To make America happy again, society has to figure out how to make our country whole. Understanding what divides Americans—and what gives them hope—could be critical to improving their well-being and the nation’s.

By tracking patterns in well-being, and creating programs based on the results, we can take steps toward tackling the malaise that afflicts many of us, including the physically and mentally stressed, the jobless, the aging and those struggling with drug use.

Surveying well-being and ill-being involves asking people how satisfied they are with their lives, what their hopes for the future are and whether they recently experienced such emotions as anger or contentment.

When I explored such surveys for my 2017 book on well-being, some surprising patterns emerged. Chief among them: Well-being is more unequal in the U.S. across race and income groups than in many other countries. Happiness has fallen the most over time among the white population (particularly males) and (less surprisingly) the least educated. Distress was greatest among those in middle age. And African Americans were much more optimistic and hopeful than their white counterparts.

It’s long been reported that optimists live longer and healthier lives. My recent research has found that to be true among those born between 1935 and 1945 and still alive in 2015.

When civil and gender rights improved in the 1970s, women and African Americans became increasingly optimistic. At the same time, less educated white men became decidedly less optimistic as the manufacturing sector declined, a downward turn that could be related to a loss in status. Research a colleague and I conducted on well-being surveys shows that the same people and places that reflect the greatest losses in optimism (and increases in worry) in recent years are the most vulnerable to the deaths of despair (because of suicide, drug overdose, and alcohol) that are driving up the country’s overall mortality rate.

In addition, mental distress is often compounded by physical pain. A study titled “Unhappiness and Pain in Modern America,” published this month in the Journal of Economic Literature, analyzed data from 30 countries around the world and showed that Americans reported experiencing significantly more pain than respondents in the other countries.

The pain of some Americans can be attributed to years of physical labor or the lack of access to good healthcare, problems often compounded by being overweight and obese.

Yet white Americans report significantly more pain than African Americans, who have equally poor or worse health indicators. The disparity may be because of the nature of pain, which is not only physical. Pain has psychological components too.

The pain Americans say they feel is linked to broader nationwide trends of hopelessness and desperation. Respondents living in places with higher levels of deaths of despair—such as Appalachia and Youngstown, Penn.—are also more likely to report high levels of pain, according to my research.

Work based on well-being metrics shows that desperation can be reversed. Interventions and simple programs can improve a person’s outlook. Such approaches include increasing access to volunteering, the arts, and shared green spaces. Simply interacting with members of the community has been shown to raise the well-being of those who have retired or dropped out of the labor force and are often home alone.

In Santa Monica I worked with a team in 2015 that designed a well-being tracking index and related interventions. When the survey identified social isolation as a marker of low well-being, the city responded with programs that support community engagement. These included group walks, library visits, and art projects.

Studying the metrics helps pinpoint trends and identifies the vulnerable. Yet for interventions to be effective, they must also address such underlying causes of unhappiness as drug addiction and joblessness.

The high levels of reported pain in the U.S. also reflect an epidemic of misuse of and addiction to opioids and other painkillers.

In my home state, the Maryland Behavioral Health Administration has programs that teach children growing up with addicted parents how to be resilient, which involves teaching a sense of competency and problem-solving and coping, among other skills. In California, Be Well Orange County is developing such programs.

Much can also be learned from informal safety nets and community support common in African American and Latino communities. These include extended families, churches, and other social entities that give purpose and meaning to life beyond an income and a job.

Sociologist Andrew J. Cherlin of Johns Hopkins University has extensively interviewed children of steelworkers from the now-defunct Bethlehem Steel complex in Baltimore. While many of the African American workers faced significant discrimination, many of their children attended college and moved to better neighborhoods. Yet they return most weeks to the church near the factory and reap the psychological benefit of giving back to their community.

One crucial key to making America happy again may lie in understanding the hope and resilience of those who have been traditionally disadvantaged yet still believe in a version of the American dream.

       

In new research, Carol Graham and Sergio Pinto assesses the troublesome levels of ill-being among men who are out of the labor force (as distinct from unemployed men), and the challenges this poses to the future of work and the future of the middle class more generally. Carol Graham, the Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow and research director in the Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings, came on to the show to discuss this new research, titled “Men without work: Why are they so unhappy in the US compared to other places.”

Also on today’s episode, meet Margaret Taylor, a new fellow in Governance Studies at Brookings and senior editor and counsel at Lawfare.

Related content:

Men without work: Why are they so unhappy in the US compared to other places?

How automation and AI are redefining work (podcast)

The plight of low-income white Americans (podcast)

Measuring the Pursuit of Happiness (podcast)

Future of the Middle Class Initiative at Brookings

Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on iTunes, send feedback email to BCP@Brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

The Brookings Cafeteria is part of the Brookings Podcast Network.

       

We are in an era of progress paradoxes. Unprecedented gains in technological innovation, poverty reduction, and life expectancy around the world coexist with persistent poverty traps in the poorest countries and increasing inequality and anomie in some of the wealthiest ones. In the U.S., one of the wealthiest countries, we see booming stock markets and record low levels of unemployment alongside stories of profoundly unequal hopes, lives, and lifespans.  An important driver of these inequalities is the decline in the status and wages of low-skilled labor at the same time that high-skilled workers have experienced increases. Relatedly, we have seen an increase in prime-age males (ages 25-54)—and, to a lesser extent, women—simply dropping out of the labor force: Fifteen percent have already dropped out and this number will likely increase to over 20 percent in the next few years. Yet despite their increasing numbers, these individuals fall out of the calculation of unemployment rate when they stop looking for work. Meanwhile, U.S. life expectancy is falling due to suicides and drug and alcohol overdose (“deaths of despair”), primarily among less-than-college-educated whites in their middle-aged years. Out of the labor force (OLF) males are more likely than the average to be opioid users and on the disability rolls, as well as victim to deaths of despair. Our markers of well-being—and in particular the absence of hope—match the patterns in these deaths. Poor and working-class whites report much less hope for the future and more stress than do poor African Americans and Hispanics, even though the latter face higher objective disadvantages. And the same places that have higher levels of these kinds of deaths have lower average levels of well-being along the same dimensions. In addition to tragically lost lives and human potential, these trends have political ramifications. Prime-aged males OLF are more likely to live in counties that voted for Trump in 2016. And while the trends may be most notable in the U.S., there is frustration among this same cohort in Europe, reflected in the rise of support for right-wing populists there. In a new paper, we look to shed light on the unhappiness and frustration of this understudied group across several regions as a first step to seeking solutions. We examine prime-age males OLF across four regions: EU, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the U.S., based on data from the Gallup World Poll from 2010-17. Our analysis provides a more nuanced picture of the well-being and ill-being of prime-age males OLF around the world than the common narrative suggests. OLF males are not the poorest group in any of these regions, and are closer to the low, vulnerable end of the middle-class in their locales. While their household incomes are below the average for their countries, they are often slightly higher than those of the unemployed. In the developing regions of LAC and MENA, individuals who report to be out of the labor force may also work in the informal sector and earn comparable incomes to the formal sector, though with more unpredictability. In the U.S., OLF males are often on disability or other social insurance programs, while in Europe there are widely available and generous social welfare programs. And despite much discussion suggesting that poor life satisfaction among underemployed or unemployed men in the Middle East was a possible catalyst for insurgency and uprisings, our analysis does not find them to be particularly dissatisfied compared to the full-time employed, relative to what we find within other regions. This may have something to do with longer trajectory and social acceptance of male underemployment and unemployment in MENA, compared to the U.S. and the EU, where it is a relatively novel phenomenon. It is also noteworthy that while prime-aged males OLF across all regions typically fare worse than the other out-of-the-labor-force groups, the unemployed often tend to have even lower well-being. The exception is the U.S., where prime-aged males OLF are a particularly troubled group, not only in health but also in terms of reported well-being and of markers of ill-being. Within the country, they are as unhappy as the unemployed and much less optimistic than either the unemployed or full-time employed. Unlike in the other regions, they are just as likely to report anger and sadness than the unemployed, and no more likely to smile or experience enjoyment. Relative to other regions, they typically have the largest well-being gaps relative to those who work full-time. Figure 1. Life satisfaction for the EU, MENA, LAC, and U.S. (within-region) Figure 2. Negative affect indicators for the EU, MENA, LAC, and U.S. (within-region) Figure 3. Positive affect indicators for the EU, MENA, LAC, and U.S. (within-region) When comparing the absolute levels of well-being of prime-age males OLF across regions, the well-being profile of U.S. males is only slightly above that of those in MENA, a region where absolute levels of wellbeing for all demographic cohorts are significantly lower than those in the U.S., EU, or LAC. We find that those in MENA (and, for the most part, also in the U.S.) have particularly low levels of well-being for the dimensions highlighted above: evaluative, negative affect, and positive affect. Yet in MENA, there are relatively small differences in well-being between prime-age males OLF and those employed full-time; both groups have low well-being levels to begin with—as does the average respondent. In contrast, in the U.S., prime-age males OLF have both low absolute well-being levels and wider gaps when compared with other employment categories, fitting the broader trend of a group that is in deep despair. Figure 4. Life satisfaction for prime-age males OLF (across region comparisons) It is important to highlight the historical lack of labor market opportunities for most groups in some MENA countries compared to the newer trend of labor force dropout—and the stigma associated with it—in the U.S. While Latin America has also historically had weak formal labor markets, those are countered by widespread informal employment as well as high levels of well-being relative to the region’s per capita income. In the U.S., the strong individual work ethic and lack of support for collective safety nets that characterize the American dream contribute to the strong stigma of being out of the labor force. Prior to the decline of the manufacturing sector, working class whites had privileged access to the jobs therein and to stable middle-class lives that came with them. When those jobs declined, so did the life narrative of these workers, as well as their relative status compared to minorities and immigrants. In contrast, minorities, who had a much longer trajectory of coping with adversity and of multi-tasking in order to survive, continue to display higher levels of resilience. Another part of the narrative of white working class—strong marriages and religiosity—has also suffered. Marriage rates and civic and religious participation have fallen more for the working class relative to the college educated since the 1970s, in part related to labor force dropout. Trends in optimism for less-than-college-educated males also began to fall relative to women and African Americans during the same period, an early precursor to the trends in premature mortality. As a parallel to these trends, belief in the American dream and in the rewards to higher education fell at the same time that it remained strong for African Americans and Hispanics. There is much more to learn about these worrisome declines in labor force participation and the associated ill-being that comes with them. While the problem is starkest among U.S. prime-age males, all four of these regions will continue to face the challenges that technology-driven growth poses for low-skilled workers. There are some lessons about the kinds of policies that can encourage the participation of low-skilled workers in the new global economy from economic renovations in some small cities in the U.S. heartland. There is also a growing literature based on interventions that enhance the well-being of those who can no longer work via new opportunities for community involvement and other forms of activities to prevent social isolation. More generally, our findings suggest a broader need to re-think our models of growth and indicators of progress.

       

The global economy is full of progress paradoxes. Progress in technological innovation, reducing poverty, and increasing life expectancy around the world continues to increase. Yet there is also persistent poverty in poor and fragile states and increasing inequality and anomie in some of the wealthiest ones. This latter trend is showing up in a resurgence of nativism and anti-establishment voting across many countries. The election of Donald Trump in the U.S. in 2016 soon after British voters’ decision to leave the European Union were stark markers. Subsequent elections of right-wing populists in several other European countries confirmed a rising backlash against globalization in wealthy countries.

These trends have even starker markers. Despite having one of the wealthiest economies in the world, life expectancy in the U.S. is falling due to deaths driven by suicides and drug and alcohol overdose, primarily—although not only—among less than college-educated whites in their middle-aged years. Our research finds that poor whites report much less hope for the future and more stress than do poor African Americans and Hispanics, even though the latter face higher objective disadvantages, and the trends in optimism (or lack thereof) and other markers of well-being match the patterns in deaths of despair.

Central among the drivers of these trends is the decline in the status and wages of low-skilled labor at the same time that those of high-skilled workers increase. A related feature is the increase in prime-aged males (and to a lesser extent women) simply dropping out of the labor force. In the U.S., for example, 15 percent of prime-aged males are out of the labor force and will likely increase to over 20 percent. Males who are out of the labor force are disproportionately represented among opioid users, on disability rolls, and in the deaths of despair. Such men are also more likely to live in counties that voted for Trump in 2016. While the trends may be most notable in the U.S., there is frustration among this same cohort in Europe that is likely reflected in voting trends there as well as in the U.S.

Unlike the U.S. and Europe, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have a long history of underemployment and unemployment among prime-aged males. At the time of the Arab Spring uprisings, much of the extant research focused on frustration among underemployed and unemployed males as a possible cause of the uprisings. Yet the results are inconclusive. Some authors pointed to a steep decrease in life satisfaction in the years preceding the Arab Spring, especially for those in the middle class. Arampatzi et al., meanwhile, find an association between life satisfaction and some of the commonly highlighted causes for the uprisings—unfavorable labor market conditions and perceptions of widespread corruption, cronyism, and inequality of opportunity. However, in the countries where uprisings took place, there is little evidence of either the middle class or youth being particularly dissatisfied by comparison with other groups in the same countries. Additionally, the research is limited by lack of formal testing for systematic differences between MENA countries where the uprisings did and did not take place.

Earlier research by one of us at the time attempted that comparison and found no systematic differences in life satisfaction trends across the countries in MENA with and without Arab Spring uprisings. The only difference that we found was less optimism about the future in the countries with uprisings compared to those without. However, there were not significant differences across demographic cohorts, such as the employed versus the unemployed. Moreover, despite the public frustration, most of the countries where uprisings took place were experiencing positive levels of economic growth. This is suggestive of the “progress paradox” phenomenon—in which significant segments of the population are left behind—that we have found in other countries and regions around the world, including those referenced above.

In the current study, which focuses on prime-aged males out of the labor force (OLF) across four regions—European Union (EU), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), MENA, and the U.S.—we find that this group is not the poorest, and is instead likely closer to the low, vulnerable end of the middle-class continuum. While their levels of income are below the average for their countries, they are often slightly higher than those of the unemployed. In the developing regions of LAC and MENA, individuals who report to be out of the labor force likely work in the informal sector and earn reasonable if unpredictable incomes. In the U.S., OLF males are often on disability (as noted above) or other social insurance programs, while in Europe there are widely available and generous social welfare programs.

In this paper, we aim to shed light on the links between political disaffection and unhappiness by focusing on a specific and relatively understudied group: prime-aged males OLF. We compare the well-being and ill-being of this group in the U.S. and EU with those in a much poorer context in MENA. We also compare the same trends in LAC, a region known for relatively high levels of poverty and inequality, as well as large informal economies, but where there has been much positive progress in the past two decades.

Some of our results, described in detail below, are surprising. For example, prime-aged males out of the labor force in MENA are not particularly unhappy or frustrated compared to those employed full-time. Indeed, the unemployed are the worst group in that region.

In contrast, in the U.S., we find that prime-aged males out of the labor force are a particularly troubled group, both in terms of reported well-being and in terms of health and other markers of ill-being, perhaps because of the very strong ethic of hard work and individual effort, and the stigma associated with being out of the labor force. In addition, marriage rates and civic or religious participation have also fallen more for the working class—in part related to labor force dropout—relative to the college educated in the U.S. since the 1970s. Trends in optimism for this same group (less than college-educated males) also began to fall relative to women and African Americans during the same period.

Our aim is to better understand this cohort as part of a broader need to rethink our models of growth and indicators of progress. Despite their differences, all of these regions will continue to face the challenges of technology-driven growth that tend to exclude the less-than-college educated. While beyond the scope of this paper, we need to know much more about the kinds of policies that can encourage the participation of able workers in the new global economy, as well as those that can provide community involvement and other forms of activities that prevent isolation for those who can no longer work.

       

The past century is full of progress paradoxes, with unprecedented economic development, as evidenced by improvements in longevity, health, and literacy. At the same time, we face daunting challenges such as climate change, persistent poverty in poor and fragile states, and increasing income inequality and unhappiness in many of the richest countries. Remarkably, some of the most worrisome trends are in countries with rapid economic growth and falling poverty. Not surprisingly, there is much debate about the sustainability of our future.

Economic growth and the traditional metrics used to assess it—GDP paramount among these—are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee inclusive and sustainable growth in the global economy. Well-being metrics, which build from large-scale surveys of individuals and capture the income and non-income determinants of well-being, provide a different picture of what is happening to people within and across countries—stories the economic numbers do not tell. By providing insights into the kinds of policies that will sustain human welfare in the future, these metrics are important complements to income-based data.

The U.S. has one of the wealthiest and most vibrant economies in the world. Growth has been steady for years, the stock market is booming, and unemployment is at record lows. Yet life expectancy is falling—unique among rich countries—due to preventable deaths such as suicide, drug overdose, alcohol poisoning, and other preventable causes among less than college-educated whites, the traditional bastion of the American working class (see Figure 1).

An increasing proportion of this group—15 percent of prime-age males—is out of the labor force altogether, a figure projected to reach 25 percent by 2025. My research with Sergio Pinto finds that these same cohorts report much less hope for the future and more stress than do poor African Americans and Hispanics, who face higher objective disadvantages. These markers of ill-being link closely to the individual and locational patterns in the “deaths of despair”, and minorities are much less likely to die of these deaths (see Figures 2a and 2b). This toxic combination has not only yielded a loss of welfare and productive potential, but has spurred the resurgence of nativism and support for anti-system populists who promise a return to the past.

China is one of the most successful stories of rapid growth and poverty reduction in modern history. GDP per capita and household consumption increased fourfold between the years 1990 and 2005, and life expectancy increased to 75.3 years from 67 years in 1980. Yet in that period, life satisfaction fell dramatically and mental health reports and suicides increased, the latter reaching one of the highest rates in the world in the 1990s. The unhappiest cohorts were educated workers in the private sector, precisely those who were benefiting the most from China’s “new” economy. Long working hours and lack of sleep and leisure time were important drivers of this trend, as is deteriorating air quality due to increased smog and traffic.

The most recent success story of rapid growth and poverty reduction is India, with extreme poverty falling from 38 percent to 21 percent from 2004 to 2011. Yet life satisfaction dropped significantly—10 percent or a full point on a 0-11 scale—from 2006-2017 (see Figure 3). Optimism about the future also fell at the same rate, although starting from a slightly higher level. Among the myriad causes are rising expectations, increasing income inequality, and tensions over gender rights.

Another stark marker is suicide. By 2016, India had 18 percent of the world’s population but over a quarter of all global suicides, an increase of 40 percent from 1990 (these numbers may be low due to underreporting). Indian women account for 36 percent of the world’s total suicides for females and Indian men account for 24 percent of the male total. There were large differences across ages and states—with young and elderly women and elderly men having much higher rates. This was also the case for poorer states. (Because of the high rate of population growth and large population, suicide rates actually went down slightly during this period, even though absolute numbers of suicide increased significantly.)

While both genders show a stark downward trend in life satisfaction, they do not reflect the gender differences in suicide rates. In part, this is a sad artifact of construction: life satisfaction surveys do not have scores for those who have taken their lives. Strong norms may also affect the response scales. Recent research, based on vignettes asking respondents to report their life satisfaction under alternative scenarios, suggests that women in places with strong gender discrimination report to be happier than they are due to low expectations (discussed in detail below).

Again, rising unhappiness and ill-being coincide with the positive story that standard economic indicators and aggregate numbers are telling. Indeed, the increased suicides in the U.S., China, and India buck against trends in the rest of the world. Suicide rates are falling elsewhere—by 29 percent since 2000, and are primarily concentrated among older people. In contrast, in the U.S. they are concentrated among the middle-aged and in China and India, among young women. In these countries, people are foregoing the prime years of their lives as many of their fellow citizens prosper.

Do these paradoxes signal that our models of growth—and the lifestyles they result in—are out of touch with the realities and desires of the average human being? Is growth alone is not enough? Are current growth models sustainable going forward?

       

An extensive literature examines the link between social protection-related public spending and objective outcomes of well-being such as income, employment, education, and health (see Department for International Development [DFID], 2011; ILO, 2010; World Bank, 2012). Much less attention has been given to how government social protection policies influence individuals’ own sense of well-being, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (often referred to as developing countries). Yet, the effectiveness and the sustainability of such policies and programs often depend on how people perceive them (Arampatzi, Burger, Ianchovichina, Röhricht, & Veenhoven, 2015; Livani, 2017; Oishi, Schimmack, & Diener, 2012; Veenhoven, 2002; Verme et al., 2014). 

This paper examines the relationship between social protection programs and subjective well-being in Iraq. The need for government assistance is evident in a context of violent conflict and uncertainty. Beyond the immediate monetary need, public transfers are potentially important for psychosocial well-being by mitigating uncertainty and providing a sense of a functioning government. The well-being effects of public transfers may be strongest for the poor, the socially excluded, and for individuals who live in the most insecure regions. Another important consideration is the source of income assistance. For example, receiving financial help from relatives, friends, and private charities (as opposed to the government) may have more positive effects on subjective well-being since it strengthens inter-personal support within communities and recipients feel cared for on a more personal level (Aknin, Dunn, & Norton, 2012; Aknin, Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton, 2011; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Saunders, 2000; Veenhoven & Ouweneel, 1995). Alternatively, help from these private sources could lead to more discomfort or shame for “burdening” other families or the community. This is particularly pertinent to Iraq where the alternative, i.e. government assistance, is viewed as an entitlement due to the country’s rich natural resource endowments (Alzobaidee, 2015; Krishnan, Olivieri, & Ramadan, 2017), and may therefore have weaker stigma effects than income assistance received from private sources.

Finally, under stable socio-economic conditions, individuals care about the process in which income is generated. The procedural utility theory posits that people do not only value outcomes but also the processes that lead to those outcomes (Benz, 2005; Frey, Benz, & Stutzer, 2004). People derive a higher satisfaction from income generation processes that are viewed as “empowering” and characterized by independence and autonomy as opposed to processes that are hierarchical and where individuals are subjected to decisions made by others (Benz, 2005; Benz & Frey, 2008; Hagler, Hamby, Grych, & Banyard, 2016; Schneck, 2014). Therefore, income generated through employment, self-employment, or personal assets is likely to have a more positive effect on subjective well-being than any type of public or private income assistance. Whether this is also true in unstable environments remains largely unexplored.

The analysis in this paper takes place in a middle-income country that is resource-rich, conflict-afflicted, and heterogenous in terms of its population’s ethnic, cultural, and religious composition. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has examined the relations of social protection-related public spending with subjective well-being in such a context. Moreover, there is a dearth of studies on subjective well-being in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Given the volatility of the region, as well as the recent civic uprisings and demonstrated dissatisfaction with government policies, it is important to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence citizen satisfaction, that in turn can promote social cohesion and stability.

Also, the research informs social policies in Iraq, particularly as the Government considers and implements reforms to improve the effectiveness and fiscal sustainability of its social protection system. Since 2014, the decline in oil prices and armed conflict has severely constrained the fiscal space and strengthened the imperative of reforming social protection programs (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth [IPC-IG], 2017; Krishnan et al., 2017). Some of the programs, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) are universal in nature and present a great fiscal burden. More than 70 percent of spending on the program could be saved if leakages to the non-poor were eliminated (Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2012). Therefore, one of considerations for reform is to gradually move toward a targeted system that exclusively benefits the poor while using the freed-up resources to design programs that promote employment, education, and housing for the poor and non-poor alike (World Bank, 2014b). The feasibility and sustainability of such reforms hinges to a large degree on citizens’ assessment of their well-being under the different programs. Therefore, it is important to have greater insight into the relationship between existing programs and subjective welfare to complement the knowledge on the objective well-being effects of the programs.

Our research finds that the relationship between public transfers and life satisfaction differs across social protection programs. Public programs that are based on categorical targeting and intended for individuals believed to be vulnerable bring about greater stigma and disempowerment effects than programs that are contributory or universal in nature. As expected, the association between public income assistance and life satisfaction is more positive (or less negative) for the poor. However, this is not the case for socially excluded groups (such as female-headed households) or for individuals who live in the most insecure regions.

We do not find any support for the idea that income assistance from private persons and entities is a less stigmatizing alternative to public programs. Also, in contrast to both public and private income assistance, income generated through personal assets and property ownership is consistently associated positively with life satisfaction. Seemingly, individuals feel more empowered, proud, and fulfilled by this type of income.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 is the introduction; Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework; Section 3 provides the background and Iraqi context; Section 4 outlines the research questions and the methodology; Sections 5 and 6 present and discuss the results; and finally, Section 7 discusses policy implications and provides concluding remarks.

       

What we know depends on what we measure. Traditional income-based metrics, such as GDP and poverty headcounts, tell a story of unprecedented economic development, as seen by improvements in longevity, health, and literacy. Yet, well-being metrics, which are based on large-scale surveys of individuals around the world and assess their daily moods, satisfaction with life, and meaning and purpose in life, among other things, provide a very different picture of what is happening to people within and across countries—stories that economic numbers often do not tell. Deep poverty and frustration persist in the most fragile countries, and income inequality and unhappiness are increasing in some of the richest ones. Remarkably, some of the most worrisome trends are in countries with rapid economic growth and falling poverty.

India

The world’s most recent success story in rapid growth and poverty reduction is India, with extreme poverty falling from 38 percent (2004) to 21 percent (2011). Still, life satisfaction dropped significantly—10 percent or a full point on a 0-10 scale—from 2006-2017. That is roughly equivalent to the unprecedented drop in life satisfaction in the U.S. during the first six months of the financial crisis. Optimism about the future, which typically remains steady even when life satisfaction drops, also fell at the same rate. 

Another stark marker is suicide. By 2016, India had 18 percent of the world’s population but over a quarter of all global suicides, an increase of 40 percent from 1990 (these numbers may be low due to underreporting). Indian women account for 36 percent of the world’s total suicides for females and Indian men account for 24 percent of the male total. There were large differences across ages and states—with young and elderly women and elderly men having much higher rates. This was also the case for poorer states. (Because of the high rate of population growth and large population, suicide rates actually went down slightly during this period, even though absolute numbers of suicide increased significantly.)

While both genders show a stark downward trend in life satisfaction, they do not reflect the gender differences in suicide rates. In part, this is a sad artefact of construction: life satisfaction surveys do not have scores for those who have taken their lives. Strong norms may also affect the response scales. Recent research, based on vignettes asking respondents to report their life satisfaction under alternative scenarios, suggests that women in places with strong gender discrimination report to be happier than they actually are due to low expectations.

This story of ill-being juxtaposed against the positive story told by standard economic indicators is not unique to India. Indeed, these trends mirror what happened in China a decade earlier. In the 1990s, China experienced perhaps the most rapid growth and poverty reduction in modern history. GDP per capita and household consumption increased fourfold between 1990 and 2005, and life expectancy increased to 75.3 years from 67 years in 1980. Nevertheless, in that period, life satisfaction fell dramatically and reported depression and suicides increased, the latter reaching one of the highest rates in the world in the 1990s.

US

Another example is the U.S., where booming stock markets and record low unemployment rates coincide with falling life expectancy—unique among rich countries—due to preventable deaths—suicide, drug overdose, alcohol poisoning, and other preventable causes—among non-college-educated whites, the traditional bastion of the American working class. An increasing proportion of this group—15 percent of prime-age males—is out of the labor force altogether, a figure projected to reach 25 percent by 2025.

Income-based indicators do not provide good explanations for these paradoxes. Our research in the U.S. finds that poor whites report much less hope for the future and more stress than do poor African Americans and Hispanics, despite the latter groups facing higher levels of poverty, disadvantage, and discrimination. Yet minorities have also been making gradual if hard-fought progress at a time that the white working class is shrinking in size and fears losing its identity. These markers of ill-being link closely to the individual and locational patterns in the “deaths of despair”, and minorities are much less likely to die of these deaths.

Hope is a factor. New studies show that interventions that provide hope for the future lead to more effort or investments producing better outcomes. Research based on panel data for the U.S. finds that individuals born in the 1930s and 1940s, who reported to be optimistic in their twenties, were much more likely to be alive in 2015. The one population cohort that experienced drops in hope beginning in the 1970s, meanwhile, was non-college educated whites. The above trends show that lack of hope, even amidst prosperity, can have high negative costs for societies as a whole.

China

In China, the unhappiest cohorts were educated workers in the private sector, precisely those who were benefiting the most in income terms from China’s “new” economy. Long working hours and lack of sleep and leisure time were important drivers of this trend. In India, the explanations range from inequality across genders and regions, to working conditions and hours, to rising expectations driven by very visible extreme wealth juxtaposed against large pockets of deep poverty.

The well-being approach

Are these paradoxes a sign that our models of growth—and the lifestyles they result in—are out of touch with the realities and desires of the average human being? Are they sustainable going forward? At a minimum, they suggest that complementing standard income-based indicators of progress, such as GDP, with different markers, such as well-being metrics, will provide us with a fuller picture of what is happening to human welfare in our complex and changing global economy. As we write, along with Kate Laffan, this month in Science, using both sets of metrics will help in the design of policies that are inclusive and politically and socially sustainable.

The well-being approach gives us new insights into how humans experience and assess economic processes, helping to explain progress paradoxes such as those above. For example, economics informed by well-being helps us understand individuals whose conceptions of happiness or a good life reflect low expectations or strong norms (such as gender discrimination in the case of India), preferences for equity and altruism rather than income gains, and the negative role that stigma plays in schools, the workforce, and in homes.

Well-being metrics concord with income measures in showing that income is necessary to human well-being. Yet, depending on the specific metric used, they also show that factors such as health, meaningful work, and fairness and friendships can be as important. Very rapid economic change tends to disrupt many of these things. Well-being studies also find that smoking is bad for well-being and exercise and volunteering is good for it. In the U.S., the least happy places with the highest rates of deaths of despair have higher percentage of smokers and a lower one of those who exercise, as well as less civic organizations. Existing research also highlights the negative well-being costs of air pollution, traffic, and airplane noise—prevalent factors in India and China. They also suggest that pro-environmental behaviors, such as recycling, while often entailing time and money costs, are associated with higher levels of well-being, as most people seem to benefit from contributing to a better community.

Well-being metrics, like income-based metrics, also have limitations and methodological challenges. These include adaptation (very poor people with low expectations reporting to be very happy) and scale interpretation (we cannot assume, for example, that all individuals interpret the 10 point life satisfaction scale the exact same way). Innovations in the measurement science, though, are providing reasonable ways to adjust for these problems, such as via the vignette strategy described above.

Individuals with higher levels of well-being tend to have better long-term outcomes, in part because they believe in their futures and are therefore more likely to invest in them. While the environment people live in undoubtedly plays a role, so do innate character traits. An early study found that the individual-level life satisfaction that is not explained by observable demographic and environmental factors is associated with better income, health, and social outcomes later on. Sibling studies show that those with genetic and other markers of higher well-being (who grow up in the same households and environments) have better future outcomes.

There is still much more that we need to know, including how genes and the environment interact to generate better well-being over the life course, and if hope, resilience, and other markers of well-being can be learned and fostered beginning early in life. More immediately, though, the costly progress paradoxes above, as well as the positive linkages between well-being, productivity, and health, make a strong case for how and why it should matter to policy today and in the future.

       

There are many sides to the vociferous debate over international migration. While much of it focuses on the economic costs and benefits of migration in both recipient and sending countries, much less is known about the human side of the migration story. Most of what we know is based on anecdotal stories, such as a disproportionate focus on a visible crime committed by one immigrant, or heart-wrenching tales of what happens to illegal migrants who fail to reach their intended destinations. While these stories are important, they are not based on sufficiently large-scale and representative data that can inform the policy debate. Our new research uses worldwide data to focus on a little known story: what happens to the families of migrants who are left behind.

International migrants often leave their family members behind in the origin country, because it is costly for the whole family to move or because of strict immigration policies and uncertain conditions in the places they are going. Migrants often send home money (i.e., remittances) that benefit those left behind by increasing their consumption and improving their living conditions. At the same time, migration disrupts family life, which could have negative effects on the well-being of migrant-sending households living in the countries of origin. Previous work shows that migration could increase both the incomes and happiness levels of those who move. Yet how does the out-migration of family members affect the well-being of family members left behind in the country of origin? We explore this question in a recent paper, published in the Journal of Population Economics.

Academics and policymakers alike have increasingly included subjective measures of well-being in their arsenal of tools to assess the causes and consequences of complex processes such as migration. Subjective well-being relates to the notion ordinary people are the best judges of how their lives are going. Unsurprisingly, governments around the world are complementing objective welfare metrics with subjective well-being outcomes such as life satisfaction and happiness to assess individual welfare and societal progress and guide policymaking. In the context of our study, subjective measures allow us to draw a fuller picture of the effects of emigration on migrant family members staying behind than by simply looking at their consumption, income, or labor market participation.

The current evidence on the well-being consequences of emigration for those staying behind at the origin countries primarily comes from one-country studies in low- or lower-middle-income origin countries. Our paper fills this knowledge gap by studying a wide range of origin countries, including high-income countries, and by using several subjective well-being dimensions, which has not been done before. We further distinguish between hedonic (i.e., affective) and cognitive (i.e., evaluative) dimensions of subjective well-being. Positive hedonic well-being is about feelings such as joy and happiness at a particular point in time. Negative hedonic well-being includes experiences of stress, anger, sadness, or worry at a particular point in time. By contrast, evaluative well-being usually reflects people’s capabilities, means, and long-term opportunities, based on questions that ask respondents to evaluate their life satisfaction on a scale of 0 to 10.

We use data from the Gallup World Poll, which includes several subjective well-being questions and information on whether the respondent has household members abroad and whether the respondent’s family receives help in the form of money or goods from abroad. We analyze 144,003 left behind individuals living in 114 countries during 2009-2010 and uncover both the common trends in a set of varied countries and differences across country groups.

We find that having family members abroad is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction and with positive effect among the left behind, and that receiving remittances is linked with even greater increases in life satisfaction, especially in poorer contexts—both across and within countries. Specifically, remittance receipt corresponds to a 2 percent increase in life satisfaction (evaluated at the sample mean of life satisfaction of 5.495) (see Figure 1). As we explain in the paper, this result is likely due to the improvements in living standards or the different social status remittance-receiving families could have in the community. The additional well-being influence coming from having relatives abroad is about the same size of that of the well-being effect of remittances. This may reflect that those left behind may derive satisfaction or joy from knowing that their family members realize their potential abroad. Having a family member living in a different country could also increase the future chances of moving abroad for the left-behinds. We find similar results for positive affect: simply put, the daily experiences of happiness of the left behinds seem to improve. Thus, the out-migration of family members influences both life evaluations and positive emotions through an income channel (remittances) and a residual psychological channel (having relatives abroad).

Figure 1

Yet at the same time, we discover that having household members abroad is associated with increased stress and depression for the left-behinds, and remittances do not offset these conditions. Figure 2 illustrates this point.  At the same time, however, remittances are statistically unassociated with stress and depression as the error band around these estimates crosses the 0-line, suggesting that the stress and depression consequences of remittances are indistinguishable from zero. Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 show that while remittances “buy happiness,” they do not relieve the pain of separation.

Figure 2

We also find that the out-migration of family members appears less traumatic in countries where migration is more common, which also tend to be poorer, indicating that people in such contexts are used to coping with separation. Migrant-sending households in low-income countries often gather in informal groups to help each other to share information or when preparing for migration. But receiving remittances in high-income countries is linked with depression experiences, possibly because getting money from relatives abroad in prosperous countries with relatively generous welfare systems is a marker of destitution or disadvantage and, as such, also leads to depression. Thus, in countries where emigration is less common, such as in richer countries, there is room for policies to mitigate the negative experiences of stress and depression for vulnerable groups of household members staying behind through encouraging formal or informal support groups and stress and depression prevention programs.

Overall, our findings demonstrate that the out-migration of family members and their remittances can improve well-being through easing budget constraints and enhanced financial security, there are also significant psychological costs to the large numbers of family members of migrants. More generally and not only for this reason, emigration cannot be a substitute for economic and institutional development in the countries from which migrants originate.

       

There is much debate now—in both developed and developing economies—on the merits or de-merits of universal basic income (UBI), with strong opinions on either side. Advocates clash with those who see targeted transfers to the poor—such as the conditional cash transfers first pioneered in Latin America—as better at providing incentives for long-term investments in health, education, and labor force participation. Yet some research finds that targeted public welfare programs often come with stigma and disempowerment, in addition to high administrative costs, supporting the case for universal basic income guarantees. Critics of universal programs highlight the fiscal burdens such programs can impose, as well as labor market and other disincentives that they may introduce.

We surely cannot resolve those debates. Yet our recent research on the subjective well-being effects of a wide range of social assistance programs in Iraq may inform them. Iraq is a middle-income country with a tragic recent history of violence and conflict, yet a wealth of oil reserves with which to fund extensive income transfers to its population. While not all of the findings are generalizable, a number of them are relevant to the provision of social support in other countries.

Subjective and objective well-being metrics are complementary measures of development. They do not always move in the same direction, however, and the gaps in what each find often highlight anomalies and progress paradoxes. For example, while in theory additional income (regardless of the source) should contribute positively to individuals’ welfare, transfers do not always enhance subjective well-being. Our research on Iraq suggests that the way in which income is generated matters, even in contexts of conflict and instability. Self-generated income is more conducive to life satisfaction than non-contributory public or private income assistance. Some types of public transfers are even negatively associated with life satisfaction, likely due to a sense of loss in autonomy, self-worth, and creativity for recipients.

Since the early 1980s, Iraq has been at the center of various types of domestic and international conflicts, with devastating economic and social consequences. Given Iraq’s recent history, public transfers play a crucial role in the very survival of Iraqi citizens, and, as such, should enhance life satisfaction and other dimensions of well-being. We looked into this question, using the 2012 Iraq Household Survey, the most comprehensive survey ever carried out there. The survey provides a wide range of information on income, socioeconomic traits, transfers, and subjective well-being at the individual level. We found that even in the extreme economic and political uncertainty in Iraq, individuals derive greater satisfaction from public assistance programs and income generation processes that emphasize self-reliance and independence.

In 2012, about 20 percent of Iraqis lived under the poverty line, with another large proportion of the population vulnerable to falling into poverty. Surprisingly, male-headed households were, on average, poorer than female-headed ones. Female heads accounted for approximately 12 percent of households, the majority of whom were widows. The lower poverty rate among female-headed households (16 percent versus 20 percent for male-headed households) was likely due to the additional assistance that they received from various sources. Areas other than Baghdad and the Kurdish region had more poverty; in 2012, the headcount poverty rates in the Kurdish region, Baghdad, and the rest of Iraq were 12 percent, 18 percent, and 22 percent, respectively. Families in the distant Kurdish region were less dependent on assistance than the rest of Iraq.

Government support is a major component of family income in Iraq. Non-labor income, which is dominated by government assistance but also includes private income assistance and capital income (income generated from own assets and property), accounts for 32 percent of total income for Iraqi families. For households in the poorest income decile, it is as high as 51 percent of total family income.

The survey includes a life satisfaction question, which runs from not at all to very satisfied on a 1 to 4 scale, as well as questions about satisfaction with domains such as employment, income, and neighborhood security. Overall life satisfaction in Iraq is remarkably high. Its ranking among world countries for 2010-2012, for example, was 105 out of 162 countries, scoring higher than several wealthier countries without conflict. This may reflect the remarkable human capacity to adapt to adversity that one of us has found in many poor countries around the world.

Yet there are differences across regions and domains of life in Iraq. Satisfaction with work, housing, and income is lower than that with life in general—not a surprise given the economic conditions in the country. The Kurdish region has the highest levels of life satisfaction (Figure 2).

Receiving any type of assistance (public or private) is, on average, associated negatively with life satisfaction. Individuals who live in households that receive assistance are 0.116 points lower on the life satisfaction scale than those in households that do not receive any assistance. This negative association is mitigated slightly (while remaining negative) for individuals below the poverty line.

Contrary to our expectations, the negative association between receiving assistance and life satisfaction is greater in magnitude (1.5 times the size) for female-headed households than male-headed households. This could be because of the higher poverty rate among male-headed households, although there are likely other forces at play that we cannot observe. For example, there may be gender-specific barriers that make the process of receiving assistance more challenging or discouraging for women. When contrasting regions, our results show that any assistance and life satisfaction is associated positively in the Kurdish region and negatively in other parts of Iraq. This finding is contrary to what we expected, since living conditions in the Kurdish regions were better than in the rest of the country. One explanation is that since the flow of assistance from Baghdad to the Kurdish region has fluctuated and is dependent on political events, receiving assistance from the central government is received more positively. Alternatively, the delivery is more efficient and transparent there.

Food rations (Public Distribution System – PDS) are virtually universally distributed and account for the largest component of non-labor income. We find that living in a household that is the recipient of food rations does not have a significant relationship with life satisfaction in Iraq. However, the association is significant and positive for the poor. We also looked at pensions, particularly households that have at least one member who is of pensionable age and households in which at least one resident is a widow/widower. On average, receiving a pension is linked positively to life satisfaction in Iraq, and the effect is, not surprisingly, slightly stronger for the poor (Figure 3).

The Social Protection Network (SPN) aims to reach vulnerable individuals. However, since the program targets households based on categories other than income (such as the disabled, orphans, divorced/widowed women, married university students, and the internally displaced), many non-poor families also benefit from the program. On average, being the recipient of these is associated negatively with life satisfaction, but is not significant for the poor or for female-headed households.  Once again, the negative effect is smaller in the Kurdish region.

Receiving cash and in-kind transfers from private sources, meanwhile, is associated negatively with life satisfaction across all groups (except for the Kurdish region). In contrast to public assistance, the negative association between private transfers and life satisfaction is similar for the poor and non-poor alike (perhaps even worse for the poor). This suggests the stigma effects—as well as unobservable conditionality—that could come with private transfers. In addition, many households who need to seek out private assistance from friends or family are likely in precarious situations, and thus may have had lower levels of life satisfaction even prior to the transfers.

In contrast, the relationship between life satisfaction and capital income—which comes from individuals’ own assets and property—is positive. On average, individuals in households that receive capital income tend to be 0.116 points higher on the life satisfaction scale (accepting that this type of income accounts for a very small proportion of family income). The positive association is greatest in magnitude for female-headed households. It is plausible that such income provides empowerment for women in the context of unequal gender rights.

One note of caution in all of these findings is that, given that we only cross-section data, we cannot control for endogeneity—e.g., the possibility that less happy people are more likely to be on transfers, as in the case of the private assistance above. Given that such a high percentage of Iraqi’s receive transfers and that Iraqis score quite high on life satisfaction despite the adverse conditions that they live in, it is unlikely that all of them are unhappier than the average.

While our findings have implications for social policies in Iraq, they will not be relevant until there is greater stability there. With much of the population heavily dependent on government assistance, any changes to the social protection system could result in humanitarian and political crises. In the future, however, the government could invest in income support programs that emphasize self-reliance rather than dependency, while balancing the needs of the very poor. One option is to implement programs that include both “livelihood-protection” and “livelihood-promotion” components. Such programs combine income transfers with a second component such as skills training. Another option is to have different programs for different income groups, such as cash and in-kind transfer programs for the poorest individuals and employment and training programs for middle-income earners.

More generally, our results suggest that subjective well-being measures can provide complementary information for the design and evaluation of poverty alleviation interventions. Moreover, our findings shed modest light on the broader social policy discussions around the provision of universal basic income. Negative subjective well-being effects could outweigh the potential benefits in some contexts, for example, in part hinging on norms of individual versus collective responsibility for social welfare. Many developing countries, meanwhile, share characteristics similar to Iraq, and political instability and poor governance decrease the efficiency—and the credibility—of government assistance programs.

       

Issues of despair in the United States are diverse, widespread, and politically fueled, ranging from concentrated poverty and crime in cities to the opioid crisis plaguing poor rural towns. Local leaders and actors in disconnected communities need public policy resources and inputs beyond what has traditionally been available.

Scholars at Brookings and Washington University in St. Louis are working together to analyze the issues underlying America’s disaffection and divisions in order to provide policy ideas for a better, more inclusive future. Through on-the-ground community research in Missouri—a microcosm of America’s problems—as well as the application of ongoing policy research, we hope to develop approaches that can tackle factors like lack of access to health care, scarcity of low-skilled jobs, weak education systems, and hollowed-out communities.

Simply put, we are asking how has the American Dream been broken and how can it be restored?

What we know and what is missing

In general, indicators such as economic growth and unemployment rates continue to improve in the U.S., as do some markers of well-being, such as longevity. Yet the aggregate indicators mask inequality of access and outcomes. Such indicators do not account, for example, for the decline in prime age male labor force participation, nor do they reflect the rising numbers of “deaths of despair” due to opioid or other drug overdoses, suicide, and other preventable causes. Such deaths are concentrated among less than college educated, middle-aged whites.

The past few decades have also seen a dramatic increase in the disability rate (the number of disabled Social Security beneficiaries), greater income inequality, and stagnating mobility rates. Different regions have had divergent fortunes, meanwhile, and many, particularly in the heartland where manufacturing has declined, are characterized by “left-behind” populations in poor health and with little hope for the future, and a hollowed out middle-class.

As such, the macro numbers simply do not capture the full picture of inequality, public frustration, and socioeconomic distress. Well-being metrics could be part of the solution in understanding trends among and across subpopulations.

Looking back on recent episodes of political upheaval, previous decades produced clear indicators that should have been seen as red flags for the current crisis. If we can better identify these risk factors in advance, then we can provide appropriate policy recommendations to those working in communities most affected, as well as anticipate the challenges of those populations and places at greatest risk.

How can research and data be used at the local level? The application of subjective measures

As we further explore metrics of well-being, the question will be how to analyze data in a way that is useable and valuable to local leaders. While well-being measures offer interesting insights, they are inherently subjective and focused on mindset rather than quantitative outcomes. Pairing well-being measures with traditional “hard” measures like GDP and employment rates has proven useful in the past.

As shown by research in Peru into the relationship of traditional economic and social measures to perceived well-being, status, identity, and inclusion, hope is a significant factor in determining success. People who are more hopeful tend to have better economic and social outcomes.

Communities should also strive to achieve a balance between hope and realism. Although our research shows that hope is a key determinant of well-being, excessive optimism can easily lead to disappointment.

Personal responsibility for success is also an important factor. To the extent that people blame themselves (or their neighbors) for the current social and economic challenges, pressure for policy responses is lost. Too much blame on individual agency makes a community unwilling to try to make things better through policy. The goal should be to achieve a healthy balance of outlooks, personal responsibility, and realistic understanding of chances for success.

Better indicators of people’s outlooks on life combined with indicators of opportunity and deprivation could help achieve this at the grassroots level. Novel approaches that combine quantitative and qualitative data can inform a range of community efforts. Scholars at Washington University have already taken the lead by using national data from call-in distress services for individuals and families, with the goal of identifying specific geographic information, down to the neighborhood level, on vulnerable areas.

Brookings scholars actively participated with the state of Colorado to implement a comprehensive system for monitoring mobility and opportunity—the Colorado Opportunity project, and in a separate effort, with the city of Santa Monica to design an effort to regularly monitor a range of well-being dimensions.

Next steps

Now is an opportune moment for local, regional, and state leaders to make positives changes in communities, rather than waiting for action at the federal level. And, given the complex nature of our crisis of divide and desperation, policies must be better targeted to different age, racial, and socioeconomic groups—and their circumstances, something best achieved at the local level.

Even if analyses and practices are adapted for specific geographic regions and demographic groups, local governance challenges will still make implementation difficult to achieve on the ground. Many communities lack local leadership and empowered community organizations. Nongovernmental organizations, state level governments, and even the private sector can help fill the leadership void in communities and support existing local efforts.

The fact is that the issues of despair in America have no one answer, nor does the responsibility fall on a single sector, institution, or group of people. It will take a concerted effort from many stakeholders, focusing on an immense set of challenges that differ from community to community.

Our collaboration between Brookings and Washington University aims to help those taking the lead by providing valuable data, analyses, and policy ideas.