Brookings: Experts - Stephen R. Grand

Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism

Mon, 10 Sep 2012 15:30:00 -0400

Event Information

September 10, 2012
3:30 PM - 5:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN3 and online at C-SPAN.org.

With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?

On September 10th, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings held a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO moderated a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who presented recommendations to the next president.

Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.

Download papers from the event:

Keeping on Offense: The Next President Should Keep After al Qaeda but Mend Relations with Congress on Terrorism, by Daniel L. Byman and Benjamin Wittes
An Opening for a New Narrative in U.S.-Muslim World Relations, by Stephen R. Grand
What Focusing on Drones and Detention Misses, by Kevin Watkins and Rebecca Winthrop

Campaign 2012: Twelve Independent Ideas for Improving American Public Policy is an indispensable guide to the key questions facing White House hopefuls in 2012.

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Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism

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Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Mon, 28 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 28-31, 2012

Qatar
Doha

Read the 2012 working group and long conversation papers »

See the forum agenda for details on sessions and speakers.

The 2012 U.S.-Islamic World Forum, convened by the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, housed within the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, in partnership with the State of Qatar, took place in Doha, Qatar, on May 29-31. The theme for the forum was, "New Voices, New Directions," emphasizing the challenge of change. Policy makers and officials, thought leaders and activists, and entrepreneurs and journalists met during sessions to facilitate productive dialogue concerning problems faced in U.S. relations with the Islamic world.

In 2011, the forum took place in the midst of the “Arab Awakening” and the dramatic changes that continue to transform the Middle East and North Africa. From Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen, ordinary citizens made possible extraordinary political and social changes. The 2012 forum examined the impact of these changes and continuing challenges posed for Muslim communities around the globe, including in South and Southeast Asia, as well as strategic implications for the United States.

During the three days of the forum there were a variety of formats for candid dialogue and engagement:

A series of keynote speeches at the opening gala dinner from world leaders on the challenges confronting Muslim communities around the globe and their relations with the United States.
Three plenary sessions of fast-paced, in-depth discussions among prominent international figures on broad thematic issues: political, social, and geostrategic change in the Muslim world.
Two panel discussions featuring experts on key issues: the 2012 U.S. presidential elections and the role of arts and culture in social change.
A set of four small working groups that brought together practitioners from specific fields to develop practical partnerships and policy recommendations presented in papers published by the Brookings Institution.
The 2012 signature event, “The Long Conversation,” is an effort to explore the dynamic relationship between citizen, religion, and the state in a changing world. The resulting policy paper incorporates discussion amongst forum participants during this off the record session.

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Event Materials

Participants

Panelists

Khaled Abol Naga

Actor, Producer, and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador

Naif Al-Mutawa

Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Teshkeel Media Group

Hossam Bahgat

Founder and Director, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights

Anies Baswedan

Rector, Paramadina University

Endy Bayuni

Senior Editor, Jakarta Post

Saeb Erekat

Chief Negotiator, Palestinian Liberation Organization

Nabil Fahmy

Founding Dean, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo

William A. Galston

Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow

Rached Ghannouchi

Co-Founder, Ennahdha

Stephen Grand

Director and Fellow

Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu

Secretary General, Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Martin Indyk

Colin Kahl

Associate Professor, Georgetown University
Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security

Hina Rabbani Khar

Foreign Minister, Pakistan

Dalia Mogahed

Executive Director and Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies

Saad Mohseni

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, MOBY Group

Rami Nashashibi

Executive Director, Inner-City Muslim Action Network

Iqbal Noor Ali

Senior Advisor, Aga Khan Development Network

Walter Parkes

Film Producer and Writer, Parkes/MacDonald Productions

Kori Schake

Research Fellow, Hoover Institution
Associate Professor of International Security Studies, United States Military Academy

Cynthia Schneider

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Shibley Telhami

Nonresident Senior Fellow

An Opening for a New Narrative in U.S.-Muslim World Relations

Stephen R. Grand — Fri, 20 Apr 2012 15:50:00 -0400

Follow @BICampaign2012
Editor's Note: For Campaign 2012, Benjamin Wittes and Daniel Byman wrote a policy brief proposing ideas for the next president on America’s counterterrorism efforts. The following paper is a response to Wittes and Byman’s piece from Stephen Grand. Rebecca Winthrop and Kevin Watkins also prepared a response arguing that the United States must put poverty, including strategies for positive youth development, at the center of the nation’s wider national security agenda.

Daniel Byman and Benjamin Wittes analyze in detail military and law enforcement actions to counter terrorism. The next presidential administration will also have to make complementary efforts to dry up support for terrorists within the local populations where they operate.

The Obama administration sought to do just that in its early outreach to Muslim communities around the globe. In his inaugural address, the new president declared: “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” He granted his first foreign television interview to Al Arabiya, the pan-Arab television network. On his first foreign trip, he addressed the Turkish parliament, where he praised that country’s success in building a “strong, vibrant, secular democracy.“ Further, he declared that “the United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam” and went on to describe partnership with the Muslim world as “critical not just in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject, but also to strengthen opportunity for all its people.”

The impetus behind the administration’s efforts was clear. Al Qaeda feeds upon a narrative popular in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds that asserts that the all-powerful United States, rather than using its immense resources to uplift the condition of Muslims, has become yet another imperial power intent on occupying Muslim lands and on killing innocent Muslims. While only a small fraction of the world’s 1.4 billion Muslims agree with al Qaeda’s violent methods—which have made Muslims their primary victims—many more are sympathetic to its arguments. The administration sought nothing less than to shatter the al Qaeda narrative by presenting an America that no longer played to type.

The centerpiece of Obama’s outreach to the Muslim world was his Cairo speech of June 2009. Calling for “a new beginning” between the United States and Muslims around the globe, he outlined ways they might work together to combat violent extremism, reduce the threat from nuclear weapons, advance democracy, enhance the role of women, and promote economic development in Muslim-majority countries. From the perspective of Muslim audiences, however, the most striking aspect of the speech was his discussion of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Seeking to signal that he would be different from past U.S. presidents, Obama called for a halt to the construction of Israeli settlements. That line garnered thunderous applause, but unfortunately became the litmus test by which many Muslim audiences have judged U.S. policy since. The president was unable to get the Israeli government to agree to a complete settlement freeze, and direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians eventually ground to a halt. On the issue that means the most to many Muslims when it comes to the United States—Palestine—Obama failed to deliver.

The Cairo speech spawned a flurry of activity within the administration to make good on Obama’s promises of partnership, which were intended as a complement to its other counterterrorism efforts. For a young administration that did not have all its foreign policy team yet in place and was grappling simultaneously with an economic crisis, it proved a difficult undertaking. The effort had to be coordinated across a number of federal agencies and initially lacked funding. Some valuable initiatives were launched: world-class scientists were sent to the region as science envoys, an entrepreneurship summit was convened by the White House, and regional centers of excellence in science and technology were established. But as compelling as the idea was, true partnerships in development between citizens in Muslim-majority countries and the United States proved difficult to organize and sustain, particularly by a government bureaucracy. Few of the Cairo initiatives have yet had the kind of impact or visibility to make a difference at the level of politics.

The excitement generated in some quarters by the Cairo speech soon turned to disappointment that Obama’s soaring rhetoric was not matched by concrete actions. Available public opinion data suggest that many Muslim-majority societies had slightly more favorable views of the United States following Obama’s election and the speech, but that this positive feeling dissipated over time. At the same time, al Qaeda’s popularity continued to wane—a phenomenon that began soon after 9/11 and may have less to do with changes in U.S. policy or personnel than with the tremendous bloodshed wrought by the terrorist organization.

Then along came the Arab Spring. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt upended the status quo, at least in the Arab Middle East. While over the near term al Qaeda may benefit operationally from the instability generated by these popular revolts, from a public relations standpoint they were a disaster for the organization, showing as they did that violence was not necessary to effect meaningful political change.

The Arab Spring has created an opening for the United States to rewrite the narrative about itself in the region and thereby further marginalize al Qaeda. The United States now has the chance to “stand squarely on the side of those reaching for their rights,” as President Obama proclaimed it would in a May 2011 speech at the State Department. At times, however, his administration has been too hesitant to throw its support behind popular movements in the region, out of concern about the consequences for long-standing U.S. interests like the free flow of oil and Israel’s security.

Whoever captures the presidency in 2012 will inherit these same challenges, which necessarily operate alongside the ones that Wittes and Byman describe. Al Qaeda is on the defensive but not defeated. Its popularity has fallen in most Muslim-majority countries. People power is now viewed as a more promising path to political change than suicide bombings. But the future of the Arab Spring remains uncertain. The United States has a profound interest in seeing these democratic experiments succeed, just as it does in improved governance and greater economic opportunities for citizens in the rest of the Muslim world. To the extent that the United States can be seen as a meaningful partner in building such a future, it will help engender greater trust, where trust has long been lacking, and remove any remaining reservoirs of support for al Qaeda.

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An Opening for a New Narrative in U.S.-Muslim World Relations

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

The OIC and the Arab Awakening

Thu, 15 Mar 2012 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

March 15, 2012
12:30 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
Washington, DC

On March 15, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings hosted Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, the secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

As momentous changes have swept across the Arab world over the past two years, the OIC has emerged as an important voice defending the dignity and rights of its citizens. Early last year, the OIC suspended Libya from membership and condemned Muammar Gaddafi's attacks against his own people. It has also established a Human Rights Commission that has emphasized human rights violations in Syria, and repeatedly called attention to the need for international aid to Somalia.

Dr. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu of Turkey took office as the ninth secretary general of the OIC in January 2005. Since joining the OIC in 1980 as founding director general of the Research Centre for Islamic History, Culture and Arts (IRCICA) in Istanbul, Dr. İhsanoğlu has sought to create awareness about Islamic culture across the world through research, publishing, and organizing congresses. He has been recognized as a leading contributor to rapprochement between cultures, particularly between the Muslim and Western worlds.

Dr. İhsanoğlu spoke about the Arab uprisings, the role of the OIC in engaging with and advocating for the rights of Muslim communities outside of the organization’s member states, the challenges in ending the violence in Syria, and the OIC’s efforts at promoting human rights and good governance. Participants of the event included current and former ambassadors, government officials, academics, and journalists.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Dr. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu

Secretary General, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

What is Religious Fundamentalism?

Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 22, 2012
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Washington
DC

On Wednesday, February 22, 2012, the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted a discussion with Karen Armstrong, author, most recently, of The Case for God and Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life, and the Rt. Reverend John Bryson Chane, the eighth Bishop of Washington. The discussion focused on the history of religious fundamentalism, the tensions that have arisen between modernity and so-called traditional values, and the role that religious leaders can play in alleviating those tensions. Stephen Grand, director of the Project and fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the talk.

Karen Armstrong began the talk by saying that the term “fundamentalism,” a western concept, is often misunderstood and used incorrectly. She noted that most fundamentalists are not violent and that fundamentalism, in all religions, represents a push back against some form of external imposition and a profound fear of “annihilation,” often at the hands of modern secularists. Armstrong added that the separation of religion and politics may seem natural to western society, but that this is not the case in many other cultures. But even in the West, the relationship between religion and politics has historically been a very violent one, and one that took centuries to sort out. For this reason, Armstrong said that when other cultures have not had time to secularize, at their own pace, secularism has often had negative consequences. For example, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s idea of separating religion and politics in Egypt was quite violent, evidenced by the number of Muslim Brotherhood members he placed in torture prisons. Therefore, it is important to understand the consequences of certain actions toward religious movements. Armstrong said that when fundamentalist groups feel under attack, they tend to become stronger and have more influence. Under attack, they often retreat from the outside world, creating a “world unto itself,” with their own education systems, publishing houses, etc. After the Scopes Trial here in the United States, for example, Christian fundamentalists became much more extreme and much less interested in engaging with other factions of society. Using this historical account as an example, Armstrong concluded her talk by saying that being hostile to fundamentalist movements tends to have negative consequences and that the way to ease these tensions is by engaging with fundamentalists on equal terms.

The Rt. Reverend Chane reiterated Armstrong’s point that the term “fundamentalism” is a western invention, noting that in the late 19th century, American revivalists such as R.A. Torrey compiled The Fundamentals and emphasized a literal interpretation of scripture that relied heavily on the writings of Augustine of Hippo and John Calvin. Chane said that modern Christian fundamentalists, influenced by the early revivalists, believe holy texts to be inerrant and often see the world from a Manichean perspective (i.e., good vs. evil, light vs. dark). He added that the fundamentalist narrative is often framed as a reaction to modern economic and cultural changes. The challenge, therefore, is in reframing the narrative in order to have productive conversations, even among those who may disagree vehemently on theological grounds. Being able to have these conversations would clear up many misperceptions, especially with regard to Islam. Chane cited a survey that showed that a large majority of Protestant pastors think Islam is a violent religion. He stated that the Bible, especially the Old Testament, has many examples of violent and destructive events. Although many of these may not have actually happened, it does show that people should not rush to judgment based on either holy texts or the actions of a few. Chane added that the Qur’an has close to 200 verses about mercy or forgiveness and only about 20 about judgment or wrath. The Rt. Reverend concluded his remarks by saying that, along with reframing the narrative about religion, there needs to be more attention paid to the power of compassion in religion, including in conflict management.

In the question and answer session, when asked about why political Islam has become more prominent in the last few decades, Armstrong answered that there has been a lot of frustration with secularism in the Middle East, especially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Armstrong reiterated her earlier point that imposing secularism in a region that had had no history of it was bound to produce negative consequences. Political Islam, therefore, was a manifestation of people’s hopes of going back to something more authentic than what had been imposed on them by secular leaders. When asked specifically about Islamic fundamentalism, Armstrong said that this current phenomenon is not necessarily about going back to fundamentals, as it has been for some Christian fundamentalists. Instead, some of the most prominent examples of what many consider Islamic fundamentalism—notably Sayyid Qutb’s writings and the Iranian revolution—were actually in response to violent state repression. In that sense, fundamentalism is very much a modern movement, one that is against any form of imposition, including secular governance. Another participant asked whether people can be more than just mere observers of these phenomena and whether there are commonalities among the religions that can help build bridges. Chane answered by saying that to be an observer is to take a stance on the situation, adding that there is in fact a lot of yearning for highlighting commonalities and engaging in interfaith dialogue. Another participant concluded the discussion by stating that there needs to be a distinction made between fundamentalists and fanatics or exclusivists. He added that it is imperative for religious leaders to be more inclusive, even if they disagree with people of different faiths or who hold different views.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Karen Armstrong

Author, A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam

Rt. Rev. John Bryson Chane, D.D.

Eighth Bishop of Washington

The Long Spring Ahead for the Arab World

Stephen R. Grand — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 15:40:00 -0500

Talk of the Arab Spring has turned, in some quarters, to talk of an Arab Winter. The latest cause for pessimism has been the results of the first of three rounds of Egyptian parliamentary elections, where the Muslim Brotherhood and a Salafist political party garnered, respectively, roughly 49% and 20% of the available seats, making it likely they will dominate the next parliament.

As I wrote in the chapter "Democratization 101" in The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East, we know from experience elsewhere in the world that democratic transitions are long and complicated processes. Toppling a dictatorship is in many respects the easy part; building a new democratic state in its place is a much more complicated affair. Egypt's transition comes with no guarantees that it will lead, in the end, to democracy. There are bound to be setbacks and surprises along the way. Regime insiders and non-democratic groups will look for opportunities to try to co-opt the revolution for their own purposes.

We also always knew that the Muslim Brotherhood would perform well in these elections. The Brotherhood and the Salafis have long been better organized and better resourced than their liberal counterparts, in part because the Mubarak government found it more difficult to crack down on religious groups. It is one of the reasons that successive U.S. administrations at times hesitated in pushing too hard for democracy. Success in democratic politics often boils down to organization—how many voters can you get to the polls—and here the Islamists had a significant head start.

Before giving in to pessimism, it is important to recall all that has changed over the past year. Last November, Hosni Mubarak's regime was conducting parliamentary elections that were as fraudulent as they come, in which his New Democratic Party secured 209 of the 211 seats in parliament; this year's have been remarkably free and fair by comparison, even if we may not like the results. Now Mubarak is on trial and his NDP has been consigned to the dustbin of history. Elsewhere, Tunisians have sent former president Ben Ali into exile and held successful elections of their own; Libyans have dispensed with Muammar Qaddafi; Yemenis seem finally to be edging Ali Abdullah Saleh from power; and Syria's Bashar Assad is internationally isolated and on the defensive. In the one region of the world that seemed immune to the democratic winds of change—the Arab world—that change is now sweeping through at a breathtaking pace.

In The Arab Awakening, I discuss the uncertainties associated with democratic transitions but argue that the best guarantor of success over the long-term will be the emergence of a political constituency for democracy. Well-designed laws and institutions are important, but they will only work as intended if the public is prepared to defend them. Politicians need to know that their own citizens will make them pay a price should they deviate from the new rules of the game.

In this regard, right before Egyptians went to the polls, a drama of great import played out in Tahrir Square. Angered by the military's killing of scores of protestors, more than a hundred thousand Egyptians flooded back into the square demanding that the military speed the transition to civilian rule. In response, the interim government resigned and the military moved up the date for presidential elections and the transfer of governing authority to civilians.

These developments were quickly overshadowed by the liberals' poor showing in the elections. If Egypt's new generation of youth could not win the ultimate test of elections, what use were they? Indeed, much of the Egyptian public has tired of the protestors, as perhaps have we. What seemed so remarkable a year ago—ordinary Arabs taking to the streets to demand their rights—now seems commonplace. Many Egyptians have had enough of protestors littering their streets, just as we've grown indifferent to the scenes of protests flooding our television screens every night. We're not just weary but wary -- concerned that mass protests will degenerate into chaos or mob rule.

But at a time when political institutions are weak or unformed, continued public demonstrations of citizens' desire for democracy remain vital. The elections may be determining who will serve in the next parliament, but the demonstrators in the streets are shaping how much power that parliament will actually wield.

Three forces now seem to be vying to determine Egypt's future: 1) the military, which seems intent above all on protecting its own privileges; 2) the Islamists, who are likely to emerge as a governing bloc, but remain conflicted internally over their commitment to democracy and the role that religion should play in public life; and 3) the youth of Tahrir Square. Despite liberals' poor showing at the polls, the latter still have a critical role to play, ensuring one form of tyranny does not simply replace another. Until democratic institutions fully take root in Egypt, their help will continue to be needed to ensure that the military moves forward with the promised transition to democracy, the new parliament plays by the democratic rules of the game, and minority rights are respected.

An empowered and engaged citizenry remains critical to preserving the fruits of this Arab Spring.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Image Source: Â© Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

The Arab Awakening : America and the Transformation of the Middle East

Fri, 18 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2011 381pp.

Video

"The events began in Tunisia in January 2011 . . . shook the political, social, and intellectual foundations of the Middle East. The tremors can still be felt, and no one is quite certain when the aftershocks will end, or when another shock wave of popular unrest might occur. Nevertheless, enough time has passed to try to make sense of what has happened so far and, perhaps, gain an inkling of where the region is headed."—from the Introduction by Kenneth M. Pollack

About the Book | Contents | Author Commentary | Events | About the Authors

About the Book

The Arab Awakening brings the full resources of Brookings to bear on making sense of what may turn out to be the most significant geopolitical movement of this generation. Coauthored by 18 of the leading experts on the Middle East, it is essential reading for anyone looking to understand these developments and their consequences.

Even the most seasoned Middle East observers were taken aback by the events of early 2011. Protests born of oppression and socioeconomic frustration erupted throughout the streets; public unrest provoked violent police backlash; long-established dictatorships fell. How did this all happen? What might the future look like, and what are the likely ramifications for the United States and the rest of the world? In The Arab Awakening, experts from the Brookings Institution tackle such questions to make sense of this tumultuous region that remains at the heart of U.S. national interests.

The Arab Awakening offers broad lessons by analyzing key aspects of the Mideast turmoil, such as public opinion trends within the "Arab Street"; the role of social media and technology; socioeconomic and demographic conditions; the influence of Islamists; and the impact of the new political order on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The authors also look at the countries themselves, finding commonalties and grouping them according to the political evolutions that have (or have not) occurred in each country. They offer insight into the current situation, and possible trajectory of each group of countries, as well as individual nation studies.

Part I: The Dynamics of the Arab Spring
Part II: Countries in Transition
Part III: The Imperative of Reform
Part IV: States in Crisis
Part V: Other Regional Actors
Part VI: The External Powers

Author Commentary

" Israel Looks at the Arab Awakening with Skepticism" by Daniel Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, February 9, 2012
"International Order in the Arab World " by Bruce Jones, Brookings Up Front blog, February 1, 2012
"Yemen's Transition of Power" by Ibrahim Sharqieh, Brookings Up Front blog, January 9, 2012
"The United States and Iran: The Arab Awakening Changes Everything" by Suzanne Maloney, Brookings Up Front blog, January 4, 2012
"The Palestinians and the Arab Awakening" by Khaled Elgindy, Brookings Up Front blog, December 29, 2011
"United States Policy in Syria: Masterful Inaction" by Michael S. Doran, Brookings Up Front blog, December 13, 2011
"The Long Spring Ahead" by Stephen R. Grand, Brookings Up Front blog, December 8, 2011
"Arab Public Opinion: A Question of What They Want and Say" by Shibley Telhami, Brookings Up Front blog, December 6, 2011
"Can Al Qaeda Capitalize on Unrest in Egypt and Syria? " by Daniel L. Byman, Brookings Up Front blog, December 1, 2011
"The Egyptian Military Faces Its Defining Hour " by Kenneth M. Pollack, Brookings Up Front blog, November 28, 2011
"Saudi Arabia: Its Rulers and its Future in Light of the Arab Awakening " by Bruce Riedel, Brookings Up Front blog, November 23, 2011
"Egypt: The Military, Elections, and the Hope for Reform " by Shadi Hamid, Brookings Up Front blog, November 21, 2011

Events

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Akram Al-Turk

Akram Al-Turk is the publications manager and senior research assistant in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Pavel K. Baev

Daniel L. Byman

Michael Doran

Khaled Elgindy

Stephen R. Grand

Shadi Hamid

Bruce Jones

Suzanne Maloney

Jonathan D. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack

Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he is
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy. Previously, he was director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and spent seven years in the CIA as a Persian Gulf military analyst. He is the author of A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (Random House).

Bruce Riedel

Ruth H. Santini

Salman Shaikh

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Ömer Taşpınar

Shibley Telhami

Sarah Yerkes

Sarah Yerkes is a former Research Analyst of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.

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Ordering Information:

{BEE4D1CC-5E07-4799-AEF4-76EAC977FCEC}, 978-0-8157-2226-7, $26.95 Order
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Muslim Minority Communities Around the Globe

Wed, 19 Oct 2011 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 19, 2011
2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC

On October 19, 2011, the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted a panel discussion looking at Muslim minority communities around the globe and the challenges they face. How are Muslim Shi'i communities different in belief and tradition from Sunni communities? What specific challenges do they face with respect to their ability to practice and worship freely? What are the specific rights and responsibilities of majority and minority communities in religiously mixed societies? The panel built on the discussions of the Religious Leaders working group at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum and the recently published report, "Muslim-Majority and Muslim-Minority Communities in a Global Context."

Stephen Grand, the director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, served as moderator for a panel of experts including Azizah al-Hibri, Ambassador Suzan Johnson Cook, and Imam Mohamed Magid. Dr. al-Hibri is a professor at the University of Richmond’s T.C. Williams School of Law. She is also the founder and president of KARAMAH: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights and was appointed by President Barack Obama to serve as a commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Ambassador Cook serves as the ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom at the U.S. Department of State. Imam Magid is the president of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the executive director of the All Dulles Area Muslim Center, organizations that build bridges of understanding within Islam as well as to all people of faith in North America.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Dr. Azizah Al-Hibri

Professor of Law, University of Richmond
Founder and President, KARAMAH

Ambassador Suzan Johnson Cook

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State

Imam Mohamed Magid

Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society Center
President, Islamic Society of North America

The 9/11 Generation: 9/11’s Impact on Civic Activism in the U.S. and Abroad

Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 13, 2011
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Following the events of 9/11, younger Muslims in the United States and overseas became increasingly active and involved with their governments and local communities, creating a “9/11 Generation.” But who are the various voices that have emerged from across Muslim youth communities? How have American Muslims sought to build bridges between the United States and the global Muslim diaspora through the internet and social media? What lessons from global Muslim communities can be learned and applied here in the United States?

On September 13, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine how 9/11 has galvanized a generation of Muslims to greater civic engagement. Panelists analyzed the factors that led to increased Muslim activism immediately after 9/11 and evaluated how this dynamic has changed and evolved over the last decade.

Panelists included Farah A. Pandith, special representative to Muslim Communities at the U.S. Department of State; Kofi Rashid, partner at Interculture; and Imam Mohamed Magid, executive director of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society and president of the Islamic Society of North America. Fellow Stephen Grand, director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

Participants

Panelists

Kofi Rashid

Partner
Interculture

Imam Mohamed Magid

President, Islamic Society of North America
Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society

Farah A. Pandith

Special Representative to Muslim Communities
U.S. Department of State

Building Bridges Between the Western and Muslim Worlds

Mon, 12 Sep 2011 12:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 12, 2011
12:00 PM - 2:00 PM EDT

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Washington, DC

On September 12, 2011, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted a luncheon discussion with Karen Armstrong, author, most recently, of The Case for God and Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life. Armstrong gave a few introductory remarks before answering questions from participants.

Armstrong emphasized that, even ten years after the events of 9/11, the West is still struggling in the so-called battle for the “hearts and minds” of those living in the Muslim world. She suggested that westerners need to better understand Islam and its history, not from Islamists or experts but from Muslims themselves. She also stated that recognizing the suffering of the “other” is an important step in building bridges between the western and Muslim worlds. And briefly touching on the recent events in the Arab world, Armstrong cautioned that western publics and policymakers should not expect a sudden emergence of secular political systems, noting that it took European countries hundreds of years and a lot of bloodshed to fully attain secular, democratic systems of governance.

Armstrong also talked about her initiative, the “Charter for Compassion,” a collaborative effort to instill compassionate thinking and action into religious and political life. The initiative—and the charter on which it is based, written by leading religious scholars from six world traditions—has been introduced in various projects in Pakistan and Jordan and has been well received, especially among business leaders. When asked if there were challenges in relaying a message of compassion in Pakistan, Armstrong insisted that the Charter had been widely recognized there as deeply resonant with the Islamic ethos and that indeed Pakistan had become one of the great leaders of the Charter. “The political situation in Pakistan and the fact that narrower interpretations of Islam, such as Wahhabism and Deobandism, had taken strong hold in the country meant that there were many challenges and that progress could not be swift. It had taken thirty-five years for the country to get into its current state and we would not see concrete results for at least ten years,” Armstrong said. She added that the militancy in Pakistan is not due to religion but instead to socio-economic problems and the geostrategic issues that have emerged as a result of statehood and the decades-long instability in Afghanistan. Armstrong also addressed other issues that participants raised. She emphasized the need for nuance in combating anti-Muslim sentiment, spoke about how suffering and the effects of colonialism need to be recognized, and stressed that religious institutions, especially at the local level, must be included in the conversation about compassion.

Participants

Panelists

Karen Armstrong

Author, A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, and Christianity and Islam

@ Brookings Podcast: The Tenth Anniversary of 9/11

Stephen R. Grand — Fri, 09 Sep 2011 15:31:00 -0400

Ten years after the attacks on the United States by al Qaeda, expert Stephen Grand, director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings, reflects on the progress the United States has made, and the continuing conduct of the war on terror. Grand says we have killed or captured key terrorist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, and significantly weakened al Qaeda while strengthening our own national security. However, U.S. retaliation has served to further alienate Muslim peoples across the globe, and ended U.S. naivety about its reputation in the world as a force for good.

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Ten Years After 9/11, We Still Can’t Agree Who the Enemy Is

Stephen R. Grand — Tue, 06 Sep 2011 12:03:00 -0400

The United States can claim many successes in the ten years since 9/11 in combating the terrorists responsible for those horrific attacks, but there have been missteps along the way as well. Where we have come up short, it has often been because of our inability as a nation to reach a consensus as to who the enemy is.

Many of our most tangible successes are linked directly to the events of that fateful day. We have succeeded in imprisoning or eliminating many of those who plotted the attacks, including killing Osama bin Laden and his former lieutenant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. We have improved our homeland defenses and our intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing capabilities to help prevent further attacks against the United States. We have dislodged al Qaeda from its former sanctuary in Afghanistan and, with the help of drones, now have many of its leaders on the run in the tribal areas of Pakistan. We have ousted the Taliban, al Qaeda’s former host, from power in Afghanistan, sending a clear signal that the United States and the international community will not tolerate states that harbor terrorists (though, through our own inattention, we allowed the Taliban to regroup so that they once again threaten Afghanistan’s stability).

However, if you broaden the focus to how we have fared more generally in countering extremist violence by radical Muslim groups around the world, the picture grows murkier. On the positive side of the ledger, the al Qaeda narrative has lost any broad popular appeal. In the Arab world most notably, young people are far more interested in using non-violent protest to push for freedom and democracy than in becoming suicide bombers in the cause of an Islamic caliphate. Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq and now Libya are all taking tentative steps toward democracy, which over the long-term promises to help relieve the pent-up anger and frustration felt by many citizens, by giving them a greater say in their own affairs and hopefully greater life opportunities.

On the negative side, while al Qaeda may have lost much of its luster and its leadership may be on the run, al Qaeda as a movement has metastasized, with active affiliates in the Gulf, the Maghreb, Europe and beyond. Today, al Qaeda operates far less like a hierarchical organization and more like a loose network of like-minded extremist groups, with the center providing more inspiration than operational command. And, as unpopular as al Qaeda may have become in many parts of the Muslim world, so too is the United States. Despite President Obama’s efforts to reach out to the Muslim world, views of the United States in most Muslim-majority countries are broadly unfavorable.

One reason is that we as a nation appear conflicted as to who the real enemy is: we can’t decide whether we are at a war with a small, violent fringe group of fanatics who have sought to highjack a peaceful religion for their own nihilistic purposes, or Islam itself, one of the three Abrahamic faiths, with some 1.4 billion followers. Chairman Mao Zedong once said, “The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” We have been less successful in making the “swimming” more difficult for groups like al Qaeda, in part because of our perceived inability to differentiate between the faithful and the fanatical. Ten years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda may have become household names, but we as a nation still don’t know much about Islam. In a 2010 Pew poll, when Americans were asked how much they knew about Islam, 30% responded “not very much” and 25% “nothing at all”—only slightly higher than in 2001 (37% and 24%, respectively).

Out of ignorance, we have tended to paint our enemies with a broad brush, implicating ordinary Muslims in the sins of an extremist few. In our television and film, Islam is often depicted as a violent religion. Rumors are spread that our president might be a closet Muslim (as if that were something dangerous and un-American). Conspiracy theories are spun—akin to those that once circulated about the Freemasons, the Papists and the Jews—that American Muslims are secretly plotting to establish a Muslim caliphate in the United States. (How a group that represents about two percent of the population could achieve such a feat in a democracy is rarely made clear, however.) A Florida pastor makes a national spectacle by putting the Koran on trial and eventually burning it.

None of this goes unnoticed abroad. In a large Gallup survey of Muslim communities around the globe, one of the key findings was that Muslims feel a profound lack of respect from the West. They sense that Islam as a religion is under siege.

There will always be issues that divide the United States and the Muslim world. Many stereotypes propagated about the United States in Muslim-majority countries are equally as unflattering, ill informed, and injurious. For as long as Israelis and Palestinians are unable to reach a peace settlement, our perspectives on that conflict are likely to diverge. Even after we withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is likely to continue to be perceived by many Muslims around the globe—fairly or unfairly—as an overweening superpower intent on imposing its will on Muslims and Muslim lands.

But our ignorance of “the other” only exacerbates the problem. A little respect could go a long way in mending relations with the vast majority of Muslims who share our antipathy toward al Qaeda.
On this tenth anniversary of 9/11, we have much to be encouraged about, but also some important homework to do.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Mr. Assad: Tear Down Your Police State

Stephen R. Grand — Fri, 20 May 2011 16:29:00 -0400

For those hoping President Obama would lay out a grand strategy for the Middle East, his recent speech at the State Department must have been disappointing. There was little attempt to connect the dots and explain why the United States had endorsed regime change in Tunisia and Egypt but not Bahrain, why we chose to intervene in Libya but not Yemen or Syria. The president did not put forward, as some had urged, a new framework for Middle East peace. Instead, the president delivered what was on its surface a much more modest address. But while late in coming, the speech could ultimately prove transformational.

For want of a better term, it could be described as a “directional” speech. In Reagan-esque style, President Obama provided the world with his own interpretation of the recent dramatic events that have swept across the Middle East and North Africa, and the direction in which he saw the winds of history now blowing. The president described how, driven by a hunger for dignity and self-determination, “the people of the Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands.” He observed that, “Two leaders have stepped aside. More may follow.” He suggested that “it will be years before this story reaches its end.” But he made it clear how he thought it would end: “that repression will fail, and that tyrants will fall.”

Speaking fittingly from the State Department, he declared a new direction for U.S. policy: that America would align itself squarely behind these new winds of change. “It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.” He offered significant financial assistance to the fledgling democracies of Tunisia and Egypt, while also indicating that U.S. assistance would “extend to nations where transitions have yet to take place.”

And he offered some direction regarding what should and should not be acceptable in this new world – some rules of the road in a region undergoing dramatic change. He spoke of the “moral force of nonviolence” and the right of citizens to free speech and free assembly. He made clear that “the United States opposes the use of violence and repression against the people of the region.” Rulers, he suggested, had to heed their citizens’ calls for change and move toward dialogue and democracy. Singling out Syria as an example, he indicated, “President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.”

On the one hand, it was a much more realistic speech than the one President Obama gave in Cairo shortly after taking office. There were no soaring promises this time, like his earlier pledges to close Guantanamo and halt Israeli settlements – pledges that have since haunted his efforts to engage with the Muslim world. This was a speech by a more seasoned American president, more cognizant of the limits of American power and the American presidency.

On the other hand, it may yet prove to be a revolutionary speech, akin to President Reagan’s 1987 speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. That, too, was a statement by an American president about the world as it was evolving, in attempt to shape it toward “the world as it should be.” Reagan’s call to Mr. Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” was dismissed by many at the time as lacking in seriousness because the United States lacked the leverage to make it happen. But the call carried tremendous moral force. Reading between the lines of the Obama speech, it can be understood as a similar call to those “prying loose the grip of an iron fist” to continue in their struggle. It was also a stern warning to the region’s leaders to heed the voices of their people or stand aside the forces of history. This was the president not as commander-in-chief of the world’s largest army, but as its most inspirational cheerleader, trying to breathe new life into the Arab Spring.

History will judge whether the speech and subsequent U.S. policy succeed in turning noble aspirations into a better tomorrow for the peoples of the Middle East.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tue, 12 Apr 2011 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 12-14, 2011

Washington
DC

On April 12-14, 2011, the Government of Qatar, the Brookings Institution and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World hosted the eighth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, convening for the first time in Washington, D.C. at this critical moment in Middle Eastern political history.

The U.S.-Islamic World Forum is a platform for dialogue at the highest level featuring leading U.S. and Muslim public officials, business leaders, scholars, journalists and commentators. Long seen as the world’s premier policy event for leaders with stakes in the global Muslim community, the Forum has a history of fostering unique, positive relationships between policymakers, business, cultural and religious leaders from across the Muslim World and the United States.

This year’s discussions focused on the rapid, turbulent change in the Middle East and implications for Muslims around the world.

There were five plenary sessions on topics such as civil society, the Libyan crisis, and the media.
Watch videos and read more about the plenaries »

Ten rountables held discussions on the Middle East peace process, the role of youth in the Arab Spring, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and many other issues.
Watch videos and read more about the roundtables »

Five working groups were convened to discuss and recommend action on issues in U.S. relations with the Islamic world, which were summarized in a paper published by the Brookings Institution. They are as follows:

Muslim-Majority and Muslim-Minority Communities in a Global Context
Humera Khan, Executive Director, Muflehun
Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America

Disconnected Narratives Between the United States and Global Muslim Communities
Ambassador Marc Ginsberg, Senior Vice President, APCO Worldwide
Anne Hagood, Managing Editor, The Layalina Review and The Chronicle, Layalina Productions

Higher Education Reform in the Arab World
Katherine Wilkins, Vice President for Communications, AMIDEAST

Building Capacity and Developing Leadership among American Muslims and Their Organizations
Brie Loskota, Managing Director, Center for Religion and Civic Culture, University of Southern California
Nadia Roumani, Co-Founder and Director, American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute, University of Southern California

The Role of Entrepreneurship and Job Creation in U.S.-Muslim Relations
Ahmed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, and Director of Strategic Partnerships and Communications, Silatech
Mohamed Younis, Senior Analyst, Gallup Center for Muslim Studies

Forum Highlights:

Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton » (state.gov)

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks at the 2011 U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Washington, D.C.

Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, and Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu.

Time Magazine Editor and CNN host Fareed Zakaria moderates a panel with former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Judeh, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey Ibrahim Kalin, and U.S. Senator John Kerry.

(images courtesy of Paul Morse)

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Starting in Egypt: The Fourth Wave of Democratization?

Stephen R. Grand — Thu, 10 Feb 2011 14:17:00 -0500

If the last half of the twentieth century was the hour of the big man in Arab politics and the first decade of the twenty-first was the hour of the extremist, we are now witnessing on the streets of Cairo – to steal a phrase from the late Lord Ralf Dahrendorf – the hour of the citizen. Three waves of democratization have swept the globe in modern history, it has been argued, and each has bypassed entirely the Arab world. With the sudden collapse of authoritarianism in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak’s regime teetering on the brink, a fourth such wave may be taking shape, with the Arab world at its epicenter.

It’s worth pondering what a fourth wave of democratization might look like, drawing upon what happened two decades ago in the former East bloc:

First, it’s unlikely that the autocracies of the Arab world will all topple quickly like dominoes as we saw in Eastern Europe. Protest movements will undoubtedly emerge in other Arab countries, other regimes may fall, but many Arab authoritarian governments are likely to be with us for a while longer. The communist regimes of Eastern Europe were all propped up artificially by Soviet military power; when it became apparent that Gorbachev was unwilling to intervene any longer in their internal affairs, these regimes collapsed quickly in the face of popular protests. Oil and natural gas have been the props supporting a number of Arab regimes (though it’s been American aid in the case of Egypt and Jordan), and these natural resources and the wealth they generate are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Moreover, while the states of the Arab world share a common language and history and many cultural characteristics, they differ importantly in the nature of their regimes, the degree to which they have been open in the past to the outside world, the level of education of their citizens, and the strength of their civic institutions. What has happened in recent weeks in Egypt, the most populous Arab state, will embolden ordinary citizens throughout the region to make their voices heard, but most probably with varying results because of these very differences.

Second, political change will come in many forms, not just street protests. The events of recent weeks have put Arab leaders on notice. Many will now take steps to forestall any possible political unrest. We have seen this already in Jordan, where King Abdullah announced a new government in an effort to preempt the growing protests in his own country. Some of these changes are likely to be genuine, responding to the changed power dynamic in the region, and some merely cosmetic (as we saw in many of the successor states of the former Soviet Union) – changes meant to simply distract or buy time in the hopes that the public fever for change will eventually dissipate.

Third, political change will not always mean democracy. The Obama administration has been justified in its concerns about the rapid collapse of authority in Tunisia and Egypt. It will likely be a long and perilous road from the political openings we have seen in the last weeks to genuine democracy. Caretaker governments will have to be formed, constitutions rewritten, free and fair elections held, and new democratic political institutions crafted. These new institutions will be but paper creations if publics do not remain constructively engaged so as to ensure they function according to the will of the people. As the experience in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union shows, there will be many opportunities during this extended transition process for former regime insiders, extremists, political opportunists, and even criminal elements to co-opt these popular revolutions for their own purposes. Of the 28 countries in the former Soviet sphere, only 13 are today categorized by Freedom House as “free” and another 8 “partly free”. As with the former East bloc, the nature of each society will matter significantly in terms of which Arab countries succeed in making the transition to democracy and which do not. Well-educated, highly networked societies that have been relatively open to the world are likely to fare better than others.

Fourth, the political battles ahead in these societies are likely to revolve more around bread-and-butter issues than around ideology, but unlike in the former East bloc, the role of religion is likely to be a hotly contested issue. What has been most striking about the protests in Tunisia and Egypt is their non-ideological character. The protesters have had very simple and pragmatic demands focused on ending dictatorship and the corruption that accompanied it and improving basic rights and material living standards. To the extent their cries have verged on the ideological, it is greater freedom and democracy, and not Islam, that they have been calling for as way out of their current woes. For years, many western commentators have asked, often unfairly, where are the moderates? Well, here they are, marching peacefully in numbers larger than had ever been seen in the Arab world. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was late to the party, joining the demonstrations in large numbers only on the fifth day of the protests. More importantly, they do not appear keen on swiping the entire punch bowl for themselves. Nonetheless, there are likely to be heated debates ahead over the proper role of religion in public life, which remains an unresolved question in the Arab world. Better this battle be waged peacefully, though, within the context of democratic institutions, than violently on the streets.

Fifth, the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt may well bring about a fundamental shift in geopolitics, akin to the realignments occasioned by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the attacks of 9/11. Already we have gotten a foretaste of this in the shift in world media coverage over the last weeks –- from covering suicide attacks by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the protests of ordinary citizens in Tunisia and Egypt. For the foreseeable future, the energies and attentions of the United States and other major powers are likely to be consumed by political change in the Middle East. They will find themselves scrambling to keep up with the heightened expectations of newly empowered Arab publics – cajoling existing political leaders to get ahead of the curve by implementing meaningful reforms, managing peaceful political transitions, helping craft democratic political institutions and, above all, seeking to ensure stability as citizens clamor for regimes whose legitimacy derives not from force but from the will of the people.

Finally, a fourth wave of democratization could potentially spread well beyond the Arab world. It is conceivable the scenes from Tunis and Cairo could eventually serve as a rallying cry for a reenergized Green Movement in Iran. Chinese dissidents might find inspiration to challenge more aggressively the political monopoly of the communist party. And with presidential elections looming in Russia in 2012, democracy could perhaps have another chance there.

These could indeed be interesting, if perilous, times ahead.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Developing Partnerships with Predominantly Muslim Nations

Stephen R. Grand — Thu, 18 Nov 2010 00:00:00 -0500

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important strategic challenges facing the United States is placing its relations with predominantly Muslim societies on sounder footing. Too often in recent years, particularly since the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11, these relations have been dominated by fear and mutual recriminations. As President Obama articulated in his Cairo address, there is much to be done if we are to get this vital relationship right: from eliminating the widely held perception among many Muslims that the United States is at war with Islam, to resolving the many violent and divisive conflicts now roiling the Muslim world in which the United States is often deeply embroiled, to addressing the very real developmental challenges facing many predominantly Muslim societies and improving how these societies are governed. But building more bridges and partnerships between citizens of the United States and of predominantly Muslim societies may be the most vital.

An important dimension of the problem is the lack of knowledge and depth of mutual misunderstanding we possess about one another. In repeated Gallup polls since 9/11, when asked what they most admire about Muslims and Islam, a majority of Americans have responded either “don’t know” or “nothing.” The majority of Americans also say they do not know much about Islam, and only about half know a Muslim personally. In contrast, most Muslims do express admiration for some aspects of the West, citing technology and democracy most often, but many disapprove of U.S. foreign policy and very few have ever met an American. What this data bears out is that we simply do not know enough about one another.

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Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Publication: U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy

Of Korans and Kingdoms: U.S. Relations with the Muslim World

Stephen R. Grand — Sat, 11 Sep 2010 11:25:00 -0400

Nine years after 9/11, America still struggles with knowing who are our friends are, who our enemies, and the nature of the challenges we confront.

As we mark the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States continues to be mired in a deadly war in Afghanistan against a resurgent Taliban. In Iraq, we have declared an end to combat operations, but we still have 50,000 troops on the ground and the country remains highly unstable. Our invasion of Iraq has tilted the balance of power in the region toward Iran, which continues to advance its nuclear ambitions despite tightening international sanctions. The Palestinians and Israelis have finally resumed direct talks but the political environment in which those negotiations are taking place are less than propitious for reaching a final settlement.

Nine years on, al Qaeda no longer enjoys sanctuary in Afghanistan for training and U.S. military strikes have significantly degraded its operational capabilities, but the pool of recruits for the organization and its burgeoning affiliates has only grown. At home, a national debate has erupted over the propriety of building a Muslim community center two blocks from Ground Zero, and an eccentric Florida pastor has captured global news attention with his threats to burn copies of the Koran.

How did we get here? Our faltering progress in marginalizing al Qaeda and putting relations with the Muslim world on sounder footing are not for a lack of resolve or an unwillingness to sacrifice blood and treasure by two U.S. administrations. Rather, it stems from our inability as a nation to understand who our enemies are, who our friends, and the nature of the challenges we confront.

Our enemy, as Presidents Bush and Obama both pointed out, is not Islam, but al Qaeda and other like-minded organizations—a loose network of terrorist groups that have sought to hijack a peace-loving religion for their own nihilistic political purposes. After nine years of counter-terrorism efforts, al Qaeda endures not because of its great military strength or organizational prowess but because of our own perceived power and our own policy failures. Al Qaeda feeds upon a popular narrative in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds that the all-powerful United States, rather than using its power to uplift the condition of Muslims around the globe, is at war with Islam—intent on occupying Muslim lands and on killing innocent Muslims. When our drone attacks miss their intended targets, when we employ misguided rhetoric about crusades and imperialism, and when we desecrate Islam’s most sacred religious symbols, we only play into this narrative.

Our friends, at the end of the day, will be the 1.4 billion Muslims who are not affiliated with al Qaeda. While many may resent U.S. policy, they find al Qaeda’s nihilism—of which they have been the primary victims—wholly unappealing. They want the same things that people all around the world want: to be able to feed their families, send their children to good schools, compete successfully in the global economy, and have the freedom to realize their full potential as humans. When they are successful in building their own, more positive futures, al Qaeda will quickly slide into irrelevancy.

The challenges we face going forward—beyond trying to bring to a close the many violent conflicts roiling the “Muslim world”—are twofold. First, to help address the most pressing issue afflicting many predominantly Muslim societies: poor governance. The corruption of many local political leaders and their inability to provide their citizens even the most basic social services are undermining the legitimacy and coherence of states, creating the chaos and instability upon which al Qaeda thrives. We must find a way to give ordinary citizens the knowledge, the perspectives, and the skills so that their voices can be heard and they can play a constructive role in creating for themselves better schools, better roads, better health care systems, better economies, and ultimately better governments.

Second, we must educate Americans about Islam. Nine years after 9/11, our relations with the “Muslim world” continue to be driven largely by ignorance and fear. We will never get the atmospherics of this relationship right until our political leaders and the American public can better differentiate the faithful from the fanatical. When we burn a Koran, we not only desecrate another faith and our own founding principles as a nation, but we also send up in smoke any prospect of building a more secure and stable future for our children.

Authors

Stephen R. Grand

Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam

Thu, 24 Jun 2010 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

June 24, 2010
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

The nearly seven million Muslims living in the United States represent an increasingly important part of American society. Yet relations between the U.S. and its Muslim community are strained. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Akbar Ahmed conducted a cross-country study of the American Muslim community, recounted in his new book, Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam. The book examines questions of the acceptance of Muslims as truly “American,” and what being “American” means, as well as issues such as how Muslims in the United States relate to other religious communities. The book also explores the potential threat of increased “homegrown terrorism” like the attempted bombing of Times Square and the deadly shooting spree at Fort Hood.

On June 24, the Brookings Institution hosted a discussion on the findings of the book and the experience of being Muslim in America. Following the presentation, Imam Mohamed Magid, vice president of the Islamic Society of North America, discussed Ahmed’s book and the crucial issues he raises. Fellow Stephen Grand, director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

After the program, the speakers took audience questions.

Audio

Journey into America: The Challenge of Islam

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20100624_muslim_community

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Imam Mohamed Magid

Vice President, Islamic Society of North America