As government forces close in on Idlib province in northern Syria, a catastrophe looms for the roughly 3 million Syrians living there. President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian backers are determined to assault the last remaining enclave of resistance to his regime. If the past is any guide, it will be horrible. Already, the regime has launched dozens of airstrikes, which have killed civilians. A Monday agreement between Russia and Turkey appears to create a safe zone in Idlib—but only in the rather unlikely event that it holds, and even then only in a limited geographic space, for a modest fraction of the region’s population.

The United States must take a stand. We can’t reverse the course of the war, but we can at least take action to ensure that the people of Idlib are spared the worst—even if this entails some unpalatable moral compromises. Assertive deterrence by the United States and its partners is essential. To be effective, however, deterrence should be linked to a diplomatic strategy that will require difficult trade-offs.

Washington should start by vowing to retaliate in the event of any indiscriminate use of violence by Assad against his own people, in a manner of our choosing. This could be done without dramatically escalating U.S. involvement in the war. For example, a helicopter seen to be barrel-bombing an apartment building could later be destroyed by a long-range surface-to-air missile once back at its base. The Trump administration has rightly threatened to respond if Assad uses chemical weapons in his planned campaign. While commendable, this ignores that conventional weapons—artillery, airstrikes, barrel bombings—account for something like 99 percent of all casualties. International prohibitions against genocide, and the laws of war under Geneva Conventions, could be invoked to justify the response.

Such a threat by the United States would have to be embedded within a broader political and military framework for how it could contribute to winding down the violence and ending the war. This strategy would prioritize removing former al-Qaeda and Islamic State elements who have infiltrated the more moderate opposition forces and civilian populations in Idlib. They need to go. Working with Turkey, local moderate opposition forces and perhaps even Russia, we need to commit to this task—not with U.S. ground forces in any large numbers, but with the combination of intelligence, airpower, Special Operations raids and collaboration with partners that has worked against the Islamic State in the country’s east. It will take time. But it must be done.

Meanwhile, we need to offer Assad a hard-headed bargain. One part of the deal he won’t like: Idlib province, as well as small pockets in the south and the large Kurdish-majority areas to the country’s northeast, would remain autonomous from Damascus for the foreseeable future (and we would continue to threaten retaliation against any regime helicopters, other planes and large ground weapons used in these places). The international community would also help these regions rebuild and establish forms of self-governance. The end goal of this strategy is not partition but to lay the groundwork for decentralized governance in a unified Syria in the future.

The other part of the deal will appeal far more to Assad, and to his Russian and Iranian sponsors. In areas of the country where the government is now in control, the United States and allies would tolerate Assad’s rule for the foreseeable future and bring the U.N.-convened talks in Geneva designed to replace him to a long-overdue close.

To be sure, this brutal mass murderer ultimately has to go for the country to have any hope of future stability. Any political transition in Syria will, however, have to be a managed one that allows Assad and regime loyalists some say in choosing his successor. Otherwise, he and supporters will fear retaliation by a future government bent on revenge. We should withhold reconstruction aid for the regions of Syria that Assad controls until he is gone. But the international community should otherwise make it clear that we will no longer pursue his ouster in favor of a majoritarian successor. As much as this approach may insult our democratic mores, it is the only realistic option for the foreseeable future, given Syrian realities today.

This new approach gives Assad a choice. He can destroy much of Idlib, risk retaliation from Washington and key European Union member states that could ultimately jeopardize his military strength, further polarize the country, further delegitimize his own hold on power and guarantee that Syria will have little outside help in rebuilding itself. Or he can allow Turkey, backed by the United States and others, to take the lead in Idlib for the foreseeable future, while staying in power for the time being—and, more to the point, ultimately passing control to a chosen successor. From a U.S. perspective, one has to hold one’s nose to contemplate making such an unpalatable deal with Assad. But the path we are on now is much worse.

       

As Syrian forces and Russian warplanes take early steps for a long-awaited offensive against the northwest Syrian province of Idlib, where more than 2 million civilians live amongst several tens of thousands of opposition fighters, catastrophe looms. 

President Donald Trump, Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford have all warned Moscow and Damascus not to employ their usual type of indiscriminate, brutal attacks against this last remaining major enclave of the Syrian opposition (myriad militias, including the Islamic  State of Iraq and Syria and al-Qaeda-related elements as well as more moderate factions).

But why would President Bashar Assad or President Vladimir Putin listen to such pleas?  They know America is interested first and foremost in staying out of the Syrian war as much as possible—a common priority of both President Barack Obama and President Trump. An offensive against Idlib will unquestionably lead to a massive humanitarian catastrophe. Yet appeals based on morality and decency will probably ring hollow with Assad and Putin, both of whom believe that the United States has handled this war atrociously—supporting rebels just enough to egg them on, without providing them the means to win.

At least Damascus and Moscow have been effective in their brutality, so the reasoning would continue, and as a result are now poised to win the war once Idlib is brought under control.

Nothing justifies killing civilians 

In reality, of course, Assad and Putin are wrong. Nothing can justify the carpet bombing, barrel bombing or use of conventional artillery and chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods that has been the standard recourse of the Syrian military and its Russian and Iranian allies throughout this terrible conflict—the worst of the century anywhere on Earth.

Moreover, the regime’s victory will leave it in control of a country broken by violence, a traumatized population and a devastated economy crippled by sanctions. The Sunni parts of Syria are so devastated, in terms of human lives and property, that it is hard to see how the reemergence of new extremist elements can be prevented in the future.

ISIS might have lost most of its territorial holdings for now, but ISIS 2.0 or something worse lurks just around the corner.

We need an overall framework for preventing a massacre in Idlib and ending the war in Syria, not appeals to the better angels of Putin’s or Assad’s nature. The right plan would also help bring home refugees and assist communities in the areas where U.S. and allied forces are present to build better political futures for themselves.

It is on this last point where the interests of Damascus, Moscow and Washington might converge. Of course, no viable strategy can require a huge new investment in U.S. troops, lives or treasure; the American public will not tolerate it. But with the right modification of previous policy, updated to reflect the circumstances of late 2018, it might not be too late to partially salvage what is left of Syria. 

America can stop these civilian deaths

The key elements of such a comprehensive plan should be as follows:

• Recognize that the U.N.-sponsored Geneva diplomatic process will not replace Assad with an elected government or a truly representative government of national unity. To continue to pretend otherwise is fantasy.
• Adopt the longer-term  goal that the Syrian government choose Assad’s successor, subject to approval by the international community, with a Cabinet of advisers and ministers that would include individuals from the country’s other major regions, sectarian groups and political affiliations. Assad remains unlikely to accept such a compromise soon, but it could be the best we can hope for, and it is consistent with statements from Russian and Iranian leaders about the need for post-conflict reforms in Syria’s government.
• Combined with such flexibility on the political front, be more stern towards Assad on the military front. Specifically, we should pledge to retaliate at a time and in a manner of our choosing, against regime assets used in indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
• Offer to work with Turkey, and possibly even Russia, in counterterrorism operations within Idlib, to root out over time ISIS and al-Qaeda-related elements.
• Work with autonomous actors in the country’s Kurdish northeast and, over time, in Idlib if possible to help with the recovery process—by empowering them through stabilization and reconstruction efforts to define the terms of their eventual reintegration into a unified, decentralized, Syrian state.
• Except for very limited humanitarian aid, do not provide international assistance to the central government or any regions Assad still rules, until he steps down in the manner indicated above.
• In the course of the above, keep American forces on the ground in roughly their current numbers, to help with reconstruction and to ensure the autonomous areas stay secure.
• Be willing to employ American and allied air power to retaliate against any regime or Iranian attacks on U.S. or friendly positions.

Negotiating this deal could save millions of lives

We cannot be sure that Russia would agree to such a deal. If it did, we cannot be confident it has the political capital to assist in carrying it out. But Russia does have incentives to end this war, too, and to get international help for the eventual reconstruction of Syria.

This type of pragmatic plan for Syria would protect our friends and allies while allowing reconstruction to begin and refugees and internally displaced persons within Syria to return to areas of U.S. operations, reducing the odds of a future resurgence of ISIS.

And it is certainly better than trusting Russia to evict Iran from Syria, an earlier U.S. hope, or trusting Assad to show mercy to his own people in Idlib and beyond.

The emergence of an ISIS 2.0 or similar extremist movement  could easily be the result of a precipitous American departure. And a huge humanitarian disaster, with major spillover costs for U.S. allies, could loom if we simply allow the devastation of Idlib to go forward with no more than verbal exhortations to brutal thugs to somehow show restraint when they have not done so before.

       

Executive summary

With an all-out fight for Syria’s northwest province of Idlib looming, if not already beginning, the potential is growing for yet another round of immense human tragedy within the country. The consequences for regional stability, and for the possible future emergence or re-emergence of various extremist groups and associated sanctuaries, could be severe. Future events may soon require an updating of our analysis and ideas, but nonetheless, we offer the following as a realistic “10-degree shift” to U.S. policy in Syria at this crucial inflection point in the war.

Current U.S. strategy toward Syria has largely, though not completely, led to the battlefield defeat of ISIS there. But to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS or a related extremist group, limit Iranian influence in Syria, and address humanitarian and refugee stresses in the region that severely affect U.S. allies such as Turkey and Jordan, the United States should engineer what we call a 10-degree shift in strategy. Chief elements would include:

• Recognizing what is increasingly obvious: that President Bashar Assad will not be displaced or replaced through the current Geneva peace process. Instead, the United States should work over time to persuade his cronies and allies to convince him to step down in favor of a successor who is largely of his choosing. Other Syrian groups and the international community should have a say in the formation of additional elements of a new Syrian government, as a precondition for the provision of substantial reconstruction aid to and through the central government.

• Threatening and, if necessary, conducting limited reprisal air strikes against Syrian aerial assets, in retaliation for any future regime barrel bombing, particularly around Idlib. Washington should adopt a similar strategy toward Iran should its proxies attempt attacks against the United States or its allies.

• Promptly providing humanitarian and reconstruction aid to those parts of Syria not under government control, with U.S. forces remaining in roughly their current number and location to supervise the process and help train provisional local security forces (more like police than opposition forces bent on Assad’s removal). The aid should be provided more locally than regionally, in part to discourage the formation of a single, strong Kurdish zone that would exacerbate Turkish fears of secessionism.

• Working with Turkey to weaken extremist elements in and around Idlib, including with limited military action if need be, and continuing U.S. military action against residual pockets of ISIS elements in the country’s east until the battlefield defeat of ISIS is complete.

       

As the White House prepares for the July 16 summit between American President Trump and Russian President Putin, Syria will be on the agenda. President Trump has signaled his interest in winding down the U.S. military presence in that country’s long and tragic civil war. In exchange, according to press reports, President Trump may ask Putin to contain Iran’s influence in Syria, a huge lift given the scale of Iran’s presence in the country, and the critical role it has played in the Assad regime’s military gains since 2015. With such a promise by Putin, together with further progress in the fight against ISIS in the country’s east, Mr. Trump might then declare mission accomplished and pull the United States out of Syria entirely.

This would be a major mistake for several reasons. First, Russia has broken too many of its commitments in Syria to take Putin’s guarantees seriously. For example, Russia has been bombing opposition positions in southwest Syria in recent days even though it signed a de-escalation agreement with America and Jordan promising not to do so last year. Second, the degree of Russian leverage over Iran, or even over the Assad regime, is questionable. In the past, Iran and the regime have brushed aside Russian efforts to reshape the political and diplomatic landscape in Syria—most notably in dismissing Putin’s recent statement that all foreign forces must leave the country.

Third, if the United States abandons any role in Syria, it will undermine just about the only remaining source of leverage the U.S. has to shape the trajectory of the Syrian conflict. In the midst of yet another barbarous regime offensive in southwest Syria, which is displacing additional tens of thousands of innocent civilians, turning America’s back and ceding the field entirely to President Bashar al-Assad would be a moral outrage. It would also sow the seeds for the resurgence of ISIS 2.0—just as Shia abuse of Sunnis in Iraq under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave rise to ISIS (“al Qaeda 2.0”)—in that country in 2013/2014. American officials may hope that the U.N.-sponsored diplomatic process in Geneva could rescue the situation by negotiating an end to the Assad regime and a new national unity government. But that story is a fairy tale. Assad, who holds most of the military cards in Syria now, has no interest in being negotiated out of power, especially in favor of a majoritarian government that would inevitably be Sunni-dominated—and thus quite possibly seek vengeance against Assad and his fellow Alawites.

Fourth, actions that signal that the U.S. is no longer concerned with the outcome of the conflict will make it far more difficult for Washington to help Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon with the war’s ultimate fallout, and with the return or relocation of refugees. Additionally, it will make it much harder for the U.S. to influence the shape of any future regional security architecture and temper the influence of hostile actors in the Middle East.

Admittedly, seven and a half years into this tragic conflict, there are no good answers. However, some outcomes are much less bad than others. For instance, it is still realistic for the United States to help protect its Kurdish partners in the country’s northeast. Furthermore, America can secure some limited protections and temporary autonomy for friendly opposition forces and the populations they represent elsewhere. Moreover, it is important to begin reconstruction and the return of refugees in parts of Syria outside of the regime’s control. It is also possible to work with other countries to try to pressure Assad out of office over time in favor of a somewhat more tolerable successor. These steps will also reduce the odds of an ISIS 2.0 emerging, will limit (though hardly end) Iran’s influence in the country, and hold out at least some prospect of addressing the larger strategic effects of the regime’s victory.

The core elements of a strategy that would seek to achieve the above objectives, without significantly expanding the role of American military forces in the Syria conflict, should include the following:

• First, recognize that the Geneva process will not replace Assad with an elected government or a truly representative government of national unity.
• Instead, adopt the longer-term goal that Assad will choose his own successor, subject to approval by the international community, with a cabinet of advisors and ministers that would include individuals from the country’s other major regions and sectarian groups. Assad remains unlikely to accept such a compromise, but it may be the best America can hope for, and it is consistent with statements from Russian and Iranian leaders about the need for post-conflict reforms in Syria’s government.
• In the short term, use negotiations with Damascus and Moscow to pursue protections for various autonomous zones in opposition-dominated regions within Syria. This could start with the country’s Kurdish northeast, which should be split into at least two such zones to mitigate Turkish worries about Kurdish secessionism. Similar autonomous areas should be pursued for areas mainly in opposition hands, notably in the country’s northwest near Idlib, if possible.
• American and international assistance should then start flowing to these zones. However, except for very limited humanitarian aid, such assistance should not be given to the central government or any regions Assad still rules, until he steps down in the manner indicated above.
• American forces should stay on the ground in roughly their current numbers, to help with reconstruction and to ensure the autonomous areas remain secure until Assad is gone. In addition, U.S. funding for stabilization programming in opposition-controlled areas should be restored immediately.
• American and allied airpower should remain available, if need be, to retaliate against any regime or Iranian attacks on American or friendly positions.

The United States cannot be sure that Russia would agree to such a deal. If it did America cannot be confident it has the political capital to assist in carrying it out. But Russia does have incentives to end this war, too.

This type of pragmatic plan for Syria would protect America’s friends and allies while allowing reconstruction and refugee return to begin, reducing the odds of a future extremist takeover. And it is certainly better than trusting Russia to evict Iran from Syria, or trusting Assad to show mercy to his own people. The emergence of an ISIS 2.0 or similar extremist movement could easily be the result of an abrupt American departure and therefore should be avoided.

       

Executive summary

Beginning as early as 2012, the Bashar Assad regime in Syria has worked to put in place the legal and regulatory authorities to implement an ambitious vision of reconstruction as a process of authoritarian stabilization. With its military victory close at hand, the regime’s intent is to use reconstruction to reimpose its authority, tighten its control over Syria’s society and economy, and fundamentally alter Syria’s demography to achieve what Assad himself has characterized as a “healthier and more homogenous society.”

The odds that it will achieve these aims are high. Contrary to views of the Assad regime as too severely weakened by eight years of conflict to reassert its authority, it faces relatively few obstacles in its drive to reimpose its control. The reasons for this are rooted in the nature of the Assad regime and in how Syria’s conflict unfolded, defying widely-held assumptions about the effects of civil war on pre-war institutions and governance practices, and creating a post-conflict landscape that the regime will find relatively easy to navigate. Today, for all intents and purposes, the structure, governance, and organization of post-conflict reconstruction in Syria are settled issues. The Assad regime has consolidated its dominance over the levers of reconstruction, rendering it virtually impervious to external pressure.

This assessment of Syria’s post-conflict landscape poses challenges for both policymakers and development practitioners. To date, however, neither have addressed its implications for policy or how Syria’s experience challenges the core assumptions that dominate current approaches to reconstruction. This paper argues that both policy and practice rest on problematic assumptions and calls for a fundamental rethinking of what the options are for those hoping to shape Syria’s post-conflict trajectory.

The disconnect between policy and practice, on the one hand, and conditions on the ground, on the other hand, is due in no small measure to the blinkered effects of interpreting Syria through the lens of “fragility.” Syria is regularly held out as an example of a fragile state driven into conflict by the cumulative effects of poor governance and dysfunctional institutions. It is more accurate, however, to describe Syria as a “fierce” state: one in which ruling elites elevate survival above all else and design institutions to support this aim. In fierce states, the consolidation of such institutions and their effectiveness is often tied to attributes that directly contradict those seen as necessary to overcome fragility, including accountability, voice, equity, transparency, and inclusion. Instead, governance in fierce states is managed as an expression of a zero-sum existential struggle in which conflict reinforces the determination of a ruling elite to defend existing institutional arrangements by force. Not all fierce states survive challenges on the scale of those confronted by the Assad regime. Those that do, however, credit their survival to the very institutions, norms, and practices that reconstruction orthodoxy targets for reform.

This diagnosis has obvious implications for both policy and practice. Fierce states are poor candidates for the standard reconstruction treatment. They call into question the value of fragility-based models of state failure as a guide for policy. Absent recognition of the limits of fragility-based frameworks, and without acknowledging the extent to which the Assad regime has consolidated its hold over the instruments of reconstruction, the United States and EU may well fall into the trap of viewing Syria through the lens of current, fragility-based reconstruction orthodoxy. Such an approach, this paper argues, would be a mistake. It vastly underestimates the resilience of the institutions, norms, and practices that define economic governance in Assad’s Syria. It does not take adequate account of the near impossibility of pursuing any form of reconstruction support that will not contribute to the regime’s project of authoritarian stabilization and demographic change, or avoid channeling funds into the pockets of regime cronies and warlords. The hope, however modest, that political conditions might someday permit external actors to engage in effective, accountable reconstruction programming in Syria, or through their interventions influence the course of reconstruction, is deeply misguided.

What both policymakers and practitioners should recognize is that the Assad regime’s efforts to shape an architecture that ensures its unchallenged control over every aspect of the reconstruction process are too far advanced for external actors to unravel or easily circumvent. If the United States and EU wish to influence Syria’s post-conflict trajectory, they will need to rely on alternatives to reconstruction as potential sources of influence or pressure on the Assad regime.

       

In this episode, Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow with the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Steven Heydemann, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and Janet Wright Ketcham ’53 Chair of Middle East Studies at Smith College, break down the difficult questions of how and when external actors should engage in reconstruction efforts in Syria without legitimizing the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Show notes: 

• Rules for reconstruction in Syria
• The fire next time: Stabilization in the Middle East and North Africa
• Live Universal Awareness Map
• No easy way out of reconstructing Raqqa
• What’s next for the war(s) in Syria?
• Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan
• After 7 years of war, Assad has won in Syria. What’s next for Washington?
• The struggle for Syria, Chapter Two

Direct download of this episode (mp3)

With thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo, Chris McKenna, Brennan Hoban, and Fred Dews for additional support.

Subscribe to Intersections here or on Apple Podcasts, send feedback email to intersections@brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

Intersections is part of the Brookings Podcast Network

       

On August 17, Syrian officials oversaw the opening of the first Damascus International Exhibition since the start of the Syrian uprising. Reflecting the triumphalism now widely on display in Damascus, the exhibition—an international trade fair—has been heavily promoted by the Assad regime, presented as a symbol of its victory over the insurgency that began more than six years ago.

Even as military operations continue in areas still held by the opposition and ISIS, General Director of the Exhibition Fares al-Kartally told AFP that the regime wanted the fair “to signal the start of reconstruction.” Syria, official newspapers declared, is now “open for business.”

Syria’s Reconstruction Gold Rush

The prospect of lucrative reconstruction deals has triggered a deluge of interest from governments and firms looking to profit from Syria’s devastation. The regime’s closest allies, Russia and Iran, have been the most prominent beneficiaries of the Syria reconstruction gold rush, with China not far behind.

Almost two years ago, a Russian trade delegation announced in Damascus that “Russian companies would lead Syria’s postwar reconstruction.” That visit set the stage for contracts believed to be valued at $1 billion. More recently, Russian private security contractors have been “rewarded” for their role in combat operations with lucrative oil and gas contracts.

Iran, which has been a major financial backer of the regime, has inked new trade deals with Syria, and encouraged its citizens to go on a real estate spending spree, driving up housing prices in some areas under regime control. Iran also has the largest presence at the International Exhibition; more than 40 Iranian firms are taking part.

As for China, in early August of this year the Chinese government hosted the “First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects,” during which a Chinese-Arab business group announced a $2 billion commitment from the government for the construction of industrial parks in Syria.

Syria’s neighbors are also anxious for a slice of the reconstruction pie, and increasingly public about their ambitions. In late July, Amman hosted an international reconstruction conference, “Syria ReBuild 2017,” under the auspices of the Jordan Construction Contractors Association and the Ministry of Public Works. Lebanon is expanding Tripoli’s port to accommodate what officials forecast will be a massive demand for construction material—“an opportunity that [Lebanon] needs to take very seriously,” according to a former finance minister.

Even governments that sided with the opposition are angling for a piece of the action. During a visit by Turkey’s President Erdoğan to Saudi Arabia this February, Abdulrahman Abdullah Al Zamil, chairman of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce, told a Turkish newspaper that “the war in Syria will not last more than a year, and Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be the re-constructors of Syria.”

Aggravating the problem

While the regime cultivates a carefully curated image of Syria as an ever-more stable country on the path to recovery and peace, the reality is far different. The regime’s rush to reconstruction may be little more than a prelude to the renewal of violence. What we know about the conditions that promote the recurrence of violence after civil war gives rise to ominous warning signals about what is happening in the Syrian case.

Recent data indicate that since the start of this century, 90 percent of civil wars have occurred in countries that previously experienced mass violence. In a major study of the breakdown of peace after civil war, Charles Call identifies political exclusion as the most significant factor contributing to the recurrence of mass violence. “How, in the wake of bloody war,” Call asks, “can external actors help foster a society that can resolve its conflicts without recourse to mass violence?”

The answer lies in the principles and priorities that guide early recovery and post-conflict reconstruction. Not surprisingly, where these are designed to mitigate the grievances and governance failures that caused mass violence, prospects for recurrence go down. Where they are likely to amplify pre-war grievances and failures, prospects for recurrence are much higher. Everything we know about the Assad regime’s approach to reconstruction confirms that it will aggravate the factors that drove millions of Syrian citizens into the streets in 2011, and then into an armed uprising. Post-conflict reconstruction that does not address critical questions of institutional legitimacy and capacity, or provide for citizen security, justice, and political inclusion, is unlikely to be stable.

“For the Assad regime…reconstruction is not seen as a means for economic recovery and social repair, but as an opportunity for self-enrichment.”

For the Assad regime, however, reconstruction is not seen as a means for economic recovery and social repair, but as an opportunity for self-enrichment, a way to reward loyalists and punish opponents, and as central to its efforts to fix in place the social and demographic shifts caused by six years of violent conflict. Assad himself affirmed this intent in a speech he delivered to mark the inauguration of the Damascus Exhibition. Thanking Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, Assad said that Syria had “lost its best youth and its infrastructure,” but had “won a healthier and more homogenous society.” The prominent Arab political analyst Azmi Bishara described Assad’s claim as “Hitlerian,” and as confirmation of the “genocidal” intent of the regime’s policies of displacement.

In his speech, Assad went on to condemn Turkey’s President Erdoğan as untrustworthy, a “political beggar,” and to reject Turkey as a partner in reconstruction. Defining the terms on which other countries might be offered a role in post-conflict recovery, Assad asserted:

“[T]here will be no security cooperation, no embassies, and no role for some countries that say they seek a solution—only after they sever their relations openly and unequivocally with terrorism…We will not allow enemies and adversaries,” he railed, “to achieve with politics what they failed to achieve with terrorism.”

Senior officials echoing Assad’s line have repeatedly affirmed the regime’s insistence that “only friends need apply.” The “priority of investments in Syria,” Prime Minister Khamis told a visiting Omani delegation earlier this month, “will be given to the businessmen from the friendly and brotherly countries which stood by Syria in its war against terrorism.”

Rules of donor engagement

The regime’s approach to reconstruction, and the eagerness of its allies and neighbors to participate in a process that will aggravate the causes of conflict, has important implications for the United States, the European Union, Japan, and international institutions like the World Bank, which are struggling with questions about whether and how to support Syria’s postconflict reconstruction. Unless external actors choose to link their participation in reconstruction to principles that will improve the prospects of durable peace, the regime’s probable military victory will likely be only round one in a much longer cycle of violent conflict.

In light of how the regime intends to pursue reconstruction, how should the West and other external actors respond? What kind of an approach to reconstruction might prevent a new wave of violence in the future?

To mitigate the conditions that led to civil war in Syria and reduce prospects for conflict to recur, reconstruction activities should be guided by a few, simple rules. These guidelines lead to a very different, more contained and less ambitious, conception of reconstruction than is envisioned in proposals for a Syria “Marshall Plan,” but are far more likely to produce positive results for Syrian citizens.

Here are the four most important of these rules:

1. Bypass Assad. Every reconstruction dollar that touches the Assad regime is vulnerable to corruption, and will enrich regime cronies, enhance the regime’s legitimacy, and contribute to its dark vision of a “more homogenous” Syria. Cross-border channels for funding reconstruction that are transparent, accountable, and outside the regime’s control are the only way to avoid these effects. In the near term, this implies a focus on areas of the country that remain outside the regime’s direct control.
2. Go local. Unless reconstruction funding is directed to and managed by local actors, projects will reflect the political aims and priorities of the Assad regime rather than communities. With the extensive connections that external actors have developed in communities across Syria since 2011, the capacity exists to design reconstruction as a bottom-up process that will enhance the autonomy and reliance of local actors, and reflect local needs.
3. Go small. Notwithstanding the vast scale of Syria’s reconstruction needs, large-scale funding will foster corruption, inefficiency, and waste. A strategy focused on local reconstruction will be most effective if resources are scaled to local needs and local capacities. In non-regime-held areas, where destruction is less severe than in the major urban centers of Western Syria, small-scale reconstruction can have significant positive effects.
4. Go slow. The urgency of reconstruction is real. Time and again, however, the imperative of moving quickly has led to poorly-designed and poorly implemented projects. Matching the pace of reconstruction support to a strategy anchored in the above rules will reduce the likelihood of flooding communities with resources they cannot effectively absorb.

Western actors are already engaged in limited early recovery efforts in Syria, including in areas liberated from ISIS. With the military defeat of ISIS drawing closer, and de-escalation agreements in place in large swaths of the country, the shift from combat operations to reconstruction will accelerate. As criteria to guiding the design and implementation of reconstruction programs, these four simple rules give donors a pathway for supporting Syria’s post-war recovery that will not further empower and legitimate the Assad regime, or assist it in consolidating an exclusionary and repressive model of post-conflict governance.

While these rules are simple, they will not easily be accepted by major institutional actors, such as the U.N. and the World Bank, that most often work only with recognized governments. They are certain to be rejected by the Assad regime and its key allies.

These challenges, however, should not deter external actors from insisting that their participation in Syria’s reconstruction is contingent on whether it will mitigate rather than aggravate the conditions that caused Syria’s civil war in the first place. Following these rules would be a significant step in that direction.

       

U.S. Syria policy is in disarray. As the Obama administration enters its final months, strains over what to do about Syria’s civil war have reached a breaking point. In June, 51 diplomats signed a dissent channel memo challenging Obama’s handling of Syria and calling for deeper U.S. engagement to protect civilians, reduce violence, and improve prospects for a negotiated end to more than five years of devastating conflict. In mid-July, as Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated closer military cooperation with Russia against the Nusra Front and ISIS, Pentagon resistance has spilled into the media. Rifts over Syria within the State Department have deepened. The U.S.-backed Geneva process to negotiate a political transition in Syria, due to resume this month, is stalled and close to collapse. There is no diplomatic “plan B” in sight.

Amid turmoil in Washington, conditions on the ground in Syria are eroding the administration’s efforts to hand over a more tractable conflict to its successor. Despite a new U.S. commitment of $439 million for Syria relief, aid is not reaching hundreds of thousands of civilians besieged by the Assad regime—including in Daraya, where dozens of residents have starved to death. The partial ceasefire negotiated in February has broken down, only the latest in a string of Russian failures to ensure Assad’s compliance with internationally-brokered agreements. Instead, Russian air support has enabled regime forces to encircle Aleppo, trapping 300,000 civilians. If Syrian refugees are no longer streaming into Europe, it is because they are now stranded along the Turkish and Jordanian borders, refused entry into countries that were once safe havens for Syrians fleeing violence at home. Today, more than 150,000 Syrians are struggling to survive in harsh conditions, including exposure to attacks from Russian aircraft.

Russian and American myopia

But the White House seems untroubled by the turbulence its overture to Russia has created, by dissent among the diplomats charged with implementing its policies, or by the receding prospects for an end to Syria’s war. Indeed, the administration seems to have downgraded its efforts to achieve a political transition in Syria, preferring to focus almost single-mindedly on the fight against ISIS and Nusra, and to embrace military cooperation with Russia as the means to this end.

As others have noted, however, de-linking the campaign against ISIS and Nusra from the fate of the Assad regime is counterproductive. Military cooperation with Russia that is not tightly linked to a transition process will not achieve stability in Syria. Washington must condition any cooperation with Russia on Moscow’s commitment to facilitating a meaningful political transition that removes Assad from power and provides for the rebuilding of political institutions—including core institutions of the Syrian state—Without that, any gains achieved against ISIS and Nusra will be short-lived. As in Iraq, where a sectarian and exclusionary regime spurred the rise of ISIS and led the United States to support a transition that ousted Nouri al-Maliki from power, Syria will not achieve an end to violence, or any serious prospect for reconstruction and the return of normalcy as long as the Assad regime or its remnants continue to rule. Expectations to the contrary—including those expressed by Russian officials—are out of touch with what five years of brutal violence have done to the Syrian state and to any possibility that Assad can stabilize or govern Syria. Officials in the Pentagon and State Department generally recognize this reality. The White House is apparently unpersuaded.

Military cooperation with Russia that is not tightly linked to a transition process will not achieve stability in Syria.

Today, the sovereignty claimed by the Assad regime is a legal fiction, sustained only by the massive military support of Iran and Russia. The Syrian state, which is seen by both the Obama administration and Russian officials as necessary to provide continuity of governance in a transition, is in fact inseparable from the regime and cannot be reformed. Always corrupt, it has morphed into a large-scale criminal enterprise linked to a repressive apparatus. The regime’s armed forces have been gutted: current estimates suggest that Assad’s regime can field no more than 20,000 to 25,000 troops. The vast majority of pro-regime fighters are either loyalist militiamen drawn heavily from Assad’s own Alawite community or foreign mercenaries recruited by and loyal to Iran.

Priority number one: The Assad regime

Under these conditions, a durable settlement of Syria’s civil war will remain elusive—and the stability of the Arab east precarious—unless the U.S. administration and its Russian counterparts accept the need for a comprehensive strategy. That strategy must address not only ISIS and Nusra, but the much tougher challenges associated with the transformation of an Assad regime that is increasingly confident of the inevitability of its military victory and increasingly bellicose in its rejection of a negotiated transition. A U.S.-Russian policy of targeting ISIS and Nusra first and then the regime . . . whenever . . . will perpetuate violent extremism and continue to drive radicalization and sectarian polarization that might originate within Syria but cannot be contained there.

Russia has an important role to play in the design and implementation of a comprehensive strategy, but whether it is willing or able to do so is uncertain. Thus far, the administration’s hopes that Moscow would exert leverage over the Assad regime to observe ceasefires, permit humanitarian access, reduce the use of barrel bombs, or engage constructively in the Geneva process have not paid off. Russia has done little to demonstrate its seriousness as a partner in transition, amplifying concerns in Washington that its diplomatic efforts are simply a smokescreen to distract attention from its pursuit of a regime military victory. Accommodating Russia’s interest in closer military cooperation with the United States—without a commitment to cooperate in creating conditions on the ground that will support meaningful negotiations—will only reduce Moscow’s incentives to use whatever leverage it might have to prod the regime back to the negotiating table.

The agreement that Secretary Kerry is negotiating with Moscow holds out some potential for reducing violence against civilians, limiting the activities of the Assad regime air force, and preventing attacks against moderate opposition forces—but only if Russia agrees to it and, even less certain, can get the Assad regime to go along. Abandoning a comprehensive strategy in Syria, however, and engaging with Russia in the fight against Nusra and ISIS without explicitly making that cooperation contingent on a clear, defined process of political transition in Syria, would have major shortcomings. It would do little to address underlying sources of radicalism, further compromise prospects for a negotiated transition, and virtually guarantee that Obama will bequeath to his successor an open-ended Syria conflict that continues to destabilize the Arab east and Western Europe. Failure to use engagement with Russia to prevent this scenario from unfolding will be a major missed opportunity as the Obama administration prepares to hand off the Syria file to an incoming president.