Author

Nathan Hultman

Nonresident Senior Fellow - Global Economy and Development

@natehultman

Donald Trump’s election raises the question of whether the U.S. will continue to be a leader on climate change and clean energy. After a long and arduous process with strong U.S. leadership to organize international action on climate change, momentum had been built behind the current process of nationally-determined goals and nationally designed strategies. Within the U.S., there will be questions about whether climate strategy will be undone.

Donald Trump’s election raised the question of whether the U.S. will continue to be a leader on climate change and clean energy. At the international climate negotiations in Morocco today, the mood after the election is deeply uneasy.

A look at the new situation highlights both negative risks for existing policies and potential areas of continued action. A few major features of this new situation bear highlighting.

1. There is still uncertainty about what Trump’s climate and energy policies will be. Trump did not develop many specific proposals about energy or climate change. He mentioned support of energy independence, fossil energy (including coal), affordable energy, and jobs. He did not specifically address clean energy; given that it would support energy independence and jobs, it is hard to know at this stage if he would intend to include that in his overall strategy. On climate change, there is even less development of policies. During the campaign, Trump was dismissive of climate change and even called it a hoax perpetuated by the Chinese, and said he would “cancel” the Paris Agreement.

2. Many U.S. policies are already in force. Most policies enacted by the Obama administration over the past eight years have been regulatory actions and not simple executive orders. This is an important distinction—regulatory actions take years to develop, revise, and finalize. Courts often weigh in on specific questions about regulatory interpretation, such as for the recently finalized Clean Power Plan for the electricity sector. Undoing some rules like energy efficiency standards and fuel efficiency standards is not actually easy, as it would have to follow a new regulatory process that would satisfy the requirements of scientific and stakeholder input, as well as survive potential court challenges. Failure to enforce would invite additional lawsuits. In addition, barring a change in managerial style, it seems unlikely that Trump’s administration would quickly become a well-oiled machine focused on climate priorities. So there is considerable momentum already in the body of regulations on the books that would continue to influence the broader economy, and in some areas such as technologies, actually locks in improvements. Trump can slow down new initiatives but would have a hard time unwinding all of the processes that have been put in place over the last nearly decade of intense work by the current administration.

3. International efforts will continue. The Paris Agreement was designed to engage with specific national circumstances of each country, and the new administration will not have much ability to change the approach currently being taken by the international community. The Republican platform—which is a guide to potential Trump policy—expresses skepticism about funding international mechanisms and explicitly states opposition to financing the Green Climate Fund, an important component of the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, given the links of climate to other international issues, Trump will need to stay at least partially engaged in the discussions.

4. There remains deep interest in climate action from a number of non-governmental stakeholders. Unlike during the former President George W. Bush years, the global level of interest in climate action is high in many stakeholder groups, including many parts of the private sector. The science is clearer. Clean energy costs have dropped dramatically—even since 2008, costs for wind are down 40 percent, solar photovoltaic 60 percent, and LED lighting 90 percent. These cost reductions make action to shift toward clean energy much easier and make the benefits to health and jobs very clear.

5. Climate change won’t go away. The issue of climate change will come knocking on Trump’s door in a number of ways. Because of the much larger international interest in climate change as an issue that affects other countries’ livelihoods and economies, this issue will be inextricably linked with other foreign policy goals of a Trump administration, including trade and security. The health effects of climate change and continued burning of fossil fuels will continue to beset Americans. And state and local leaders will continue to have to contend with climate-related events like heat waves, droughts, and flooding.

There is a relatively broad recognition that, as an outsider, Trump has not developed detailed proposals on many issues. Climate change and energy are not different in this sense. In addition, others have already observed that Trump’s campaign sought to be conciliatory in his victory speech and indeed tried to message stability to the international community just ahead of the election. There is therefore a possibility for engagement as President-elect Trump and his team begin to develop their strategy. For example, George W. Bush came into office with little background on the issue, and while he was not broadly seen as a climate champion, his administration eventually engaged constructively with some of the important issues, in contrast to his early more strident approach.

The Paris Agreement was designed to engage with specific national circumstances of each country, and the new administration will not have much ability to change the approach currently being taken by the international community.

Finally, this election certainly brings up the question of what the long-term U.S. strategy could look like. It was already well understood that, beyond even the next four years, U.S. climate policy would have to rely not only on the executive branch but also on a broad base of new legislation from Congress, action from state and local officials, and implementation of climate goals by a broad array of non-government stakeholders. California, as just one of many examples, has set highly ambitious climate goals and has enacted legislation at the state level, including a cap-and-trade policy, to deliver on these goals. There has been substantial progress on technology, innovation, and resilience outside the U.S. government in the past decade, and there is no reason to believe that people will want good health, better technologies, or clean air less just because of a change in administration. So while the coming four years will certainly look different under a Trump presidency, there are still pressures that can push emissions down that involve improvements in technology, continued impact from regulations already in place, and state and local actions.

      

 

 

WHAT THE PARIS AGREEMENT MEANS AND WHAT TO EXPECT

Now is a good time to ask what the agreement means in the overall arc of global and national climate politics and what we might expect to emerge from it in coming years. In so doing, it is first important to note, as many others have, that the agreement itself is delivered with no guarantees. This is by design: the primary innovative feature of the Paris Agreement is its reliance on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that individual countries generated, through their own domestic processes, in advance of the Paris negotiations last year. These NDCs are heterogeneous, and use different approaches to setting climate targets that, by definition, reflect the domestic circumstances of the countries that proposed them. In this light, the agreement is best viewed as a coordinating and reporting mechanism which, with the proper establishment of international expectations and domestic stakeholder pressures, sets incentives for countries to both volunteer ambitious targets and to deliver progressively on those targets over time. It thus seeks to establish a cycle of positive actions whereby countries set and deliver increasing ambition.

So, while the Paris Agreement itself does not guarantee the outcomes it seeks to achieve, it is unequivocally a major advance in the international and national drive to address climate change. Since Nobel winning scientist Svante Arrhenius theorized about the greenhouse effect in 1896, scientists have known about the heat-trapping properties of carbon dioxide, and subsequently learned about and quantified the impacts of many other greenhouse gases. Amid increasing concern about global environmental problems in the late 1980s, climate change became a concern among many in the scientific and policy communities, leading to a first “Framework Convention” on climate change at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Leaders tried to establish a more robust internationalized approach with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which was, overall, not successful, other than a few bright spots; it was not a universal agreement, lacking participation from the United States, China, India, and other countries, and embodied a less viable top-down target setting mechanism. Leaders later tried an early version of the structure of the Paris Agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen, making innovations on the a broad and universal approach that became the heart of the Paris architecture.

While the Paris Agreement itself does not in any way guarantee the outcomes it seeks to achieve, it is unequivocally a major advance in the international and national drive to address climate change.

The Paris Agreement—having incorporated not only the lessons of those previous attempts, but also lessons from other international agreements and the reflection that all countries can and must contribute toward the solution of this global issue, lays a solid foundation for action—is now our best hope to keep global climate risks at reasonable levels. It provides a framework for cooperation and incentives for countries to establish a positive competition as they retool their economies toward less emitting, cleaner sources of energy, better land use practices, and improved industrial technologies and processes. It also sets a process for countries to revisit their commitments every five years, thus establishing a route to increasing ambition over time, which we know must be part of a global approach to stabilize the climate.

A MILESTONE, BUT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN

So we should pause to celebrate this milestone.

Then, mindful of how challenging the process will be, we must encourage countries to start taking concrete, achievable steps in the very near term that will help them deliver on their targets. This presents the biggest potential pitfall in achieving success under Paris, and it will only be workable if there is a continuing broadening of support for climate policies over time among the major emitters. On the positive side, deploying new technologies now will help continue the rapid pace of cost declines in energy technology—for example, wind costs have dropped 40 percent, solar costs have dropped 60 percent, and efficient LED lighting costs have dropped 90 percent since 2008. And as technology costs drop, it will be possible for countries to take on more ambitious targets in the future.

The Paris Agreement is significant really for the opportunity it provides to realize the promise of a low carbon future. The agreement provides the right kind of mechanism to accelerate action and facilitate global cooperation on one of the thorniest issues facing us today. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Making that promise a reality will require near-term action to deliver on targets by the major economies. While daunting in many ways, the positive prospect of technology cost reductions and cleaner and healthier environments, along with improvements of quality of life in even the short run, can all support a world of increasing action on climate, working under the Paris process.

      

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The next President of the United States will in large measure determine whether the world can reach the global climate change goals established by the scientific community and world leaders in recent years. Most important will be to deliver on the promises of the 2015 Paris Agreement. It was there that consensus was reached on a new international architecture to address climate change and lower greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) to prevent further planetary warming, after years of efforts from a number of actors worldwide (Disclosure: I was in the Obama administration working on those efforts.) As the world’s second largest emitter and as a leader in technological innovation, the U.S. has an outsized role to play – not only in reducing our own emissions, but also through our own example and via diplomatic engagement. American action can serve as a powerful incentive for the rest of the world to stay on the necessary path toward the deep emissions cuts needed to stabilize the climate at lower-risk levels.

The next administration should build on the policy framework our country has already laid out and encourage continued and accelerating emissions reductions. As a start, the incoming President should focus on four broad areas:

1. Pursuing the trajectory of regulatory actions initiated by the current administration aimed at placing the country on a path toward existing 2020 and 2025 reduction targets. Among other things, this will entail continuing on existing pathways for the electric power and oil and gas sectors, vehicle efficiency, and appliance and equipment efficiency.

2. Developing new and additional options for regulatory action in energy carbon dioxide (CO2) or non-CO2 gases, including options to encourage pricing mechanisms and leverage international efforts on hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) reductions.^[1]

3. Exploring options to work with Congress on supporting budgetary priorities and developing new legislative approaches to drive down emissions. Such approaches could include, but not be limited to, a tax reform and carbon pricing strategy, new investments in forests and other land-sector activities, and strong continuing support for energy research and development, job training (or re-training), and finance and development aid to support sustainable infrastructure for the poorest countries.

4. Spurring an increase in global ambition for 2030. This will require both continued domestic progress in the United States, a new and credible 2030 U.S. target, and diplomatic engagement to encourage countries with existing 2030 targets, such as those in the EU and other key emitters, to increase their ambition.

THE NEXT FOUR YEARS OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ON CLIMATE

The ultimate, long-term success of the new international momentum to address climate change depends fundamentally on the policy choices, public engagement, and international strategy of the next U.S. President. Three aspects of the current situation illustrate why action in the next four years is essential.

First, the window for action to keep a lid on climate change is closing very quickly, but is not yet closed. Climate change is a complex process, with impacts felt at the local and regional level, often removed in time and space from the root causes of those impacts. But ultimately, we are highly confident in the basic cause and effect relationship that links emissions of GHGs to a kind of “loading of the dice” in the climate system. This “loading” leads to increased temperatures, heat waves, droughts, floods, and other hazards. Through an extensive, years-long and scientifically informed discussion, the global community of scientists, civil society, and policymakers has identified a target of keeping warming below to 2 degrees Celsius (2C) above preindustrial levels, and more recently, in light of the risks of even 2C warming, encouraging best efforts to keep the warming to 1.5 degrees. For reference, the world is now at about 1 degree of warming above pre-industrial levels, and, despite some recent slowing in the rate of change, our global economy is still producing large amounts of GHGs per year. Scientific and modeling assessments of the scale and rate of transition needed to sustain the global economy indicate that keeping warming under 2C will require a rapid, near-term effort over approximately the next 10-15 years to reach a peak in annual global GHG emissions and thereafter start a rapid decline. U.S. emissions would likely need to decrease by about 80 percent from 2005 levels by 2050. To avoid such an outcome, over the next four years, the rate of new technology deployment must continue to increase and leadership to encourage future ambition cannot pause. Otherwise, we run a significant risk of exceeding the agreed “lower risk” levels of climate change.

Second, the appropriate international policy framework is now established, but must be made real through national actions and continued international engagement. The architecture of the Paris Agreement provides a good solution to a difficult problem: Harnessing what is useful in international agreements – for example, in setting goals, facilitating transparency, and organizing a process for increasing ambition over time – to encourage substantive action at the national level. The solution depends on the division of effort whereby countries provide national targets based on their own internal assessments, and the international process can in turn reassure countries that the other major players are doing their fair share. One important feature of this system is that neither of these processes works without the other. If countries – including the U.S. – fail to demonstrate progress toward their targets in the next four years or if the international regime does not facilitate openness and transparency, confidence will drop and dilute global ambition for future commitments. Vigorous, near-term engagement at the national and international level is therefore necessary to realize the promise of Paris.

Third, clean technology costs are rapidly dropping and many are nearing, but not at, tipping points relative to legacy technologies. Many technologies, particularly mass-manufactured technologies, experience cost reductions over time as more units are produced. This is familiar in our own experiences of consumer electronics such as computers and phones. Clean technologies have historically been at a market disadvantage when compared  to conventional technologies, for three reasons: (a) they were immature and therefore, as expected, more expensive; (b) the clean benefits of the technologies are not reflected in their market prices relative to legacy technologies; and (c) for some technologies, their capital structure was weighted toward more upfront investment relative to legacy technologies, which would often be cheaper upfront and have higher long-term operating costs.  Despite these obstacles, a global patchwork of policies, research and development, consumer demand, and market innovation has driven costs for many clean technologies down to levels that are competitive with and even lower than their legacy competitors. Since 2009, for example, costs for solar and for energy-efficient LED lighting have dropped 70 percent and 90 percent respectively. Even wind technology, which was already cost-competitive and relatively mature, saw costs drop by 40 percent. Rooftop solar is now nearing and in some places is cheaper than grid-connected pricing. Nevertheless, even with these recent reductions, because the costs of dirtier technologies are still not captured in their prices, the U.S. will likely continue to overinvest in these dirty technologies. Additional actions — through any number of policy or market levers — are necessary to drive investment toward cleaner tech, in turn creating additional benefits down the road by further pushing down costs and enabling the more rapid GHG reductions needed to reach the 2C or 1.5C goals.

The critical period 2016-2020

U.S. action on climate over the next four years is therefore critical. In recent years, the United States has pursued a policy of integrating domestic actions with international leadership to encourage broad, global participation in the effort to address climate change.  We are currently the world’s second largest emitter of GHGs, emitting roughly 5,800 million net tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) per year. China is the biggest, having surpassed the U.S. about 10 years ago and now emitting roughly 10,500 MtCO2e per year. Other big emitters include the European Union, India, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Japan. Because the U.S. currently only emits about 13 percent of global GHGs, it cannot solve the problem alone. At the same time, though, others will be reluctant to address climate without full engagement by the U.S.  We are the top developed-country emitter and are looked to for leadership in both policy and the new clean energy technologies.  For these reasons, the U.S. has pursued a policy of addressing our own domestic emissions and setting ambitious domestic targets, which enables us to provide global leadership on what is fundamentally a collective action challenge. With this in mind, the next administration should pursue a set of initiatives that would collectively ensure action around seven key areas.

1. Build the policy framework for 2025, 2030, and beyond

The U.S. national climate target submitted in advance of the Paris negotiations sets a goal of reducing emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. The current administration has been active in putting in place policies to reach this target. These policies have taken a variety of forms, but the core element of the current Administration’s strategy has been to implement existing U.S. law, such as the Clean Air Act or Energy Policy Act, in diverse sectors as part of a coherent strategy to drive down emissions. This has led to a number of regulatory rulemakings over the past seven years that have focused on both CO2 and non-CO2 reductions.

Carbon dioxide from the energy system is the biggest contributor to U.S. emissions, and the Administration finalized a few major rules that would have a major impact on U.S. emissions. The Clean Power Plan (CPP), the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s domestic climate policy, would accelerate the process of decarbonizing the U.S. electricity grid through increased use of renewables and natural gas.  (Of course, the CPP is facing legal headwinds as it wends its way through the U.S. courts. Legal challenges include: objections over Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations that would impose emissions cuts in the electricity sector and push fossil-fuel plant owners to buy carbon credits from wind and solar plants; concerns over the separation of federal powers; and a perceived threat to state-level authority. While the EPA believes it is on firm legal grounds for a successful outcome, the controversy underscores that, in the long run, constructive engagement on climate from Congress would be helpful.) Another major set of rules govern fuel efficiency in vehicles and account for nearly as much emissions reduction to 2030 as the CPP. Last but not least are energy efficiency standards assertively promulgated by the Department of Energy (21 new standards were set since 2013 alone). These collectively should reduce about 3,000 MtCO2e by 2030, nearly half what either the CPP or the transportation efficiency standards should deliver individually.

Regulations aimed at energy CO2 have not been the only actions though. A number of other policies address non-CO2 gases such as methane or HFCs and are designed to encourage climate-friendly reforms.  At the federal level, these have included actions through tax policy to support deployment of solar and wind energy, and initiation of voluntary measures and public-private partnerships in areas such as land use, agriculture, and forestry. These Federal initiatives co-exist with a patchwork of policies at the state and even local level to encourage deployment of clean technologies and in some cases, pricing of emissions (such as California’s emissions trading system).

These many policy actions provide a strong foundation for the U.S. to reach its domestic 2020 and 2025 emissions goals. Indeed, after decades of increasing emissions, a combination of these policies, plus market developments and technological changes have moved the U.S. emissions trajectory in the right direction. Ten years ago, projections for the U.S. estimated that emissions would be about 20 percent above 2005 levels by 2020. It now looks likely that the U.S. will be in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 – a dramatic and welcome reversal that should be able to reach the 2020 target established in 2009.  Such actions are vital for demonstrating leadership internationally and are part of a sound overall strategy to ensure global cooperation on the issue. However, reaching goals for 2025 and creating the conditions to continue lowering emissions at roughly the same rate through 2030 and beyond will require additional actions over the next four years. The next administration therefore has a multi-part challenge.

First, it should continue to shepherd the regulatory approach that has characterized recent U.S. climate policy. This approach has the advantage of being based on existing law and using robust American regulatory processes to establish reasonably cost-effective pathways for reducing emissions. As such, it would provide a seamless transition and sustain the rapid pace of initiatives necessary to keep the U.S. on track.

To this end, the next administration would continue the current set of regulatory actions that have not yet been finalized, such as for existing oil and gas methane sources, and to support the appeals and implementation process for all finalized regulations. It can furthermore investigate options for additional sectors – for example, carbon dioxide is also emitted from refineries, off-road and off-highway vehicles, marine transportation, rail, and others. Finally, the next administration should consider options to facilitate the pricing of emissions, which send more consistent price signals about how to incorporate the benefits of clean technologies. This could happen, for example, by states linking up the emissions trading systems they may choose to establish under the CPP, or perhaps by utilizing Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, which allows emissions trading in cases of international reciprocity.

Second, the next administration should continue to pursue options for reducing emissions through voluntary means, partnerships with affected industries, and support of city and state level initiatives. Such options do not have the binding force of law or regulatory actions, but they can build experience and help surface low-cost opportunities that may not have been understood or identified yet. For example, encouraging precision fertilizer application can lower costs to farmers and reduce emissions of the nitrous oxide.

Third, while the regulatory approach is a solid way to deliver reductions through 2025 and beyond, there is nearly universal agreement that a very important tool for a long-term viable climate policy is to price emissions. Pricing can happen via a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system, but the key element, as mentioned above, is to improve the visibility of the costs of dirty technologies in investment decisions. States have the power to initiate pricing, and regulatory actions can establish a pricing system in certain circumstances. But at some point – the sooner the better – Congress should establish a pricing policy that would encourage faster deployment of clean technologies, above and beyond regulatory actions. The politics on climate change may be changing quickly, and there is growing support for action on climate change.  The next Administration should therefore be ready to work with Congress to encourage such legislation and to integrate it smoothly with existing regulatory policies.

2. Set an ambitious and achievable 2030 goal

Setting near-term emissions reduction goals can help focus government attention on how to deliver on the target. Indeed, such goals are at the heart of the recent Paris Agreement. The U.S. has to date produced two climate goals – one, produced in 2009, for the year 2020; and the second, produced in 2014, for the year 2025. The incoming administration will have the opportunity to set up an ambitious goal for 2030 – one that could communicate to the country and global community that we will continue to lead in driving down emissions. The best targets are both ambitious as well as grounded in analytical thinking and understanding of viable pathways. Because the U.S. is seen as a bellwether, setting and sticking to a target in line with deep midcentury decarbonization would signal that the U.S. intends to be at the forefront of the clean technology industry and would encourage higher ambition on the part of our international partners.

3. Establish a viable pathway to mid-century deep decarbonization

As noted earlier, the pathway to global emissions reductions consistent with a 2C or 1.5C world requires rapid and sustained effort over the coming three decades. Given the structure of the energy economy, while there are many ways to cut emissions in the near term, achieving major cuts on the order of 80 percent by 2050 will require a few essential broad measures. They include steps to decarbonize electricity, implement large amounts of energy efficiency, switch as much demand as possible to electricity, and bolster carbon sinks as much as possible.  Getting there requires connecting what we know about the future constraints to existing investment decisions – particularly those that have long lifespans. While a car may be replaced a couple of times before 2050, most industrial plants, buildings, and electricity generators will at most be replaced once. Moreover, the U.S. cannot easily reach its goals without healthy and growing forests and other carbon sinks; a major commitment to invest in and expand forests could help significantly in the post-2030 period. The next administration should ensure that there is sufficient modeling and analytical capacity to understand all aspects of our emissions trajectory—including land sector sinks; we should in turn apply insights from this planning process to setting policies and making the infrastructure investments needed to achieve deep decarbonization by mid-century.

4. Fully support international partners and the Paris process

While the Paris Agreement provides a welcome framework for global action, it will only be as good as the national actions that are delivered. One of the many positive aspects of the Agreement is its very broad participation – over 180 countries representing over 98 percent of emissions have submitted national targets. Because of centrally important role of national targets and transparency, the United States should support countries in their efforts to reach their own ambitious targets. This can take the form of public-private partnerships for investment, facilitating the improvement of national analytical capacity and techniques, and financing available through existing mechanisms (e.g., bilateral partnerships, the World Bank, or the Green Climate Fund).  Such support should not only be limited to near-term implementation, important though that is, but should extend to support for countries to develop their own analytical capacity and undertake their own work to develop mid-century strategies and connect them to near-term policy decisions.

Because of the central importance of transparency in the Paris architecture, the U.S. should continue its role as a vocal advocate of knowledge sharing, supporting and encouraging the international community to create a robust platform for transparency under the Paris Agreement. Finally, because international action on climate does not all take place within this one climate agreement, the administration should continue to drive forward with other approaches to reducing short-lived climate pollutants, such as HFCs through the Montreal Protocol, methane through the Global Methane Initiative, black carbon through the Arctic Black Carbon initiative, collaboration on reducing dependence on kerosene wick lamps, and initiatives on climate-smart agriculture to reduce methane and nitrous oxide emissions.

5. Encourage a global reassessment of ambition for 2030

The Paris Agreement provides several opportunities over the coming years to assess the collective ambition of countries and how well that ambition matches to the global goals of 2C or 1.5C.   In advance of the Paris negotiations, countries submitted their own nationally-determined targets. For the world’s major emitters, these targets were variations around some kind of quantitative emissions or technology goal over a certain time period. The United States, as mentioned earlier, provided a target of 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.  However, many countries offered a 2030 target. It is already fairly clear that an increase in collective ambition for 2030 – particularly from a few big, key emitters – will greatly help the chances of staying below 2 or 1.5C. Having established an ambitious domestic 2030 target for the U.S., the next Administration should encourage a significant ratcheting up of global ambition in 2030. One could imagine that, as one of the global leaders in this area, the European Union would be eager to help with this effort by providing an example of ratcheting up with their own target and working with its own partners. At the same time, the next administration should be mindful not to allow the focus to shift to 2035, because it is, frankly, too far away. A 2030 ratchet is the important next step.

6. Integration of adaptation, resilience, and sustainable infrastructure

While much of the above discussion focuses on the problem of reducing emissions, preparing for the impacts of climate change is an equally urgent issue both domestically and internationally. Preparing requires substantial mobilization of first responders, planners, and many other stakeholders at local, state, and national levels. On a parallel track, the Administration should continue improvements in American resilience and adaptation to the impacts of climate, and bolster integration of climate adaptation into our own and global international development efforts to support the world’s most vulnerable. In parallel, the Administration should rethink how to provide finance for sustainable infrastructure through our own and through international financial institutions. While the bulk of attention in the world of climate finance has been focused on funds that are specifically designated for climate mitigation and adaptation needs, a much broader pool of capital and financing is available through the broad set of multilateral and bilateral institutions. Ensuring that these institutions are integrating sustainability into their infrastructure decisions – for example, by supporting resilient infrastructure, integrating sustainable transportation, and avoiding high-carbon finance wherever possible – would provide substantial leverage and long-term global payoffs for people and the climate.

7. Leading in Energy Innovation and Jobs

The next Administration should continue to strongly support energy innovation, with investments to support the new technologies that will enable the energy transition at lower cost and with better outcomes. The U.S. leads the world in applying creativity to solve problems through innovation and technology. We have a globally excellent system of higher education, national laboratories, and funding for science and technology research and strong capital markets and risk culture that support new ventures.  Stimulating the investment in new technologies requires a broad effort aimed at both bolstering basic research and development, but also fostering innovation and entrepreneurship from the private sector and creating stable and predictable markets for new technologies. In addition, the U.S., along with many of the world’s major economies, has promised to double our budget for clean energy research and development. Delivering on these funding goals will be one key element of a successful strategy. Another is to be sure that, as the energy sector undergoes a dramatic transformation, those people in the old industries should not be cast aside. Restructuring causes disruption to real lives and governments at all levels should partner with universities and the private sector to ensure that those workers from old industries can find a new home for their skills.

Four years pivotal for the next 100

In this piece I’ve argued that the next administration will play a pivotal role in determining the ultimate success of the global approach to addressing climate change and keeping warming to lower-risk levels. I’ve laid out seven areas for particular focus, dwelling at some length on the specific policy approach that would be needed, and outlining a number of specific elements to activate over the coming four years. But there is one cross-cutting theme that would be helpful, perhaps necessary, to deliver the level of change needed, and that is the prospect for a meaningful change in the politics of action on climate change. Environmental policy has not always been a one-party issue, nor should it be. The Environmental Protection Agency was initiated under President Nixon and the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 were ushered in under President George H.W. Bush, to give just two examples. Climate change affects the health and well-being of all Americans. Resilience and preparedness for natural hazards and extreme weather are concepts that all Americans can support. Affordable clean energy is a positive choice.

Perhaps surprisingly, it appears support for climate policy is broadening and could soon become re-invigorated, as revealed in a recent study by the University of Maryland’s Program for Public Consultation. The study found that 71 percent of respondents nationwide either strongly or somewhat  strongly approve a 2 percent annual emissions reduction goal, and, even more interestingly, that included more than half of Republican respondents (52 percent). Broken out by state, the researchers found support of 66 percent of respondents in Ohio, 69 percent of people in Oklahoma, 70 percent in Texas, and 71 percent in Florida. Seen in light of polarized national attitudes, these results may seem surprising, but given the nature of the issue, the next Administration may wish to target some initiatives that can continue to build cross-party support. Whether these would truly yield a positive outcome is uncertain. Nevertheless, stronger bipartisan engagement will be helpful for the long-term robustness of a long-term U.S. strategy to address climate change.

Read more in the Election 2016 and America’s Future series.

      

 

 

On Earth Day, world leaders will gather at the U.N. in New York for a ceremony to formally initiate one of these milestones—the international climate agreement struck last December in Paris. For the first time, the Paris Agreement provides an international structure that allows and encourages all countries to participate in reducing global emissions, and to do so in a way that fits with their national development circumstances. Under the agreement’s architecture, targets from 188 countries have been submitted covering roughly 99 percent of global emissions. When compared to the 2000-2010 period, emissions growth from all countries is expected to slow by more than 50 percent between now and 2030. In addition, these commitments would drive declines in global average per capita emissions by 9 percent by 2030 compared with the levels in 1990. This is a notable departure from the previous effort at reducing emissions, under the different architecture of the Kyoto Protocol. That covered only 30 percent of global emissions and the world’s top three emitters did not sign on.

The commitments made under the Paris Agreement are not, by themselves, “enough” to mitigate the climate problem. But the agreement is dynamic; the first targets provide a substantial step, but there is a built-in recognition that the global pace of emissions reduction will have to accelerate to enable the world to meet goals for global temperature change and reduced risks of the most severe climate change.

To that end, the Paris Agreement provides a mechanism for increasing ambition over time, with an opportunity to present new targets every five years, and encouragement to revisit some near-term targets by 2020.  Already, in the U.S. emissions are down 10 percent from 2005 levels and are on track to hit the 2020 emissions target. The U.S. and China, the world’s top two emitters, have been leading globally, and worldwide acceleration of clean energy investment has driven down clean energy costs between 40-90 percent in the past five years. The deployment of hundreds of gigawatts of clean energy technologies as a result of the Paris targets will drive costs down further, making renewable energy like wind and solar cost competitive with, or cheaper than, fossil fuels in many new locations globally.

At a ceremonial moment like Earth Day, it is usual to celebrate the positive. But it is also worth asking if countries will even deliver the reductions that they have already promised. There are no sanctions if they do not. The Paris agreement does not force countries to do the right thing, but instead sets up a structure in which real people, local communities and business—the constituents of every country—acting in their own self-interest, can also contribute to reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, this is not just a government-delivered program. It will require sustained broad engagement of all actors, who will be able to evaluate progress through a transparent and regular national monitoring system.

So it’s worth celebrating the Paris Agreement today in the same way we would celebrate other kinds of commitments for the future. We don’t know for sure that it will work, since it depends on subsequent actions and there are many hazards along the way. We do know that the agreement represents a promising, though incomplete, approach to addressing climate change. And we can be confident that the basic approach is about the best we can do in the current context of international coordination. What that means is that this agreement can’t solve the problem on its own. In coming years, the world’s nations, innovators, organizations, citizens, and other actors will have to push hard to build the right actions within this framework.

But since it is Earth Day, let’s also take a step back from the Paris Agreement and climate change, important and timely as they are, and look at the broader picture of planetary health. By the end of this 46th Earth Day, there will still be 1.3 billion people without access to electricity; air pollution will still cause millions of premature deaths per year; the loss of tropical forests continues to be a concern for biodiversity, human health, and climate; and even well-understood, solvable problems that should be completely and irrevocably consigned to our past—like lead poisoning—persist. From a blue marble perspective (remember the picture of Earth taken from space), we must confront a set of interlinked challenges that include improving human well-being in full concert with the Earth’s ecosystems.

In the four decades since blue marble picture, we have seen a gradual integration of the issues of environment and global development. Human well-being and environmental concern have always been linked, but from an institutional and process standpoint, many policy activities were divided between environment and other goals. Agencies, organizations, and advocates at the national and international level were divided into different camps, often not coordinating beyond their respective communities.

This has now changed, thanks to the agreement on Agenda 2030 and the articulation of a universal set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs will be an important roadmap for national governments, the private sector, international organizations, and others to prioritize and address the world’s most pressing issues—and for the first time, development and environment goals are explicitly considered together. As such, goals like poverty alleviation, education, health, and equality are integrated with clean water and sanitation, renewable energy, climate, and ecosystems. This integration in process, it is hoped, will lead to better integration in practice and therefore a more focused and effective approach to tackling global challenges.

One of the proximate inspirations for the first Earth Day was a major oil spill near Santa Barbara, California. This spill caused a massive public outcry and added to already heightened concerns about toxins in the environment, air and water quality, the relationship between ecosystems and human health, and the global environmental impact of humanity on the planet and on our own welfare. Forty-six years later, there is a prospect for a relatively rapid shift away from fossil fuels and an international approach that is targeting the goals of environmental and human welfare in a systematic way. Neither of the past year’s milestones will determine our ultimate success, but with the appropriate concrete steps of implementation in the coming years, they could provide what might be viewed—maybe from the blue marble perspective of, say, the 92nd Earth day—as a transformational opportunity.

      

 

 

While addressing climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions presents challenges for Qatar and the GCC, it is also an opportunity which could underpin a diver­sification of Qatar’s economy and lead to the devel­opment of low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), energy efficiency tech­nologies and alternative energy technologies.

This report reviews a wide variety of consid­erations for low-carbon transformation and energy reform in Qatar and the GCC region. The report con­tains four chapters focusing on climate change, CCS, energy ef­ficiency, and solar and other alternative energies. Each chapter contains specific recommendations for actions that Qatar and the GCC could take to address concerns about greenhouse gas emissions while at the same time support the development of a range of new energy sources and technologies that would provide environmental and economic benefits for the region and the world.

For an overview of the policy recommendations across the four topic areas, read the executive summary »

Read the full report »

	Chapter 1: Climate Change   This chapter provides an overview of climate change impacts on Qatar and the GCC; the economic implications of global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on fossil fuel consumption; and the economic challenges and opportunities of climate change policies. The chapter concludes with recommendations as to how Qatar can develop a comprehensive approach to climate change that can make a meaningful contribution to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions, taking into account its economic interests and leveraging its’ strengths in focused areas of clean energy technologies to drive climate change solutions. Read the chapter (PDF)
	Chapter 2: Carbon Capture and Storage   This chapter provides an assessment of the role of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Qatar and other GCC countries; barriers to developing this technology; existing initiatives taking place at the international level; bilateral and regional cooperation on CCS; and action on CCS in Qatar and the region. The chapter concludes with recommendations as to how Qatar can develop a national CCS program that helps address challenges of increasing emissions growth while enhancing the country’s capacity for R&D and expertise on CCS technology. Read the chapter(PDF)
	Chapter 3: Energy Efficiency   This chapter discusses the need for energy efficiency measures in Qatar and the GCC by providing an overview of energy intensity in the region; benefits of energy efficiency measures including different types of technologies that can be applied; lessons learned at the international level by way of policies and obstacles; and financing for energy efficiency. The chapter also reviews existing energy efficiency measures in Qatar and the GCC, and concludes by providing recommendations for policy approaches and efficiency measures tailored to the region. Read the chapter (PDF)
	Chapter 4: Solar and Other Alternative Energy   This chapter provides an assessment of the need for alternative energies given global energy demand and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the international level. Also discussed are benefits of alternative energy sources, an overview of the types of alternative energy technologies that could be relevant for Qatar and the GCC region, and international initiatives, financing and policies for alternative energy. Qatar and the other GCC countries are examined in terms of the potential advantages and challenges to introducing alternative energy, as well as an overview of the existing initiatives and efforts to introduce these technologies in the region. The chapter concludes by outlining several policy options that could help encourage wider development of an alternative energy economy in the GCC. Read the chapter (PDF)
	Conclusion: Synthesis and Recommendations   The preceding four chapters have reviewed a wide variety of considerations that could input into future national energy strategies in Qatar and the GCC: an examination of the global interest in climate change and in greenhouse gas emissions reduction; and an assessment of the state of carbon capture and storage (CCS), energy efficiency, and alternative energy and solar technology. The concluding section of this report synthesizes the recommendations outlined in each chapter, and proposes actions across several areas that provide focus to sectoral policies and help make concrete any national energy action plans. These areas include technological innovation, industrial efficiency, alternative sources of supply, energy market restructuring and effective governance. Read the conclusion (PDF)

      

 

 

The intense and emotional nature of the negotiations is not unusual at this stage of the game. What was meant to be an interim negotiating session whose main role was to produce a timeline from now until the final COP in Paris where a new agreement is to be struck, turned into a battle over familiar, longstanding issues that are inextricably tied to the negotiations on an eventual treaty. Ultimately negotiators were able to achieve compromises on a series of controversial issues—evidence that there is space for agreement and that political momentum is ramping up.

Hard fought compromises were made on issues such as reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+), and loss and damage (financial compensation for developing countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change for damages they would incur as temperatures increase). Crucially, a timetable was put forward to guide negotiations over the coming two years, which was arguably the most important and anticipated outcome of the talks. Small steps were made on discussions of financial contributions to fill existing funding mechanisms like the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund, although this is an area of the UNFCCC process that is among the most contentious and cuts across almost every single issue under negotiation. Here are some highlighted outcomes in four major negotiating areas:

1. Structure and timeline of the 2015 agreement

Compromise was reached on the framework for a 2015 agreement, resulting in a new text for the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) that will form the basis of negotiations going forward. The key portion of text reads: All nations should “initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions.” The hard-won language of “contributions” is intentionally vague and steps back from language sought by others that called for “commitments,” which would have implied mandatory actions as opposed to weaker voluntary actions. Additionally, it was agreed that these “contributions” should be ready by the end of the first quarter of 2015. The United States is among those advocating pledges be made by the end of the first quarter of 2015, while the European Union would like to see pledges on the table in 2014. The earlier countries are able to put forward pledges, the more likely a robust international review of these pledges can take place before the 2015 agreement is finalized.

Crucial language remaining in the text defines a 2015 agreement “in the context of adopting a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” This text reflects a compromise by the United States—who would prefer an agreement that covers all countries by 2020—and large developing countries led by China and India who advocate for a clear division between countries based on common but differentiated responsibilities (or CBDR, a key founding principle of the UNFCCC). This language effectively kicks the conversation on emission reduction commitments and their legal nature down the road, increasing the likelihood for discord at Lima in 2014 and Paris in 2015. This new text also eliminated suggested language calling for a “legally binding treaty under international law,” for which the European Union was advocating and for which the United States would not be able to sign up. At this point, the legal nature of the agreement is still undecided, leaving it the most politically important decision facing negotiators over the next two years.

2. Financial contributions

Finance and financial contributions have been a central part of recent negotiations, with developing countries calling for financial contributions to existing funding mechanisms before they were willing to talk about post-2020 emission reduction actions. Several fragmented pledges for new money emerged from Warsaw. The U.S. pledged $25 million as part of a major new $280 million funding initiative aimed at slowing deforestation and stemming its effect on world carbon emissions. In this initiative, the U.S. joined Norway, the U.K. and the World Bank in launching the “BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes.” The fund will provide incentives to developing countries that are taking steps to limit deforestation under the United Nations’ REDD+ program. Norway pledged substantially more—$135 million—and the United Kingdom pledged $120 million.

Countries also promised $100 million to top up the existing Adaptation Fund, which was set up in 2008 to provide money for poorer countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The Adaptation Fund was given new pledges of assistance by mainly European countries: Norway pledged $2.5 million; Sweden pledged $30.2 million; Belgium pledged $1.6 million; and Germany pledged $40.7 million (or 30 million euros). Additionally, Sweden announced a $45 million commitment to the Green Climate Fund once it “becomes operational with all the necessary arrangements and standards in place,” and Japan promised $16 billion to help developing countries reduce emissions over the next three years. Adding to the calendar in 2014, the U.K. announced that it will convene a “global summit” on climate finance next spring to build political momentum on financial issues.

3. Loss and damage

In addition to the existing mechanisms for delivering climate finance, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, calls have emerged recently for a new and separate process to assist poor countries after climate-linked losses (such as the aforementioned recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines). This loss and damage discussion became a seriously polarizing issue in these talks, and disagreements prompted the developing country G-77 to walk out of discussions late Tuesday night. Bilateral discussions took over late in the week in an attempt to achieve compromise between key countries, and this effort resulted in a new international mechanism. The new “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts” does not promise compensation for damages caused by climate change impacts in developing countries, a red line for the United States and other developed countries. The mechanism places the issue under an adaptation framework for at least three years, with a review built in for 2016. This outcome represents a hard-fought compromise between the United States, Nicaragua, the Bahamas and Fiji, and was seen as a satisfactory interim outcome for both sides.

4. REDD+

The REDD+ program covers guidelines and provisions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, and it has emerged as one of the major success stories out of Warsaw. Negotiators reached several goals that were set at the 2010 conference in Cancun, agreeing on key text regarding scientific and technical rules, financing and a national coordination system. Additions to the text on technical issues included decisions to enforce environmental and human rights safeguards in REDD+ projects; lay the groundwork for a system to monitor, report and verify carbon emissions reductions from standing forests; establish national forest monitoring systems; institute reference levels—or base lines—upon which a country measures efforts in reducing deforestation; and create definitions for the drivers of deforestation (text on these decisions can be found here). Negotiators also agreed to text on REDD+ finance, including a clause saying that countries must show recent proof that safeguards are respected in order to receive compensation. Additionally, the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom announced the first major pledge for REDD+ since the 2009 conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, a joint $280 million to the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund (mentioned above).

In conclusion, the Warsaw talks are best seen as the end of the first stage in a roughly three-year arc to develop a new climate agreement. In a difficult negotiation, one would not expect major breakthroughs or concessions in these early stages, nor did we see any in Warsaw. Yet plans for the coming two years were made, and, if followed, they would be an improvement in providing a more orderly discussion of commitments than has been the case in previous high-profile negotiations (such as Kyoto and Copenhagen). The loss and damage mechanism was created, but without any real substance. Provisions on REDD+ were agreed upon and should provide scope for the incorporation of forest carbon activities into national pledges. Despite these small successes, the bigger question is whether the cracks emerging between the developed and developing country parties will widen over the coming months.

      

 

 

Through a series of regular intergovernmental meetings, the U.N. process has produced a few notable treaties that seek to drive, govern, or otherwise organize the international response to this global risk.  These treaties have a mixed record of achievement.  Many hopes were pinned to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, and though certain narrow elements of that agreement were surprisingly fruitful (e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism), it was largely a disappointment.  Hopes were raised again in 2009 for a new treaty, and although the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a reasonably solid international agreement, the meeting was largely perceived to be a failure because it did not provide a mechanism to compel international action beyond simple voluntary measures.  Despite a distinct lack of enthusiasm from some countries, negotiators decided to try again for a new treaty (or “agreed outcome with legal force”), this time with a deadline of 2015 and with broad coverage.  That gives the world’s ministries of foreign affairs roughly 2 years to achieve an outcome that has thus far been elusive.  The first outlines of this eventual agreement—or, at least, states’ opening positions—will be sketched out over the next two weeks at this year’s annual climate meeting: COP19 in Warsaw, Poland.  Although no groundbreaking decisions are expected out of Warsaw, the meeting will be an important step toward defining the structure and timeline needed to achieve the hoped-for treaty at the Paris meeting in 2015.

The importance of action on climate change is difficult to overstate; recent reports by the global scientific community underline the scope of the climate change challenge and emphasize the urgent need for a solution.  The Working Group 1 portion of the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)  Fifth Assessment Report released last month reported a carbon budget based on how much carbon dioxide (CO₂) the world could emit in the future without temperatures rising more than 2°C.  The analysis underscored that the amount of carbon the world can burn without heading for dangerous levels of warming is far less than the amount of fossil fuels left in the ground, and at current rates, this “budget” would be exhausted within 30 years.  The upshot is that the quantity of carbon in the conventional and unconventional resources we already know about greatly exceeds the known ability of the atmosphere to absorb it.  Similarly, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recently released its latest Emissions Gap Report which showed that even if nations meet their current climate pledges, greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are likely to be 8 to 12 gigatonnes of CO₂-equivalent (GtCO₂e) above the level needed to have a good chance of remaining below temperature increases of 2°C by 2020 on the lowest cost pathway.  The question we have at hand, then, is what process or policies we can embrace that would lead to a dramatically faster rate of creation and deployment of new, lower-emission and higher quality technologies.  There will undoubtedly be roles for different governance levels, particularly at the national or domestic policy level, but a major issue is what kind of international agreement would best facilitate this transition.

Last year’s U.N. discussions in Doha did result in a partial streamlining of what has become a cumbersome process – multiple technical “streams” of work being coordinated with input from nearly 200 countries and many international agencies.  Last year, negotiations under an interim Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action were concluded and the Kyoto Protocol also concluded activities under its first commitment period and commenced the second commitment period, covering the eight-year gap between 2012 and 2020.  This left the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), as the main negotiating track under discussion at Warsaw, a process that began two years ago in Durban when parties set 2015 as the deadline for a new agreement with legal force covering all countries by 2020.  Parties will have the chance to discuss the ADP again in Lima next year, before the talks conclude with a potential agreement in Paris in 2015.  A full summary of the outcomes from Doha can be found here.  

Consensus is starting to emerge on the elements that would be needed for such an agreement to be ready by 2015.  Discussions in Warsaw would be successful if they can outline a process for countries to report terms of national emission reductions and financial pledges, and a timeline for when they should be presented.  Several proposals have been put forward that call for pledges to come forward, ranging from as early as Ban Ki-moon’s United Nations Leaders Summit on climate change to be held in September 2014, to COP20 in late 2014, or as late as COP21 in late 2015.  Putting forward even tentative pledges well in advance of the 2015 deadline would leave time for international peer review of the overall level of ambition, and allow for pledges to be scaled up if necessary to ensure a sufficiently effective agreement that meets scientific parameters.  Warsaw presents an opportunity to provide clarity on both the timeline of pledges and the scope and timing of the post-2020 agreement itself.

There are a number of additional issues that will also be discussed at Warsaw, and each presents its own set of challenges.  Emission reduction pledges for both the post-2020 agreement and 2015 to 2020 gap will be discussed, with questions remaining on the level of ambition, the type of review mechanism and legal nature of compliance mechanisms.  Financial assistance remains a key issue for all parties, with pledges needed for both the long term (how to fulfill the $100 billion per year by 2020 target) and for the short term (filling the fast start gap between now and 2015).  Another big area of concern is issues of equity.  Although parties have determined a new agreement would cover all countries, it is not clear what this means in terms of commitments and how much of a challenge this would pose to the long held principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) – a principle of great importance to developing countries.  It is eminently clear, for example, that the United States does not want another treaty that divides the world into two (or more) groups and imposes different obligations on them.  Additionally, Doha saw the emergence of the loss and damage issue which is expected to make an appearance at Warsaw.  Developing countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are calling for compensation for damages they would incur as temperatures increase.

At Warsaw, parties will be outlining their opening positions for the eventual treaty.  This should include progress on defining the timeline and structure of the new agreement, and a signal as to when new pledges should be put on the table.  The next two years are crucial and countries will need to take their discussions at the international level back to their domestic constituents to define workable strategies and targets everyone can sign on to.  There is limited time left to work out a new agreement, and a negotiating text emerging from Warsaw that outlines the principles of national obligations, reporting, monitoring and ambition would enable work to begin in earnest.

      

 

 

While this is the first time that the Obama administration has released a comprehensive climate strategy, most of the individual policies described within it represent repackaged ideas that have already been either proposed or enacted (see my earlier note on “What to Watch for” for additional details).  There were no major surprises, although several new goals and minor initiatives were introduced.  Overall, then, the strategy’s value is in synthesizing the many individual actions that have been initiated by the president, thereby creating a comprehensive picture and roadmap for the current American approach to climate change.  In itself, then, the strategy adds additional clarity for U.S. businesses, state and local governments, and the international community about the direction and ambition of U.S. federal policy for the next few years.

The strategy is laid out in a 21-page document with—depending on how you count them—over 60 policy proposals.  Several of these stand out:

1. Regulations for power plant emissions. This is probably the item that was most discussed in advance, and it is no surprise that Obama is pushing for these rules.  The new strategy says simply that Environmental Protection Agency will “work expeditiously” to enact standards on both existing and new sources.  These rules (see “What to Watch for”) would preclude the construction of new coal-fired electricity, unless it has carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology and would likely mandate some moderate efficiency upgrades for the most egregious existing electricity generators.
2. Electricity grid upgrades.  New infrastructure investment in the nation’s electricity grid and expansion of the capacity to transport power is important not only for energy security but also for enabling certain approaches to demand management and renewable energy generation—both of which would contribute to emissions reduction goals.
3. Targeted support for CCS.  Carbon capture and sequestration technology, which captures and buries CO2 from fossil fuel combustion, is technically proven but remains expensive.  The strategy proposes loan guarantees for technology development and deployment.
4. Quadrennial energy review.  The strategy establishes a periodic review of the nation’s energy situation and energy policies. While it seems relatively mundane, this exercise might be valuable for allowing some strategic oversight of the nation’s widely disparate energy-related activities and their consequences for energy security and the environment.
5. Increased fuel economy standards for heavy-duty vehicles.  The past four years have seen increased stringency for fuel efficiency for cars and light trucks out to 2025 and for heavy trucks to 2018.  This new initiative will set standards for heavy trucks out to 2025.
6. Reducing emissions of HFC. Hydrofluorocarbon is a potent greenhouse gas and the U.S. is already working with other international partners to limit and gradually reduce its use.
7. Reducing methane emissions.  The U.S. is a heavy user and producer of natural gas, and this usage is likely to continue expanding with increased utilization of shale gas.  The methane in natural gas is also a potent greenhouse gas, so reducing leaks can help lower climate impacts. The strategy sets out an interagency process to improve the national gas system through regulation and industry partnerships.

In addition, there are a few programs that should be useful but are somewhat more moderate in scope:

1. An explicit strategy for organizing federal, state and local institutions to prepare for hazardous or damaging climate and weather events.  It is clear that there will likely be some consequences for the U.S. due to climate change and continued weather variability, and the new approach seeks to systematize the planning and response strategies across the wide number of agencies and institutions that will have to be involved.
2. Clean energy permitting.  The strategy calls for an additional 10 gigawatts of new renewables to be permitted on federal lands.  In addition, it encourages the upgrading of existing dams with new hydroelectric capacity.
3. New energy efficiency goal.  The U.S. has had a long track record of success with low-cost efficiency improvements due to gradually ratcheting federal standards. This new policy sets an aggregate target to reduce carbon emissions by at least 3 billion tons by 2030 through the standards set under Obama’s two terms in office.
4. New federal goals for renewable energy. The strategy increases the U.S. federal government’s target for renewable energy use from 7.5 percent to 20 percent by 2020.
5. Standardized energy efficiency contracts.  While it seems potentially niche, this small provision buried in the strategy has great potential.  One of the barriers to energy efficiency investment is not its financial payback—which tends to be quite healthy—but rather the difficulty in aggregating finance for what amounts to millions of small but profitable changes.  Advocates hope that standardizing contracts will do for energy efficiency what standardized mortgages did for the housing market—make the investment attractive for big financial institutions who need to invest large sums easily.
6. International finance for clean energy.  The strategy clearly prioritizes clean energy for international energy assistance.
7. Continued engagement in international discussions.  The strategy expects any international post-2015 climate agreement to have legal force and be applicable to all countries—not just developed ones.  In addition, it outlines continuation of existing engagement across multiple negotiation forums such as the Major Economies Forum and various bilateral discussions with key global emitters.

There is one more new item apparent from Obama’s speech: A sharper focus on the broader human values side of climate change.  Obama used this event to situate our response to rising emissions not only in the policy realm of technology and economics, but also in the area of religious values and a responsibility to others within and outside the U.S.  Given that a broad-based congressional response is needed to go beyond the policy elements sketched out in Obama’s new climate strategy, this anchoring of climate change within human values may prove to be a particularly helpful direction toward building the necessary support.

Interestingly, while the official strategy released by the White House has no mention of the controversial Keystone XL pipeline, President Obama did mention it during his speech.  He promised that if the administration found that Keystone would “significantly” increase U.S. CO₂ emissions, they would not find it in the national security interest of the United States and would reject it.  It is important to note that much of the discussion within the U.S. government so far has revolved around the likelihood that if Canadian oil sands petroleum were not exported to the U.S. via the pipeline, it would migrate to the U.S. in other ways (such as via rail and through various sea ports). Much therefore depends on the calculation of what would happen to the oil if the XL pipeline were not built.  Overall, this statement does not seem to change the tone substantially from what we have heard before, although it is a clearer statement of the carbon criterion.

The new climate strategy therefore succeeds in presenting the Obama administration’s activities in a comprehensive framework—touching on reducing domestic emissions, preparing for weather-related impacts and engaging with the international community.  While most of the policies presented are extensions of existing work, the consolidation and communication of the approach as an overall strategy can help place these individual policies in their broader context and therefore undergird the logic for pursuing them.  The power plant pollution standards are clearly a central element of this strategy, and this makes it more likely that we will see both existing and new source standards in the coming years.  The standardized energy efficiency contracts are a small piece of the strategy, but deserve careful monitoring because of their potential to be innovative for bringing in new sources of finance.  In addition, several new initiatives like the new coordination on resilience, the interagency process for methane and the quadrennial energy review are likely to help improve the clarity and efficiency of our federal government’s response to climate change.

The net result of these many administration actions could be to help U.S. domestic emissions meet Obama’s stated target of a 17 percent reduction, relative to 2005 levels, by the year 2020.  For that, the strategy provides a solid approach that is likely to succeed.  The bigger question, of course, is whether this strategy brings the U.S. in line with where we would ideally want to be either up to 2020 or beyond it.  Unfortunately, to reach the levels of emissions necessary for climate stabilization—on the order of a 50 percent global reduction by 2050 and up to an 80 percent reduction by 2100— his strategy is insufficient.  With this strategy, the president is essentially pulling out all the stops that are available to him.  Unfortunately, with an uncooperative Congress, that is not enough.  Only Congress really has the power to implement the fundamental regulatory and fiscal changes—such as carbon taxes or broad-based energy policy—that would put the U.S. on an aggressive path toward a low-carbon pathway.  As such, Obama’s strategy is best seen as a push to keep us close enough to that pathway so that, if Congress does choose to implement some more substantive measures, the costs of making the transition will be relatively moderate, particularly compared to the likely damages from climate change.

      

 

 

The road to this announcement thus far has in fact been longer than the road remaining ahead—some observers may recall that even in the presidential debates in 2008, both Barack Obama and John McCain agreed on the importance of addressing climate change and differed primarily in the degree of stringency they would apply to a policy of pricing greenhouse gas emissions. On the campaign trail that same year, Obama repeatedly returned to three priority themes that he promised to focus on during his presidency: the economy, health care and climate change. As we now know, other issues took precedence in the ensuing years, particularly after a disappointing international climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009, and after the 2010 elections and vitriolic health care debate helped scuttle discussion of a domestic cap-and-trade program on greenhouse gas emissions. 

As a consequence, Obama recalibrated his approach and maintained a low level of engagement on the issue of climate change. Most visibly, his engagement focused on energy policy, where he advocated for low-emissions technologies. His approach was most notable through his support for clean technology innovation and green jobs—which were a familiar pillar of his 2012 campaign pitch—but also manifested in a number of more technical administrative efforts that sought to establish higher standards for efficiency in transportation and electricity generation. For example, automobile fuel efficiency standards were raised significantly, from an average of 27.5 mpg to 37.8 mpg by 2016 and over 50 mpg by 2025. Nevertheless, the general hostility or disinterest of Congress has essentially precluded a more comprehensive, legislatively grounded approach. Such an approach could include features like a mechanism to tax greenhouse gas pollutants or to establish federal requirements for renewable energy or carbon content in liquid fuels. 

Against this backdrop, the administration’s options are limited but by no means absent. The president has already sketched the broad outlines of his new policy, which will come in three parts: (a) reducing carbon pollution; (b) preparing for the impacts of climate change; and (c) leading global efforts to fight climate change. Obama has already discussed options in each of these categories and may reveal new ones. Taking each one in turn: 

Reducing carbon pollution. It is widely acknowledged that there are negative consequences to releasing large volumes of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, but currently doing so in most places in the world is either free or relatively cheap. The most broad-reaching and economically sound way to fix this problem is to make the cost of pollution more expensive by imposing a tax or fee on this greenhouse gas pollution. However, for many reasons (beyond the scope of this note), Obama can’t count on Congress to institute any such tax in the near term. As such, he has been looking for other ways to improve, through regulation, the efficiency of parts of the U.S. economy and to expand low-emission sources of energy supply. Such approaches could include: 

• Issuing more stringent standards to reduce carbon emissions from existing power plants. While the Environmental Protection Agency has already issued aggressive rules covering new (i.e. proposed, not-yet-built) power plants that would essentially block new coal-fired electricity plants, it would be a much more dramatic effort to start regulating emissions from plants that are currently operational. Such standards have been proposed but have not yet been implemented. 
• Regulating the production of high greenhouse-effect gases (such as hydrofluorocarbons) under the Clean Air Act. Because of their chemical characteristics, some gases have a much higher impact, pound-for-pound, than the standard tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide. Because of this high leverage, reducing the net greenhouse impact of such gases can be done more cheaply than achieving the equivalent reduction in carbon.  
• Improving standards to reduce methane emissions from natural gas distribution systems and from natural gas fracking. The recent “shale gas revolution” in the U.S. has contributed to domestic energy security but if some of that additional natural gas flowing through the system leaks to the atmosphere, it could have a negative greenhouse impact. Improving data collection, reporting and regulation of the U.S. natural gas system could mitigate such impacts. 
• Facilitating access to public lands and offshore ocean areas for development of renewable energy technologies. Some technologies, like offshore wind technology and solar power, could be utilized on public lands and be subject to federal permitting processes. Streamlining these procedures could accelerate the deployment of these lower-carbon supply options. 
• Increasing efficiency standards for new appliances. Efficiency standards are a well-tested and cost-effective method to encourage incremental technological change. A new set of standards for appliances, refrigerators, lighting and industrial equipment could generate overall economic savings as well. 
• Generating new technologies through science and technology investment. Obama has been a strong advocate of targeting research and development funding toward national priorities. He could propose federal investments in innovative clean-energy technology—not only solar, wind, batteries and other new technologies, but also biofuels and nuclear energy.

Preparing for the impacts of climate change. In the climate debate, much attention is traditionally focused on the technologies and fuels that result in greenhouse gas emissions. But it is generally expected that, given the pollution already released, even now most places around the world will be subject to some changes in weather variability, trends and severity. The U.S. is expected to grapple with some such changes—in the most dramatic instance, of the kind witnessed during Superstorm Sandy—but perhaps also on a much more broad basis as well via increased drought, flood or heat events. As we have discovered countless times, reducing the toll on people, communities and property requires relatively mundane steps. Such steps include preparing and training of first responders, streamlining communication across institutions, ensuring sound infrastructure planning and good zoning decisions, encouraging healthy insurance programs, and developing and funding post-event recovery efforts. Such approaches will likely form a central part of any U.S. plan to prepare for climate change impacts.

Leading global efforts to fight climate change. Although the U.S. played a substantial global leadership role on climate change in the 1990s, its priorities have shifted elsewhere in recent years. Nevertheless, the U.S. did join many other countries in issuing a non-binding national pledge to reduce emissions in 2009, and President Obama has repeated that goal subsequently. The U.S. target of reducing domestic emissions by 17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020 is thought to remain in reach, though doing so would require an aggressive set of initiatives like the ones discussed above. In addition, the international community recently agreed to seek a new globally inclusive international agreement on climate change by 2015, and, as one of the world’s leading emitters, the degree of U.S. ambition in reaching its own goals will dramatically affect the chances of success for any such global agreement. There is one other major emitter whose participation remains uncertain but essential—China. A side agreement between the U.S. and China on their own emissions, perhaps with the participation of a few other major emerging economies, would go a long way toward bolstering the outcome of this next round of discussions. Interestingly, the U.S. has been in intense discussions with China and recently released a joint statement with China on climate change. Obama may therefore clarify his approach to the 2015 discussions as well as with respect to other big emitters like China.

It is possible that the president could present a surprise or two in the policy proposals he brings to the table on Tuesday—and one might hope he does, for even reaching our 17 percent reduction target is regrettably both uncertain given the policy levers at his disposal and inadequate given the magnitude of reductions we would need to undertake to stabilize the climate. Many climate advocates are hoping that Obama use this forum to make a clear stand against the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. This administration has made clear on many occasions their agnosticism about XL, and most indications have been that they will allow XL to be built, despite the concerns about its facilitating the import of higher-carbon petroleum from Canada. Finally, I would add one more note to watch for during Obama’s speech on Tuesday—the invocation of religious values in what Obama may argue is an obligation to “preserve God’s creation for our children and future generations.” Some people (including myself) have argued that for too long, the climate debate has been too heavily relegated to technical arguments—essentially important though they are—and too little connected to the genuine value debates that will ultimately drive policy action in this issue.