Brookings: Experts - Khaled Elgindy

The End Of 'Fayyadism' In Palestine

Khaled Elgindy — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Nearly a week after the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Washington is still coming to terms with what happened and what a post-Fayyad era might mean. To many, Fayyad’s departure has dealt a major blow to the seven-year project he oversaw to build the institutions of a future Palestinian state, and hence to the prospect of peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians. According to one Washington analyst, Fayyad’s departure represents an “early defeat for Secretary [of State John] Kerry” as well as his boss. “For the last four years,” opined the analyst, “the administration has elected to work with Abbas at the expense of Fayyad.” This view, while common in Washington policy circles, stems from a basic misreading of both Fayyad’s role and the reasons behind its termination.

The end of the Fayyad era was not only inevitable, but was always bound to elicit far more anxiety in Washington, London and Brussels than in Ramallah, Nablus, or Hebron—not because Palestinians don’t want or need institutions but because Fayyad’s institution-building project, affectionately known as “Fayyadism,” had run its course and, more importantly, was fundamentally out of step with Palestinian realities and politics.

To be sure, Fayyad’s was always an impossible job. And in the end both he and his economic recovery and institution-building plans were doomed by a perfect storm of internal and external forces—an inept and corrupt Palestinian leadership, an all-consuming and repressive Israeli occupation and a deeply flawed and dysfunctional “peace process.”

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is itself a “government” unlike any other; it has neither an army nor sovereignty over its territory. Meanwhile, its very institutions, which remain almost entirely dependent on foreign largesse, are themselves of questionable legitimacy. President Mahmoud Abbas’s term is technically expired, while the Palestinian parliament has not convened in five years. All this in the context of a debilitating division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, which—thanks to U.S. and Israeli opposition to internal Palestinian reconciliation—has become part and parcel of the U.S.-led “peace process.”

Fayyad’s government was further constrained by a severe fiscal crisis triggered by growing domestic debt and the drying up of international donor funds. Last, but certainly not least, were the myriad restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation itself, including the hundreds of impediments to movement and access necessitated by Israel’s vast and ever-expanding settlement enterprise in the West Bank.

Even against such overwhelming odds, Fayyad’s efforts proved to be stunningly successful. As early as April 2011, the World Bank had effectively “certified” the PA as being “well positioned to establish a state at any time in the near future.” Since then, the World Bank has continued to reaffirm that conclusion, while warning that “Israeli restrictions and controls… have a detrimental impact not only on economic growth but also constrain the PA’s ability to develop its institutions as well as limit politically its room for maneuver on tougher reforms.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have long since lost faith in the Oslo process, of which “Fayyadism” was merely the latest incarnation. Last September’s “cost of living” protests were an early warning signal, particularly the ease with which popular anger against Salam Fayyad’s austerity measures morphed into generalized demands for the cancellation of the Oslo Accords themselves. Having reached the upper limits of what could be achieved, and in the absence of a genuine political progress, it was only natural that the process would turn in on itself.

Among other things, the September protests raised questions about the value of building governing institutions while overlooking—if not actively reinforcing—the broader dysfunctional context in which they operated. Why should 36 percent of the PA’s budget go to security while only 2 percent is spent on agriculture? Likewise, what value was there in building institutions that cannot reach 40 percent of its population in Gaza? Or that hasn’t had a functioning parliament in nearly six years? How far can an economic recovery plan go when Palestinians are prohibited from accessing or developing 60 percent of the West Bank in the resource-rich Jordan Valley? In short, what value was there in building the institutions of a state that never comes into being?

Fayyad’s “institution-building” was never intended to be a stand-alone project. Its international sponsors, including the United States, understood that its success would depend on progress made along parallel diplomatic and political tracks. With both a credible negotiations process and developments in Palestinian politics in a state of “peace process”-imposed paralysis, however, Fayyadism became a substitute for both meaningful diplomatic efforts to end the Palestinians’ predicament and the domestic political means to achieve it.

All of which raises an even more fundamental contradiction. Fayyad is rightly credited with several major accomplishments, including restoring basic law and order, scaling back corruption, and reestablishing a measure of public confidence in Palestinian institutions. However, if these accomplishments cannot withstand Fayyad’s absence—as many now fear they won’t—then they were never institutions to begin with. Any policy that is so bound up in a single solitary mortal being is by definition untenable—underscoring both the absence of strategic foresight in the U.S.-led “peace process” and a stunning lack of regard for domestic Palestinian politics.

America’s casual disdain for domestic Palestinian politics was summed up rather succinctly by DOS spokeswoman Victoria Nuland in February 2012. Responding to a question about internal reconciliation efforts, Nuland put it thus: “What matters to us and what matters… to the process that we are trying to keep on track here is that Abbas remains the president, that Fayyad remains the prime minister.” The same infantilizing attitude was displayed when word first broke of Fayyad’s possible resignation, in which a State Department prematurely (and incorrectly) declared, “As far as I know he's sticking around.” American interference in the domestic politics of other countries is certainly not unheard of, including in Israel. But whereas in Israel and elsewhere such interventions are the exception, in Palestine they are the rule.

Despite his numerous accomplishments, Fayyad was simply no longer viable from the standpoint of Palestinian domestic politics. While Fatah and Hamas have seldom agreed on anything, the two warring factions were united in their staunch opposition to Fayyad’s rule, as was a growing segment of the Palestinian populace. For all his popularity in diplomatic circles, Fayyad never had any significant domestic base of support. His “Third Way” party won only two seats in the last parliamentary elections and continues to poll at under one percentage point, while his approval ratings have steadily declined. Fayyad was by no means despised by the masses, but nor was he seen as the messiah-like figure held up by the West.

Whether or not domestic opposition to Fayyad is wise or warranted in the eyes of the U.S. or other western governments is wholly beside the point. Just because Palestinians do not have a state does not mean they do not have politics or that their leaders are immune from public opinion and other domestic pressures.

Indeed, for many in the U.S. and Israel, “Fayyadism” is seen not just as a pathway to Palestinian statehood but as a means of “reinventing” Palestinian politics along the way—which may also explain much of the anxiety surrounding his departure. Without Fayyad and his institution-building project, the U.S., Israel and the rest of the international community come face-to-face with the core of the conflict—the occupation, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees—in the form of a genuine diplomatic process aimed at ending the conflict, and hence with Palestinian politics as well.

The fact that Palestinians do not have a state is not because they do not have enough, or the right kind of, institutions. Those institutions exist, whether in the form of the PA or the ostensibly more representative and authoritative umbrella of the PLO—the Palestine Liberation Organization. But for those institutions to function properly, they must have domestic political support and legitimacy. For that to happen, they must be seen as working for and not against Palestinian basic aspirations—namely ending the occupation and achieving self-determination.

In short, it is the absence of a credible peace process as well as an inability to come to terms with Palestinian politics that has led to the erosion of existing Palestinian institutions, and not the other way around.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: The Daily Beast

Obama, Netanyahu and the Peace Process: Is Progress Possible?

Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Despite the notable diplomatic victory of helping normalize relations between Israel and Turkey, hopes for reviving the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians remain low following President Obama’s first trip to Israel. Billed as a trip where the President would ”listen” to the newly formed Israeli government and Palestinian leaders as opposed to actively seeking to renew talks between the two sides, it remains unclear whether any progress can be made on this perpetually vexing issue. Is there any hope for a renewed peace process? What role can the Obama administration play in restarting talks between Israelis and Palestinians? What will the new coalition in Israel mean for the country’s foreign policy?

On March 28, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine the future of the stalled peace process. Panelists included former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich, Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Natan Sachs. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Palestinian Politics Do Matter

Khaled Elgindy — Sun, 24 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

With President Obama's visit to Israel and the occupied territories now behind us, attention is likely to turn to how we might restart the peace process. But if the past is any indication, one crucial element will be largely ignored in the discussion: Palestinian politics.

In contrast to the almost limitless deference shown to the pressures of Israeli domestic politics (as when Obama abandoned calls for a settlement freeze in 2010 because of the composition of Israel's governing coalition), American officials remain remarkably tone deaf to Palestinian political needs. But there are some realities they need to understand about the deeply divided Palestinian body politic.

It has now been seven years since Hamas defeated Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah faction in a parliamentary election for control of the authority. That 2006 electoral victory emboldened Hamas' forces to seize control of the Gaza Strip, ending nearly half a century of Fatah domination of Palestinian politics. Although Abbas has managed to cling to his position as president of the Palestinian Authority, he and his leadership have little to show for their rule other than a series of failed negotiations, a cash-strapped government on the verge of collapse and an unprecedented schism in the Palestinian national movement.

Meanwhile, Abbas' term has long since expired, and the Palestinian parliament has not convened in nearly six years — both testaments to the paralysis of Palestinian politics as well as the waning legitimacy of Palestinian leaders.

Palestinians today are deeply frustrated with this divided and ineffective leadership, Israel's ongoing repression and ever-expanding settlement enterprise, and a so-called peace process that has done little more than enable all of these.

Despite all of this, the United States continues to operate as though Abbas' West Bank leadership has no political opposition or public opinion to answer to. For too long, American policymakers have treated Palestinian politics as something that can be avoided, suppressed or, if need be, reshaped. Indeed, if an accommodation is to be made, it is usually Palestinian politics that must bend to the perceived needs of the peace process rather than the other way around.

Even today, the United States continues to pressure Palestinian leaders to return to talks, despite their slim chance of success and the enormous costs incurred by repeated failures. And, despite the strong desire of Palestinians to see an end to the seven-year rift between Fatah and Hamas, the Obama administration continues to oppose internal Palestinian reconciliation efforts.

As convenient as it might seem, the idea that Palestinian politics don't matter, or that they can somehow be reengineered by outside actors, is both wrongheaded and dangerous. Hamas may be a problematic actor, but it cannot simply be wished away or boycotted out of existence. Despite its record of violence, including horrific attacks against Israeli civilians, Hamas remains a major force in Palestinian politics; it has also shown a willingness to play pragmatic politics, both in terms of Israeli security and a two-state solution.

Attempting to exclude Hamas or any other political group is a recipe for perpetual internal conflict; it is also self-defeating. As the recent Gaza conflict has demonstrated, the policy of isolating Hamas while building up the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has been a spectacular failure. Hamas has more international legitimacy today than before, while the authority is on the brink of collapse.

Even thorny issues such as the fate of Palestinian refugees, another important political constituency long neglected by both the peace process and their own leaders, cannot be ignored indefinitely.

Palestinians may not have a state yet, but that doesn't exempt their political leaders from very real domestic constituencies and political pressures that they must answer to, whether inside the occupied Palestinian territory or in the diaspora. Just as we intuitively understand the constraints imposed on the administration by Congress and by powerful domestic lobbies, or remain preoccupied with the ever-present concerns of Israel's coalition politics, so too should the U.S. begin to acknowledge and accommodate Palestinian politics.

Although it is true that Palestinians do not enjoy anything like the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel, simple logic ought to dictate that a weak and divided Palestinian leadership with questionable domestic legitimacy is in no position to negotiate a comprehensive agreement with Israel. More important, for such an agreement to hold, it must have buy-in from key Palestinian political constituencies, including both supporters and opponents of the current leadership. The same is true of Israel, or any other nation — a point President Obama alluded to in his speech to Israeli students in Jerusalem when he stressed that "peace must be made among peoples, not just governments."

"As more governments respond to popular will," the president said, "the days when Israel could seek peace with a handful of autocratic leaders are over." Although the president was referring to Arab states in the throes of revolutionary change, the point applies equally to the Palestinians.

The United States does not have to like Palestinian politics or endorse its themes or outcomes — any more than it needs to embrace the appointment of pro-settlement and anti-peace figures to Israel's Cabinet — but it does need to acknowledge them. No political leadership should have to choose between international acceptance and domestic legitimacy. Indeed, any credible peace process must allow the Palestinians to have both.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Los Angeles Times

Image Source: © Jason Reed / Reuters

Brookings Expert Roundtable on President Obama’s Trip to the Middle East

Martin S. Indyk, Khaled Elgindy and Natan B. Sachs — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 13:30:00 -0400

On March 19, President Obama will travel to the Middle East where, in addition to visiting Israel, he will meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah. While this will be Obama's first visit to Israel as president, the White House has sought to lower expectations for any breakthrough in the peace process. In a roundtable discussion, Brookings experts Martin Indyk, Khaled Elgindy and Natan Sachs preview the president's trip. Their discussion explores Palestinian and Israeli expectations of Obama’s trip and the Israeli government's newly formed coalition government—including its prospects for negotiations with the Palestinians. They also discuss what role, if any, Secretary of State John Kerry might play in the future of the Middle East peace process.

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Brookings Experts on Netanyahu’s New Coalition Government in Israel

Fri, 15 Mar 2013 10:59:00 -0400

Yesterday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled his new coalition government, seven weeks after his re-election. Following deadlocked negotiations, a slimmer government—with just 21 members—emerged and will be Israel’s first without ultra-Orthodox parties since 2005. Netanyahu’s announcement comes just days before President Obama is scheduled to visit the country. Martin Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Michael Doran, Khaled Elgindy, and Natan Sachs weigh in on the new coalition, and analyze the effect on the Middle East peace process.

Tamara Cofman Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Benjamin Netanyahu starts his new term as Prime Minister in a weakened position after he conceded essentially to all of Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid's demands (even yielding on education minister at the last minute) and still not getting an agreement for another week.

Lapid as finance minister, and Yesh Atid holding education and welfare, puts them in a strong position to fulfill campaign promises and position Lapid for greater gains in the next election. Indeed, the next election seems his primary concern. For Lapid, the peace process is not a priority issue.

Bayit Yehudi, for its part, received ministerial positions for Jerusalem, Diaspora, and religious services, all key for its constituency. A former head of the settler council, Uri Ariel, will run the ministry of housing and construction. No one expects this government to last a full term. Scenarios raised are either that it won't pass a budget or that Netanyahu will stymie Lapid so badly that it will drive him out of the coalition, allowing Netanyahu to bring in the religious parties and to shape the government he wanted all along. The latter could, I believe, only strengthen Lapid in new elections.

Aryeh Deri notwithstanding, the Haredis' attitudes on territorial compromise have changed. Netanyahu may not be comfortable with the status quo in Israel's relations with the Palestinians, given the price in international isolation and the harm to trade and relations with Europe. But beyond making some gestures, it's not clear how much he is willing to do. And with or without the Haredim, his coalition will not push him in a conciliatory direction.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

If the U.S. pushes Netanyahu on anything serious (not likely), then the coalition will fall, because Bennett will not be able to support. Which leads to a counterintuitive conclusion: you really need the ultra-Orthodox parties in the government to support serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues, because those parties give the government an extra margin of support.

I predict a short life for this coalition. This strikes me as a government in which everybody will be jockeying for position in the next election right away. The big issue will be Haredim in the military, and that will be very divisive.

Israelis love to complain about the Haredim, it's true, and everybody thinks they have gone too far. However, the secular-religious fight that is going to open up will be brutal. It's the biggest fault line in the society, and once the religious start hammering away at this government, I think we will see lots of cracks open up quickly—on lots of different issues.

The territorial questions are not central to the Haredim’s political identity and their participation in a government gives the prime minister more room to maneuver. They do not facilitate, and they have obstructionist tendencies, but they help to create an environment that is more propitious than what we get without them, which we see before us now. To me, it's a great irony of Israeli politics that I never contemplated before now.

Martin Indyk
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Program

The Haredim issue will not divide the government, but I don't doubt it will divide society. However, the bark is always worse than the bite in Israeli politics.

The proposition that the ultra-Orthodox parties need to be in the government for it to be able to make serious moves on Israeli-Palestinian issues is unsupported by any evidence. The Haredim have been one of the enablers of the settlement movement, and they moved progressively to the right on peace issues while they were in the government. Now in the opposition they'll be in bed with Labor and the Arab parties. Maybe that will bring them back to where they were during the Yitzhak Rabin years, but even then they were unreliable peace partners.

The Haredim are out of this government, so drafting them into the army will not divide it or bring it down. On the contrary: Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett are united on this issue, Tzipi Livni supports them, and Avigdor Lieberman’s side of the Likud is at least as hard line on it as they are. The rest of the Likud are secularist settler sympathizers. And the Haredim won't get much comfort from Shelly Yacimovich and their new leftist-secularist parties allies in the opposition. We are about to see a reasonable sharing of the burden. Good news for Israeli society even if it's bad news for the peace process.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree that the Yair Lapid-Naftali Bennett alliance hides real differences between their parties, especially on issues of religion and foreign policy. In some respects, this is not a “natural” alliance; I'm actually very impressed by the discipline among the ranks of Bennett's Jewish Home party throughout these negotiations, sustaining the alliance with the secularist Yesh Atid. But the religious issues might not fracture the coalition in the short term; the main questions surrounding the Haredim have been agreed upon already and will be implemented before long, according the coalition agreement. In other words, that hurdle is largely passed. Now what remains is for Jewish Home to collect the benefits, in terms of jobs and influence within the religious community, from control over the religious affairs ministry and other positions of power. This they will be very happy to do.

One potential source of tension in the coalition is actually is the Bennett-John Kerry axis. If the United States pushes on the Palestinian issue, fissures can emerge between the core of the coalition and its far right. I agree completely that the Haredim are not a secure base for the Middle East peace process, but the Jewish Home is much less so. One of their central demands was to get the housing portfolio, with settlements in mind, and with the new, hawkish defense minister (Moshe Yaalon, from the Likud) there may be more activity on that front.

The potential silver lining for diplomacy is that some of the recent noises from the prime minister’s office are consistent with Tzipi Livni's more moderate approach. Even Yaakov Amidror, the national security advisor—probably as right wing as anyone—now reportedly sees the diplomatic price Israel pays over the settlements. The PMO's solution will likely be an attempt to garner support through talks--and through having Livni in place to lead them—whether or not these talks are meaningful or based on a true change in policy. But it's worth remembering that there is always discussion whether now—of all times—there is a change of heart in Netanyahu's circles on the Palestinian issue. This may well just be spin.

If and when the government falls, there could either be an alternative government, with the Haredim, or even new elections. A lot depends on whether Lapid sees an electoral opportunity and whether Livni is inclined to leave as well. If the center leaves en masse, Netanyahu will have a hard time, mathematically; the right + religious is likely too narrow for comfort. If Bennett's party leaves because of diplomatic developments, the Haredim may jump back in to get revenge on the Modern Orthodox, but if the mood is that Netanyahu is vulnerable, they may prefer elections to get their revenge on him too. In short, as is usually the case, the brand new government in Israel may not last its full term.

Khaled Elgindy
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

It looks as though the new Israeli government intends to be quite active on the Palestinian issue after all—though not in the way most had hoped. With the appointment of Uri Ariel, former head of the settlers’ umbrella group known as the Yesha Council and himself a West Bank settler, to head the Ministry of Housing and Construction we can expect an even greater surge in settlement expansion in the occupied territories than we’ve seen in recent years. Ariel’s Bayit Yehudi party, the third pillar of Netanyahu’s ruling coalition and third biggest vote-getter in the Knesset, not only opposes territorial concessions to the Palestinians but openly rejects the two-state solution itself—sentiments shared by many in Netanyahu’s own Likud party. The strong pro-settlement bent of the new Israeli government is certain to alarm Palestinian leaders in Ramallah, who are sure to reiterate their message about the dangers posed by the settlements and the urgency of a two-state solution to President Obama directly on his upcoming visit to Israel and the occupied territories. Having withstood similar pleadings for much of the last four years, however, there is little reason to expect the administration to abandon its laissez faire attitude toward settlements or become more actively engaged in peacemaking any time soon.

Martin Indyk

In addition to settler control of the Housing Ministry, the Interior Ministry will be in the hands of Likud and the Defense Ministry also. So the three critical ministries for settlement activity will be in the hands of those most committed to the settlement cause.

Authors

The Failure of Egyptian Politics

Khaled Elgindy — Mon, 28 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Editor's note: This article was orginally published by Tahrir Squared.

Two years ago, Egyptians from all walks of life—Muslims and Christians, men and women, rich and poor, young and old—stood side-by-side and shoulder-to-shoulder in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to demand an end to sixty years of dictatorship. This week, as Egyptians mark the second anniversary of the revolution, the contrast between the iconic images that defined the eighteen-day uprising and where Egypt is today could not be more stark.

Two years after launching their historic revolution, Egyptians are more divided than ever, and as the weekend’s deadly clashes have shown, violence has become the rule rather than the exception at Egyptian protests. Beneath the surface of the ever-present split between Islamists and non-Islamists that has dominated Egyptian politics for much of the last two years lie a number of other deep and growing fissures in Egyptian society along generational, class, and sectarian lines, and which occasionally erupt into open conflict and violence.

The toxic nature of Egyptian political discourse, framed increasingly in existential and zero-sum terms, continues to inspire violence by both supporters and opponents of the current government, including the violent confrontations surrounding President Morsi’s controversial decrees and the crisis over the constitution at the close of 2012. Far from consolidating Egypt’s path toward stability and democracy, the election of the country’s first civilian president last summer and the adoption of a new constitution last month have only deepened the atmosphere of polarization and mutual delegitimization that has dominated Egypt’s transition since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak.

This sorry state of affairs is above all a failure of Egypt’s political class, which has repeatedly failed to place the broader public good over their own petty partisan, ideological and parochial concerns. Since the start of the transition, the vast majority of Egyptian political forces opted to negotiate with the SCAF—much as they had under Mubarak and his predecessors—rather than find ways of working together, giving the ruling military council a virtual free hand to manipulate the process and sowing the seeds of future instability. A number of proposals to form a broadly representative “presidential council” to oversee or co-manage the transition repeatedly came to naught. This dysfunctional dynamic has persisted to this very day, effectively transforming Egypt’s transition into an endless power struggle.

While much of the blame for Egypt’s botched transition rests on the country’s former military rulers, all sides are guilty of overreach and misreading of the political map. For all its electoral prowess and mastery of retail politics, the Muslim Brotherhood has been spectacularly inept at nearly every other aspect of politics. The Brotherhood’s record of broken promises, unilateralism and a deeply ingrained majoritarian mindset have burned bridges across the political landscape and earned it a reputation for rank opportunism.

That the Brotherhood and other Islamist forces also mistook their repeated electoral success for a genuine popular mandate for their highly contentious Islamist project further alienated what few political allies they still had. Faced with periodic unrest and a recalcitrant bureaucracy the Brotherhood may finally be starting to realize that there is more to politics than elections, and that its ability to govern—at all if not effectively—requires a modicum of good will and political consent. President Mohammed Morsi’s response to the current crisis—dismissing ongoing unrest as signs of a “counter-revolution” while at the same time renewing calls for “national dialogue”—is typical of the kind of dual discourse that has led so many to distrust the Brotherhood. Opposition forces meanwhile have dismissed Morsi’s call for dialogue as an empty gesture, but have consistently failed to present a viable alternative.

Despite representing sizeable constituencies, the various secular, liberal and revolutionary groups that make up the opposition camp remain highly fractious and lack both a coherent political vision and a reliable political base on the ground. In lieu of a strategy, opposition forces continue to fall back on the over-used and increasingly ineffective tactics of protest and boycott. In addition, the opposition has failed to cultivate and mobilize what should have been a natural constituency: the highly energized but politically unsavvy youth movements that spawned the Jan. 25 uprising and that have remained a vanguard for change ever since. Saturday’s announcement by the National Salvation Front (NSF), the opposition umbrella headed by Mohammed ElBaradei, that it will boycott upcoming legislative elections is emblematic of the opposition’s lack of political foresight and penchant for self-marginalization. If the Brotherhood presides over a government that cannot govern, the NSF represents the equally absurd specter of an opposition that won’t oppose.

The bankruptcy of Egypt’s political class is taking a heavy toll. In addition to crippling basic governance, Egypt’s chronic instability is steadily eroding basic law and order and battering its already shaky economy—all of which fuel the cycle of unrest. It is no wonder, then, that Egyptians are beginning to turn away from politics. Despite high levels of enthusiasm in the early stages of the transition, voter apathy has increased steadily over the past two years. Each round of voting has witnessed successively lower voter turnout, culminating in December’s constitutional referendum in which just 32% of eligible voters turned out, the lowest of any since the start of the transition.

What if anything can be done to prevent Egypt from sliding deeper into crisis? Without an all-powerful central authority with which to turn, Egyptians have no choice but to learn to deal with each other. Like it or not, Egyptians may have no choice but to engage in a genuine national dialogue aimed at reaching a broad-based consensus. Indeed, a credible process of consensus-building may be the only way to militate against the Brotherhood’s majoritarianism and the opposition’s spoilerism. Egypt’s diverse political actors do not have to love one another, only to find some way to inhabit the same social and political space. Since President Morsi has already shown he is incapable of rising above his partisan and ideological loyalties, such an initiative will have to come from outside actors, such as Al-Azhar University or other credible third parties. While consensus-building has often been dismissed by Egyptians of all political stripes as unworkable and politically naïve, the alternative—increasing instability and violence—hardly seems more workable.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Tahrir Squared

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Ramallah Unravels - The Collapse of the Palestinian Authority

Khaled Elgindy — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA) demise would eliminate the single most tangible expression of efforts to achieve a two-state solution – all but destroying chances for a peaceful settlement between Palestine and Israel for the forseeable future. Khaled Elgindy drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.

If the PA collapses, what would be the initial impact?
What can Congress do to ensure the Palestinian Authority's stability?
How should the secretary of state reapproach political negotiations?

Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)

TO: President Obama

FROM: Khaled Elgindy

Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is threatening to dissolve the PA and hand back to Israel full responsibility for the 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank. Even without such a step, the severe fiscal crisis within the PA, compounded by Israel’s withholding of Palestinian tax transfers (accounting for two-thirds of the PA budget) and the drying up of international — especially Arab — donor funds, could lead to the same result.

The collapse of the PA could lead to large-scale Palestinian civil unrest and perhaps even a total breakdown in law and order in the West Bank, increasing the chances of a violent Palestinian uprising against Israel, a full Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, and/or a takeover by extremist elements. From a strategic standpoint, the PA’s demise would eliminate the single most tangible expression of efforts to achieve a twostate solution — an investment totaling tens of billions of dollars from the United States and the international community over nearly two decades — all but destroying chances for a peaceful settlement between Israelis and Palestinians for the foreseeable future. It would also increase the isolation of our ally Israel and force it to deal with Palestinian demographic realities on a whole new basis that threatens the democratic and Jewish nature of the state. It would have serious negative implications for U.S. interests in the region and beyond.

Recommendation:

Despite the dire condition of the PA, its collapse is not inevitable. Strengthening the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, however, will require boosting the PA both economically and politically, as well as preparing the ground for a credible negotiations process. This will require you to press Congress to release aid to the PA, urge Israel to hand over all the tax revenues, and insist that the international donors fulfill their financial commitments. Israel will also need to be persuaded to allow Palestinian development in the West Bank’s Area C and stop new settlement activity. And it will require you to announce early on that you have asked the Secretary of State to prepare for a new initiative to achieve a two-state solution.

Background:

The collapse of the PA would instantly put out of work approximately 140,000 public sector employees, who serve as breadwinners for roughly onethird of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. This includes some 58,000 men who currently serve in the various PA security services. The implications of this are impossible to overstate. On the one hand, mass unemployment and the absence of a police force could easily degenerate into large-scale Palestinian civil unrest and perhaps even a total breakdown in law and order in the West Bank, an environment in which extremists would thrive. This in turn would dramatically increase the likelihood of a violent Palestinian uprising against Israel (a “third intifada”), a full Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank, and/or a takeover of Palestinian population centers in the West Bank by extremist or rogue elements. In addition to ending nearly 20 years of security coordination with Israel, the prospect of tens of thousands of idle, frustrated, well-armed and welltrained Palestinian security personnel would pose a whole slew of security challenges for Israel.

The PA’s collapse is likely to result in one or both of the following scenarios:

• Hamas Takeover: As the most obvious and most important beneficiary of the PA’s demise, Hamas would have both the means and incentive to try to extend its current control over Gaza to the West Bank. Buoyed by its recent “victory” in Gaza and its growing regional acceptance, Hamas may judge that Israel would be willing to tolerate Hamas rule in the West Bank if it shows it is able to prevent attacks on Israelis and maintain basic law and order. For Israelis, however, the West Bank is not Gaza, and the prospect of a well-armed, ascendant Hamas force situated just a few kilometers from Tel Aviv and most major Israeli population centers is unlikely to be tolerated by any Israeli government.

• Local Ad Hoc Leaderships: As an alternative to a Hamas takeover (or as a precursor to one), we could also see the emergence of multiple, ad hoc leaderships across the West Bank, comprised of some combination of local clan heads, municipal councils, business interests, and even gangs or warlords. Dealing with multiple centers of power would pose logistical challenges for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in its efforts to protect Israeli settlers while increasing the likelihood of friction both with and within Palestinian communities, making an IDF reoccupation of Palestinian cities and towns far more likely.

Preventing the PA’s Collapse:

In either case, the longer uncertainty and instability (or worse, violence and chaos) persist, the louder Palestinian, Arab, European and other voices will be for Israel, as the Occupying Power, to assume its responsibilities under international humanitarian law for both policing and governing the Palestinian population. The immediate objective for the United States therefore should be to do everything possible to prevent the collapse from occurring.

• The first priority is to prevent an imminent financial collapse of the PA by pushing all international donors, especially Arab states, to follow through on their commitments to the PA. For such calls to be credible, however, the U.S. and Israel must be willing to do the same. Thus, it is equally crucial that you press Congress for the immediate release of $200 million held since the PLO’s unsuccessful bid for full UN membership last year (and to refrain from further aid cuts) as well as pressure Israel to release all withheld VAT transfers, which account for some two-thirds of the PA budget.

• This is only a short-term fix, however, which cannot succeed without parallel economic and political measures. As a recent World Bank report makes clear, genuine economic growth is not possible while restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation remain in place, particularly the Palestinians’ inability to exploit or develop some sixty percent of the West Bank designated as Area C. It is time to have a serious conversation with the Prime Minister of Israel about lifting restrictions in substantial portions of Area C.

• It will not be possible to keep donor funds flowing or to sustain developments on the ground without meaningful and parallel progress at the political level. This will require credible U.S. action on the issue of Israeli settlements aimed at preventing the recent surge in settlement plans — especially in the E-1 corridor and other sensitive areas in and around East Jerusalem — from moving forward on the ground. While new negotiations remain a key objective, it would be a mistake to rush into them. Rather than merely urging (or attempting to force) the parties to return to the negotiating table, you should instruct your new secretary of state to undertake a serious appraisal of the likely requirements for success and causes of past failures, while making clear that an American initiative is forthcoming.

Minimizing the Fallout:

Should these efforts prove unsuccessful, and the PA collapses or is dissolved by Mahmoud Abbas, you would need to move quickly, in coordination with Israel and Jordan, to prevent West Bank cities and towns from descending into total chaos and to contain any outbreak of Palestinian– Israeli violence in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. At the same time, both the United States and Israel would have an overriding interest in preventing the total elimination of Fatah on the one hand and a complete, partial, or even attempted takeover by Hamas on the other. This will require close consultation with the Israelis to contain their military response to any unrest, and to prevent such a response from escalating the violence even further. It will also require engaging (directly or via third parties) with credible Palestinian interlocutors capable of exerting some measure of control on the ground — namely Fatah and Hamas. And since the United States cannot talk directly to Hamas, such coordination would need to take place through a unitary leadership mechanism such as the PLO, which could (at least theoretically) survive the PA’s demise.

Needless to say, this will require the United States to drop its opposition to Palestinian reconciliation, and encourage Israel to do likewise. Moreover, if we are to dissuade Hamas from taking over (or even attempting to) in the West Bank, it will need to be offered something in return. This will entail some sort of power-sharing arrangement in a newly restructured and reconstituted PLO, as well as working with Egypt and other regional partners like Qatar and Turkey to persuade Hamas to go along.

There are many risks involved in engaging with Hamas in this way, including legitimizing a designated terrorist organization whose charter calls for the destruction of Israel as well as the potential for provoking a backlash from Congress (to say nothing of the resistance from the government of Israel). Nevertheless, attempting to ignore or sideline Hamas would be even riskier and more costly, encouraging it to become more assertive and aggressive in both the West Bank and Gaza. Although Hamas would undoubtedly pay a heavy price for any confrontation with Israel, it would come at considerable cost to Israel as well, in both human and political terms. Any period of protracted violence between Israelis and Palestinians will subject Israel to greater international opprobrium and isolation, as well as growing calls for Israel to assume its responsibilities under international law, while extinguishing what little hope may still exist for a two-state solution. The simple reality is that a credible Palestinian interlocutor that can act effectively both on the ground and in the diplomatic sphere, regardless of its composition, is the only thing standing between where we are today and an eventual one-state outcome.

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Khaled Elgindy

Image Source: © Ammar Awad / Reuters

President Barack Obama’s Second Term: Big Bets and Black Swans

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 13:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 17, 2013
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

President Barack Obama begins his second term at a critical moment in world affairs, facing the many challenges that an unstable world—much of it in turmoil—presents. In response to these many challenges, Brookings Foreign Policy scholars have prepared a Presidential Briefing Book with memos to President Obama that detail the “Big Bets” that he should place in foreign policy, and the “Black Swans”—low probability, high impact events— that could unexpectedly dominate President Obama’s second term. The “Big Bets” include: a nuclear deal with Iran; a new approach to China; securing free trade agreements with Asia and Europe; outlining an Obama doctrine for the use and deployment of drones and cyberweapons; and establishing the United States as a leading energy exporter. The “Black Swans” include: a U.S.-China confrontation over Korea; revolution and war in China; the collapse of the House of Saud; the unraveling of the eurozone; the unraveling of the Palestinian Authority; and the impact of rising seas and climate change-related migration.

On January 17, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of “Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.” The first panel focused on the transformational policies that could shape a new global order. The second panel focused on the low probability, high impact events that might derail the president’s second term agenda. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy, provided introductory remarks. David Gregory, host of NBC’s Meet the Press, moderated both panel discussions.

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Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum: What Comes Next?

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 10:30:00 -0500

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December 17, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

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This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN2. The full video is available on cspan.org.

On December 15, Egyptians voted on a new constitution. The vote was intended to be the culmination of Egypt’s journey from authoritarianism to democracy, but it occurred amid a political crisis and, regardless of outcome, will not resolve tensions. What can the United States do to help ensure Egypt moves toward stable democracy? How will the U.S. relationship with Egypt emerge from this crisis?

On December 17, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore these and other questions about Egypt’s constitutional referendum and its effect on U.S.-Egyptian relations. Panelists included Brookings Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Shadi Hamid, director of research for the Brookings Doha Center, who appeared via video conference from Doha. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

After the program, panelists took audience questions.

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U.S. Support for Mahmoud Abbas's U.N. Bid for Palestine Could Save Two-State Solution

Khaled Elgindy — Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

As Gazans sift through the wreckage caused by Israel’s eight-day bombardment that ended in last week’s ceasefire, Palestinians are shifting their attention to two new controversies this week. As Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas was preparing for his historic statehood bid today at the United Nations, workers began exhuming the body of his late predecessor, Yasir Arafat, to allow doctors to perform an autopsy. While there may seem to be little connection between Mr. Abbas’s UN bid and Arafat’s exhumation, both events reveal a great deal about the current Palestinian leadership.

More than a year after Abbas’s initial request to the Security Council for full membership in UN, where it has languished in bureaucratic purgatory ever since, Abbas is returning to the UN to ask the General Assembly to upgrade the status of Palestine to that of a non-member state. Yet Abbas’s decision to go to the UN is not the product of a broader strategic vision but rather the lack of one.

Having tethered his political fate to the sinking ship of a US-sponsored peace process, Abbas has no place left to turn. Two decades of “peace processing” not only failed to bring Palestinians a state but have left Israel’s occupation more deeply entrenched and Palestinian institutions weaker and more divided than ever. The recent violence in Gaza has only highlighted Abbas’s impotence and growing irrelevance in Gaza, even as his West Bank authority teeters on the verge of financial collapse.

Abbas came to power in January 2005 determined to unify unruly Palestinian factions under his leadership and secure a peace deal that would end the decades-old conflict with Israel and establish a Palestinian state. Today Abbas presides over a divided and dysfunctional Palestinian polity comprised of a war-shattered and impoverished Gaza Strip that is beyond his reach and a West Bank that has been colonized and cantonized beyond recognition.

Abbas might have mitigated much of the damage to his leadership had he done more to put the Palestinian house in order, which has been badly divided since a brief civil war in 2007 left Hamas in charge of the Gaza Strip and his unelected Fatah faction in charge of the West Bank. Several agreements aimed at reconciling the two rival factions – which has been a central Palestinian demand since popular uprisings began toppling Arab dictators in early 2011 – remain unimplemented.

Instead of weaving together all three options – negotiations with Israel, national reconciliation, and the UN statehood bid – into a single, coherent strategy, Abbas chose to triangulate between all of them while fully committing to none of them.

The UN bid comes on the heels of yet another potentially explosive controversy. Just two days before Abbas arrived in New York, workers began exhuming the body of his late predecessor, Yasir Arafat, in order to determine an exact cause of death. And the two events may be linked by more than just timing.

In late 2004, besieged by the Israeli Army in his Ramallah headquarters for three years, Arafat suddenly fell ill before eventually dying in a French military hospital in November 2004. Arafat’s death became the subject of elaborate conspiracy theories, and many Palestinians, including some senior Palestinian Authority officials, continue to believe he was poisoned. The controversy was resurrected last July after an Al Jazeera documentary claimed to have uncovered new evidence supporting the poisoning theory.

The autopsy results could spark yet another crisis, as any evidence that suggests Arafat was poisoned will naturally focus suspicion on Israel, which has a history of assassinating Palestinian leaders dating back to at least the 1980s. Love him or hate him, Yasir Arafat was always larger than life, even while he was alive. As the architect of the Palestine Liberation Organization and a leader in both war and peace, Arafat is revered as the godfather of the Palestinian national movement. Ultimately, Arafat’s exhumation, and the Palestinian public’s fascination with it, is as much a commentary on the current Palestinian leader, Abbas, as it is nostalgia for the previous one.

The contrast between the two leaders is hard to ignore. Yasir Arafat is deceased, but his political legacy lives on. Although largely hated by the US, Israel, and even Arab leaders, he was admired, and in some cases even idolized, by his people. The reverse is true of Mahmoud Abbas. For all his moderation and acceptability to Israel and the international community, Abbas has little to show for his rule but a series of failed negotiations, a feckless and bankrupt authority, and an unprecedented division in the Palestinian national movement.

The one remaining card Abbas does have, however, is the United Nations statehood bid. As those close to him often point out, the choice for Abbas now is between going to the UN and going home.

The one remaining card Abbas does have, however, is the United Nations statehood bid. As those close to him often point out, the choice for Abbas now is between going to the UN and going home.

With more than 130 countries already pledging to support his UN bid, a victory for Abbas seems all but assured. Yet the United States and Israel remain adamantly opposed to the move, even threatening economic and other sanctions against Abbas’s already beleaguered and cash-strapped Palestinian Authority if he goes ahead with it. Such actions are ultimately self-defeating of course, since the collapse of the PA would almost certainly mean the end of a two-state solution, as well as its greatest champion. Whatever one thinks of Abbas as a leader, he is the only actor on any side actively working to bring about a two-state solution.

Of course, Abbas’s UN bid is as much an attempt to salvage his own legacy as it is a two-state solution. In seeking to deny him that legacy, however, the United States and Israel could end up destroying the possibility of a two-state solution as well.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: The Christian Science Monitor

Image Source: © Ahmed Zakot / Reuters

Egypt's Stake In the Gaza Strip's Stability

Khaled Elgindy — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Residents in Israel and the Gaza Strip are taking shelter and bracing themselves as rocket fire into both regions continues to take civilian lives. Egypt has condemned the strikes into Gaza and is sending its Prime Minister to Gaza for talks. Restoring peace in the region is critically important for Egypt’s new government, says Fellow Khaled Elgindy.

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Why Palestinians Protest

Khaled Elgindy — Thu, 20 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

With anti-American unrest spreading through the Muslim world and an ongoing crisis unfolding in Syria, one might be forgiven for missing the wave of Palestinian protests that swept through the Israeli-occupied West Bank this month. The uprising virtually paralyzed life in Palestinian cities, with scenes reminiscent of the first intifada: burning tires, shuttered shops, and general strikes punctuated by occasional clashes between rock-throwing Palestinian youths and uniformed security forces. What began as a relatively limited display of anger over soaring prices and unpaid salaries soon became, as the Associated Press put it, “the largest show of popular discontent with the Palestinian Authority [PA] in its 18-year existence.” The intensity of the protests has subsided in recent days, but the sentiments behind them will persist, plaguing Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and U.S. policy toward the region.

For ten straight days, starting on September 5, thousands of Palestinians, upset over rising food and fuel prices and the PA’s inability to pay government salaries, took to the streets to demand the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. These initial demonstrations were exploited by members of Fatah, PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ faction, with the aim of sidelining Abbas’ longtime rival and perhaps winning concessions from Israel and the PA’s foreign donors. But the protests quickly took on a life of their own, spreading to cities across the West Bank and eventually leading to demands for the ouster of Abbas, too.

Read more at foreignaffairs.com »

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Foreign Affairs

The Middle East and the Presidential Election: A Live Web Chat with Khaled Elgindy

Wed, 19 Sep 2012 12:30:00 -0400

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September 19, 2012
12:30 PM - 1:00 PM EDT

Online Only
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

The recent attacks on U.S. diplomatic outposts in Libya, Egypt and other parts of the Arab world have renewed debate about national security issues and U.S. policy in the Middle East as the Arab Awakening continues to unfold. The need to adapt to growing anti-American sentiment and political and economic instability in the region has brought foreign policy issues to the forefront of the presidential campaign.

How do the presidential candidates differ in their foreign policy strategies toward the Middle East? What are the implications of those agendas for the region? On September 19, Brookings expert Khaled Elgindy took your questions and comments in a live web chat moderated by Vivyan Tran of POLITICO.

12:30 Vivyan Tran: Welcome everyone, let's get started.

12:30 Khaled Elgindy: Hello everyone. Glad you could join us.

12:31 Comment from Elizabeth, USA: Is either candidate likely to address the strong anti-American sentiments raging throughout the Middle East before November? Do you think it will come up at the debates?

12:31 Khaled Elgindy: I think both candidates already have, in their own ways.

12:32 Khaled Elgindy: They clearly have different perspectives on the issue, as well as different roles. It's one thing to analyze from the outside, it's another to tackle the issue as the president.

12:33 Khaled Elgindy: I suspect the issue will come up on some level in the debates, though most likely in a fleeting and probably superficial manner. Foreign policy is not typically a major component of presidential debates and usually candidates stick to talking points.

12:34 Comment from Jon: You wrote recently that Obama has fallen out of favor with the public in many parts of the Middle East. What are the major contributors to this drop in popularity?

12:34 Khaled Elgindy: One of the big reasons is, quite simply, exaggerated expectations.

12:35 Khaled Elgindy: Obama came in promising all sorts of things — a new relationship with the Muslim world, Israeli-Palestinian peace, ending wars in Iraq & Afghanistan, closing Guantanamo, etc.

12:36 Khaled Elgindy: None of these has been accomplished.

12:36 Khaled Elgindy: This, combined with historical baggage and misunderstanding, has deepened the sense of disappointment.

12:37 Comment from Karen K.: How can the president, whoever wins, help to create more trust between the Arab world and the United States?

12:38 Khaled Elgindy: The U.S. has to do a better job of connecting with the people of the region, and not just the governments and elites.

12:39 Khaled Elgindy: This is a learning process on both sides of the relationship. There are deep, historical misunderstandings that color how each side (to be simplistic) views the other.

12:40 Khaled Elgindy: Just as the U.S. has strong bonds with other countries in a way that transcends politics and pragmatic interests, the U.S. will also need to start developing bonds with a broad range of social, civic, political, cultural and other actors in countries like Egypt, Libya, etc.

12:40 Khaled Elgindy: That will take time, of course, but it's worth the long-term investment.

12:41 Comment from Patricia: From a political perspective, what would be more advantageous to the Muslim Brotherhood —a second Obama term or a Romney presidency? What about for the Egyptian people?

12:42 Khaled Elgindy: The MB is a large and diverse organization. It's very hard to generalize about what they believe about the U.S .and other issues.

12:44 Khaled Elgindy: The MB's views on the U.S. are also in flux. They have come a long way in the 80 years of the existence. Their instinct, for historical and philosophical reasons, is to view the U.S. with mistrust. But now they are seeing the value of having the U.S. as an ally.

12:44 Khaled Elgindy: The short answer, however, is that they probably do not have a preference as far as Romney or Obama. They tend to view U.S. politicians with equal levels of distrust.

12:45 Comment from Anonymous: In the leaked video from the other day, Romney claimed that a two-state solution for the Palestinians and the Israelis raised too many difficult problems that couldn't be solved. I've listened to other serious policymakers who think a two-state solution is impossible at this point, but they seem to have reasons beyond "it would be complicated." Was there any merit whatsoever to Romney's private declaration that a two-state solution is impossible?

12:45 Khaled Elgindy: It may surprise you but I tend to agree.

12:46 Khaled Elgindy: What Romney did is to state explicitly what is essentially the unspoken position of the Obama administration.

12:47 Khaled Elgindy: The U.S. officially backs a two-state solution and sees no alternative to it — yet it is consistently unprepared to do what is required to bring it about. This is true of Democratic and Republican administrations.

12:48 Khaled Elgindy: Unfortunately, the 2-state solution is not going to be around forever and cannot always be subject to U.S. political calendar, etc.

12:49 Khaled Elgindy: Eventually, there will have to be a price for all the many years and opportunities that have been squandered — and that price may be the 2-state solution itself.

12:49 Comment from Jill: Following on Patricia's concern, what about Netanyahu's perspective? With Romney's recently disclosed statement about the unlikely success of a two-state solution, is Israel likely to throw their support towards him?

12:50 Khaled Elgindy: It's not unprecedented for U.S. and Israel leaders to meddle in each other’s domestic politics, and this time is no exception.

12:51 Khaled Elgindy: There are those in both Israel and DC who feel Netanyahu has already thrown his backing behind Romney and the GOP. It will be interesting to see how the Obama-Netanyahu relationship, which is already strained, will develop in the event Obama wins.

12:52 Comment from Abigail: What kind of balance does there need to be in dealing with Iran? I know Israel has asked for a red line on Iran; how would this impact U.S. relations in the region?

12:53 Khaled Elgindy: A very, very crucial issue.

12:53 Khaled Elgindy: The Iran issue is source of considerable debate here in DC, in the region, and around the world. There is tremendous anxiety about a nuclear Iran.

12:54 Khaled Elgindy: But Iran, of course, is not just about Iran. It also relates to so many other issues in the region — Syria, the Gulf, the price of oil, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, etc.

12:56 Khaled Elgindy: And it's not just the complex, strategic balance and relations in the region that is problematic. This crisis is coming at an extremely volatile and fast-moving moment in the region's history. It is almost impossible to "game out" all of the possible contingencies and things that could wrong in terms of an attack on Iran.

12:56 Khaled Elgindy: That's what makes this so difficult, and why the U.S. remains hesitant to go full throttle on the military option.

12:57 Comment from User in VA: Do you think the Arab world sees America as representative of the type of democracy so many have been calling for throughout the Arab Spring uprisings? Or are many in the Arab world craving a different vision of democracy?

12:57 Khaled Elgindy: The Arab world of course does not have a single view of the U.S.

12:57 Khaled Elgindy: Different countries and groups view the U.S. differently for different reasons.

12:58 Khaled Elgindy: Arabs also have nuanced views of the U.S. — there are some aspects they admire (U.S. democracy is one of them) and others they don't (e.g., U.S. policy).

12:59 Khaled Elgindy: It's a complicated picture for us and for them. But that also means there are opportunities for us to deepen our understanding. The most dangerous thing we can do, here or there, is to take a monolithic or essentialized view of the other. We need to constantly be attuned to changes and nuances.

1:00 Vivyan Tran: Thanks for the questions everyone, see you next week!

In Arab World, Obama Has Fallen from Grace

Khaled Elgindy — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: In an interview with France24.com, Khaled Elgindy examined how a U.S. president who initially inspired hope among Arabs failed to meet expectations.

F24: The new poll shows Obama to be very unpopular in the Arab world. What are the major sources of disappointment?

Khaled Elgindy: There was obviously a lot of hope when he came in, huge expectations that Arabs and other Muslims had of him. The disappointment reflected in the poll is partly due to the fact that he didn’t live up to expectations. But it’s also because the expectations were exaggerated to begin with – and not just in the Arab world.

In the Arab world, the expectation was that he would do more on the Palestinian issue, which is, of course, a unifying theme in the minds of Arabs. From an Arab point of view, Obama has been consistently bad on that issue, even though in some Israeli circles he has also been seen as abandoning Israel.

Arabs are disappointed because, on the ground, policy has not really changed from the Bush era. Obama has not even reached the most minimal expectations of Arabs. There is a sense that he’s shown disregard for Palestinian government and Palestinian needs, and that it’s a very paternalistic relationship that the US has with Palestinians.

That stands in stark contrast to how the US has adapted its policies in the wake of the Arab Spring. In Egypt, the US has done a fairly good job in adapting to dramatic changes. Even though the president of Egypt is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Obama administration had a very thoughtful approach to taking into account new Egyptian public opinion and sensibilities. There has been no such consideration when it comes to Palestinian politics.

F24: When we say Obama elicited a lot of hope, was that hope among regular Arabs or also among Arab diplomats and leaders?

Elgindy: Both. I don’t know what exactly diplomats and leaders were thinking, but anecdotally, I would say that part of the hope came from the fact that people were relieved that Bush was gone. Obama is someone who doesn’t look or talk like Bush. That pushed expectations even higher. So a lot of it was just relief, because from an Arab point of view, Bush was responsible for a lot of harm: in Iraq, Palestine, and in the Muslim world. So now, they’re saying: “We thought this guy would be really different from Bush, but he’s actually pretty similar -- not in the things he says, but in the things he does.”

Read the full interview at france24.com »

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: France24

The Muslim Brotherhood: Egypt's New NDP?

Khaled Elgindy — Sun, 26 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: This article was originally published on Ahram Online on August 26, 2012.

President Mohamed Morsi's recent sacking of the military's top brass, including former head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and de facto interim president of Egypt Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, has drawn both praise and condemnation from the country's fractured revolutionary and pro-democracy forces. While some welcomed the move as a necessary step toward genuinely democratic civilian rule, others saw it as a naked power grab and a precursor to a new form of tyranny.

Whatever one thinks of Morsi's move, it has renewed concerns over the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, effectively the country's new ruling party in post-revolutionary Egypt. Indeed, many Egyptians are beginning to wonder whether they haven't simply traded in one single-party dictatorship for another.

Similarities between the Muslim Brotherhood and the now-defunct ruling party of Hosni Mubarak, the National Democratic Party (NDP), are difficult to ignore. Like its former nemesis, the Brotherhood’s political arm the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) represents the most formidable force on the Egyptian political scene today, with an unrivalled political machine backed by substantial business interests and extensive patronage networks at all levels of Egyptian society.

And like the NDP, the Brotherhood/FJP has sought to consolidate its primacy through an accommodation with the military, which despite the recent house-cleaning still wields considerable economic and political power. The sacking of Tantawi et al, which probably could not have occurred without the backing of other senior officers, has reconfigured the power balance between the Brotherhood and the military, but does not amount to a subordination of the military to civilian rule.

Even more worrying is the Brotherhood’s long history of unilateralism, as well as its own hegemonic tendencies, including its attempts to dominate both the parliament and the constituent assembly (before both were dissolved by court order). Most recently, the wave of media censorship and attacks on free speech directed at voices critical of or hostile to the Brotherhood are eerily reminiscent of the Mubarak era.

The Brotherhood and its supporters dismiss such comparisons as patently unfair – and with some justification. Unlike Mubarak's NDP, whose political domination was built on vote-rigging, intimidation and other forms of institutional thuggery, the Brotherhood's enormous electoral success, whether in recent presidential elections or last winter's parliamentary races, was earned fairly in competitive elections.

Similarly, after just a few months in power, the Brotherhood has nothing like the kind of institutional control over the bureaucracy and state institutions, many of which are semi-autonomous and remain deeply distrustful of the Brotherhood, that was accrued by the NDP over the past several decades.

Such differences are by no means trivial. The introduction of electoral democracy in particular marked a clear and dramatic break with the past, and one that many believe will militate against the emergence of a new dictatorship. After all, as in any democracy, should Morsi and/or the Brotherhood fail to deliver on their promises, Egyptian voters will have an opportunity to "throw the bums out."

Indeed, given Morsi's and the Brotherhood's rather ambitious campaign promises – which include everything from improving Cairo’s notoriously gnarled traffic, to reviving the country's ailing economy, to reforming Egypt’s abusive and incompetent security sector – failure would seem all but guaranteed. This assumes, however, that the political game is taking place on a level playing field, which is certainly not the case in Egypt.

In reality, failure at the governance level does not necessarily mean imminent defeat at the polls. The Brotherhood has already won five of five electoral contests since Mubarak’s ouster. And given its superior organisation and resources, as well as the various levels of disarray and dysfunction of most non-Islamist parties, future parliamentary elections are likely to return similar results.

While we would expect the political fortunes of any group to rise and fall with the ebb and flow of realities on the ground, certain conditions could make the Brotherhood's electoral supremacy much more impervious to change.

Theoretically at least, it is possible for the Brotherhood to fail and still succeed. The most obvious challenge comes from the Brotherhood's preeminent role in drafting Egypt's next constitution, allowing it to write its political dominance directly into the script.

That role was recently enhanced by Morsi's own unilateral 'constitutional declaration' granting himself the power to name a new constituent assembly in the event the current one fails. But there are other, more subtle ways by which the group can institutionalise its dominant position.

As is well known, the Muslim Brotherhood is far more than just a political actor, or even a source of patronage. And despite the FJP's declared independence, decision-making within the 'party' continues to flow directly and organically from the 'association.'

This effectively places the Brotherhood's vast social, charitable and educational operations at the service of its political wing. Add to this the inherent lack of transparency and accountability associated with a highly secretive and, as yet, unlicensed organisation whose internal workings and finances remain beyond public scrutiny and a more problematic picture begins to emerge.

The potential manipulative impact of such a machine goes far beyond mere patronage, particularly when combined with another highly potent force – religion. The ability to claim religious legitimacy gives the Brotherhood an aura of moral superiority, if not infallibility, over its non-Islamist (or 'un-Islamic') political rivals, which could be used to stifle legitimate political dissent.

Recent threats by pro-Brotherhood clerics against anti-Morsy voices, some of whom attempted to make opposition to the president tantamount to apostasy, may not have been sanctioned by the Brotherhood, but could easily become a more pervasive (and acceptable) phenomenon down the road. Ironically, even the Brotherhood's electoral legitimacy could be used to justify anti-democratic behaviour, signs of which are evident in Morsy’s somewhat SCAF-esque constitutional declaration granting himself sweeping executive and legislative powers.

Thus, while the Brotherhood may lack the institutional powers of the old NDP, it enjoys several other significant advantages over the former ruling party, which could ultimately prove more resilient. With the exception of the military, whose interests do not lie primarily in ensuring the emergence of a democratic political order, there remain few checks on Morsi's (and by extension the Brotherhood's) authority. Equally worrisome, there has yet to emerge a viable and cohesive political force capable of challenging the Brotherhood's dominance.

This does not mean, however, that the Brotherhood has replicated the tyrannical order that existed under Mubarak, or even that it necessarily will – only that it has the potential to do so with very little standing in the way. So, has the Muslim Brotherhood become the new NDP? The answer is no – or at least not yet. Until such checks are put in place, however, it is prudent for Egyptians to keep asking the question.

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: Ahram Online

Image Source: Asmaa Waguih / Reuters

Egypt, Israel, Palestine

Khaled Elgindy — Sat, 25 Aug 2012 00:00:00 -0400

As the world continues to be transfixed by the political soap opera unfolding in Egypt, perhaps none in the region have looked on more closely than the Israelis and Palestinians. While there is much that divides the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, they share an enormous stake in the shape of Egypt’s future as well as a growing unease about much of what they have seen so far.

For Israeli officials, the toppling of Hosni Mubarak has led to the rise of Islamist forces hostile to Israel and an increasing security vacuum along its southern border, which casts doubt on the long-term durability of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The fall of Mubarak and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood is equally troublesome for Palestinian officials in Ramallah, as it eliminates their most powerful Arab ally and emboldens their Hamas rivals in Gaza (Hamas being an off-shoot of the Brotherhood). The election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi to be the first civilian president since the formation of the Egyptian republic sixty years ago has only intensified anxiety in Tel Aviv and Ramallah.

Though it is too early to say exactly what shape Egypt’s foreign policy will take, we are unlikely to see any time soon either a continuation of the accommodationist policies of Mubarak or a radical shift in Egypt’s dealings with Israel and the Palestinians. Deeper changes in Egypt’s regional posture are likely over the long-term but will depend on a host of internal and external factors, including the relative success of political and economic reforms currently underway, trends in U.S.-Egyptian ties, and developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front and other regional dynamics. Despite the inevitable cooling in Egyptian-Israeli and U.S.-Egyptian ties, however, the period ahead may not be all doom and gloom in terms of Arab-Israeli peace, provided that Israel and the United States can recognize and capitalize on an existing but narrow window before it closes.

Foreign Policy Grievances

The virtual absence of anti-Israeli and anti-American slogans throughout the eighteen-day uprising in Tahrir Square is often cited reassuringly as evidence that the Egyptian revolution was not about Israel or the United States. Such assertions are not entirely accurate, though. While popular rebellions are seldom propelled by foreign policy concerns, as opposed to domestic grievances, the Egyptian uprising and the ensuing transition cannot be de-linked entirely from Israel and the United States. The changes associated with Egypt’s ongoing political transition will have a profound impact on Egypt’s relations with both countries in the years to come.

Support for Palestine and antagonism toward Israel are deeply ingrained in Egyptian political culture and national consciousness. An issue that transcends partisan politics and commands broad national consensus across all ideological and demographic lines, the Palestinian cause is as much a matter of identity as it is a question of public policy. Beyond sympathy for the plight of Palestinians, hostility toward Israel is also fueled by Egypt’s own past sacrifices in blood and treasure; four wars with Israel led to tens of thousands of Egyptian deaths and billions of dollars in destruction. Even after three decades of formal peace, most Egyptians still view Israel as a threat to national security and as an enemy, not only of Palestinians but of all Arabs.

The Mubarak regime did little to combat such sentiment. In fact, it frequently stoked populist antipathy toward Israel as a way to boost its own domestic legitimacy. In an environment where most forms of political expression were either severely curtailed or banned altogether, the regime generally tolerated anti-Israel and pro-Palestine activities, so long as they steered clear of criticism of the regime itself. This balancing act became increasingly untenable during the 2000s and the so-called “war on terror.”

In the decade after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Mubarak made Egypt a cornerstone of two key pillars of American policy, U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the Arab-Israeli peace process—which by the close of the decade had become virtually interchangeable. Trilateral security coordination and intelligence sharing reached unprecedented levels following the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority election in 2006. By making himself an indispensable asset to the United States and Israel, however, Mubarak also fueled perceptions that his regime was little more than an extension of American and Israeli policy.

Israel’s crackdown against the Palestinian uprising (the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that began in September 2000 and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq galvanized Egyptians and other Arabs like rarely before. The proliferation of Palestine solidarity initiatives, anti-normalization and boycott campaigns against Israel, and mass demonstrations against Israel and the United States steadily increased into the latter half of the decade in response to the 2006 Lebanon war, the Gaza blockade, and the 2009 Gaza war (Operation Cast Lead). This decade’s events served as a training ground and inspiration for proto-revolutionary groups like the Kifaya! (Enough!) movement and the April 6 Youth Movement.

Thus, somewhat ironically, Palestine activism became a sort of incubator for the protest movement that eventually led to the January 25, 2011, uprising. On one level, Egyptians’ identification with Palestinian subjugation (and struggle for eventual liberation) was a vicarious expression of their own yearning for freedom. At the same time, pro-Palestinian activism along with anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment in Egypt became surrogates for anti-regime politics—epitomizing the ever-widening divide between the ruler and the ruled.

Instead of working to level the playing field on behalf of the Palestinians in the U.S.-led peace process, as most Egyptians would have preferred, the U.S. expected Mubarak to further pressure the beleaguered Palestinian leadership into participating in (failed) negotiations and to refrain from reconciling with Hamas. Of all the issues on the Israeli-Palestinian scene, however, none was more universally unpopular or more damaging to Mubarak’s domestic standing than Gaza, which became a rallying cry for established opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the newly formed protest movements. By closing off the Egyptian side of the border to Gazan trade, civilian traffic, and humanitarian access, the Mubarak regime became complicit in the Israeli-imposed blockade of the Gaza Strip and the 2009 Gaza war.

Egypt’s historic peace treaty with Israel did more than just reconcile two former foes; it consummated Egypt’s strategic reorientation toward the United States. While Anwar Sadat may have signed the historic treaty, it was Mubarak who implemented it, preserved it, and made it a pillar of Egypt’s strategic posture in the region. Officially, Mubarak maintained a cool, arm’s length, and occasionally confrontational stance toward Israel, while quietly deepening security cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv at all levels. Thus, despite the notoriously cold peace kept by Mubarak, Israeli leaders considered him a strategic prize.

Fairly or unfairly, it is impossible to separate Mubarak’s growing unpopularity and waning domestic legitimacy from his relationships with the United States and with Israel. On one hand, much of Mubarak’s behavior in the region was seen as being at the behest of both countries. And on the other hand, the invaluable political, diplomatic, and especially military support provided by the United States (largely in response to Israel’s needs) played no small role in sustaining the Egyptian dictatorship.

Israel, Palestine, and the ‘New’ Egypt

Pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel sentiment has continued to animate Egyptian politics after the uprising. Anti-Israel protests are commonplace and Tahrir demonstrations regularly feature Palestinian flags and other symbols. Israel became a convenient punching bag for populist politicians from across the ideological spectrum, while Egyptian presidential candidates competed over who was more pro-Palestinian.

Two events stand out as particularly noteworthy. The storming of the Israeli embassy in Cairo on September 9, 2011, by Egyptian protesters angry at the killing of Egyptian border guards during an Israeli operation against militants in the Sinai weeks earlier marked a turning point for all sides. The embassy attack, which prompted an emergency evacuation of the ambassador and his staff out of the country, was a signal to Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans alike that change was coming. The Muslim Brotherhood and other political parties condemned the embassy attack as an act of vigilantism unbecoming of a civilized state rather than for the sentiment behind it.

Then, in March 2012, Egypt’s first freely elected parliament voted unanimously to expel Israel’s ambassador in Cairo, a rare show of consensus in Egypt’s notoriously fractious politics and a clear signal as to where Egypt’s political class stood vis-à-vis Israel. In doing so, parliamentarians also approved a text declaring, “Revolutionary Egypt will never be a friend, partner, or ally of the Zionist entity, which we consider to be the number one enemy of Egypt and the Arab nation,” and further urging the government, “to review all its relations and accords with that enemy.” Although purely symbolic, given the parliament’s lack of authority in diplomatic matters, the vote could not have been reassuring for Israel.

Despite the harsher tone coming out of Cairo, very little has actually changed in Egyptian policy toward Israel and the Palestinians since Mubarak’s ejection in February 2011. The country’s interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), have said they will uphold Egypt’s international obligations, including the treaty with Israel—as have most Egyptian political parties, both secular and Islamist. Egypt also continues to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (such as it is) and a two-state settlement of the conflict, and remains the primary backer of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority.

The only new developments to emerge since Mubarak’s removal have been Egypt’s brokering of a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement in April 2011 and the growing security vacuum in the Sinai, neither of which is irreversible. Even the highly unpopular closure of Gaza, despite some changes in the management of the Rafah border crossing, is largely the same as it was under Mubarak. More crucially, Egyptian-Israeli security coordination has continued throughout Egypt’s tumultuous political transition and despite the heightened tensions on both sides of the border.

In fact, Egypt’s overall foreign policy orientation remains remarkably similar to what it was under Mubarak, including Egypt’s close strategic partnership with the United States and its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (despite the latter’s open hostility toward the Egyptian uprising). This should come as no surprise given that the military in general and the intelligence apparatus in particular have continued to control Egyptian foreign and national security policy. Islamists have had little say in governing the country during the transition much less in formulating foreign policy.

Perhaps the most fundamental change to come out of the Egyptian uprising—and which will be among the most difficult to roll back—is the increased importance of public opinion, which is now a force in domestic politics and even policy-making like never before. The weight of public opinion was evident throughout the transition. In addition to the vote to expel the Israeli ambassador, for example, there were the populist positions adopted by the unelected government installed by SCAF such as the decision to turn down International Monetary Fund loans and the uproar over the release of American non-governmental organization workers. The attitudes of ordinary Egyptians are likely to have an even more pronounced impact on politicians now that they are accountable before their constituents.

Peace Treaty Inertia

The ascendancy of the Islamists, who now hold the presidency of the Arab world’s most important country, could result in a reorientation of foreign policy in due course. But there are three reasons to expect more continuity than change in Egypt’s foreign policy over the next several years, regardless of who holds the levers of power.

In the first place, Egyptians are simply too consumed with domestic issues to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda at this time. Despite the supposed handover of power to an elected president on June 30, the country’s turbulent transition is anything but complete. On the contrary, the election of a highly polarizing figure like Morsi and SCAF’s rather brazen attempts to hold on to power, suggest that the democratic transition is at best just beginning and at worst put off indefinitely.

Meanwhile, with the fate of the parliament and constitution-drafting process still largely up in the air, Egypt’s three-way power struggle between the military, the Islamists, and revolutionary forces is likely to continue for some time. This uncertainty and the continued potential for instability are exacerbated by the ever-present threat of popular unrest and an economy teetering dangerously close to collapse. As a result, foreign policy matters will continue to take a backseat to domestic issues such as the economy and security. Like many unfulfilled aspirations of the Egyptian revolution, Egypt’s re-emergence as a dynamic actor in the region and a leader of the Arab world will clearly have to wait.

The absence of major differences of opinion among Egyptians, whether at the popular or political levels, also favors continuity. Despite the fractious nature of Egyptian politics, there is a fairly broad consensus across social, political, and ideological lines on foreign policy matters in general and on Israel and Palestine in particular. Several recent polls also show that, while Egyptians are generally split over whether the Camp David peace process was positive or negative for Egypt, there remains support among the main political forces—including Islamists, nationalists, leftists, and revolutionaries—for maintaining the treaty, if with greater reciprocity and balance. The main changes Egyptians would like to see in the relationship have to do with security arrangements in the Sinai, natural gas sales to Israel, and Israel’s overall treatment of Palestinians.

In the end, the most important determinant of Egyptian policy toward Israel/Palestine in the short- to medium-term remains the role of Egypt’s military. SCAF’s muscular role in politics will persist for some time. In addition to preserving their vast economic interests, the ruling generals have repeatedly sought immunity from government oversight, budgetary scrutiny, and even prosecution, while continuing to control key government functions. Whether or not such exemptions are ultimately codified in the constitution, SCAF has made it clear—most recently in its unilateral “constitutional addendum”—that it seeks to retain control over areas that bear directly or indirectly on Egypt’s foreign policy, including defense, national security, and intelligence, as well as other sovereignty portfolios such as the justice and interior ministries. It is this fact more than any other that has prevented a full-blown panic on the part of the Israelis, even after the election of a Muslim Brotherhood leader to the presidency.

Yes to Camp David, But with Changes

Egyptian policy toward Israel and Palestine in the coming years is likely to focus on three points. First, Egypt will maintain the peace treaty with Israel but will eventually seek certain adjustments—something most Egyptian political parties, secular and Islamist, have already called for. The most likely candidate in this regard relates to the status of the Sinai, a matter of intense concern for Israelis and Egyptians alike. Camp David-imposed restrictions on the ability of Egyptian forces to deploy in the Sinai are seen across the board—by SCAF, Islamists, and secular political groups alike—as an affront to Egyptian sovereignty and national pride. At the same time, there is a longstanding fear that Israel seeks to permanently push Gaza, demographically and politically, onto Egypt. For their part, Israelis fear an increasingly lawless Sinai is becoming a haven for jihadi extremists on its southern flank and for weapons’ smuggling into Hamas-controlled Gaza.

Egyptian authorities acknowledge the security problems in Sinai and have recently begun to crack down on jihadi militants there, but are equally worried about the prospect of unilateral Israeli actions in the Sinai. Despite their shared concerns regarding the region, Israeli leaders are disinclined to consider changes to the peace treaty for fear of establishing a precedent. Even so, renegotiating aspects of the treaty could be in Israel’s long-term interests, not only for addressing a key security concern but, perhaps more important, by making Egypt’s current rulers—including previously rejectionist Islamists—direct stakeholders in the treaty.

Second, Egyptian policy is likely to focus on reconciliation of Palestinian factions rather than on the ‘peace process.’ To the extent that Egypt does engage in Israeli-Palestinian affairs it will be limited to areas where its own national security is directly affected. Thus, we are likely to see less emphasis on negotiations with Israel and more emphasis on preventing Israeli-Palestinian violence and on promoting internal Palestinian reconciliation. There are practical as well as political reasons for this. The palpable absence of any meaningful peace negotiations has already led to a focus on crisis-prevention over conflict-resolution by many of the parties concerned. For their part, Egyptians will be even less inclined to deal with distractions much less crises on their eastern borders.

Even the Muslim Brotherhood, which may find itself facing new pressures from both the military and angry revolutionaries, will find it hard to do more than pay lip service to the cause of Palestine—let alone that of Hamas. Although Hamas remains the biggest beneficiary of the Brotherhood’s success, its current sense of triumphalism may be short-lived. A protracted and difficult transition in Cairo will leave Egyptians in general and the Brotherhood in particular more inclined to keep things quiet along its eastern border. More important, while a further easing of the Gaza closure is certainly possible, a full-blown opening of the border as Hamas officials have been calling for is probably not in the offing.

The Brotherhood has already signaled a move in this direction. Despite organic ties with Hamas, it has adopted a relatively neutral position regarding the latter’s feud with Fatah during the transition. This may be due to a desire to avoid confrontation with SCAF, as well as with the United States, or may be part of a calculated attempt to establish its credibility as a future interlocutor. The Brotherhood’s neutrality comes at a time when the military regime, specifically Egyptian intelligence, is playing a more evenhanded (or at least less overtly pro-Fatah) role in reconciling the two Palestinian factions. In his inaugural speech, President Morsi pledged not only to support Palestinian rights but also made clear that Palestinian national reconciliation was a prerequisite for the Palestinian people to recover its territory and sovereignty.

Calm in Gaza requires a political arrangement on both the Hamas-Israel and the Hamas-Fatah tracks. The prospect of an Egyptian-mediated reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah does not sit well with Israel, which considers Hamas a terrorist group and opposes its inclusion in Palestinian governance. On the other hand, Israel could stand to benefit from the fact that Egypt is keen on preventing war and containing conflicts along its eastern border. This was evident in Egypt’s brokering of the March 2012 Gaza truce, which ended four days of fighting between Israel and Palestinian militants, as well as the deal that ended a potentially explosive mass hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in May 2012.

The fact that the Brotherhood may be inclined to push Hamas to reconcile with Fatah and maintain a ceasefire with Israel does not mean Hamas will necessarily comply. While the Brotherhood clearly has influence over its Islamist allies in Palestine, perhaps even inordinate sway, it is not in a position to issue orders to Hamas leaders either inside or outside Gaza. The willingness of Hamas to go along with Egyptian preferences, however, may depend on what Morsi and the Brotherhood can deliver for Hamas politically. Since a total opening of the border is unlikely at this time, Hamas may seek the assistance of Egyptian Islamists.

A third area of focus related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves Egyptian relations with the United States. Although the alliance will remain intact, tensions that began well before the 2011 uprising have accelerated throughout the transition. Egyptian efforts to push for Palestinian unity or changes in the peace treaty with Israel could strain relations even further. Either way, security coordination with both the United States and Israel is likely to continue in the coming years.

In the meantime, the delicate balance the United States now maintains with Egypt’s military rulers on the one hand and its elected civilian (and thus far mainly Islamist) officials on the other is likely to grow even more complicated and uncomfortable in the years to come. Not only must each side contend with domestic constituencies that remain staunchly opposed to any U.S.-Islamist dialogue, they must also tread lightly so as not to alienate political actors in both countries. This will be particularly difficult for the U.S. administration, which must strike a balance not only between the military and an Islamist president but between these two power centers and more secular, liberal groups as well.

Looking Forward

Over the long term, we should expect to see much deeper changes in Egyptian dealings with Israel and the Palestinians, though it will take time for the gap between public sentiment and government policy to narrow. This assumes, of course, that some kind of democratic transition is still occurring—which is by no means assured, especially given recent developments, but neither is it entirely precluded. In any event, to the extent that such a shift does occur, it will most likely involve movement from both ends toward the middle. In other words, we can expect to see gradual changes in public opinion and government policy simultaneously rather than sudden, dramatic shifts in one or the other.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the ultra-conservative Salafis have shown a capacity for compromise, particularly the former. In fact, the Brotherhood’s discourse with regard to Israel and the Palestinians underwent a major transformation during the transition—even before it won a majority in the parliament. The apparent overhaul of the Brotherhood’s electoral program from 2010 to 2011 is especially striking. Whereas both programs contain the standard references to the “Zionist enemy,” the 2011 program of its newly created Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) is considerably more tame, dropping the most incendiary references to Israel, such as the “rapists of the Al-Aqsa Mosque,” and eliminating the section on the “Palestinian cause” altogether. Even the anti-blockade language was heavily watered down, to the point that it no longer even mentions Gaza by name.

Whether such changes are indicative of a genuine political evolution or are merely cosmetic and tactical, only time will tell. More importantly, the evolution of Egyptian policy toward Israel/Palestine, over say the next five to twenty years, will depend on numerous factors, including the results of Egypt’s economic reform.

The extent to which the military remains involved in the political sphere, and the manner in which it may eventually be eased out, will certainly affect Egypt’s long-term posture toward Israel/Palestine. Having already witnessed a major set-back in the transition to democratic civilian rule, the prospects for pushing the military from politics in the near future are not promising, though not impossible further down the road. While continued military rule may seem good for Israel in the short-term, it is ultimately unsustainable. Although a civilian-led government will undoubtedly reflect anti-Israel populism as a factor, it is also more likely to pursue a rational course of action.

The success or failure of Egypt’s economic recovery will also affect future relations with Israel and Palestine, which of course is also bound up with its own interminable transition. Economic improvement will afford Egypt the space to play a more active diplomatic role in the region and beyond, and could reduce its overall dependence on U.S./Western and Saudi/Gulf assistance. On the other hand, continued economic hardship will prolong Egypt’s diplomatic stagnation and perhaps further fan the flames of populism and xenophobia.

Egypt’s posture in regard to Israel/Palestine will of course also depend on the future of U.S.-Egypt relations. Despite recent strains, and growing calls in both Washington and Cairo for phasing out the strategic partnership, the alliance is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Over time, however, irrespective of who rules Egypt or which party comes to power, Egyptian foreign policy is likely to become more independent and more assertive, making some sort of parting of the ways inevitable. In which case, it would be reasonable to expect the military-military aspect of U.S.-Egyptian ties to be the last to go.

The political evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood (or any successor movements or parties that may emerge from it) and other Islamist forces, including in the diplomatic realm, is likely to continue over the long term. However, this will largely depend on the success or failure of Egypt’s democratic experiment as well as Western and Israeli responses to Islamist success. Since democratic backsliding would likely have a disproportionate effect on Islamists (as with the recent dissolution of parliament), a return to autocracy, or a prolonging of military rule, is likely to radicalize them on a greater scale than other political trends. Likewise, a resumption of American hostility to Islamism of the kind witnessed in the previous decade, or an escalation in Israeli rhetoric, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s references to Islamism as the “insatiable crocodile,” can only fuel anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment.

Finally, developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front will also help shape Egypt’s outlook on the matter. The continued absence of progress toward a comprehensive resolution of the conflict will likely harden Egyptian antipathy and distrust at the public and political levels toward the United States and Israel. Moreover, a resumption of large-scale Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly if it involves heavy Palestinian casualties, will inflame public sentiment and put pressure on Egyptian politicians to respond. Such a scenario might even re-entrench military rule (perhaps with U.S./Western acquiescence), undercut economic recovery, and radicalize large segments of the Egyptian political class. While even the most just Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement will not compel Egyptians to love Israel or Israelis, it will help to stem the growing reservoir of hostility and even hatred as well as restore Egyptian trust in the United States.

Opportunity for Peace?

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process had stagnated well before the dramatic Arab Spring. With the exception of a brief period in the final year of the George W. Bush administration, no serious negotiations have taken place between the parties throughout the preceding decade. The loss of Mubarak and the rapid rise of Islamists in Egypt and elsewhere have made a negotiated settlement less appealing to Netanyahu and more urgent for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

While an Islamist president in Egypt, a hardline government in Israel, and a divided Palestinian leadership may not seem like the ingredients for a diplomatic breakthrough, particularly against the backdrop of declining American influence and generalized turmoil in the region, the prognosis need not be completely negative. This notion is not based on an optimistic reading of present realities, but on a realistic view of future possibilities. Namely, if from an Israeli point of view the region looks bad today, there is no reason to believe it will look any better in the future, even when things settle down. Such a reading should be an incentive to more seriously explore the possibilities that exist.

Although Morsi’s election hardly represents a mandate for the Islamic project, Islamists are likely to remain key players in Egyptian politics for some time. Regardless of his Islamist ideology, the current president’s views on foreign policy, and particularly on Israel and Palestine, are squarely with those of mainstream Egyptian society. In any case, regardless of who is in power (again, assuming a democratic transition has not been foreclosed), Egyptian policies are likely to become more responsive to public opinion, not less. Likewise, as Egypt stabilizes politically and economically over time, its involvement in foreign engagements is likely to increase rather than decrease, as will the eventual easing of the military from its political role. Nor do trends elsewhere in the region favor Israeli delays in achieving a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. Any future political configuration in a post-Assad Syria, for example, is likely to include a strong contingent from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, already a major force within the country’s opposition movement.

None of this is to say that a Palestinian-Israeli breakthrough is imminent or even likely, only that initiating a credible peace process between Palestinians and Israelis is possible even under present conditions. Any serious initiative on this front, however, would require substantial political will and investment on the part of the United States as well as a modicum of stability in Egypt’s transition. Although neither of these conditions currently exist, it is not inconceivable that one or both could come about by the end of 2012 or early 2013.

At a minimum, the current hiatus presents an opportunity for the United States, in conjunction with its international and regional partners, to re-think a deeply flawed and severely outdated approach to Arab-Israeli peacemaking. This will require a willingness to go beyond failed mechanisms like reliance on the Quartet—a mediation bloc consisting of the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the UN—and a recognition that regional players, including Egypt, have a leading rather than supporting role to play. More importantly, it will also require the United States and Israel to adapt to new realities not just in Egypt but in Palestine as well. The notion that a meaningful peace deal could be reached in the absence of Palestinian unity was always questionable. In the wake of the Arab Spring, however, it is totally untenable.

Video

Israel, Palestine and the “New” Egypt

Authors

Khaled Elgindy

Publication: The Cairo Review of Global Affairs