came as such a surprise, why our personnel weren’t better protected and, most important, what we need to do to ensure that our diplomats in the field can continue doing their vital work in reasonable safety. There is also a larger question: whether the administration’s “light footprint” in Libya after the fall of Moammar Gaddafi was too light. These are issues that ought to concern the secretaries of state and defense, the CIA director and others responsible for our diplomats’ security as well as our broader foreign policy doctrine.

But none of this was under the purview of the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. It seems a big reach to suggest that Susan Rice, of all people, should be barred from another job in the Obama administration because of what happened in Benghazi.

With so many potential crises staring us in the face in 2013, the country doesn’t need a nasty fight over who said what when or a brutal confirmation battle that may result in a new secretary of state wounded from the start by a partisan Senate vote. It’s hard to see what national interest would be served by such a spectacle at a time when many around the world wonder whether the United States can get its act together.

Yes, liberals and Democrats have done the same in the past, voting against Republican presidents’ nominees and buying into conspiracies much wilder, and more damaging, than this. But why don’t we try to break the cycle and make an effort to restore some comity to the foreign policy debate? Republicans should let this one go and save their energies for the real problems looming before us.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Allison Joyce / Reuters

How the Fiscal Crisis Puts National Security at Risk

Robert Kagan — Mon, 12 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

In the interest of national security, and the preservation of the world order the United States has upheld and benefited from since World War II, Republicans and Democrats must make the necessary compromises and agree on a deal to address the nation’s fiscal crisis in both the near and the long term.

I am not an economist or a budget analyst, so I don’t presume to know exactly what a “grand bargain” should look like. It seems pretty obvious that a compromise will require both tax reform, including if necessary some tax increases, and entitlement reform, since those programs are the biggest driver of the fiscal crisis. What I do know, as a national security analyst, is that our continuing failure to address the crisis in a way that makes possible a return to stable economic growth has become a serious foreign policy problem.

In a world that still looks to U.S. leadership on many issues, despite what some say, our utter dysfunction on matters involving the basic health of our economy does not inspire confidence. Nor will the United States act with confidence abroad while we are unable to address our problems at home. It is no accident that all the misguided talk of a “post-American world” came after the financial crisis exploded.

A principal victim in the absence of a deal to address the fiscal crisis has been and will continue to be the national security budget. Republicans and Democrats alike have been prepared to see hundreds of billions of dollars cut from the defense budget, with even more cuts coming if Congress fails to avoid the automatic “sequestration.” The already shrunken foreign-aid budget is also being cut at a time when, in the Middle East, for instance, we need to be spending more, not less, to support stable economies as the basis for democratic reform.

It would be one thing if the world were kindly affording us a timeout, a nice period of placidity in international affairs, while we get our house in order. But the world is not cooperating. The international environment is becoming more, not less, challenging. Iran continues to move closer to obtaining a nuclear weapon, and the prospect of a conflict cannot be dismissed. The outcome of the Arab revolutions remains uncertain. The tumult in Syria threatens to embroil the entire region. The future of Afghanistan and nuclear-armed Pakistan remains worrying. Terrorists continue to expand their efforts in the Middle East and Africa. China’s military is growing, and at a time of changing leadership some forces in the Chinese system are pushing for greater assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Even absent some new crisis, both Leon Panetta and Bob Gates have warned of the catastrophic consequences of deeper defense cuts to the nation’s security.

We need to dispel the illusion that cuts to the national security budget really save us money. Some Republicans who oppose compromising on taxes make the same miscalculation as Democrats who favor deeper defense cuts. They think that if the United States would simply scale back its role in the world, it could save money and make raising further revenue unnecessary. This is a faulty assumption. The present global economic and political order, which has provided the environment in which the United States has grown and prospered for decades, is built on and around American power and influence. Were the United States to cease playing its role in upholding this order, were we to retreat from East Asia or to back away from the challenge posed by a nuclear Iran, the result could only be global instability. From a purely economic perspective, it would be far more costly to restore order and stability — both essential to a prosperous global economy — than it would be to sustain it. Indeed, if there is no deal on the fiscal cliff and the long-term fiscal crisis because Republicans and Democrats won’t make a sensible compromise on raising revenue and reforming entitlements, and the result is further cuts in the defense and foreign affairs budgets, then the cost — including the dollar cost — could make the present budget arguments look absurdly petty.

The point is, none of the elements of a deal to address the fiscal crisis — not taxes or entitlements or anything else — can be considered in isolation. We should have learned the lesson of the 1920s and 1930s, another period when a global economic crisis was inconveniently accompanied by an unsettled and dangerous geopolitical situation. Then, American leaders concentrated on trying to address their domestic economic problems, somehow imagining these could be separated from the broader international economic and political environment. The United States actively retreated from global involvement to focus on what these days we would call “nation-building at home.” The result was disastrous both at home and abroad.

The United States is far more deeply integrated in the global economy than it was 80 years ago, and the well-being of the global economy is far more dependent on the security and stability that U.S. power and influence provide. The world won’t stand still while Americans fight these political battles. And it won’t be forgiving of decisions that weaken our ability to defend the international order in which Americans have for so long prospered.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: The Washington Post

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Elections américaines: "Avec Obama, l'Amérique conserve une position hégémonique" (Wir herrschen auch morgen noch)

Robert Kagan — Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: In an interview with L’Express, Robert Kagan says that the United States remains the dominant power in a uni-multipolar world. Despite alarmist talk of an American decline, the country is not seriously weakened, and the Obama administration has responded intelligently to security needs in the world. Preserving the defense budget, engaging in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and forging new alliances in Asia should be the priorities for the next term. It was also pubilshed in German by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

L’Express: Vivons-nous toujours dans un monde américain?

Robert Kagan: Oui. Le système international libéral que les Etats-Unis ont bâti au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale est toujours en place. Aucune puissance ni groupe de puissances n'a encore surpassé l'Amérique. Ces dernières années, les Etats-Unis ont perdu de leur superbe, bien sûr. Mais le pays a déjà connu des trous d'air et, grâce au système qu'il porte à bout de bras depuis la guerre, le monde ne s'est jamais si bien porté.

D'abord, la démocratie s'est étendue aux quatre coins de la planète, alors qu'il n'y avait que dix pays démocratiques en 1939. Ensuite, entre 1945 et 2012, l'économie mondiale a crû d'environ 4% par an et, pour la première fois, cette croissance n'est pas l'apanage d'un petit groupe de pays développés. Enfin, les grandes puissances ne se sont pas directement affrontées militairement depuis 1945.

L’Express: Vous décrivez un monde unipolaire. Pourtant, le monde n'est-il pas déjà multipolaire?

Kagan: Je ne le crois pas. Et, si je puis me permettre, la France et l'Union européenne ne font rien pour que le monde devienne réellement multipolaire...

En fait, nous vivons dans un monde "uni-multipolaire". Je m'explique. Les Etats-Unis dominent l'arène internationale et, à l'étage inférieur, figurent plusieurs puissances d'envergure. Mais les puissances qui composent le système international ne sont pas égales, à la différence des acteurs du concert européen du XIXe siècle. Ce n'est pas plus mal: un monde multipolaire n'est ni stable ni pacifique et serait, à terme, une menace pour la paix. Une telle configuration fait en général le jeu des autocraties, faute de gendarme pour les dissuader d'étendre leur zone d'influence.

Nous n'en sommes pas là. Les Etats-Unis conservent une position hégémonique: ils produisent un quart de la richesse mondiale, comme au début des années 1970. Leur puissance militaire reste écrasante. Quant à l'émergence de l'Inde, du Brésil, de la Turquie ou de l'Afrique du Sud, elle ne menace pas l'Amérique. Au contraire, elle la renforce, comme l'essor de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et du Japon lui a profité après guerre.

L’Express: Quid de la Chine?

Kagan: Les Etats-Unis bénéficient d'une situation géographique exceptionnelle: ils sont loin des autres grandes puissances. Ce n'est pas le cas de la Chine. Superpuissance économique, elle est cernée par le Japon, l'Inde et la Russie - autant de grands acteurs qui s'opposent à son hégémonie géostratégique.

Pour que le monde redevienne bipolaire, il faudrait que la Chine domine toute l'Asie. Or les Etats-Unis ont renforcé leurs liens avec l'Inde, le Japon, la Corée du Sud, les pays de l'Asean (Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est) ou encore l'Australie, à la demande de ces Etats. La Chine manque cruellement d'alliés pour contester la présence du "gendarme américain" dans le Pacifique et l'océan Indien.

L’Express: Vous parliez d'un simple "trou d'air". L'Amérique ignore-t-elle le déclin?

Kagan: Depuis plus de quatre ans, les Etats-Unis souffrent, c'est évident. Cependant, une superpuissance ne décline pas en si peu de temps. Au milieu des années 2000, beaucoup soulignaient qu'aucun pays n'avait été aussi puissant que le nôtre dans l'histoire de l'humanité. Quelques années plus tard, voici que les mêmes auteurs annoncent notre chute imminente! Ce n'est pas sérieux.

La Grande-Bretagne a perdu son hégémonie au bout de plusieurs décennies. Ce n'est pas la première fois que l'Amérique est confrontée à une crise sérieuse. Dans les années 1930, dans les années 1970... Chaque fois, on surestime notre décadence. On imagine que les Russes ou les Japonais ou les Chinois désormais ne feront qu'une bouchée de l'Amérique. Tant mieux, au fond. Ce discours nous pousse à nous réinventer sans cesse. Je suis persuadé que l'Amérique s'adaptera.

L’Express: La crise actuelle n'est-elle pas plus grave que les précédentes? Au-delà des difficultés économiques, l'Amérique n'a jamais semblé si divisée, son système politique, bloqué, et les inégalités paraissent gigantesques. Ces problèmes ne nuisent-ils pas à la puissance des Etats-Unis?

Kagan: Je suis moins alarmiste que vous, car je ne crois pas que la nation américaine est sérieusement affaiblie. Elle est fragmentée politiquement? Oui, certes, mais les Américains partagent toujours la même idéologie et les mêmes principes - ceux de la Déclaration d'indépendance, de la place laissée à l'individualisme et à l'égalité des chances. Simplement, aujourd'hui, ils ne sont pas d'accord sur l'interprétation de ces grandes idées.

Pour autant, et il en est ainsi depuis la guerre de Sécession, ils ne remettent pas leur régime en question. Le blocage des institutions est réel, mais les partis se sont toujours vigoureusement opposés dans notre histoire: à l'époque de la Reconstruction, à la fin du XIXe siècle, démocrates et républicains étaient profondément divisés. Les médias ont toujours reflété ces affrontements. De nos jours, la chaîne de télévision Fox News renoue avec cette tradition.

La période de la guerre froide, pendant laquelle les partis coopéraient davantage, était une exception. Quant aux inégalités, elles ne datent pas de ces dix dernières années. Elles se creusent depuis au moins trente ans, et n'interviennent pas dans la conduite de la politique étrangère. En revanche, un danger d'ordre psychologique guette l'Amérique: à force de croire que le déclin de leur nation est inéluctable, les Américains peuvent précipiter sa chute. Mais nous avons encore notre destin en main.

L’Express: Vous êtes optimiste!

Kagan: Oui, plutôt, dans la mesure où des changements structurels majeurs de l'ordre international ne sont pas à l'horizon. Comme tout ordre politique, l'ordre américain finira par s'écrouler. Mais pas dans les prochaines décennies.

L’Express: Vous, le républicain, estimez qu'Obama n'a pas nui à la puissance américaine. Comment jugez-vous sa politique étrangère?

Kagan: Je distingue trois phases. La première a consisté à prendre le contre-pied de son prédécesseur. Obama a tenté d'améliorer l'image des Etats-Unis à l'étranger en polissant son discours, en tendant la main au monde musulman et à la Russie.

La deuxième a été marquée par le retour aux réalités: Obama a découvert que le monde avait besoin des Etats-Unis. Il a dû répondre aux appels des pays asiatiques, soucieux des manoeuvres chinoises, et à ceux des pays arabes, inquiets du programme nucléaire iranien, ainsi qu'à ceux des pays d'Europe de l'Est, toujours sous la menace de la Russie. Obama a aussi renforcé la présence américaine en Afghanistan, multiplié les attaques de drones et fait intervenir les Etats-Unis en Libye pour chasser Kadhafi. En somme, il a fort classiquement usé de la puissance américaine.

La troisième phase est en cours: elle correspond à la politique étrangère d'une année électorale. Depuis l'assassinat de Ben Laden, Obama évite toute aventure à l'étranger. Il ne veut prendre aucun risque à l'approche des élections.

L’Express: Est-ce pour cette raison que les Etats-Unis ne veulent pas intervenir en Syrie?

Kagan: C'est l'une d'elles, j'en suis persuadé. Si les troubles en Syrie avaient commencé en 2010, l'Amérique serait sans doute intervenue plus énergiquement dans la région.

L’Express: Existe-t-il une doctrine Obama en politique étrangère?

Kagan: On a tort de personnaliser à outrance la diplomatie des présidents américains. La conduite de la politique étrangère est avant tout une affaire de circonstances. Celle des Etats-Unis obéit à des cycles depuis la Première Guerre mondiale. A des moments interventionnistes succèdent des séquences plus isolationnistes: intervention américaine pendant le premier conflit mondial, repli dans les années 1920 et 1930, Seconde Guerre mondiale et guerre de Corée, accalmie sous Eisenhower, conflit au Vietnam, repli sous Carter, grandes manoeuvres sous Reagan, reflux sous Clinton...

Après les interventions en Afghanistan et en Irak sous Bush, il était logique que la politique étrangère d'Obama baissât d'intensité. Cela dit, il n'est pas aisé de comprendre comment Obama voit le monde. Il n'a pas de goût prononcé pour la politique étrangère. Il était totalement novice en la matière et il est sans doute l'un des présidents ayant le moins pensé la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis.

L’Express: Comment la notez-vous?

Kagan: Son bilan est mitigé. Il a réussi à améliorer la popularité des Etats-Unis mais pas au Moyen-Orient, son principal objectif, sans doute à cause de son incapacité à faire avancer le dossier palestinien. Mais on surestime l'image. L'essentiel, c'est la puissance et la sécurité. Obama a répondu intelligemment aux besoins des pays asiatiques et a renforcé la présence américaine dans la région. L'agressivité de la Chine l'a aidé. Vis-à-vis de l'Iran, sa main tendue n'a servi à rien.

L’Express: Une guerre contre l'Iran est-elle inévitable?

Kagan: C'est une éventualité très plausible: Obama s'est engagé à ce que l'Iran ne se dote pas de l'arme nucléaire. Mais je ne suis sûr de rien, d'autant qu'il faut tenir compte du facteur israélien. Par ailleurs, il faut signaler qu'Obama a poursuivi dans maints domaines la politique étrangère de Bush. En Afghanistan, il a multiplié les attaques de drones. En Iran, il a perpétué une cyberguerre - l'envoi de virus informatiques - dont les prémices ont été élaborées par l'administration précédente.

L’Express: Quelle que soit l'identité du futur locataire de la Maison-Blanche, quelles seront ses priorités afin de préserver la prédominance des Etats-Unis?

Kagan: J'insisterai, pour ma part, sur la nécessité de maintenir le budget de la Défense à son niveau actuel. Si les Etats-Unis baissent pavillon, s'ils se replient pour faire quelques économies, il nous en coûtera à terme. En priorité, l'Amérique doit maintenir son engagement au Moyen-Orient et dans le golfe Persique, tout en consolidant ses alliances en Asie de l'Est et du Sud-Est. L'économie américaine devra aussi renouer avec la croissance. C'est la condition sine qua non pour que les Etats-Unis rayonnent dans le monde. Le pire danger, c'est que la crise se perpétue.

Wir herrschen auch morgen noch

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Herr Kagan, leben wir noch in einer amerikanischen Welt?

Kagan: Ja. Das liberale internationale System und vor allem dessen Institutionen, die nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg von den Vereinigten Staaten geschaffen wurden, sind immer noch da. Bislang hat noch keine Macht oder Gruppe von Mächten die Vereinigten Staaten überflügelt. Natürlich hat Amerika in den letzten Jahren etwas von seinem Glanz verloren. Aber die Vereinigten Staaten haben auch früher schon Turbulenzen erlebt, und, wichtiger noch, dank des Systems, für das sie sich seit dem Krieg einsetzen, geht es der Welt besser als jemals zuvor. Die Demokratie hat sich in alle Winkel der Erde ausgebreitet. 1939 gab es nur zehn demokratische Staaten. Von 1945 bis 2012 ist die Weltwirtschaft jährlich im Durchschnitt um vier Prozent gewachsen, und zum ersten Mal beschränkt sich das Wachstum nicht nur auf eine kleine Gruppe hochentwickelter Länder. Und schließlich hat es seit 1945 keine direkte Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Großmächten gegeben.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Sie beschreiben hier eine unipolare Welt. Aber leben wir nicht inzwischen, wie viele in Europa dies gern sehen möchten, in einer multipolaren Welt?

Kagan: Das glaube ich nicht. Und wenn Sie erlauben, die Europäische Union tut nichts, damit die Welt tatsächlich multipolar wird. In Wirklichkeit leben wir in einer unipolar-multipolaren Welt. Die Vereinigten Staaten dominieren die internationale Arena, und den zweiten Rang nehmen mehrere bedeutendere Mächte ein. Aber die Mächte, die das internationale System bilden, sind einander nicht ebenbürtig, im Unterschied zu den Ländern, die im 19.Jahrhundert das europäische Konzert bestimmten. Und das ist gar nicht schlecht. Eine multipolare Welt ist weder stabil noch friedlich und wäre letztlich eine Gefahr für den Frieden zwischen den Großmächten. Solch eine Konstellation spielt in der Regel den Autokratien in die Hände, da es keinen Polizisten gibt, der sie davon abhält, ihren Einflussbereich auszudehnen. Das entspricht nicht der gegenwärtigen Lage. Die Vereinigten Staaten sind immer noch in einer Hegemonialposition. Sie produzieren, wie schon zu Beginn der 1970er Jahre, ein Viertel des weltweiten Reichtums. Ihre Militärmacht ist immer noch erdrückend. Der Bedeutungszuwachs Indiens, Brasiliens, der Türkei oder Südafrikas stellt keine Bedrohung für Amerika dar. Ich würde sogar sagen, er stärkt die Vereinigten Staaten, wie sie nach dem Krieg vom Aufstieg Westdeutschlands und Japans profitiert haben.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Unterschätzen Sie da nicht den Aufstieg Chinas?

Kagan: Die Vereinigten Staaten besitzen eine außergewöhnliche geographische Lage. Sie sind von allen anderen Großmächten weit entfernt. Für China gilt das nicht. China ist zwar eine wirtschaftliche Supermacht, aber das Land ist eingekreist von Japan, Indien und Russland - sämtlich Großmächte, die sich einer geostrategischen Hegemonie Chinas widersetzen. Wenn die Welt wieder bipolar werden sollte, müsste China ganz Asien beherrschen. Die Vereinigten Staaten haben jedoch ihre Beziehungen zu Indien, Japan, Südkorea, den Asean-Ländern und auch Australien auf deren Wunsch hin intensiviert. Den Chinesen mangelt es einfach an Verbündeten, um den Vereinigten Staaten ihre Stellung im Pazifischen und Indischen Ozean streitig zu machen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Sie haben von „Turbulenzen“ gesprochen. Amerika erlebt also keinen wirklichen Niedergang?

Kagan: Seit mehr als vier Jahren leidet Amerika, das ist unbestreitbar. Aber Supermächte erleben ihren Niedergang nicht in so kurzer Zeit. Mitte des ersten Jahrzehnts unseres Jahrhunderts sagte man, noch nie in der Geschichte der Menschheit sei ein Land so mächtig gewesen. Einige Jahre später behaupten dieselben Autoren, der Niedergang der Vereinigten Staaten stehe unmittelbar bevor. Das ist nicht seriös. Großbritannien hat seine Hegemonie im Verlaufe mehrerer Jahrzehnte verloren. Es ist nicht das erste Mal, dass Amerika sich in einer ernsthaften Krise befindet. In den 1930er Jahren, in den 1970er Jahren...Immer wieder wird unsere Dekadenz überschätzt. Man stellt sich vor, die Russen oder die Japaner oder die Chinesen würden Amerika bald verschlingen. Dennoch halte ich das für eine sinnvolle Mahnung. So sind wir gezwungen, uns immer wieder neu zu erfinden. Und auch diesmal, davon bin ich überzeugt, wird Amerika sich auf die neue internationale Lage einstellen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ich habe den Eindruck, die Krise ist diesmal ernster als die früheren. Abgesehen von den aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Problemen, scheint Amerika noch nie so gespalten, das politische System so blockiert und die Ungleichheit so gewaltig gewesen zu sein. Werden diese Probleme nicht die internationale Macht der Vereinigten Staaten beeinträchtigen?

Kagan: Da bin ich weniger pessimistisch als Sie, weil ich nicht glaube, dass die amerikanische Nation ernstlich geschwächt wäre. Ist sie politisch gespalten? Ja, aber die Amerikaner teilen dieselbe Ideologie und dieselben Grundsätze, die der Unabhängigkeitserklärung, des Individualismus oder der Chancengleichheit. Nur herrscht heute keine Einigkeit über die Interpretation dieser großen Ideen. Aber - und das ist schon seit dem Unabhängigkeitskrieg so - die Verfassungsordnung wird nicht in Frage gestellt. Auch im Blick auf die Blockierung der Institutionen haben Sie recht. Aber in der amerikanischen Geschichte standen die Parteien immer in heftigem Widerstreit zueinander. In der Wiederaufbauphase Ende des 19.Jahrhunderts waren Demokraten und Republikaner tief gespalten. Die Medien waren stets ein Abbild dieser Gegensätze. Der Fernsehsender Fox knüpft an diese Tradition an. Tatsächlich bildete die Zeit des Kalten Krieges, in der die Parteien enger miteinander kooperierten, eine Ausnahme, das vergisst man allzu oft. Was die Ungleichheit betrifft, so ist sie nicht erst in den letzten zehn Jahren entstanden. Sie hat sich seit mindestens drei Jahrzehnten entwickelt und hat im Übrigen keinen Einfluss auf die Außenpolitik. Dagegen gibt es eine psychologische Gefahr, die Amerika bedroht: Wenn die Amerikaner glauben, der Niedergang ihres Landes sei unabwendbar, könnten sie gerade dadurch den Sturz des Landes herbeiführen. Aber noch liegt unser Schicksal in unseren eigenen Händen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Sie sind also nicht beunruhigt?

Kagan: Ich bin relativ optimistisch, solange sich keine größeren strukturellen Veränderungen der internationalen Ordnung am Horizont abzeichnen. Wie jede politische Ordnung wird auch die amerikanische zusammenbrechen, aber nicht in den nächsten Jahrzehnten.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Obwohl Sie Republikaner sind, erwecken Sie den Eindruck, dass Obama der Macht Amerikas keineswegs geschadet hat. Wie bewerten Sie seine Außenpolitik?

Kagan: Ich unterscheide drei Phasen. Die erste - ein großer Klassiker der amerikanischen Politik - bestand darin, dass Obama das Gegenteil von dem tat, was sein Vorgänger getan hatte. In groben Zügen kann man sagen, er verbesserte das Bild der Vereinigten Staaten im Ausland, indem er eine freundlichere Sprache pflegte und der muslimischen Welt und auch Russland die Hand reichte. Die zweite Phase war von der Rückkehr zu den Realitäten geprägt. Obama entdeckte, dass die Welt die Vereinigten Staaten braucht. Er musste auf die Sorgen der asiatischen Länder angesichts des chinesischen Expansionismus reagieren, auf die der arabischen Länder wegen des iranischen Atomprogramms und auf die der osteuropäischen Staaten, die immer noch unter der russischen Bedrohung leiden. Obama verstärkte auch die amerikanische Präsenz in Afghanistan, er vervielfachte die Zahl der Drohnenangriffe und intervenierte in Libyen, um Gaddafi zu stürzen. Insgesamt hat er die amerikanische Macht in ausgesprochen klassischer Manier eingesetzt. Die dritte Phase erleben wir gegenwärtig. Sie entspricht ganz der Außenpolitik in einem Wahljahr. Seit der Tötung Bin Ladins vermeidet Obama jedes ausländische Abenteuer. Er möchte im Blick auf die Wahlen kein Risiko eingehen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ist das der Grund, weshalb die Vereinigten Staaten nicht in Syrien intervenieren wollen?

Kagan: Es ist einer der Gründe, da bin ich mir ganz sicher. Ich denke, wenn die Wirren in Syrien schon 2010 begonnen hätten, dann hätten die Amerikaner energischer eingegriffen.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Gibt es in der Außenpolitik eine Obama-Doktrin?

Kagan: Ich glaube, es ist falsch, die Diplomatie der amerikanischen Präsidenten allzu sehr zu personalisieren. Die Außenpolitik hängt zunächst einmal von den Umständen ab. Die der Vereinigten Staaten folgt seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg gewissen Zyklen. Auf interventionistische Phasen folgen stärker isolationistische: amerikanische Intervention im Ersten Weltkrieg, dann Rückzug in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren; der Zweite Weltkrieg und der Korea-Krieg, dann Beruhigung unter Eisenhower; der Vietnam-Konflikt, Rückzug unter Carter, große Aktivitäten unter Reagan, Zurückhaltung unter Clinton...Nach den Interventionen in Afghanistan und im Irak unter Bush war es ganz folgerichtig, dass Obamas Außenpolitik weniger intensiv ausfiel. Allerdings ist nicht leicht zu erkennen, wie Obama die Welt sieht. Er hat keine besondere Vorliebe für die Außenpolitik. Er war ein vollkommener Neuling auf diesem Gebiet, und er ist zweifellos einer der Präsidenten, die am wenigsten über die Außenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten nachgedacht haben.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Und die Bilanz...?

Kagan: ...ist mäßig. Es ist ihm gelungen, das Bild der Vereinigten Staaten in der Welt zu verbessern, allerdings nicht im Nahen und Mittleren Osten, seinem eigentlichen Hauptziel, und das zweifellos, weil er nicht fähig war, in der Palästinenserfrage Fortschritte zu machen. Aber die Bedeutung des Image wird überschätzt. Entscheidend sind Macht und Sicherheit. Obama hat intelligent auf die Bedürfnisse der asiatischen Staaten reagiert und die amerikanische Präsenz in der Region verstärkt. Die Aggressivität Chinas hat ihm dabei geholfen. Gegenüber Iran hat seine Politik der ausgestreckten Hand zu nichts geführt.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ist ein Krieg mit Iran unausweichlich?

Kagan: Das ist eine sehr plausible Möglichkeit. Obama setzt sich dafür ein, dass Iran keine Nuklearwaffen entwickelt. Aber da scheint mir nichts sicher zu sein, zumal man auch den Faktor Israel berücksichtigen muss...Übrigens ist anzumerken, dass Obama auf zahlreichen Gebieten Bushs Außenpolitik fortgesetzt hat: Man denke an Afghanistan, an die Forcierung der Drohnenangriffe und an die Fortsetzung des Cyberkriegs, dessen Grundlagen noch von der vorigen Administration gelegt worden sind.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Was wird sich in der amerikanischen Außenpolitik ändern, wenn Mitt Romney zum Präsidenten gewählt wird?

Kagan: Romney wäre sicher härter gegenüber Wladimir Putins Russland. Er würde den Verteidigungshaushalt nicht senken. Im Grunde sehen die beiden Männer Amerika nicht in derselben Weise. Romney glaubt eher an die Ausnahmestellung Amerikas, während Obama da skeptischer ist. Mehr möchte ich dazu nicht sagen, denn ich gehöre zu Mitt Romneys außenpolitischen Beratern.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ganz gleich, wer nun ins Weiße Haus einzieht, wo werden seine Prioritäten liegen, wenn es darum geht, die Vorherrschaft der Vereinigten Staaten zu sichern? Und wo liegen die größten Gefahren, die auf ihn warten?

Kagan: Ich bin entschieden der Auffassung, dass der Verteidigungshaushalt auf dem gegenwärtigen Stand gehalten werden muss. Wenn die Vereinigten Staaten die Segel streichen, wenn sie sich wegen ein paar Einsparungen zurückziehen, werden wir auf lange Sicht einen hohen Preis dafür zahlen. In erster Linie muss Amerika sein Engagement im Nahen und Mittleren Osten wie auch am Persischen Golf aufrechterhalten und seine Bündnisse mit den Staaten in Ost- und Südostasien festigen. Auch die Wirtschaft muss zu ihrer Größe zurückfinden. Das ist eine unerlässliche Voraussetzung, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten ihre Stellung behaupten wollen. Die größte Gefahr wäre eine Fortdauer der Krise.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: Ouest France

Image Source: © Philip Andrews / Reuters

Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?

Wed, 07 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 7, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings hosted a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results could affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists discussed the approach of the second Obama term, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.

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Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?

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Transcript (.pdf)

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20121107_election_day

Foreign Policy and the Presidential Election: A Post-Debate Analysis

Wed, 24 Oct 2012 16:30:00 -0400

Event Information

October 24, 2012
4:30 PM - 5:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

With just two weeks to go before the U.S. election, President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney will engage in their final presidential debate on Monday, October 22. In this next debate, the candidates will focus on a wide range of foreign policy issues, including the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the Iran crisis, and U.S.-China relations. Given the tone of the Obama-Romney town hall meeting and the critical U.S. and global security issues on the agenda, the foreign policy debate promises to be equally intense.

On October 24, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the issues raised during the final presidential debate. Susan Glasser, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine, moderated the panel, which included Brookings Senior Fellows Robert Kagan, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth Lieberthal and Bruce Riedel. Brookings Vice President Martin Indyk offered opening remarks.

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Audio

Foreign Policy and the Presidential Election: A Post-Debate Analysis

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Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

foreign policy post debate corrected transcript

For U.S. Presidential Candidates, Foreign Policy Is Domestic Policy

Robert Kagan — Tue, 23 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, appearing along with Jamie Rubin, who was assistant secretary of state for public affairs in the Clinton administration, Robert Kagan gives his analysis of how each candidate performed during Monday's presidential debate on foreign policy. See an excerpt below, read the full transcript online and watch the interview.

Christiane Amanpour: So how does the future President of the United States deal with it? How do you make sure that the liberals, the masses of the people who voted with their feet, get what they want and it doesn't fall into, you know, being hijacked by the minority extremists?

Robert Kagan: Well, I mean, first of all, it's, unfortunately, even more complicated than that.

The liberals didn't win in Egypt; the liberals -- the grassroots in Egypt are the Muslim Brotherhood. They are the widest, most widely supported organization in the country. So we are going to have to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. And that makes a lot of people nervous. But we have no choice.

What we need to do is try to make sure that they continue -- they were elected democratically. We have to make sure they continue to support a democratic system.

The good news is, as the rulers of Egypt, they need tremendous amounts of support from the international community and the United States. Their economic situation is terrible. They don't want to preside over an economic disaster. That's not good for them.

And therefore they need IMF funding. They need American support. And they've been behaving that way. They have not abrogated the treaty with Israel and taken other measures that might have been upsetting.

So we have to use the opportunity that we have, when they need this support to say, yes, we will support you. But you must understand that what a democracy does is respect the rights of minorities, et cetera.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: CNN

The Proper U.S. Response to the Cairo Attack

Robert Kagan — Thu, 13 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

A handful of Republicans pushed Wednesday to cut off aid to Libya and Egypt. Fortunately, most Republicans and Democrats in Congress reject the idea. In Libya, the government is largely secular and pro-American. It is also weak and unable to preserve order against the many forces — from remnants of the Gaddafi era to radical Islamic militants — that challenge its authority. Cutting off support isn’t the answer. If anything, we should be increasing assistance, especially security assistance, to help Libyans make their country safer, for themselves and us.

The bigger and more important challenge is Egypt. The attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo were not carried out by or at the instigation of the elected Egyptian government. As The Post’s David Ignatius rightly points out, many of the protesters who stormed the compound Tuesday oppose the current government. But that government’s failure to protect the embassy, a core international obligation, and President Mohamed Morsi’s failure to condemn the attacks are worrisome.

There is also reason to be concerned about the Morsi government’s policies more generally. The record is mixed.

Egypt is certainly more democratic than it was under the Mubarak regime, which the United States supported for 30 years. The month-old Morsi government has respected Egypt’s long-standing peace treaty with Israel. When Morsi traveled to Iran recently, he infuriated his hosts by denouncing tyranny and calling for action against Tehran’s ally in Syria. The Egyptian government’s primary interest has been to seek assistance for its faltering economy, and it has been negotiating responsibly with the International Monetary Fund. This is all to the good.

Some conservatives are starting to make a glib comparison between the evolution of Egypt today and the Iranian revolution of 1979. This is a faulty analysis. Egypt is not declaring jihad on the West, and Morsi is not Ayatollah Khomeini. We need to avoid an undiscriminating Islamophobia and distinguish between those who want to kill Americans and those who may dislike the West but are primarily interested in rebuilding their societies after decades of dictatorship.

As with many nascent democracies around the world, Islamic and non-Islamic, the transition in Egypt is incomplete. Some signs give reason for hope, but there are also signs of undemocratic tendencies. The Morsi government has been censoring media and hounding political opponents. Coptic Christians are justifiably scared. Women have reason to worry about whether their rights will be respected.

The United States needs to strike an intelligent balance. If Egypt’s economy crumbles, is the nation going to become less radical? Is it more likely to uphold the peace treaty with Israel? Is it more likely to be a force for moderation in the greater Middle East?

The United States and its friends in the region have a vital stake in the success of Egypt’s transition. U.S. policies should aim to support the forces in Egypt — and there are many — that want a democratic system and a healthy economy. That means providing aid, ideally even more aid than is planned. But it also means making clear to Egyptians what that aid is for. U.S. support should be conditioned on the Egyptian government’s behavior, both internationally and domestically. The Morsi government needs to understand that it will not get U.S. assistance, or much help from the rest of the international community, if it clamps down on freedoms at home, persecutes religious minorities such as the Copts or fails to meet its basic international obligations.

The Obama administration has not been wrong to reach out to the popularly elected government in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood won that election, and no one doubts that it did so fairly. We either support democracy or we don’t. But the administration has not been forthright enough in making clear, publicly as well as privately, what it expects of that government.

Out of fear of making the United States the issue in Egyptian politics, the Obama administration, like past administrations, has been too reticent about stating clearly the expectations that we and the democratic world have for Egyptian democracy: a sound constitution that protects the rights of all individuals, an open press, a free and vital opposition, an independent judiciary and a thriving civil society. President Obama owes it to the Egyptian people to stand up for these principles. Congress needs to support democracy in Egypt by providing aid that ensures it advances those principles and, therefore, U.S. interests.

Meanwhile, politicians and commentators would be wise to tone down the apocalyptic rhetoric. This is an election year, and there is much to criticize in the way the administration has handled events in the Middle East. But a toxic mix is brewing between the natural impulses of political warfare and a tendency, perhaps still on the fringes, to tar all Islamic governments with the same brush and tell them all to go to hell. Sorry, we can’t afford to.

This is not the time for a “who lost Egypt?” debate. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen are far from lost. The only smart course is to redouble our efforts and use the considerable influence the United States still has to try to shape a region that remains of vital concern to Americans and the health and stability of the international order that the United States upholds.

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: The Washington Post

How 9/11 Changed How Americans View The World

Robert Kagan — Mon, 10 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s note: On NPR’s Talk of the Nation, Robert Kagan discussed - with Neil Conan and Woodrow Wilson Center President Jane Harman - Americans’ attitudes towards politics and international affairs since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

NEAL COHAN, HOST: Robert Kagan, the same question: How have your views changed since 9/11?

KAGAN: Well, I'm kind of a dinosaur, so my views don't - didn't change that much. I mean, obviously, we've had two unsuccessful military conflicts. The question that I have about American public opinion is: Are we in a fundamentally changed public opinion environment, or are we just going through what, really, if you look historically, is a consistent cycle?

There have been numerous periods throughout American history when we've gone from a period of global activism with a lot of public enthusiasm, World War I, for instance, which was immediately followed by tremendous disillusionment and a turning away from the world.

And if you look at the long history of polls since the Second World War, there have been ups and downs. There was a time - 1982, I'm looking at this poll - Americans were even less enthusiastic about having an active role then than they are today. But then it went up 10 points.

So, obviously, at this moment, in this recession, with, you know, Afghanistan not looking successful, Iraq a mixed picture, Americans are more pessimistic. If we get out of the recession, when we get out of the recession, I hope, when we face new crises, I think you could see American opinion changing again.

And one of the things that I note, interestingly, is that there is a majority of support for enforcing no-fly zones over Syria, which is a military action, which could have all kinds of consequences. So I take a more - I take a longer view of this, and I've seen - you know, you've seen, historically, Americans go up and down on this question. And I consider 61 percent supporting an active role in the world quite high and, in a way, you know, to be welcomed.

CONAN: But big majorities opposed to acting if, for example, China invades Taiwan, if North Korea attacks South Korea, split on Israel.

KAGAN: Yeah. But I'm not sure - I'd like to know compared to when. Was there a time when Americans were enthusiastic about going to war with China over Taiwan? It's possible. I haven't seen older polling about that.

And then, of course, there is the interesting phenomenon that we've seen over and over again, Americans saying, a majority of Americans saying they don't want to get into a certain conflict. The president, you know, often with the approval of Congress, not always, nevertheless taking Americans into that conflict and then seeing Americans rally to support that action.

Woodrow Wilson, in 1916, won his election saying he was the man who kept us out of war. Five months later, he led Americans into war with enormous public support. So I just - I'm wary of looking at these public opinion polls and thinking that somehow this is an attitude written in stone. These things are very changeable over time.

Listen to the full interview at npr.org »

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: NPR

Puntate Sull'unione Politica

Robert Kagan — Sat, 14 Jul 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In this interview with Angelo Aquaro of La Repubblica, Robert Kagan discusses his views on the European Union and the financial crisis, American and European roles in Syria and Iran, and perceptions of Mario Monti both in Italy and abroad.

Angelo Aquaro: Scusi, professore, ma se gli americani vengono ancora da Marte e gli europei da Venere, allora da dove viene Mario Monti, l'uomo che il settimanale Time ha definito "il più importante d'Europa ", l'italiano che qui in America è una superstar, invitato di lusso tra i big della new economy nella Sun Valley? Robert Kagan, l'autore di Paradiso e potere, il pensatore di destra che oggi, a sorpresa, piace a Barack Obama, sorride. Il suo nuovo libro, The World America Made, è già uno scandalo.

Perché di fronte alle tesi liberal del declino - da Fareed Zakaria, L'era post-americana, a Thomas Friedman, Il mondo è piatto - sostiene che l'America resta una grande potenza: pur sempre, s'intende, nel mito guerresco di Marte. "Beh, non credo che per Mario Monti sia importante venire da Venere o da Marte. Non è lì per fare la guerra o la pace: e davvero non saprei qual è il pianeta dei problemi finanziari. Ma per quello che so sta facendo un gran lavoro. Qui c'è molta ammirazione. E spero che l'Italia prosegua su questa direzione".

Ecco, proprio questo è il problema. Il Wall Street Journal si chiede se senza di lui l'Italia rispetterà gli impegni. Mentre l'ex premier Silvio Berlusconi è pronto a tornare in campo.

Robert Kagan: Non vorrei entrare nel merito...

Aquaro: È un discorso più generale: fino a che punto un disastro economico di tali dimensioni può richiedere soluzioni eccezionali.

Kagan: È davvero un tipo di decisione che spetta al popolo italiano: trovare un equilibrio tra la necessità di affrontare la crisi e non avere, invece, un approccio politico alla crisi stessa. Però, ecco, la democrazia è democrazia: e la sospensione della politica generalmente non dura a lungo.

Aquaro: Ma lei la vede o no l'uscita dal tunnel per l'Italia e l'Europa?

Kagan: Il mio ottimismo è messo alla prova. Però se credo che l'Unione, alla fine, troverà una via d'uscita è perché credo che il suo significato ultimo non sia meramente economico: è politico. E l'idea che l'Unione si dissolva politicamente è più che un rischio per gli europei. La Grecia resterà dentro o fuori? Io credo che l'Unione resterà comunque in piedi. Provate a porvi la domanda: che Europa sarebbe se finisse la Ue? Già questo può aiutarvi a tenerla unita.

Aquaro: In Spagna siamo arrivati agli scontri per l'austerity. Un'Europa unita aiuterebbe a gestire queste crisi?

Kagan: Prendersela con Bruxelles invece che con Madrid? No: in questo gli stati nazionali, che poi devono rispondere agli elettori, continuerebbero ad avere un bel da fare.

Aquaro: Il suo saggio sull'Europa-Venere e l'America-Marte compie dieci anni.

Kagan: E dovrei sorprendermi che è ancora più attuale. Chiariamo: oggi come allora non vedo in bianco o nero. Inghilterra e Francia, per esempio, hanno spinto per la forza in Libia proprio quando gli Usa sembravano riluttanti. Ma l'Europa è l'unica che diminuisce le spese militari. Al contrario di Cina, Brasile, India, Turchia.

Aquaro: Lei spiega che l'economia non basta: senza capacità militare non ci sarà mai vera influenza.

Kagan: Guardate alla Germania e alla sua ritrosia a impegnarsi sempre in Libia. E se penso all'Europa mi è difficile pensare a un'Europa senza la Germania. Ecco perché America ed Europa hanno mentalità differenti. Prendete Barack Obama.

Aquaro: A cosa si riferisce?

Kagan: Sta impostando tutta la campagna elettorale come il presidente che sa come uccidere: lui ha ucciso Osama Bin Laden, lui ha ordinato i blitz con i droni. In Europa pensavano che sarebbe stato un presidente più "europeo": ha dimostrato di essere un vero presidente americano.

Aquaro: L'idea del suo libro, che non è vero - come dicono invece a destra - che l'America sia in declino, è finita nel discorso sullo Stato dell'Unione. Avrebbe mai pensato di diventare ispirazione per Obama?

Kagan: Guardi" dice ridendo "io ho sempre ritenuto che la politica estera dovesse essere bipartisan. Sono contento che il presidente abbia trovato il libro utile.

Aquaro: L'ha cercata?

Kagan: Abbiamo avuto alcuni incontri: non a tu per tu. Washington è piccola. E poi non io non scrivo per questo o quel partito.

Aquaro: Veramente è tra i più importanti consiglieri dell'uomo che sfida Obama, Mitt Romney. Che si è già distinto per i suoi attacchi all'Europa.

Kagan: È stato davvero spiacevole che le sue dichiarazioni siano state prese come antieuropee: voleva soltanto dire che non permetterebbe mai che l'America adotti un sistema di welfare europeo.

Aquaro: Anche Obama accolla all'Europa le responsabilità per la crisi: non è che siamo diventati il vostro capro espiatorio?

Kagan: Che ironia: in Europa pensano che la responsabilità della "loro" crisi sia dell'America. Tutti cercano un capro espiatorio.

Aquaro: Lei scrive: non è vero che l'America è in declino. Però nel libro non cita mai chi l'ha guidata negli ultimi anni.

Kagan: Il libro ha una prospettiva storica. Però no, non credo che Obama stia spingendo l'America verso il declino. Sì, mi ha deluso la lentezza di reazione verso la Primavera araba. Ma se è per questo negli Anni '90 mi aveva deluso la lentezza nei Balcani di George H. W. Bush. E poi di Bill Clinton.

Aquaro: E adesso la Siria.

Kagan: Non fossimo sotto elezioni vedremmo un'America molto più attiva. Ma non credo che Obama voglia rischiare. Anche se alla fine Assad cadrà.

Aquaro: Ha ragione John McCain a chiedere un intervento?

Kagan: Non intervento diretto. Ma costruire zone sicure per l'opposizione usando la forza aerea di Stati Uniti e Nato: come in Libia.

Aquaro: E l'Iran? L'US Navy prepara le grandi manovre nel Golfo.

Kagan: Le possibilità di un'azione militare non sono poche. Siamo lì per mandare un segnale o perché temiamo che possano passare all'azione? L'arrivo di una dragamine fa pensare alla seconda ipotesi. Le sanzioni sempre più stringenti potrebbero spingere l'Iran a un'exploit militare.

Aquaro: Dica la verità - parlando di Europa, Siria, Iran e adesso tornando all'Italia: come ha vissuto, da osservatore internazionale, il passaggio da Berlusconi a Monti?

Kagan: Mi sta chiedendo se l'Italia, oggi, viene presa molto più seriamente come paese? La risposta è sì. A un'analisi oggettiva non c'è dubbio che sia considerata molto più seriamente. E questo giusto per rovinare le mie prospettive per quando Berlusconi tornerà: non potrò più rimettere piede in Italia.

Aquaro: Crede davvero che tornerà?

Kagan: Ma non posso saperlo! E la prego: non scriva anche questo.

Aquaro: Il professore ci perdonerà: ma per noi che veniamo da Venere come resistere alla tentazione?

Authors

Robert Kagan

Publication: La Repubblica

Image Source: Eric Vidal / Reuters