Brookings: Experts - Bruce Jones

U.S.-China Study Group on G-20 Reform

Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:34:00 -0500

The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, the Center for American Progress, and the Stanley Foundation formed a study group in late 2011 to evaluate the role of the G-20 in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and the influence of the relationship on the G-20 and to propose recommendations that could improve the efficacy of this important body. The Chinese and American experts listed below held two conferences over the course of 2012, in Santa Monica, in February and in Beijing in October. At the end of these meetings, participants in the group agreed to 20 recommendations.

Read the U.S.-China Study Group's recommendations » (PDF)

Participants in the G-20 Study Group

Tim Adams, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and former Sherpa and Undersecretary of the Treasury under President George W. Bush

Sabina Dewan, Director of Globalization and International Development, Center for American Progress

DU Yanjun, Director of the Department of International Exchanges, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)

Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Matthew Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies and former Director for International Economics in the Obama White House

Nina Hachigian, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress

Adam Hersh, Economist, Center for American Progress

HUANG Ying, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of World Economic Studies

Bruce Jones, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order (MGO) project at the Brookings Institution and Director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University

LI Zheng, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

LIN Hongyu, Director of the Department of International Politics at the China University of International Relations

LIU Bo, Deputy Director of the Department of International Exchanges, CICIR

Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations

Keith Porter, Director of Policy and Outreach, the Stanley Foundation

QIAN Liwei, Associate Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

David Shorr, Program Officer, the Stanley Foundation

Randy Schriver, Armitage International

WANG Wenfeng, Deputy Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

YUAN Peng, Assistant President, CICIR and Director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHAI Kun, Director of the CICIR Institute of World Political Studies

ZHANG Wenzong, Assistant Professor, the CICIR Institute of American Studies

ZHU Feng, Deputy Director, Center for International & Strategic Studies, Peking University

ZHU Liqun, Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University

Publication: Center for American Progress, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and The Stanley Foundation

Image Source: © Kevin Lamarque / Reuters

Maritime Security: Calming the Eastern Seas

Richard C. Bush III, Bruce Jones and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia that is conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for resources is destabilizing the maritime domain in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack wrote this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

What should the U.S. do to encourage China, Japan, and others to avoid conflict?
How can agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War serve as a guide for regulating interaction at sea?
How can cooperation in the Arctic serve as a model for multilateral cooperation in East Asia?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Richard Bush, Bruce Jones, and Jonathan Pollack

Maritime East Asia is becoming increasingly dangerous. The past 12 months have seen a series of crises and spats in the East China Sea and South China Sea that threaten to spiral out of control. The twin sources of danger are 1) how regional actors conduct maritime operations to assert and/or defend claims to territory and natural resources’ rights; and 2) their weak capacity to conduct crisis management under domestic nationalistic pressures. The United States risks becoming entangled in conflicts among countries that are its friends and partners.

Recommendation:

You have the opportunity to mitigate the danger of future physical clashes by mounting a concerted diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned jointly to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms in the near term and to promote more institutionalized risk-reduction measures in the medium term. This will both serve U.S. interests in avoiding unnecessary entrapment and foster an environment conducive to cooperative exploitation of resources.

This could be pursued both at the regional and international levels. During the Cold War, the United States concluded risk-reduction agreements with the Soviet Union to regulate the interactions of its naval ships and air force planes. There has been recent work by the United Arab Emirates, Australia and India to foster better exchange of lessons, build private and public sector capacity, and share information about crisis-mitigation tools at the international level; diplomatic efforts to build on this could provide useful context to regional efforts and minimize a sense that China is being singled out.

Background:

The United States has long sought to foster an environment in East Asia conducive to peace, stability and prosperity. Yet an intensifying contest for hydrocarbon, mineral and fishery resources among regional actors is destabilizing the maritime domain. For resource reasons, China, Taiwan and Japan each claim the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands northeast of Taiwan while China, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian countries claim various land forms in the South China Sea. Conflicts have become more intense in recent years because China is acquiring the seaborne capabilities to assert its own claims and challenge those of others. Growing nationalist sentiment in all countries pressures leaders to take strong stands and eschew compromise. Physical clashes have occurred, which have illustrated the weak crisis management capacity of the countries concerned. In this environment, the prospect for mutually-beneficial cooperation in the exploitation of resources is low (international energy companies, for example, are reluctant to undertake major projects in contested areas).

The United States takes no position on which country owns which land form. But Washington has strongly advocated the freedom of navigation for all countries, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and using international law in addressing questions of sovereignty and resource exploitation. China’s recent and more assertive behavior in defining and advancing its claims — still non-violent but decidedly coercive — has been contrary to those U.S. interests.

In addition, treaty obligations threaten to entangle the United States in specific ways. The U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty applies to all territories under Japan’s administrative control, which includes the Senkaku Islands. According to the long-standing American position, the U.S. mutual defense treaty with the Philippines does not apply to land forms in the South China Sea, but it does apply to “Philippine vessels.” At a minimum, these legal commitments create the potential for a “tail wags the dog” situation. In a crisis, they entail the fundamental credibility of the United States to stand by allies.

The proximate source of the current danger is the physical clashes and standoffs between vessels of the claimant countries, which are growing more common. Although none has crossed the threshold of loss of life, that may be only a matter of time. Clashes at any level are not in the U.S. interest, because they force the United States to choose among countries with which it seeks good relations. Trying to mediate the underlying territorial disputes would be a fool’s errand, and your administration should not try. Nor should you try to facilitate resource-sharing agreements among the claimant countries as long as the current fevered environment continues.

But the United States has both the need and the opportunity to facilitate a reduction in the probability of physical clashes and the attendant tensions — to the benefit of all. Your administration should continue to counsel restraint among the contenders (China has deservedly become the main target of such demarches). In the near term, it should mount a diplomatic effort to encourage the countries concerned to adopt conflict-avoidance mechanisms jointly. In the medium term, it should promote more institutionalized riskreduction measures to regulate the operations of their maritime agencies.

The United States created such mechanisms with the Soviet Union during the Cold War to regulate interaction at sea and in the skies over Berlin. Current and retired U.S. naval and air force officers are a repository of experience on how to conduct conflict-avoidance and risk-reduction measures. The United States should also explore ways to root these efforts in a global framework, drawing on lessons from the management of the Arctic, which has been something of a good news story for international cooperation in recent years.

At this juncture, Japan is quietly willing to develop a conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime for the East China Sea. The ASEAN states are committed to concluding a binding code of conduct with China for the South China Sea for that same purpose. But China has been reluctant and has erected obstacles to a cooperative and stabilizing solution. Beijing has insisted that it will not talk to Japan until Tokyo is prepared to acknowledge that a territorial dispute over the Senkakus exists (Japan is reluctant to do so because it fears that such acknowledgment will be followed by a Chinese demand for negotiations). Concerning the South China Sea, China has used its close ties with Cambodia to delay and deflect any action on a binding code.

Your administration can play a behind-the-scenes role in breaking these logjams. You should start with engaging Beijing’s new leader and stressing to them that China should have little interest in suffering the reputational effects of its coercive behavior or the problems that come with a true crisis. Instead, it is in China’s interests to step back from these conflicts and focus on what is really important. A conflict-avoidance/ risk-reduction regime is a low-cost, face-saving way to do that. Second, as an inducement to China and in return for strongly supporting Japan on such a regime, you should urge Tokyo to bifurcate its position on the Senkakus: retain its de jure position that the islands are Japan’s (so no dispute exists), but acknowledge that de facto other states have their own positions which they are free to present in the course of negotiations on other issues. Concerning a South China Sea code of conduct, you should first firm up support among claimant and other like-minded countries for a code of conduct that is strong enough actually to avoid conflict and reduce risk. Next, with their concurrence, you should suggest to China that if it continues to block a code by splitting ASEAN, the claimant countries and others that support a strong code will, with the support of the United States and others, have no choice but to negotiate with China as a “coalition of the willing.”

Conclusion:

The United States has absolutely no interest in going to war to protect the honor of friends and allies over small rocks and islands. Should it become necessary to contend with China to protect U.S. interests in East Asia and to buoy the confidence of American friends, it should be over a more consequential issue. With a modest yet concrete effort, you have the opportunity to reduce the salience and danger of an issue that will only inflict more headaches. Stabilizing the situation in East Asian waters will mitigate the danger of future clashes and also foster an environment in which cooperative exploitation of resources is more likely.

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Image Source: © China Daily China Daily Information Corp - CDIC / Reuters

Susan Rice and 21st Century Diplomacy

Bruce Jones — Fri, 14 Dec 2012 10:55:00 -0500

Susan Rice’s decision to withdraw her name for consideration for the position of Secretary of State was characteristic: putting country and loyalty to the president first. It’s America’s loss.

For the past two months, Susan Rice has been the subject of a sustained and plainly political attack over her comments about Benghazi. Because I have personal ties to her[1], I felt compelled, uncomfortably, to stay silent. But I can certainly comment on her qualifications to serve this country. For four years, I've had courtside seats as Susan Rice has served her country as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations – an institution I've worked with and watched for nearing two decades.

What’s striking about the debate about Rice’s credentials, is how little of it drew on her work over the past four years. That’s strange, because the who, the what, and the how of her experience at the U.N. is centrally relevant to U.S. foreign policy.

First, the who. America sometimes doesn't pay much attention to the U.N., but the rest of the world does, and they send highly talented people there to fight their corner, often with close ties to their chief executives. To navigate an issue to conclusion at the U.N., you have simultaneously to handle Russia and China, and an array of actors whose influence is rising on the global stage. That doesn't only include the likes of Brazil and India who each had a two-year elected stint on the U.N. Security Council during Rice’s tenure, but also key American partners like South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Singapore, and Australia. Rice used her Africa experience effectively too; Africa matters at the U.N., as they do in a growing number of economic and global negotiations – few Americans would focus on this fact, but Africa’s combined middle class is larger than China’s, and America has critical energy and security interests on the continent. Rice has also forged close and effective relations with core U.S. allies who also invest considerable political capital at the U.N., including Canada, the U.K. and Israel.

Second, the what. Odd as it may seem to some in Washington, many of America’s top security issues flow through or around the U.N. Security Council. That’s especially true where the Security Council has been directly engaged on sanctions or interventions (Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Syria debates). Because Rice was simultaneously a member of President Obama’s national security cabinet, she actively participated in decision-making around these issues, beyond just their Security Council dimension. Then there are also core interests in places where the U.N. has mediation, elections, peacekeeping or humanitarian roles, from Myanmar to Lebanon to Somalia to Afghanistan. And there are the ‘global’ issues: climate change; development; human rights. These issues are growing in significance in U.S. diplomacy, because they matter to the U.S. economy and to U.S. values, and because they matter to U.S. allies as well as the emerging powers – if very differently.

That takes us to the how of the U.N. Now, quite a bit of what the U.N. does, especially at the General Assembly, is simply incomprehensible: interminable debates about issues of modest consequence conducted by countries with no ability to affect the outcome. Rice has wisely stayed away from much of that part of the U.N., and concentrated her efforts in those areas where U.N. decisions do matter or where countries that matter to the U.S. have chosen the U.N. to pursue an important agenda. In those arenas, there’s a lot of talking and meetings involved, along with large doses of patience. That Rice has been able to muster that patience again and again shows how far the reality of her performance is from the caricature of her personality.

There’s a broader point here too, about multilateral engagement. Before he left office, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg concluded that the business of building and management the tools for collective action have gone from a side business to the core of American foreign policy. Diplomats who ply their trade in multilateral arenas like to joke that they play chess while their bilateral colleagues play checkers. For all its warts, the U.N. requires the discipline of corralling and cajoling allies and others into collective action – and pushing hard to get people out of the way when deference to a false consensus would impede results.

The defining element of Rice’s worldview is that America should be able to use its power in all its forms to protect its interests and to defend core values. Pundits have said that she strongly defends the president’s vision, and that’s true; but she’s shaped it as well, bringing him to a more effective vision of how to marry American power to leadership in a changing world. Between her role at the U.N. and in the cabinet Rice has had four years of demonstrating how to marry American diplomacy with the tools of hard power to effect outcomes.

In the debate over her qualifications, the argument that she’s unqualified is trivial, and she’s proven to have the character for modern diplomacy. As a testing ground for the diplomacy of a changing world, it would be hard to design a better four-year tour. I can imagine her in a wide range of other national security and Cabinet positions in the near future. For now she’ll continue to serve in a vital way as ambassador to the U.N., putting country first. Would that her critics had had the character to do the same.

1. Susan Rice is a family friend; a former colleague at Brookings; and my wife has worked for her at USUN for the past four years.

Authors

Bruce Jones

Image Source: © Allison Joyce / Reuters

A Preview of the 2012 UN General Assembly Meetings

Bruce Jones — Thu, 20 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

With the deadly attacks on the U.S. embassy in Libya and mounting violence in Syria as a backdrop, the United Nations General Assembly has convened its 67th general session this week. World leaders will spend the next several days focusing on economic, political and environmental issues. Topping the list is the specter that violent outbursts could spread through the Middle East and an assessment of the Millennium Development Goals, notes Senior Fellow Bruce Jones.

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A Preview of the 2012 UN General Assembly Meetings

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Bruce Jones

@ Brookings Podcast: The Arctic as an Emerging Market

Bruce Jones — Fri, 29 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Climate change and the search for resources have turned the Arctic into an emerging market and an important trade route. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project, says that the top of the world poses possibilities for international tensions among interested nations claiming sovereignty, but at least so far, no serious conflicts have emerged.

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Bruce Jones: Arctic Region’s Importance for Trade, Transit and Energy Is Increasing

Authors

Bruce Jones

America’s Role in the World

Bruce Jones and Benjamin Wittes — Mon, 25 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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With its continuing weak economy and the growing power of China and other countries, America’s role as the pre-eminent power in the world has changed in the past few years. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, a director of the Managing Global Order Project, and Campaign 2012 Project Director Benjamin Wittes discuss what the next president will need to do to continue America’s role as a world-wide power.

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Dancing on the Sand: How the Rio+20 Summit Fell Short

Bruce Jones — Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 -0400

At 4:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning, 1,000 or so advanced delegates at Rio+20 (formally, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development) laid down their pens and shut off their laptops. At noon, Brazil's worldly foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, gaveled through the Outcome Document from the chair. And by mid-afternoon, Rio was full of a sound to which that joyous city is unaccustomed: the collective moan of 40,000 environmentalists disappointed about the results. (Yes, you read that right: 40,000. Alongside 10,000 official government participants.) But if the environment movement expected Earth-saving outcomes from Rio, they were clearly enjoying too much of Brazil's famed cachaça.

That the Rio outcome fell short of the highest expectations was not only predictable, it was predicted -- by everybody. A senior European Union negotiator told me last month that the EU's major focus had already turned to lowering expectations. That was wise: No credible analysis of environmental agreements past tells us that a global summit of this kind, with a broad, encompassing agenda, can actually deliver genuine changes in the way the world does its economic or energy business. Throw in a gloomy global economic situation, and major leaps forward were a non-starter.

There were some avoidable mistakes. Brazil got into an early fight with Mexico, which was simultaneously preparing the Los Cabos Summit of the G-20, about which country would "lead" on green growth issues. (As if the problem is that we have too much leadership on green growth, rather than a dearth of it.) The result was that rather than the G-20 negotiations bolstering Rio, the two processes proceeded in parallel. For the Rio process itself, the U.N. produced a reasonable backdrop analysis but never managed to escape the utterly opaque language of "sustainable development," and did far less than was necessary to shape the political space for action.

Read the full article at foreignpolicy.com »

Authors

Bruce Jones

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © STRINGER Brazil / Reuters

Arctic Issues Reinforce Case for Senate to Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty

Bruce Jones — Fri, 15 Jun 2012 14:47:00 -0400

President Obama is urging the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, an accord that governs international waterways and helps countries manage maritime disputes. The U.S. is the only major country that hasn’t ratified the treaty, which administration official say would bolster national security, help create jobs and facilitate oil exploration. Opponents argue that the treaty would require the U.S. to forfeit certain royalties and would undermine the nation’s sovereignty in waterways around the world. Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project, says it’s time that the U.S. Senate ratify the accord.

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Senate Should Approve Law of the Sea Treaty

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Bruce Jones

The International Framework for Sustainable Development and Global Order

Fri, 08 Jun 2012 15:32:00 -0400

Bruce Jones describes how the international framework for implementing Rio+20’s action items must be reformed in order to achieve success through the creation of a new U.N. Council on Sustainable Development or adaptation of the U.N. Economic and Social Council.

Publication: Rio+20: Coalitions Driving Bottom-Up Change

Chill Out: Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic

Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven — Wed, 30 May 2012 14:15:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: In this report, the authors address the Arctic’s growing strategic relevance and conflict dynamic; offer background on and assessment of the existing institutions, and examine ongoing risks. Ultimately, they conclude that the prospects for cooperation outstrip the potential for conflict and that the Arctic offers lessons for tackling evolving challenges in other regions.

INTRODUCTION

As the Cold War receded, so too did the strategic significance of the Arctic, once a zone of U.S.-Soviet contestation. In recent years, tensions have once again been rising. From the infamous planting of the Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean in 2007 to Secretary Clinton’s appearance at the May 2011 Arctic Council ministerial, states have turned their attention to the North. The drivers of this shift are rapidly melting ice and the consequent prospects for the development of energy resources; its facilitators have been innovating in extraction technologies and marine transportation systems to move cargoes of hydrocarbons and hard minerals along previously inaccessible sea routes. Rising oil prices in 2004-2008 generated investment resources.

These changes have created a complex and, to some, worrying political picture. Many fear the Arctic will see an intensifying battle for sovereign control and commercial advantage. While such a view may be “more alarmist than alarming,” insecurity in the far North has increased risks of political and military conflict and highlighted the need for a stable maritime security system to manage disputes and other security concerns.

The bleakest forecasts have overlooked positive developments in the region. Despite the Arctic’s dangerous mix of great power competition, unresolved territorial disputes, and increasingly accessible oil and gas reserves, there has to date been little actual discord. Unlike in the South China Seas, which faces a similar mix of uncharted energy resources and contested boundaries, Arctic states have pledged to solve disputes in an orderly process, managed the peaceful resolution of a major territorial conflict, and concluded a binding agreement to cooperate on search and rescue.

This is not to say there is no reason for worry. The most contentious issues are yet to be resolved. There is scope for strategic miscalculation, a loss of faith in multilateral processes that deliver unwelcome findings, or an environmental disaster triggering a spiral of mistrust.

The Arctic therefore emerges as a rich case study of current and potential areas of international cooperation and tension, with implications for energy security, global trade, global power politics, sustainable development, and climate change. In this paper, we first address the Arctic’s growing strategic relevance and its potential conflict dynamic. Second, we offer background on the existing institutions and legal regimes, assessing their strength and effectiveness, and then reviewing recent negotiations. Finally, we examine ongoing risks in the region, assessing their likely scale and evolution.

We conclude that—for now—the prospects for continued cooperation outstrip the potential for conflict among Arctic states, and that the Arctic offers lessons, and even elements of a model, for tackling evolving challenges in other regions.

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Andrew Hart
Bruce Jones
David Steven

Image Source: © Reuters Staff / Reuters

Reviving American Leadership

Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright and Jane Esberg — Fri, 25 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

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Editor's Note: The following is a Campaign 2012 policy brief by Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright and Jane Esberg proposing ideas for the next president on America’s role in the world. Strobe Talbott and John-Michael Arnold prepared a response arguing that political polarization in America is preventing the federal government from taking much-needed action on critical issues such as climate change and international security. Homi Kharas also prepared a response arguing that stark ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats mean the 2012 presidential election could have far-reaching impacts on America’s role in the world.

In April 2009 President Barack Obama announced: “I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that Brits believe in British exceptionalism, and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism. . . . I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships.” Though Obama meant it as an endorsement of burden sharing, Republican candidates in 2012 have latched on to this comment, arguing loudly and often that not only is America special, but that conservatives believe this more than the president does.

In the eyes of former Republican candidate Rick Perry, “the exceptionalism of America . . . makes it the last best hope for mankind.” For Ron Paul, this “exceptional country” sets the example that “others will emulate.” Likewise, Herman Cain, Michele Bachmann, and Jon Huntsman have all remarked that America is an “exceptional nation.” Mitt Romney put it most cuttingly when he said that Obama “went around the world and apologized for America.”

While such rhetoric captures the headlines, what should be of greater concern is the likely effect of the 2012 election on U.S. foreign policy and the future of the U.S.-led international order. The next president—whatever his party—will face a series of domestic and international constraints that will press for the continuity of Obama’s policy, rather than significant change. In fact, there is already broad agreement on three principles concerning reform of the international order, advocacy for human rights, and the use of military force. Bipartisan support for these principles should be fostered and communicated to allies, enemies, and “swing states” alike. Building on that foundation, the next administration should

Concentrate on economic diplomacy designed to preserve economic openness, promote international trade, and correct financial imbalances that make the order crisis prone.
Foster a more just and stable international order. Where feasible, that means relying less on nondemocratic regimes and building ties with communities inside authoritarian states and states newly transitioning toward democracy.
Broaden and intensify efforts to form creative new multilateral arrangements in which emerging powers take on responsible roles, and efforts to enhance the credibility and efficacy of existing instruments.
Retain the option for credible use of force, but make more effective use of diplomacy, civilian engagement, and other forms of power and influence, so as to minimize the times and circumstances in which force is necessary. The new administration should therefore avoid cuts to the State Department’s budget and ensure that savings in the Defense Department are linked to a strategy designed to deal with future threats and challenges, with some burden sharing from new and old allies, where possible.
Strengthen and deepen America’s traditional alliances in Asia and Europe and develop new strategic partnerships.

The Progression in Obama’s Foreign Policy

When Barack Obama took office, he outlined three major foreign policy goals: “reestablish America’s standing in the world; create dialogue with friends, partners, and adversaries based on mutual respect; and work together in building partnerships.” Yet arguably the greatest foreign policy successes of the ensuing three years—the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki and the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi—rested not on American soft power but on the uses of hard power, applied unilaterally in two of the three cases. Moreover, two of the acts probably violated some elements of international law. This does not mean that his focus on engagement has been replaced, but that increasingly it has been balanced by overt and covert military action, coercive diplomacy, and a deepening of alliance commitments.

Such changes reflect a shift in Obama’s foreign policy vision resulting from the experience that just as American power is limited so too is the willingness of other states to cooperate. At the same time, Obama still seems open to forging an international order in which emerging powers take on greater responsibility, but as yet those powers do not seem ready for prime time.

Obama’s campaign platform of peace through diplomatic engagement and military restraint played off the post-Bush distaste for war. Just before announcing his candidacy, Obama called for a “strategy no longer driven by ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground and our interests.” Pragmatism also drove his policies of high-level engagement with allies and adversaries alike, including rogue regimes like those of Iran and North Korea. Thus high-level dialogue aimed at constraining and reasoning with governments meant in part tacitly supporting rogue or dictatorial regimes.

During the Green Revolution, for example, Obama avoided showing direct support for protestors for fear that it would backfire. In a 2007 debate, he called China “neither our enemy or our friend. . . . But we have to make sure that we have enough military-to-military contact and forge enough of a relationship with them that we can stabilize the region.” To promote dialogue, Obama publicly supported the One China initiative and postponed a visit with the Dalai Lama. He also called for “direct and aggressive diplomacy” to address the North Korean nuclear program. He was wary of using military force outside of addressing a direct national interest, saying in 2007 that he would not leave troops in Iraq even in the event of genocide: “if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now.” Thus above all else, stability and peace drove Obama’s foreign policy rhetoric.

By the early months of 2011, however, Obama’s goal of engagement with adversaries had shifted. The discovery of a secret nuclear facility in Qom, Iran’s refusal to negotiate, and the regime’s crackdown on the Green Revolution persuaded Obama to seek UN Security Council authorization for sweeping sanctions. These passed, even though the move alienated Brazil and Turkey, which were negotiating a fuel-swap deal with Iran. In the same period, China became increasingly assertive in the South China Sea, submitting claims to vast amounts of the maritime territory and harassing U.S. naval vessels on a surveillance mission. It also proved intransigent on discussions of nuclear weapons reductions. These moves would eventually result in Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia” in the winter of 2011. Engagement also failed to mend relations with North Korea, which unveiled an advanced uranium enrichment facility and began provocations against South Korea that included sinking its navy corvette Cheonan and shelling the coast. High-level talks seemed most effective in Russia, where Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) discussions created a new strategic reduction treaty and American concessions on missile defenses bought Russian support for sanctions on Iran and the cancellation of S-300 missile sales to Iran. Ironically, when discussing Russia during the campaign, Obama had supported “pushing for more democracy, transparency, and accountability” and called a “resurgent” and “aggressive” Russia “a threat to peace and stability.”

What changed was not Obama’s belief in America’s special role in the world but his understanding of how that must manifest itself, given that other states were not always willing to cooperate and differed from the United States in their perception of threats. As a result, Obama’s foreign policy shifted in three respects: it showed greater readiness to use America’s military reach, put greater emphasis on the United States leading the way in the design of new institutions, and intensified the focus on human rights and democracy abroad. Thus Obama sent troops into Pakistan without permission, in violation of Pakistani sovereignty, to conduct the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. He agreed to the assassination of al-Awlaki, an American citizen and al Qaeda operative, in Yemen. Iran’s nuclear timeline was delayed in large part because of likely U.S. or Israeli covert actions, such as use of the Stuxnet computer virus and probable assassinations of Iranian scientists and engineers. To reorient American power toward the Asia-Pacific, the United States announced that marines on rotation would operate from a base in Darwin, Australia, and that Washington would provide new littoral battleships to Singapore and naval support for the Philippines. To promote cooperation on issues of American interest, Obama spearheaded the creation of new global arrangements, including the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and the Open Government Partnership (OGP), and he also announced the creation of a U.S.-led economic framework for Asia. In addition, during Hu Jintao’s January 2011 visit, Obama twice referred to the need for China to improve its human rights record, and he repeated the sentiment in his speech to Australia’s parliament.

The deployment of resources to the Asia-Pacific and the use of drones has been called a form of “offshore balancing,” which in this context means greater reliance on air, sea, and naval power, a reduction in major troop presences in the greater Middle East, and fostering strategic regional alliances. The logic is that a step back from costly land-based commitments will provide the United States with additional options to achieve its geopolitical objectives. This position is hardly new. With intellectual roots in the cold war, Obama’s policies in many ways represent a return to tradition. What is novel about Obama’s version of offshore balancing is its moral dimension, which centers on America’s exceptionalism—including its respect for human rights—rather than just its hegemony. Although Libya was, after all, an exercise in U.S. and allied airpower, the strict realist interpretation of offshore balancing considers it a means to undermine any potential challengers. By contrast, Obama’s version also stresses ethical responsibility: “Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.” Even the development of new global arrangements like the NSS, GCTF, and OGP can be seen as a form of diplomatic offshore balancing, ensuring American interests while indirectly pressuring other governments to fall in line by building partnerships and setting global norms.

In this regard, the foreign policy actor that Obama most closely resembles may be James Baker, secretary of state to George H. W. Bush. Initially using traditional offshore balancing through deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia to protect Kuwait, Baker also pushed for direct Western intervention in the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis: “The only way to solve [the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina] is selective bombing of Serbian targets.” However, he balked at unilateral action, stating that the United States “cannot be the world’s policeman.” Baker effectively balanced American power, alliances, and international institutions to achieve national interests, and Obama has followed suit.

The Republican 2012 Debates

Despite ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan, tensions with Iran, regime transition in North Korea, the Arab Spring, the Eurocrisis, and America’s tense relationship with China, foreign policy has been a minor theme of the Republican primary debates. In fact, it was hardly mentioned in the numerous debates in the summer and fall of 2011. Even when several conservatives expressed concern about the exclusion of international issues from the contest and candidates held two national security debates in response, one received only an hour of live televised time and was relatively lackluster, while the other concentrated on Iran and terrorism-related issues. The second debate also veered throughout into domestic politics—such as entitlement reform and immigration—and had no discussion of Asia or the European crisis. Despite Egypt’s second wave of protests in Tahrir Square, which coincided with the first round of its elections, the Arab Spring was only touched on at the very end.

The debates reflected the substance and style of the primary campaign as a whole. Whenever foreign policy realities—the Arab Spring, Libya, Europe—intruded, the candidates’ positions were underdeveloped and subject to change. One candidate, Herman Cain, managed to dominate the news cycle for several weeks despite committing several major foreign policy gaffes, including not knowing that China had nuclear weapons, promising to release all prisoners in Guantánamo in exchange for U.S. prisoners held by the Taliban or al Qaeda, and being unable to offer a view about the Libya intervention. This was less significant for what it said about Cain than about primary voters’ lack of interest in a candidate’s foreign policy views. Of all the candidates, only Mitt Romney ever had anything approaching a foreign policy infrastructure similar in size and scope to that of John McCain or the two top Democratic contenders of 2008.

In the absence of a substantive debate or conversation on foreign policy, the candidates engaged the issues of national security and foreign policy rhetorically and by invoking themes that resonate with the base—notably that of American exceptionalism and Obama’s penchant for underplaying it. When a May 2011 article in the New Yorker by Ryan Lizza included a quotation from an unnamed White House official describing the president’s strategy on Libya as “leading from behind,” GOP candidates immediately jumped on this statement and returned to the theme in the fall. Issues that seem compatible with the narrative of Obama the naïve appeaser (on Iran and Russia) are embraced, and inconvenient facts (such as covert activities against Iran) are ignored. Issues that do not lend themselves to the narrative—such as Obama’s Asia strategy of balancing China—are avoided entirely. The harsh criticism is of a general nature and fails to provide substantive arguments on major issues such as the Arab Spring, counterterrorism, the European crisis, or the intervention in Libya.

When the Republican candidates have focused on foreign policy, they have conceived it narrowly and in 2004 terms, focusing on terrorism, Iran’s nuclear weapons, and sovereignty. America’s broader role in the world—particularly in such regions as Asia and Europe—has been given short shrift. For example, Romney’s foreign policy speech made no mention of any of America’s Asian allies, even though it emphasized a commitment to alliances. Only Israel and the United Kingdom made the cut. Not only have the candidates not offered policies to deal with the international dimension of the financial crisis, they have shown little sign of understanding it at all. On other transnational issues, such as climate change and foreign aid, the Republican position has weakened since the Bush administration, as made clear during the second GOP foreign policy debate when Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense during the Bush administration and a leading hawk, implicitly admonished the candidates for proposing to cut aid to Africa. Grand strategy appears to have contracted as well. Bush made the promotion of democracy and freedom the central pillar of his worldview, but with the exception of Rick Santorum, no candidate for 2012 has taken up his banner. Indeed, the Republican notion of the national interest and security has shrunk considerably since George W. Bush left office.

What is more, though seemingly united in their criticisms of Obama, the Republican Party is sharply divided on its view of America’s role in the world. Henry Kissinger once wrote, “It is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day.” While accusing Obama of Wilsonianism, the Republican foreign policy line itself has proved confused, split between three separate—and often contradictory—strains of thought: machoism, isolationism, and engagement. These correspond very roughly to the Jacksonian, Jeffersonian, and Hamiltonian foreign policy traditions. Most candidates incorporate at least two such concepts into their rhetoric, though all reveal a different vision of what it means for America to be exceptional.

Perhaps the clearest offshoot of exceptionalism is American machoism, which implies that by grace of its strength the United States can shape the rest of the world into what it wants. Saber-rattling on Iran has been its most overt sign in the debates, as well as in Romney’s call for increased military spending. However, this current machoism is more expansive than its Jacksonian roots: while similarly uncompromising and lacking a moral dimension, it has developed a cockiness about the nation’s ability to promote its interests short of force. Newt Gingrich, for example, stated that the United States needs to start “taking back” the United Nations and to refuse engagement with the “terrorist” Palestinian Authority. Romney denounced the “reset” of relations with Russia as “caving in” to demands on Iran. Such comments essentially argue that the United States can have its way in any scenario—and that President Obama simply hasn’t been demanding forcefully enough.

If this machoistic rhetoric seems like a natural extension of exceptionalism, it is also reminiscent of Bush’s policies, so the candidates have almost universally tempered it. To avoid the appearance of warmongering, they have balanced it with a Jeffersonian emphasis on avoiding “entangling alliances.” Current Republican isolationism rests on two beliefs: first, that America is “exceptionally” self-sufficient and thus does not need to engage extensively to preserve its own security; and second, that engagement weakens America by draining its resources. Foreign aid in particular rankles isolationists. Rick Perry promised to drop all aid to zero and to reevaluate whether recipients “deserve” it, a proposition with which Gingrich agreed. He also promised a “very serious discussion of defunding the United Nations.” Gingrich called for the suspension of UN funding in response to the vote on Palestinian statehood. None of the candidates espousing such arguments have explained how this foreign policy vision takes into account the realities of an interconnected global economy.

However, some Republicans favor a Hamiltonian emphasis on engagement to promote American interests, in close alignment with Obama’s foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, Jon Huntsman became the symbol for this strand of Republican thought, supporting talks with China, Pakistan, and other key states in the interest of U.S. security. Romney, too, thinks the United States should “employ all tools of statecraft” and “exercise leadership in multilateral organizations.” Though recently critical of the United Nations, even Gingrich encouraged the United States to increase funding for certain UN programs when cochairing a 2005 task force on UN reform for the United States Institute of Peace. In the debates, Michele Bachmann and Rick Santorum stated that staying engaged with Pakistan is of vital importance to U.S. security.

Most candidates avoided embracing any single policy strain fully: machoism too closely aligns with Bush’s Iraq invasion, isolationism too clearly ignores the transnational threats the United States still faces, and engagement too closely echoes Obama. With the exception of Ron Paul and Jon Huntsman, the candidates have pieced together parts of multiple lines, with somewhat schizophrenic results. In one breath, Romney states the United States should “embrace the challenge . . . not to crawl into an isolationist shell,” in another that it “ought to get the Chinese to take care of the people [in need of humanitarian aid].” That is to say, America—strong as ever—should lead, but why not let someone else do it. Such competing policies are highly suggestive of an actual Republican administration’s stance.

Facing Reality

The Republicans have strived to differentiate themselves from Obama, but part of the reason for the inconsistencies in their foreign policy line lies in the evolution of his thinking. Defining an “Obama Doctrine” is a challenge. He is not an interventionist (in Sudan and Congo), except where he is (in Libya and in Uganda in a small way). He addresses threats cooperatively (in the Nuclear Security Summit), except when he doesn’t (in the bin Laden raid and allegedly in the case of the Stuxnet attack on Iran). He calls for democracy (in the Middle East), except when he by and large stays silent (on Russia). He does not fit neatly into a realist or an idealist box. Obama has evolved to a position that might be termed ethical offshore balancing. While, as Walter Russell Mead has argued, he campaigned on Wilsonian-Jeffersonian ideals, he has developed a hybrid Wilsonian-Hamiltonian foreign policy.

Any candidate will face a number of foreign policy challenges and have limited policy options to manage them. China’s growth and influence are a fact of life: hard containment is at odds with the reality of U.S.--Chinese economic entanglement, but allowing China unfettered dominance of Asia is hardly a viable or desirable option either. Obama’s balancing effort contains most of the right notes, and it is hard to see how any Republican president might differ substantially from Obama’s eventual position on this. Brazil and India are playing an increasingly important role in the global order, and the United States must find ways to engage them or else risk alienating important regional players and leaving their potential contributions to a stable order on the table. But equally, no American president in the foreseeable future is going to offer these countries anything like a veto over American foreign policy programs (or a veto in the UN Security Council). The shaky economic foundations of the global financial system need urgent attention, and it is striking to recall that it was George W. Bush—hardly America’s greatest multilateralist—who authorized the most important expansion of International Monetary Fund (IMF) powers in recent times to deal with the global financial crisis. Obama has continued strengthening the IMF, and although no Republican candidate has mentioned the IMF explicitly, Gingrich’s and Romney’s foreign policies seem unlikely to radically change the stance at the IMF or in the G20. Neither isolationism nor machoism addresses the reality that the United States has clear and important stakes in the global economy that make it vulnerable to the actions and behaviors of other nations. Similarly, transnational threats mean isolationism is not an option.

Hints of the same basic policies can already be seen in the Republican field. The most developed foreign policy statement of any of the Republican campaigns came in a Romney speech, and its parallels with Obama’s foreign policy are striking. On major doctrinal matters—including the use of military force, advocating for human rights, and reforming the international order—the positions are similar.

Indeed, many on both sides of the aisle believe that a healthy global economy is integral to a functioning and effective international order. The next administration should intensify its economic diplomacy to preserve economic openness, foster international trade, and correct financial imbalances that invite crisis. Many would also agree that the United States has a unique role both in fostering a stable international order and in promoting justice and dignity. As mentioned earlier, America should rely less on autocratic regimes and more on building ties with communities inside authoritarian states and those moving toward democracy. These are better achieved through quiet policy than declarative rhetoric, given the inevitable reality that there will be important exceptions—as in the case of Saudi Arabia.

Equally important, U.S. power and security need to be embedded in multilateral institutions and alliances. The next administration should intensify U.S. efforts to foster such arrangements and encourage emerging powers to take on responsible roles, and to enhance the credibility and efficacy of existing instruments.

As also mentioned earlier, the credible use of force must remain an option, although the emphasis should be on more effective use of diplomacy, civilian engagement, and other forms of power and influence. It is therefore vital to keep the State Department budget at its current level and to ensure that savings to the Defense Department’s budget are linked to strategies to deal with future threats and challenges and to make sure that allies and partners will share some of the burden, where possible. In its relations with China, the next administration should aim to retain a judicious blend of efforts to balance and efforts to engage. As a new generation of leadership takes over in Beijing, it will be important to communicate the resolve to balance China’s regional muscle and a desire to see China succeed at economic growth, social development, and gradual political liberalization.

For now, the Republican candidates tend to favor continuity in their general worldview, although some may diverge on climate change and arms control. Whichever party finds itself occupying the White House in January 2013, America’s international order strategy seems likely to be shaped not by minor differences between the two parties but by the twin realities governing present times: American reliance on the global economy and global reliance on American power.

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Campaign 2012: America’s Role in the World

Fri, 25 May 2012 11:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 25, 2012
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Follow @BICampaign2012

Despite America’s longstanding status as the world’s only superpower, rapid globalization and new global security threats have raised questions about America’s role in the international order. The U.S. must contend with the rise of strong economic actors like China and Brazil, while volatile regions like the Middle East and the Korean peninsula remain dependent on America’s international security presence. The next president will have to manage these dual realities while protecting American interests at home and abroad.

On May 25, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on America’s role in the world, the sixth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. Deputy White House Editor Edward-Isaac Dovere of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Bruce Jones, Strobe Talbott and Homi Kharas, who presented recommendations to the next president.

After the program, panelists took questions from the audience.

You can follow the conversation on this event on Twitter using the hashtag #AmericasRole or on our @BICampaign2012 Twitter feed.

Download papers from the event:

Reviving American Leadership: The Next President Should Continue on the Path Obama Has Set, by Bruce Jones, Thomas Wright, and Jane Esberg
It's the Climate, Stupid!, by Strobe Talbott and John-Michael Arnold
Less Agreement Than Meets the Eye, by Homi Kharas

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Panelists

Benjamin Wittes

Edward-Isaac Dovere

Deputy White House Editor

Bruce Jones

Homi Kharas

Strobe Talbott

Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities: Building on the Legacy of Richard Holbrooke

Tue, 22 May 2012 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2012
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

A strong international commitment to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities was a central theme of the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s life and work. Last month, the Obama administration created an Atrocities Prevention Board, citing the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as both a core national security interest and moral responsibility of the United States. On May 22, the Brookings Institution, in collaboration with the Central European University School of Public Policy and International Affairs, hosted a discussion on U.S. and international efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, building on Ambassador Holbrooke’s legacy.

The first panel, moderated by Brookings President Strobe Talbott, focused on what can be learned from Ambassador Holbrooke’s work, especially in terms of atrocity prevention. Panelists included Robert Orr, U.N. assistant secretary general for policy coordination and strategic planning; Kati Marton, author and journalist; and Vali Nasr, dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. The second panel, moderated by Senior Fellow Bruce Jones, director of the Managing Global Order project at Brookings, addressed future challenges and policy choices in genocide and mass atrocity prevention. Panelists included John Shattuck, president and rector, Central European University; and Renata Uitz, professor of law, Central European University.

After each session, the panel took audience questions.

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Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities

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Participants

Panelists

Strobe Talbott

Kati Marton

Author and Journalist

Vali Nasr

Dean, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Senior Fellow,

Robert Orr

Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Assistant Secretary

President and Rector

Professor of Law

Meet the GUTS: The Rise of Germany, the United States, Turkey, and South Korea

Bruce Jones and Thomas Wright — Thu, 17 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Friday's G-8 summit at Camp David may seem something of an oddity -- an archaic reminder of a time before the rise of the BRICs and the supposed decline of the Western powers. But the West is still very much alive and kicking -- and, driven by its most dynamic members, has a chance of remaining on the top of the heap for the foreseeable future.

The West is not in decline, at least not in its entirety. Rather, the financial crisis has created a two-speed West. Four large countries -- Germany, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States -- are actually increasing their international influence, while the others are stuck in a rut.

Ironically, America's obituary as a great power has repeatedly been written over the past three years even as it has grown stronger on multiple fronts. U.S. influence in Asia has risen at a rapid clip since 2008, driven largely by regional anxiety about Chinese assertiveness. The United States deepened its traditional alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. It developed strategic partnerships, including with the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in ways that were previously unthinkable. Paradoxically, Chinese economic growth has weakened its own geopolitical position and benefited the United States. Such are the ways of world politics.

The United States is rising in other areas too. On national security, the U.S. position is also stronger than it has been in many years. The U.S. military and intelligence services have shown impressive dynamism in bringing al Qaeda to the brink of total defeat, something many analysts believed unlikely only a few years ago. The Pentagon has been at the forefront of the drone and robotics revolution, which may give it an edge in 21st-century conflicts. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats have developed innovative new means of international cooperation, notably with the Nuclear Security Summit and the Open Government Partnership.

America's greatest vulnerability remains its weak economy. Significant challenges lie ahead, but it is worth noting that the United States has significantly outperformed the eurozone and has better prospects for growth than most other Western states. It remains a hub of innovation: Just consider the rise of social media and the technology-driven exploration for shale gas. Over the long term, the fiscal challenges confronting the United States must be weighed against the very real -- and very underestimated -- internal strains on the Chinese and Indian economies.

It's not just the United States that is propping up the West. Germany stands apart as a rising power amidst a weakened Europe. Its unemployment rate is at a post-Cold War low and its timely market reforms have allowed it to export its way out of the recession. The euro crisis is Germany's greatest challenge but, ironically, it has also made Germany the continent's preeminent diplomatic and geoeconomic power: For better or worse, Chancellor Angela Merkel's government has won argument after argument about the future direction of the EU, often despite deep reservations from other member states. Francois Hollande's election in France will complicate but not erode Merkel's position. And even if she loses power next year -- an unlikely prospect despite her recent setbacks in regional elections -- a different German leader will continue to profit from Germany's economic strength within Europe.

In East Asia, South Korea's strong economic performance since the financial crisis led some analysts to argue it should be added to the BRICs, but as one of America's oldest and most reliable allies, it belongs in the West's column. It has become a powerhouse of high-end manufacturing and is on course to become richer than Japan in per capita terms within the next five years. Internationally, South Korea responded robustly and responsibly to North Korea's aggression by strengthening the alliance with the United States and embarking upon controversial defense cooperation with its old enemy, Japan. It has also taken an active role in upholding the international order, hosting the G-20 summit in 2010 and the nuclear security summit in March.

Turkey, a longstanding U.S. ally and NATO member, is the fourth member of the rising West. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed Turkey into a regional powerhouse -- its economy has more than tripled under his watch, registering growth rates on par with China. After years of eschewing its Muslim identity, Turkey is emerging as a model, albeit an imperfect one, for Islamic democrats in the Arab world. Turkish assistance is indispensable in dealing with the Syrian crisis, and its diplomats play a pivotal role in mediating international negotiations with Iran. Yes, the new Turkey has a tendency to chart its own path -- but even if Erdogan is often at odds with other NATO members, Turkey represents a bridge from the West rather than an island apart from it.

But even as these four countries have expanded their influence, the West is also hobbled by four countries that have yet to recover from the financial crisis: Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. All suffer from lower growth rates than the rising West and, unlike the United States, they have not compensated for economic weakness with bold advances in other areas. Britain and France tried to take the initiative with the Libya intervention, but the war merely illustrated their yawning technological shortcomings, and showed how heavily NATO allies rely on U.S. airpower.

Britain has the best chance to join the rising West if it can turn its economy around. Its leadership of the G-8 next year offers an opportunity to demonstrate some of its old flair for global leadership, especially if it takes creative steps to reach out to dynamic new players like Turkey and Indonesia. Another state, Australia, is between the two Wests -- it avoided a recession after the fall of Lehman Brothers but has not had the impact of a rising power in recent years. However, its geographical position, close security relationship with the United States, and vast energy supplies means it is likely to become more influential in global politics.

The rising West is a force to be reckoned with. It is no coincidence that U.S. President Barack Obama has been closer to the leaders of his fellow rising Western states than to the leaders of the rest; he named South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and Erdogan as two of his closest international allies. (He appears not to be as close personally to Merkel but Germany's centrality in the euro crisis means he is in constant contact with her.)

So don't write off the West yet. The rising powers in the developed world will not always agree, but when they do they will be hard to resist. And they will be important interlocutors for the BRICS as they engage the Western order. Unfortunately, Friday's G-8 summit is unlikely to harness their power -- Turkey and South Korea's leaders are at home.

Perhaps these rising powers need an acronym if they are to be taken seriously. Is it time for the BRICS to meet the GUTS of the West

Authors

Previewing the G-8 and NATO Summits: An Examination of the Summits’ Top Agenda Items

Wed, 16 May 2012 10:45:00 -0400

Event Information

May 16, 2012
10:45 AM - 2:00 PM EDT

Root Room
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC

In the coming week, the United States will host both the G-8 and NATO Summits, two important gatherings of world leaders focusing on a number of critical global issues including Europe’s economic stability, cooperation and security concerns in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and recent political changes among the G-8 member states.

On May 16, in advance of the summits at Camp David and in Chicago, the Managing Global Order project at Brookings hosted Michael Froman, assistant to the president of the United States and deputy national security adviser for international economic affairs at the National Security Council and the National Economic Council, for an overview of the summits’ key issues. Froman currently serves as the U.S. Sherpa for the G-20 and G-8 Summits, and is responsible for coordinating policy on international trade, investment, energy security and climate change, and development and democracy issues. Following his remarks, two panels featuring Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Jones, Justin Vaisse, Suzanne Maloney and Bruce Riedel, examined the summits’ top agenda items. The first panel discussed how G-8 member states can better cooperate to engage emerging powers and outline how the outcome of the French election affects the summit and transatlantic relations. The second panel examined the various security issues on the agenda for the G-8 and NATO summits, including Iran, the Arab Awakening, and Afghanistan. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, and Senior Fellow Dan Byman, director of research for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the panel discussions.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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Participants

Panelists

Martin S. Indyk

Michael Froman

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser for International Economic Affairs

The G-8 Summit's Most Pressing Issues

Bruce Jones — Tue, 15 May 2012 12:59:00 -0400

President Obama will host leaders from the world’s eight leading industrial nations at his Camp David retreat this weekend for talks on some of the most pressing global issues. While Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, won’t make it to the summit, leaders from United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom will attend.

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The G-8 Summit's Most Pressing Issues

Image Source: Reuters

The Options in Syria

Bruce Jones — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 00:00:00 -0400

The April 10 deadline for Syrian forces to withdraw from major cities set by Kofi Annan, the United Nations and Arab League special envoy for Syria, appears to have come and gone with little change on the ground. Thursday's deadline for a complete ceasefire looks set to pass as well. For now, Annan rightly insists the plan is still on the table. But Syria's last best chance for a diplomatic solution is dying.

If Annan's plan is likely dead, the coroner won't pronounce it for a few more days. Deadlines like these are sometimes rescued in diplomatic overtime. Russian prestige is now on the line, and we may see a last-ditch effort from Moscow to get Assad to comply. The upcoming G8 foreign ministers' meeting in Washington on April 12, where Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will confront an irate Hillary Clinton, might provide an opportunity to break the deadlock between the United States and Russia.

There's precedent for this: When the U.N. Security Council was stalemated in 1999 over Kosovo, it was a G8 meeting that provided the diplomatic breakthrough between the United States and Russia. There will be ferocious diplomacy to that end in the next few days, as well as diplomacy aimed at seeing whether Beijing can be persuaded to play ball -- or at least not block Security Council action -- leaving Moscow more isolated. We could still see the Security Council agreeing to a new resolution, calling on President Bashar al-Assad to implement Annan's plan and agreeing to deploy a monitoring force. Still, those hoping for a diplomatic solution to this mess shouldn't fool themselves -- the odds are low.

But the odds were always low. Several days ago, commentators were busily rehearsing the line that Annan was naive to be "shocked" that Assad broke his promises. Casablanca-style "shocked, shocked" is more like it: Annan is nobody's fool. He has long experience with Assad, and knew full well the odds lay against his following through on any diplomatic solution. The former U.N. secretary-general was not counting on Assad's good will, but on producing a plan that could unify the Security Council, shifting Assad's international calculus. It still might. It probably won't.

Annan and current U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon were right to try. Diplomacy sometimes succeeds in unlikely circumstances, and could have forestalled the inevitable deterioration that will now follow. And if diplomacy irrevocably fails in the next few days, then no one can credibly argue that all other options were not exhausted before more forceful measures are used.

What might those measures be?

There will be new calls for the use of force to achieve regime change. The strong moral pros and substantial operational cons of that option have been fully debated in this magazine and elsewhere. At this stage, there is no sign that the United States, NATO, Turkey, or anyone else is contemplating a full-blown intervention. Indeed, the White House has reportedly signaled to the Syrian opposition recently that it is not prepared to escalate its conflict with the Assad regime.

A more likely scenario was spelled out by Foreign Policy's own James Traub. His argument is that the least bad option may be one of arming the rebels, supporting them politically if they accept certain basic standards of conduct, and engaging in a slow, drawn-out process of bleeding the regime -- what he calls a "neo-mujahideen" strategy. That phrase deliberately invokes the risks as well as potential gains of such an approach, and there should be no doubting that it carries the danger of major escalation and sectarian clashes.

There is a further option that has not been exhaustively examined: that of a multi-national stabilization force. A stabilization force is neither an intervention nor a peacekeeping tool: It has the military capacity of the former, but the intentions of the latter. It does not aim for regime change, but to stop a particular bout of killing and to prevent more. The deployment of such a force helped stop widespread slaughter by the Indonesian army in East Timor in 1999.

It's neither an easy option nor a silver bullet. Memories of the disastrous U.S.-led multinational force in Beirut in 1982, which ended ignominiously after bombings of the U.S. and French barracks killed 241 American servicemen and 58 French soldiers, still linger. The multinational force deployed to eastern Congo in 1996 to bring an end to massive violence and displacement illustrates the strengths and limitations of this approach. That force achieved its goal: The mere pre-deployment of the force in Entebbe, Uganda, got Rwanda to withdraw its forces back across its border -- but not before Rwanda's rulers killed tens of thousands of former rebels. Still, in both eastern Congo and East Timor, multinational forces probably forestalled a far-worse slaughter.

A stabilization force of this kind can't fight its way into Damascus. The Syrian regime, or at least the army, doesn't have to formally acquiesce to its deployment, but it does have to signal that it won't fight it on the way in. This was the case during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, when France, India, Italy, and others sent troops into southern Lebanon as part of a cease-fire arrangement. Hezbollah never agreed to the presence of the force, but quietly sent signals to Paris that it wouldn't contest its deployment.

Why might Syria's forces hold back? First, it's a lot better than opening the door to aggressive attempts at regime change, if those measures start becoming more credible. Second, as in eastern Congo, the pre-deployment of such a force can change the army's calculation. As my Brookings Institution colleague Martin Indyk has pointed out, the Syrian army has no appetite for a confrontation with Turkish forces, and even preparation of a force could shift its psychology and its assessment of the choices it faces. Western powers can also help by increasing the economic costs on Assad's business-community supporters, by working with international financial institutions to stipulate that debt accrued under this regime should be considered "odious" -- a step that would mean debt incurred under this regime need not be paid back, setting out a deeply uncertain economic future for Assad's business-community supporters.

Who could lead such a force? Turkey has understandably equivocated about the option of using its army to help protect civilians or stabilize Syria. The risks Turkey faces are enormous -- but it might be more willing to see its army deployed as part of a multinational force with international authorization, spreading both the operational costs and the political risk. Gulf states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have strongly signaled their desire to support the Syrian opposition, would be more than happy to supply the financing.

Such a force would first have to try to win Security Council authorization. Turkey would have to be willing to make the first move, as the willingness of one country to take a leadership role is usually a precondition of authorization. That's already a tough step -- but winning support from China and Russia, veto-wielding members of the Security Council who have already rejected two resolutions targeting Assad, will be even harder. Is it doable?

The odds aren't as slim as one might think. Tactically, the right approach here would be for Turkey to make this proposal, not the United States. The Turks could seek support from its emerging-power friends both inside the Security Council (India, South Africa) and outside it (Brazil, Indonesia). The emerging powers collectively make a great deal of noise about using the Security Council as a tool to avoid force aimed at regime change. So let them lead an effort to do so.

Russia and China would be much harder pressed to oppose an initiative from these emerging powers than from the usual clutch of Western states in the Security Council. The Gulf can put some pressure on China here -- Beijing is distracted by its own problems right now, and how much longer it will provide cover to Moscow's errant allies in Syria remains to be seen.

And if the Security Council won't authorize an international force, NATO or the Arab League could. NATO has been desperate to avoid getting dragged into Syria, but providing diplomatic cover for a multinational force is a different story.

Of course, some of U.S. President Barack Obama's critics would no doubt charge that letting Turkey and others drive a proposal forward amounts to another example of "leading from behind" -- but that criticism would be infantile, and the Obama administration has earned more than enough foreign-policy credibility to turn the other cheek. Once authorized, a force would certainly need U.S. intelligence and tactical support, but not American boots on the ground.

All of this, it bears repeating, is unlikely. There's no overnight deus ex machina here. First, several more days will pass in diplomatic overtime trying to rescue Annan's plan -- infuriatingly so for Syrian civilians, but realistically the right call. Those frustrated by the slow pace of diplomacy must remember that military options will take weeks, if not months, to organize.

Still, faced with a range of other dreadful choices, this one might balance the pros and cons less badly than some. Right now, the so-called international community faces all bad choices, and Assad has the choice of continued slaughter -- in slow motion or high gear. If and when diplomacy does finally fail, the decision to form a multinational force to protect civilians could turn the tables and confront Assad's supporters with bad choices of their own.

Authors

Bruce Jones

Publication: Foreign Policy

Perspectives on the G-20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Fri, 17 Feb 2012 11:23:00 -0500

On February 19-20, the Mexican government hosted the first ever meeting of the G-20’s foreign ministers. This is an important development in the international architecture for managing the evolving relations between the established and the rising powers. We invited scholars and officials from the G-20 nations to write, in their personal capacity, about the meeting, what it should do, and what it portends in global governance and the management of the changing global order.

United States

Bruce Jones
Senior Fellow and Director, Managing Global Order Project at Brookings
Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

This weekend, the Mexican government will host a meeting of the G-20’s foreign ministers, in Los Cabos. The meeting has been overshadowed by the drama at the UN Security Council, where the US and its allies have clashed with China and especially Russia over violence in Syria. But the Los Cabos meeting constitutes a step change in the governance of global issues.

The G-20 Summit of leaders itself has played a crucial role since November 2008. First, and vitally, in avoiding a global depression, through it’s coordinated stimulus program and refinancing and remandating of the IMF. Second, since the crunch phase of the global financial crisis, the G-20 has made important headway in laying the groundwork of financial regulation, economic surveillance and oversight to reduce the risks of the next crisis. That is an unfinished business, and the Eurozone crisis highlights continuing challenges. Superficial journalism has highlighted ongoing disputes, or less than dramatic Summit outcomes; but overall, the G-20 is a major success story.

One of the more subtle successes of the G-20 is that it has started to foster the habits of cooperation among a set of countries that have not yet had to develop those habits. The G-7 western allies have forty years of experience of working together, and shared values that bind. The critical insight that President Bush had in his last days in office was that the global financial crisis was a bigger problem than the West alone could handle. A wider group was going to be necessary for the crisis response; and moving ahead, building the infrastructure for cooperation between the established and emerging powers is the necessary condition of managing global order. It’s a historical irony that it was President Bush rather than the more globally minded President Obama that made the decisive moves on the G-20 and the IMF, but the pattern was well set and the Obama administration has deepened the work on both fronts.
Because of the scale of the global financial challenge, G-20 managers resisted early calls – including from this project – to widen the agenda of the G-20. They were right. Had the G-20 diverted focus from its core function of protecting the global financial system and maintaining a stable international economic order, not only would we not now be in an incipient global recovery, relations between the major and the emerging powers would have deteriorated rapidly. A continued concentration on core issues is warranted. Over time, though, the G20’s managers have found some bandwith to begin working together on other issues, from development to fossil fuels subsidies.

What’s left behind is foreign and security policy. There are several issues where the established and emerging powers have differences of view on that agenda – Syria is only the most acute and most obvious of them. But there are a raft of other issues where the major powers have shared interests or, more commonly, where they have a shared interest in avoiding a deep crisis – like in Iran. China may not agree with the U.S. approach on Iran, but they have a fundamental interest in avoiding a deep crisis that closes the Straits of Hormuz – and they warned Iran on this in sharp terms in January 2012. There’s perhaps no more important challenge in global order than beginning to set the pattern of finding areas of common agreement, and working through differences short of crisis, between the major and the rising powers. That will not encompass all issues – there will still be many areas that are simply subject for bilateral relations, or for ongoing dispute. It’s surely in all our interests, though, that that set of issues be as small as possible, and that we build up similar habits of cooperation, or at least habits of deconfliction, where fundamental values aren’t in conflict.

In this regard, the G-20 foreign ministers meeting in Los Cabos represents the first real opportunity we’ve had to begin that work. Yes, the emerging powers have happened to be in the Security Council over the last two years, and China has a permanent seat there. But the Security Council is a tool for crisis management and negotiation, not for forging new habits and not for building confidence. Broader confidence building processes will results in a narrowing of the gap in the Security Council, not the other way around.

Several countries resisted the Mexican initiative, or hesitated in accepting the invitation. Among the first foreign ministers to say yes was US Secretary of State Clinton. The rest quickly followed.

It was the right move. Perhaps not much will come out of the Los Cabos meeting – and the Mexicans have wisely tried to downplay expectations by emphasizing that it’s an “informal meeting”, rather than a Summit. That’s the right move too. A search for formal agreements or communiqués would simply push this back into a space of unproductive negotiations. Far more important is relationship building, building shared perspectives on key security issues, and an informal space for back room negotiations. I suspect that Secretary Clinton will use quite a lot of her time in Los Cabos cornering her Chinese and Russian colleagues on the Syria question – and that’s very much to the good.

So, Felicidades to Mexico on an important initiative. With modest expectations, and some creative leadership, a foreign ministers process for the G-20 can fill an important gap. We may still face a “G-Zero” future of unmanaged problems and centrifugal tensions between the major powers; but we’re not there yet. The Mexican initiative is a step in the right direction.

Brazil

Celso Amorim
Writing in a Personal Capacity

Not too long ago, some months after the Lehman Brothers débacle, I was invited to talk to French and international students at the Science Po in Paris. I was then the Brazilian Foreign Minister. Among other things, I remember having said that the G-8 was dead, a statement that generated a lot of criticism in the media, not least in Brazil. A few months later, the President of the United States, expressed essentially the same view, in softer words. During the Pittsburgh summit, President Obama said that the G-20 had become the main international forum for economic matters. And a process of change, still incomplete for sure, took place in formal financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Today, after a succession of crises in Europe, no one with a minimum knowledge in international economics would dare contradict that view. Indeed, how can world economic problems be solved without the participation of the BRIC countries? As a consequence the world governance in financial and economic affairs was drastically reformed in a period of not more than two or three years.

Nothing remotely similar to these momentous changes happened in the field of peace and security. After two decades of intense and often tedious discussions in the UN, the Security Council remains exactly with the same format designed sixty years ago in San Francisco. Given its lack of representativeness and legitimacy, it is no wonder that the Council cannot deal appropriately with such important subjects as the several dimensions of the so called Arab Awakening,or, more pointedly, with burning issues such as the Iranian Nuclear Program, not to speak of a more structural response to the problems of Africa. One of the reasons that made the changes in the governance of international economic affairs possible was the relative informality of fora such as the G-7/G-8 as well as the more flexible procedures for reform in the international financial institutions (in contrast with the ultra-rigid requirements for reforming the UN Charter).Without exaggerating the scope of the changes that may begin with the February meeting of Foreign Ministers in Mexico, one is allowed to hope that it can at least initiate a process which someday will impact on the more formal institutions that deal with political and security matters. In order that such a process may take place, it essential that the FM meeting focuses on concrete questions - such as the ones mentioned here - and does not lose much time and energy on more abstract issues of institutional nature. Nor should it bother too much with other subjects - important as they may be - which have already found an appropriate locus for debate, such as climate change. In other words, for a political G-20 to become a relevant forum it must not develop a theory about walking. Like the Greek philosopher who rebutted the sophistic argument on the logic impossibility of movement, it must simply walk.

China

Shen Dingli
Professor of International Relations, Director of the Center for American Studies, and Executive Vice Dean of the Institute of International Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai

The G-20 emerged from global financial crisis in 2008 to bail out the market as an informal ad hoc grouping. Thus far it still has utility as the debt of both the United States and eurozone has to be cut and global trade rebalanced. This type of global governance entails new institutions such as the G-20 to play a constructive role which the UNSC and G-8 could not play effectively.

The Summit meeting and Financial Ministerial Level meeting of the G-20 addresses present economic and financial dimensions but to better institutionalize the G-20 has to structure more formally and tackle broader international affairs. Bringing international political and security affairs to the G-20 agenda could empower G-20 in a structural way.

The upcoming G-20 Foreign Ministers’ informal meeting from February 18-20 in Mexico renders such an opportunity for the most influential established powers and most important emerging nations to timely address issues of common interest beyond global economic recovery and rebalancing. The foreign ministers could plausibly set a new paradigm of the organization and offer a chance of consensus on crucial issues.

Syria and Iran are two such crucial matters that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting will find it hard to ignore. As the G-20 is not the G-8, it gives more authoritativeness and representativeness of the world powers to approach to the two crises in a balanced manner. Also, as the G-20 is not the UNSC, which has to make critical decision when needed, it tends to allow sufficient deliberation without splitting the organization. Rather, it permits more time for consensus building before the UNSC would vote on Syrian, and Iranian, cases. Established powers would have more chances to hear the common voices of Russia, China and India while the emerging powers could also debate among themselves, which is more ideal than the UNSC itself.

Ambassador Wu Jianmin
Professor of International Studies, China Foreign Affairs University
Chairman, Shanghai Centre of International Studies

The G-20 is a reflection of the profound changes underway in world affairs. These changes are far from over. As a new group on the international arena, the G-20 is still evolving. The informal meeting of the G-20 foreign ministers, to be held on February 18-20 in Mexico, is a natural development of its evolution, since economics, politics and security are all interrelated.

The very existence of the G-20 is closely tied to financial crises. The G-20 was set up in 1999 in the aftermath of Asia Financial Crisis. The G-20 summit was born in 2008 out of the current financial crisis. In the Chinese language, crisis consists of two characters: danger and opportunity. Indeed, the mankind advances from crisis to crisis.

The performance of the G-20, since 2008, proves to be positive. Some believe that the “heroic phase” of the G-20 is over. I disagree. The evolution of the G-20 is a long process. We have to judge it in a comprehensive way. Thanks to the G-20, the current financial crisis didn’t turn into a great depression. This is a remarkable achievement. We all know the current crisis is deepening. This is a global problem. A global problem requires global solution. A global solution requires international cooperation.

The composition of the G-20 is not homogeneous. Among the G-20 countries, the situation varies from one to another. They have different political systems, different cultures, different histories and they are in different stages of development. It is quite natural that they have divergence of views. To advance the G-20’s work, one has to focus on shared interests. This is the key to success. On the basis of shared interests, G-20 can build up consensus, which leads to action. It was true of G-20 summit in the past. It will also be true of the forthcoming informal meeting of the G-20 foreign ministers.

Australia

Michael Fullilove
Director, Global Issues Program, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, Australia
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution

Australia is a wealthy nation with a small population occupying a large continent located a great distance from our historical sources of security and prosperity. As a result, all Australian governments have been concerned to join (and, if necessary, erect and strengthen) institutions through which they can influence global decisions and touch the global flows of power – including the United Nations, alliance institutions and APEC.

Australia’s foreign minister, Kevin Rudd, served as prime minister during the global financial crisis and was one of the forces behind the designation of the G-20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation.

As one of the progenitors of the G-20, Australia is keen to see the institution develop and strengthen further. Last year saw the first meeting of G20 finance and development ministers; now G-20 foreign ministers are convening for the first time. For Canberra, the fact of the meeting itself is important: it shows the stitching together of the group.

Foreign ministers will assemble in Los Cabos at a time of great stress and concern about the global economy. Growth prospects are down; Europe’s financial problems are affecting other national economies; capital flows to developing countries have withered. Foreign ministers are particularly well-placed to engage on the human and social costs of the global crisis.

Australians are a practical people. The government wants a good discussion on the meeting’s agenda items, including global governance, green growth and human development. More importantly, though, Canberra hopes for some sharp, clear positions.

Food security is an area demanding extra action, including the implementation of pre-existing commitments as well as addressing the long-term trends. The Australian government would like to explore innovative ways of leveraging private-sector funds for development. It also looks for recommendations on dealing with youth unemployment that can be put to G-20 leaders later in the year.

We don’t know how the G-20 will develop in the future. The best way to preserve its position is to make every post a winner – including this first meeting of foreign ministers.

Spain

Giovanni Grevi
Senior Researcher, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid

The first informal meeting of G-20 Foreign Ministers in Mexico should be welcomed for three reasons. First, the G-20 is a process promoting shared responsibility. As such, it should afford some flexibility to tackle important issues related to its core economic agenda. This has been the case, for example, with development and food security. Second, while foreign policy issues can prove divisive, disagreements are not cast in stone but are subject to evolving assessments and perceptions. Those are the two levels at which informal meetings in the G-20 context can make a difference over time. Third, informally discussing foreign policy issues within the G-20 process would help underpin the authority of the UN Security Council. The G-20 could perform as an important platform for confidence building or de-confliction, paving the way for debates at the UNSC level, where decisions belong.

That said, given the different sensitivities of G-20 members on addressing foreign policy in the G-20 context, this should be done in a prudent and incremental way. It will be up to G-20 leaders to decide whether any item discussed by Foreign Ministers will climb up to summit level. Two criteria should guide this decision, namely a clear chance of successful agreement and a clear link between political, security and economic concerns. In short, added value. The agenda put forward by the Mexican Presidency may benefit from a more targeted approach to common transnational challenges and vulnerabilities. Relevant issues could include so-called flow security (keeping material and virtual commons such as the cyberspace safe and open); resource governance; the security implications of climate change in specific regions; and countering illegal trafficking of drugs and people. Foreign Ministers could address controversial geopolitical issues more comfortably in ad hoc side-meetings than in plenary debates.

The G-20 will thrive or wither away based on its capacity to cope with the permutations of the financial and economic crisis. But it would be delusional to think that focusing on economics while cross-border risks spread and geopolitical crises fester will preserve the prosperity of G-20 members. The G-20 need not shift its core focus. Likewise, it should not compete with other bodies. But to the extent that it can help coping with shared political challenges threatening economic security, it should.

South Korea

Dong Hwi Lee
Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South Korea

A G-20 foreign ministers' meeting will be convened for the first time in Mexico, where the next G-20 summit will be held, during February 19-20, 2012. It is an encouraging development, for it improves the prospects for the G-20 process to evolve into a truly premium forum as global governance undergoes significant changes.

Foreign ministers' talks are expected to make three key contributions to upgrading the G2-0.

First, the G-20 foreign ministers' talks can provide a venue for addressing so-called "hybrid issues," for example energy and climate change, which characterize international relations in the 21st century, and to which both economy and security are inextricably linked. By tackling such issues, the G-20 can continue to broaden its scope of agenda and thereby cement its raison d'etre.

Second, the foreign ministers' talks can function as a forum for the world's major economies to effectively respond to the political uncertainty that may very well result from global economic instability. The G-7 is a case in point. It started out as an economic forum, but ultimately G-7 foreign ministers' meetings offered a useful safety net as the world struggled to overcome the political fallout from the collapse of the Cold War structure. The advantages of G-20 foreign ministers' meeting will only be redoubled this year, for a series of leadership transitions around the world will fuel uncertainties, let alone the turbulence already apparent in the Middle East.

Third, if the foreign ministers' talks do evolve into one of the systemic pillars of the G-20 process, the meetings will serve as an essential mechanism for efficiently innovating the G-20 process. The larger membership compared to the G-8, disparate cultural backgrounds among member states, and demand for record- keeping/evaluation are some of the many practical needs that need to be met, resulting in calls for further expanding secretarial function in the future. All in all, the G-20 foreign ministers' meetings will be significant on their own merit. More importantly, they will play a significant role in advancing institutionalization of the G-20.

Argentina

Rut Diamint
Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires
Researcher, National Council of Scientific and Technologic Research (CONICET)

The emergence of the G-20 forged expectations of a possible democratization of the international order. Several elements came together to strengthen that illusion. First, there was evidence that the G-8 was no longer able to determine the rules of the international system. Second, there was widely spread and harsh criticism directed toward the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council. The third was the emergence of middle powers with prospects of sustained growth and respect for international norms and values. The fourth was a national and global civil society more involved in the claim for national and universal standards of justice. The fifth was the emblematic supremacy of human rights laws. The final element was a recognition that major blunders, such as a financial meltdown, are not exclusively committed by developing nations.

In this context the G-20 was supposed to open a more inclusive and egalitarian dialogue. Unfortunately, the G-20 did not achieve convincing efforts towards global security. It is true that we could argue that behind the notion of global governance supported by the G-20 meetings is the paradigm of peace and a peaceful conflict resolution. But, when talking about specific proposals, security is too tied to economic interests. Encouraging protective measures to prevent colossal disasters, like the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, or condemning all forms of terrorism are, without a doubt, valuable initiatives but they also may be seen as mere rhetorical and bombastic announcements. The scope of the dialogue changed, but the logic is still the same—a realist one extremely related to the balance of power.

The expectation of an egalitarian and pluralistic G-20, representing a greater diversity, and at the same time restricted to the most powerful international actors from the perspective that they will assume greater responsibility for stabilizing the world and assist especially needy countries, but without the typical vices of the specialized bureaucracies of most of the multilateral agencies, is regrettably absent.

The reform of financial institutions that ignores the crucial importance of developing a comprehensive program of stability and security has no future. It is time to attach to G-20 cooperation policy, specific clauses that clearly induce to the respect for human rights, the elimination of double standards, and the
compliance with international agreements. Undeniably, the vocation of being more global and plural leads to the establishment of commonly accepted standards of conduct in the international security field. There is not global economic governance without global security.

India

WPS Sidhu
Senior Fellow, Center for International Cooperation, New York University

Like the G-7/G-8, which began life as a purely economic club of the world’s biggest economies, the G-20 too is evolving from an ad-hoc gathering of select nations to fix the world’s financial and economic woes into an institution concerned with international peace and security. The first ever meeting of G-20 foreign ministers in Los Cabos, Mexico this weekend marks this crucial transition.

This shift could not have come at a more appropriate time. With post-Gaddafi Libya in disarray, the bitter dust-up over Syria in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the looming war clouds over Iran, there is an urgent need for a forum like the G-20 to try and carve out a common, cooperative approach on all these issues amongst its members.

But is it, perhaps, too optimistic to assume that the G-20 will succeed where other forums have failed? Yes and no.

It is certainly optimistic to assume that a single meeting, even in the tranquil setting of Los Cabos, will be able to overcome the deep divisions between the established powers and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in particular. Nonetheless, the G-20 meeting does offer a useful venue to try and bridge these differences and would be an opportunity for the established and reemerging powers to engage at two levels: strategic and tactical.

At the strategic level the G-20 members could try and explore normative areas of convergence, especially over the concepts of responsibility to protect, given that there was a broad support for the principle (as apparent in UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973) but serious disagreement on how it should be implemented.

In addition, the group could also consider the Brazilian idea of “responsibility while protecting” which needs to be further elaborated outside of the charged atmosphere of the UNSC setting. Moreover, there is also need to explore the responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction. As the Libyan case has amply demonstrated, a successful (albeit prolonged) military campaign and regime change alone does not guarantee greater security or better governance for the populace.

Against the backdrop of these broader normative debates, which are likely to continue beyond Los Cabos, there are several tactical issues that require urgent attention. Syria is prominent among them.

Given that there now appears to be overwhelming (if not unanimous) support for a political transition in Syria could a common agenda be worked out within the G-20 framework, especially one that takes on board the Russian and Chinese sensitivities as well as lessons from the Libyan experience? If such an understanding could be reached in Los Cabos, it could contribute to a more cooperative approach among the key powers in the UNSC.

Here, it is worth remembering that it was a similar G-8 meeting in Berlin in June 1999 that helped to resolve the tensions, particularly between Russia and the United States, over the bombing of Kosovo and paved the way for the consensus UNSC resolution 1244 and post-conflict reconstruction. While it could be argued that a G-8 consensus was easier, given the smaller membership, if the G-20 were to achieve a similar breakthrough, it would carry greater conviction given the more representative and diverse nature of the bigger group. The more representative nature of the G-20 would be an important asset in dealing with the gathering storm over Iran.

Finally, given the present stalemate over the UNSC reform process and assuming that this is first of regular G-20 foreign ministers meetings, this forum would be the only venue where the permanent members of the UNSC and the aspirant members, notably Brazil, India and South Africa would be able to interact on a regular basis on international peace and security issues.

Authors

Celso Amorim
Rut Diamint
Shen Dingli
Michael Fullilove
Giovanni Grevi
Ambassador Wu Jianmin
Bruce Jones
Dong Hwi Lee
WPS Sidhu

International Order in the Arab World

Bruce Jones — Wed, 01 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

One year after the fall of Mubarak, the Arab awakening is still in flux, and so is the international order. In the interactions between the two, there is evidence to please both optimists and pessimists. In my chapter “The International Order and the Emerging Powers: Implications of the Arab Awakening” in The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, I examine this tension that is throwing into disarray the values, alliances, and institutions that make up the changing global order.

A year ago, we would not have predicted that the Arab League would call for military intervention; nor would we have foreseen that a Security Council, whose composition at the relevant moment included Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, would vote to invoke the "responsibility to protect" and authorize NATO to mount a military campaign to halt aggression. Count one for optimists. Unfortunately, diplomatic fallout from that episode—which arose because the non-western powers perceived that the United States and NATO far exceeded the mandate they were given, taking a "protect civilians" mandate and using it to force regime change—is now stalling action in Syria (though developments on that front are starting to make some form of UNSC political action more likely). Even the score, for pessimists, for now.

More points on the gloomy side. It’s been evident from day one that a major package of both economic assistance and, more importantly, new trade openings would be necessary to help move the Egyptian economy forward, which in turn will be vital for medium term progress in Egypt’s democratic reforms. Europe looked the most likely candidate, but the deepening eurozone crisis has left the EU rudderless and not in the mood to spend large sums beyond its own borders. Facing a slowdown at home and the risk of a deeper slowdown if Europe stalls, China too has reined in its spending. The net result is that the new political forces in Egypt, including the Islamists, are left with one address to look to: Washington.

Things can still spin out of control in the region. Tensions between Turkey and Israel; between Turkey and Syria; and between Israel and Iran—all of these can turn into outright hostilities. Iran is lashing out, most recently by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz. That threat has one unintended consequence, which was to concentrate minds in Beijing, who slammed Iran for its new nuclear activities and the threat on the Straits. While refusing to agree to an American request to stop buying Iranian oil, China is looking to diversify its sources and has stopped expanding its oil imports from Iran, perhaps bowing to the inevitable disruption.

Three things appear certain. There’s more turbulence ahead, before any form of democratic stability arises. The changing international order will continue to complicate the search for democracy in the Middle East; and vice versa. And through it all, the United States will still be a power unlike all the others—no longer able to dominate events, but left holding the bag nonetheless. It’s going to be an uncomfortable year.

Authors

Bruce Jones

The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East

Fri, 18 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2011 381pp.

Video

"The events began in Tunisia in January 2011 . . . shook the political, social, and intellectual foundations of the Middle East. The tremors can still be felt, and no one is quite certain when the aftershocks will end, or when another shock wave of popular unrest might occur. Nevertheless, enough time has passed to try to make sense of what has happened so far and, perhaps, gain an inkling of where the region is headed."—from the Introduction by Kenneth M. Pollack

About the Book | Contents | Author Commentary | Events | About the Authors

About the Book

The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. Coauthored by 18 of the leading experts on the Middle East, it is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences.

Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.

The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the "Arab Street"; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The authors also look at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. They offer insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, as well as individual nation studies.

Part I: The Dynamics of the Arab Spring
Part II: Countries in Transition
Part III: The Imperative of Reform
Part IV: States in Crisis
Part V: Other Regional Actors
Part VI: The External Powers

Author Commentary

" Israel Looks at the Arab Awakening with Skepticism" by Daniel Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, February 9, 2012
"International Order in the Arab World " by Bruce Jones, Brookings Up Front blog, February 1, 2012
"Yemen's Transition of Power" by Ibrahim Sharqieh, Brookings Up Front blog, January 9, 2012
"The United States and Iran: The Arab Awakening Changes Everything" by Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Up Front blog, January 4, 2012
"The Palestinians and the Arab Awakening" by Khaled Elgindy, Brookings Up Front blog, December 29, 2011
"United States Policy in Syria: Masterful Inaction" by Michael S. Doran, Brookings Up Front blog, December 13, 2011
"The Long Spring Ahead" by Stephen R. Grand, Brookings Up Front blog, December 8, 2011
"Arab Public Opinion: A Question of What They Want and Say" by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Up Front blog, December 6, 2011
"Can Al Qaeda Capitalize on Unrest in Egypt and Syria? " by Daniel L. Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, December 1, 2011
"The Egyptian Military Faces Its Defining Hour " by Kenneth M. Pollack, Brookings Up Front blog, November 28, 2011
"Saudi Arabia: Its Rulers and its Future in Light of the Arab Awakening " by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Up Front blog, November 23, 2011
"Egypt: The Military, Elections, and the Hope for Reform " by Shadi Hamid, Brookings Up Front blog, November 21, 2011

Events

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Akram Al-Turk

Akram Al-Turk is the publications manager and senior research assistant in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Pavel K. Baev

Daniel L. Byman

Michael Doran

Khaled Elgindy

Stephen R. Grand

Shadi Hamid

Bruce Jones

Suzanne Maloney

Jonathan D. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he is
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Previously, he was director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House).

Bruce Riedel

Ruth H. Santini

Salman Shaikh

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Ömer Taşpınar

Shibley Telhami

Sarah Yerkes

Sarah Yerkes is a former Research Analyst of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

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