Brookings: Experts - Daniel L. Byman

Israel’s Three Gambles in Syria

Daniel L. Byman and Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

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Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Mr. Obama, Don’t Draw That Line

Daniel L. Byman — Sat, 04 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

“The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable,” President Obama warned Bashar al-Assad’s government last December. “If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.”

This threat followed the president’s earlier warning that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” This red line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence community assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrians had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.

The administration’s ultimatum now seems like cheap talk, and it illustrates the risks of carelessly drawing red lines and issuing highly public threats that won’t be enforced.

So far, at least, the Obama administration has put off both consequences and accountability and simply pushed for further investigation. Meanwhile, Mr. Assad has not blinked, and the president’s political opponents, like Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, argue that Iran and North Korea will draw the wrong lessons if the president lets Mr. Assad call his bluff.

Red lines can be attractive tools of foreign policy, deterring foes from ethnic cleansing, genocide or, in the case of Syria, using chemical weapons. Part of the reason to go public, as one administration official put it last year regarding Syria, is to have a “deterrent effect.” By threatening to act in advance of a problem, you stop the problem and don’t have to act. Issuing a red line can also reassure allies or placate domestic critics.

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Daniel L. Byman

Publication: New York Times

Image Source: © Yazan Homsy / Reuters

Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?

Daniel L. Byman — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 13:08:00 -0400

Abstract:

How do jihadist insurgencies differ from non-jihadist ones? Jihadist insurgents, like all insurgents, seek to control the government, need money and weapons, and thrive where government is weak. Yet their cause—jihad at local, regional, and global levels—gives them instant friends and resources, but also built-in enemies and burdens. Jihadist insurgents often organize, recruit, and fund-raise differently than traditional insurgent groups. The agendas of these militant groups often go against the local residents' sense of nationalism and anger these communities with their extreme interpretations of Islam. To take advantage of this, the United States can amplify local voices that are best able to discredit these insurgents and press allied regimes to disrupt the mosques, schools, and fund-raising networks that help support them. However, Washington should also recognize that weakening these groups at the local level may make them more likely to embrace international terrorism. Allied efforts to co-opt jihadists may make area societies and governments less favorable to other U.S. policies. Finally, failed democratization—a particularly salient issue given the Arab Spring—risks playing into the jihadist narrative.

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Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

The Arab Awakening and the New Sectarian Divide

Wed, 10 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 10, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

With the rise of violence between ‘Alawis and Sunnis in Syria, and the ongoing Shi’a-Sunni strife in Iraq, the danger of sectarianism is growing. Will a deepening and potentially violent sectarian divide between Sunni and Shi’a be a lasting legacy of the Arab awakening? How will important smaller countries like Bahrain and Lebanon be affected? Will Iran exploit this trend? How should the United States adjust its foreign policy to reflect the dangers of sectarianism?

On April 10, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Brookings Nonresident Fellow Geneive Abdo, to discuss her forthcoming Saban Center analysis paper, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide.” Abdo was joined by Kristine Smith Diwan, assistant professor of Middle East Politics at American University. Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman, director of research for the Saban Center, moderated the discussion.

Obama, Netanyahu and the Peace Process: Is Progress Possible?

Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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March 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Despite the notable diplomatic victory of helping normalize relations between Israel and Turkey, hopes for reviving the stalled peace process between Israelis and Palestinians remain low following President Obama’s first trip to Israel. Billed as a trip where the President would ”listen” to the newly formed Israeli government and Palestinian leaders as opposed to actively seeking to renew talks between the two sides, it remains unclear whether any progress can be made on this perpetually vexing issue. Is there any hope for a renewed peace process? What role can the Obama administration play in restarting talks between Israelis and Palestinians? What will the new coalition in Israel mean for the country’s foreign policy?

On March 28, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to examine the future of the stalled peace process. Panelists included former Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Distinguished Fellow Itamar Rabinovich, Fellow Khaled Elgindy and Fellow Natan Sachs. Senior Fellow Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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Obama, Netanyahu and the Peace Process: Is Progress Possible?

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Crisis in Mali and North Africa: Regional Dynamics and International Priorities

Wed, 06 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

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February 6, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

France’s recent military intervention in Mali and the hostage crisis in Algeria have brought international attention to continuing instability in West and North Africa. The crisis has renewed focus not just on the region, but also on Europe’s approach toward Africa, American policies to combat extremism and the complex history and relationships that shape modern dynamics in the Sahel.

On February 6th, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted a discussion on the crisis in Mali and explore how current affairs and priorities in France, the U.S., and West and North Africa have influenced recent events and the trajectory of the conflict going forward. Panelists included: Brookings Senior Fellow and Daniel L. Byman, research director of the Saban Center; Brookings Senior Fellow Mwangi S. Kimenyi, director of the Africa Growth Initiative; Todd Moss, vice president for programs and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development; and Brookings Senior Fellow Justin Vaisse, director of research for the Center on the United States and Europe. Margaret Brennan, State Department correspondent for CBS News, moderated the discussion.

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The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?

Thu, 24 Jan 2013 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

January 24, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Israelis headed to the polls just one day after President Barack Obama’s second inauguration and as the peace process remains stalled and changes sweeping the Arab world introduce new challenges for Israel. The tense relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, the projected winner of next week’s elections, raises questions as to how the two countries will cooperate in dealing with these challenges, and others, including Iran’s nuclear program. What do the election results tell us about Israel’s trajectory in the coming years? How will the United States and the region react to a new Israeli government?

On January 24, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the election outcomes and their meaning for Israeli domestic and foreign policy and for the incoming Israeli government’s relationship with the United States. Panelists included Brookings Fellow Natan Sachs, who has spent the last four weeks in Israel observing the election campaign, and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings and former U.S. ambassador to Israel. Senior Fellow Daniel Byman, Saban Center Research Director, provided introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.

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The Israeli Elections: What Do They Mean for the United States?

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Al Qaeda Is Alive in Africa

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 17 Jan 2013 00:00:00 -0500

It has been over a year and a half since Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, but now it seems like al Qaeda is everywhere: from Algeria to Somalia, from Mali to Yemen, from Pakistan to Iraq. In July 2011, arriving in Afghanistan on his first trip as U.S. defense secretary, Leon Panetta said, "We're within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda." But on Wednesday, Jan. 16, Panetta seemed to express a good deal less optimism, making clear that the Algerian hostage crisis currently unfolding was "an al Qaeda operation." So has al Qaeda really become this web of linked groups around the world pursuing a common jihad against the West? And what is the relationship between the al Qaeda core and its affiliate organizations?

These are important questions; the debate about whether the United States should join the French and step up involvement against jihadi groups in Mali centers on these complicated ties. For while al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and his lieutenants in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area consume much of our thinking on al Qaeda, the United States is also fighting al Qaeda affiliates like al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Shabab in Somalia, which is also linked to al Qaeda.

In 2012, the United States conducted more drone strikes on AQAP targets than it did against al Qaeda core targets in Pakistan. In Mali, U.S. concern is heightened by reports that some among the wide range of local jihadi groups like Ansar Dine have ties to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). If groups in Mali and other local fighters are best thought of as part of al Qaeda, then an aggressive effort is warranted. But if these groups, however brutal -- and despite the allegiances to the mother ship they claim -- are really only fighting to advance local or regional ambitions, then the case for direct U.S. involvement is weak. The reality is that affiliation does advance al Qaeda's agenda, but the relationship is often frayed and the whole is frequently far less than the sum of its parts.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Eric Gaillard / Reuters

Flowchart: How the Government Handles a Terrorist Threat

Benjamin Wittes and Daniel L. Byman — Fri, 04 Jan 2013 10:59:00 -0500

Authors

How to Handle a Citizen Terrorist? We Have an App for That

Benjamin Wittes and Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 03 Jan 2013 17:22:00 -0500

Ever caught a U.S. citizen you suspected of terrorism, and not known what to do with him? We have an app for you. Sorry, you can’t yet download it for your iPhone—yet—but our Disposition Matrix App is now live over at The Atlantic. [see it on our site here.]

For the past several months, we have been working on a very interesting—and surprisingly complicated—project, trying to think through all of the many iterations of what people mean when they speak of domestic jihadist terrorism. Neither our legal system nor our scholarship offers much in the way of consistency on the subject. So we have been trying to break out all of the different ways these cases present themselves and analyze them separately. Which ones are we really afraid of? Which ones do our laws handle well? Which types of cases really challenge our existing institutions?

As an initial matter, we have been studying the cases in which American citizens have gone abroad to fight against their country. In the course of our work, the Washington Post published its famous “disposition matrix” series. So we thought it would be interesting to reverse-engineer a crude kind of disposition matrix flowchart based on the citizen cases we had examined. That is, faced with a citizen suspected of allying himself with al Qaeda, what are the questions that would lead authorities to, say, an extradition request, a federal court indictment, or the launching of a Hellfire missile?

The convoluted nature of the flowchart gives, we think, some visual sense of why consistency across these cases is so difficult. The true disposition matrix is, of course, prospective, not reverse-engineered, and it’s not just about citizens either. And it’s way more complicated than this one. But the complexity of even this flowchart gives a sense of the many moving pieces in these cases—that is, why they are so hard.

(Many thanks, by the way, to Christopher Ingraham, Brookings’ data visualization guru—who turned our notes into something you might actually want on your iPhone.)

Editor's Note: This post was originally posted on Lawfare.

Authors

Publication: Lawfare

Image Source: JEFFREY S. VIANO

Global Counterterrorism: A Progress Report

Tue, 18 Dec 2012 10:30:00 -0500

Event Information

December 18, 2012
10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on CSPAN.org. Click here to watch online.

The United States is at a pivotal moment in its fight against terrorism and violent extremism. As a result of international cooperation with its partners and the application of a “smart power” approach that integrates diplomacy, development and defense, the al-Qaida core has been degraded and is finding it more difficult to raise money, train recruits, and plan attacks. Yet, while great strides have been made, significant challenges remain. Recent events in the Middle East and Africa—the Arab Awakening, Syrian civil war, and the upheaval in Mali, among others – add additional dimensions to America’s counterterrorism challenges. How serious are the current array of threats? What will it take to meet them? What’s next in the country’s fight against international terrorists?

On December 18, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, who after one term as Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department presented a progress report on American counterterrorism. Brookings Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel offered his own thoughts on American counterterrorism efforts, and Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman, research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated discussion.

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Al Qaeda’s Not as Battered as Obama Thinks

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Just a few weeks ago, in the final stretch of the presidential campaign, President Obama announced that “Al Qaeda is on its heels.” It was a claim echoed by senior administration officials from DNI James Clapper (who declared al Qaeda “diminished”) and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta (who claimed “we’re within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda”) Republicans were quick to disagree, of course, but they seemed to think their most eloquent rebuttal was simply the 9/11 attack in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans. Suddenly, the threat of al Qaeda seemed horribly clear.

In fact, reports of al Qaeda’s demise are both true and overstated. For as the President and his advisors contend, the core organization now led by Ayman al Zawahiri is on its heels, with key senior leaders dead and many others on the run or in hiding. But as jihadist attacks in Benghazi, Yemen, and elsewhere indicate, the broader movement is alive and in some places prospering.

Al Qaeda is best understood as a set of circles. At the center, the bullseye, is a relatively small organization of perhaps several hundred fighters who swore loyalty to Osama Bin Ladin and now to his successor, Ayman Zawahiri. They are often referred to as the “al Qaeda core,” “Al Qaeda Central,” or the “Al Qaeda Senior Leadership” (of course, this being Washington, this immediately became AQC or AQSL). At the outer circles are a loose set of groups and individuals who share at least some of the core’s ideology and goals: so the “D.C. Five” who traveled from the United States to Pakistan, reportedly to fight U.S. troops in Afghanistan, had no operational links to the core but accepted its key tenet that U.S. forces were engaged in an oppressive struggle against Islam and should be fought with all means. In the middle circles are individuals who received some al Qaeda training and support but who have not sworn loyalty to Zawahiri.

Perhaps the most important, and most ambiguous, category today is al Qaeda affiliate groups. For even as the al Qaeda core has been hit hard, affiliate groups have prospered. Al Qaeda of Iraq, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (based in Yemen), Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (which grew out of the Algerian struggle), and the Shebaab in Somalia all have some formalized relationship with the al Qaeda core. In addition to taking on the al Qaeda name, they have also vowed to attack Western targets and implement an Islamic state. In some cases they have struck at Americans and Europeans in their region and used al Qaeda methods, like suicide bombings. And one affiliate, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, has tried twice to down U.S. aircraft in sophisticated operations that, if successful, would have been major coups for the jihadist cause. Outside these immediate affiliates, groups have emerged in Mali, the Sinai peninsula, and Nigeria that espouse al Qaeda ideas even though the groups themselves are not (yet) operationally close to the al Qaeda core in Pakistan.

Ansar al-Sharia, blamed for the Benghazi attacks, is inspired by al Qaeda’s ideas but does not appear to have direct links to the al Qaeda core and otherwise appears closer to the edge of the target than to the bullseye. The attack it pulled off was hardly spectacular—basically, it assaulted a weakly defended American diplomatic facility. So it is hard to infer that the terrorism threat to Americans outside Libya from this group is strong. (As terrorism analyst Peter Bergen acidly remarks, “If you buy that, I have a bridge in Benghazi I'd like to sell you.”)

Groups like Ansar al-Sharia, and even more direct affiliates, like Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, pose a threat that is quite distinct than that of the al Qaeda core. The good news is that they are far less able, and for the most part far less interested, in hitting the U.S. homeland. Much of their effort is local, fighting the government where they live and rival groups that contend for the same turf. The bad news is that they are often eager to target Americans in their neighborhood, whether it be official facilities like the consulate in Benghazi or assassinating Americans with the bad luck to stumble in their paths. Perhaps the biggest overall threat they pose is to regional stability. In Mali, that may matter little, but in the Sinai peninsula they could spark another clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, while in Iraq their violence might lead to a renewal of the sectarian civil war.

Going after the core with drone strikes and international intelligence and police cooperation remains a priority. But the United States should also think hard about the affiliate question. One important implication is the risk that unresolved civil wars can pose. In Syria, the jihadist presence has gone from non-existent to marginal to considerable: a predictable development in a country where local Sunni Muslims believe the world is doing little to protect them and understandably welcome any help they can get, even if they do not approve of the message of the helper.

Another implication, somewhat ironically, is to ensure the successful transition of Islamist movements like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood into successful political parties. Zawahiri’s message is that violence, not peaceful politics, will advance the cause of Islam and, not surprisingly, he loathes the Brotherhood. Helping show that a peaceful alternative will work is vital to preventing local Islamists from taking up the banner of jihad.

Finally, U.S. officials need an open and sustained dialogue on the question of which affiliate groups are priorities and which are distractions. Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula has tried to hit the U.S. homeland, and helping defeat it in conjunction with the Yemen government is prudent. On the other hand, intervention in Nigeria would accomplish little and probably make jihadists who now focus locally into a strong anti-American force.

The Benghazi tragedy offered a rare opportunity to educate the public about these distinctions but instead degenerated into a way to score political points. As a result, the American people are more confused than ever.

Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: The New Republic

Image Source: © Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi / Reuters

Winning the Stalemate in Gaza

Daniel L. Byman — Mon, 19 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

For 25 years Israel and Hamas have fought, and for 25 years neither has prevailed. Hamas has scored many victories: it began as a small terrorist organization in 1987 and steadily grew in size and importance. In 2006, it won elections in Gaza and seized power there in 2007, becoming the Strip's de facto government and emerging as an equal to Fatah, which dominates the West Bank. Israel, however, has prevented Hamas from gaining further ground in the West Bank while, over time, forcing Hamas to realize, in practice if not in rhetoric, that the Jewish state is here to stay.

The problem, then, with trying to end the fighting and prevent another recurrence is that both sides believe that using force advances their interests. Now, they each want more, and both face domestic pressure to demand more.

Rocket attacks from Gaza have increased in 2012, making life miserable for Israelis near the Strip. The goal of Israel's most recent campaign, "Pillar of Defense," is to force Hamas to end its own rocket attacks and to compel other Palestinian groups to do so as well. As Israel's defense minister, Ehud Barak, declared, "Hamas is responsible for the rocket fire and all other attempts to harm our soldiers and civilians, even when other groups participate." Israel is demanding what all governments demand: that its own people be safe.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Foreign Policy

Curious Victory: Explaining Israel's Suppression of the Second Intifada

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 12:41:00 -0500

Abstract:

The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Terrorism and Political Violence

Israel's Gamble in Gaza: The Perils of Operation Pillar of Defense

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Israel's latest campaign in Gaza, which began on Wednesday with the killing of Hamas' military commander, Ahmed Jabari, and air strikes on the group's long-range rocket launchers, is a gamble—and one that Israel might lose. Its goal is to compel Hamas to stop shooting rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip and to crack down on other groups who are also doing so. Hamas, however, will find it hard to bend to Israeli pressure. In turn, it will be up to outside states, particularly Egypt, to foster a deal to end the fighting.

After Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli incursion into Gaza in 2008-2009 that resulted in over 1,000 Palestinian deaths and tremendous destruction, relations between Hamas and Israel wavered uneasily between hostility and tacit cooperation. True, Hamas' rhetoric toward Israel remained hostile, but the number of rockets that went over the border plunged and most of them were launched not by Hamas, but by more radical groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas feared that launching large numbers of rockets would prompt Israel to again retaliate harshly and devastate Gaza, thus jeopardizing Hamas' political position there. At times, the group even tried to restrain its uncomfortable bedfellows. Indeed, although Hamas and Israel would both deny it, their interests were often aligned. As Aluf Benn, one of Israel's leading analysts, put it after Jabari's death, "Ahmed Jabari was a subcontractor, in charge of maintaining Israel's security in Gaza."

But Jabari's first allegiance, of course, was to Hamas. And, over time, Hamas became increasingly accepting of attacks on Israel. As the memory of Cast Lead faded, the number of attacks coming from Gaza began to rise once more. Israel claims that over 200 rockets struck the country in 2010. The number climbed to over 600 in 2011. And 2012 has seen even more—over 800 before the current operation began. Most of these attacks came from other Palestinian groups, but more recently Hamas seemed to take a more active role in the violence, openly tolerating other groups' gambits and carrying out some strikes itself.

By this week, those attacks had "made normal life impossible for over one million Israelis," as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained on Thursday. And so he and his government are again pounding Hamas in an attempt to restore the post-Cast Lead status quo, in which Hamas polices both itself and the rest of the strip. So far, Operation Pillar of Defense, as Israel calls it, has resulted in the deaths of 18 Palestinians (of whom roughly half were civilians). Hamas' response has killed three Israelis.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: Foreign Affairs

Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda

Tue, 13 Nov 2012 10:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 13, 2012
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post 9/11 era. Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure—orchestrated with U.S. support—raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation. How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war? What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?

On November 13, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion to explore these and other questions about the conflict in Yemen. Panelists included Gregory Johnsen, a Ph.D. candidate in the Near Eastern Studies Department at Princeton, and Fellow Ibrahim Sharqieh, deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center, who appeared via video conference from Doha.

Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman, director of research for the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

Audio

Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20121113_yemen_transcript

A Less Nimble America in the Arab World

Daniel L. Byman — Thu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

This was not a foreign policy election. Indeed, in contrast to past campaigns, the Republican candidate was not able to successfully assert that he would better protect America. President Barack Obama used his administration's killing of Osama bin Laden as a way of making security a non-issue. So despite the presence of over 60,000 American troops in Afghanistan, the implosion of Syria and Iran's nuclear ambitions, the only foreign policy issue that made a dent during weeks before election day was the killing of American Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi, Libya. Even this tragedy only led to a debate about blame, not about shifting the course of U.S. foreign policy.

However, the killing of Ambassador Stevens -- or more accurately the U.S. reaction to it -- is likely to make one of the biggest challenges facing the second Obama administration even bigger: what to do about the Arab spring? To put it mildly, the United States has had an inconsistent response to the Arab spring. Libya saw decisive military intervention, while in Egypt the Obama administration impressively helped usher Mubarak from power. More quietly, the United States worked with its allies to give Yemen's Saleh a push. In Bahrain, however, the Obama administration did little while the government brutally repressed demonstrations. And in Syria, Washington has only slowly moved to back the Syrian opposition, and even then it is maintaining a healthy distance.

Other regimes may crumble, and still others might attempt real reform to stave off unrest. But the heady weeks of early 2011 when dictators in Tunisia and Egypt rapidly fell and it looked like democratization might sweep the region are long gone. In Tunisia and Egypt, we worry that voting might usher in illiberal regimes that trample on minority and women's rights and be hostile to the United States. An even bigger worry in Yemen and Libya, and of course Syria, is that weakness or even chaos might replace tyranny, creating a safe haven for terrorists and making life intolerable due to the spread of crime and tribal and sectarian violence. In all these countries, new leaders have arisen, many of whom are not well known to American officials. And in all these countries, the popular will suddenly matters in a way that it never did when autocrats alone ruled. We hope these countries will eventually become mature democracies, but alternatively, or even concurrently, they might become home to a significant terrorist presence and suffer considerable unrest. As Benghazi shows, there are new threats and dangers to the United States that come along with the new politics.

Ambassador Stevens was exactly the sort of diplomat we needed for these messy challenges. He plunged into his work, placing himself at risk in order to mingle with ordinary Arabs and gain a ground truth far from the corridors of power. As a result, he was admired by many Libyans and able to inform U.S. policy far more effectively than other officials as he knew Libya and new Libyan leaders well. However, to avoid future Benghazis, and future deaths of diplomats -- and the political furor and blame-game that accompanies their death -- U.S. leaders will tell them to retreat further behind secure compound walls. Such a move is understandable and will keep our diplomats safer, but it will also make them far less effective. They will not be able to mix with the local populations, learn their concerns and attitudes, and represent America to ordinary Arabs.

If U.S. officials can only be found in embassy fortresses, the United States will be less nimble in responding to (or, ideally, preventing) these threats and, more broadly, the new realities of the Arab spring and its aftermath. Our diplomats and intelligence officers will know fewer people, and those they know are more likely to be established figures rather than the ordinary Arabs who are suddenly empowered by the Arab spring. Emerging leaders, and emerging policy concerns, will be harder to identify. Implementing policy in Libya or other Arab countries with new political realities will be far harder if Americans are not on the ground.

Obama administration officials should recognize this likely deficit as they conduct foreign relations in the aftermath of Benghazi and posture the U.S. civilian presence in Arab countries. Our diplomats are like our soldiers -- they are precious to us, but we must also recognize that if they cannot take risks they cannot do their jobs.

Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: The Huffington Post

Syria: The Path Ahead

Thu, 08 Nov 2012 09:30:00 -0500

Event Information

November 8, 2012
9:30 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

As the Syrian conflict approaches its twentieth month, fears are mounting that Bashar al-Assad’s regime may stay in power or that Syria will collapse into sectarian war. An enduring conflict in Syria will have far-reaching consequences for the region, could threaten key U.S. partners, and may require urgent decisions. Has the struggle for democracy in Syria been lost? Is there more the United States could do to influence events there? What steps could the international community take to prevent strife and sectarianism from spreading throughout the region?

On November 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will explored these and other questions about the conflict in Syria. Panelists Mike Doran, the Roger Hertog senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Director of the Brookings Doha Center Salman Shaikh, appearing by video conference, discussed policy options for the U.S. and international community, with a focus on Shaikh’s recently authored paper, "Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It)." Daniel L. Byman, senior fellow and research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion.

Audio

Syria: The Path Ahead

Transcript

Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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A Modest Post-Assad Plan

Daniel L. Byman and Renanah Miles — Wed, 24 Oct 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Should Syrian president Bashar al-Assad fall, Syria’s problems will have only just begun. With the dictator gone, crime, score settling and a violent contest for power likely will ensue, keeping the streets unsafe and the people afraid. Iran, foreign jihadists and Syria’s neighbors may meddle to protect their interests or stir up trouble. Assad kept Syria’s rival communities in check through force, but his reign created underlying schisms. Now, the civil war has generated new ones. It also has turned the country’s economy, always struggling, into a disaster area. So far the splintered Syrian opposition has shown no skill in reassuring Syria’s minorities, and any new government’s initial legitimacy is likely to be weak.

Unlike other Arab Spring conflicts that have resulted in regime capitulation (Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen) or regime decapitation (Libya), the long and bloody Syrian conflict is likely to generate a failed state requiring the kind of large-scale reconstruction efforts seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Inevitably, some will call for America to step in to establish order. The United States has a long and rather ugly record in trying to help countries in Syria’s position. True, in Iraq and Afghanistan the United States has gained hard experience in the dos and (mostly) don’ts of state building. But the lessons from these and other state-building efforts suggest success requires considerable resources, excellent coordination within the government, long-term follow-through and serious planning for the postconflict period even as the war is being waged. None of these is likely to be present for any U.S. effort in a post-Assad Syria, given the current political and operational environment.

We argue here that the United States and its allies are unlikely to overcome Syria’s myriad problems and establish a peaceful, stable and democratic Syria. The likely lack of resources, poor governmental coordination and the sheer scale of Syria’s problems probably would spell failure for any ambitious efforts. Moreover, regime-change initiatives could backfire and complicate postregime plans.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman
Renanah Miles

Publication: The National Interest