Brookings: Experts - Richard Joseph

President Barack Obama and Africa’s Uncompleted Journey, Part II

Richard Joseph — Thu, 14 Mar 2013 15:29:00 -0400

Trade and Investments

In view of the extensive work being conducted on this topic, I will focus on a few dimensions. There is a plethora of American agencies responsible for the nation’s international economic engagement. The creation of a more coherent investment-promotion structure is vital. This is a central plank in legislation sponsored by Senators Dick Durbin and John Boozman to promote American jobs through African exports. After fifteen years of sustained economic growth in Africa, attention must also shift to the quality of this growth, the productive capacity of economies, the diversification of export products, the capturing of low-wage industrial employment shed by China, and, most crucially, the generating of more and better jobs. As relations with contemporary Mexico demonstrate, American companies can contribute to such advances in a win-win manner. In view of its domestic travails, the case for enhanced U.S. economic engagement must include the expansion of markets for goods and services at home as well as abroad.

Doing business in Africa outside the extractive sector is still a forbidding prospect for many American companies. Moreover, African countries cannot rely on the prolonged commodities boom to sustain their earnings. Oil exports to the U.S. in 2012 declined significantly as American domestic production mounted. In confronting the new challenges and opportunities, members of the African diaspora have a significant role to play. They can help build efficient and transparent trade and investment regimes in their home nations as well as in other African countries. Africa’s continental and regional organizations must also accelerate the construction of cross-border arenas for the free movement of capital and labor. Resurgent nations in the continent, as they diversify production and exports, will compete with Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Vietnam and other rising nations. They cannot do so without the requisite skills and institutional capacities.

Strengthening Democracy

Most African countries today conduct elections. Some commentators continue to equate the holding of elections with being democratic. Voting exercises can be intrinsic, however, to systems meant to forestall democratization, that is, making governments accountable to, and replaceable by, a country’s citizens. One of the most important, but under-recognized, achievements of the first Obama Administration has been the support it has given to advancing African democracy. The U.S. Africa Strategy document of June 2012 promises to hold the bar high regarding the fairness of electoral procedures. Where security considerations have not blunted this commitment, for example in Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Malawi, Senegal, and Zimbabwe, the U.S. has provided sustained support for democracy and insisted on respect for term limits and other constitutional provisions. Where security concerns have been paramount, however, as in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the U.S. has often spoken one way and acted another. The gap between rhetoric and practice can and must be narrowed.

There is no reason why African democracy, as part of the international liberal order discussed in Part I of this essay, should not be a continuing policy priority of the United States. The United States enjoys many capacities, in association with myriad domestic and international organizations, to further the empowerment of Africa’s people through democratic institutions and procedures. There is now a variety of instruments to assess the representative quality of African governments. Governments whose authority is legitimately acquired and maintained are the best long-term guarantors of peace and security.

Read the full piece in AfricaPlus »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: AfricaPlus

Image Source: © Larry Downing / Reuters

President Obama and Africa’s Uncompleted Journey, Part I

Richard Joseph — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's Note: A public meeting of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on February 28 will consider the following question: “President Obama and Sub-Saharan Africa: Just Right or Not Enough?” Several commentaries which demonstrate the increasing demand for enhancing American engagement with Africa are provided on the Council’s website.[i] In the first of a two-part essay, Richard Joseph discusses how this debate relates to ideas for bolstering a liberal international order. In the second part, he will elaborate on specific policy priorities.[ii]

1960 was the year of African Independence when 17 countries, about a third of the continent, pulled down the flags of their colonial powers and raised their own. The following year, on August 4, 1961, Barack Obama was born. He is not only linked to Africa as the son of a Kenyan, his life calendar and that of Africa are intertwined. On the two occasions when Mr. Obama gave formal addresses in speeches in Africa, he spoke to the heart of the dilemma of new nations that had stumbled along the path of progress. As a U.S. Senator in Nairobi, Kenya, Mr. Obama described in August 2006 how corruption corrodes the state from the inside, preventing it from bringing peace, justice, and prosperity to the citizens of Kenya and other African countries. On his return to the continent three years later as U.S. president, he declared in Ghana that enlightened leadership, democratic institutions and good governance are the keys to economic growth and prosperity. These themes are woven into the U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa issued by the White House in June 2012.

Many commentators have been critical of the level of attention devoted by the Obama Administration to Africa. In its defense, the Administration has had to cope with a prolonged economic recession, extricate the U.S. from two land wars, combat international terrorism and turmoil in the Middle East, and confront other daunting challenges. An opportunity to send a needed signal to Africa was missed, however, during the State of the Union Address on February 12. When President Obama announced the completing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and talks to create a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union, he could have added a few words about the prospects for enhanced engagement with an economically resurgent sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, Africa appeared in references to combatting terrorism and al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia and Mali. It was also implied in the paragraph devoted to “the most impoverished parts of our world” where “people live on little more than a dollar a day”. The commitment to eradicate extreme poverty in two decades, and realize “the promise of an AIDS-free generation”, is well and good. But these familiar woes should have been juxtaposed with the striking economic advances in Africa and the new opportunities they represent for Africans as well as Americans.

Pragmatic Liberalism: A Governing Philosophy for Today’s World

President Obama’s second term heralds a new era. His inaugural address was anchored to a reaffirmation of the American “creed” of its founders. Before discussing its implications for the people and nations of Africa, it is worth noting the overlap with a recent publication by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry: “Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist era.”[iii] According to these scholars, the capacity of the United States to shape the world in positive ways exceeds that that of any other nation. The central strategy, they state, should be building a domestic and international order in which “peace, prosperity, and freedom are widely shared.” The roots of American liberal internationalism lie in “social democratic ideals” and “an equity agenda”. The governing approach should reflect “progressive pragmatism”. While the American system involves rights and representative institutions, it is also an “experimental project of incremental adaptation and innovation.”

Americans in the twentieth century evolved a “complex smart state”, the authors contend, characterized by “burden-sharing, problem-solving, and mutual learning.” Responding to external challenges requires adapting American values and capacities to the “post-hegemonic system of global governance.” In an era of complex interdependence, the United States, according to Deudney and Ikenberry, no longer has the capacity to serve as the “sole provider of global public goods.” Nevertheless, American leadership is indispensable, and the anchor of foreign policy should be the strengthening and activation of the community of democratic nations.

In his second inaugural address on January 21, President Obama linked his policy agenda in a similar way to an affirmation of the essence of America and its system of democratic government. The address began by recalling the statement in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal” and the inalienable rights with which they are endowed. The Republic was set on “a never-ending journey to bridge the meaning of those words with the realities of our time”. There has been a constant balancing of “initiative and enterprise” with the need for an activist government; of the fundamental ideals of America and making them real in “today’s world”. Deudney and Ikenberry would be pleased with Mr. Obama’s melding of the tenets of liberal democracy and social democracy, of free enterprise and social equity, when he declared: “our country cannot succeed when a shrinking few do very well and a growing many barely make it.”

The inaugural address was brief on foreign policy, but what it said reflected the pragmatic progressivism – I prefer to call it pragmatic liberalism – that President Obama advocates at home. As he stated, the United States should ensure “the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity, human dignity and justice”. He affirmed in his second inaugural address American support for defending and strengthening democracy overseas while remaining “the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe: no one has a greater share in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation”. And he advanced a view of leadership that is equally visionary and pragmatic, evoking America’s “lasting birthright” and “precious light of freedom” alongside the need to “act in our time”. President Obama is doing no less, one commentator remarked, than defining a “21st century version of liberalism that could outlast his time in office.” [iv]

In one paragraph of his inaugural address, President Obama began five successive sentences with the phrase, “Our journey is not complete…” They were followed by a list of the unfulfilled dimensions of America as a lawful, just and peaceful country. On his next visit to Africa, he could begin a public address with similar words and fill in the blanks with aspirations known to his audience. Mr. Obama advanced a robust view of the responsibilities of government that carried over into the State of the Union address a few weeks later. He could very well repeat to African government officials what he said in that second address: “We were sent here to make what difference we can, to secure this nation, expand opportunity, and uphold our ideals through the hard, often frustrating, but absolutely necessary work of self-government.“

Going forward, how should President Obama construct his Africa legacy?

The first observation is that, in line with Deudney and Ikenberry, the principles, orientations and priorities to be applied should be no different from those Mr. Obama is espousing regarding the American journey. There is hardly a word in the second inaugural address that the citizens of Africa would not associate with their own aspirations. The American-African conversation should be conducted on the basis of shared values and interests. Again, following Deudney and Ikenberry, the conversation can be based on “the pull of success, not push of power”. Such a change in tone and focus would be welcomed by America’s interlocutors in the continent.

The second observation is that, despite the difficulties, many countries – especially in sub-Saharan Africa – are exiting a long tunnel and experiencing a “new birth” of political and economic freedom. Africa is moving away from the era of major wars, unelected governments, and state-dominated and mismanaged economies. Since the mid-1990s, an economic upswing has persisted despite the global recession. In a few decades, Africa will be the most populous continent, and several of its economies will count among the most productive in the world. On the first appropriate occasion, President Obama should present to the American people the outlines of an American Agenda for Africa. Unlike the U.S. Strategy toward Africa, the Agenda would couple the best ideas within the Administration with those of diverse American constituencies including the new African diaspora.

Aaron David Miller commented that Obama’s State of the Union Address “stressed fixing America’s broken house, not chasing around the world to fix everyone else’s.”[v] Interestingly, in a conversation I had with an African graduate student at Northwestern University after the address, she stated that President Obama should not be criticized for failing to tackle Africa’s problems more vigorously. “That is for our leaders to do”, she remarked. I sensed that her views reflected feelings of members of her generation. They are skeptical of demands for more external assistance by governments which had often made poor use of internally-generated and externally-provided resources.

While hailing the opportunities, it is important to be frank about the challenges to be confronted. We can identify today a few fairly-constructed national entities in Africa (Cape Verde, Ghana); many undergoing major reconstruction (Guinea, Ivory Coast); some dealing with fault lines that can rupture into violent conflict (Kenya, South Africa); some with parts being constructed while others are torn down (Nigeria). Dynamic countries (Rwanda, Uganda) can be found abutting “nation-spaces” that have never known coherence and stability (Congo Kinshasa, Sudan); and countries with great resources have been derailed by their leadership (Zimbabwe). Given this diverse scenario, how should President Obama most usefully invest his authority and talents, and marshal Americans to engage with the positive trends and opportunities?

Enhanced Engagement with Africa

The engine that will power increased prosperity and poverty reduction in Africa is the achievement of transformative and inclusive economic growth over an extended period. To make it a reality, the following is my suggested list of priorities. In the second part of this essay, I will elaborate on each of them, show how they are connected, and identify emerging policy proposals:

Trade and Investments
Strengthening Democracy
Developmental Governance
State Capacity and National Cohesion
Peace and Security
Energy, Water, and Transportation
Youth, Women, and the Diaspora

I will conclude by summarizing an article that examines the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.[vi] What is surprising is how much the author, Philip Stephens, discusses this Partnership using the same theoretical framework as the Deudney and Ikenberry essay — and which is also reflected in President’s Obama recent public addresses. According to Stephens, while the trade deal would “boost investment, growth and living standards”, “the reward is the advance of the liberal political order that has lately seemed in retreat.” (italics added) Furthermore, he states, the deal would “abolish tariffs, remove regulatory barriers and create an integrated marketplace.” The pull of success would be evident in the strengthening of “international norms and values”. Among them are “the rule of law, collective security, respect for human dignity and accountable government”.

An American Agenda for Africa, if it becomes a reality, will similarly include mechanisms for increasing trade and investments and building interconnected markets. But it must also be wedded to strengthening security which, according to Stephens, “resides in broad acceptance of international norms and values as well as in brute military force.” This challenge must be grasped by those who advocate enhanced American engagement in Africa. It is important to connect the emerging economic order in the continent with efforts to strengthen, as Stephens says of the Transatlantic Partnership, the rule of law, collective security, respect for human dignity and accountable government. Africa’s uncompleted journey can be fruitfully discussed in relation to the unfolding journey of America’s 44th president as well as the political and economic renewal he is championing at home and abroad.

[i] See the list of resources at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Event/FY13/02_February_13/President_Obama_s_Africa_Policy__Just_Right_or_Not_Enough_.aspx

[ii] This two-part essay draws on many years of policy analysis and advocacy whose central axis is the promotion of democracy, development and security in a complex and rapidly evolving continent. For commentaries since 2008, see www.brookings.edu/experts/josephr and www.africaplus.wordpress.edu.

[iii] http://www.cfr.org/united-states/democratic-internationalism-american-grand-strategy-post-exceptionalist-era/p29417. The following quotes are taken from this text. [iv] Richard W. Stevenson, “In Age of Spending Cuts Making A Case for Government,” The New York Times, February 13, 2013.

[v] Aaron David Miller, “The Avoider”: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/12/the_avoider_obama_state_of_the_union_foreign_policy

[vi] Philip Stephens, “Transatlantic free trade promises a bigger prize,” Financial Times, February 14, 2013.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: AfricaPlus

Discordant Development and Insecurity in Africa

Richard Joseph — Wed, 19 Dec 2012 09:49:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This chapter is part of the 2013 Foresight Africa full report, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. Read the full report here.

Richard Joseph explores how “discordant development”—deepening inequalities and rapid progress juxtaposed with group distress— is often one of the root causes of uncertainty, insecurity and violent conflict in Africa. For example, Mali and Ghana have experienced similar growth rates but Mali is sundered and in disarray, while Ghana has experienced both political and economic progress.

Joseph discusses the causes of discordant development and provides recommendations for how policymakers can begin tackling this problem in order to address broader issues of insecurity. Joseph contends that sustaining growth and avoiding discordant development require not only enlightened leaders but also robust democratic institutions and vigilant civil societies. He warns development officers and political leaders against viewing Africa solely through “polarizing lenses,” either screening out security challenges in growing economies or overlooking axes of growth in conflict-plagued societies.

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Richard Joseph

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Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2013

Tue, 18 Dec 2012 12:14:00 -0500

Africa starts 2013 with hope and optimism. Africa has dropped its mantle as a “doomed continent” and has weathered several global economic crises fairly well. Today, the continent is a land of opportunity both for Africans and international investors. Many now see the region as “emerging Africa” because of the positive changes that have taken place and continue to take place across the continent.

Africa has changed, moving from economic stagnation to above 5 percent GDP growth on average. The continent is now home to some of the fastest growing economies in the world: Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. This growth has helped build a burgeoning middle class, which has created new markets for goods and services. Investors focused on tapping into these new markets in Africa are likely to find it easier to do business there than ever before as African governments are working to reduce transaction costs. In addition to growing consumer markets, African countries have discovered additional natural resources. If managed properly, these resources could help spur further economic growth and development for the region and improve the lives of millions.

Such an optimistic outlook for the continent means that African and global policymakers must get ahead of the challenges and opportunities for an important year of decision-making. Since 2010, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) has asked its scholars to assess the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. This year, AGI experts and colleagues have identified what they consider to be the key issues for 2013 and ways to leverage opportunities so that Africa can continue its “emerging” momentum. The following briefs in the Foresight Africa collection are meant to create a dialogue on what matters in Africa for 2013, and it is our hope that this dialogue will continue through the year.

Download the full 2013 Foresight Africa report »

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President Obama and Sub-Saharan Africa: What’s Missing

Richard Joseph — Wed, 12 Dec 2012 16:30:00 -0500

On June 14, 2012, President Obama affixed his signature to the “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa.” It identified four focus areas: democratic institutions; growth, trade and investment; peace and security; and opportunity and development. The response from the policy community was a shrug. Mwangi Kimenyi of the Brookings Institution claimed that the policy document was neither “new” nor “strategic,” and did not establish a “foundation for creative engagement with an emerging Africa.”

The Obama administration must confront two challenges. First, it must convey more effectively the important contributions the U.S. has already made toward these priorities. Second, Mr. Obama has to put his personal stamp on specific initiatives he considers central to his legacy.

The president’s talk in Ghana in July 2009 electrified the audience by declaring that America was ready to help the continent build a broader base for prosperity. The gateway to that transformation was eliminating bad governance. While this message was repeated in the June 2012 policy document, it is lost in the long list of program initiatives.

The president’s critics suggest that the U.S. should focus on the great opportunities in an economically resurgent Africa. Look at the dizzy expansion, they say, of China in Africa and how its engagement in mineral extraction, trade, construction, and infrastructure has been supported by frequent visits from China’s top leaders.

Often overlooked in these critiques is that the American predominant role in advancing global peace and security includes Africa. This is an argument Mr. Obama himself needs to make. Africa is not only a continent of “frontier economies,” it remains one of “frontier states.” The U.S. plays a unique role in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and increasing good governance within African states.

Mr. Kimenyi suggests that Mr. Obama should “shelve” his June 12 strategy and “start afresh.” I won’t go that far. But Mr. Obama needs to step up to the plate. He should plan a visit to Africa in 2013 that includes stops in several countries, convene a roundtable on Africa to garner policy ideas from academic experts and analysts, and lay out his “Agenda for Africa” in a major address to the American public. Moreover, he should lead a comprehensive international effort to end the relentless wars and economic predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The consequences have been genocidal for the Congolese people.

Despite the economic upswing, and China’s growing presence in African infrastructure, manufacturing accounts for a paltry share of Africa’s output. Mr. Obama should highlight the contributions American corporations can make to industrialization and job creation in the continent. He should put forward incentives for American institutions to pursue deeper engagement with their African counterparts, especially in higher education and health care. Mr. Obama’s name is on a dozen program initiatives in Africa, but who knows it? That must change, and soon.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: Council on Foreign Relations

Image Source: © Finbarr O'Reilly / Reuters

The American Presidency and Democracy Promotion in Africa

Richard Joseph — Thu, 23 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

On May 18, 2012, a Symposium of the G-8 Summit was convened in Washington, DC to launch a major initiative on global agriculture and food security. In addition to President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, and several leaders of international organizations, the featured speakers included four African presidents: Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, John Atta Mills of Ghana, Boni Yayi of Benin, and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. Mills and Zenawi have since died. Kikwete, Mills, and Yayi headed governments that are among the most democratic in Africa. Mills’s successor for a four-year term will be chosen in democratic elections this December, the sixth successive multiparty election to be conducted in Ghana since 1992. The Ethiopian insurgents, who were waved on by American diplomats to take Addis Ababa in 1991 after many years of armed struggle, have never kept their promise to permit the construction of an open and fair democratic system. The struggle continues, therefore, to match words with deeds in democracy building in Africa.

Just weeks after this Symposium, the White House announced on June 14 a new U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. In clear language, it presented the main dimensions of American policy towards Africa, accompanied by a cover letter from President Obama. Issued near the end of the first Obama Administration, this document can be used to assess how well the government has lived up to its promises. It also offers guidelines for American policymakers after the November 2012 elections.

Of the four pillars of U.S. policies, the one mentioned first is “Strengthen Democratic Institutions”. The others are “Spur Economic, Growth, Trade and Investment”, “Advance Peace and Security”, and “Promote Opportunity and Development.” What is unusual about the democracy pillar are the bold commitments made. They are anchored to President Obama’s declaration in Accra, Ghana, in July 2009: “Africa does not need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.” The Strategy “commits the United States” to “challenging leaders whose actions threaten the credibility of democratic processes.” “Our message,” President Obama declares, “to those who would derail the democratic process is clear and unequivocal: the United States will not stand idly by when actors threaten legitimately elected governments or manipulate the fairness and integrity of democratic processes.”

One month after the issuance of the U.S. Strategy, a remarkable article by Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Engelbert was published in the journal African Affairs. It isentitled, “Extraversion, Vulnerability to Donors, and Political Liberalization in Africa.” “Extraversion” is a concept earlier applied to Africa by British scholar, Christopher Clapham, to refer to the susceptibility of African countries, and especially governments, to external influence. Drawing on a wealth of empirical data, Peiffer and Englebert examine the impact of “extraversion” on political liberalization and democratization. They confirm what other researchers, included me, have written, namely, that “rapid improvements in democracy from 1989 to 1995” were “followed by overall stagnation”. Further, they contend that both initial transitions and subsequent democratic consolidation reflect the differing degrees of regime extraversion.

An important implication of this study is that sustained external action in support of political liberty and democracy in Africa matters, and matters a great deal. It does not imply that such efforts will always produce desired outcomes, since regimes differ in their “extraversion portfolios”. From this perspective, what can be said about the record of the Obama Administration’s first term? In several notable cases, the U.S. government has walked the talk of democracy. It did not “stand idly by” when the “fairness and integrity of democratic processes” were threatened in Côte d’Ivoire. Laurent Gbagbo was forced, through collaborative efforts, to stand down after he lost the November 2010 election. He and his wife Simone now await trial in The Hague for the abuses committed.

The U.S. was also an active participant in the coalition of African and non-African countries and organizations that brought democracy to Guinea after decades of rapacious and repressive governments. The same was true of the restoration of constitutional government in Niger; the transfer of power from a dying President Umaru Yar’Adua in Nigeria; inducing President Abdoulaye Wade to respect the electorate’s verdict in Senegal; and ensuring a peaceful succession in Malawi to Africa’s second woman president, Joyce Hilda Banda. So there are many entries on the positive side of the ledger. However, in a continent of great security challenges - widespread poverty, failed states, Islamic militancy, armed insurgencies, piracy and other woes - a “perfect” record of support for democracy is not achievable.

Despite all this, the Obama Administration has set the bar higher for democracy promotion in Africa: “The United States will take a strong and consistent stand against actions that undermine democratic institutions or the legitimacy of democratic processes. We will evaluate elections against the highest possible standards of fairness and impartiality.” Of course, neither the U.S. government, nor even the smaller European democracies, has ever maintained “a strong and consistent stand” in support of democracy in Africa. Other interests, and especially security concerns, have often forced changes in such positions. If elections in Africa are evaluated “against the highest possible standards of fairness and impartiality”, many will not pass muster. The forthcoming American presidential election could therefore determine whether the gap between U.S. ideals and interests narrows or widens further. [See Jeffrey Gettleman’s Ethiopian Leader’s Death Highlights Gap Between U.S. Interests and Ideals]

Key statements in the Strategy document regarding democracy in Africa could have been written by leading students of these processes. While gains have been made, it admits that they are often “fragile”. In a number of cases, the “transition to democracy is uneven and slow”. Leaders abound “who resist relinquishing power”. “In many countries, corruption is endemic, and state institutions remain weak.” What the document in effect acknowledges is that electoral authoritarian regimes, which dominate the African landscape, are relics of an era that will one day come to an end. The government officials who drafted this document are well aware that these statements will be used by democracy advocates in Africa to challenge their countries’ repressive governments, and also to hold the United States government accountable.

Although the Strategy document concerns sub-Saharan Africa, it was issued at a time when this arbitrary geographical designation is even more in question. The “Arab Spring” has had its greatest blossoming in North Africa. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have shed autocratic governments, and some progress is being made in Morocco towards electoral accountability. The possibility of linking political advances in North and sub-Saharan Africa is an opportunity to embolden and deepen these processes throughout the continent.

If Barack Obama is elected to a second term, his foreign policy team will have its “New Strategy” ready for implementation. If he is defeated, this document can provide an array of ideas for its successor. The views of Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, and their foreign policy advisers, regarding political liberalization and democracy in Africa are not known. Whatever the outcome of the U.S. elections, the four dimensions of U.S. policy would have to be confronted. It should be noted that there has been a substantial degree of bipartisan support for increased U.S. engagement with Africa over the past two decades. Each succeeding administration has built on what was achieved by its predecessor. The administration of George W. Bush introduced several major programs – on HIV/AIDS, aid financing, and malaria – that were continued under Barack Obama. Both governments renewed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key initiative of Bill Clinton’s government. While no major U.S. policy initiative in Africa during this period has been reversed, some have been significantly enhanced. One such example, as the Strategy document attests, is democracy promotion by the Obama administration.

Caryn Peiffer and Pierre Engelbert conclude their timely treatise as follows: “With African economies undergoing apparently dramatic changes and donors perceiving increased anti-Western threats on the continent, African regimes might be entering a more turbulent era than the last two decades.” Whether democracy advances, stagnates, or regresses in Africa during this era will greatly depend, their study shows, on certain factors: the interplay of internal forces in particular countries; the stratagems employed by African leaders and regimes; and what is done by major external actors and forces.

The goals of economic growth, peace and stability, and the general widening of opportunities – all clearly articulated in the Strategy document – are often used to justify the stalling of democratic progress in Africa. A “strong and consistent stand” on behalf of democracy, however, is the pillar around which all the others should be arrayed, both in Africa and in the councils of the U.S. and other external governments. Participants in the May 2012 Washington Symposium on global agriculture and food security were greeted by a demonstration protesting violations of human rights and civil liberties in Ethiopia. The successors of Meles Zenawi, and all African autocrats, are put on notice that, eventually, a democratic pillar will be erected in their own Tahrir Square. It is also the one that will remain standing when their autocracies have ended.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: Council for a Community of Democracies

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Strategic Priorities in Contemporary Africa: Part III

Richard Joseph — Wed, 16 May 2012 16:16:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This is the third of a three-part series by Richard Joseph, who examines Africa's "prismatic narrative," in which African developments must be viewed "through the prism of how key dimensions interrelate and the complex interplay of local, regional, and global factors." Read the first and second parts.

At the time of the G8 and NATO summits, Africa has assumed greater importance in global hopes and concerns. Accelerated growth and development, democracy, and the containing of organized violence are central themes of the new African security agenda. Two decades ago, African issues, except for the export of crude petroleum and other minerals, could be bottled up within the continent. That is no longer the case. Major discoveries of oil, gas, and coal are making the continent more significant in meeting global energy needs. Abundant and underutilized land will steadily contribute to global food supplies. And expanding economies will continue to provide increased opportunities for investors. It is the physical security side of the African ledger, however, that poses the greatest challenge. How this is tackled will greatly affect progress in other areas.

I call this the “prismatic narrative” because it requires assessing African developments through the prism of how key dimensions interrelate and the complex interplay of local, regional, and global factors. In a forthright article in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2012), General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, discussed adjustments in American forces in response to new strategic challenges. Following prolonged combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Odierno states that the U.S. Army, together with U.S. Special Forces and other units, will devote increased attention to “shaping the strategic environment, preventing the outbreak of dangerous regional conflicts, and improving the army’s readiness to respond to a range of complex contingencies worldwide.” Although General Odierno says little about Africa, what he details has huge implications for American engagement with the continent.

Read the full piece on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Strategic Priorities in Contemporary Africa: Part II

Richard Joseph — Mon, 23 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This is the second of a three-part series by Richard Joseph, who examines Africa's "disaster narrative," in which "political instability, state erosion, gross abuses of government power, and appalling human catastrophes" remain enduring issues across the continent. Read the first part.

It would require the skills of a master carver to capture the radically different faces of the African continent. Reports of political instability, state erosion, gross abuses of government power, and appalling human catastrophes appear alongside stories of remarkable economic advances. This has been the case for many years. In November 1993, for example, IMF director Michel Camdessus characterized the 20-year decline in Africa’s per capita growth rates as “the sinking of a continent.” Less than three years later, he stated that an economic recovery was underway—an analysis now confirmed. Camdessus warned, however, that the recovery would not occur in “countries ravaged by war, fratricidal conflicts, and serious political upheaval.”

Even African countries that appear to be doing well can suddenly spin into crisis. Consider Mali, one of the poster countries for democratic progress and political stability during the past two decades. Tuareg nomads recruited into the armed forces of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, along with other migrants from west and equatorial Africa, returned to their native Mali in early 2012 lugging heavy weaponry. They quickly turned the tide in a rebellion that had waxed and waned for many years in the country’s vast northern lands.

Read the full piece on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Strategic Priorities in Contemporary Africa: Part I

Richard Joseph — Thu, 29 Mar 2012 10:55:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This is the first of a three-part series by Richard Joseph, who examines Africa's "progress narrative," which "has provided an uplift from the usual dismal perceptions" of the continent. Read the second part.

Three narratives about Africa can be seen in contemporary media reports: a progress narrative, a disaster narrative, and what I call a prismatic narrative. The first narrative emphasizes the sustained growth, accompanied by poverty reduction and other social gains, that is now evident in about a quarter of the continent’s 55 countries. The disaster narrative was recently captured by Jeffrey Gettleman of the New York Times: “Many parts of Africa are clearly sinking deeper into violence, chaos, and obscurity.” The prismatic narrative can be seen in a report of the Africa Progress Panel chaired by Kofi Annan: “Progress, stagnation, and discouraging regression continue to co-exist on the continent.”

The progress narrative has provided an uplift from the usual dismal perceptions of Africa. It has been featured in two 2010 books: Vijay Rajahan's Africa Rising and Steven Radelet's Emerging Africa. In a similar vein, the World Bank declared in its 10-year Africa Strategy in March 2011 that sub-Saharan Africa had “an unprecedented opportunity for transformation and sustained growth” and “could be on the brink of an economic takeoff, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago.”

Read the full piece on the Chicago Council on Global Affairs »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Insecurity and Counter-Insurgency in Africa

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:48:00 -0500

Richard Joseph reviews the threats stemming from the statelessness of Somalia, the need for political reconfiguration in Sudan, and the potential for conflict in Nigeria.

Publication: Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012

Reversing the Terrorist Tide in Nigeria: The Need for Smart Power

Richard Joseph — Tue, 03 Jan 2012 12:38:00 -0500

On the first day of 2012, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in four of his country’s 36 states and closed parts of its borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. He also pledged to crush Boko Haram, the self-declared al-Qaida affiliate. The emergence of northern Nigeria as a theatre in global jihadism has been one of the grim developments of the past two years. On December 25, 2009, the failure of explosive materials to detonate in the underwear of 23-year old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab prevented a horrific airplane calamity. It was soon learned that Abdulmutallab had been prepared for this assignment by Anwar al-Awlaki, the terrorist mastermind subsequently killed on September 30, 2011 by American drone aircraft in Yemen.

Several bombing incidents in Nigeria on Christmas Day 2011 showed the potent and merciless character of the insurgency. In one of these incidents, 37 parishioners were killed in a Catholic church on the outskirts of the capital, Abuja. Boko Haram militants, who have also engaged in several armed confrontations with Nigerian security forces, claimed responsibility. Similarly, 25 people died when the same militants bombed U.N. headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011. While Nigeria confronts these dire threats, the world community cannot overlook the need for comprehensive global engagement to advance governance, security and development in Nigeria. Although the challenges are great, so also are the resources available to meet them.

At least half of Nigeria’s estimated 160 million citizens are Muslim, and the greater majority resides in the northern states of the federation. Extremist groups have periodically emerged among them, but usually dissolve after brutal confrontations with security forces. This is no longer the case. Boko Haram, which in Hausa, the lingua franca, means “western education is sacrilege,” is unyielding. It rejects what the northern region most urgently needs: rapidly improved education to narrow the widening gap with the southern states. It also leverages resentment many northerners hold for the relative success, once economic and now also political, of the more-Christianized south. Boko Haram’s recent attacks and announcements are heightening regional, ethnic and religious tensions. A recent declaration called on southerners to leave the north, a chilling reminder of the pogroms and mass migrations that preceded the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70.

Reversing the terrorist tide in Nigeria will require expert counter-insurgency assistance along with efforts to accelerate political and economic progress. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, in a visit to Abuja in August 2009, spoke forcefully of the need to reduce political corruption. Much remains to be done to improve transparency and accountability in the use of public funds. This struggle can draw on many resources including myriad civil society organizations, diverse and vigorous independent media, the wide availability of cell-phones, and a judiciary that intermittently demonstrates the capacity to curb the abuse of power. The appointment of a new head of the federal anti-corruption agency in November 2011, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), together with the recruitment of capable individuals to lead the economic and finance ministries and the Central Bank, could accelerate the pursuit of honest and effective government.

Goodluck Jonathan presides over a highly presidential system. In May 2010, he succeeded Umaru Yar’Adua who died after a prolonged illness. Jonathan, who had formerly served as governor of Bayelsa, an oil-rich state in the Delta region, was elected to a four-year term in April 2011. After more than a decade of military operations, and the lavish distribution of funds by government agencies and petroleum companies, armed insurgencies in the delta region have abated. The opposite is true in the north which, together with the rise in terrorism, has experienced economic contraction and the loss of the patronage-commanding presidency.

The Jonathan presidency is caught in a perfect storm. His legitimacy is challenged by some northern political barons who believe that presidential power should have been retained by their region in keeping with an extra-constitutional power rotation principle. This dissension was echoed in the fierce riots throughout the north after Jonathan’s electoral victory in April 2011. Jonathan has promised to serve only one elected term (although he is eligible for two), which holds the threat of condemnation by opponents if he reneges and profound dismay among supporters if he does not. Moreover, major infrastructural reforms must be rapidly executed in virtually every sector despite systemic inefficiencies. Jonathan is currently pushing through an unpopular reform long attempted by his predecessors, the removal of subsidies on petroleum, much of which is imported because of Nigeria’s dilapidated refineries. While vowing to reduce corruption, Jonathan must keep federal largesse flowing to party bosses to whom he owes his ascendancy and political survival.

What can the United States and other major countries do to help Nigeria address the immediate security crisis as well as safely navigate the remaining 40 months of Jonathan’s presidency? In the terminology of Joseph Nye, a smart power strategy is required to skillfully combine hard and soft power. The first priority should be to neutralize Boko Haram without a massive display of American counter-terrorism prowess, which could provoke the public backlash seen elsewhere, notably in Pakistan. The required actions include a rapid upgrade in the professional and technical capacity of Nigeria’s security forces. They must begin intercepting Boko Haram militants before they strike, but also avoid the general brutalities that have fomented deeper anger. Nigerian forces have been accused of previous abuses including extra-judicial killings, making the removal of legal constraints under the state of emergency a cause for extreme vigilance. Second is the need to engage Nigeria’s vast diaspora, perhaps a million-strong in the United States. With their education, training and material resources, and their commitment to improved governance in their native country, they have much to contribute to capacity building, accelerated development and the rule of law. Third, a determined effort must be made to promote high quality and job-producing growth through trade and investment in a country that has the potential to match the rising nations of Brazil and Indonesia.

While pleading guilty in the Detroit federal court on October 12, 2011, Abdulmutallab warned: “You laugh at us now, we will laugh at you later.” As Nigerian security and social forces mobilize to meet a challenge that is implacable and remorseless, this pivotal nation must be helped intelligently, assiduously, and comprehensively to succeed.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Image Source: Â© Afolabi Sotunde / Reuters

Examining Mitt Romney's Approach to Preventing Jihadism in Africa

Richard Joseph — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:50:00 -0500

Africa is seldom a central feature of American presidential campaigns. In an interview with the Des Moines Register on December 9, Mitt Romney briefly brought Africa into the conversation. Explaining what he would do differently than President Barack Obama to counter the threat of radical Islam, Mr. Romney first stated that he would have taken much more vigorous action to dissuade Iran from its “nuclear folly,” but then segued into what the United States should do to prevent radical jihadists from expanding in countries such as Nigeria. His proposal, which he claimed reflected a policy of former President Reagan, would provide special partnership forces of military and intelligence personnel to help local armed forces “root out jihadists,” thereby avoiding the need for “kinetic military power” in the future.

Mr. Romney pointed to the success of this strategy in reducing such threats in the Philippines; and he supported the dispatch by the Obama administration of such a contingent to hunt down Joseph Kony, leader of the terrorist Lord Resistance Army, in Central Africa. What can be said in response to these remarks? First, the partnering of small units of military and intelligence advisers with the military forces of other countries is certainly a more widespread practice than Mr. Romney indicates. Second, there is no reason to assume that such efforts are not underway in Nigeria already, as they are in countries to the west of Nigeria where al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is active. Third, describing what is happening in northern Nigeria as a case of radical jihadists seeking to expand to other parts of the country, casts anti-jihadism in the same mode of Cold War discourse on stopping communist infiltrators.

Mr. Romney must be given credit for bringing sub-Saharan Africa fleetingly into the picture. There is little prospect, however, that contenders for the Republican nomination will provide more than sound-bites to show their resolve in defending American national security in Africa. At some point in the run-up to the November 2012 elections, a mature conversation should take place about the complex political and economic challenges in Africa today. Such a review should include the need for multifaceted responses to counter the despair and radicalization, especially of young people, in diverse country contexts.

One of my Nigerian colleagues who teaches Islam begins his introductory course by telling American students: “We will study what Muslims do when they are not blowing up things.” Advisers to U.S. presidential candidates should prepare briefing papers on why a shadowy group in northern Nigeria is now blowing up cars, buildings, police stations, and themselves. While small partnership forces can help hunt its militants down, corrupt governance, dismal education, joblessness, and grinding poverty will ensure they persist. Eventually, we may arrive at policies that can stop individuals bent on acts of terrorism while also helping reverse conditions that led to their loss of hope for salutary change in this world. Nigeria, with a democratic, if flawed, federal system, ample national resources, and a Muslim population that is overwhelmingly “non-jihadist”, is an appropriate place for American and other partnership forces to engage in enhanced governance and development cooperation alongside focused counter-insurgency assistance.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Image Source: Â© Brian Snyder / Reuters

Democracy and Reconfigured Power in Africa

Richard Joseph — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 17:11:00 -0500

In July 2009, President Barack Obama declared in Accra, Ghana, that Africa no longer needs strongmen—it needs strong institutions. Almost a year later, at a meeting of the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton contended that many African leaders seem more concerned with staying eternally in power than with ably serving their people. In some cases, she said, democracy “as one election, one time” still prevails.

How much do these views correspond with what is taking place in African countries? What patterns emerge in the configuration of political power? And finally, how do we assess Africa’s democratic prospects in light of global developments?

As once impregnable autocracies fall in North Africa, the people of sub-Saharan Africa can reflect on two decades of political turmoil and change. Today most countries in the region are nominally democratic; that is, they hold regular elections, opposition parties compete for elective offices, and a wide range of opinions can be expressed. The 2010 survey by Freedom House, however, suggests that sub-Saharan Africa reflects a global trend in which political rights and civil liberties have deteriorated in recent years.

Developments in Africa, according to Freedom House’s Arch Puddington, show “a continued pattern of volatility amid overall freedom decline,” with democratic backsliding exceeding advances. Samuel Huntington’s theory of waves of democracy, and of reverse waves, has been helpful in explaining this course of events. The third wave of democracy did sweep across much of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, but has now subsided, except for ripples and eddies.

This is an appropriate moment, therefore, to step back from the volatility and try to understand the deeper dynamics of political change and continuity in the region. In this exercise, the perspective of Richard L. Sklar, a longtime student of African affairs and retired professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles, is helpful. Sklar has argued for the importance of studying power and the means by which it is acquired and exercised. He contends that all governmental systems are mixed, and everything that is good in governance may not necessarily be “democratic.”

Sklar calls attention, for example, to the significance of oligarchic entities, such as the US Supreme Court or the British House of Lords, in capitalist democracies. Significant powers are often devolved to unelected institutions such as the US Federal Reserve. Well before the post-Soviet transitions, Sklar claimed that Africa was a “workshop of democracy.” And he identified a unique African contribution to modern governance in “dual majesty”—that is, the persistence alongside Western-type political orders of traditional systems of authority such as chieftaincy institutions. Sklar’s studies alert us to the importance of understanding the contextual dynamics of power, authority, and institutions in Africa.

A few other observations are pertinent as well. First, we should think of democratic and autocratic systems of power as being simultaneously in play in many African nations. Second, appropriate attention should be devoted to geopolitics and the impact of external forces. Cambridge University’s Christopher Clapham refers to the “extraversion” of African countries throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods: that is, the extent to which they have been, and continue to be, influenced by external powers. A third consideration in many African countries’ political development is the significance of armed struggle in installing long-surviving regimes and shaping their character.

Resilient Autocrats

In an essay on the new authoritarianism in Russia, Ivan Krastev asks “why authoritarianism is surviving in the age of democratization.” He argues that students of democracy have been “blind to the resilience of authoritarianism.” However, a number of scholars have dealt with this issue in essays since 1991. To capture the tentative nature of these political processes, I argued in my 1998 edited book, State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, that many new regimes reflected a reconfiguration of power rather than a transition to constitutional democracy.

When we speak of autocracy and authoritarianism, we naturally think of the exercise of power. However, the same should be true of democracy, which derives from the Greek word, demokratia, meaning the power of the demos. A struggle to wrest power from autocratic systems and shift it to the people is evidently happening in North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East. Likewise, anyone who witnessed the villes mortes campaign in Cameroon in the early 1990s, when protesters shut down major cities, or many of the other uprisings and demonstrations of that period, would attest to this central feature.

After popular upheavals, however, nations have to be governed. In restoring order, a reconfigured autocracy can be established, as happened in Russia under Vladimir Putin. In the journey from system overthrow to new political order, African countries are strewn along a continuum from the liberal democracy of Cape Verde to the hard autocracy of Eritrea, with many hybrid systems in between.

The most prevalent political system in Africa today, notwithstanding important democratic advances, is the electoral authoritarian regime, which ranges from noncompetitive, as in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), to competitive, as in Uganda. At the top of the list of consolidated autocratic rule would be José Eduardo dos Santos, who succeeded Antonio Agostinho Neto as Angola’s president in September 1979. Dos Santos and the ruling MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) were confident enough of their hegemony to permit parliamentary elections in 2008, in which the party won 82 percent of the vote.

It can be expected that this dominant party system, as with other post-liberation governments like Namibia’s SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization), will persist through several electoral cycles. The power and authority of the Angolan regime rest on decades of colonial and postcolonial armed struggle, enormous oil wealth, a petroleum industry that now competes globally, and the capacity to adjust to criticisms without ceding its extensive control of the state and economy.

Another case of Marxism-Leninism reconfigured for the new global era, following the armed seizure of power, is the Ethiopian regime of Meles Zenawi and the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front). Freedom House’s 2010 survey downgraded Ethiopia from “partly free” to “not free.” What impact will this demotion have? Not much, most likely. Ethiopia has been one of the world’s leading per capita recipients of overseas development aid, and will continue to receive such largesse.

The EPRDF regime rests on a minority ethnic base and operates a system carefully designed to enable it to dominate provincial governments. When the opposition improved its performance in 2005 elections, and the results were falsified, subsequent protests were brutally suppressed. The regime then tightened its preelection controls and significantly improved its “electoral” support in 2010. The Ethiopian regime knows that what really counts is not its democratic character but its capacity to project force, domestically and externally, and the country’s socioeconomic indicators. In alliance with the United States, Ethiopia has sent troops to fight Islamist insurgents in Somalia. When Sudan seemed on the verge of another outbreak of fighting over the disputed Abyei district and in south Kordofan, Ethiopia again obliged external powers by sending troops to help contain the threat. It is not easy to persuade a postliberation regime in a very diverse country of 90 million to serve as regional gendarme, permit humanitarian access to its impoverished communities, and also risk defeat in competitive elections.

An even more direct challenge to democratic state building in Africa is the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) led by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Since the regime exercises draconian control over all forms of association and expression, elections can be regularly held with landslide victories regularly reported. The 1994 genocide has been used to justify resisting anything deemed a threat to peace and stability.

Some governments and international agencies have implicated the RPF in mass killings during the Rwandan and Congolese wars of the 1990s, continuing cross-border interventions in Congo, and a raft of human rights abuses, but the regime counters these criticisms by citing the praise of its foreign admirers. And even more than Ethiopia, the Kagame regime can cite impressive socioeconomic achievements. These new and refurbished authoritarians fend off democratization by espousing a developmental ideology, by relying on militarized state power, and by insisting on being judged according to their liberation narratives.

Who Decides?

In a few instances, African heads of state have opted to lead their countries in opening up their political systems rather than pursue last-ditch stratagems to retain power. The most notable of the various examples is that of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who got ahead of both his party and the populace when he declared in February 1992 that the time had come to end the legal single-party system. Subsequently, Tanzania evolved, with the glaring exception of Zanzibar, into single-party dominance with significant democratic content.

A more nuanced but equally significant case is that of Abdou Diouf, when he completed 19 years as president of Senegal in 2000. Presiding over a country with deep democratic roots, a vigorous civil society, and strong countervailing power in the form of Islamic brotherhoods, Diouf continued the process of gradual liberalization pursued by his predecessor, Léopold Sédar Senghor. Following disputed elections in 2000, rather than challenge the results as some party barons wanted, Diouf chose to cede power to his longtime challenger, Abdoulaye Wade, and the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party). Yet Wade, instead of carrying Senegal forward as anticipated to become one of the stalwarts of democracy building in Africa, has taken it backwards to a regime characterized by an expanded presidency, mismanagement, and nepotism.

A perceptive statement by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg at the end of their influential 1984 Comparative Politics article, “Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa,” helps put these cases in context:

[D]emocracy can be promoted by inventive political practitioners as well as by favorable socioeconomic processes, and the former do not necessarily have to wait upon the latter. Statesmen are to political development what entrepreneurs are to economic development. Indeed, they may be more important insofar as political development is less dependent on material resources and consists essentially in appropriate inclinations and conduct.

Nyerere and Diouf demonstrated “appropriate inclinations and conduct” when they elected to move their countries toward a democratic opening. But the relative autonomy enjoyed by African leaders can also result in countries’ moving backwards. After Diouf led his nation toward greater democracy, his successor took it in another direction for personal rather than societal or structural reasons.

Zambia over two decades experienced four direction switches that could be attributed, in large part, to the predilections of the country’s head of state. Kenneth Kaunda’s 27-year rule might be described as a moderate autocracy. Although Kaunda stoutly resisted demands for multiparty democracy, once this concession was made, he allowed the process to proceed in a relatively salutary manner, and stepped aside following his defeat by Frederick Chiluba and the MMD (Movement for Multiparty Democracy) in 1991.

However, to the consternation of the coalition of political, trade union, civic, and religious groups responsible for Chiluba’s victory, as well as a broad alliance of external donors, he then established a tawdry kleptocracy. The coalition that put him in power fortuitously reconstituted itself to block his attempt to remove a two-term constitutional limit to his presidency.

Chiluba’s former vice president, Levy Mwanawasa, sharply shifted Zambia back onto a democratic course. During a presidency tragically cut short by his death in August 2008, Mwanawasa showed principled leadership in having Chiluba brought to trial on corruption charges while he also stood up to the misrule of Robert Mugabe in neighboring Zimbabwe. Sadly, and again reflecting how dependent Africa’s emergent democracies can be on the inclinations of their leaders, Mwanawasa’s successor, President Rupiah Banda, reversed gears and even praised the unredeemable Chiluba.

The veteran politician Michael Sata defeated Banda and ended 20 years of MMD rule in Zambia’s September 2011 elections, but we do not know yet what kind of president he will be. Will he prove a born-again kleptocrat like Chiluba, a commited democrat like Mwanawasa, or something else?

The curriculum vitae of leaders can offer little guidance as to whether once in power they will follow the ideals they championed in opposition or just reinstate personalist and patrimonial systems. The name Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is already etched on the plinth of state builders and democracy builders in Africa based on her achievements as Liberia’s president; she has pulled her country decisively away from the depravity of the Samuel Doe/Charles Taylor era.

Will Alassane Ouattara establish a similar record in Ivory Coast? He conducted a principled struggle to secure an electoral mandate as president following a 2010 election, bringing an end to the tumultuous and destructive political gyrations his nation had experienced since the 1993 death of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny.

What is so far true of the Liberian and Ivorian leaders, with their earlier careers respectively as a commercial banker and an International Monetary Fund official, has not been the case for their Malawian counterpart. Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika, a former World Bank economist, experienced the obloquy of having the British government suspend aid to his country on July 14, 2011, while the United States suspended a $350 million aid compact from the Millennium Challenge Corporation on July 26. The reasons given were economic mismanagement and the brutal suppression of popular protests against his government.

Mutharika dissolved his cabinet and assumed all ministerial duties on August 20, 2011. He seems to be reading from the playbook of Niger’s former president, Mamadou Tandja, who suspended his government and opted to rule by decree in June 2009. In February 2010, Tandja was ousted by the military; new elections were conducted with international assistance in January 2011.

The adage “power corrupts” reminds us of an unchanging human flaw. In Botswana, one of the jewels of African democratic governance, President Seretse Khama Ian Khama—despite his pedigree as the son of the country’s revered first leader, Seretse Khama—has been opting for autocratic and arrogant rule. Rather than in waves that follow one another, democracy and autocracy now appear to move in tandem in Africa, often depending on the character of whoever occupies the highest political office.

Power Shifts

A few regimes in Africa have weathered many changes in the political climate. For example, since its independence in January 1960, Cameroon has been led by just two men, Ahmadou Ahidjo and his former deputy, Paul Biya. Will the winds of change now blowing southward because of the Arab Spring ruffle such governments?

In some cases, an alliance between France and postcolonial rulers in Africa has afforded the latter a unique capacity to survive and thrive. The Bongo and Eyadema regimes in Gabon and Togo, for instance, not only have survived the deaths of their chieftains, but the autocrats’ sons (Ali Bongo and Faure Gnassingbé) have succeeded them.

In Tunisia the Nicolas Sarkozy government, after taking the usual French stance of supporting an entrenched autocrat, shifted course and supported the ouster of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. France has since led the successful allied effort to dislodge Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. And its helicopter gunships evicted from his bunker Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to vacate his office after losing the Ivorian presidential election to Ouattara. This is not typical Gallic state behavior in postcolonial Africa.

Biya has served continuously in the government of Cameroon since 1964 and as its president since 1982. Cameroon is an oil-producing country that has known decades of peace and stability, so no one will bother his deeply implanted regime unless Cameroonians decide that the time for change has truly come. But three other countries, all potential economic powerhouses, are on the cusp of possibly significant transformations: Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, and Kenya.

In Zimbabwe, though it is surrounded by countries that underwent profound changes in the 1990s, Mugabe and his party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front), have maintained their dominance, albeit tempered by the creation of a government of national unity in February 2009. ZANU-PF has lost every vote in which Zimbabweans enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to express their views, beginning with a constitutional referendum in 2000. So the regime has only been able to retain power through force and its control of access to critical resources, whether sequestered land, foreign exchange, or diamonds.

Zimbabwe’s ruler is old and ailing. The regime has no geostrategic levers that can be pulled to ward off external pressures. To be sure, China is deeply engaged, as is the case wherever there are natural resources to be procured and profitable business can be done. As elsewhere in Africa, however, China’s opportunism enables it to adjust no matter where the political wind blows. ZANU-PF barons engage in a fierce struggle over the authoritarian succession, while domestic forces struggling against autocracy have done all that could be expected of them in the face of so brutalizing a regime.

The prospects of a democratic transition in Zimbabwe now rest on the emergence of an international coalition, including some regional leaders and organizations, committed to shifting the balance of power to enable Zimbabweans to express their will in nonviolent elections. Once they can do so, and the results are enforced as in Ivory Coast, the long Zimbabwean nightmare will be brought to an end.

In Ivory Coast, such a coalition of forces blocked the authoritarian succession that Gbagbo, abetted by his wife Simone, sought to engineer. A transition to democratic rule in Ivory Coast would not have occurred without the coordinated actions of several entities: the African Union, ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), the United Nations, France, the United States, an armed movement long in control of the north of the country, and political forces led by Ouattara. In this global era, the extraversion of African countries can work for the good of the people, as the case of Ivory Coast demonstrates and while that of Zimbabwe awaits consummation.

Violence in Kenya following a disputed 2007 election was so gruesome that the international community was compelled to intervene. Although a series of high-level missions failed to break the logjam, one led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had the tenacity, skill, and wide support to succeed. Its outcome included not only provisions for a power-sharing arrangement but also an agreement allowing the International Criminal Court to indict individuals responsible for instigating mass violence. Of signal importance, too, were steps leading to constitutional reforms approved in an August 2010 referendum.

Kenya, given its ethnic polarization and pervasive corruption, still has a long way to go in achieving a stable democratic order. Yet it has come a considerable distance since the bloodletting and forced displacements of 2008. Great political skill, and sustained international and domestic action, will be required to keep this pivotal country on a path of accelerated growth and democratic development.

New Pyramids

A new global era has begun with the reconfiguration of pyramids of power. There is a logic to the usual power pyramid, with a supreme leader at the top and resources flowing up and down. When popular upheavals occur, the pyramid is inverted. As exhilarating an experience as this may be, an inverted pyramid is unstable until a new political order is constituted. In some cases, the new order may simply be a refurbished version of the old one. It takes consummate skill to right the pyramid while also making the new leadership rule-bound and accountable. As Francis Fukuyama demonstrates in his extraordinary new book, The Origins of Political Order, at the heart of this difficult and uncertain process is institution building.

In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the pyramid of power has been inverted, somewhat ambiguously in the case of Egypt. In Egypt the secular forces that drove the revolution quickly learned that the girders of the ancien régime (especially the army), and those formerly opposed to it (especially the Muslim Brotherhood), will play major roles in shaping the new order. While the composition of forces in post–Ben Ali Tunisia is not yet clear, to be reckoned with is a vast security apparatus, corporate groups that benefited economically from the Ben Ali era, the armed forces, and provincially based interests. Libya was much more bereft of national institutions, and of organized political and civil society groups outside the regime structures, than the two other countries. So a comprehensively new pyramid of power must be constructed there.

How does sub-Saharan Africa look from this perspective? Since South Sudan gained its independence on July 9, 2011, the region has increased from 48 to 49 nominally sovereign countries. In the past two decades, the reconfiguration of power pyramids has ranged from minimal to maximal. Some, as in Mauritania, Niger, and Madagascar, have moved among democratic, authoritarian, and uncertain categories as a result of power struggles at the top. Ghana, similarly to the Botswana of Ian Khama, requires probing beneath the veil of past democratic accomplishments.

Popular support for the two major parties in Ghana is so finely balanced that the presidency can now be won or lost in just four years. But the wide discretion enjoyed by the president, persistent patrimonialism in the allocation of state resources, the ethno-regional nature of political coalitions, and the heightened incentive for gaining political office provided by new oil wealth put Ghana at risk of slippage in elections next year. International agencies have as important a role to play in helping such countries stay on track democratically as they do in bringing some back after derailments.

It is not likely that new waves of democracy will wash through sub-Saharan Africa any time soon. The political context is too varied. A particular democratic advance, or a retreat, might differ from others even in neighboring countries, so the use of only statistical approaches to gauge democratic progress can obscure more than enlighten.

In some cases, a significant advance can take the form of a reasonably fair election after several flawed contests, as in Nigeria in April 2011. In others, as in South Africa, it could be a peaceful change in leadership through party structures, as in Jacob Zuma’s succession from Thabo Mbeki as head of the ANC (African National Congress) in September 2008—which effectively determined the country’s next president.

Guinea, a mineral-rich nation devastated by predatory rulers for a half century—a country that was becoming a base for international drug trafficking— was able in 2010 to elect a civilian president and win a chance at a wholly new start.

Or the advance might take the form of the Kenyan 2010 referendum to enact a new constitution— an outcome of negotiated compromises among political factions, a process conducted without the ugly interethnic clashes of 2008. These are steps of profound importance for the countries concerned even if they do not constitute a pattern across a vast continent.

Claiming Democracy

Federalism in certain cases could provide mechanisms for sharing and dispersing power within the “geographical entities” bequeathed by colonialism. Most countries now opt for centralized systems that respond to the need for order while increasing the risk of reconfigured autocracy. Nigeria today has the only true federation in Africa.

Several Nigerian states are taking advantage of the opportunity to construct pyramids of power that reflect Fukuyama’s core tenets: effective state capacity, law-based governance, and public accountability. Furthermore, these dispersed power centers can be Sklarian constructs with “the authoritative allocation of values” shared by traditional and religious authorities, professional and civic organizations, and governmental entities. Unfortunately, however, most Nigerian government units have not yet risen above what the Nigerian journalist Emeka Izeze calls “the mediocre level of petty roguery and money sharing.”

The response to this challenge is what Michigan State University’s Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan—in their chapter in my edited book, Smart Aid for African Development (2008)—have described as “claiming democracy.” Armed with innumerable cell phones, conventional and social media, and access to abundant civil society groups, Nigerians are becoming increasingly empowered.

At the forefront internationally of “claiming democracy” is India, with experiments under way in several states to make government officials more accountable to local communities. This social movement has culminated in successful protests led by the activist Anna Hazare to compel India’s parliament to create a powerful new anticorruption agency.

Everything that has motivated the Indian social movement is present in Nigeria. While Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has brought many office holders to account and has recovered substantial sums, it lacks the power and independence that India’s new anticorruption agency will possess.

In Nigeria, terrorist acts and violent upheavals multiply the challenges confronting President Goodluck Jonathan’s government and the project of democracy building. Widespread poverty caused by decades of predatory governance has created pools of ready recruits for Islamic extremism. Around the city of Jos in the Middle Belt area, disputes over land, ethnicity, religion, and politics coalesce to produce riptides of mass slaughter.

As Ben Ali flees, Mubarak is brought to trial in a cage, Gbagbo is driven from his bunker, and Qaddafi’s tyranny is extinguished, the writing is on the wall for Africa’s entrenched strongmen. But removing them is not enough. Just as daunting a task is establishing law-based states and political institutions that actually improve social welfare.

Sustained progress in the region will depend on what Fukuyama calls “the long, costly, laborious, and difficult process of institution building.” And, as Sklar long ago advised, major institutions of governance will continue to have democratic, oligarchic, and autocratic features. Understanding these configurations, and how they can be tilted toward empowering the demos, is a challenge to be met by political actors as well as by those who study these evolving systems.

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Richard Joseph

Publication: Current History

Image Source: Â© Akintunde Akinleye / Reuters

Nigeria's Potential and Political Failures

Richard Joseph — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 10:21:00 -0400

Editor's note: Richard Joseph reflects on Nigeria's potential and political failures in a radio interview with WBEZ 91.5.

Jerome McDonnell, WBEZ: Last night in Lagos, Nigeria, statesmen, politicians, scientists, lawyers, and civil society groups gathered at a conference that compared the second republic with the current dispensation. They warned that Nigeria was in danger of sinking unless governments at the federal and state level tackled mounting challenges such as corruption, failed infrastructure and economic inequities. The conference also addressed the disaffected youth of the country. Nigeria’s youth has drawn global attention to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, known as the underwear bomber. He pleaded guilty Wednesday to eight charges, including conspiracy to commit terrorism and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, this for his attempted 2009 Christmas Day bombing of an airplane over Detroit. The conference was also a chance to honor Professor Richard Joseph’s landmark book Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Fall of the Second Republic. Richard Joseph is the John Evans professor of international history and politics at Northwestern University. The work documented how political leaders squandered an opportunity to positively transform the country.

Richard Joseph: I went to Nigeria in February of 1976. Nigeria at that time was launched on a transition to civilian rule as a military government led by Obasanjo, who came back later on as a civilian president. I found myself very fortunate, teaching at what was then a premier university in Nigeria, University of Ibadan. I was going to write this book on the making of the second republic. And so I set about doing that. And on the course of following the emergence of the political parties, constitution making, and so on, I realized this was going to be a lot more complicated.

Jerome McDonnell, WBEZ: What was the problem?

Richard Joseph: Well, the problem was that Nigeria at the time was going through what was called the oil boom. Nigeria had ended its civil war in 1970. And so we’re now at a point where Nigeria is having several years of very high oil income especially after the 1973 jump. So I arrived in Nigeria at a time when Nigeria felt like, you know—

Jerome McDonnell, WBEZ: Like a million bucks?

Richard Joseph: Absolutely. And in fact, the breakthrough for me in fact was an article I wrote eighteen months after I arrived in Nigeria called Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience. That was published in 1978. And that book is where I really said, guys, you know, there’s a lot of money coming in here, but I’m not seeing a growth in development process. So, studying the making of the second republic, and so on, I had an eureka moment and that eureka moment was making this connection between how Nigerians thought about politics, how they thought about power, in all institutions including university institutions. And the way in which they were going about fashioning this second republic. And that eureka moment was what we now know as prebendal politics.

Listen to the full interview at WBEZ.org »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: WBEZ 91.5

Nigeria and Global Insecurity

Richard Joseph — Mon, 17 Oct 2011 15:11:00 -0400

The lines between al-Qaida, Islamic extremism in Africa, and wider insecurity in the continent’s most populous nation, Nigeria, are converging. Most attention is devoted to the first two challenges, but the time has come to broaden the conversation. In a recorded statement, Osama bin Laden identified Nigeria as an important future arena for al-Qaida. The apprehending of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian from a rich and influential family, who tried igniting an explosive device in his underwear as his aircraft neared Detroit in December 2009, made real bin Laden’s threat.

Then, in October 2010, as invited dignitaries headed to the official celebration of Nigeria’s 50th anniversary in the capital, Abuja, explosions drove them back to their homes and offices. Other bombing incidents have followed. A few weeks ago, the terrorist mastermind Anwar al-Awlaki was killed by missiles fired from CIA drones in Yemen. Public revelations of how Abdulmutallab was prepared for his terrorist assignment by al-Awlaki, during his visits to Yemen, were curtailed when he pleaded guilty to all charges in the bombing plot.

U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. has stated that the verdict showed that “our courts are one of the most effective tools we have to fight terrorism and keep the American people safe.” There is a need to go beyond such assertions and ask what are the tools for accomplishing these national goals, how should they be combined, and how does ensuring our national security dovetail with what is being done in beleaguered countries such as Nigeria with millions of futureless youth.

As the United States reduces its armed presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is also scaling up its technological capacity to kill and intercept terrorists. What, we should ask, are the non-military policies that will complement warfare by cruise missiles, radar-eluding attack helicopters, and predators operated from U.S. air bases? With proposals before the U.S. Congress for deep cuts in foreign aid, and also a request from the Pentagon for $5 billion to operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) just next year, there is an urgent need to broaden the debate on national security beyond military operations.

Routinized Insecurity

By taking the extremist path, Abdulmutallab rejected the moderate Islam that prevails among northern Nigerian elites. In his statement to the Detroit court on October 12, he said that he was seeking revenge for U.S. military attacks on Muslims “in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and beyond.” Abdulmutallab therefore used the federal courtroom, not to fight the charges against him, but to continue in another form the horrific mission foiled two years ago. His chilling assertions will be transmitted to the disenchanted poor in northern Nigeria, where Islamic extremism has risen and subsided for decades.

A few months ago, I received an email from a colleague in Abuja saying that I should “tell my friends in Washington not to send drones” because the groups responsible for bombing incidents in the region were home-grown malcontents. Soon after, a suicide bomber destroyed the U.N. building in the Nigerian capital killing 23 occupants and maiming dozens of others. Boko Haram, the self-declared Nigerian al-Qaida franchise, claimed responsibility. Most Nigerians now acknowledge the intractability of the threats they face, fostered as much by material grievances as by the bludgeoning tactics of their own security forces in response to domestic upheavals.

Insecurity has come to characterize the lives of many Nigerians. Armed robbery, a commonplace hazard, is now compounded by kidnapping for ransom. To combat crime, a massive database of sim card numbers, along with personal details and photographs of their owners, has recently been created. Civil liberty concerns about this venture have been raised. The choice given in Nigeria, however, is categorical: comply or put away your cell phone. Similarly, because of the Awlaki-Abdulmutallab December 2009 plot, American air-travelers are increasingly given a choice: body-scan or body- frisk. The prerogatives of national security, whether in the use of drone-fired missiles or expanding electronic surveillance, overshadow policy discussions about the socio-economic drivers of local insurgencies now linking up with global jihadist groups.

During the discussion following a public lecture I gave in the coastal city of Lagos last October, two young men from the northeast spoke with great passion of their distress. In my meeting with them afterwards, all I could do was commiserate with their anguish. As part of the wider dialogue on strengthening security, policymakers should ask how Nigeria can be helped to become a stable, prospering and democratic nation, similar to other large complex nations like Indonesia and Brazil. Poverty, especially in the predominantly Islamic north, is widening the pool of potential terrorist recruits. Once-thriving textile industries have collapsed in the face of Chinese imports; formerly remunerative commercial crops, such as cotton and groundnuts, have dwindled. Beyond herding, small-scale trade and agriculture, and government patronage, it is unclear how this region of over 60 million people subsists.

Expanding the Security Toolkit

During the April 2011 elections, when the northern presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, was once again decisively defeated by a southerner, riots in northern Nigeria led to hundreds of deaths and extensive destruction. The targets of the rioters’ ire were not only resident southerners, but also members of the religious, traditional and political establishment. There is an urgent need in Nigeria to commit substantial domestic resources, bolstered by external assistance, to a comprehensive growth and development initiative focused on the troubled northern region. Industrial ventures could be supported to capitalize on Nigeria’s vast energy resources in oil, gas, solar and wind. Work and training programs in agriculture, agro-industry, infrastructure, public health and environmental sanitation could target millions of distressed youths.

When the next group of young people asks what they can expect from the United States, I want to be able to recite a list of initiatives that can excite their imagination, engage their energies, and bolster their hopes. We cannot rely solely on constructing electronic fences to identify and stop extremists, and then bring them to trial or confine them to Guantanamo. While ramping up technological responses to terrorism, let us not skimp on the urgent people-to-people work. This is not the time to slash foreign aid, but rather innovatively seek to promote transformative governance and job-producing economic growth. There is no reason to concede the battle for hearts and minds when there are so many untapped resources at our disposal, as well as in countries like Nigeria that are assailed by terrorism.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Beyond Voting and Rioting: Why Democracy Must Prevail in Nigeria

Richard Joseph — Thu, 28 Apr 2011 15:54:00 -0400

After my visit to Nigeria in October 2010 to give public lectures in Abuja and Lagos on elections and democracy, I returned to the United States profoundly concerned about many persistent problems and especially the visible impoverishment of the north.

The recent rioting in that region, ostensibly triggered by the defeat of Muhammadu Buhari in the presidential vote, has deeper causes and wider ramifications. Nigeria's unmet policy challenges require urgent attention.

Nigeria's many infrastructural and socio-economic deficits are widely known. A return to business as usual, assuming the elections for state governors and assemblies are conducted without major disruptions, is hazardous. Designing collaborative projects on governance and development should be high on the agenda of Nigerian federal and state governments and their international partners.

Five years ago, as concerns mounted regarding the ill-prepared 2007 elections, a conference was convened at Northwestern University, Illinois, that included many Nigerian and American experts. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka gave the keynote address. However, there was little official response to this and other similar consultations. Over the past several months, we have seen a very different response. Decisive actions have been taken to prepare for the 2011 elections, including the appointment of Professor Attarihu Jega as head of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Positive consequences followed, especially the conduct of much better elections despite inevitable logistical problem and electoral mischief.

Read the full article at allAfrica.com »

Authors

Richard Joseph

Publication: AllAfrica.com

Nigeria's HIV/AIDS Pandemic: Time for Bolder Action

Richard Joseph — Fri, 11 Jun 2010 15:50:00 -0400

Among the long list of Nigeria’s woes, AIDS is seldom mentioned. Yet, Nigeria has the second largest number of HIV-infected persons in the world, now estimated at 3 million. If South Africa, the country with the largest number of HIV-infected persons, succeeds in sharply reducing its infection rate, will Nigeria eventually surpass it on the world HIV/AIDS chart? That is statistically possible given Nigeria’s population, three times larger at 150 million, and its weaker health and other infrastructures.

What will it take to curb Nigeria’s spiraling AIDS pandemic? A team of Nigerian and American researchers, supported by the University of Ibadan, Nigeria and Northwestern University have sought answers by studying the social, economic and political barriers to effective prevention and treatment. The program is the Research Alliance to Combat HIV/AIDS (REACH) whose data and findings were presented in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, on May 4. Other dissemination events followed at the two collaborating institutions, at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and concluded at the Brookings Institution on May 27.

For several years, the central focus of the AIDS campaign has been the provision of anti-retroviral drugs and creating the necessary testing and monitoring facilities. It has brought life-saving treatment to 4 million people worldwide. But that has left 6 million with the disease currently untreated. In sub-Saharan Africa, five persons are newly infected for every two receiving medical care. The number of infected persons is growing faster than the pool of donor funds to treat them. U.S. aid dollars now cover the cost in Nigeria of counseling and treatment for 300,000 of the 350,000 under care. Yet 200,000 are untreated under the current guidelines. Over a million more would be treated if Nigeria sought to comply with new World Health Organization guidelines for starting drug treatment. Not only must Nigeria find a way to get treatment to the large pool of infected persons, it has to slow its rate of infection. These two interrelated challenges can only be surmounted by an exceptionally bold, comprehensive and sustained effort.

REACH began on the premise, now all-too-evident, that treatment was just one part of the answer. Today, not only are many infected persons not treated, a substantial number do not know their HIV status and thus continue transmitting the disease. Even proven prevention techniques are blunted in Nigeria because of the country’s woeful public health system. Only 62 percent of pregnant women in REACH studies have had HIV counseling and testing (HCT). Of those tested, almost a third did not return for their results. Yet, the timely administering of long available drugs can sharply reduce transmission of the virus to newborns. It is not surprising that 56,000 HIV-infected babies are born each year in Nigeria.

On the basis of REACH survey data, Nigeria, via its National Agency for the Control of AIDS (NACA), can begin a substantially scaled-up program. A key component of this program would be expanded community studies on the barriers to effective prevention and treatment. REACH recommendations include the following:

Reduce sharply the number of persons who have not been HIV-tested in any 12 month period.
Provide HIV tests and appropriate counseling as routine aspects of all healthcare services.
Engage communities and myriad public, private and religious institutions in action programs focused on achieving high and sustained HCT rates.
Take HCT door-to-door using rapid testing methods.
Target the specific barriers to HCT increase shown in REACH studies such as ignorance about risk, assumed cost of drug treatment, confidentiality concerns, and uncertainty about follow-up care.
Develop more effective ways to reach vulnerable youths, especially girls.
Engage political, religious, community and entertainment leaders in high-profile prevention events.
Design innovative approaches to combat stigma.
Commit Nigerian funds over several years to prevention and care so that a greater proportion of expenditures is covered domestically.

Nigeria’s new president, Goodluck Jonathan, has brought renewed dynamism and direction to his country’s federal government. By supporting bold action on HIV/AIDS, he can quickly align Nigeria with other African countries such as Botswana and South Africa that have adopted more aggressive approaches to reversing this relentless pandemic.

Authors

Richard Joseph

Ending Nigeria’s HIV/AIDS Pandemic

Thu, 27 May 2010 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 27, 2010
9:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

There are currently an estimated 3 million people living with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria, making it the second most infected country worldwide. In light of these stark figures and the general failure by African countries to curb the HIV/AIDS pandemic, how can Nigeria expect to achieve a breakthrough in dealing with its HIV/AIDS epidemic? What policy actions should the global public health community, international donors and the Nigerian government take to help end this health crisis?

The Research Alliance to Combat HIV/AIDS (REACH), a joint collaboration between Northwestern University and the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, has sought to answer these questions. Since 2006, REACH has engaged social scientists in community-based research to explore the attitudes and behaviors related to HIV/AIDS prevention in four Nigerian states and advance strategies to reduce infection rates. On May 27, Global Economy and Development at Brookings and the Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies at Northwestern University hosted a discussion on REACH’s most recent findings and policy recommendations. The first panel focused on the current state of the epidemic in Nigeria. The second panel examined a preventative approach to HIV/AIDS in Nigeria and other African countries.

Transcript

Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Richard Joseph

Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Principal Investigator, REACH
John Evans Professor, Northwestern University

Moderator: Ernest Aryeetey

Senior Fellow and Director, Africa Growth Initiative

Layi Erinosho

President, African Sociological Association

Uche Isiugo-Abanihe

Professor of Demography and REACH Chair, University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Gbenga Sunmola

Principal Researcher, REACH
Research Coordinator, National Agency for the Control of AIDS, Nigeria

Oka Obono

Principal Researcher, REACH, University of Ibadan

Johnnie Carson

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Moderator: Jacques van der Gaag

Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Center for Universal Education

Phillip Nieburg

Public Health Epidemiologist, REACH
Senior Associate, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Nkem Dike

Associate Project Director, REACH, Northwestern University

Nigeria's Season of Uncertainty

Alexandra Gillies and Richard Joseph — Wed, 12 May 2010 15:29:00 -0400

Editor's Note: From ill-fated politics, to major infrastructural challenges and a fragile democracy, Nigeria has faced many serious and recent obstacles. Richard Joseph and Alexandra Gillies review these critical events and challenges, and discuss what glimmer of hope lies ahead for the African nation. This article was originally published in the May 2010 issue of Current History.

Introduction

“Nothing,” wrote Reuben Abati, the editor of Nigeria’s The Guardian, “can be more tragic than the present season of uncertainty in which Nigeria has found itself.” Indeed, in recent months the country has experienced an extraordinary and often surreal political drama seemingly scripted by a writer of fantasies.

On November 23, 2009, Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua was flown to Saudi Arabia for emergency medical treatment. Confusion swirled about his condition, though the immediate problem was reported to be pericarditis, an inflammation of tissues around his heart.

When, on Christmas Day, a young Nigerian named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried (but failed) to ignite an explosive device on an airliner that was approaching the airport in Detroit, Michigan, no Nigerian head of state was available to engage with the US government over this alarming event. Following the attempted attack, the United States placed Nigeria on a terrorism watch list of 14 nations whose air travelers were subjected to increased security screening. (On April 2, that watch list was discarded in favor of a different set of policies.)

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Alexandra Gillies
Richard Joseph

Publication: Current History