The U.S. election was watched closely around the world, with foreign leaders acutely aware that in some ways, the result of the presidential campaign could have major impacts on their future relations with the United States.

As Joe Biden prepares to enter the White House in January, what questions or concerns is he likely to hear from his counterparts in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America, as well as officials from international institutions? Below, Brookings Foreign Policy experts channel the priorities — and in many cases anxieties — of foreign capitals as Washington approaches a leadership change.

       

In the latest in a series of provocative actions linked to the exploration of oil and gas in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey recently carried out naval exercises in an area of the sea that Greece also considers its own territorial waters. In doing so, Turkey confronts an energy cartel named the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which includes Egypt, Israel, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and the Palestinian Authority.

The European Union is seeking to mediate, and French President Emmanuel Macron said that the situation is so worrying that France will strengthen its naval contingent in the eastern Mediterranean. But this is just the tip of the iceberg.

At the beginning of August, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement — one that Turkey declared “null and void,” not surprisingly — to delimit their exclusive economic zones (EEZs, which are the sea areas in which a state exercises its authority) to allow private individuals to exploit marine and submarine resources. These agreements are regulated bilaterally by the states, even if there is an international framework. The aim was to limit Turkish ambitions in the area and respond to a clear provocation on Ankara’s part: its 2019 signing of a memorandum in Istanbul with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli on exclusive economic zones and military cooperation.

The Libyan pawn

The Libya-Turkey agreement — which the EMFG does not accept, charging that it violates the Montego Bay Convention of 1982 — had two main objectives: to define the Turkish and Libyan EEZs, respectively, to exploit energy resources; and to allow Turkey to provide military assistance to the GNA in the current Libyan civil war. Ankara’s broader aim is to preempt any possible EMGF project in the area as long as Turkey remains excluded from the group. If the EMGF countries — which in some cases have very tense relations with Ankara — continue to exclude Turkey (or even move to block Turkey from accessing a gas field within its own EEZ, based on an interpretation of the Montego Bay Convention), Turkey could use it as pretext to adopt a more aggressive strategy. In such a scenario, Ankara could put forward international legal obstacles to prevent gas from being released into the region, making it less cost-effective to extract it.

The agreement sparked the ire of the GNA’s rival in Libya, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army and initiated a siege on Tripoli in April. He has been backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates since 2014. They see Libya not only as an optimal platform for expanding their economic aims, but also as a game board for an ideological confrontation with Turkey and Qatar — political representations of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is a sworn enemy for Egypt and the dynasties of Gulf.

Libya, in this sense, represents an extraordinary possibility for Abu Dhabi to see its medium-power aims realized, as well as for Cairo to expand its area of influence westward. In fact, Libya’s eastern, coastal region of Cyrenaica has always been a land of trade and deep tribal ties with Egypt. Lately, Cairo has aimed to play a central role in crisis scenarios in the broader Mediterranean, where the problems of the Palestinians intersect with those of the Syrians and Libyans, and where the energy resources are enormous interests that go well beyond the Mediterranean basin.

In this context, France seeks to play a leading role: Paris has for some time taken positions opposed to Ankara (on Turkey’s NATO membership, natural gas, migrants, and Libya), and recent months it has strongly supported initiatives by Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus against Turkey. Earlier this year, it asked to become a member of the EMGF, while the United States asked to become a permanent observer. France sees these steps as an opportunity to strengthen its strategy in the Mediterranean. More broadly, though, Europe does not currently have a real strategy to contain Turkey.

The fundamental role of the U.S.

The United States considers this area one of great strategic interest, especially for containing Chinese and Russian interference through regional alignments and allies. The policy objective is to keep the main maritime trade routes — first of all the Suez Canal — safe. In this sense, the goal is to minimize the opportunities for confrontation between the countries of the region, especially with two NATO members involved, Turkey and Greece, and potentially now France.

The void left by the United States in the political dynamics of the Mediterranean has been filled, to a growing extent, by China and Russia. The two powers are able to maneuver well in the region, taking advantage of the increasing systemic disorder and growing tensions between states. America should act to prevent this.

Washington should start with Libya, pushing the peace process diplomatically and — if the Libyans request it — also militarily through the United Nations, which could organize an international contingent to establish security and create the conditions to revise the November 2019 Turkey-GNA memorandum. This is a fundamental starting point, because only with a stable Libya will the current dynamics among the regional powers wane.

At the same time, the U.S. should leverage the allies of the EMGF to arrive at more flexible positions towards Turkey, recognizing its legitimate interests to become a EMGF partner and to have the chance to engage in joint resource exploitation and revenue sharing (and recognizing its terrible economic situation). In exchange, Turkey should contain its regional ambitions, bearing in mind that an armed conflict between these Mediterranean powers would be catastrophic.

       

There has been mildly encouraging news out of Libya in recent months, almost nine years after the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi led to chaos rather than an improvement in governance and stability. The international community has ignored many chances to help the country get back on its feet. Now it has another opportunity that should not be squandered, lest a humanitarian tragedy ensue, and Libya once again becomes a gateway of numerous refugees streaming into Europe, as well as extremists making their way to the conflicts of the broader Middle East region.

The immediate reasons for this renewed opportunity come from a series of military setbacks by the forces of Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, which is essentially one large militia operating out of strongholds in the east. Last spring, Haftar and his forces moved south then west, taking much of the country, including the central regions where oil is produced, ultimately knocking on the door of the capital of Tripoli, a city otherwise generally spared of the fighting until then. Haftar benefited from Russian mercenaries and United Arab Emirates airpower, and quieter assistance from countries such as Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia.

Fortunately, various militias operating in support of the Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Serraj and blessed by the United Nations, have managed to push Haftar back, first out of the city center, then out of nearby strongholds, and now entirely out of the west. The situation is still fluid, to be sure, and Russian warplanes have been seen in the country, raising the prospect of an escalation. With material assistance from Turkey, however, the tide has now turned.

Libya again resembles what had been the norm for a number of years, with a well intentioned but weak government effectively controlling only parts of Tripoli, various militias dominating in one city or another, some oil flowing with production, and the population generally managing to scrape by, at least more so than people in other war torn Middle East lands such as Yemen and Syria can. This means there is an opportunity.

Tracking a similar state of affairs in 2018 as part of a working group led by the Brookings Institution, we advocated a form of governance based on cities for Libya. Rather than a strong central state with its own powerful military, we favored effectively stitching the country together piece by piece from the ground up. Militias and other local power brokers that tolerated outside observers, minimized use of violence, and provided security or services to local populations would, under this concept, qualify for a prorated share of the oil revenue in Libya.

An oversight board composed of Libyans as well as outside technical experts would make the determinations about who qualifies for such funding, and who should be at least temporarily docked from some of it based on bad behavior. A United Nations observation force could also deploy to the country in small numbers, not to keep the peace, but to report on violations and thus incentivize the militias to keep the peace between themselves and within the areas they control.

The situation in Libya does not suggest that all armed groups in the area can lay down their weapons. Their existence is not only a phenomenon related to power. It goes much deeper. Young men, without a state grid capable of giving them a critical citizenship dimension, have found their economic and social realization in the militias, a sense of belonging that will be difficult to unhinge. Over time, this system could evolve into a set of municipal governments and small armies or paramilitaries that would then join the coast guard as a truly national security service. The effort would happen from the bottom up and not the top down.

But there are some problems. Haftar may not yet have accepted his return to a regional power broker in just part of Libya. If he is hatching plans to retake much or all of the country again, he will have to be stopped. But the challenge is that this kind of idea is not going to emerge from the Libyans themselves. There is not enough trust, and there are too many disparate actors, all of whom are relatively weak. None except perhaps Serraj are in a position to request the economic and security assistance, along with a United Nations observation force, that would most likely be needed for such a concept of recovery and reunification.

At a time of uncertainty at home and abroad, and with diplomatic efforts from North Korea to Afghanistan and elsewhere mostly dead in the water, the administration should consider arbitrating a new peace process to promote a vision of cooperation in Libya. The United States more than other parties is still seen by most Libyans as neutral and relatively well intentioned. The moment is ripe to give this problem another try, while being more realistic about what it will take to bring some semblance of order to Libya than other previous efforts have attempted.

       

The global outbreak of a novel strain of coronavirus, which causes the disease now called COVID-19, is posing significant challenges to public health, the international economy, oil markets, and national politics in many countries. Brookings Foreign Policy experts weigh in on the impacts and implications.

Giovanna DeMaio (@giovDM), Visiting Fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe: As I write in more detail elsewhere, with almost 7,000 reported cases of coronavirus (including 366 dead), Italy is the European country hardest hit by COVID-19 contagion. While one might expect nationalist narratives to thrive in a time of stress and uncertainty, Italians have actually set aside euro-skepticism and anti-globalization sentiment and have instead embraced international cooperation. The long-term consequences will depend in part on whether the European Union can manage this crisis effectively and as one.

While other European leaders, like French President Emmanuel Macron, have called for more coordination both in the EU and with the United States, Europe is currently facing some protectionist trends that risk undermining a collective approach to handle the crisis. The meeting of EU ministers of health in Brussels on March 6 revealed that for now, Europe is failing this stress test, as it was impossible to convince France, Germany, and Czech Republic to lift the ban on exporting protective medical gear (face masks, mostly) to avoid shortages at home. To address this, President of the European Parliament David Sassoli declared that the EU commission is working to create a centralized agency in charge of buying and distributing this kind of material in order to prevent “useless competition between EU member states and prevent international speculation.” Conversely, the Chinese company Xiaomi has donated thousands of face masks to Italy as a thank-you for having welcomed the firm so warmly two years ago.

Hopefully sooner rather than later, coronavirus will be under control and manageable — but the damages will remain for a long time. At that point, Italy will remember who came to help, and Europe will know the results of the test over its capability to share both risks and prosperity.

David Dollar (@davidrdollar), Senior Fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center: China is getting back to work after a breathtaking drop in economic activity during January and February. Purchasing Manager Indexes (PMIs) come from surveys of firms’ production, employment, and new orders. February PMIs came in at 26.5 for services and 35.7 for industry, the lowest ever recorded. A PMI of 50 is the dividing line between contracting and expanding, and the services PMI had never been below 50 since it was introduced. China will be reporting January and February data together for many variables, since the New Year holiday occurs during different months each year, making a year-to-year comparison of months misleading. January-February exports were down 17%, while imports were down 4%. Pollution data monitored by NASA and European Space Agency satellites show that the mean density of nitrogen dioxide — emitted by motor vehicles, power plants, and industrial facilities — dropped significantly between February 10 and 25 to below 125 micromoles per square meter (compared to more than 200 micromoles between January 1 and 20). That is probably the most accurate picture of the decline in activity at the height of the crisis. More recently, the pollution data shows a significant uptick in activity, but not yet back to pre-virus levels.

Despite the very weak February, China now seems to be getting back to work. Major provinces such as Guangdong started easing their travel restrictions in mid-February. The Transportation Ministry reported that 110 million migrants returned to their work cities just during the one week, February 22-28. Quarantining procedures were also eased. The company Foxconn, for example, has sent workers with fevers to the hospital, but otherwise has “quarantined” returning workers on their campus where they have continued to work. Major employers have offered bonuses of 5,000-10,000 renminbi ($720-$1,440) to get workers to return, with the result that most migrants are back at work and most large companies are operating. Still, there are many reports of supply chain problems, so it is doubtful that their production is back to pre-virus levels. And things are not as positive for small and medium firms. Hence, the return to pre-crisis production level is more likely to come in late April, rather than late March.

What happens to China’s economy for the rest of the year depends on how the world deals with the coronavirus. China will probably report a sharply negative number in the first quarter, but then has the potential to bounce back during the remainder of the year. But there is tremendous uncertainty about any such forecast right now. If the virus leads to sharp slowdowns in China’s major trade partners (Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and the U.S.), then there will be blow-back on China. The factories may be getting back to work, but if worldwide demand declines, then they will soon be idle again. For services, which now make up about 60% of the economy, there will certainly be some bounce-back from the depressed level in February. But it is unlikely that people will take extra vacations, movie visits, and restaurant meals to make up for what was lost during the lock-down. Also, if China’s industrial economy takes a hit from lower global demand, then that has to have some spillover on services, as workers lose jobs and income and become more cautious about spending.

Federica Saini Fasanotti, Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence: As I write in more detail elsewhere, I have just returned to Italy from a trip to the United States — on a deserted flight — and I’ve found my home city of Milan to be empty. The schools are closed, while hospitals are working 24/7 in full emergency mode. But compared to the panic of a few weeks ago, when much uncertainty loomed, my country now appears more focused.

Its leadership shared all decisions with the population. There has been a succession of detailed medical bulletins and press releases. Italians have been made aware of the problem and many of them, particularly in the critical areas, are responding to the huge sacrifices the government is requesting.

In the United States, the Trump administration should share every decision with the population — if Italy’s case is any guide, the public will likely prove extremely collaborative. The president must not try to minimize the importance of the science, nor the aggressive nature of the virus. Similarly, the administration should not attempt to censor any news, even the most alarming, and let specialists handle the matter publicly. At the end of the day, this challenge can be overcome if treated with the right procedures.

Samantha Gross (@samanthaenergy), Fellow in the Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate: The coronavirus has claimed another victim. The OPEC+ alliance passed away on Friday, March 6, 2020, at the age of three years.

OPEC and its partners met in Vienna March 5 and 6 to discuss production cuts in response to plummeting demand due to the coronavirus. OPEC ministers argued for an additional 1.5 million barrels per day of production cuts, on top of the 2.1 million barrels per day of cuts that the OPEC+ group agreed to last year. However, the Russians said no.

The OPEC+ arrangement between the Saudis and Russians was always a marriage of convenience, not a love match. The oil price Russia needs to balance its budget is lower than that in Saudi Arabia, meaning that the Russians can more easily weather a period of low oil prices. The Saudis have taken on more than their fair share of the production cuts as a result. The arrangement was thus a good deal for the Russians, on balance. However, word is that the Russians became tired of cutting their production while U.S. oil production surged. This situation feels like déjà vu from the price crash of 2015, with the Russians playing the role that the Saudis did then — wanting to maintain market share and hoping that low prices will push U.S. oil out of the market. In response, the Saudis started a price war, promising to increase crude oil production and lowering prices for their crude. Markets have responded, with U.S. crude prices reaching a four-year low on the morning of March 9. The International Energy Agency predicted a year-on-year decline in oil demand in its March Oil Market Report, released on March 9. We are likely seeing only the beginning of a severe oil price collapse.

U.S. production stands to be disproportionately impacted by a period of low oil prices, not because it is expensive, but because of its unique, price-responsive cost structure. U.S. tight oil wells decline quickly, meaning that drilling must continue to keep production flowing. The variable cost of production that U.S. drillers see will therefore be higher than producing from many existing fields in other places, even if those existing fields have higher costs overall. However, the reverse is true when prices rise — U.S. production can ramp up more quickly than other sources of oil. Thus, any market share gains for other producers during the crisis are likely to be lost as soon as demand comes back and prices recover.

Additionally, the U.S. industry is in better shape than it was during the 2015 price collapse. Low prices then brought production efficiencies and consolidation among producers. The producers that remain are stronger financially and better able to weather a low-price period. Some U.S. producers locked in higher prices earlier in 2020, meaning that their production will not respond to the price drop until those contracts expire, in some cases in 2021.

Where oil demand goes from here is an epidemiological question, not an oil markets question. There’s no question that the industry will be hurting, and if trade, travel, and other economic activity continue to be depressed as the virus spreads, this could be just the beginning of a crisis for oil producers. Only time will tell.

Cheng Li, Senior Fellow and Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Ryan McElveen, (@RyanLMcElveen), Associate Director of the John L. Thornton China Center: As we write in more detail elsewhere, while the coronavirus crisis has led many states and non-state actors to behave in their own self-interest, viewing the distribution of masks and other medical supplies as a sort of zero-sum geopolitical game, others have selflessly endeavored to distribute supplies to those who need them most, engaging in “mask diplomacy” despite needs in their own countries. In turn, the exchange of masks has taken on a new meaning of goodwill. Perhaps nowhere has that act of goodwill been as pronounced — and surprising — as the generous gifting between Japan and China.

The contrast in the global response to the coronavirus outbreak has been stark. While China levied criticism on the United States for its miserly initial offers of aid to China, on Taiwan for cutting off exports of masks to the PRC, and on countries around the world for closing borders to Chinese travelers, Japan was upheld for setting a more magnanimous example. Japanese entities — from the central and local governments, to NGOs and and corporations — joined together in common cause to help their neighbors across the East China Sea.

Through the gifting of masks and other supplies, Japan rebuilt a bridge to China that had long been severed. In response, Chinese social media quickly filled with gratitude for the Japanese well wishes. The Chinese people, as well as the Chinese government, have sought to return the kindness, even amidst their own precarious situation. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Geng Shuang expressed China’s willingness to reciprocate Japan’s kindness with a quote from the Book of Songs: “You throw a peach to me, I give you a white jade for friendship.” In the wake of the coronavirus outbreak on the Princess Diamond cruise ship which docked in Japan, China donated testing kits to the National Institute of Infectious Diseases of Japan. Even China’s richest man, Jack Ma, has stepped up to help, not only by pledging $14.5 million to fight the coronavirus, but also by donating one million masks through his foundations.

The coronavirus has done what few observers thought possible: quell generations of China-Japan antagonism. And for the immediate future, both countries are now bound together in the same public health crisis—the full political and economic implications of which are yet unknown—and neither side would gain from halting the mutually-beneficial collaboration now.

Mireya Solís (@solis_msolis), Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for East Asia Policy: As I write in more detail elsewhere, Japan is a frontline state in the ongoing global health crisis brought about by the emergence of a highly infectious viral disease quickly spreading from China to its neighbors and beyond. The coronavirus crisis stands to deal a severe blow to the Japanese economy, has raised significant questions of the government’s ability to deal with a pandemic, and has altered both domestic political dynamics and Japan’s diplomatic calendar in a landmark year. The associated disease, COVID-19, is likely to extend a large shadow on the remainder of the Shinzo Abe era.

The economic impact of the coronavirus crisis stands to be severe, hitting Japan at a moment of particular vulnerability due to the sharp economic downturn in the aftermath of the consumption tax increase last fall. A new pathogen triggering a global pandemic is the ultimate black swan. For Japan it has brought back the prospect of a recession, as it negates the possibility of a V-shaped recovery from the severe downturn registered in the last quarter of 2019: an annualized contraction of 7.1% with sharp drops in business investment and private consumption.

Meanwhile, as cases of community dissemination continue to grow and testing for COVID-19 moves at a sluggish pace, broader questions have emerged on the government’s ability to act decisively. Without question the Abe team has boosted Japan’s executive decisionmaking capabilities: The prime minister’s office has operated as a “control tower” taming endemic bureaucratic sectionalism, and it instituted a new National Security Council to provide a whole-of-government response to Japan’s national security threats. But COVID-19 bedevils these structures and hinders an effective government response.

Finally, 2020 was geared to be a major year for Japanese diplomacy, with a number of signal events that would also marshal Prime Minister Abe’s legacy. A state visit by President Xi Jinping to herald the stabilization of Japan-China relations has been postponed. And the fate of the summer Olympics hangs in the balance of a still little-understood new global health risk.

Thomas Wright (@thomaswright08), Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and Europe: As Kurt Campbell and I recently wrote in more detail elsewhere, the coronavirus may be another once-in-a-century event. If some of the gloomier projections of COVID-19 play out, the world will face one of its worst peacetime crises of modern times. Unfortunately, this crisis occurs in a dark political climate, more similar to that of the early 1930s, when many governments pursued nationalist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, and international cooperation was very limited. Over the past decade, the world has grown more authoritarian, nationalistic, xenophobic, unilateralist, anti-establishment, and anti-expertise. The current state of politics and geopolitics has exacerbated, not stabilized, the crisis.

COVID-19 is becoming the third major crisis of the post–Cold War period, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the financial collapse of 2008. This crisis may exact a greater toll than the other two and has demonstrated the limits of populism as a method of government. Expertise matters. Institutions matter. There is such a thing as the global community. An enlightened response, even if it’s unpopular, matters. The system must be made to work again.

       

In 1597, the British philosopher Francis Bacon wrote a sentence that would become famous: “ipsa scientia potestas est.” Knowledge itself is power.

In Italy, which faces a severe COVID-19 outbreak, this motto rings particularly true.

Knowledge is power. But during a time of emergency, there are two possible approaches to knowledge and power from governments:

• Responsible democracies share information, transparently, with their citizens. They spread knowledge to enable solutions. Such transparency requires courage among political leaders, but is highly precious because it promotes confidence among citizens.
• National leaders who are weak or not used to democracy do not share information as readily with their citizens. Although at first that might seem like the best solution, in the internet era information and misinformation circulate freely. That could be the beginning of the end for political leaders.

Italy, with this virus, has taken the former approach. Its leadership shared all decisions with the population. There has been a succession of detailed medical bulletins and press releases. Italians have been made aware of the problem and many of them, particularly in the critical areas, are responding to the huge sacrifices the government is requesting.

Italy has been criticized for being a hotspot of the disease, but it should be lauded for its transparency and the strict actions it took immediately. Other countries have not been so effective, so far.

On the ground in Italy

I have just returned to Italy from a trip to the United States — on a deserted flight — and I’ve found my home city of Milan to be empty. The schools are closed, while hospitals are working 24/7 in full emergency mode. But compared to the panic of a few weeks ago, when much uncertainty loomed, my country now appears more focused.

In the last three weeks, the Italian government has issued three decrees. The first came on February 22, immediately after the first patient was found in the country, introducing urgent measures regarding containment and management of the virus. It imposed school closures until at least April 3 (we are now entering the third week with students at home), and also restricted access to museums, cinemas, and public places for large gatherings. The second was issued on February 28, in order to support measures for families, workers, and business — postponing, for example, utility payments (e.g. water, gas), implementing measures to strengthen social safety nets in the “red zone” and, issuing other measures to help people affected by the consequences, even indirect, of the health emergency. The third came on March 8, addressing  further measures for containing the spread of COVID-19 throughout the country.

The national health system, amidst all this, is proving to be extraordinary. Many doctors and nurses are working without rest and are voluntarily taking on extra jobs, making us Italians proud. And the government is following what specialists are suggesting: Take it step by step.

The scale of the challenge

In spite of all these heavy measures, the epidemic has continued to spread. The diffusion index (a measure of how many people one patient can infect) is high (2.5), and the mortality rate is 3.5 out of 100 patients. As of today, March 9, Italy has 7,985 cases, 463 dead, and 724 recovered. Now Italy has 4,316 hospitalized patients with symptoms, of which 733 are in intensive care, while 2,936 are in isolation at home. These are the numbers we know, but the virus is very likely to be far more prevalent than we think.

A majority of those whom the virus has killed are men over 81 years old with other health complications. Twenty percent of those who have been infected and present serious symptoms need to be intubated for respiratory failure because interstitial pneumonia develops. The healing process for pneumonia cases is very long: at least two weeks in intubation, two weeks in the hospital, and then another two weeks at home. Public health experts expect the epidemic to peak in Italy in one month. So, the road remains a long one and risks damaging the entire national economy.

The real problem is the lack of adequate intensive care facilities. At the moment in Italy, the number of hospital wards that are open to patients in need of other care (not related to COVID-19) has been cut in half, and hospitalizations not related to the virus occur only in emergency situations or for serious oncologic problems. Routine surgical operations have been postponed en masse to leave intensive care facilities available.

Efforts are underway to make 50% more beds available for intubated patients. There are plans to create resuscitation cores in hospital corridors, while retired doctors were called back into service and medical students in their final year were invited to go to the ward to help. Alarmingly, an estimated 12% of Lombardy’s doctors and nurses cannot work because they tested positive for the virus and are in quarantine themselves. Italy is looking for infectious disease specialists, pulmonologists, internists, emergency medicine specialists. In short, it needs new medical personnel who can help those who have been fighting in the trenches for weeks, and who can replace them in case of contagion.

What the united states should do

The U.S. government failed in sending experienced virologists and American medical specialists to Italy (and also to China). They could have not only helped foreign colleagues, but also observed how such countries are facing this unprecedented public health emergency with structures that have not been designed for this type of epidemic. Criticizing foreign communities does not solve the pandemic — assistance does. Global collaboration in these cases can really make the difference. China, for example, is sending Italy face masks, disposable gloves, and protective suits. We will never forget this gesture.

The Trump administration should share every decision with the population — if Italy’s case is any guide, the public will likely prove extremely collaborative. The president must not try to minimize the importance of science, nor the aggressive nature of the virus. Similarly, the administration should not attempt to censor any news, even the most alarming, and let specialists handle the matter publicly. At the end of the day, this challenge can be overcome if treated with the right procedures.

The coronavirus is not only a curse: It is also an extraordinary chance to improve our facilities and health care infrastructure — and above all, to learn and be more ready for the next emergency.

       

Meanwhile, facing a stagnant economy and constant threats to infrastructure, the Libyan people are caught in the crossfire of this protracted jockeying. Unchecked migration and the threat of extremist groups taking hold in the country’s contested spaces likewise make Libya’s internal situation a security concern for Europe and the United States. Solving the civil war in Libya would restore needed stability to a strategically vital part of northern Africa, while laying the groundwork for the prosperity of the Libyan people.

On February 24, the Brookings Institution hosted an event to discuss these issues. Moderated by Michael O’Hanlon, the conversation featured Federica Saini Fasanotti, whose new book “Vincere: The Italian Royal Army’s Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa 1922-1940” provides timely and salient insight into the history of warfare in Libya.

       

For much of its course, the war in Libya passed through deserts and rural areas, rarely reaching cities. The war has been carried out by relatively few combatants — rather, the conflict has been marked by the use of drones, as well as long stalls on the battlefield. In April of this year, Libyan Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar — who leads the armed wing of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives — launched an offensive on the capital of Tripoli, marking a major new stage of the country’s now almost eight-year civil war. In the months since, at least 1,000 people have been killed in the fighting, including around 200 civilians. An estimated 128,000 have been displaced.

Now, a possible new phase of the conflict puts 1 million people at imminent risk. After weeks of stalemate, the conflict has started to move inside the capital, with bombings intensifying in the core of the city. Tripoli could soon experience even more deadly urban warfare. With the international community still in a state of deadlock, Washington must push harder for a ceasefire.

The futility of international summits

In October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Libya — facing an ongoing institutional vacuum — was going to become the “main terrorist hub in North Africa where this disease [terrorism] may spread into other countries and continents.” At the beginning of December, sitting at the Mediterranean Dialogues Conference (MED) in Rome, he claimed that before organizing any other conference on Libya — referring to the one slated to be held in Berlin next year — international leaders should take into account the agreement signed last February in Abu Dhabi by Libya’s two leaders: Fayez al-Serraj in the name of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, and Haftar in the name of the House of Representatives (HoR). At previous junctures, the two have agreed in principle to the creation of a new presidential council, the drafting of a new constitution, and fair sharing of oil incomes. Since none of that has yet materialized, many international actors see additional conferences as a waste of time.

During the MED, Special Envoy of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya Ghassam Salamé emphasized the deterioration of the situation on the ground in Libya in the last few weeks. Both sides are increasing their use of drones, artificially increasing an otherwise small number of soldiers and fighters. Since Haftar launched his Tripoli offensive on April 4, his Libyan National Army (LNA) has launched around 800 drone attacks, while the GNA has launched about 270. In recent weeks, the aerial bombardments have increased, above all those directed towards the center of Tripoli, which was spared until now. Salamè has said that they are getting closer and closer to the most populated area, meaning there is a real chance of carnage.

Foreign footprints in Libya

If the fight really reaches fully urbanized areas, meaning the core of the city, the type of warfare will change completely, with people fighting street by street. Russian mercenaries fighting on Haftar’s behalf have exacerbated the violence in recent weeks. (For that reason, the GNA is collecting the names of the estimated 600-1,400 Russian fighters on the ground in order to create a list to present to Moscow.) They brought expertise, weapons, and ruthlessness. On behalf of al-Serraj’s GNA, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is now threatening to send troops to Tripoli to help. Last week, the two leaders signed a strategic agreement on new maritime borders in the Aegean, triggering Greece’s wrath and prompting the ouster of the Libyan ambassador to Athens. Rumors say that a new shipment of weapons from Ankara to Tripoli may be coming, as Turkey has done in the past.

But unless Turkey provides even stronger help, GNA militias in Tripoli face a particularly grim situation. A street fight is completely different from fighting in rural areas: The casualties (including among civilians) will grow exponentially.

The deep divisions within the international community have prevented the call for a ceasefire. The Security Council has met 15 times since the war began in 2011, but with no meaningful effect. Instead, the external interference has become more and more intense: The U.N. arms embargo has been violated at least 45 times since the beginning of the conflict.

For this reason, Salamé has changed his strategy, which for the last 18 months had focused on domestic issues. He has asked for a short truce, strongly urged a serious gathering of the five permanent members of the Security Council to find common ground on the Libyan crisis, and called for an intra-Libyan dialogue without any foreign intrusion. In his formulation, a follow-up committee would monitor the ceasefire, through intelligence and control on the ground, without the use of U.N. forces.

The Libyan case clearly shows the profound polarization of the international community, which is also evident in the cases of Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and elsewhere. In the meantime, Russia — which believes that its Western counterparts are absolutely unreliable, as Lavrov claimed at the MED — is pursuing a more aggressive strategy in the region.

The key role of the US    

The United States has strong moral weight on the international scene, and its absence has given way to far more ruthless powers. The U.N. Security Council has not even agreed to a call for a ceasefire in Libya, which is emblematic. In recent days, the tension on the ground has intensified, in large part due to increased Russian and Turkish maneuvers.

That is why the U.S. government should take a serious stand against Haftar’s moves and issue an international condemnation against him, following the state of Virginia’s example. The White House, State Department, and Pentagon must synchronize their approaches and send a unified message. None of the four international conferences about Libya have yielded meaningful results, and what is now needed is a real commitment regarding the role of external actors and a strong U.N. call for an immediate ceasefire (which, as Salamé suggested, should be monitored by a neutral and international body working with both sides).

The only heavyweight capable of accelerating this process is the United States. An internationally accepted and controlled ceasefire would hopefully mean a real stop of external intrusions. Those intrusions — mostly mercenaries and arms — have been fundamental for Haftar’s ability to fight independently.

Finally, the White House should understand that Libya is not just the perfect safe haven for every terrorist: Libya is an important chance to show the world the positive potential of American diplomacy, a notion that has been lost recently in the morass of Yemen and especially in Syria.

       

General Khalifa Haftar started his long march toward power in May 2014. Under “Operation Dignity,” Haftar started a major fight against Islamists and militias in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya’s east. In March 2015, the House of Representatives in Tobruk appointed Haftar commander in chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA), a cluster of different militias. The LNA includes Islamists such as the Madkhalis, a fundamentalist group that supported Moammar Gadhafi and fought hard against ISIS in Libya. The LNA’s battle, under the guide of Haftar, to take Benghazi in 2014—as well as Derna, a city 155 miles to the east, in 2018—was slow.

In the meantime, Haftar also marched toward the Oil Crescent, the Libyan energy hub near the city of Sirte, to seize it from the Petroleum Facilities Guard of Ibrahim Jadhran. For this, Haftar earned the title of Field Marshal. And earlier this month, after a long march through southwestern Libya—a region known as Fezzan—Haftar made the bold decision to march on the capital city of Tripoli.

Over the last several years—in the name of an anti-terrorism fight and endless battles to control terrain—Haftar has won the support of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Russia, France, and Saudi Arabia. This, in spite of the fact that these countries also claim to support a strong role for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and its special envoys, which back Haftar’s opposition: Tripoli’s Government of National Accord, led by Fayez al-Serraj.

They have sent Haftar advisors, funds, and weapons. The United States, meanwhile, has kept its distance from the Libya file since the murder of its ambassador in Benghazi in September 2012. Instead, Washington’s interest has largely been limited to a sporadic fight against terrorist groups in the Maghreb and the Sahel. That approach is clearly a tactical one, but does not amount to a strategy.

Haftar’s bold move

Under Italian colonization, the Royal Army in Libya was divided in two contingents, with two different commanders. This helped control logistics in such a hostile environment: Long distances, lack of infrastructure, a desert of shifting dunes, and unbearable temperatures made it enormously difficult to move supplies, which affected every decision of the professionalized Italian military.

Haftar, in contrast, took a rag-tag army comprised of barely-trained militias across the vast Fezzan. He dangerously stretched the contingent in doing so. The soldiers captured in the first week of the siege on Tripoli are very young and clearly not up to the task. Moreover, hundreds of young dead Cyrenaicans (from the east) have now been buried in Tripolitania (in the west), creating a huge problem in the eastern city of Benghazi, where families cannot get back the bodies of their children. At this point, it’s clear that Haftar has only two choices: winning the battle for Tripoli or leaving Libya forever. No one in Benghazi would ever accept him as a loser.

That’s why the fight in the capital looks to be long and bloody, unless the militias that govern Tripoli manage to subdue the strongly hated Haftar. Civilians, caught in the crossfire, see this as an attack on them and an offense to the city’s honor; the militias defending Tripoli see the attack as a huge risk for their territory and their freedom of movement. Accepting Haftar would mean losing all that.

The wrong man for Libya

Thousands of years ago, the great Chinese General Sun Tzu wrote that the best general is the one who wins the war without fighting. Haftar should have taken inspiration from him. He should have known that, in spite of all their frictions, Libyans are able to unify in the face of a common enemy, and that is exactly what Tripoli’s militias—usually busy warring with each other—did in recent weeks.

And even though the field marshal should be able to win the war thanks to his external allies, it’s hard to predict what exactly will happen. Regardless, Tripoli will remain a chaotic place. Ongoing chaos provides fertile ground for resistance groups, including terrorist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

Libyans do not deserve more bloodshed or another military regime. That’s why Haftar is the wrong man for Libya. His attack on Tripoli spoiled the chance to hold a U.N.-backed National Conference in the city of Ghadames in mid-April, which should have been a crucial moment for unity.

Haftar, had he been wiser, could have gathered his army but allowed the conference to proceed in peace—at that point, he could claim to have helped the peace process and position himself as the only Libyan leader able to guarantee progress. Instead, he chose a path of violence, which never pays back—violence hits, first of all, the civilians.

The role for the United States

Before tweeting something rash, President Trump should think seriously about the productive role the United States might play. As I have argued before, the U.S. role could be still determinant in reversing Libya’s awful downward spiral. The United States could have an important diplomatic function on two fronts: To coordinate and balance the different external actors, and to help mediate between the main internal actors, namely the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and the Tabrouk-based House of Representatives.

Washington should take a clear, firm position on Libya that acknowledges U.N. resolutions that the United States has supported in the past. It should also push for a withdrawal of Haftar’s army from Tripoli and for a common voice—among the key external players—on Libya.

In practical terms, the United States should leverage the preferential relations it has with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, making sure that no more material support goes to Haftar’s army. Without that support, Haftar would remain mired outside the gates of Tripoli. If Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to step back, the UAE would do so as well, and the chain of support for Haftar would break.

As for Western diplomacy, more resolute U.S. action would block any dangerous French ambitions linked to the energy sector, in particular. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo should work to improve relations between France and Italy regarding Libya, a problematic split in what has become a deeply divided Europe.

Finally, a simple military gesture—such as the placement of an American warship outside the port of Tripoli—would send a clear message to Haftar and could encourage him to retreat from any further violence on the capital.

       

On March 12, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted an event to highlight a new collaborative report which outlines recommendations for the United States and other outside actors on a new policy in Libya. The crux of these recommendations is to focus the country’s economic, political, and security activity on its major cities, with the United States reinstating its embassy and ambassador.

Questions from the audience followed the panelists’ discussion.