Author

William H. Frey

Senior Fellow - Metropolitan Policy Program

Clearly, the national slowdown of these migration flows, which started during the 2007-2009 recession, took an exceptionally long time to recover.  Each of them were in full force for the early years of the 2000s, propped up by dynamic Sun Belt economic growth as well as ample affordable housing in the suburbs and smaller communities.  But the late decade recession, coupled with the financial crisis and mortgage meltdown, put the brakes on these flows leading to commensurate population growth slowdowns in their destination areas.

The gradual revival, now evident for each of these flows, appears in three figures shown below.

Figure 1 indicates that net movement from the Snow Belt (Northeast and Midwest regions) to the Sun Belt (South and West regions) has been increasing for three straight years. After a peak shift of 611,000 migrants from Snow Belt to Sun Belt states from 2004 to 2005, the annual volume plummeted to below 360,000 for most years between 2008 and 2013. However, the last three years have shown successive rises to 593,000 with states such as Florida, Washington and North Carolina displaying migration gains well above levels during the “down” recession and post-recession years.

Figure 2 shows the turnaround in migration between large metropolitan areas, with populations exceeding one half million, and the rest of the country — smaller metropolitan areas and non metropolitan territory. With only a few exceptions between 1990 and 2007, large metropolitan areas, as a group, lost migrants to smaller areas. This migration exchange flipped in 2008-2009 with changing economic conditions and remained to the former areas’ advantage through 2015-2016. However, over the past three years, large metropolitan annual migration gains were successively reduced from 118,000 to just 26,000.  During the same period, small metropolitan areas, as a group, experienced a net migration rise from 2,000 to 63,000 while non metropolitan counties sustained reduced out-migration from a low point in the 2010 to 2013 period. The migration shift to smaller areas has not completely turned around but it is strongly trending in that direction.

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Figure 3 displays shifts between urban core and suburban counties within large metropolitan areas using a Brookings classification where urban core counties contain a metropolitan area’s principal city or highly dense inner suburb and suburban counties which are less dense counties including outer suburbs and exurbs.

As with the former trends, a noticeable shift occurred beginning in the recession years — with urban core counties “holding on” to potential out-migrants compared with the early 2000s. And the suburban counties — especially outer suburban and exurban counties — gained far fewer migrants than before as the housing crunch took hold. Yet, the last three years show trends in the opposite direction as out-migration from the urban core increased, as did migration gains in the suburbs. In fact, the outer-most exurban counties registered considerable gains, more than quadrupling in size since 2011-2012.

Together these complementary flows can have important impacts, both negative and positive, on different parts of the country. For example, the new trends increased migration declines for large Snow Belt metropolitan areas.  Thirty-six of the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas are located in this region of which 28 registered net out migration in 2015-2016.   Led by New York (with 199,000 out-migrants) and Chicago (with 89,000), 22 of these 28 areas showed larger out-migration than in 2012-2013. The 64 large metropolitan areas in the Sun Belt, only 20  registered net out migration, dominated by Los Angeles (87,000). Link to table.

Perhaps the greatest contrast in migration trends can be made between core counties of large Snow Belt metropolitan areas and suburban counties in the Sun Belt as displayed in Figures 4 and 5.

Figure 4 shows trends in domestic migration rates for core counties of selected Snow Belt metros:  Pittsburgh (Allegheny County), Milwaukee (Milwaukee County), Chicago (Cook County), and New York (Brooklyn borough). Each of these follows the reverse U-shaped pattern of initial out-migration which becomes moderated or shifted to migration gains during the recession, only to accelerate downward.

Countering these, in Figure 5, are domestic migration rates for outer suburban or low-density counties in Sun Belt metros: Tampa (Hernando County) Dallas (Kaufman County), Portland, Oregon (Columbia County) and Lakeland, Florida (Polk County). These counties display a U-shape pattern of high initial migration that becomes depressed during the late 2007-12 period and rises more recently.

Another trend promoting larger flows is a recent nationwide rise in long-distance migration rates for the young adult population, age 25-34. While Millennials are notorious for their low mobility, also related to a down economy and housing market, the newest CPS migration data for 2015-2016 shows a small uptick in inter-county movement for this group. (See Figure 6).  Though their shorter distance within-county migration still stands at historically low levels, this rise in longer distance movement among Millennials could power even bigger migration flows in the future.

Of course, the renewed migration flows revealed by the new census statistics are at levels lower than those observed just before the recession- when the economy was humming and the housing market was in over-drive.  But the uptick in these flows across different spatial dimensions and the suggestion that young adults may no longer be “stuck in place” leaves open the possibility that the nation could be on the cusp of even greater migration surges.  If that turns out to be the case, then more parts of the country need to brace for experiencing ever greater population gains or losses than has been the case for much of the last decade.

      

 

 

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Subscribe to Brookings podcasts here or on iTunes, send feedback email to bcp@brookings.edu, and follow us and tweet us at @policypodcasts on Twitter.

5 on 45 is part of the Brookings Podcast Network.

      

 

 

According to the estimates, 177 million live in Clinton counties compared to 146 million in Trump counties*. County populations include persons of all ages, not just voters (see Figure 1). While it is true that Clinton took less than one sixth of the nation’s 3,100+ counties, she won most of the largest ones, including 111 of the 137 counties with over 500,000 people. Trump won the Electoral College by successfully navigating rural-urban balances in key swing states, taking small areas by large vote margins.

Notably, Trump is the first winning candidate since at least 1992 to carry only a minority of the nation’s combined county populations. Even George W. Bush, who lost the popular vote but won the 2000 election, won in counties that contained 16 million more people than those won by his opponent, Al Gore. And while in the other elections, Bush, Barack Obama, and Bill Clinton did garner county population advantages in the range of 46 million to 67 million, Hillary Clinton’s 31 million population advantage is still substantial. See Table 1 below.

Calculated as a share of the U.S. population, only 45 percent of residents live in Trump counties. Yet this share varies by demographic groups** When looking at households classed by income, it is the least well-off households that are over represented in Trump counties while the most well-off households are underrepresented (see Figure 2). Interestingly, less than one third of all households earning more than $200,000 reside in Trump counties.

Generally, Trump counties are least likely to be home to those with “urban” attributes.  Only about one in five foreign-born residents live in these counties, compared with a much larger share of the United States’ native-born population (49 percent) that calls these places home.  Fewer single than married persons are Trump county residents. Especially sharp divides are seen by race and ethnicity.  Less than one fifth of all Asians and less than one third of all Hispanics and blacks live in counties carried by Trump.

By contrast, 56 percent of the nation’s white population lives in Trump counties.  Yet this is not the case for all whites. Nearly two thirds of whites with just a high school education are Trump county residents. This falls to 57 percent for those with some post secondary education but without a college diploma.  But among whites with college degrees, only 42 percent reside in Trump counties.

The profiles of Trump’s America and Clinton’s America might best be compared when looking at the age and racial make-up of counties that voted for each candidate (see Figure 3). Trump’s America is clearly whiter and older. Even young people living in Trump counties are predominantly white, despite the fact that the national child population is nearly “majority minority.”

Populations in counties where Clinton prevailed are younger and decidedly more diverse. In Clinton counties, as a group, minorities outnumber whites for all ages under 45 and are not far behind whites in the 45-54 age group.

These Census data make it clear just how sharply divided the nation is politically, demographically, and geographically; more so now than at any other time in recent history. Right now, the Republican Party has control of the presidency, Congress, and a majority of state  governments. But demographic projections suggest the groups now in Clinton counties will continue to grow and disperse to the future advantage of Democrats. It is a precarious time for the nation’s political apparatus. Neither party should assume that it can hold sway for the long run without reaching out to others in the rest of the country.

*Because voting information was not tabulated for counties in Alaska, which Trump won by 14 percent, all of Alaska’s population was allocated to Trump in these results.

**Statistics shown for social and demographic groups are based on 2015 census estimates and 2011-2015 multiyear American Community Survey data, the most recent data available at this time.

      

 

 

Historically, U.S. political institutions have struggled to represent a society that is demographically different than its electorate. The systematic disenfranchisement of women and communities of color, for example, contributed to a public policy process that ignored and underserved large portions of the population. Functionally, they created what the authors refer to as representation gaps — the difference between the percentage of voters who belong to a given group and the percentage of the whole population that belong to that same group.

Representational gaps such as these persist in modern America politics. They are obviously different in size and arise as the result of different processes, but the problems they induce are similar. Given their continued existence, the goal of this report is as follows:

• Document the representation gaps we have observed along age, education, gender, and race lines over the last several decades.
• Predict what those gaps might look like going into the future using the best available demographic projections and turnout data.
• Facilitate a conversation about the representational challenges the United States is likely to face in the coming decades and what solutions might work best to confront them.

This new analysis finds the white overrepresentation and minority underrepresentation has been a defining feature of American politics for decades. In fact, the report finds that we may currently be at peak levels of both overrepresentation and underrepresentation. It also finds that white overrepresentation is likely to decline in the future, as underrepresentation of Latinos and Asians declines significantly due to projected increases in citizenship among these groups. This trend will be especially noticeable in states that currently have the highest white representation gaps, such as Arizona, California, and Texas. By 2060, we expect the states with the highest white representation gaps to be interior states, such as Kansas, Utah, and Wyoming.

However, while representation gaps will likely decline in future decades, they will by no means be eliminated. Significant white overrepresentation and Latino and Asian/other underrepresentation will likely remain, primarily because of participation gaps reflecting the relatively low registration and turnout rates of the latter groups. Simulations indicate that the most successful route for minimizing future representation gaps lies in equalizing registration and turnout rates across races, perhaps due to some combination of registration reform and changes in mobilization practices. Progress in this direction would leave only a small representation gap due to the younger age structure among Latinos and Asians/others. It would also tend to equalize representation gaps across presidential and congressional elections in contrast to the current situation where gaps in congressional representation are much larger.

Read and download last year’s report, “America’s electoral future: How changing demographics could impact presidential elections from 2016-2032.”

      

 

 

In July 2015, one month after he announced his bid for the presidency, The Washington Post published my essay “Stop Laughing at Donald Trump.” I wrote it as a warning to members of both the Republican and Democratic establishments, not to mention major media outlets, who were then ridiculing Trump as a less than serious candidate.

What they missed, and what I tried to point out, was the power of a campaign that played to the fears of older whites in a country that is undergoing swift demographic change and increased global connectivity. As I stated then:

Trump’s message is a call to 1950s American greatness and a simmering, mad-as-hell populism that blames Chinese imports, “freeloading” Saudis, and Mexican immigrants (and Mexico) for the nation’s ills. It appeals to a vein of the U.S. electorate that will remain a significant voting bloc for several election cycles to come: older whites.

Yet even I did not foresee how forcefully this populist message could play out in a rapidly diversifying country. Trump’s Republican primary wins and his general election Electoral College win were anchored by the support of whites age 45 and above. And while many of these voters were drawn to his promise of creating a better economy, a large part of Trump’s appeal was pitched to their fears of growing immigrant populations, racial minorities, political correctness, and other aspects of America’s emerging demographic change.

Now, just three weeks in office, the Trump administration has doubled down on his messages of fear with executive orders to build a wall along the Mexican border and impose an immediate ban of refugees, immigrants, and visitors from seven Muslim counties, not to mention the President’s unsubstantiated claim that he lost the popular vote as a result of 3 to 5 million noncitizens who illegally voted for his opponent.

While there is always room for a reasoned debate on immigration reform, refugee policy, and the like, these swift, highly symbolic actions from the President and his administration will continue to stoke the fears of his base that “the country is changing too quickly.” These messages clearly resonated in the election where exit polls showed that 85 percent of voters favoring building a wall were Trump’s mostly older white voters  (compared with 10 percent who were Clinton voters); 83 percent of those favoring the deportation of illegal workers were Trump voters  (compared with 14 percent who were Clinton voters).

Of course the fears among older whites about immigration and racial change are not just products of Trump’s candidacy. They build on a cultural generation gap revealed by national polling in recent years. Pew surveys as early as 2011 indicated that more than half of white baby boomers and seniors saw the growing numbers of newcomers from other lands as a threat to American values and customs. A 2015 PRRI poll shows that, more than younger generations, older whites think the country’s culture and values are worse today than in the 1950s.

These views reflect those of a generation that grew up during a period of low immigration in the 1950s and 1960s and have seen an explosion of diversity over the past 30 years. They remain fearful of what this may mean for their safety and for rising taxes, which may not go to families they see as their children.

The message they need to hear is that the growth and prosperity of minorities, especially younger minorities, is vital to their future. Due to the aging and retirement of the country’s white baby boom population, racial minorities will comprise all of the growth in the labor force population.  As age dependency rises, the nation’s productivity and seniors’ well-being will be increasingly dependent on today’s youthful minorities.

Today, nearly half of young people under age 18 are racial minorities and a quarter are first and second generation immigrants. And this fraction will grow as the white population continues to age.  Policies that invest in their future—their education, their health and their families’ well-being—will be essential for strong national growth. This will only occur if the older mostly white generation understands this and is willing to support the investment that this next multicultural generation needs.

Yet the messages of Trump’s campaign and early presidency are hardly conducive to making this happen. If this political demographic division continues, it will be counterproductive for the nation’s economic growth. And it will continue to be at odds with America’s long established history of welcoming and assimilating new populations. 

Perhaps more importantly for the President’s party, the widening of this generational divide does not bode well for its future. Trump’s appeal to the “forgotten American” is reminiscent of Richard Nixon’s appeal to the “silent majority” of middle class whites who were shaken by the Civil Rights legislation and youthful protests of the 1960s. While Nixon and the Republicans were able to benefit from this strategy, the nation’s demography was quite different than it is today. In 1960, 13 percent of the U.S. population were racial minorities, mostly blacks living in highly segregated cities. When the 2020 census is taken, more than 40 percent of the population and 34 percent of eligible voters will be racial minorities of different hues, living in all parts of the country. Election simulations based on these future population statistics that assume the continuation of past voting patterns project Democratic wins in several presidential elections to come.

Trump’s presidency has just begun and has four years to make its mark. With the campaign behind him, it will benefit him, his party, and the nation to take steps to heal rather than aggravate the wounds of a political demographic division that are still very raw.

      

 

 

Yet, this near single-minded focus misses a crucial point:  America’s white population is rapidly aging. As a result, the nation’s future—both economic and political—is increasingly dependent on young people of color.

When white Americans see that minority children make up ever greater shares of young people in schools and playgrounds, they rarely understand the reason.  It is, in large part, because the nation’s white youth are declining in number and have been for more than a decade. Between 2000 and 2015, the United States has seen an absolute loss of 6.8 million white men and women who are younger than age 20, a decline of 14 percent. At the same time, the total U.S. population grew by 14 percent.

The decline of white youth is a national phenomenon, occurring in 47 states and in nearly 90 percent of the nation’s 3100 counties—especially those in the Rust Belt and Appalachia. Census projections reveal that, for decades to come, more young whites will be passing age 20 than will be born or will immigrate.  And as the white population ages, there will be proportionately fewer white women of child bearing age.

The main reason we are not facing the declining labor force/extreme aging phenomenon now plaguing Japan, Italy, and other “older” countries is the youthful infusion of workers provided by racial minorities, especially the fast growing populations of Hispanic and Asian Americans. The 2020 Census will show that more than half of Americans under age 18 are racial minorities. Going forward these groups along with African Americans will provide all of the nation’s child population gains as well as all future gains in its labor force.

For this reason, significant investments in the next multiracial generations need to be made.  This is not only to assist their own well-being, but also to create a future labor force whose members can contribute to the nation’s economic well-being, and whose taxes will contribute to Social Security and Medicare relied upon by aging white baby boomers. 

Getting older whites to understand this demographic reality will be a tall order especially if the Trump administration continues to play to the fears of much of its white working-class base, which does not see today’s highly diverse younger generation as “their” children and grandchildren.  Whites who grew up in a less diverse America are uncomfortable and sometimes hostile to demographic change.  A 2015 PRRI survey shows that older working class whites think that, compared with the 1950s, America’s culture and way of life have changed for the worse and that immigrants today are a burden. Younger whites and racial minorities believe the opposite.

Yet if today’s multicultural youth are to contribute to a growing economy, there is much work to do. Too many minority children attend under-resourced, segregated schools and do not have the guidance or finances to attend two and four year colleges that are pathways to middle class jobs. Four year college enrollment for Hispanics and blacks, while rising, stands well below that of whites. Income inequality has hit minority youth particularly hard, as seen in continued high child poverty levels; and can only exacerbate the nation’s inequality in the future. Trends such as these make it clear that major public interventions are necessary to improve the well-being of the next generation.

Rather than inflaming this generational divide for political gains, leaders at all levels of government need to emphasize how investments in today’s young minorities and their families—their education, job training, medical care, and housing—will ensure the nation’s future economic and demographic sustainability.

To accomplish this, the Trump administration needs to take a broader view of America’s future than Trump did during the campaign. From a business perspective, he can make the case to the Republican controlled Congress and to the nation that the investment in our largely minority next generation would bring a substantial return in our economic growth, as the white population ages.

To older and middle-aged whites, the “message” that leaders of both parties need to emphasize is their generational co-dependency with younger minorities. While the younger generation would benefit from greater investments in their well-being today, the aging generation will receive support in the form of contributions to Social Security and Medicare as that generation enters the labor force and pays taxes. Perhaps even more important, taking this stand would go a long way toward healing the sharp racial and generational divide that the nation now faces.

      

 

 

Declining national population growth

The nation’s annual growth rate sunk below 0.7 percent in 2015-16, making it the lowest rate of growth since the 1936-37 measurement (see Figure 1). For the bulk of the period spanning World War II through the early 1980s national growth exceeded 0.95 percent. And high growth rates during prime baby boom years exceeded 1.5 percent, topping out at 2.1 percent between 1949-50.

A modest slowdown occurred during the 1980s, though rates still hovered around 0.9 percent, then rose to over 1 percent in the 1990s consistent with the birth of the millennial generation and rises in immigration. The early 2000s showed a slight diminution in those rates but growth remained above 0.9 percent.

After 2008, rates dipped below 0.8 percent for six years and fell to the recent sub 0.7 percent low in 2015-16. Some of the initial decline over these years is attributable to reduced immigration. But as immigration levels have increased in the past three years, now hovering around one million annually, low “natural increase” – the excess of births over deaths – has played a bigger role as the birth rate has declined and the death rate has risen (see Figure 2).

It is likely that some of the reduced fertility in recent years is attributable to recession-related delays in family formation among young adult millennials; this trend could reverse in the near future as the economy continues to grow. But higher death rates are likely to continue due to the long-term aging of the population, a phenomenon contributing to projected declines in U.S. growth rates, which could drop as low as 0.5 percent in 2040.

Still immigration, both past and present, has contributed to the nation’s population growth at a time when several other industrialized counties, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy are facing the specter of long-term population decline. By comparison, the United States can look forward to continued population growth, albeit at lower levels, for decades to come.

Continued shifts to the Sun Belt

Despite the lower national growth rate, the new statistics herald good news for several Sun Belts states where recent population shifts are reversing slow growth during the Great Recession and immediate post-recession years. Seven of the eight fastest growing states are located in the West: Utah, Nevada, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Arizona. Each of these registered growth rates exceeding 1.6 percent in 2015- 2016, and Montana, which ranked 14th, grew by 1 percent. All of these western states (Colorado excepted) grew more rapidly in 2015-16 than in 2014-15 (download Table 1).

Southern states and the District of Columbia fill out the rest of the 14 fastest growing states led by Florida (ranked fourth), along with Texas, South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia (ranked 10th through 13th). Most of these states grew more rapidly in 2015-16 than they did during much of the period surrounding the 2007-09 recession. The uptick in population growth seen in this year’s Census data could be a sign that these states are heading back toward the growth levels they experienced prior to the recession.

At the other end of the spectrum are eight states that registered population declines in 2015-16. Two are especially notable: Illinois, which experienced the largest absolute population losses of any state for three years running; and New York, which registered its first population loss since 2005-06. Others displaying population declines are West Virginia, Vermont, Connecticut, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi.

Of particular note is North Dakota, a state were growth rates exceeded 2 percent for four consecutive years and that registered the highest growth rate in the country in  2014-15.  But its recent economic slowdown due to the reversal of the oil boom has led to a severe drop-off in its ability to attract workers. In 2015-16, North Dakota’s growth fell to 0.15 percent, ranking 37th among states.

Migration across regions

Population growth is the sum of several components: natural increase, immigration, and domestic migration. The latter is closely tethered to economic circumstances and shapes yearly population gains or losses across states and regions.

The new net domestic migration statistics show a continued revival of movement from the broad Northeast and Midwest “Snow Belt” region to the South and West “Sun Belt” region. The mortgage meltdown, financial crisis, and the onset of the Great Recession converged to stall Snow Belt out-migration to the Sun Belt between 2007 and 2013. Now the Snow Belt to Sun Belt flows, which began to emerge again in 2013-14 are continuing, as shown in Figure 3.

Among states, the largest 2015-16 net migration gainers included Florida, Texas, Washington, North Carolina, Colorado, Oregon, South Carolina, Georgia, and Nevada. Most of these states displayed an uptick in net migration since 2014-15 and a significant increase in net migration since 2009-10 (download Table 2).  The exception is Texas, which is one Sun Belt state that fared relatively well during the recession. But now, Texas’s migrant appeal, while still high, has modestly declined thanks to other Sun Belt states become increasingly attractive.

The greatest out-migration states, with the exception of California, are located in the Snow Belt including New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut Michigan, and Ohio. While many of these states held on to “would be migrants” during the recession when Sun Belt jobs dried up, most are once again seeing increased out-migration. In 2009-10, right after the recession, New York lost 91,000 migrants. This has risen to a loss of 191,000 in 2015-16.

California’s migration trends are a notable Sun Belt exception. Unlike most other states in this region, California followed the “New York model,” losing fewer migrants during the recession and now experiencing renewed out-flows to more affordable states nearby like Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and Washington, as economies pick up there.

Overall, the United States seems to be in the midst of a population growth paradox: As the nation’s population growth continues to stagnate due to fertility declines in the context of an aging population, internal population shifts help places like the Sun Belt continue to grow. Because the latter is more economically driven than former, it is encouraging to see that a key demographic indicator of a strong economy – migration in response to newly emerging employment opportunities – is reviving in tandem with the economy.

View Table 1>>

View Table 2>>

      

 

 

“Less white” white neighborhoods

Since 2000, racial minorities—blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and other non-white groups—have comprised 95 percent of U.S. population growth and 98 percent of growth in the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas. Still, in these areas, which saw both high minority growth and increased minority dispersion to the suburbs, the average white resident lives in a neighborhood that has become only modestly more diverse and remains markedly “whiter” than its respective metropolitan area population.

This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the racial make-up of these combined large metropolitan areas, as well as the racial make-up of neighborhoods where the average white resident lives.

Sixty-four percent of the population in large metropolitan areas was white in 2000, a figure that dropped to 56 percent for 2011–2015. However, the neighborhood of the average white resident in these metropolitan areas continues to remain “whiter”—with that white share declining from 79 percent to 72 percent, and showing modest gains in the shares of other racial groups.

For whites residing outside of large metropolitan areas, neighborhoods are even whiter and the changes were even smaller. That is, white residents in small metropolitan areas live in neighborhoods that are, on average, 80 percent white, down from 84 percent in 2000. Whites residing outside of metropolitan areas live in neighborhoods that are 85 percent white, down from 88 percent in 2000.

The modestly less-white character of neighborhoods where whites reside is not unique to just a few individual metropolitan areas. It is occurring, to some extent, in all 100 large metropolitan areas, and is especially noticeable in the 51 major metropolitan areas with populations exceeding one million (see Table 1).

To be sure, there is variation across metropolitan areas in just how “white” these white residents’ neighborhoods already were in 2000. For example, whites living in places with large minority populations (such as New York and Los Angeles) live in neighborhoods that are noticeably less white than white residents who reside in less diverse metropolitan areas (e.g., Pittsburgh and Minneapolis-St Paul).

In a handful of areas, including Las Vegas and Orlando, minority population growth was extraordinarily large. In these metro areas, “white” neighborhoods became markedly more diverse between 2000 and 2011–2015.

But even in these areas (as in most), whites live in neighborhoods that are far whiter than the metropolitan area as a whole. This relates to the continued high segregation levels of blacks, Hispanics, and other racial minorities.

Black and Hispanic neighborhood segregation

The new Census statistics also provide measures of neighborhood segregation for blacks compared with white residents. There continues to be wide variation in segregation among the nation’s 51 major metropolitan areas (see Table 2). Metropolitan Milwaukee shows the highest black-white segregation, with an index of 81—meaning that 81 percent of blacks would have to change neighborhoods to be distributed equally with whites. 

Almost five decades after the 1968 Fair Housing Act was enacted, seven of these major metropolitan areas—including Milwaukee, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and St. Louis—show segregation indices exceeding 70, which is considered a high level of segregation. These slower-growing regions have shown modest or negative growth in their black populations in recent decades. And despite recent black suburbanization, which lowered their segregation rates from extremely high levels, they remain (as in 2000) the most highly segregated areas of the country.

Among major metropolitan areas, Las Vegas registers the lowest level of segregation, at 40. As with other metro areas with sub-50 segregation scores, Las Vegas experienced marked gains in its black and other minority populations over the years, opening the door for development of new housing tracts since older, segregated neighborhoods were already established. However, several of these areas—including Phoenix, Virginia Beach, and Raleigh—registered slight increases in black-white segregation since 2000.

While post-Civil Rights Era enforcement and population shifts have lowered black-white segregation from the extremely ghettoized patterns seen prior to 1970, segregation declines since 2000 have been relatively modest. The average segregation score among the major metropolitan areas declined only from 63 to 60.

Hispanic-white segregation also varies across metropolitan areas, but at generally lower levels than for blacks. New York and Los Angeles lead all major metropolitan areas with segregation indices of 61. Other areas with Hispanic-white segregation levels of at least 50 include those with large Hispanic populations, such as Miami, Chicago, Houston, and Dallas. Still, each of these areas showed modest segregation declines since 2000.

Jacksonville registers the lowest Hispanic-white segregation index among major metropolitan areas, but those areas with the lowest segregation levels (including Portland, Seattle, Virginia Beach, and St. Louis) showed segregation increases since 2000. As with many of the 22 major metropolitan areas that exhibited increased Hispanic-white segregation, these areas experienced marked recent increases to their relatively small Hispanic populations. When averaged across all major areas, Hispanic-white segregation levels increased from 47 to 48 between 2000 and 2011–2015.

America’s diversity explosion continues to power demographic change in all parts of the country, especially in large metropolitan areas, and racial minorities continue to spread from cities to suburbs and to new metropolitan areas. Still, neighborhood integration is not keeping pace with the declines that occurred during the decades that immediately followed the Civil Rights Era. Whites continue to reside in predominantly white neighborhoods, even in large, highly diverse metropolitan areas. And both blacks and Hispanics continue to be most segregated in areas that contain large numbers of these groups, and where concentrated poverty has risen. While macro demography broadly shapes our destiny, these new numbers indicate that additional forces must be involved to achieve more fully integrated living at the local level.

Download Table 1 and Table 2

      

 

 

This movement was stopped in its tracks by a blowback of older Americans who are mostly white, live in all parts of the country, and elected Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton.

Among votes counted at this time, exit poll show Republican Trump bested Democrat Clinton by a net of 6,414,252 votes among voters over age 45. As for voters under age 45, Clinton received a net of 6,679,191 votes more than Trump.

Although this national young/old split is fairly even, older voters made deciding numeric differences in Trump’s favor for consequential swing states, especially in the Rust Belt. This differs from the two previous presidential elections when the younger voters gave Barack Obama his wins.

The Democratic leaning young adult vote is now driven by racial minorities who made up 37 percent of voters under age 30 in the 2016 election. In contrast, whites constituted 78 percent of the voters over age 45 and 87 percent of those over age 65. On Nov. 8, whites in these age groups showed the strongest support for Donald Trump in almost every swing state that he won.

The educational profile of these older whites is notable—65 percent are not college graduates. These so called “non college whites” were the major engine for Trump’s surge with high turnout and strong voting preferences. Non college whites comprised 34 percent of all voters and favored Trump over Clinton by more than 2 to 1.

Whites, especially older whites, were responsible for reversing past Democratic expansion in the Sun Belt states of Florida and North Carolina, as well as for capturing previously Democratic leaning northern states: Iowa, Michigan  Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

In 2012, Obama won all of these states, except Iowa, by gaining more votes from racial minorities than he lost from whites. Trump carried each by gaining more white votes than he lost to racial minorities.

The reasons for this blowback from older demographic blocs surely has something to do with their perception of doing poorly during the recession and post-recession years and their willingness to rebel against Washington D.C.  However, it is also rooted in something I have called a “cultural generation gap,” a disconnect between older, primarily working class, whites and the increasingly diverse and globalized nation we are becoming.

This disconnect is evident in a recent PRRI poll, which shows the former agrees that, since the 1950s, America’s culture and way of life has changed for the worse. This perception is in contrast to millennials, minorities and whites with college degrees who see it as a change for the better. Donald Trump’s messages of greater isolationism, nostalgia and immigrant deportation resonated strongly with the group.

As I wrote in my book “Diversity Explosion,” there is a geographic dimension to this cultural generation gap that has political implications. The dispersion of younger  Hispanics and Asians to the Sun Belt and youthful black migration to the South will make these growing regions more competitive for Democrats. But so too will former northern Democratic strongholds become more competitive for Republicans as white baby boomers become a bigger part of their older voting populations.

Obama was able to take advantage of the former by extending the political battleground to the interior West (Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico), as well as the South (Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina). Importantly he maintained the Democratic hold on many whiter, northern states. Yet the recent blowback from the older white bloc cost Hillary Clinton key pieces of each region.

The diverse demographic transformation, as well as the rise of college educated whites, will continue to sweep across this country, impacting all ages and regions. If current party voting proclivities persist, these trends could provide the wind beneath the Democrats’ sails in several presidential elections to come and, in the process, integrate new diverse generations into a productive globalized economy. But, in the meantime, if a sharp disconnect is allowed to exist between tomorrow’s and yesterday’s America, the nation will once again experience the kind of demographic blowback that elected Donald Trump as our next president.

      

 

 

Can an extraordinarily high turnout of the white working class produce a Trump victory on Nov. 8?   It is clearly the case that the white working class, identified here as whites who are not college graduates, has been underrepresented among the voting population in prior elections.  As Figure 1 indicates, the turnout on Election Day of non-college white eligible voters is consistently lower than that of college educated whites, a difference of 57 and 79 percent, respectively, in 2012.  This pattern of lower turnout among non-college whites is evident in all states, especially the “white” Rust Belt states that Trump is counting on winning.

These numbers suggest that the white working class bloc has a high ceiling of potential voting power, if it could be energized to increase its turnout.  Non-college whites have long demonstrated greater support for Republican candidates than have white college graduates, providing Republicans a substantial counterweight to the strong Democratic support of racial minorities.

In 2012, non-college whites, who did vote, registered a Republican vote margin (Republican vote percent minus Democratic vote percent) of 22 percent compared with a Republican vote margin of 11 percent among college educated whites who voted. In contrast, racial minority voters showed a Democratic margin (Democratic vote percent minus Republican vote percent) of 64 percent.

This year’s polls suggest an even greater divergence between the Republican support from the white working class and other groups, and white college graduates in particular, many of whom will vote Democratic for the first time in decades. For this reason, greater white working class turnout is especially crucial to Trump’s cause.

Impact of high turnout from white working class voters

To understand what a super-sized white working class turnout could mean for the coming election, I conducted simulations of three possible turnout scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes that each group—non-college whites, college educated whites, and minorities—would turn out at the same rates as in the 2012 election. Scenario 2 alters this by assuming that non-college white turnout rates increase by 10 percent (to 67 percent, nationally). And Scenario 3 makes the highly improbable assumption that non-college whites will turn out to vote at the same rate as college educated whites (79 percent).

The estimated number of 2016 voters under these three scenarios are depicted in Figure 2 where the only differences occur with the numbers for non-college whites whose voter populations rise from 57 million in Scenario 1, to 67 million in Scenario 2, and 79 million in Scenario 3.

Election outcomes: The popular vote

What would these three turnout scenarios imply for the election’s outcome? To ascertain this, one must first stipulate how each group would vote with respect to Trump or Clinton.

For non-college whites, I attributed a Republican margin of 32 percent, which is 10 points higher than in 2012. As for college educated white voters, I posited that their vote will be evenly split between Clinton and Trump with a Democrat or Republican margin of 0—given their lack of enthusiasm for Trump this year, especially among white college educated women. Finally, for the minority population, I attributed the same Democratic margin, 64 percent, as was observed in 2012.

Once I apply these attributed Republican (Trump) and Democratic (Clinton) margins to the estimated numbers of voters in the three turnout scenarios above we see the following outcomes for the national popular vote:

Scenario 1, which does not inflate non-college white turnout rates from those of 2012, shows a Clinton winning by 6.6 million votes with a margin of 4.8 percent. Under Scenario 2, which increases the non-college white turnout by 10 percent, Clinton still wins but only by 3.4 million votes and with a margin of 2.3 percent.

However, in Scenario 3, which makes the extraordinary assumption that non-college white turnout equals college educated white turnout (an increase of 22 points from 2012) and no increase in turnout for other groups, Trump would indeed win the popular vote but by less than 500,000 votes and with a margin of 0.3 percent.

Election outcomes: The Electoral College

Of course, Trump winning the popular vote, even under an extreme turnout scenario, does not necessarily translate to an Electoral College victory. To gain some sense of what the possible electoral outcomes could be, I conducted similar simulations for 10 swing states, shown in the table below, for the three different turnout scenarios for non-college whites.

As with the U.S. popular vote simulations, I stipulated each state’s Republican and Democratic margins as follows: for non-college whites, I added 10 Republican margin points to the 2012 margin; for college whites, I assumed an even Republican and Democratic vote split; and for minorities, I posited the same Democratic margin as in 2012.

When 2012 turnout rates are assumed for non-college whites   in Scenario 1, Clinton wins in all of these states except Ohio, where Trump wins by only a 0.2 percent margin- a virtual toss-up.  Increasing non- college white margins by an additional 10 points, in Scenario 2, adds Pennsylvania  to  Trump’s column by a tiny 0.2 percent margin; though his Ohio margin rises to 2.5 percent.

Finally, “the supersized turnout” Scenario 3 does bring to Trump an additional state, Wisconsin, and one more, Iowa, is within striking distance.  Yet even with this scenario, and giving Iowa to Trump, Clinton would still win the Electoral College 293 to 245, if all other states voted the way they did in 2012.

It is fair to say that all of these simulations probably overstate the support that Trump will receive irrespective of turnout rates.  Compared with national polls taken in early and mid-October , I have attributed  greater Trump voting margins to non-college whites, and less Clinton support to college educated whites.

Furthermore, I did not consider previously Republican-voting Arizona and Georgia as the potential swing states they could become if there is high turnout and support among their sizeable Hispanic and black populations.

Presented here is more than a best-case scenario for the impact the white working class can have in support of Donald Trump. What this analysis makes plain is that even in the rosiest of scenarios, an extraordinary turnout of white working class voters, by itself, cannot produce a Trump victory.  Thus, the “hidden voter” theory appears to be highly overblown.