Brookings: Experts - Richard C. Bush III

Barack Obama and China's Xi Jinping to Meet In California

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 21 May 2013 11:37:00 -0400

Yesterday, the White House announced that President Obama will meet with China’s President Xi Jinping on June 7-8 in California. The announcement said that the two will hold “in-depth discussions on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues, . . . review progress and challenges in U.S.-China relations over the past four years and discuss ways to enhance cooperation, while constructively managing our differences, in the years ahead.”

Yet the purpose of this meeting is not to bargain or to solve specific problems, but to set a tone and create a sense of shared fate between the two leaders by allowing Obama and Xi to firmly establish a good personal relationship, a precondition for the successful conduct of their bilateral relations. The two got a start on that task last February, when Xi visited Washington as China’s vice-president. Two days in California allows both more time and an informal environment for each to talk about his domestic challenges and visions for the future, about his country’s role in the international system and how US-China relations fits with all of this.

Such an interchange is particularly important because each president sits atop a complex and sprawling governmental system that is not easy to monitor or control. This is one of the reasons for recent frictions between the two countries. Their California encounter meeting provides Xi and Obama the opportunity to identify and enlarge the areas of overlap in the interests of their two countries, and then, when they return to their capitals, to set priorities in their systems accordingly. Having seen the value of creating this opportunity, they should seize it.

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Richard C. Bush III

United States Policy towards Northeast Asia

Richard C. Bush III — Tue, 07 May 2013 14:37:00 -0400

Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the April 2013 edition of SERI Quarterly.

With the Obama administration making the transition to its second term, it is appropriate to review its policy goals towards Northeast Asia and whether policy implementation can be sustained. In this essay, I review what senior officials have said on these subjects, and consider the challenge of coping with the rise—or revival—of China, while focusing more sharply on the Korean Peninsula.

Declaratory policy

Three texts reveal how the United States government views its interests and objectives towards Asia. Chronologically, they are: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s October 2011 article in Foreign Policy; President Obama’s speech to the Australian parliament on November 17, 2011; and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon’s remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.[1] Five topics merit attention: terminology; the purposes of policy; its scope; the approach to China; and sustainability.

In terminology, two words have gained the greatest currency: “pivot” and “rebalancing.” “Pivot” is a vivid word that plays upon Obama’s love of basketball, it also has a rather absolutist connotation. “Rebalancing,” on the other hand, is more relativistic, both in terms of where America places its priorities geographically and which policy arenas it emphasizes. The word that is least appropriate for Northeast Asia is “return,” which had some currency in the early part of the administration. “Return” may have been accurate for Southeast Asia but not for Northeast Asia.

In terms of the purposes of rebalancing, senior officials spoke in different but substantively convergent ways:

Clinton referred to “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism”; to “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific”; to responding to the wishes of the region itself; and, in effect, the long, benign impact of America’s presence in and posture toward the region (“We are the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for decades . . . and that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth.”)
Obama spoke simply of a “large and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with friends and allies.”
Donilon also implied a “shaping” objective, even though he did not use the word. He said, “We aspire to see a region where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where citizens increasingly have the ability to influence their governments and universal human rights are upheld.”

[1] Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11, 2011 (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175215.htm); “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 17, 2011, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament); “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery,” November 15, 2012, White House website (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery).

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Richard C. Bush III

Publication: SERI Quarterly

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Economic Growth, Energy, and Economic Partnership: Japan’s Current Obstacles and New Opportunities

Fri, 03 May 2013 15:00:00 -0400

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May 3, 2013
3:00 PM - 3:50 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

In the four months since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was inaugurated in Japan, his Cabinet has pushed forward in rapid succession an unprecedented series of potentially transformational economic policies. On May 3, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings hosted an address by H.E. Toshimitsu Motegi, minister of economy, trade and industry of Japan.

In his address, Minister Motegi described the steps necessary for Japan to continue to move forward. He touched on Japan's growth strategy, membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and energy policy.

Richard Bush, senior fellow and director of CNAPS, provided a brief introduction. Brookings Senior Fellow Mireya Solís, the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, moderated the discussion.

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Taiwan’s Response to an Evolving Security Environment

Mon, 29 Apr 2013 14:00:00 -0400

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April 29, 2013
2:00 PM - 4:15 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

The Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China (Taiwan) released its second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in early March. The QDR presents a comprehensive examination of developments in Taiwan’s security environment and explains updates in its planning and strategy. As in the United States and other countries, the document is a reflection of the president’s strategic priorities, a serious planning exercise and a public relations tool which seeks to inform the public and win its support.

On April 29, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a discussion on Taiwan’s recently released QDR. Vice Minister of National Defense for Policy Andrew N.D. Yang, presented the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s views of the Asia-Pacific security environment and Taiwan’s defense transformation. Chia-Sheng Chen, director of the defense ministry’s Defense Net Assessment Division, explained the QDR in more detail. Phillip Saunders of the National Defense University added his personal perspective on the security challenges Taiwan faces and the way it addresses them in the QDR.

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China-Taiwan-United States Relations

Tue, 23 Apr 2013 09:00:00 -0400

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April 23, 2013
9:00 AM - 3:00 PM EDT

Conference Room B-1
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC

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China and Taiwan have improved both the tone and substance of their relationship over the past five years, especially on bilateral economic issues. But these advances have not been matched by progress on more difficult political or multilateral issues, and some observers believe that the improvement of cross-Strait relations will lose momentum as these more sensitive issues come up for discussion. The respective political calendars in China and Taiwan may further complicate matters.

On April 23, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a public seminar featuring senior experts from the United States, China and Taiwan. Panelists analyzed the domestic forces influencing cross-Strait relations; prospects for developments in the political, security and regional economic arenas; and possible roles for the United States. Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the board of the American Institute in Taiwan, delivered a keynote address.

Watch video from the event at csis.org »

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Reviewing Ma Ying-jeou’s Strategies for National Security in Taiwan

Richard C. Bush III — Fri, 19 Apr 2013 14:00:00 -0400

Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou spoke Monday evening by video-link to a group of distinguished scholars at Stanford University. Although nothing Mr. Ma said was particularly surprising, his remarks did have three important features.

In the first part of his the speech, the president reviewed the basis for re-engagement with China after his first inauguration in 2008 and the cooperation that has been subsequently forged. This was not, of course, the first time that Ma has reviewed this record, and by now the process is well and widely understood. Yet it is still a story worth re-telling, if only to remind us that nothing about cross-Strait relations after 2008 was fore-ordained. Leaders in both China and Taiwan had to take certain risks for a more stable relationship. They had to find a mutually acceptable premise for interaction (the 1992 consensus). And agree just as clearly on what would be discussed (easy, mainly economic, issues) and what was off the agenda (e.g. independence or unification). What new agreements will be signed and whether the two sides move toward political talks is quite uncertain at this point, but what has already been achieved was neither trivial nor automatic.

Later on, Mr. Ma provided a concise yet clear statement of Taiwan’s national security strategy. To quote him in full: “The first part involves institutionalization of the rapprochement with mainland China so that neither side would ever contemplate resorting to non-peaceful means to settle their differences. The second part involves making Taiwan a model world citizen by upholding the principles of a liberal democracy, championing free trade and providing foreign aid to the international community. The third part involves strengthening national defense capability.” The first of these is particularly interesting, because it expresses an essentially liberal, internationalist approach to ensuring peace and stability: that is, binding a potential adversary to a cooperative relationship so that the stakes of initiating conflict are just too high. But the other two parts of the president’s strategy clearly indicate that he is not placing all his eggs in a Chinese basket.

In discussing Taiwan’s relations with the international community, President Ma properly cites an important, recent achievement. That is the agreement reached between Taiwan and Japan on April 10^th on fisheries. Taiwan fisherman are of course pleased because it clarifies their right in their traditional fishing grounds, but such an accord would not normally command any interest beyond the two countries concerned. But in this case it should. The matter is part of the nexus of issues that include territorial disputes over maritime land forms, the quest for natural resources, the rules of engagement of maritime vessels of contending countries, and coping with popular nationalism. The Japan-Taiwan agreement is important because it does not try to resolve all issues for all time but addresses the most pressing matters in a pragmatic and mutually beneficial way. It offers a way forward for other countries to reduce the temperature on their maritime disputes and reduce the risk of wider conflict through accident and miscalculation. As President Ma said, the pact “sets a good example of how the concerned parties can find ways to settle their dispute and preserve peace and stability in the region at the same time.” He may not have intended to allude in this remark to China, whose maritime vessels have been operating in a rather edgy way of late. But the shoe certainly fits.

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Richard C. Bush III

Image Source: © Pichi Chuang / Reuters

North Korea and Policy Priorities for the United States

Mon, 15 Apr 2013 10:00:00 -0400

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April 15, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This event was broadcast live on C-SPAN and cspan.org. Click here to watch online.

In the past months, North Korea has issued a series of threats and provocative actions, from testing a nuclear device and conducting a missile launch—in contravention of multiple United Nations resolutions—to cancelling the armistice ending the Korean War and threatening a new war against the United States and South Korea. Harsh rhetoric from North Korea is nothing new, but some observers feel that the recent threats represent real danger. Others claim that they reflect internal dynamics in North Korea and that the crisis will pass.

On April 15, Foreign Policy at Brookings hosted a discussion on the policy priorities for the United States in dealing with North Korea during and after the current crisis. Brookings experts debated the threat to the United States and its allies and analyzed steps that the United States can take to mitigate the danger, including sanctions, engaging allies and neighbors in the region, nonproliferation efforts and, if necessary, responding to aggressive actions by North Korea.

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The Brookings Institution and Taiwan-China Relations

Richard C. Bush III — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor’s Note: In a speech delivered at “Between Power and Knowledge: Think Tanks in Transition” at National Chengchi University on April 11, 2013, Richard Bush discusses the Brookings Institution’s long history of conducting research on Taiwan-China relations. A portion of the speech is below; the complete speech can be found here.

A couple of years ago, I chanced upon an aging copy of the January 1945 issue of National Geographic magazine. To my surprise, there was an article about Taiwan (called “Formosa” in the article). As was common with National Geographic at that time, there were many pictures of the island’s aboriginal peoples (in this case, they were all fully clothed). But there were also pictures of U.S. bomb damage during World War II, and a not-bad description of Taiwan’s history, society, and 20^th century circumstances. The author was Joseph Ballantine, who had served in the American Consulate in Taihoku from 1912 to 1914. I had never heard of Ballantine, so I resorted to my default source of information – Wikipedia. Imagine my even greater surprise when I discovered that he had actually been a scholar at Brookings, and that through the Institution’s Press, he had published a book about Taiwan in 1952: Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy.[1] I had no idea that my own organization’s coverage of the Taiwan Strait issue had such a long history. So I was pleased when Arthur Ding invited me to write about how Brookings had treated the subject over the last six decades. I do so in a basically chronological way and draw on the books that a series of Brookings scholars have written that addressed cross-Strait relations to one degree or another.

[1] Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 1952).

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Richard C. Bush III

Publication: National Chengchi University

Facing Mainland China: Taiwan’s Future Challenges

Richard C. Bush III — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: The following speech was delivered at Tamkang University in Taiwan on April 10, 2013.

It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at Tamkang University. I was first on your campus almost thirty years ago when I was working as a staff member in the US Congress and my boss, the late Congressman Steve Solarz spoke here. I have probably made visits since then but really can’t remember when they were. In any event, it’s great to be back. Thank you, Dean Dai, for that kind introduction. It’s always good to see Professor Lin, who was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the first year I worked there.

The topic I picked for my speech today is “Facing Mainland China: Taiwan’s Future Challenges.” Actually, Taiwan has faced challenges stemming from the Mainland for a long time, actually for more than six decades. But the challenges today and in the future are more complex and consequential than ever before. The choices for Taiwan will be difficult, and it is important that they be made well. To avoid making choices is also a choice.

Actually, it’s a bit presumptuous for an outsider to try to give advice to the citizens of another country, particularly a democratic country, on the challenges they face and how to face them. In a profound way, that really is their business. And I readily acknowledge that my own country is having great difficulty meeting its formidable challenges. But my ties to Taiwan were first formed almost forty years ago, and have only grown over time. I care very much what happens to this island and its people. So I hope you will permit me to make a few observations on my topic. I won’t talk for too long, because I want plenty of time for questions.

To begin, it is worth noting that Taiwan would face some difficult challenges even if China were not such an important factor. That is because Taiwan, like some other places in East Asia, has entered a transition in its social and economic development that requires new policy models. Even if China did not exist, these challenges would press Taiwan.

In addition, Taiwan’s economy is increasingly post-industrial and is finding it harder to remain both competitive in the global economy and provide good jobs and good wages for all. Income inequality is trending upward. The unemployment rate was higher in this past decade than it was in the 1990s (1-3 percent). The central government budget has been basically flat over the last few years, government debt is growing, but the tax burden of Taiwan citizens is fairly light (58^th among a group of 65 more advanced countries). The island has already begun to move, correctly, to a knowledge-based economy, but there a still a large number of small, inefficient, family operations. And for a knowledge-based economy, its companies will need people with the right kinds of skills, which probably requires reform of the education system.

If these challenges weren’t enough, demography makes them much more difficult. Taiwan’s total population will peak relatively soon, probably in 2025. The working age population will decline from 74 percent of the total today to around 67 percent in 2025; the elderly’s share of the population will increase from 11 percent today to 20 percent. That means that smaller numbers of workers will be supporting more and more old people. By 2060, half the population (workers) will be supporting 40% of the population (retirees). To make this specific, the students in this room will have to pay for the pensions and health care of your professors after they retire. And as long as young people either don’t get married or don’t have children, that situation will continue.

So even if China did not exist, Taiwan would face tough choices as a society: choices between economic prosperity on the one hand and social welfare—for the old and the young—on the other. But China does exist. It provides Taiwan with opportunities, to be sure. Many of you young people may work on the Mainland. But China is a source of insecurity for Taiwan, and so an added challenge. So the task for the island’s leaders and citizens will be to balance their desire for security, prosperity and welfare.

Let me turn now to the various challenges that Mainland China poses for Taiwan.

The first and fundamental challenge is Beijing’s ultimate objective regarding Taiwan, what it calls “peaceful unification” under the one country, two systems formula. In effect, it wishes to have Taiwan become a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, with a status essentially the same as Hong Kong and Macau.

Now Taiwan has always said “no” to one country, two systems (1C2S), and there is little public support for it. It’s important, however, that Taiwan people have a substantive foundation for their opposition rather than be opposed for opposition’s sake. To my mind, there are at least two reasons. The first that there are a serious conceptual differences between Beijing and Taipei over whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity in two important respects: first, the island’s international role, and second, cross-Strait relations. Essentially, this is the issue of the Republic of China, and there is a broad consensus here that the ROC does exist, while Beijing’s formal view is that the ROC hasn’t existed since the founding of the PRC. For Hong Kong and Macau, 1C2S granted a “high degree of autonomy” but not sovereignty. Beijing remains the exclusive sovereign. To my mind, this disagreement over sovereignty is rather fundamental.

The second reason is what 1C2S would mean, hypothetically, for Taiwan’s democracy after unification. Hong Kong is important here as well. When crafted the Hong Kong political system over twenty years ago, through the Basic Law, it skewed the electoral process in ways that made it difficult—or impossible—for individuals and political forces it does not like to come to power. We of course don’t know whether China, as part of a unification deal, would seek to change Taiwan’s political system so that it has the same effect as in Hong Kong. If it did, however, the DPP, which today is a significant portion of Taiwan sentiment, would be marginalized.

But that is just my view. What’s important is how Taiwan citizens and leaders think about this.

When the results of the 2012 presidential elections were announced on the evening of January 14^th last year, President Ma Ying-jeou said that he would “safeguard the sovereignty of the Republic of China with my life.” That’s a strong statement, and I am pretty sure that President Ma knows what he means by it. But I believe that Taiwan as a whole could broaden and deepen its understanding of the sovereignty concept. In this regard, it would be particularly useful for each of the major political parties to come to their own internal consensus and then work on a cross-party consensus.

So Challenge Number One is Beijing’s current ultimate goal, unification under 1C2S. That option – and it’s an option only – creates Challenge Number Two. That challenge is the possibility that as the ROC government negotiates with Beijing today, it may make concessions that undermine its claim of sovereignty when it comes to resolving the fundamental cross-Strait dispute. Note that Beijing has a similar challenge: as it negotiates with Taipei today, it wishes to avoid making concessions that undermine 1C2S.

This challenge has been around a long time – for both sides. It is one reason that cross-Strait relations were so difficult from the early 1990s until 2008, to the point that the United States occasionally feared that the two sides might slide toward a conflict that neither intended. This short term-long term problem remains today. Some in Taiwan say that the Ma Administration has damaged Taiwan’s sovereignty in the way it negotiated various economic agreements like ECFA without specifying exactly how. My own analysis concludes that the Ma Administration has not negotiated badly and has preserved Taiwan’s position on this key issue. But it will become important if and when the two sides begin discussions on political and security talks, because sovereignty is an inherently political issue. Which is one reason why those talks are so difficult to start, and may not start anytime soon.

Challenge Number Three is different. It concerns not the content of cross-Strait negotiations but how Beijing seeks to promote its goals concerning Taiwan. Here we need to think about how China is pursuing its objectives regarding Taiwan, and I find it useful to distinguish analytically between two different ways or paradigms: the paradigm of mutual persuasion and the paradigm of power asymmetry, which is different.

Essentially, the paradigm of mutual persuasion is a shared approach of negotiation, persuasion, incrementalism, and mutual adjustment. I would argue that this is the approach that the two sides have followed since Ma Ying-jeou took office. It is part of what Beijing understands by its concept of peaceful development. It is in Taiwan’s interest that mutual persuasion continue (also, I would argue, it is in China’s and America’s interest).

The paradigm of power asymmetry is different. Here, China would exploit the growing power gap with Taiwan – economic, diplomatic, military, and so on – by pressuring Taiwan to accept a resolution of the fundamental dispute more or less on its terms, and even though many in Taiwan would be unhappy about submitting in this way. But listen to how one influential PRC scholar of cross-Strait relations has put the matter: “The severe asymmetrical balance of power between mainland China and Taiwan is a fact that no one can change. Moreover, this problem . . . will continue to increase, a situation that Taiwan needs to handle pragmatically and calmly.” We can speculate on what the scholar means by “pragmatically and calmly.”

Why would Beijing decide on a shift in paradigm? First of all, it might do so if it decided, based on its perceptions or misperceptions, that a future Taiwan government was moving towards de jure independence, and if it could not get Washington to restrain Taipei.

But let us assume, purely for purposes of discussion, that the KMT remains in power, why then might Beijing decide to shift to a strategy of pressure and intimidation? This would happen, I speculate, if it became impatient and decided that Taiwan would never move from the status quo to unification. We have seen hints of that impatience in Chinese suspicions that President Ma’s true objective was “peaceful separation” with a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” character. And recall that one of the circumstances specified in the 2005 anti-secession law is that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”

Now I actually don’t think that China will lose patience in the foreseeable future – for the rest of President Ma’s second term, perhaps. I believe that the PRC officials responsible for the conduct of cross-Strait relations are realistic about the views of the Taiwan public and the limits that places on the Taipei government. They seem to believe that time is on Beijing’s side. On the other hand, I don’t know what “new thinking” Xi Jinping may have concerning Taiwan policy, and recent statements by PRC officials urge movement on political issues. So it’s impossible to know whether Beijing’s patience will last indefinitely. No-one should assume that it will.

Note that when I talk about a Chinese strategy of pressure and intimidation, I don’t mean the use of force or even the explicit threat of force. In a situation of power asymmetry, the stronger power need not act overtly to compel the weaker power. In the Taiwan case, Beijing might conclude the very fact that Taiwan is quite dependent on the Mainland economically and the mere existence of its increasingly robust military capabilities will be sufficient to secure Taipei’s submission more or less on its terms.

Obviously, a pressure strategy would create a great challenge for Taiwan. It would. I think, create intense pressure on Taiwan’s leaders and turmoil among the public. The political system would be under tremendous strain.

So what should Taiwan do about this situation? This is my final challenge, the challenge of self-strengthening. It is really a set of challenges. And Taiwan isn’t the only country that needs to strengthen itself from within. In my view, frankly speaking, there is a lot that the United States must do to strengthen itself from within in order to rebuild the pillars of national power that have permitted it to play a dominant role in world affairs since World War II.

I have already referred to the first of these self-strengthening challenges. It is to maintain and enhance Taiwan’s global economic competitiveness in spite of the demographic shift. This requires the continued building of a knowledge-based, innovation-driven economy, and all that this implies for education, financial markets, and the level of government regulation. It requires that the Mainland side properly protects the intellectual property owned by Taiwan companies.

But economic self-strengthening also requires liberalizing its economic ties with all its major trading partners, not just China. To liberalize with China alone runs the risk of being too dependent on the Mainland. Liberalizing with all major trading partners will require eliminating some protectionist barriers, but the structural adjustment that this stimulates will work to Taiwan’s benefit. In fact, this is the policy of the Ma Administration.

I have also suggested that n terms of fundamental policy, it is a good idea for Taiwan to foster a clearer sense of what it means to say that Taiwan or the ROC is a sovereign entity, not just for its role in the international system but also regarding cross-Strait relations and the domestic political system. This will ensure that if and when political and security talks come, Taiwan’s negotiators will no what aspects of sovereignty are relatively minor and can be conceded and which are so important that they must be defended at all costs. One part of this self-strengthening will be public education so voters understand along with officials.

Diplomatically, Taiwan should ensure that its relationships with its most important diplomatic partners are strong and positive. This includes, of course, the United States and Japan, but also the principal countries of Western Europe. In this regard, I am pleased to report that relations with the United States have improved in recent years.

Militarily, Taiwan should skillfully enhance the deterrent capabilities of Taiwan’s armed forces. By this I mean raising the costs and uncertainties for Beijing if it were ever to mount an intimidation campaign, which at least implies a willingness to use force. Here, I associate myself with the Obama Administration which, in the words of one official, believes that “Lasting security cannot be achieved simply by purchasing limited numbers of advanced weapons systems. Taiwan must also devote greater attention to asymmetric concepts and technologies to maximize Taiwan’s enduring strengths and advantages.”

Finally, there is the question of the political system. Frankly, I believe that Taiwan’s political system tends to focus on relatively superficial issues – such as the security of President Ma’s daughter – rather than on the fundamental challenges that face the island. Politicians are aided in this tendency by this mass media.

Now, I understand that this is a structural problem, created not by individual politicians or media companies but by the nature of competition within both the political and media world. I also believe that Taiwan is better off having a democratic system than something else, in part because it creates a challenge for Beijing – that if it wishes to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan, it will have to satisfy a broad spectrum of public opinion. And I realize that reforming a political system is very hard to do. Just look at the similar problems that exist in the United States. But it is Taiwan’s political system that will be the mechanism by which self-strengthening occurs in the other areas I have mentioned. So if that mechanism is not strong and effective itself, everything else will be difficult. The fundamental question is, are the people of Taiwan being well served by their political system.

None of these forms of self-strengthening will be easy, particularly in a divided polity. But they are areas where a broader and deeper Taiwan consensus will buoy Taiwan’s psychological confidence and reduce the chances of PRC pressure in the first place. In this regard, young people have a special role to play, for the simple reason that over the long term, you have the most at stake. On the other hand, for Taiwan to remain divided and forego the opportunity for self-strengthening only increases the island’s vulnerability. And it will be young people who have the most to lose.

My final question, Question 8, is what are the implications of all of this for the United States? You may have seen the policy brief of mine that Brookings issued recently, so I will just summarize its conclusions.

First of all, the fact that stabilization has only gone part way and could stall should allay any American fears that, in effect, Taiwan will “abandon America” for the sake of its relationship with China.

Second, it would be unwise for the United States to “abandon Taiwan” for the sake of its relationship with China. I and other scholars have offered several compelling reasons why this is so (as long, of course, as Taiwan desires American support):

First of all, Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China differences, it is not the only one. Frictions over maritime East Asia and North Korea are examples. So conceding to Beijing on our security relationship with Taiwan would not necessarily foster a more friendly China.
Second, U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them too.
Third, whatever China says, U.S. arms are actually not the reason that Beijing has been unable to bring Taiwan “into the embrace of the Motherland.” More to the point, China has not been able to persuade Taiwan’s government and public to accept its “one country, two systems” formula. If China were to make an offer that was actually to Taiwan’s liking, Taipei would not refuse that offer because of U.S. arms sales.
Fourth, there have been points in the past when the United States has acted in ways that placed Taiwan in a vulnerable position. Most or all of those occurred before the people of Taiwan had any say in their future, as they clearly do now. I hope that we don’t repeat this unfortunate history.

Finally, how a status quo United States and a reviving China cope with each other will be played out over the next few decades in a series of test cases. North Korea, maritime East Asia, and Iran are a few of them. Taiwan is another. Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like North Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

Authors

Richard C. Bush III

Publication: Tamkang University

Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters

Examining North Korea’s Recent Heated Rhetoric

Strobe Talbott, Richard C. Bush III, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Jonathan D. Pollack — Fri, 29 Mar 2013 15:04:00 -0400

As the United States and South Korea undertake joint military exercises, North Korea has responded with harsh rhetoric, saying that its people are “burning with hatred” for the United States. Brookings President Strobe Talbott leads a discussion with Richard Bush, Michael O’Hanlon, and Jonathan Pollack focusing on the latest saber rattling by North Korea and exploring the intentions of Kim-Jong Un, North Korea’s young leader.

Strobe Talbott: Do you think that the current bluster (and more) from Pyongyang represents more of what we’ve seen before from North Korea or is there a real danger of conflict? If the latter, what should the U.S. be doing to prevent that terrible prospect and what would happen if it comes to blows?

Michael O’Hanlon: I recently wrote on the subject in Politico following the third nuclear test in an effort encourage the U.S. against overreaction given Kim Jong-Un's youth and inexperience—and his potential for moderation/change as he ages (I hope!). My proposal was to make any additional sanctions temporary, partly as a way to induce Chinese support and partly as an incentive to North Korea not to test again (since the new sanctions would only sunset in the event of no further tests or big provocations).

But, of course, that's not quite the same as an answer to your question. In light of the above thinking, my own druthers would be to make any upgrades in our capability quietly—even secretly—so as not to provoke the action-reaction cycle we are now in (e.g., sending F-22 aircraft to bases in South Korea to improve the effectiveness of any initial air strikes, but not telling anybody except Seoul).

Richard Bush: The consensus opinion among specialists is that North Korea’s recent actions are the same old-same old, the typical way North Korea responds to U.S.-ROK exercises every year. Specifically, because the regime portrays the exercises as a segue for a U.S.-ROK attack, even nuclear attack, then it must make at least verbal threats about what it will do when that war happens. The intensity this time may have been dialed up a bit because Kim 3.0 is feistier than his father was, but it's a question of degree.

What may happen (or may not) is a limited conventional strike at the DMZ, against a ROK naval ship, or against one of the West Sea Islands (like the one that preceded our November 2010 visit to Seoul). The ROKs have pledged retaliation, which does create the problem of escalation, but how it might play out is speculative at this point.

Talbott: Thanks, Richard. Most convincing and, to a point, reassuring.

O’Hanlon: Yes, to a point, indeed. "Consensus among specialists" is not always a concept I find reassuring, though! I am glad, Richard, that you seem willing to deviate somewhat from that consensus yourself (at least to some extent). This is probably the same old-same old….until it's not, that is. I actually do worry that the U.S. default approach of tit-for-tat with North Korea (and the imposition of additional, permanent sanctions after the third test), while of course morally defensible, may exacerbate the situation in this particular case—which feels somewhat different to me than past periods of bluster.

Talbott: Interesting point, Mike. I’d be interested in your assessment of Kim-Jong Un, or Kim 3.0 as Richard calls him. His recent rhetoric and actions show that he is willing to test the boundaries of what is internationally acceptable. But, I had the impression that he was subject to a lot of supervision from the North Korean military, meaning he doesn't have much autonomy, especially, one hopes, when it comes to declaring the Korean War back on and taking other actions that would significantly escalate the situation.

O’Hanlon: Right and Kim-Jong Un wants to be friends with Dennis Rodman and he grew up largely in Europe—and he doesn't strike me as the suicidal type, so I'm hoping that someday he'll want to be the next leader of a "reform from within" movement as in Vietnam years ago, Burma of late, etc. Obviously a long-shot concept at the moment though....

Jonathan Pollack: The reality is that we don't really know very much about what animates Kim 3.0, so we must infer from what we can observe about his behavior. He seems very much like Kim Il Sung and may even be modeling himself on his grandfather. (He has his physicality and extroversion; even his body language seems reminiscent of the grandfather.) Very few foreigners have met 3.0. The Chinese blessed his succession at an early date (November 2010, as I recall), when a then serving member of the Politburo Standing Committee was on the podium with young Mr. Kim. So far as I can determine no senior Chinese official has met with him since then, and he has not been invited to visit China. In contrast to the distinct warming in China-SK relations (including several messages between Xi Jinping and Pres Park), there is a decided coldness/distancing in China-NK relations. I think Beijing early on calculated that there was a potential opening with 3.0 (as did we—witness the abortive February 29 agreement), but this seems largely a dead letter at this point.

The most troubling possibility is that he is very full of himself, listens to few others, and is now consorting regularly with the North Korean military leadership. Despite some early hopes for reform in the North, he has now wrapped himself in the "military first" rhetoric every bit as much as his father did. Worse yet, he has a successful satellite launch and another nuclear test under his belt, with clear expectations that more could be in the offing.

As I wrote in the Foreign Policy program’s Big Bets-Black Swans project, there needs to be a much more determined effort by the United States and ROK to deal fully with China in the event that things go from bad to worse in Korea. Now is definitely the time, lest we find ourselves in an acute crisis. That said, North Korean propaganda always spikes whenever the U.S. and the ROK are in the middle of major exercises, so perhaps the latest campaign will subside as the exercises wind down next month. But the tone and threats are particularly worrisome at present - even they are intended largely for domestic effect.

O’Hanlon: That's an excellent point, Jonathan, if I may say so (the focus on consultation with China).

I can't disagree with any of the analysis, and of course, you know the dynamics in the region very well. However, I still would venture to say that our February 2012 hopes (just two months into 3.0's rule, when he still hadn't even turned 30 years old as I recall) were unrealistically optimistic that early in his tenure within a Stalinist system, and we should remember how unlikely glasnost and perestroika would have seemed (or Chinese and Vietnamese economic reform) a few years before they occurred. But that's a footnote, not a central argument, of course.

Pollack: I and a few others met with the State Department’s Glyn Davies immediately after the signing the 2/29/12 agreement. He remained very sober about the possibilities—and that it seemed too good to be true. Davies was careful not to oversell the agreement, which, in the end, blew up two weeks later.

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Image Source: © KCNA KCNA / Reuters

China’s Rise: Assessing Views from East Asia and the United States

Fri, 29 Mar 2013 09:00:00 -0400

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March 29, 2013
9:00 AM - 1:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

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The opportunities and challenges presented to East Asia by China’s rapidly increasing international stature, economic influence and military heft have been thrown into sharp relief over the last few years. Escalating tensions over a series of maritime territorial disputes have contrasted with a marked improvement in cross-strait relations and with efforts by China to pursue free trade agreements with ASEAN countries as well as Japan and South Korea. Until recently, however, scholars who follow this issue have not had access to survey data that might allow them to draw more specific conclusions about the attitudes of other East Asians towards the rise of China.

On March 29, the John L. Thornton China Center and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, the Program for East Asia Democratic Studies of the Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University, and the Institute of Arts and Humanities of Shanghai Jiaotong University will host a half-day conference to address this question. At the conference, panelists will present data from the Asian Barometer Survey and compare these findings with prevailing survey data in the United States. Leading experts from both sides of the Pacific will weigh the potential implications of these studies for future relations between China and other East Asian countries and for U.S.-China relations.

After each set of presentations, speakers will take audience questions.

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What Lies Ahead for Japan and the United States

Fri, 22 Mar 2013 14:00:00 -0400

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March 22, 2013
2:00 PM - 3:00 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

An Address by H.E. Kenichiro Sasae, Ambassador of Japan to the United States

During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent visit to Washington, DC, he announced that “Japan is back.” Meanwhile, the Obama administration is emphasizing a “rebalancing” of its global posture toward the Asia-Pacific region.

On March 22, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings hosted an address by H.E. Kenichiro Sasae, ambassador of Japan to the United States. Following the productive summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe and President Obama last month, Ambassador Sasae discussed the roles of the two countries in shaping the regional order in East Asia and how they may strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. Senior Fellow Richard Bush, director of CNAPS, provided introductory remarks. Senior Fellow Mireya Solís, the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, moderated the discussion.

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UN Sanctions, North Korean Threats

Richard C. Bush III — Thu, 07 Mar 2013 14:28:00 -0500

The UN Security Council has unanimously condemned “in the strongest possible terms” North Korea’s February nuclear test (its third). It expanded financial sanctions, mandated close checks of cargo entering and exiting North Korea, and warned of future measure if Pyongyang persists in its provocative behavior.

Are these new sanctions likely to bring about an immediate and positive change in North Korean policy?

Probably not. Economic sanctions usually require a long period of time to “bite,” and they must be fully multilateral in scope. These new sanctions can further constrain the resources available to the resource-poor North Korean regime and thereby its broader policy choices. To have that effect, however, sound implementation is critical. This is particularly true of China, through which much of North Korea’s trade and financial transactions flow.

What is the underlying objective of the sanctions regime?

The goal of this and previous actions is to sharpen the choices of North Korea, to disabuse it of the idea that the international community will both accept it as a state with nuclear weapons and permit international economic activity on a normal basis. Only when it understands that it can only have one or the other will it even consider making a fundamental choice between the two. The transition to a new regime creates, in the medium term, the possibility of such a policy shift. If that does not happen, the international community will have to contain the consequences.

What should we make of North Korea’s threat to attack the United States?

Certainly, those threats cannot be dismissed out of hand. But Pyongyang has issued similar warnings before and not acted upon them. The regime has domestic reasons to make create a crisis atmosphere, and while it glories in shows of bravado and brinksmanship, it is not suicidal. Actually, the greatest danger in the near term is a conventional but limited military action against South Korea. Look for Seoul and Washington to strengthen deterrence against such attack and prepare a proportionate response should deterrence fail.

What is North Korea’s strategy that is driving these actions?

Just as the United States, South Korea and others have sought to sharpen Pyongyang’s choices, so too is North Korea trying to sharpen ours. There is a test of wills at play here. The salutary consequence of the current struggle is that it has led China to seriously question its past “even-handed” policy, which had the effect of indulging North Korea in its provocations.

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Richard C. Bush III

Shinzo Abe's Visit to Washington

Richard C. Bush III — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 17:51:00 -0500

Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, made the rounds of Washington today (February 22nd). He laid a wreath at Arlington National Cemetery (implicitly honoring those who lost their lives fighting Imperial Japan in World War II). He and President Obama had a full discussion of security and economic ties. And late this afternoon, Abe spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

President Obama endorsed the U.S.-Japan alliance as “the central foundation for our regional security,” and Prime Minister Abe emphasized later that it worked to mutual benefit of the two countries. Obama told Abe that he would have “a strong partner in the United States throughout your tenure” – a validation that will no doubt enhance his political standing back home. The two leaders were on the same page regarding the need for “strong actions” regarding the recent nuclear test by North Korea, and they specifically discussed financial sanctions.

Obama and Abe discussed the proposal that Japan join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major, new rule-setting effort in the field of regional economics and trade. Washington wants Japan to be prepared to include all relevant issues, especially market access for American farm products. The two governments confirmed that understanding, but the United States also reaffirmed that Japan would not have to make fundamental concessions even before the negotiations began. Thus, progress was made, but a lot of work remains to be done.

On recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea, Abe publicly reaffirmed Japan’s adherence to its position that as a matter of history and international law, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are Japan’s sovereign territory. He received from Secretary of State Kerry a reiteration of U.S. statements that those islands are within the territorial scope of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan and that the United States is opposed to unilateral efforts to undermine Japan’s administrative control of the islands. Yet Abe also pledged that Japan would continue to act in a “reserved manner,” that it would not initiate an escalation of the conflict, and that Tokyo was open improving its important relationship with China.

For the short term, U.S. expectations from the summit were probably low. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party faces elections for half the seats of the Upper House of the Diet (legislature) in July. Winning a majority in that election and so ending divided government in Tokyo is very important for Mr. Abe. He was not about to make bold initiatives in Washington that could hurt him back home (on TPP, for example), but the United States has an interest in a Japanese government that can work to meet the many challenges that faces it.

Over the longer term, the Obama administration expects more than a good set of meetings. It hopes that Japan will bear its part of the burden of preserving peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia and the world, and that there would be close coordination and cooperation on how to manage China’s rise on issues large and small. In that regard, Abe pledged new action on the security relationship but also a renewed commitment to a positive and constructive global and regional role. Abe’s simple message was that, after several years of uncertainty about Tokyo’s future trajectory, Japan “was back,” and contrary to the doubts of some Americans, it would remain a first-tier country.

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Richard C. Bush III

North Korea's Nuclear Tests: A Persistent, Deliberate Process

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

North Korea continues to develop an arsenal of nuclear weapons despite the concerns and condemnations from neighboring countries and Western powers. Scientific reports about this week’s blast suggest that the bombs could be growing more sophisticated and dangerous. Richard C. Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and Jonathan Pollack, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, take a closer look at North Korea’s nuclear program and the message it sends.

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North Korea's Nuclear Tests: A Persistent, Deliberate Process

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The Implications of North Korea's Third Nuclear Test

Richard C. Bush III and Jonathan D. Pollack — Tue, 12 Feb 2013 09:37:00 -0500

We do not yet know how much North Korea has advanced its nuclear weapons program as a result of today’s test. Specialists are intensely curious about the fissile material used (plutonium or enriched uranium) and the design of device. Pyongyang claims that the latest test was of a smaller, lighter weapon, and the available seismic data indicates an appreciably greater explosive yield than either of the prior tests. The North is undoubtedly making progress, and it is not too early to assess the implications of this test – and the successful ballistic missile launch in December – for the interests of all countries immediately affected by the detonation.

Kim Jong Un very likely sees himself as the big winner from today’s test. Kim became North Korea’s top leader following the death of his father Kim Jong Il fourteen months ago. His principal goal since then has been to establish his own personal legitimacy and preserve that of the Kim Royal Family. In that regard, securing progress on the missile and nuclear programs is the coin of the realm.

For the United States and Japan, the two tests confirm past judgments about Pyongyang’s long-term intentions. That is, the DPRK is intent on acquiring the ability to strike the continental United States as well as Japan with nuclear weapons, an objective that no package of outside incentives is likely to prevent. The stakes are high. Should North Korea succeed in its quest, it will significantly destabilize the security of Northeast Asia and increase the dangers of proliferation to other regions.

Some will fault Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul for not having engaged Pyongyang to head off the tests of recent months, but there is little or no evidence that Kim Jong Un would have been any more responsive to engagement than his father. Instead, the U.S., Japan, and South Korea have sought in recent years to “sharpen North Korea’s choices,” between sustaining its nuclear and missile programs, in contrast to heightened economic and political benefits with the international community. All three states will likely respond to today’s test by seeking to tighten sanctions. There is ample room to improve the implementation of existing measures, and new financial sanctions are available (see the current Iran menu). But a question lingers, are we indeed shaping North Korea’s choices or is it shaping ours?

The third nuclear test puts China’s new leadership on the hot seat. Under its previous leader Hu Jintao Beijing had multiple objectives in its North Korea strategy: restrain DPRK provocations; limit the impact of multilateral sanctions so that they do not stabilize the North Korean regime; provide economic support to Pyongyang to enhance stability and encourage better behavior; and facilitate a diplomatic approach for managing the problem, if not solving it. By testing in defiance of China’s wishes, Pyongyang has once again demonstrated that it has a very different agenda. It is betting that Beijing’s threats of punishment (as under Hu Jintao) are all bark and no bite. In effect, it is testing China’s new paramount leader, Xi Jinping. Will he cooperate with Washington in tightening sanctions and withdraw material and political benefits to Kim Jong Un? Or will Xi accommodate to a new status quo? Those questions will occupy the Beijing leadership during the Chinese New Year holiday.

The DPRK’s action probably has the greatest impact on South Korea’s president-elect, Park Geun-hye, who will be inaugurated on February 25^th. Madame Park had campaigned on the premise that the North Korea policies of the current president, Lee Myung Bak, had been too tough and one-sided. She had proposed the creation of a “trust-building” process with Pyongyang and a focus on areas of potential mutual benefit. Much of the South Korean public supported that stance when they cast their votes. With today’s nuclear test, Kim Jong Un has signaled that any acts of accommodation must come solely from the South Korean side, thus putting Madame Park on the defensive. Her initiative is now very unlikely to get off the ground. Any claims that the test was directed against outgoing President Lee will ring hollow to the new president, compelling her to rethink her approach to future dealings with the North.

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Governance, Rule of Law and Natural Resources in Indonesia and Lessons for Burma’s Transformation

Thu, 07 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

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February 7, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

An authoritarian state merely a decade ago, Indonesia is now an open, pluralist democracy characterized by consistently high levels of economic growth, a growing middle class and booming foreign investment. Not only is Indonesia geostrategically important in the development of U.S. policy toward Asia, it is also a model for the coexistence of Islam and democracy and a key player in efforts to tackle global deforestation, biodiversity loss and climate change.

On February 7, Brookings hosted a discussion on Indonesia’s natural resources management in the context of the country’s political, economic and rule of law reform efforts, as well as its battle against terrorist groups. The panel also drew lessons for Burma’s political and economic transformation and its management of natural resources.

Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown provided insights from her recent fieldwork in Indonesia on illicit economies and organized crime; School of Advanced International Studies Associate Director William M. Wise analyzed the rise of terrorist activity in Indonesia; and Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Lex Rieffel discussed how Burma can learn from Indonesia’s economic reforms and management of foreign aid and foreign investment. Senior Fellow Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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The Future of China-Taiwan Relations

Wed, 06 Feb 2013 14:30:00 -0500

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February 6, 2013
2:30 PM - 4:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

During much of the 2000s, tensions between Taiwan and China roiled the stability of East Asia. Each side feared the intentions of the other and acted on those fears, creating a vicious circle of political mistrust and military build-up. The United States was drawn in because Beijing and Taipei each urged Washington to take its side against the other. Some strategists believed that Taiwan was the only issue that might spark a U.S.-China war. Over the last five years, the relationship between China and Taiwan has changed for the better, with cooperation replacing confrontation, and the danger of war declining. However, future momentum will likely slow, and China has not abandoned its goal of unifying with Taiwan on its terms. Will it be content to continue its current, incremental approach? What will happen if it doesn’t? What can Taiwan, China and the United States do to ensure that the current stability will continue?

On February 6, the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings (CNAPS) hosted the launch of a new book, Uncharted Strait: the Future of China-Taiwan Relations (Brookings, 2013) by CNAPS Director and Senior Fellow Richard Bush. Uncharted Strait explores the significant shift in cross-Strait relations and prospects for the future. Senior Fellow Mireya Solís, the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.

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