Brookings: Experts - Stephen P. Cohen

The India-Pakistan Conundrum: Shooting for a Century

Fri, 14 Jun 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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June 14, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has proven to be one of the world’s most intractable international conflicts. In his new book, Shooting for a Century (Brookings Press, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen explores the origins and costs of India-Pakistan hostility, various explanations of why the dispute endures, past and current efforts to normalize the relationship, as well as the consequences of nuclearization. He argues that the prospects for normalization are poor, but because of the stakes and urgency, it is a process deserving of bilateral effort and greater world attention. Cohen also outlines suggestions as to how the rivalry might end, as well as the approach he believes the United States should take vis-à-vis the rivalry.

On June 14, the India Project at Brookings hosted the launch of Shooting for a Century with a discussion on present and past ties between India and Pakistan, prospects for normalization, as well as what role, if any, the U.S. should play. Brookings Distinguished Fellow Thomas Pickering and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis joined Cohen for the discussion. Strobe Talbott, president of Brookings, introduced the session. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project, moderated the discussion.

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The India-Pakistan Conundrum: Shooting for a Century

Shooting for a Century : The India-Pakistan Conundrum

Stephen P. Cohen — Wed, 29 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Brookings Institution Press 2013 275pp.

Named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of America’s 500 most influential people in foreign policy, South Asia expert Stephen P. Cohen has been cultivating a 50-year relationship with the region. In Shooting for a Century, Cohen explores the history, the current-day dynamics and potential future of tensions between India and Pakistan. He posits with conditional pessimism that normalization is unlikely. Is cataclysmic conflict inevitable for these two rivals?

Excerpt:

For Pakistanis, the notion of a perpetual conflict means finding a way to live with a more powerful and still-threatening neighbor, strengthening the one technology that assures Pakistan that India will not seek a military victory—nuclear weapons.

When I broach the idea of normalcy to Indians and Pakistanis, as well as Americans, I receive three kinds of responses. Many Americans and some Pakistanis and Indians believe that nothing can be done, that this is an eternal strategic rivalry, what I have called an intractable paired minority conflict. The policy prescription that flows from this judgment is to avoid involvement and hope that time will alleviate some problems. For Indians, this means waiting Pakistan out, avoiding a major conflict, and hoping that the political process in Islamabad will eventually produce a leadership that is willing to address Pakistan’s identity crisis and consider a compromise over Kashmir and other issues. Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic state still threatens Indian pluralism, and when it is given muscle by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, it becomes a domestic political problem for India, leaving aside the ambivalence of some Indian Muslims.

For Pakistanis, the notion of a perpetual conflict means finding a way to live with a more powerful and still-threatening neighbor, strengthening the one technology that assures Pakistan that India will not seek a military victory—nuclear weapons—while searching for a way to overhaul the economy. From an orthodox Pakistani position, normalization will come if and when India backs off on the key symbolic and strategic issues that have been there for sixty-five years, notably Kashmir. Meanwhile, the Pakistani state will continue to endorse and support elements of the Pakistan identity that make it distinctive, including hatred and fear of India, with a few hawks still arguing that India, not Pakistan, is an artificial state and that Pakistan need only wait until India comes apart.

…India-Pakistan relations have reached a hurting stalemate that strongly resembles the cold war, during which both sides endured decades of crisis and a terrific arms burden until the Soviet Union crumbled.

If the future is to be “more of the same,” then meetings between Indians and Pakistanis will come to the conclusion that nothing can be done, because individually neither side is willing to do anything, and that both sides prefer, as they have for sixty-five years, to wait and watch. Foundations should insist that any Track II dialogues that they fund actually go beyond current government policies and publicly offer new ideas—otherwise they are a waste of time and money.

The second response that I have received—largely from some Americans and Indians—is that Pakistan is a fatally wounded state trying to meet the challenges of the modern era. Normalization will have to be postponed indefinitely. The present era is massively different from the years in which Pakistan was first imagined and then enjoyed substantial international support. It is undergoing complex and unpredictable transformations brought about by global revolutions in the movement of people, goods, and ideas. When faced with these developments, Pakistan, with its 1930s-style identity and emphasis on religion as the tie that holds Pakistanis together, becomes a dysfunctional state. Some Pakistanis understood the significance of the loss of East Pakistan, but the army and the Islamists dismissed it as the result of India’s machinations and Pakistan’s failure in attempting to impose true Islam on its population. This has opened the door to more totalitarian strands of Islamic thinking. Pakistan’s political domination by the India-obsessed military, with its clumsiness at governing a complex state, seals its fate. It may last five years or more, but the end point is evident. Some Pakistanis have already reached this conclusion, as have more and more Indians; the former are looking for careers and homes outside of the country in increasing numbers, while the latter watch with trepidation. A few Indians believe that they only need to wait until Pakistan collapses and then can pick up the pieces.

In the event, India would become the dominant power of Southern Asia. However, many Indians understand that a collapsing Pakistan could also prove fatal to their country. In this view, India-Pakistan relations have reached a hurting stalemate that strongly resembles the cold war, during which both sides endured decades of crisis and a terrific arms burden until the Soviet Union crumbled. Any Indians who think that the rest of the world would manage a “soft” landing for a decaying Pakistan are, I believe, sorely mistaken and gambling on the future of India as well as Pakistan. Still, there remains the naïve hope that Pakistan will somehow vanish, or be peacefully reunited with India in ten or twenty years, the view of a former Supreme Court judge, Markanday Katju, the chair of the Press Council of India. Terming Pakistan a “Jurassic park” or a madhouse, he blamed Jinnah for creating a theocratic state and suggested that Jinnah was an agent of the British, who are to blame for India’s Hindu-Muslim conflicts. Name-calling may be gratifying, but it does not wave away the fact that Pakistan remains a potent and potentially dangerous state as far as India is concerned.

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Shooting for a Century is available in both hardcover and eBook formats:

Praise for the work of Stephen P. Cohen:

"Stephen P. Cohen is America's most seasoned expert on Pakistan. . . .The Idea of Pakistan is impressive in its breadth and scope."—Foreign Affairs

"Stephen Cohen's India: Emerging Power is an objective, lucid, and incisive analysis of India's emerging role in the global village."—Dawn

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stephen P. Cohen

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Brookings Launches the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (21CSI)

Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:40:00 -0400

Washington, D.C. — The Brookings Institution announced today the establishment of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (21CSI). The new center will be unique in addressing defense, cybersecurity, arms control and intelligence challenges in a comprehensive manner, seeking not just to explore key emerging security issues, but also how they cross traditional fields and domains.

“With the launch of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Brookings will be at the forefront of research and public debate on the critical security issues of our time,” said Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution. "21CSI will bring together the extraordinary array of scholars already working on defense and security issues at Brookings, along with adding new experts in fields that range from cyber to intelligence policy."

The Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence will be housed in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and Peter W. Singer will serve as its founding director. One of the world’s leading experts on modern warfare and author of the New York Times bestseller, Wired for War (Penguin, 2009), Singer has founded and managed two previous projects at Brookings, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and the 21st Century Defense Initiative.

The center will encompass four key focal points of policy research on security and defense issues:

A Defense Policy team will be led by Michael O'Hanlon, one of the most influential and widely published defense scholars in the world, who also serves as director of research in the Foreign Policy program. He will be joined by other resident and nonresident scholars including Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown, a leading expert on counterinsurgency and illicit networks, and Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen, a pre-eminent expert in South Asian security issues. The team will also comprise the Federal Executive Fellows (FEFs), career officers from each military service and the Coast Guard, who spend a year in residence researching and writing on defense topics.
The new Intelligence Project, focusing on the nexus of intelligence and policymaking, will be led by Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, a 30-year veteran of the intelligence community who also served on the National Security Council staff for three presidents. Riedel will be supported by a team of resident and nonresident scholars, including Paul Pillar and John McLaughlin, as well as career officers seconded from the intelligence community, and an advisory group of distinguished former senior intelligence officials and policymakers. The Intelligence Project is the first of its kind to be established at a major research institution.
The Arms Control Initiative will combine a focus on existing challenges of nuclear and conventional disarmament with new policy research on the Iranian and North Korean challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is led by Senior Fellow Steven Pifer, a former special assistant to the president with substantial arms control experience. Robert Einhorn, currently the State Department’s special adviser for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, is expected to join later this spring as a Senior Fellow. The Initiative will also house a new program designed to cultivate and mentor the next generation of arms control and nonproliferation scholars.
The new Cybersecurity project will bring together the work of Visiting Fellow Ian Wallace, a former senior official at the British Ministry of Defence, who helped develop British cyber strategy, as well as its cyber-relationship with the United States, and a team of nonresident fellows, including Noah Shachtman, national security editor at Wired magazine, recently named one of the top 10 cybersecurity writers in the world; Ben Hammersley, a war journalist, noted technology writer, and author of the upcoming book Approaching the Future: 64 Things You Need to Know Now for Then; and Ralph Langner, the cybersecurity expert credited with “decoding” Stuxnet.

21CSI will focus on cutting-edge, in-depth, policy-relevant research and programming, designed to help shape the public policy debate and inform policy-makers. Bringing together a diverse group of experts and scholars, it will seek to promote collaboration across the various policy domains, in order to better understand the rapidly evolving, increasingly complex 21st century battlefield.

“We’ve created 21CSI in response to the enormous changes playing out in the global security environment,” said Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. “To address the diverse range of issues in this field, we’ve assembled a world-class team of researchers, who are some of the leading voices on the current challenges driving security policy today, as well as how we should think about tomorrow.”

Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization, Revised with a New Preface

Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta — Wed, 05 Dec 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2012 223pp.

India has long been motivated to modernize its military, and it now has the resources. But so far, the drive to rebuild has lacked a critical component—strategic military planning. India’s approach of arming without strategic purpose remains viable, however, as it seeks great-power accommodation of its rise and does not want to appear threatening. What should we anticipate from this effort in the future, and what are the likely ramifications? Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta answer those crucial questions in a book so timely that it reached number two on the nonfiction bestseller list in India.

“Two years after the publication of Arming without Aiming, our view is that India’s strategic restraint and its consequent institutional arrangement remain in place. We do not want to predict that India’s military-strategic restraint will last forever, but we do expect that the deeper problems in Indian defense policy will continue to slow down military modernization.”—from the preface to the paperback edition

Praise for Arming without Aiming:

"Much has been made of the emergence of India on the global stage. In Arming without Aiming, Cohen and Dasgupta provide an expert assessment of what India’s rise means for its unevenly modernizing military, which is destined to become the third largest in the world. Anyone with an interest in the growing rivalry between India and China, or in the impact that a stronger, although still extraordinarily outdated, Indian military will mean for U.S.-India ties, should read this. This is an important book on an important subject, which is likely to remain unparalleled for many years."
—Edward Luce, Washington bureau chief, Financial Times

"India’s rise to power will remain incomplete until it acquires, and develops, the capacity to effectively utilize the full panoply of military power. Although India has made impressive strides in this direction in recent years, Stephen Cohen’s and Sunil Dasgupta’s Arming without Aiming demonstrates how much still needs to be done. This cautionary tale will be required reading for all those concerned about Indian defense policy and military modernization."
—Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

"The book is an empathetic, objective, and comprehensive narration and analysis of the evolution of Indian defense policy and management. The Indian strategic establishment is groping to find ways and means of safeguarding its progress toward becoming a twenty-first-century knowledge power in an international community still dominated by strategic thought from the World War II era. Steve Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta have brought into bold relief this somewhat inchoate and as yet not fully formulated effort. This will be a required reading for all senior service officers, civil servants, politicians, and academics engaged in Indian security."
—K. Subrahmanyam, Indian defense expert

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Stephen P. Cohen

Sunil Dasgupta

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Law, Order, and the Future of Democracy in Pakistan

Stephen P. Cohen — Mon, 21 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Paper presented to the NIC-EUISS Conference on Pakistan “Looking towards 2025: drivers of democratic consolidation and stability,” Paris, France, 20-21 May 2012

The optimistic title of this conference attempts an even more optimistic objective: that we understand the factors that will shape Pakistan by the year 2025, and predict how these factors will influence Pakistan’s slow crawl towards democratic consolidation.

There is also a contradiction: democratic consolidation may be inversely related to “stability” if by that we mean the continuation of an oligarchic political order, usually termed “the establishment”. Over sixty years of an establishment-dominated political order—whether by the army or by the army in cooperation with civilians—has not made Pakistan a democratic country in most senses of the word, except that the aspirations of many Pakistanis are to have democracy Pakistan-style. This aspiration is held by many in the army, which would like to have political leaders that can govern Pakistan up to its own high standards.

The law and order problem is correctly defined in the call for papers as the persistence of ungoverned areas, the continuation of militant and criminal violence throughout the country, and low levels of government accountability. The historically expanded role of the military and the groping of the judiciary for a role somewhere between acquiescence and excessive activism are both symptoms and causes. Indeed, this is the core of Pakistan’s problems: there are many, many problems, they are both causes and consequences, they are interrelated, and there are obvious solutions to each, but Pakistan lacks the capacity to systematically undertake internal reforms.

I think that the reasons for failure vary from issue (or factor) to issue. For example, the existence of “ungoverned” areas did not mean that they were ungovernable. India had such areas in its northeast including a separatist movement supported by other countries and with a sturdy base abroad, but it has slowly and systematically used the strategy memorably described to me as “first we hit them over the head with a hammer, then we teach them how to play the piano.” Pakistan, as we were recently reminded, has never tried this; emulating the British they deemed the Tribal areas and frontier provinces too difficult to manage. In a recent opinion piece the American columnist, David Ignatius, writes that Pakistan has missed the opportunity of the century by not working with the large NATO and American forces across the border in Afghanistan; together they could have launched a project that would have begun to establish the writ of the Pakistani state; instead, a mixture of paranoia and the temptation to use the tribals in a proxy war against both India’s presence in Afghanistan and American and ISAF forces proved to be too great.[1] No one will shed any tears when the backlash sweeps over Pakistan, and there is already talk of the importance of “containing” this new Pakistan, no longer a friend but still a danger to itself and its neighbors.[2]

No one solution fits all problems, there are fifteen to twenty variables (depending on who and how one is counting), and we still have no good idea which are fixable and which are permanently going to cripple Pakistan. Nor do I have a good idea which must come first and which can be deferred: I think both questions should be at the core of thinking about Pakistan’s future. In short, there is a methodological hiatus in contemporary studies of Pakistan, epitomized in the ambitious title of this conference (why not 2030, 2050, or next year?). To put it succinctly: if you don’t know where you are going any variable will take you there.

Turning to the law and order sector, there have been numerous—and usually good—studies of what needs to be done.[3] The police have to be depoliticized, they have to be well-funded, they need modern equipment, and they need to be reprofessionalized. They are not hopeless—some policing is done very well in Pakistan, and the leadership of most police services is competent, and some are more than that. There also has to be an effective judiciary, independent and concerned about the administration of justice, so police can deal with professional matters, not worry about becoming either agents of the politicians or de facto law courts on the streets and in the interrogation rooms.

This has not happened for one major reason, and several smaller ones. The major reason is the diffident attitude of Pakistan’s armed services, especially the army, towards the police, or towards any other institution of the state or provinces authorised to carry weapons and use deadly force, and which is not under army control (this seems to apply ambivalently to the various private armies and militia groups tolerated by the army for political and strategic purposes). The army simply will not abide a loss of this monopoly, and all other armed forces must be either so weak or so small as to present no imaginable threat to the army’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force within Pakistan, let alone across Pakistan’s borders.

Another, but less important reason for the failure to reform Pakistan’s police services is that it is not a high priority for the political community itself, which finds a corrupt and incompetent police force more amenable than a highly professional one. And, while raising and arming their own street gangs, politicians have been able to reach an understanding with the police forces on local law and order issues—in plain words, as other weakly-governed regions of the world, there is a nexus between the police, the criminals, and the politicians, all of which confirms for the army its need to maintain a tight lid on all three, lest the army itself become infected.

Pakistan’s courts present a somewhat different picture. Long craven and submissive, the courts—led by the Supreme Court—are attempting to restore a normal balance between them and the political community, while also maintaining good relations with the army. The courts are trying to compress two hundred years of constitutional evolution into one decade, and this will be a long and difficult process under the best of circumstances, but at least the journey has begun. What is problematic is that the natural constituency of the courts, the lawyers, are not the shining liberals that some have portrayed them to be. Others can speak more expertly on this than I, but will the hard core pro-Jamaat lawyers tolerate a truly independent judiciary? The so-called Lawyers’ Movement was anti-dictatorship, but is it pro-democracy?

Again, we come back to the army. Some very distinguished lawyers came to the army’s rescue in the Ayub years when it needed a “doctrine of necessity,” to justify the imposition of martial law during a period of domestic and international crisis. Will this happen again?

The answer to this question is easy: Pakistan will revert to military rule, including the suppression of the courts and the faulty professionalization of all parts of the law and order machinery unless a new role is found for the armed forces, and the political community begins to perform up to a moderately competent standard. I made this argument thirty years ago,[4] but nothing has changed since then, except that Pakistan’s economic and optician decay has accelerated. In a book published in 1985 I argued that the army had to find a responsible and respectable role, other than that of chief political party and tutor to the Pakistani nation. To do that, normalization with India was necessary, so that the army could devote itself to other worthwhile tasks (I suggested an expanded international peace-keeping role as one such task).

This argument raises two questions of supreme importance—and we do not have definitive answers to either of them. First, have some of the factors that will shape Pakistan’s future reached the point of no return—that nothing can be done to reverse what is generally a negative trend across the board?[5] Second, in the case of the army’s role in Pakistan, is normalization with India possible, and would that divert the army from its dominant position in the state, or merely strengthen it? Since we are some distance from normalization this question is moot at the moment, but may become a live issue should the process go forward.

As for the irreversibility of Pakistan’s economic decline, the huge youth bulge (combined with weak educational assets), the growth of sectarianism, the erratic performance of Pakistan's politicians, are all unknowns. We can predict likely futures in each instance for a short period, a year to five years, but speculating to 2025 seems to me to be naïve and a waste of time. The NIC did this several years ago when it asked a group of non-officials to predict Pakistan’s future.[6] They were, on balance, quite pessimistic. Was this useful to know? Obviously, some of us will be more optimistic, some of us more pessimistic, but without a serous analysis of the factors that will shape Pakistan's future, and how they interact, this will be a feel-good (or feel-bad) exercise that lacks a strong analytic base and has zero policy implications. Knowing that the experts feel one way or another is not very helpful information unless we know what they are expert about, and no one is an expert on events that have not happened.[7]

[1] David Ignatius, “Pakistan blew its chance for security,” Washington Post, May 17, 2012

[2] Bruce Riedel, “A New Pakistan Policy: Containment”, New York Times, October 14, 2011

[3] See the writings of the former policeman, Hassan Abbas, e.g. Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure: Is It Too Flawed to Fix? (USIP, 2011), also Hassan Abbas, Pakistan 2020: A Vision for a Better Future (New York: Asia Society Pakistan Study Group Report, 2011).

[4] Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985), with multiple editions and revisions.

[5] My approach has been to divide about sixteen different factors or variables in to four major clusters and I am indebted to my co-authors for suggesting how these might shape Pakistan’s near-term future, five to seven years from now (about 2017). The first cluster includes educational and demographic variables, propelled or retarded by the economy, a second includes the different beliefs about the “idea” of Pakistan and what it means to be a Pakistani, a third is Pakistan’s “stateness,” the competence of state organs, including the police and military, and the ability of the political community to organize itself to govern, and, fourthly, the influence of outside states and forces upon Pakistan; this includes not only the obvious candidates, such as India, China, and the United States, but also Pakistan’s vulnerability to the negative effects of globalization. See Stephen P. Cohen, “Pakistan: Arrival and Departure,” chapter in Cohen and Others, The Future of Pakistan (Washington, Brookings Press, 2011).

[6] US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future it Nongovernmental Experts, NIC 2000-02,, pp 64 ff.

[7] For my own discussion of what others have written about Pakistan’s future see the Afterword to The Future of Pakistan.

Authors

Stephen P. Cohen

Image Source: Athar Hussain / Reuters

Pakistan’s Economy at a Crossroads: A Conversation with Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, Finance Minister of Pakistan

Wed, 18 Apr 2012 10:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 18, 2012
10:30 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

On April 18, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Abdul Hafeez Shaikh, minister of finance of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for a conversation on the economic future of his country. In the first visit to the United States by a senior official since Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's historic trip to India, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh discussed the state of his country's economy and the steps taken by Pakistan to overcome the challenges among other issues crucial to the future of his country.

Dr. Shaikh is a noted economist with a doctorate from Boston University, having served for many years in the World Bank as a senior official. Currently a member of the Pakistan Senate and the Pakistan People’s Party, Dr. Shaikh has served as finance minister since 2010.

Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel provided introductory remarks, and Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Teresita C. Schaffer moderated the discussion.

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Abdul Hafeez Shaikh

Minister of Finance
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Pakistan on the Edge: The Future of Pakistan and the U.S. Response

Thu, 22 Mar 2012 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

March 22, 2012
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

As the United States plans for its withdrawal from Afghanistan and reviews its policies toward Pakistan, President Obama must weigh the potential threats and challenges for U.S. interests in the region. Among the destabilizing factors in both countries is the ongoing presence and influence of the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid, prominent Pakistani journalist and author of the new book, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Viking Adult, 2012), examines these crucial issues as the president and other Western leaders grapple with how best to work with an often unreliable and unstable Pakistan.

On March 22, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted Ahmed Rashid for a discussion of his new book and the treacherous path ahead for relations among the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan. Following Rashid’s opening remarks, Brookings Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Stephen Cohen joined the discussion. Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, director of research for Foreign Policy, moderated the discussion.

After the program, participants took audience questions.

Audio

Pakistan on the Edge: The Future of Pakistan and the U.S. Response

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120322_pakistan

Participants

Panelists

Ahmed Rashid

Pakistani Journalist and Author, Pakistan on the Brink

The Future of Reducing Nuclear Dangers: How Can India and the United States Collaborate?

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 11:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 5, 2012
11:00 AM - 12:30 PM EST

St. Louis Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Recognizing the need for India to participate more fully in the international non-proliferation system, in late 2009 the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the South Asia Program at CSIS created a Working Group on an Expanded Nonproliferation System to discuss three key issues: nuclear security, nuclear disarmament, and the possibilities for U.S.-India cooperation.

In its final report (accessible on the NTI website), the group recommended that India, while unable to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), could work together with the United States to bring India into the export control groups affiliated with the non-proliferation system.

This private discussion held at the Brookings Institution with American and Indian experts, including some of the working group’s members, began where the report ended – with a look at the structure of international efforts to reduce nuclear danger.

Stephen P. Cohen, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and moderator of the session, introduced the discussion by mentioning three paradoxes created by the nuclearization of South Asia:

Nuclear weapons cannot realistically be used, but to be an effective deterrent a state must be prepared to use them at any time, especially during crises.

Nuclear weapons are a symbol of national power and prestige, but new nuclear weapons states are reluctant to assume the responsibility and leadership of managing the global nuclear order.

Nuclear weapons and energy have an immense potential for further development, expansion and sophistication, but that also brings concerns about their safety, security and proliferation.

Teresita C. Schaffer, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and convener of the working group, commented on the conclusions of the report and made the following five observations:

While the NPT is central to Americans, it’s seen as an obstacle by Indians. One path to progress lies in using and also expanding the non-NPT institutional frameworks, including export control groups and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). They provide a means of bringing all willing and responsible nuclear weapons states into a forum on global disarmament. This is a prerequisite for the disarmament progress the NPT itself envisages, and should therefore be an early subject of discussion between India and the United States.

Nuclear security should be “low-hanging fruit.” However, it has been difficult to work on in practice. The Japanese nuclear disaster at Fukushima has reinforced this concern, and led to a new backlash against nuclear power in Indian politics. The next nuclear summit in Seoul, preceded later this month by a Sherpa meeting in Delhi may offer an opportunity to address this difficult issue.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is going nowhere at present. India will not take it seriously unless the U.S. ratifies it, which is improbable in the current political context. But even if the U.S., India and Pakistan ratified the treaty, it cannot come into effect without the signature of North Korea. This means that it will not turn into a legally binding commitment, and that its main utility lies in its normative value. While Americans and many of the other NPT members have tried to use legally binding regimes to strengthen their security, other countries, including India, are less enthusiastic. This suggests that, at least at a minimum, the world needs to make more effective use of normative statements, since the “last mile” of legal commitments may turn out to be hard to traverse.

The FMCT may be more achievable provided it can be moved to a forum in which no single country can block its progress. Given its higher degree of technicality, including the proposal to control raw materials for production of nuclear weapons, it is less replaceable by a normative statement, but could assume greater importance than the CTBT.

India remains squeamish about multilateral norm-setting: it is uncomfortable with the private character of the World Institute for Nuclear Security and the limited membership of Proliferation Security Initiative, preferring the universal membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), even while not being particularly keen to make it a more muscular organization. This is a perspective Americans can understand. Multilateral rules have at times been very controversial in the U.S., where there is strong political resistance to subjecting to international dispute settlements. But, in order to reduce nuclear threats, how may both countries work together to overcome this discomfort?

Joan Rohlfing, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and co-convener of the working group, focused her remarks on the following five issues:

The current system of nuclear governance and security is dominated by voluntary arrangements and predicated on the outmoded belief that individual state decisions and structures can provide sufficient security for dangerous nuclear materials. This idea of individual states’ nuclear “sovereignty” is, however, out of step with contemporary needs and it is therefore urgent to promote a shift in our mindsets and in our practices towards recognizing that with shared interests, there must be shared responsibilities and a much greater degree of collaboration, transparency and accountability.

There is a tension between states’ perceptions of sovereignty over all things nuclear and the increasingly urgent challenge to achieve nuclear security collaboratively. This can be traced to a set of three “international interests,” shared by all states, including:

an interest that the use of nuclear power does not lead to further weapons proliferation;
an interest that nuclear energy does not endanger human health or the environment;
and an interest to foster the ability to collectively develop the potential of nuclear energy in order to mitigate climate change.
NTI Counselor John Carlson should be credited for his excellent work on defining international nuclear interests, and especially the need to develop a stronger international role in nuclear governance.

International interests in nuclear security are dependent upon the continued public and political confidence in nuclear energy, which depends upon how well states do on nuclear safety and security. As the nuclear disasters of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima show, an accident or catastrophe in any one place in the world can have a profound impact on how the public and governments assess nuclear risks, and their willingness to continue to pursue it.

NTI has been dealing closely with these challenges, most recently by developing a nuclear materials security index, assessing on a state-by-state basis the security conditions within a given state. One of the main findings is that there is no consensus view on what things a state should do to have strong nuclear materials security, and that most states tend to look narrowly only at the physical protection measures in place at a particular facility.

India must play a greater role, working with other nuclear powers on transparency, global best practices, peer reviews, and regional cooperation. These are crucial issues on which Indian contributions have so far been minimal and insufficient.

P.R. Chari, visiting professor at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi) and member of the working group, forwarded the following observations:

The promise of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has not been realized, as India remains out of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. 2011 saw more contention than cooperation, especially on enrichment and reprocessing technologies, India’s Civil Nuclear Liability Act, and the reservations expressed by several NSG members regarding nuclear cooperation with India unless it joins the NPT.

On a positive note, Australia has finally decided to supply uranium to India, and the Indo-U.S. dialogue continues on strategic and nuclear issues, which is important for mutual understanding and for greater American appreciation of the constraints on nuclear issues imposed by India’s democratic coalition politics and civil society.

Specifically, on nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, three assertions are possible:

There will be no progress on CTBT unless the United States ratifies it. India will not go beyond its present moratorium and the jury is still out on whether more tests are needed to establish its credible nuclear triad.
With growing nuclear arsenals in China and Pakistan, India is unlikely to halt fissile material production until the FMCT is negotiated and finalized. It is egregious that one nation out of 65 has stalled negotiations for over a decade, and there is therefore a need to shift the forum for negotiations to the United Nations (UN).
Progress on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is more hopeful, as India has become pro-active regarding maritime security, policing of sea-lanes, and anti-piracy. More dialogue is needed between both countries to discuss the important legal and operational issues involved: How does the PSI fit within the UN’s legal framework? Could India interdict Chinese ships carrying contraband, and would the U.S. support it?

After the Fukushima accident, nuclear safety and security have gained salience and led to great public alarm about nuclear energy. Four specific questions arise:

How to regain public confidence that nuclear energy is safe?
How to establish a truly independent regulatory authority with domain knowledge?
What should be the realistic place of nuclear energy in the total energy mix?
How to ensure the safety of radioactive materials in industry, research and medical facilities?

The future U.S.-India dialogue will have to address the following questions:

Has the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal weakened the NSG? During the negotiations, China had hinted at the possibility of replicating the exception between China and Pakistan without prior approval of IAEA and NSG. Should NSG rules be modified or only waived on a case-by-case basis.
How to strengthen the IAEA by emphasizing its promotional, apart from its regulatory functions? The IAEA remains the best forum to synergize approaches to nuclear safety and security, for example on transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear forensics.
How can the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons be strengthened? This will improve the atmospherics for proceeding further towards nuclear disarmament.
The logical forum for discussing these and other issues, especially nuclear disarmament, would be the Indo-US strategic dialogue, which does not necessarily require an agreement to be reached, but could generate new ideas that could then be pursued in multilateral forums like the First Committee on Disarmament at the UN, or the forthcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul.

The discussion centered on the following three issue-areas:

1. Why is it so difficult for the U.S. and India to cooperate on nuclear issues?

For one participant, a political breakthrough is needed on the Indian side before a significant technical dialogue can take place. Even in its informal setting, the working group faced difficulties, so one can imagine the obstacles faced in the official dialogue.

Another reason forwarded was the historical baggage, or “trust deficit,” including a lingering Indian suspicion and doubts about U.S. intentions.

One participant underlined the difficulty in changing India’s mindset (often stimulated by the United States) where nuclear technology continues to be seen as a “miracle solution to all problems, from security to energy.” What are the incentives necessary to foster a cognitive change that also addresses nuclear energy/weapons as “a potential problem, a risky and dangerous enterprise?” How can we expect heretofore unaccountable constituencies of bureaucrats and scientist to accept international inspections?

Another participant questioned the logic and feasibility of focusing the Indo-U.S. dialogue on the nuclear domain, “the most sovereignist issue area,” to build normative cooperation and consensus between both countries, arguing that it would make more sense to focus first on “lower security” issue-areas.

One participant noted that India must be given time to complete a long and complex process, referring to the parallel examples of domestic change in Russia and the United States.

2. Lack of independent domain expertise and regulatory authority in India.

One participant observed that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is situated “in a gray area,” functioning directly under the Prime Minister, but wary in taking major decisions, and being largely unaccountable.

The necessity for a truly independent regulatory authority in India was stressed repeatedly. “You can’t have an organization [Atomic Energy Commission] that is only responsible to itself, and only occasionally in contact with the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance for its budgetary requirements,” one participated noted. However, any change in the regulatory authority is challenged by the lack of domain knowledge outside the existing establishment.

Two other participants observed that the current “excessive autonomy” enjoyed by the DAE is worrisome, reflecting a “crisis-driven” and reactionary approach. The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, recently prepared a review on nuclear safety, but it is questionable whether it did so only to assuage public apprehensions and protests following the Fukushima incident.

3. What are the avenues for future cooperation between the United States and India?

One participant questioned whether there was any significant difference in Indian and American strategies to get India on board of the four institutional frameworks of the nuclear regime (Secretary Clinton recently mentioned a “phased” and Minister Krishna a “tandem” approach). According to another participant, the difference arises between a “sequenced” (United States) and a “packaged” (India) negotiation strategy.

Another participant stressed that even while not expecting a “big bang breakthrough” India wants to see “demonstrable progress on all four fronts.” The Strategic Security Dialogue between India’s Foreign Secretary and U.S. Undersecretary Tauscher are in progress, meeting every six months. Both sides have been actively reaching out to other members of the NSG. India is aware that nuclear issues are not solely in the domestic domain, safety and security being “national responsibilities with international ramifications,” allowing for cooperation “with the United States and others.”

One participant noted a certain inertia to have overcome India in 2011, which now seems less enthusiastic, for example in regard to joining the Australia Group.

One specific issue discussed was progress on the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, a cooperative initiative announced by the Indian Prime Minister in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. According to one participant, land was acquired in Haryana, in the capital’s outskirts, two courses had been held so far, and the Center is expected to become fully operational in 2-3 years. Another participant noted the “glacial progress,” with only one meeting being held since the signing of the MoU, and that while “focusing on the hardware,” India was ignoring cooperation on setting up the training and organizational structures.

One participant noted that whatever be the appropriate balance between national and international responsibilities in the various nuclear regimes, the role of the IAEA must be strengthened, as states cannot rely only on voluntary cooperative impulses. This should be an area of fundamental agreement between India and the United States.

Finally, another participant observed the possibility of extending the working group’s focus to the areas of doctrinal issues, underdevelopment or mismanagement, in particular how states should size and secure their nuclear weapon arsenals or atomic reactors. This assumes importance with the number of private actors increasing.

Will India-Pakistan Relations Improve?

Stephen P. Cohen — Mon, 26 Dec 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Over the past decade, the South Asian security complex has expanded in four directions. To the north, China has re-asserted itself as a major player in Central Asia, through the Shanghai Co-operation Agreement, and Nepal. To the east, China and India compete for influence in Myanmar. To the south, there is a competitive three-way race for influence in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps most importantly, to the west, we have seen the renewed geopolitical importance of Afghanistan.

The core strategic conundrum that permeates all issues in South Asia, from security to trade to cooperation, however, remains that between India and Pakistan whose rivalry continues to evoke international attention, if not necessarily intervention. Despite superficial cordiality and new personalities, such as the charming Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, the normalisation process between the two seems to be stagnant. But Pakistan agreeing to begin dialogue to grant India the most-favored nation (MFN) status holds out a glimmer of hope. It was delightfully surprising that the Pakistan army decided that trade with India is in its interest. It is still unclear why the military allowed the civilians to go ahead with the dialogue but two factors could have been and could continue to influence its decisions, one way or the other.

Some people argue that the military has an interest in trade with India because of economic investments. My own view is more strategic — Pakistan military, which has its own confrontation with the United States, wants to normalize to some degree its relationship with India. It does not want to fight wars on two fronts. Yet, how this will evolve is still uncertain and the deal may not be consummated. There have been many agreements in the past that really amounted to nothing. We can only hope that this will lead to something.

It is clear that India is very concerned about Pakistan’s integrity as a nation state and would like to normalize relations, but unclear whether Pakistan wants a deeper normalization. Even if the military has allowed the trade dialogue to happen, it still regards India as a strategic problem.

The second factor in the military’s calculations seems to be finance. Pakistan military argues that the country is not destitute and has many assets. It has large quantities of payments coming in, from the Gulf in particular, and it also believes that it can count on China for assistance. It might naively think that a linkage with the Indian economy could help if American aid diminishes.

The country’s economy is structurally in deep trouble. The real problem is agriculture where it still does not have any significant reforms in place. The Indian connection is hardly likely to help. Furthermore, there will be groups in both countries that will stress the negative side of trade. It’s hard to be optimistic that trade normalization will take place rapidly or comprehensively.

Many in India, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, believe that normalizing relations with Pakistan is in India’s interest for several reasons, including reducing the influence of China. India would like to see Pakistan strong enough to hold together but not so strong as to challenge it. But Pakistan has found ways of challenging India by using destabilising proxies and terrorism at relatively low cost. The greater danger may be Pakistan losing control over its own state. There are large swaths of Pakistan that are no-go areas for the state, and there are important social sectors that defy the state, and are now attacking it.

With Pakistan having put a foot forward with the MFN concession, it is now up to India to respond, perhaps on some issue such as Siachen or Sir Creek; this may not happen, but if it does, then will Pakistan in turn reciprocate, leading to a genuine peace process? I’m both hopeful and skeptical at the same time.

Authors

Stephen P. Cohen

Publication: Forbes India

Looking to the Future of Pakistan

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 14:00:00 -0500

Event Information

December 5, 2011
2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

With each passing day, Pakistan becomes an even more crucial player in world affairs. Home of the world's second largest Muslim population, epicenter of the global jihad, location of perhaps the planet's most dangerous borderlands, and armed with nuclear weapons, this South Asian nation will go a long way toward determining what the world looks like ten years from now.

On December 5, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted the launch of The Future of Pakistan (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), which evaluates several scenarios for how the country will develop and evolve in the near future. A team of 17 experts from Pakistan, the United States, Europe and India, led by Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen, contributed chapters to the book, looking at pieces of the Pakistan puzzle. Several of the authors joined other Pakistan experts on two panels to examine the issues, relevant actors and their motivations, different outcomes they might produce, and what it all means for Pakistanis, Indians, the United States, and the entire world.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20111205_pakistan

Participants

Panelists

C. Christine Fair

Assistant Professor
Georgetown University

William Milam

Senior Scholar
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Shuja Nawaz

Director, South Asia Center
The Atlantic Council

Moeed Yusuf

South Asia Adviser
U.S. Institute of Peace

Moderator: John R. Schmidt

Professorial Lecturer
The George Washington University

Pamela Constable

Staff Writer
The Washington Post

Marvin Weinbaum

Scholar-in-Residence
Middle East Institute

Joshua T. White

Ph.D. Candidate
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS

Pakistan: No Friend and a Fading Ally

Stephen P. Cohen — Mon, 05 Dec 2011 12:21:00 -0500

Relations between the United States and Pakistan continue to deteriorate, as explained in newly released The Future of Pakistan (Brookings Press, 2011). The deadly NATO strikes launched against two Pakistani border posts earlier this week only aggravated the situation after a succession of crises that included the repatriation of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, and the resignation of the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington following “memogate.” The latest news, that al Qaeda claims responsibility for the kidnapping of an American aid expert from his home in Lahore, will undoubtedly be followed by new shocks.

A break with the current uneasy alliance, punctuated by unfriendly and sometimes even hostile behavior, is now possible. There are now calls from Washington experts for containing Pakistan and even for attacking it with military force. On the Pakistani side, there may now be a calculation that a break with the United States is desirable, that Pakistan can get by without American economic and military aid, and that China and some of the Gulf states will fill the gap. So, the relationship could experience a major transformation, even before 2014, the date for ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Despite Pakistan’s troublesome qualities, it is too soon to think of a serious containment policy and the United States has no choice but to engage Pakistan. There are several reasons for this. First, to ensure a stable and secure Afghanistan, we require a cooperative and moderate regime in Islamabad. A modicum of success in Afghanistan may be unattainable if Pakistan decides that a break is in its own interest and that it will try to manage Afghan politics through its Taliban proxies. This is likely to lead to another civil war in Afghanistan.

Second, Pakistan’s own integrity is important. Already some peripheral regions in Pakistan have become a safe haven for extremist, separatist, and terrorist organizations. A failed Pakistan would only increase these actors’ capacity to further destabilize the region and operate internationally.

Finally, Pakistan is just too nuclear to fail. A recently retired Pakistani foreign minister has accused the present Pakistani government of irresponsible and dangerous practices regarding its nuclear weapons program; this may be political rhetoric, but the truth is that we do not know very much about the security and safety of Pakistan’s weapons beyond what the government of Pakistan tells us.

If the current scenario is worrisome, the future could be even worse. The most probable scenario is one of Pakistan muddling through a variety of rapidly deteriorating domestic socio-economic, political and regional security challenges. This is the main finding of The Future of Pakistan, which I co-authored with sixteen other experts on the country. We analyzed several variables to conclude that, over the next five years, Pakistan’s success as a stable state, measured along any dimension, is far from guaranteed. In fact, the normalization and stabilization of Pakistan remain doubtful as all important indicators suggest a continuous negative trend.

As I note in the preface to the book, Pakistan has become a state marinated in crisis and it will remain important for the indefinite future. From being one of America’s “most allied of allies” it has become one of America’s major foreign policy headaches. We’re going to struggle with a rapidly failing but not a failed Pakistan for the next four or five years, if not longer.

Instead of just making faces at Pakistan, there are at least two specific things we can do to ensure both a friendly and effective alliance, which would also reduce the probability of a failed Pakistan. First, the United States could offer Pakistan a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, as it did with India. It could also persuade it to join a new Asian nuclear restraint regime, together with the United States, India, China and North Korea. Both options would require a fundamental organizational reform of our national security apparatus for South Asia, which has inherited a Cold War mentality of treating Pakistan and India separately.

Second, in the long term, the United States should seek a change in the mind-set of the Pakistani establishment, that shadowy collection of soldiers, politicians, and bureaucrats that hold a hard line towards Pakistan’s neighbors, and, increasingly, towards the United States. The only viable “carrot” for Pakistan is to integrate it in a larger South Asian context, including India. The fact that India-Pakistan relations are now better than U.S.-Pakistan relations gives us hope that this transformation may yet come about before the conflict between these two states reaches the hundred-year mark in 2047.

Authors

Stephen P. Cohen

Image Source: ï¿½ Mohsin Raza / Reuters

Pakistan's Future In Question

Stephen P. Cohen — Fri, 02 Dec 2011 15:55:00 -0500

Pakistan's stability is critically important. It's the world's fastest growing nuclear state, the epicenter of jihadism and an ally that the U.S. must hold close. In The Future of Pakistan, co-author and Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen delves into the history and politics of this faltering state with the urgent proviso that Pakistan must be rescued.

Video

Pakistan's Future in Question

Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi

Tue, 29 Nov 2011 13:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 29, 2011
1:30 PM - 3:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Since the end of the Second World War, urban population growth has soared. For the first time in human history, more people live in cities than in the rural countryside. In his first book, Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi (Penguin, 2011), Steve Inskeep of NPR’s Morning Edition chronicles the growth of Karachi from a small port city to one of the largest cities in the world. Inskeep explores a range of issues, ranging from the environmental to the economic, that define “instant cities,” and that will continue to factor into the lives of urban citizens of the 21st century.

On November 29, Global Economy and Development and Metropolitan Policy at Brookings hosted Steve Inskeep for a discussion of his book and the rapid urbanization taking place across the globe. Panelists included: Brookings Senior Fellows Stephen P. Cohen and Alan Berube, research director of the Metropolitan Policy program; and Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Johannes Linn moderated the discussion.

After the program, the participants took audience questions.

Audio

Instant City: Life and Death in Karachi

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20111129_instant_city

Participants

Moderator

Panelists

Steve Inskeep

Co-host of Morning Edition
NPR

Shuja Nawaz

Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

The Future of Pakistan

Stephen P. Cohen, ed. — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 00:00:00 -0500

Brookings Institution Press 2011 325pp.

Video

Pakistan's Future in Question

With each passing day, Pakistan becomes an even more crucial player in world affairs. Home of the world's second-largest Muslim population, epicenter of the global jihad, location of perhaps the planet's most dangerous borderlands, and armed with nuclear weapons, this South Asian nation will go a long way toward determining what the world looks like ten years from now. The Future of Pakistan presents and evaluates several scenarios for how the country will develop, evolve, and act in the near future, as well as the geopolitical implications of each.

Led by renowned South Asia expert Stephen P. Cohen, a team of authoritative contributors looks at several pieces of the Pakistan puzzle. The book begins with Cohen's broad yet detailed overview of Pakistan, placing it within the context of current-day geopolitics and international economics. Cohen's piece is then followed by a number of shorter, more tightly focused essays addressing more specific issues of concern.

Cohen's fellow contributors hail from America, Europe, India, and Pakistan itself, giving the book a uniquely international and comparative perspective. They address critical factors such as the role and impact of radical groups and militants, developments in specific key regions such as Punjab and the rugged frontier with Afghanistan, and the influence of—and interactions with—India, Pakistan's archrival since birth. The book also breaks down relations with other international powers such as China and the United States. The all-important military and internal security apparatus come under scrutiny, as do rapidly morphing social and gender issues. Political and party developments are examined along with the often amorphous division of power between Islamabad and the nation's regions and local powers.

Uncertainty about Pakistan's trajectory persists. The Future of Pakistan helps us understand the current circumstances, the relevant actors and their motivation, the critical issues at hand, the different outcomes they might produce, and what it all means for Pakistanis, Indians, the United States, and the entire world.

Praise for the work of Stephen P. Cohen:

The Idea of Pakistan: "The intellectual power and rare insight with which Cohen breaks through the complexity of the subject rivals that of classics that have explained other societies posting a comparable challenge to understanding."—Middle East Journal

India: Emerging Power: "In light of the events of September 11, 2001, Cohen’s perceptive, insightful, and balanced account of emergent India will be essential reading for U.S. foreign policymakers, scholars, and informed citizens."—Choice

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Stephen P. Cohen

Stephen P. Cohen is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Long considered one of America’s foremost experts on South Asia, he is the author of several influential books on the region, including The Idea of Pakistan and India: Emerging Power (both Brookings). He is also coauthor with Sunil Dasgupta of Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Brookings, 2010).

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Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict?

Wed, 02 Nov 2011 09:00:00 -0400

Event Information

November 2, 2011
9:00 AM - 10:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Home to nearly one-third of the world’s population, impressive economic growth, and two nuclear-armed states, South Asia is a region that can ill afford more turmoil, which is why the looming energy crisis facing the region has such massive implications. Energy demand is growing at an astounding rate. However, energy supply has been unable to keep up because of limited domestic resources, institutional—government and regulatory—shortcomings, subsidized energy prices, and a lack of investment in desperately needed energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, nearly 600 million people in the region lack access to electricity and it remains one of the most vulnerable regions to the impacts of a changing climate. In his latest book, Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict? (Brookings Press, 2011), Senior Fellow Charles Ebinger argues the region needs to address its energy shortcomings with bold decisions if it is to capitalize on the economic opportunities before it.

On November 2, the Energy Security Initiative hosted the launch of Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict? Ebinger presented his findings and recommendations, arguing that many reforms—from pricing and institutional reforms to investment in infrastructure—can be made domestically, but that these will be insufficient in the long run if the governments of the region cannot cooperate on energy trade. Following his remarks, Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen Cohen and Ron Somers, president of the U.S.-India Business Council, joined the discussion. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks.

After the discussion, panelists took audience questions.

Audio

Energy and Security in South Asia: Cooperation or Conflict?

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20111102_south_asia_energy

Participants

Panelists

Ron Somers

President
U.S.- India Business Council

Does the Elephant Dance? A Discussion on Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

Tue, 25 Oct 2011 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

October 25, 2011
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

India’s growing role on the world stage, including membership in the G20 and the United Nations Security Council, have thrown a spotlight on the scope of its aspirations and on the forces driving its foreign policy. Faced with an array of challenges from complex domestic issues to internal and external security challenges, how will India project itself internationally and how will its relationships in the region and beyond evolve?

On October 25, the Managing Global Order project at Brookings hosted a discussion on contemporary Indian foreign policy. David Malone, president of the International Development Research Centre, discussed his new book Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011), based on his experience as Canada’s high commissioner to India from 2006-08. Brookings experts Stephen Cohen and Teresita Schaffer also joined the discussion. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and MGO Director Bruce Jones moderated the discussion.

After the program, participants took audience questions.

Audio

Does the Elephant Dance? A Discussion on Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20111025_india_foreign_policy

Participants

Panelists

David Malone

President
International Development Research Centre, Canada

A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense Cooperation

Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta — Fri, 29 Jul 2011 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with the National Bureau of Asian Research, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta argue that to move defense cooperation forward, the United States and India should consider co-developing weapons technology in light of U.S. legislative restrictions on technology transfer.

Could you explain the nature of U.S.-India relations and the role of defense cooperation? How do you envision the future of the relationship?

The U.S.-India relationship is a composite of several important interests: (1) vast social and cultural ties, symbolized by the large Indian-American community, (2) a new economic interdependence, (3) the development of strategic commonality, with both hedging against a rising China and fearful of a declining, but nuclear-armed, Pakistan, and (4) finally, the growth in military and defense ties.

Not all four elements of the relationship have developed at the same pace. With the exceptions of post–nuclear test engagement and the civilian nuclear deal, the unofficial U.S.-India relationship, including people-to-people and economic ties, has outpaced official ties between the two countries. U.S.-India strategic convergence will likely come in the long term, as there are serious short-term differences on Pakistan, China, climate change, energy security, global governance, and economic policy.

Defense cooperation is important because it can bridge long- and short-term differences. Indeed, the nuclear deal bought greater freedom for Washington on its Pakistan policy and could serve this role again as the United States tries to extricate itself from the region. For this to happen, Washington must hold out the large carrot of technology and weapons transfers, which are politically problematic for many reasons, specifically the restrictive domestic legislation on defense hardware. One solution lies in the United States co-developing technology with India, as it does with Israel. Since new technology is not yet developed, it cannot be subjected to restrictive U.S. laws. On the Indian side, a number of things have to happen, including rationalizing the R&D establishment.

What do recent Indian military procurements tell us about the country’s defense outlook and strategic aims?

Most of India’s purchases are replacements for obsolete or broken equipment. However, a few acquisitions of American equipment are notable. The acquisition of a large troop carrier, the INS Jalashwa, formerly a U.S. Marine assault vessel, can provide rapid sealift capacity for Indian forces, presumably allowing for intervention elsewhere in South Asia or the Indian Ocean region. The large Boeing airlifters replace obsolete Soviet aircraft and have greater capabilities.

It remains to be seen whether India will use its new assets to develop a true power-projection capacity. Unless India can start building aircraft carriers on its own, its recent purchase of a carrier and carrier-borne jets from Russia will be largely symbolic. The planned acquisition of a nuclear submarine with nuclear-tipped missiles raises weighty questions about Asian nuclear stability, but this purchase will not come to fruition for many years.

Read the full interview at nbr.org >>

Authors

Publication: The National Bureau of Asian Research

The Forthcoming Strategic Dialogue with India

Stephen P. Cohen — Mon, 18 Jul 2011 13:34:00 -0400

Secretary Clinton’s trip to New Delhi this week for a strategic dialogue with Indian counterparts will get a “low-pass” grade unless it engages India on the nuclear issue and grapples seriously with the two major calamities facing American policy in the region—Afghanistan and Pakistan—all of which are of vital interest to New Delhi.

Inconsequential dialogues are often elevated in joint statements by including diplomatic “bumper stickers” such as “strategic partners” and announcing a lot of “deliverables,” most of which are a promise to hold more meetings. There now are at least thirty official India-U.S. dialogues and working groups covering a wide range of subjects, but many of these remain symbolic, merely marking time. At the same time, Washington also likes to put India in its basket of “friends and allies,” which ignores the reality that not all friends are allies, and not all allies are friends.

Indians will probably fill Secretary Clinton’s ears with the dangers of a rising China, but their real and immediate threat still comes from a nuclear-armed Pakistan (now too nuclear to fail) with irredentist ambitions in Kashmir. The Obama administration, reverting to Clintonian notions of arms control, carries on with soothing words, urging “dialogue” between India and Pakistan, even while the two have very little to talk about.

However, on the one issue that the Obama administration takes seriously—nuclear proliferation—it is unwilling to consider a regional agreement (as proposed by Rajiv Gandhi in his 1988 Action Plan, and recently revived by Prime Minister Singh). This would upset the framework built around the NPT regime, which is patently irrelevant to both India and Pakistan. It would also require serious talk with China and the kind of problem-solving diplomacy that cuts across regions, bureaus and departments. Mrs. Clinton cannot be blamed for inaction on this front, as a weak National Security Council is myopically obsessed with one (and only one) problem in South Asia: Afghanistan.

Here, also, there is a role for India, but American officials are confused as to what that should be. A top priority for the United States should have been to serve as a monitor of Indian and Pakistani presence in Afghanistan, but the conceptually silly “Af-Pak” framework prohibits this, leaving India out. The country has thus emerged as another site for the India-Pakistan cold war, yet both Islamabad and Delhi will be among the first to suffer the consequences from the post-withdrawal mess.

In the end, Secretary Clinton’s trip will undoubtedly be rated a success by both sides. There are, after all, enough reasons to acclaim the new relationship. There are growing economic ties, a shared commitment to democracy (but not always democracy promotion), and a common interest coping with what will hopefully be China’s peaceful rise. But the trip is likely to be a failure when it comes to practical policies that address the coming collapse in Afghanistan and after that, conceivably, Pakistan.

Authors

Stephen P. Cohen

U.S.-India Relationship on the Rocks?

Stephen P. Cohen and Constantino Xavier — Thu, 26 May 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Gone are the Cold War days in which India saw the United States with a mix of suspicion and hostility through the prism of its alliance with Pakistan. During the last decade, the United States and India have established an unprecedented partnership, including a historic nuclear cooperation deal in 2008. This positive trend culminated in President Obama’s visit last year to Mumbai and New Delhi, during which he announced American support for India’s ambition to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

It was good while it lasted. But the United States needs to move on and recognize that India’s commitment to strategic autonomy is a fundamental constraint to further improvement in bilateral relations. New Delhi wants to take it slowly because it is wary of becoming another Japan, a client state. It is this grand concern with self-reliance—and not technical or other factors—that led to India’s surprising decision last month to exclude two American contenders, Lockheed and Boeing, from an $11 billion contract for one hundred and twenty-six fourth-generation fighter jets—India’s biggest defense purchase ever.

New Delhi’s preference for two European jets (France’s Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon), while excluding Swedish and Russian contenders along with the American F-16 and F/A-18, came as a rude shock to those who had banked on surging U.S.-India defense and security relations. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India purchased $223 million worth in military equipments from the United States in the last five years—twice as much as in the preceding twenty years. Both countries also held over sixty joint exercises and military exchanges since 2000 and set up a new counterterrorism dialogue that included unprecedented levels of intelligence sharing after the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai.

Read the full article at nationalinterest.org »

Authors

Stephen P. Cohen
Constantino Xavier

Publication: The National Interest

Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?

Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta — Wed, 04 May 2011 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: The following article first appeared in the Spring 2011 issue of The Washington Quarterly, a publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most remarkable attributes of India as an independent state has been its reticence to use force as an instrument of policy. From the delay in sending troops to defend Kashmir in 1947 to the 24-year hiatus in testing nuclear weapons before 1998, Indian decisions on military force have come as an unwelcome last resort, and with rare exception, have been counterproductive, solidifying the wisdom of restraint.

India’s rapid economic growth, ambitious military modernization—particularly the 1998 nuclear tests—and rapprochement with the United States have raised the prospect of India’s rise to great-power status, including an end to the country’s enduring strategic restraint. With more options available, will India finally abandon its long-standing international political-military posture? The consequences of an end to restraint could be revolutionary, but the doctrine’s strong roots—and its survival despite failures, including against China and Pakistan—suggest that it will endure.

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Authors

Stephen P. Cohen
Sunil Dasgupta

Publication: The Washington Quarterly