Few issues are closer to President Obama’s vision of the global future than his convictions about reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. Less than three months after entering office, in a major speech in Prague, he put forward an ambitious nuclear agenda, declaring that the United States (as the only state ever to employ nuclear weapons in warfare) had a “moral responsibility…to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

Seven years later, despite the administration’s having advanced other goals in non-proliferation policy, the larger vision of a nuclear-free world remains very much unfulfilled. But President Obama apparently hasn’t given up. In late May, he became the first American president to visit Hiroshima, where the United States first employed a nuclear weapon in warfare. In his speech, the president declared that “nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles…must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them.” Moreover, as President Obama approaches his final six months in office, senior officials are purportedly deliberating additional policy changes that they believe could be undertaken without congressional approval. As Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said in a June 6 speech at the Arms Control Association, the president remains intent on advancing his “Prague agenda” before leaving office.

According to recent press reports, the policy options under consideration include U.S. enunciation of a nuclear “no first use” doctrine. Such a step would represent a profound shift in U.S. policy. Non-nuclear states living in the shadow of nuclear-armed adversaries have long relied on U.S. security guarantees, specifically the declared commitment to employ nuclear weapons should our allies be subject to aggression with conventional forces. They have based their own national security strategies on that pledge, including their willingness to forego indigenous development of nuclear weapons.

Northeast Asia presents a clear contradiction between President Obama’s non-nuclear aspirations and existing circumstances.

These issues bear directly on the credibility of U.S. guarantees to allies in Europe and Asia, with particular relevance in Northeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the content of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence pledge has already narrowed. Washington has long deemed any use of nuclear weapons a matter of absolute last resort. Since the early 1990s, Washington has also enunciated an unambiguous distinction between employment of conventional and nuclear weapons, including the unilateral withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean peninsula. 

The Obama administration itself has also moved closer to limiting nuclear weapons use exclusively to deter another state’s first use of such a weapon against the United States, its allies, and partners—in fact, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review declared that this was a “fundamental role” of the American nuclear arsenal. At that time, it also pledged to “work to establish conditions” under which it was safe to adopt universally a policy where the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear attack by an adversary. The implication of such a “sole purpose” policy would be that North Korea need not fear American nuclear retaliation if it mounted only a conventional attack against South Korea. 

Whether it is “no first use” or “sole purpose use,” Northeast Asia presents a clear contradiction between President Obama’s non-nuclear aspirations and existing circumstances. The Republic of Korea and Japan (the only state ever subject to nuclear attack) confront the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Pyongyang continues to enhance its weapons inventory and the means to deliver them. It also regularly threatens Seoul and Tokyo with missile attack, potentially armed with nuclear weapons. 

[A]ny indications that the United States might be wavering from its nuclear guarantees would trigger worst-case fears that the United States, above all, would not want to stimulate.

Both U.S. allies are therefore strongly opposed to a U.S. "no first use" pledge, and would likely have deep concerns about a sole purpose commitment. Though the United States possesses a wide array of non-nuclear strike options in the event of a North Korean attack directed against South Korea or Japan, any indications that the United States might be wavering from its nuclear guarantees would trigger worst-case fears that the United States, above all, would not want to stimulate. At the same time, choosing not to issue a "no first use" pledge should not in any way suggest that the United States favors nuclear use, which would play directly into North Korean propaganda strategy. Rather, the United States should not preemptively remove the nuclear option, especially when North Korea is in overt defiance of its non-proliferation obligations and is single-mindedly intent on a building a nuclear weapons capability.

The Obama administration must therefore balance its clear desire to advance a non-nuclear legacy with Northeast Asia’s inescapable realities. Enunciating a "no first use" doctrine or a sole purpose commitment in the administration’s waning months in office is a bridge too far. Though the United States can and should engage South Korea and Japan in much deeper consultations about extended deterrence, it cannot put at risk the security of allies directly threatened by attack from a nuclear-armed adversary. 

The next U.S. president will have to square this circle. In the meantime, the Obama administration should do all that it can to plan for the road ahead, even if it means policy pledges that might not be as visionary as it would prefer. 

      

 

 

As the United States election season heats up, campaign rhetoric questioning the value of U.S. alliances overseas has kicked off a furor of debate in foreign policy circles. At this critical juncture of the United States reassessing its international obligations, contributing scholars to the Brookings Order from Chaos project offer their analyses of the various U.S. alliances and security partnerships, along with the diverse economic, diplomatic, and security challenges that impact those critical commitments.

Setting the stage

America’s Alliances and Security Partnerships in East Asia: Introduction Alliances have been a critical part of the U.S.-led security order in East Asia since the early post-World War II period. As regional geopolitics evolve and respond to China’s revival as a great power, so too will American alliances and security partnerships. This series contends that alliances will remain a key element of U.S. national security in defending regional stability.

U.S. alliances and security partnerships

	The U.S.-Japan Alliance At a time when one of America’s closest allies is facing a variety of existential threats, John Allen and Benjamin Sugg argue that Washington must be able to assure Japan that its security is deep-seated in U.S. grand strategy and the balance of power in the region.
	The U.S.-ROK Alliance: Projecting U.S. Power and Preserving Stability in Northeast Asia Evans Revere argues that the threat of nuclear-armed North Korea, as well as rapidly changing security dynamics in Asia, make bolstering the U.S.-Korea alliance crucial for the next U.S. president to project American power and preserve stability in Northeast Asia.
	Australia and the United States: Navigating Strategic Uncertainty In these times of growing uncertainty in the global and Asian strategic environments, the U.S.-Australian security alliance seems a pillar of stability. Even so, Rory Medcalf proposes it requires a reality check if it is to stay resilient and durable in the difficult times ahead.
	The U.S.-Philippine Alliance in a Year of Transition: Challenges and Opportunities The presidential elections in the United States and the Philippines mark uncertain transitional periods for both sides. Sheena Chestnut Greitens assesses the U.S.-Philippine alliance in terms of its current status and possible future trajectories in light of the changing domestic political alignments in Washington and Manila.
	The U.S.-Singapore Partnership: A Critical Element of U.S. Engagement and Stability in the Asia-Pacific Lynn Kuok surveys the deep partnership between the United States and Singapore and finds that, though not formal allies, the two share the belief that a strong U.S. presence in the Pacific is vital for the region’s peace, stability, and prosperity. Yet, because Singapore is a reliable partner, the next U.S. administration must not take the partnership for granted if it is to flourish going forward.
	The United States Security Partnership with Taiwan Taiwan’s reliance on the United States as a security strategy will only be tested by China’s growing military capability. Richard C. Bush analyzes the United States’ unique relationship with Taiwan and its implications for Cross-Strait political disputes.

      

 

 

The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea has ruled on the case that the Philippines brought in 2013, challenging China's claims and behavior in the South China Sea. International lawyers and the policy commentariat has judged the ruling as a sweeping victory for the Philippines and a significant loss for China, which refused to acknowledge the tribunal's jurisdiction or to take part in the proceedings.

The question going forward is how China will respond. Will it double down on the aggressive and coercive activities of the past six years, behavior that has put most of its East Asian neighbors on guard? Will it continue to interpret the Law of the Sea in self-serving ways that very few countries accept? Or, might China recognize that its South China Sea strategy has been an utter failure and that its best response is to take a more restrained and neighborly approach? 

What got us here?

Critical as the next weeks and months will be, it is also useful to take a look back and examine recent events in the broad context of Chinese foreign and security policy over the last four decades. The premise of that reform policy, initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was that a weak China could best ensure its security by engaging and accommodating the international community, in order to gradually build up all aspects of its national power. The most clear-cut feature of this strategy was to join the global economy: China accepted the leadership of the IMF and World Bank; opened the Chinese economy to international trade and investment; carved out critical roles in global supply chains; accepted the liberalization disciplines of the World Trade Organization; and, more recently, began to provide public goods to other developing economies. Not everyone has benefitted from China's economic engagement, but on balance it has been a signal success.

China's reformist leaders also recognized the value of taking an accommodating stance toward its East Asian neighborhood, of which the United States is a part. One side of accommodation was to execute a skillful diplomacy designed to reduce tensions and avoid conflict unless Beijing's fundamental interests were under threat. Accommodation's other side was to delay the modernization of the Chinese military and exercise restraint in the use of those capabilities that it did create. This made sense because China both lacked the power to challenge the United States and Japan militarily and needed the help of those and other countries to grow economically. 

That approach changed in the early 2000s, when Beijing judged that it would only be secure if it expanded its eastern and southern strategic perimeters into the East and South China Seas. That judgment had its own logic, which maritime territorial disputes and reports of maritime energy and mineral resources only intensified. Thus began a program to build the capabilities to project power into the maritime domain and then use them to press its claims. That campaign created frictions with its neighbors. An increasingly overbearing diplomacy didn't help China's reputation either. 

It’s your move, China

Another part of China's grand strategy has been to integrate itself in the system of international institutions, law, norms, and regimes—both global and regional. This step did not signify a fundamental acceptance of the international order that had emerged and evolved after World War II. Rather, it reflected a belief that China could and should use institutions, law, norms, and regimes to protect China's interests against hegemonic behavior by others, particularly the United States. (Conversely, the "West" believed that binding Beijing to "its" order would restrain Chinese bad behavior.)

The tribunal’s decision on the Philippines case was a clear blow to China's long-standing strategy to use international law to advance or protect its interests, prompting feelings of buyer's remorse. The hardy perennial that China has been the victim of humiliation at the hands of Western countries will only add to the resentful reaction. Of course, China rejects the widely-held view that it is bound by the ruling even though it did not participate in the case. Also, this is a court with no enforcement powers, so Beijing could simply ignore the ruling and use its military and law enforcement assets to continue its past pattern of aggressive and coercive actions—essentially increasing the salience of its military power. That course of action would only further push the test of wills between it and Washington, even though neither benefits from a downward spiral of increased competition and conflict.

Beijing could simply ignore the ruling...That course of action would only further push the test of wills between it and Washington, even though neither benefits from a downward spiral of increased competition and conflict.

China could go even further than simply doubling down. Contrary to the tribunal's ruling, it could treat the Spratly Islands as islands under international law; define them as a single unit for purposes of defining maritime boundaries; accordingly draw straight baselines around them; then declare for itself an exclusive economic zone that covered most of the waters of the South China Sea; and finally, over time, challenge the rights of other countries to freedom of navigation and the exploitation of natural resources. For the lay-reader, what is important here is that none of these actions would accord with the widely accepted principles of the Law of the Sea. (Ultimately, China might someday insist to the countries of East Asia that it will no longer tolerate their relying on China for economic prosperity and depending on the United States for security.)

On the other hand, China could conduct a serious assessment of how it has exercised its diplomatic, coercive, and legal power over the last half-decade. Is China really more secure after alienating its East Asian neighbors through heavy-handed diplomacy, stimulating a very public coercive counter-response from the United States (too public in my view), and suffered a significant defeat in the international court of law? Might a tactical retreat at this stage, including a recommitment to international law and institutions, better serve China's strategic interests than more domineering behavior?

A key principle of Chinese diplomatic statecraft beginning in the 1980s was taoguang yanghui, a phrase that basically means to exercise restraint as one steadily builds one's power. The Chinese national security establishment has forgotten that principle as it conducted its recent policy towards the South China Sea. It would do well to revive it.

      

 

 

Event Information

On May 20, 2016, Taiwan inaugurated its first female president, Tsai Ing-wen. Along with the executive office, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained a majority in the Legislative Yuan for the first time. The challenges facing the new administration, which President Tsai laid out in her inauguration address, are vast and complex ranging from pension reforms, environmental protection and unemployment concerns to regional economic integration and cross-Strait stability.   

On June 8, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) co-hosted a conference on the future of Taiwan under the Tsai administration. Panelists presented papers on how the 2016 elections impact domestic politics, cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s external strategy, and what the elections mean for Tsai’s social and economic policy reform agenda and Taiwan’s aspirations for a greater role in international space. Orbis, FPRI’s journal of world affairs, will publish a special Taiwan issue with the conference papers.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #TaiwanElections

Video

• Panel 1: Taiwan’s domestic prognosis
• Panel 2: Taiwan’s external strategy

Audio

• Taiwan’s 2016 election and prospects for the Tsai administration

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160608_taiwan_election_transcript

      

 

 

Taiwan’s new president, Tsai Ing-wen, was inaugurated on May 20—a hot and humid day in Taipei, where I witnessed the festivities. The inauguration ceremony marked the transition of power from the administration of now-former President Ma Ying-jeou and his Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai and her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). But it also had the potential to be a turning point in Taiwan’s relations with China. Would President Tsai reassure Beijing as it had demanded for months, and so preserve relations between the two sides of the Strait? Or would she fail to sufficiently accommodate China’s wishes and trigger a deterioration in relations? Beijing’s rather quick response to Tsai’s inaugural address suggests that a crisis was avoided, at least temporarily.

Key questions

Three interrelated issues are at play. The first is a question of policy substance: How do Tsai and her DPP colleagues view Taiwan’s relationship to China? Beijing has insisted publicly that mutually beneficial relations are possible only if Taiwan’s leader accepts the 1992 Consensus concerning one China and its “core connotation” that the geographic territories of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan both belong to that one China. Tsai has several problems with Beijing’s understanding of the 1992 Consensus. Namely, there is a fear in her party (and in Taiwan more generally) that accepting China’s formula will start Taiwan down the slippery slope towards political incorporation in and subordination to the government in Beijing.

The second issue is a question of clarity: How clearly must Tsai state any commitment concerning the 1992 Consensus before China will be satisfied? For political and other reasons, she prefers some degree of ambiguity. Although her public positions have become less ambiguous in the last year, China still has insisted on absolute clarity (which it should have known Tsai would be unwilling to provide).

Third, how serious is Beijing about reaching a mutually acceptable formulation with Tsai on one China and Taiwan’s relationship to it? The pessimistic view is that Beijing fears that Tsai is so unalterably committed to legal independence for Taiwan that it would be unwilling to trust whatever statements she might make (or, it has convinced itself that such a fear is justified). The more cautiously optimistic view is that Chinese leaders might give her the benefit of the doubt, at least initially. 

Taiwan honour guards take part in a rehearsal for the performance at the inauguration ceremony of President-elect Tsai Ing-wen, in Taipei, Taiwan May 19, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Tyrone Siu.

She said

Tsai’s inaugural address and Beijing’s response are the first clear-cut data points we have to evaluate these issues.

In her address, Tsai spoke to China’s two conditions in fairly ambiguous ways, but was more forthcoming on one of those conditions than she had been so far. On the issue of the 1992 Consensus, she reiterated a formulation she had used in January, a week after her election. 

Tsai accepted certain key facts about past cross-Strait interactions, specifically:

• In 1992, the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (organizations authorized by the Taipei and Beijing government to represent them) “through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings”;
• This occurred in “a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences.” 

She acknowledged that that since 1992, “over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain.” Based on such “existing realities and political foundations, the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted” (emphasis added).

Concerning the content of the “existing political foundation,” Tsai named four elements. The first was what happened in 1992, including the “seeking common ground” spirit. Second is “the existing Republic of China constitutional order.” The third element “pertains to the outcomes of over twenty years of negotiations and interactions across the Strait.” And the fourth relates to “the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.”

But none of this is new. Why didn’t she go further in substance and express her formulation more clearly? There are two possible explanations: first is that China was demanding far more than Tsai was willing to give, for both policy and political reasons; second is that she had reason to assume that her January formulation was satisfactory to Beijing.

It was on the “core connotation” of the 1992 Consensus that she elaborated more. She said that she was “elected president in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China,” and that it was therefore her “responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China.” Depending on how Tsai defines the Republic of China’s sovereign territory, this formulation could meet Beijing’s requirement that Taiwan belongs to one China. Moreover, she pledged that “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.” Again, the references to the two “areas” could be taken to imply that they are part of the same country and so satisfy Beijing.

After the ceremony, I thought the outcome could go either way. Tsai had maintained a studied ambiguity on how she responded to Beijing’s two conditions. But if China’s leaders did not trust her fundamental intentions or wished to set her up for failure, then it could simply declare her statements as insufficiently unresponsive take a series of punitive actions that damaged their relations with Taiwan beyond any immediate repair (such as stealing away a group of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies), and closing the door on any continuing interaction.

They said

The Chinese response, attributed to an authoritative spokesperson of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, appeared about five hours after Tsai concluded her address. It set forth a chain of reasoning concerning Tsai’s treatment of cross-Strait relations and the implications. 

The statement first asserted that “the 1992 Consensus explicitly sets out the fundamental nature of relations across the Taiwan Straits, [stating that] both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one and the same China and that cross-Straits relations are not state-to-state relations.” (The formula “state-to-state relations” refers to a July 1999 pronouncement by former president Lee Teng-hui that Tsai helped prepare.)

Second, it judged that in her address, Tsai was: 

“ambiguous about the fundamental issue, the nature of cross-Straits relations, an issue that is of utmost concern to people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. She did not explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus and its core implications, and made no concrete proposal for ensuring the peaceful and stable growth of cross-Straits relations. Hence, this is an incomplete test answer.” (With that last sentence, Beijing rather snidely compares its relationship with Tsai to that of an authoritative, all-knowing teacher and an ill-prepared student.) 

Beijing then reiterated the stark options it has presented Taipei before: “a choice between upholding the common political foundation that embodies the one China principle and pursuing separatist propositions of ‘Taiwan independence.’” It newly demanded that Tsai “give explicit answer with concrete actions.” 

[P]ragmatism and common sense prevailed in spite of the ominous rhetoric from Chinese officials.

Finally, the Beijing response concludes that absent Taipei’s “affirmation of the political foundation that embodies the one China principle,…continued and institutionalized [cross-Strait] exchanges” through the two sides’ key governmental and semi-governmental organizations cannot be ensured, because those exchanges they are based on the political foundation of the 1992 Consensus. 

What is remarkable about China’s response is the disjunction between its strong criticism of Tsai Ing-wen’s failure to satisfy its demands and its fairly restrained action. Suspending the exchange mechanisms was not a trivial step, because authoritative communications channels most needed in times of uncertainty. But a suspension (not a termination) is probably the least Beijing could have done after having framed the Tsai’s cross-Strait policy choices in such stark terms for the past year. 

Good news and bad news

The good news here is that pragmatism and common sense prevailed in spite of the ominous rhetoric from Chinese officials. After issuing demands that Tsai state her position with absolute clarity, Beijing was actually willing to tolerate a fair degree of ambiguity and limit the scope of its retaliation. 

The not-so-good news is that the situation between the two sides remains delicate. China has other actions it can take to convey its dissatisfaction. Beijing and Taipei have gotten past the milestone of Tsai’s inauguration without triggering an immediate deterioration, but they have not fully stabilized their relations. This is only a beginning, and what will be needed going forward is a process of incremental trust-building through reciprocal and positive words and deeds. A number of outstanding issues remain to be addressed, and unexpected events can very easily derail progress. As a start, however, this isn’t bad.

      

 

 

Editor’s note: On May 21, Richard Bush gave a presentation at the Lung Ying-tai Cultural Foundation Taipei Salon in Taipei, Taiwan.

(as prepared for delivery)

This is probably the most challenging talk I have ever given and will ever give. I usually talk about international relations, particularly cross-Strait relations, and the internal politics of places like Taiwan and Hong Kong. I could talk at length about President Tsai Ing-wen, her politics, her inaugural speech, or cross-Strait relations. I could talk about those subjects but I don’t intend to. So I must apologize to my friends in the media that I will not be making news this afternoon.

Dr. Lung had a different purpose in mind in inviting me to speak to you today. She asked me to step back and look at the bigger picture. I will talk about Taiwan’s future. But Dr. Lung also asked me to look at issues like generation and culture, specifically the gap between generations and cultures. These are big subjects and ones that I don’t necessarily think about on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, most of you are young and I am almost the same age as your grandparents. We also come from different cultures with different values. I could probably learn more from you than you will learn from me this afternoon. I do appreciate Dr. Lung’s invitation, but frankly I wonder whether it was a good idea for me to accept – or whether it was a good idea for her to invite me in the first place!

Of course I am not a total stranger to these issues. I was young once myself, and sometimes wish I could repeat my earlier years in order to avoid all the mistakes I made the first time around. I have children of my own plus three grandchildren. Brookings employs a lot of young people who have recently left school, and whose skills are very impressive.

Autobiography

I actually think that bridging the culture gap may be easier for me than the generational gap. One reason is that I have spent my whole professional life working on Asia issues, including Taiwan. Let me tell you the basic story-line of my life so far. What you probably need to know about me is the following:

I was born after World War II as part of the baby boom generation.

My age cohort, one of the largest in American history, has been making demands on society for services from before we were born and we will continue to do so until we die.

My parents were missionaries in East Asia, first in the Philippines when I was a small boy; next in Hong Kong when I was a middle school student; and last in Taiwan, where my parents taught at Tunghai University. It was because I lived in Hong Kong for five years that I picked China as the focus of my professional career, so I am very grateful to Hong Kong.

I first came to Taiwan in 1975, the year President Chiang Kai-shek passed away, to do research on my Ph.D. dissertation. During my ten months here, my wife and I adopted a baby Taiwanese girl who had been left by her unwed mother at a social service organization. My daughter is my strongest link to Taiwan.

I am a political scientist by training but never taught in a university. Instead I worked for the U.S. government for nineteen years, with a strong emphasis on Taiwan, and at the Brookings Institution, a policy research organization for the last fourteen years.

From twelve years of working in the Congress, I came to strongly value the importance of effective democratic institutions to reflect the people’s will and to hold governments accountable for their actions. While working in the Executive Branch I learned how the U.S. government tries to adjust to changes of administration in Taiwan.

I have written four books about Taiwan’s domestic development and its relations with the United States and China.

That is enough about me. I wish I had the time to listen to each of your stories. I’m sure they would be very interesting, and that they would reveal different patterns concerning political identity and generation, among other things. Your stories would also reveal the gaps between me and all of you concerning culture, nationality, and generation.

Culture

Let me first speak to cultural differences. Culture, of course, is a broad and complicated concept that embraces many aspects: fine arts, folk arts, religion and philosophy, the norms of interpersonal relations, and so on. American culture is the partial homogenization of the cultures of many different ethnic and national groups that came to America at different times and were assimilated into the dominant society. Taiwan experienced its own unique assimilation process.

I am aware that at least some in Taiwan would say that the Taiwanese have their own culture that is separate from Chinese culture. My own uneducated view is that Taiwan culture is a regional variant of Chinese culture generally. It has done the best job of any Chinese society in preserving traditional Chinese culture. Taiwan’s culture has also evolved, and incorporated elements of our common global culture.

Let me begin by telling a story. It’s a true story that occurred around 1980, not long after the United States established relations with the People’s Republic of China. It concerns two, African-American jazz musicians who undertook a personal cultural exchange with Chinese musicians who were just starting to emerge from the horrors they had experienced during the Cultural Revolution. Accompanying the two American musicians was a writer for The New Yorker; you can find the reporters article by Googling “New Yorker Shanghai Blues.”

Now jazz is not a style of music that automatically fits with music as it was understood in the Mainland at the time. Jazz is based on the principle of improvisation, and of creating variations on a musical theme. The musician creates these variations on the spot, based on his or her feel for the music. Jazz is a uniquely American style of music, not only because it was originally created by Afro-Americana musicians but also because improvisation is a very American trait.

During the cultural exchange, the two Americans talked about jazz at a musical academy in Shanghai. What most puzzled the students was that jazz musicians did not usually transcribe their improvisations—their variations on a theme. For Chinese musicians, music was always written down. For them, unless it was written down, it did not exist. This difference between Chinese musicians and American jazz musicians seemed, therefore, to be an unbridgeable cultural gap.

To try and bridge that gap, one of the jazz musicians challenged the Chinese musicians to play a tune that they could be certain he had never heard. He would then do his own improvisation. The American’s boldness—a kind of improvisation—astonished the Chinese musicians, and they asked a young Chinese pianist to play one of his own compositions, which therefore the American had never heard before. The tune had a clear Chinese character. The American jazz musician then improvised on that tune in a way that beautifully captured the spirit of the Chinese tune. For that brief moment, what had seemed to be an unbridgeable cultural gap was bridged, and there was a degree of convergence.

We are often told that the mainstream versions of Chinese culture and American culture emphasize opposing values: the group vs. the individual; restraint vs. freedom; authority vs. rights; harmony vs. contention; benevolence vs. selfishness; discipline vs. license; shame vs. guilt; preserving the other’s face vs. gaining superiority for oneself; and so on. Anyone who comes from the Chinese cultural world and spends time in America, or the West more broadly, is certain to notice these differences, and any American who spends time in a Chinese cultural environment likely feels the same. A Chinese who marries an American or an American who marries a Chinese sees the contrast every day.

The gap between these polar opposites is pretty wide, and they seem mutually irreconcilable. But I am inclined to think that the differences are not as great as they seem.

First of all, values are sometimes a function of history and how far a traditional social and economic system has developed. America in an earlier era had values that were not totally alien to Chinese culture. At least up until the Civil War, there was something called “Southern Honor,” which is very similar in content to the Chinese concept of face. But social and economic change produced value change in the United States, including the South. Modernization has changed Taiwan’s values. It is doing so on the Mainland. The Mainland’s and Taiwan’s Chineseness doesn’t disappear, and each has is distinctive character, but there is a growing convergence with what we might call not American values but cosmopolitan values.

Second, American and Chinese cultures, even though they may place emphasis on their dominant set of values, do not ignore the secondary or opposing set. Despite the value Americans place on individualism, all our religions emphasize personal restraint, personal discipline, and the need for benevolence. Those sound like Confucian values. We have always had a lot of civic organizations, to which their members are loyal even as they maintain their individuality. Americans’ respect for authority can be quite strong, especially when those in authority enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of those who are subject to authority. Conversely, in Chinese society, an emphasis on the group has not stopped ethnic Chinese people from being individualistic in certain respects. Indeed, I sometimes think that the Chinese emphasis on the group and on authority developed precisely because people so wanted to be individuals.

Actually, I believe that every great civilization has had to address the same fundamental questions, like the relationship of the individual to the group, the nature of authority, and so on. But each civilization has come up with somewhat different answers. Concerning Chinese and American cultures, perhaps it’s not a case of having to make a choice between freedom and restraint, for example. Perhaps each culture can creatively balance the two, and so find ways to increase the positive aspect of their second-place norms and mute the negative effects of their first-place norms. That is, Americans will see the need to encourage proper restraint despite individualism, and Chinese will see the need to encourage productive individuality in the context of a collective consciousness. I would guess that this is already occurring in Taiwan. Convergence replaces divergence.

I said I was trained as a political scientist. I also believe in the value of democracy. So it’s political values that have been most interesting to me. You won’t be surprised to know that in Taiwan before the late 1980s, people who had a stake in the KMT’s authoritarian system would sometimes use cultural arguments to justify that system. The argument was that the group was more important than the individual and discipline was more important than freedom. But political reformers in the KMT, pressure from the DPP, and encouragement from the United States brought about Taiwan’s transition to democracy, the first of its kind in the ethnic Chinese world.

I sometimes hear a similar argument from officials and scholars from China. Taiwan’s transition to democracy and the desire of Hong Kong people for more democracy is a powerful refutation of that argument. Moreover, some of China’s traditional political philosophers have seen the defects of an authoritarian system. Of course, China has had many rulers who emphasized the power and authority of the state over the rights of individuals. Traditionally, Legalism and some parts of Confucianism provided a rationale for an authoritarian state ideology in Imperial China. Leninism has been the dominant ideology on the Mainland since 1949, as it was on Taiwan from the early 1950s to the late 1980s. But Mengzi and his followers challenged the advocates of autocracy and spoke of the need to have checks on absolute authority of the state.

So some of the principles that underlay open and accountable political systems are not absent in Chinese political thought – at least traditional political thought. The problem was that they were not given sufficient emphasis. Taiwan’s democracy has, at times, demonstrated that an open and accountable political system works much better in serving the public’s interest than an authoritarian system. Yet in both Taiwan and the United States, our democratic systems don’t always work so well. You will have your own views on Taiwan’s system. The defects of the American system are just as bad, or worse. I fear, for example, that whoever is elected U.S. president in November, he or she will not be willing to govern effectively because of the serious stalemate in the political system.

When it comes to cultural differences, therefore, when societies experience social and economic modernization and the globalization of economic activity, their previously different cultural values begin to converge. This is particularly true of a society like Taiwan’s, where a significant share of the population has been educated and lived overseas. In important ways, we become more alike than we differ.

I should qualify my conclusion about convergence by touching on the question of power. Taiwan has depended on the power of the United States for security for over six decades. Going back to the 1940s, the U.S. government on several occasions made decisions on its broader China policy that ignored the interests of people on this island. Even after Taiwan’s democratization brought a convergence in our political values, Washington did not necessarily agree with the policy initiatives of Taiwan’s elected leaders, because those initiatives were not in agreement with our interests. That divergence, which is not unique to Taiwan, led to tensions in our bilateral relations. Because the potential exists for a clash of interests between Taiwan and the United States, in spite of our shared values about democracy, it is important that Taiwan’s leaders and voters understand why and how the United States is a key element in Taiwan’s security strategy. It is just as important that American leaders understand the significant ways in which Taiwan is important to the United States. I believe that our leaders do have that understanding, but it must be sustained and adapted to changing conditions.

Generations

I will return to the dilemmas of democratic systems a bit later in my talk. But let me turn now to gaps between generations. As I said, this topic is more difficult for me. On this subject, I will speak mainly to those of you who are younger.

Knowing that I was going to give this talk gave me a good reason to learn more about the cohort of American young people closest to yours. We call them Millennials, because they became adults since the year 2000, the start of the new millennium. Fortunately, the Pew Research Center has already done the work for me. Let me summarize some of its findings:

Frustrated by low wages, poor career opportunities, and the high cost of housing.

Potential sources for creativity and innovation.

Frustrated by the state of Taiwan’s politics.

Increasingly focused on social issues such as land use, the environment, historical preservation, and engage in social movements around these issues.

Tied together by social networking sites.

As one observer put it, Taiwan young people “broadcast their beliefs within social movements and expand social movements by broadcasting their beliefs.”

Indeed, the rise of social movements powered by social media is one of the most significant changes in Taiwan politics in the last thirty years. The broader point is that American and Taiwan young people may have more in common American young people have with their elders and Taiwan young people have with their elders.

In preparing for this talk, I thought about why bridging generation gaps is so difficult. I came up with a couple of observations that are useful, at least for me.

First of all, people in one age cohort understandably find it difficult to appreciate the situation of people in other age cohorts. Younger age cohorts are at a particular disadvantage when trying to understand the priorities and anxieties of their elders. You would think, on the other hand,  that older age cohorts would have an easier time appreciating what younger age groups are experiencing, but it’s not so easy. Parents and grandparents forget what life is like as a young child or as a teenager. Maybe, they don’t want to remember. I am now in a comfortable employment situation and only dimly remember the anxiety I felt in getting a job when I was young, in mastering one job and then thinking about the next job. So, as people go through their life cycle, they think differently at each stage.  To a significant extent, when you become the age that your parents are now, you will look at life in the same way they do. For many of you, that will come as a great shock. It did to me.

These are differences in perspective that occur because older and younger people are at different stages of their life-cycles. But there can be other, more significant ones. Sometimes, some event or major set of events and experiences will change the consciousness of a whole generation of people, and the impact of those events will stay with that generation even as they go through their life cycle – and affect their children and grandchildren.

For example, my parents and my wife’s parents were children and teenagers during the Great Depression. Few Americans were spared the ravages of this economic collapse. Many people went without basic necessities and a normal of life, and they were scarred forever. Even though they lived in relative comfort during their adult lives, neither of my parents ever threw anything away. They and my mother-in-law never felt free to spend money on the good things of life, even though they had the money. My father-in-law, who probably had the worst experience during the Depression, seemed to get the most joy out of spending money later. The anxieties of my parents and parents-in-law about being poor were transmitted subconsciously to my wife and me. We in turn transmitted some of those anxieties to our children. Thus, the defining experience of one generation can get passed on to one or two generations that follow, but the receiving generations don’t necessarily understand the background of the feelings that are conveyed.

I imagine that your grandparents and parents went through formative experiences that were even more profound in their impact than the Great Depression. For people who came from the Mainland around 1949, there was the history of the war with Japan, civil war, the dislocation of fleeing to Taiwan, and long separation from family members left behind. For Taiwan people whose families had been here for many decades, there was the war, the arrival of the ROC regime, the 2-28 incident, the White Terror and martial law, and so on.

It is often the case that people of older generations do not wish to talk about past suffering even though that suffering may have shaped their whole psychology. They do not want to re-live the pain, and they do not wish to scare their children and grandchildren by talking about their bad experiences.

One of my deepest regrets is that I did not take the initiative to talk with my grandparents about their life experiences while they were still alive and talk as much as I should have with my parents before they died. One of the greatest services that younger generations can offer for their parents and grandparents is to draw them out about what they experienced in a different time and place. It is psychologically good for them to be able to talk about their experiences, and it is good for young people to know the ways they sacrificed and struggled. Each side will benefit because the information is shared across generations.

Those are my thoughts about generational interaction within families. Looking at society more broadly, two issues come to mind:

The first of these has to do with the obligation that younger generations have to older generations concerning the “big events” of the past and how those events caused members of older generations to suffer. In other words, transitional justice.

This is a subject of growing international attention, and it encompasses several different dimensions:

Speed up economic growth.

Transform the economy to one based on innovation.

Promote energy security.

Ensure Taiwan’s long-term competitiveness.

Reduce economic inequality.

Protect the environment in a sustainable way.

Ensure enough good jobs and affordable housing for young people.

Implement judicial reform.

Ensure sufficient benefits and services for the elderly and those who will soon be elderly.

Figure out what role aborigines and immigrants should play in this society.

Craft a relationship with the Mainland that is mutually beneficial but does not undermine Taiwan’s fundamental interests.

Ensure sufficient national defense. 

And, provide transitional justice.

As is usually the case, some of these important priorities conflict with others. Each requires resources as well as the time and attention of political and social leaders. But resources, time, and attention are scarce. Being successful on one goal may well have negative consequences for other goals. The people who might be required to make a sacrifice to achieve Goal A may be needed to play positive roles in achieving Goal B. Those people might ask, why should I help on Goal B if I am to suffer from achievement of Goal A? If achieving transitional justice divides Taiwan society, as it has in other societies, can society unite on other objectives?

So balancing these various objectives will be difficult. To get that balance, there must be a significant consensus in society on how to achieve all or most of these objectives at once. I don’t know the answer to these questions but I know that the questions exist.

Discussing transitional justice leads me to another subject. How a society views its past is related to how that society evaluates its present state and what it seeks for its future. It’s also related to how to get from the present to the future. Not surprisingly, different groups in society can disagree about past, present, and future. The difference may be defined by class, racial and ethnic identity, or generation. Or it may be a combination of all three. Certainly, class and identity differences are at play in Taiwan, the United States, and other advanced societies. But generational gaps are also significant. Again, young people in different societies and cultures may have more in common with each other in thinking about the future than they do with their respective older generations. Young people in Taiwan helped propel the DPP and President Tsai to power, just as young people in the United States propelled Barack Obama into the White House and have provided the principal support for the Bernie Sanders campaign.

When different generations take competing views on their society’s present and future, it often comes down to a difference between realism and idealism. There is a line from a play by George Bernard Shaw highlights the difference. The character who is an idealist says to the character who is a realist. He – or she – says: “You see things [as they are]; and you [explain] ‘Why?’ But I dream things that never were and I say ‘Why not?’” Obviously, not all young people are idealists and not all idealists are young. But when idealism comes to the fore, young people are usually in the vanguard. They may have legitimate grievances regarding “things as they are.” They may view political issues more in moral terms than their elders do.

In my view, a good society needs both realists and idealists. Convergence is better than divergence. Reform is an inevitable feature of modern societies. So realists, whether they are older or not, need to be open to new ideas and sensitive to the concerns of young idealists. After all, the young represent society’s future. At the same time, young idealists will be more effective if they understand in practical detail why society works the way it does and why reform may be less easy to carry out than they originally think.

There is a related issue here, that is, the role of institutions in society – again, the question of power. I mentioned at the outset that I value the importance of effective democratic institutions to reflect the people’s will and to hold governments accountable for their actions. I would include here parties, legislatures, the civil service, civil society, the media, and so on. But my emphasis is on the word effective. By their nature, institutions are conservative. They can lose their effectiveness as circumstances change. They can be corrupted by people who wish to use institutions for their own parochial ends. Just because a society has democratic institutions doesn’t mean they are effective. They can work in ways that distort the popular will rather than reflect it. When democratic institutions are no longer effective, society’s idealists inevitably press for reform.

One solution that reformists sometime propose is a shift from representative or indirect democracy—which just about all democratic systems are—to direct democracy. The Progressive Movement in the United States, which emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century, proposed moving the American system from indirect to direct democracy because it believed that existing institutions were distorting the popular will in favor of the rich and powerful. To reform the American political system, Progressives proposed adoption of direct democracy institutions like initiative, referendum, election, and recall. In fact, Dr. Sun Yat-sen adopted those mechanisms from the Progressive Movement, and we see the same reformist logic in the DPP’s long-term emphasis on using referenda in Taiwan’s political system.

I am not opposed to direct democracy mechanisms in principle, but I regret to tell you that they do not necessarily work as well as their proponents claim. Just as social and economic interests can distort the institutions of indirect or representative democracy in order to further their own parochial agenda, those same institutions can use the mechanisms of direct democracy for the same purpose. Indeed, in California, which has these mechanisms, big business often uses initiatives and referenda to secure adoption of policies that serve its interests, but skillfully disguise these as populist measures. I therefore believe that the task for reformers in America and Taiwan, whether they are idealists or not, is to make the institutions of representative democratic institutions effective.

Conclusion

So these are my thoughts—or speculations—on questions of culture, generation, and power. Let me repeat what I think are my key findings:

Each great traditional culture has addressed the same set of issues. Each has addressed them in different ways, but the differences are often differences in emphasis, not in fundamentals.

Because of social and economic modernization, American culture and Taiwan’s mix of Chinese and global culture are converging, not diverging.

Even though our cultures may be converging, the interests of our two countries may sometimes diverge. It is therefore important for American leaders to have a clear and balanced understanding of Taiwan’s interests and Taiwan leaders should take American interests into account.

As cultures converge, young people in Taiwan and young people in America may have more in common than each group has with their elders. That’s probably a consequence of the globalization of culture.

Young people can help their parents and grandparents speak to the major events that most shaped their lives and consciousness. Similarly, societies must find effective ways, like transitional justice, to ensure that people today know what happened in the past. 

In both Taiwan and America, it is very important that we ensure that our democratic institutions work well to reflect the popular will rather than distort it, and to act in the best interests of all the people rather than just a small segment.

Let me conclude by offering a few thoughts about Taiwan's future.

I spoke earlier about the policy challenges that the new administration will face: restoring growth, ensuring energy security, reducing inequality, meeting the needs of the older generation, managing relations with the Mainland, and so on. These challenges are real and they are serious. They are inter-connected, so solving one may make it harder to solve another. Meeting the needs of the elderly and reducing inequality will affect growth, while ensuring energy sufficiency may damage the environment. So, I don't envy any Taiwan leader who has to face even one of these problems. But President Tsai and her team face at least several of these problems right away and all of them over time. Because these problems are inter-connected, it will probably be necessary to find balanced solutions and acceptable trade-offs between various priorities. That is easy for me to say, but it’s very hard for Taiwan to do.

Then there is the issue of resources. Problems are easier to solve if the problem-solvers have plenty of money, time, and talent to deploy against them. Certainly, Taiwan has substantial resources, but leaders first mobilize the resources and then spread them over a number of competing priorities. Again, that’s easy for me to say, but hard for Taiwan to do.

Looming over Taiwan’s domestic issues is the shadow of China. Its long-term objective for Taiwan is well known. It does not fully understand the dynamics of this island's democratic system. It apparently doesn't appreciate how some of its policies toward Taiwan are counter-productive and alienate Taiwan citizens rather than winning their hearts and minds. Taiwan must find a proper balance between securing the benefits of Mainland relations and protecting its own core interests. it would be a mistake to ignore the need for strong armed forces. Again, easy for me to say but hard for you to do.

Ultimately, all of these hard-to-do issues are political issues. It is through politics that a society tries to reach consensus on how to address problems and set competing priorities. Now, the United States political system doesn't work very well, particularly at the federal level. So perhaps I shouldn't be commenting on the quality of another country's political system. Perhaps I shouldn't throw stones while living in a glass house.

But I do have the impression that Taiwan's political system spends a lot of time on political infighting and not on making the hard choices necessary to address policy problems. There are a number of reasons for this.  Among them is that the design of various institutions and the relationship among them needs a lot of improvement. That itself is a challenging political issue. A spirit of comprise often seems to be lacking.

Does this mean I am pessimistic about Taiwan's future? It certainly means that I am not overly optimistic—but it isn't easy to be optimistic about the prospects for any of the world's democracies today. Let's just say that I worry about the number of challenges that Taiwan leaders must address and the limited resources they have to do so with China’s shadow looming overhead. Although every country in East Asia and the United States must cope with the growing power of China, Taiwan has a lot more at stake than others. I do have a lot of admiration for President Tsai Ing-wen, and I wish her well as she begins her presidency. But I do not envy the task she faces, and I agree with her when she said yesterday that Taiwan needs a democratic system that is unified, efficient, and pragmatic. That’s easy for her to say—and correct, by the way—but it’s hard to do.

Taiwan does have certain advantages. One is that it has met serious challenges before. In the early 1950s, Taiwan was a poor society that faced external danger and had recently had to incorporate two million Mainlanders who came here for refuge. The KMT regime did not treat the Taiwanese majority very well either. But over a twenty year period, Taiwan transformed itself and made the take-off to rapid economic growth. It had a lot of American help, but it could not have achieved this success without the determination and hard work of many ordinary people.

In 1971-72 and in 1978, Taiwan suffered major diplomatic setbacks as the United States opened its relationship with the PRC. But it did not give up in despair. Instead, it took the economy to a new level, again with the determination and hard work of a lot of people. Moreover, Taiwan gained the respect of the international community by undertaking and completing the transition to democracy, which is not an easy task.

Just because Taiwan has overcome adversity before, does not mean that it will automatically do so again. Hard work and determination are not the only requirements for success. But past success should give some confidence that future challenges can be met. By the way, one reason for young people to ask their parents and grandparents about their past experiences is to gain a better understanding of how Taiwan has met adversity before.

To put it differently, Taiwan's future will be brighter the more it strengthens itself. This self-strengthening must include the economy, the military, diplomacy, its sense of sovereignty, and so on. Most of all, the political system must be strengthened so that it does a better job of addressing the challenges facing society. A stronger Taiwan will become psychologically more confident about the future, and will be better able to meet the challenge that China poses. In this regard, idealists and realists must work together to find the optimal and innovative solutions to pressing problems.

Taiwan is not unique in this regard. There are many ways that the United States must strengthen itself, and I worry that the problems of the American political system will prevent us from doing so. But the transfer of power in a democratic system does provide the opportunity for a new beginning. New leaders with a different vision can bring energy to the challenge of reform and foster new and positive habits for the conduct of politics. While I cannot forecast Taiwan’s future, I do hope that the various forces in Taiwan society—young and old, Blues and Greens, rich and not-so-rich—can work together to seize the opportunity that now exists. That’s very easy for me to say and very hard for you to do. So I wish you good luck!

      

 

 

Tsai Ing-wen will be inaugurated as the new president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in less than four weeks, on May 20. The big unknown as the rotation of power nears is whether she and Chinese leaders will be able to find a mutually acceptable way to sustain relations across the Taiwan Strait at their recent level and tone. President-elect Tsai wants that outcome. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, repeatedly call on her to provide credible assurances of her good intentions. If this gap persists until May 20 and beyond, deterioration in cross-Strait relations is likely—the only question will be how deep it will go.

“Are you or have you ever been…”

At issue is whether Tsai is prepared to associate herself with two principles that China holds dear, and whether she is willing to do so clearly and affirmatively, as Beijing publicly demands. Her oft-stated goal is to “maintain the status quo” with China. Beijing isn’t making that easy. 

The first principle is the 1992 Consensus, an understanding between Beijing and Taipei where the two sides agree to the idea of “one China.” The second principle is what China calls the “core connotation” of the 1992 Consensus: that the geographic territories of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan both belong to that one China. So far, Tsai has been willing to allude to these two principles in a positive way but not accept them explicitly. 

The likely reason for Tsai’s ambiguity is that for her, Beijing’s stated requirement is something of a poison pill. She is the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which 25 years ago stated the clear objective creating a Republic of Taiwan—in effect, Taiwan independence. That objective is still in the party’s charter, but only a small majority of the island’s public shares that goal, and Taiwan faces many other more pressing problems. Tsai Ing-wen certainly gives the impression that she needs to give those her primary attention. 

However, for her to accept the principles that China says are preconditions for stable cross-Strait relations would alienate the true believers in her party. (Some of them would probably say: “Sure, there’s one China, but we [Taiwan] are not a part of it.”) Beijing would like a clear statement from her because it believes it needs assurance that she and the DPP will not pursue Taiwan independence. In effect, however, it is presenting her with a forced choice between her policy goals and maintaining the loyalty of her political base. There’s also an obvious asymmetry in all of this: Beijing publicly demands concessions from Tsai, but she makes no public demands in return.

Between clarity and ambiguity

There is an irony in Beijing’s insistence, since the 1992 Consensus was itself an ambiguous construct. The governments of China and Taiwan agreed in general on one China, but they’ve stated different interpretations of the formula. When Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s outgoing president, came into office in 2008, he publicly accepted the 1992 Consensus but then frequently said he interpreted “one China” to mean the Republic of China (ROC). Since Beijing believes the ROC ceased to exist in 1949, it allowed Ma to get away with a measure of ambiguity. Similarly, each side of the Strait says it wants to continue the “status quo,” but they differ on what that means.

Now, Beijing is publicly demanding a high degree of clarity from President-elect Tsai. She has accommodated to an extent in her references to the 1992 Consensus and the “core connotation,” but probably feels constrained on how much further she can shift, for political and substantive reasons. 

Will the two sides be able to find a mutually acceptable place on the spectrum in between clarity and ambiguity? Judging by Beijing’s forceful insistence, probably not. They probably know that President-elect Tsai is not willing to alienate her base for the sake of cross-Strait relations, which suggests that perhaps their strategy is to set the bar so high that she cannot clear it. Beijing sees no reason to make life easy for Tsai and the DPP—it would like her and her party to lose power as soon as possible.

If the impasse continues beyond Tsai’s inaugural address next month, China will likely sanction her government for not complying with its requirements. Beijing might suspend more official interactions on economic and other issues, reduce the number of Chinese tourists and students going to Taiwan, and/or induce some of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to switch to Beijing to constrain Taiwan’s international space, among other possible measures.

What trust-building looks like

It’s possible, of course, that a different conversation is taking place behind the scenes. If it is, the content may be more pragmatic and tone more moderate. The Chinese officials conducting that dialogue might be prepared to tolerate greater ambiguity from Tsai than what other Chinese officials are demanding publicly. 

Even if such a conversation is occurring, it might not succeed. And even if it results in an understanding that gets Beijing and Taipei past May 20, there is no guarantee that the mutual accommodation will stick. The two sides are at the beginning of a trust-building process, not the end. So far, it is Beijing’s deep mistrust of Tsai’s intentions—and its demand that she state them up front—that is at the root of the stalemate.

At work here are two models for reducing mistrust. One is Beijing’s demand that Tsai Ing-wen explicitly state her adherence to principles it insists are basic to cross-Strait relations as a down-payment for preserving the status quo. This is a one-sided interaction in which China makes the demands and Tsai is expected to accommodate, and does not seem to be a good way to facilitate cooperative interaction. The other model is a step-by-step process of trust-building and confidence, where good intentions are proven by a reciprocal pattern of words and deeds. Gradualism won’t guarantee long-term harmony, but it is much more likely to succeed.

      

 

 

Event Information

A conversation with Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken

The strengthening of the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship comes at a critical time when North Korea’s unabated nuclear ambitions pose a growing threat to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, transnational challenges will require a concerted approach from all three allies.

On March 29, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted The Honorable Antony J. Blinken, deputy secretary of state, for a discussion on the United States vision for the future of the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship and the next steps for improving and expanding cooperation.

Katharine H.S. Moon, the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, offered welcoming remarks and Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductions. Deputy Secretary Blinken took questions from the audience following his remarks, which were moderated by Richard Bush, director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USKoreaJapan

Audio

• Future of the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral relationship

Event Materials

• Transcript

      

 

 

On March 17, China "restored" diplomatic relations with Gambia. The action immediately reverberated through Taiwan and was read as a warning about the future of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Over the past eight years, Beijing refused to establish diplomatic relations with any of Taiwan's diplomatic partners to avoid creating political problems for the island's president, Ma Ying-jeou, because he had accepted China's formula for the conduct of cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen, who was elected president on January 16, is not willing to explicitly support the same formula. China's Gambia move suggests that it will demonstrate its displeasure by further undermining Taiwan's international position. Although Gambia is small gruel for China, the restoration of China-Gambia ties is a big deal psychologically for Taiwan—and China knows it.

Unfriending and re-friending

The "restoration" move was actually quite clever. Gambia was one of those countries for which China and Taiwan had competed diplomatically. It had had relations with Taiwan from 1968 to 1974, then with China until 1995, and then back to Taiwan. In 2013, it decided to abandon Taiwan for China and announced that it was terminating relations with Taipei. But Beijing did not take the bait. At that time, it was playing for bigger stakes by improving its ties with Taiwan directly rather than trying to marginalize it in the international community, and it did not want to hurt Ma Ying-Jeou politically. Technically, it was not "stealing" one of Taiwan's diplomatic allies, but it could still signal that it would accommodate to a Tsai presidency only on its own terms. 

Technically, it was not "stealing" one of Taiwan's diplomatic allies, but it could still signal that it would accommodate to a Tsai presidency only on its own terms.

The victory of Tsai and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the January elections posed a dilemma for Beijing. It had the option of seeking a mutual accommodation with Tsai, and so continue the stability and cooperation that had emerged under Ma Ying-jeou. But given China's belief that Tsai and her party intended to pursue legal independence, it saw a risk that Tsai might take advantage of its goodwill and not reciprocate. She gave a press interview five days after the election that optimists believed indicated she was open to accommodation. Beijing remained suspicious and declined to give Tsai the benefit of the doubt.

Instead, it has pursued the harder option of insisting that Tsai affirmatively accept its fundamental principles as a price for a continuation of the status quo, even though many of her supporters oppose such commitments. In effect, Tsai would have to choose between her political base and China. If she stuck with her supporters, Beijing would trigger a deterioration in cross-Strait relations—economically, politically, and diplomatically. Restoring relations with Gambia was one way for China to demonstrate that its hardball threats were not a bluff. 

Restoring relations with Gambia was one way for China to demonstrate that its hardball threats were not a bluff.

Scylla and Charybdis

The Gambia action suggests a more fundamental implication: that China's deliberate goal in imposing various sanctions is to increase the likelihood that Tsai's presidency will fail. Hence, it creates the Hobson's Choice between a deterioration in cross-Strait relations and preserving domestic political support, and goes beyond limited and symbolic "punishment." 

It knows perfectly well how to achieve mutual accommodation (in part because individuals from Taiwan and Americans have been offering ideas on how to do so). But that would be inconsistent with the goal of ensuring her failure. (If this indeed is China's strategy, Tsai will have to make clear to the Taiwan public and to others that she did her best and that failure occurred because Beijing wanted it to occur.)

For Taiwan, having 22 diplomatic partners strengthens its government's view that it is a sovereign entity. For the Taiwan public, the loss of those diplomatic allies feeds fears that Taiwan is slipping into vulnerable isolation and increasingly subject to Chinese intimidation. There is anxiety that other partners are ready to switch once Beijing gives them the green light.

The Obama administration, for its part, is urging both Beijing and Taipei to demonstrate patience, creativity, flexibility, and restraint. China's Gambia move is a clear sign that it has a very different game plan.

      

 

 

On March 5, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke to the Shanghai delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) session in Beijing. China’s top leaders use these side meetings to convey policy guidance on a range of issues, and Xi used this particular one to offer his perspective on relations with Taiwan. There has been some nervousness in the wake of the January 16 elections, which swept the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to power in both the executive and legislative branches. Because the Beijing government has always suspected that the fundamental objective of the DPP is to permanently separate Taiwan from China, observers were waiting expectantly to hear what Xi would have to say about Taiwan.

Well before the March 5 speech, of course, Xi’s subordinates responsible for Taiwan policy had already laid out what Taiwan President-elect Tsai Ing-wen and her party would have to do to prevent cross-Strait relations from deteriorating, and they continued to emphasize those conditions after Xi’s speech. But analysts believed that Xi’s own formulation would be the clearest indicator of Beijing’s policy. He is, after all, China’s paramount leader, and his words carry a far greater weight than those of other Chinese officials.

This is what Xi said to the Shanghai NPC delegation about Taiwan [translation by the author, emphasis added]:

Compatriots on the two sides of the Strait are blood brothers who share a common destiny, and are people for whom blood is thicker than water…Our policy towards Taiwan is correct and consistent, and will not change because of a change in [who heads] the Taiwan authorities. We will insist upon the political foundation of the “1992 consensus,” and continue to advance cross-Strait relations and peaceful development…If the historical fact of the “1992 consensus” is recognized and if its core connotation is acknowledged, then the two sides of the Strait will have a common political basis and positive interaction [virtuous circle] can be preserved. We will steadily push forward cross-Strait dialogue and cooperation in various fields, deepen cross-Strait economic, social, and financial development, and increase the familial attachment and welfare of compatriots [on both sides], close their spiritual gap, and strengthen their recognition that they share a common destiny. We will resolutely contain the separatist path of any form of Taiwan independence, protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and absolutely not allow a repetition of the historical tragedy of national separation. This is the common wish and firm intention of all Chinese sons and daughters, and is also our solemn pledge and obligation to history and to the people. The fruits of cross-Strait relations and peaceful development require the common support of compatriots on the two sides; creating a common and happy future requires the common effort of compatriots on the two sides; and realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation requires that compatriots on the two sides join hands to work with one heart.

The italicized sentences are key: They state what the new DPP government should do if it wishes to maintain healthy cross-Strait relations and affirms Beijing’s resolve to oppose any behavior it doesn’t like. Xi didn’t threaten specific actions, but he probably didn’t have to. As always, Beijing reserves the right to decide what DPP attitudes and actions constitute separatism and a quest for Taiwan independence. 

Xi didn’t threaten specific actions, but he probably didn’t have to.

Some background

There are two important points of reference contextualizing this statement from Xi. 

Xi on November 7, 2015. First, there are his reported remarks on the future of cross-Strait relations during his unprecedented meeting with current Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore last November 7. At that time, Xi first appealed to ethnic solidarity and national unity, as he did again on March 5. He asserted that the stakes to end the state of division between Mainland China and Taiwan were very high because it was a critical part of how he views rejuvenating the Chinese nation—a theme he repeated to the Shanghai delegation. 

Xi said Taiwan, under the new government, could either continue to follow the path it has walked for the last seven-plus years under the current Ma Ying-jeou administration (“peaceful development”), or it could take the path of renewed “confrontation,” “separation,” and zero-sum hostility. If Taiwan wished to follow the first path, Xi insisted, its leaders must adhere to the 1992 consensus and oppose “Taiwan independence.” Without this “magic compass that calms the sea,” Xi warned, “the ship of peaceful development will meet with great waves and even suffer total loss.” He was willing to overlook the DPP’s past positions and actions, but only if it identified with “the core connotation of the 1992 consensus” (a reference to the PRC view that the Mainland and Taiwan are both within the territorial scope of China, a view the DPP contests). Xi alluded to the “core connotation” on March 5 but did not re-state its content. Xi then made clear that if “disaster” occurred, it would be the DPP’s fault—it was therefore up to Tsai, he implied, to accommodate to Beijing’s conditions. 

In language and tone, Xi’s Singapore statement was far more strident and alarmist than what he said on March 5. He made that first statement more than two months before the election, when perhaps he thought that tough talk would weaken Tsai’s and the DPP’s appeal to voters. If that was his objective, he failed. The tone of his March 5 remarks was more modulated, but the substance was the same. Beijing would define the crossroads that Taiwan faced, and it was up to Tsai to take the right path—at least what it defined the right path.

Beijing would define the crossroads that Taiwan faced, and it was up to Tsai to take the right path—at least what it defined the right path.

Tsai on January 21, 2016. Second, there is an interview that Tsai gave to Liberty Times (Tzu-yu Shih Pao) on January 21—less than a week after the elections—in which she sought to meet Beijing partway. For the first time, she used the phrase “political foundation” and said it had four elements: 

• “The first is that the SEF-ARATS discussions of 1992 are a historical fact and both sides had a common acknowledgment to set aside differences and seek common ground;” 
• “The second is the Republic of China’s current constitutional order.”
• “The third is the accumulated results of the more than 20 years of cross-strait negotiations, exchanges, and interactions;” and
• “The fourth is Taiwan’s democratic principles and the will of the Taiwanese people to make sure that Taiwan voters understood the limits to his tolerance.”

So, Tsai accepts the 1992 meetings as a historical fact and acknowledges that the two sides did reach an agreement of sorts, but does not accept the 1992 consensus itself as a historical fact. She spoke more about process than content. The Republic of China’s “current constitutional order” is also part of the foundation, which some have read as Tsai’s acceptance that the Mainland and Taiwan are both parts of China’s territory (Beijing’s “core connotation”)—I, however, am not so sure. Tsai did not reject Xi’s requirements out of hand, but she framed them in her own way. 

So are ties growing friendlier?

Was Xi’s tonal moderation on March 5—relative to November 7—an indicator that mutual accommodation was going on? Perhaps. But the fact that the November meeting was ostensibly private while the March speech was public might explain the difference. 

Moreover, the stream of Chinese articles and statements since March 5 that explicitly restate Beijing’s long-standing preconditions are reason to doubt that much accommodation is actually occurring. The three basic scenarios I outlined last December—accommodation, limited Chinese punishment of the Tsai administration, and comprehensive punishment—are still in play, and the key variable remains whether Xi and his subordinates trust Tsai Ing-wen’s basic intentions. That is, will they accept her recent formulations as a good-faith effort to avoid deterioration? The next milestone will be May 20, when Tsai Ing-wen gives her inaugural address and may provide a more detailed formulation of her approach to China.

      

 

 

Event Information

Thailand has been under military rule since May 2014, when General Prayuth Chan-Ocha and the Royal Thai Army seized power after deposing democratically elected Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. Current Prime Minister Prayuth has systematically postponed elections on the grounds of prioritizing order and drafting a new constitution to restore democracy. Since the coup, Thai authorities have used the murky lèse-majesté law to curtail opposition to the monarchy, while the country’s economy has languished.

On February 24, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted an event to explore the root causes of Thailand’s political crisis, the implications of an upcoming royal succession, and the possibilities for the road ahead. The event was moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush.  Panelists included Duncan McCargo, professor of political science at the University of Leeds, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Don Pathan, an independent security analyst based in Thailand.

 Please follow the conversation on Twitter at #ThaiPolitics

Audio

• Kingdom at a crossroads: Thailand’s uncertain political trajectory

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160224_thailand_political_crisis_transcript

     

 

 

Editor's Note: On January 25-26, 2016, Richard Bush gave the following remarks at the 4th Korea Research Institute for National Strategy-Brookings Joint Conference on "Policy Directions of the ROK and the U.S. for Regional Stability in East Asia" in Seoul, Korea.

For the fourth time, the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy and Brookings Institution are collaborating to hold a conference on future security issues that the Republic of Korea and United States, as two close allies, will face in East Asia. This is a partnership that The Brookings Institution holds in high regard. We are deeply grateful of General Lee Sanghee for his leadership and his staff for their outstanding and essential support.

Our first three conferences focused on the future of the Korean Peninsula. This focus was highly appropriate because there are many variables at play and unknowns to be considered. Bringing together a group of very smart people to talk about the Peninsula made a lot of sense. The first conference examined ROK-U.S. relations at the point that President Park was about to take office and President Obama began his second term. The second conference looked at how our two governments should cooperate in the diplomatic and security spheres for the unification of Korea. The third conference assessed the prospects for regional cooperation to preserve regional stability in the context of Korean unification, with the United States as the anchor. The results of these three conferences were very fruitful.

For our fourth conference, General Lee and I decided that it was appropriate to widen our lens, while keeping Korea and the United States in the center of the picture. Hence the title of this conference: “Policy Directions of the ROK and the U.S. for Regional Stability in East Asia.” In considering what to say in these brief introductory remarks, two overlapping perspectives came to mind.

Unification dynamics

The first perspective is the process by which unification of the Korean Peninsula might occur. Here, unfortunately, we don’t seem to have many relevant past cases on which to draw. In fact, the only case that I think is remotely relevant is German reunification at the end of the Cold War. The Germany experience may turn out to be totally irrelevant to Korea, and none of us can know in advance how Korean unification will take place. But the German case is worth examining for clues.

The focus here is on the implications for regional stability, the theme of our conference. In my opinion it is fair to say that once its unification occurred, Germany contributed to European stability for at least a decade and did not, in fact, undermine it. That was because it had its own interest in forging a good relationship with the Russian Federation and revive its eastern region. It is true that Europe was not completely stable in the two decades after the end of the Cold War. The most serious situation was the conflict and war that followed the dissolution of the formerly united Yugoslavia. But that tragic train of events occurred for internal reasons, and not because of anything that a unified Germany did or didn’t do.

Now we all understand that German unification was a unique case and Korean unification will be a unique case. There are many obvious ways in which the German case was very different from what we have here on the Korean Peninsula.

First of all, Imperial and Nazi Germany victimized other countries and people whereas Korea was the victim of manipulation and aggression by others, particularly Japan.

Second, the division of Germany was the result of allied consultation during World War II and a formal agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France thereafter. That created four zones in what was left of Germany and in Berlin, and regulated the interaction among the four powers (the U.S., British, and French zones subsequently became the Federal Republic of Germany). Ending the division would require another formal agreement among them. But in Korea, there was only an armistice, signed by a North Korean general representing the DPRK and China, and the American head of the UN Command, who represented the allies.

Third, one part of divided Germany did not go to war with the other in order to bring about unification. Germany was the central arena of the Cold War and sometimes tensions were very high. But this political conflict never escalated to military conflict with neither East nor West Germany as the cause. Again, the situation in Korea is different. North Korea went to war to achieve unification by force. Tensions remain fairly high, and even this year we saw another episode of North-South conflict. Similarly, East Germany did not seek to create its own nuclear deterrent, as North Korea has.

Fourth, although East Germany had a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist system, it did not also have the theocratic monarchy that exists in North Korea.

So then, what are some of the similarities in the process of German unification for regional stability that might be relevant for Korea?

First of all, the two Germanys and the two Koreas were allies of their super-power patrons and depended on their security commitments. At least in the case of the ROK, it depends on the U.S. pledge of nuclear extended deterrence, as West Germany did and a unified Germany does today.

Second, German unification occurred in the first place because of the political crisis in the late 1980s in East Germany (the GDR). Although the regime maintained a strong repressive capacity, it faced growing public demands for change and a refugee problem. The regime was seriously divided on how to deal with these changes, and the will to impose repression eventually declined. Of course, we do not know how Korean unification will occur, but the mainstream view appears to be that it will require the divisions within the Pyongyang regime or the breakdown of its authority, or both.

Third, as the internal instability grew in East Germany, there ensued an external process of negotiation in which the GDR and its Soviet patron sought to stabilize some version of the status quo with as little change as possible. This effort ultimately failed, but the negotiation process, between both East and West Germany and among the U.S., USSR, Britain, and France (the so-called four-plus-two framework), was crucial for the ultimate outcome on the West’s terms. How any negotiations occur in the Korean case will be crucial in defining the end result.

Fourth, there were tensions among the United States, Britain, and France, and between Moscow and East Berlin on how to handle the German problem (and divisions within each government). The United States was more comfortable with movement toward unification than its two NATO allies. Margaret Thatcher’s stated reason for going slowly was her desire to ensure that Gorbachev was not politically weakened at home. Over the course of the negotiations, the Soviet Union—or Gorbachev—changed the assessment of how important it was to preserve a divided Germany. But memories of past German aggression no doubt lingered. Ultimately, however, without allied unity, the outcome might have been much different. We can expect that Japan, the analogue to Britain and Germany, might have similar concerns about Korean unification.

Fifth, managing the expectations and concerns of the Soviet Union, East Germany’s ally, were very important. Future security arrangements were a significant issue in these negotiations. The Soviet Union held out for a unification arrangement in which other NATO countries’ troops would not be deployed to the former East Germany and the NATO Article 5 commitment would not apply to the GDR territory. Within the Korean unification context, we know that China worries about security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula after unification. Would it, for example, insist that the territorial scope of the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty be limited to the area south of the 38^th parallel?

Sixth, the relationship among leaders was extremely important in bringing about German unification. The fact that President Bush, Prime Minister Thatcher, and President Mitterrand felt comfortable engaging with each other; that each had a personal relationship with West German Chancellor Kohl; and that all four were able to talk with Gorbachev, eased the negotiating process considerably. This was very much a top-down process. Hence, the relations among leaders of the U.S., China, South Korea, and Japan will be very important for Korean unification. Relations with China’s leader are important because its decisions will be critical to the outcome; this gives a strategic importance to President Park’s effort to forge a good relationship with Xi Jinping. But the relationship between the presidents of the United States and the ROK and the prime minister of Japan is also important.

Finally, the key relationship driving an outcome on good terms for West Germany and its allies was the relationship between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl. They did not always see eye to eye on tactics and details, but their common purpose to achieve a successful unification and their willingness to communicate at just about every step was vital. Similarly, close relations and good communication between the U.S. and ROK presidents will be crucial.

As I suggested above, German unification did not undermine regional stability in the first decades after it occurred. The real question concerns Germany’s role not in the medium-term but the long term. As of today, Germany is the dominant power in Europe, economically and diplomatically, but not militarily. As much as the Mediterranean countries dislike Chancellor Merkel’s tough position on economic issues, my own judgment is that Germany so far has played a highly constructive and stabilizing role in Europe. The threat to regional stability comes not from a resurgent Germany but from a resurgent Russia, on which Chancellor Merkel’s firm position has been critical.

China’s revival

Those are my thoughts on my first perspective: the dynamics of unification. My final observation about a resurgent Russia provides a transition to my second perspective: the revival of China as a great power. This creates the regional context in which Korean unification will take place. It is worth noting that when German unification took place, the Soviet Union was in decline, which likely explains why Gorbachev was willing to make so many concessions to the West. Today, China is rising. Would it have the same willingness to accommodate the United States and the Republic of Korea on the terms and conditions of Korean unification? My comments here are relatively brief, because you understand this situation very well.

It is generally true that a rising or reviving state first tries to achieve dominance in its home region. That’s certainly what the United States did in the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. The history of Western Europe in the last 500 years can also be interpreted in this light. The story of East Asia from the late 1800s to 1945 was all about Japan’s economic and military regional hegemony. I am prepared to argue that the key variable that will govern regional stability in this century is China’s revival and how other countries, including the United States as a resident Asian power, react.

There are several specific features about China’s regional rise. The first is historical. That is, Imperial China’s last two dynasties, the Ming and the Qing, did engage in territorial expansion, but only to the north and the west. With the countries to the east and the south, they sought not territory but political deference. One see hints of that approach today, even under different circumstances.

The second feature is geographical. At least East Asian countries are maritime nations (Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines), and so, have naturally endowed strategic depth. Even for countries that are part of the Asian landmass, physical geography can somewhat limit Beijing’s ability to project power at their expense. This configuration is very different from the one that prevailed on the other side of the Eurasian landmass regarding a rising Soviet Union and Western Europe.

The third feature is economic. Because the top priority of the Chinese Communist Party is to grow the economy through global interdependence, it needs positive interactions with the Asia-Pacific economies. This objective has limited any temptation towards external adventurism and hopefully will continue to do so.

The fourth feature concerns security. As I mentioned, a rising or reviving power usually starts by gaining dominance of its home region, but China faces a problem in carrying out this task: the United States has been the dominant East Asian power for more than six decades, the result of its a forward deployment strategy. This allows the other Asian countries to pursue a dual-track strategy: rely on China for economic growth and rely on the United States for security. The question for the future is whether this approach can continue—either because China’s growth slows significantly or because China pushes East Asian nations to make a choice.

Therefore, any unification of the Korean peninsula will occur as part of a complex chess game between a reviving China and a status quo America, particularly as their contest for preeminence plays out in the East Asian region. Again, the relations among the presidents of China, the U.S., and the ROK become extremely important.

     

 

 

Event Information

For video and audio of the event, click here. 

With Tsai Ing-wen, leader and presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ahead in the polls against the Kuomintang (KMT) party candidate Eric Chu and People First Party (PFP) candidate James Soong, it appears Taiwan voters will elect a new ruling party on January 16. The Legislative Yuan elections are still up for grabs, and will dictate the degree of initiative a Tsai administration will have. Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has expressed its concerns, most notably through the November 2015 meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou, on how it feels a DPP-led government should approach cross-Strait relations. The four-month transition period leading up to the May 20 inauguration will be a critical time for the new government to lay out its policy agenda and work to establish a platform for cross-Strait relations.

On January 19, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) at Brookings and the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted Joseph Wu, Secretary General of the Democratic Progressive Party, for a keynote address on Taiwan's election outcomes and implications going forward. Richard Bush, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies and director of CEAP at Brookings, provided an introduction, and Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser and director of the China Power Project at CSIS, moderated a discussion after the address. Following the discussion, Mr. Wu took audience questions. 

To register for this event, please email ChinaPower@csis.org.

Transcript

• Corrected transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160119 Wu at CSISFINAL
• 20160119_taiwan_elections_transcript

     

 

 

Taiwan is the only Chinese-speaking society in the world that gives citizens the power to select their leaders through competitive free and fair elections.

Taiwan voters exercised that right Saturday and significantly changed the island's balance of political power.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on the progressive side of the spectrum, won the presidency and an absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's parliament, ousting the more conservative Kuomintang (KMT).

China fears, rightly or wrongly, that the DPP is committed to legal independence from mainland China, and thus poses a challenge to its own objective of ultimate unification.

That could foster political instability between China and Taiwan -- something that Washington does not wish to see.

Lawyer turned politician

DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen won 56.1% of the vote. Originally trained as a lawyer, she has served as the chair of a government agency responsible for relations with Beijing and as a vice premier.

More than anyone, she led the DPP back to power after a bad defeat in 2008. For the 113-seat legislature, Taiwan's Central News Agency reports that the DPP has secured 68 seats, making it the dominant party.

Moreover, polling suggests a shift in underlying attitudes that fueled today's vote. Over a period of years, the share of Taiwan people who regard themselves as Chinese -- as opposed to Taiwanese or a mix of the two -- has shrunk to 3.5%.

A major poll conducted weeks before the election by a major Taiwan magazine found that respondents were most concerned about domestic issues like the economy as opposed to relations with China.

Both major parties also thought that the economy had grown too dependent on China. Whether this shift is permanent, which would benefit the DPP long-term, will only become apparent in the months and years ahead.

What does the election mean for Taiwan's relations with China?

The mere fact that the DPP will take power does not mean that Tsai will make any moves toward legal independence from China.

She knows that less than 10% of Taiwan citizens want independence and the great majority want to preserve the status quo -- which is probably the main reason why that is one of her core policy objectives.

Nor does a Tsai presidency mean that Beijing will consider military action to rein in Taiwan. The chance of either worst case scenario occurring is very low. 

     

 

 

The votes have been counted in the presidential and legislative elections that Taiwan held earlier today. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a sweeping victory in both contests, displacing the Kuomintang (KMT).

There will no doubt be extensive and useful analysis on what the election means, particularly on the underlying preferences of the Taiwan public. But attention is already shifting to the policies that the new administration will pursue, and whether they will complicate relations on the three sides of the Taiwan-China-United States triangle.

By the numbers

On the election itself, Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP’s chairperson and presidential candidate, won with 56.1 percent of the vote, with virtually all polling places reporting. Eric Chu, the leader and candidate of the more conservative KMT, received 30.1 percent. James Soong, chairman of the People First Party (PFP), a small spinoff from the KMT, got 12.8 percent. This is the second time that the DPP candidate won in an open contest; Chen Shui-bian was the first to do so, in 2000, but only with 40 percent of the vote in a previous three-person race. 

For the elections for the Legislative Yuan (LY), voters cast two ballots. One is for a candidate to represent their geographic election district, of which there are 78. The other is for the voter’s preferred political party—that outcome produces 35 legislators, drawn from party lists. Final results are not yet available for all of the 78 geographic seats, but the Central News Agency reports that the DPP will have at least 60 seats, enough for an absolute majority. We do know the final result in the party vote: DPP with 44.1 percent; KMT with 26.9 percent; PFP with 6.5 percent; New Power Party with 6.1 percent; the pro-unification New Party with 4.2 percent; and the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union with 2.5 percent.

Not a fluke

Several tentative implications flow from these results.

The DPP victory is similar to the KMT’s in 2008, when voters rejected the eight-year presidency of DPP leader Chen Shui-bian. Tsai’s percentage this time is slightly less than the 58 percent that Ma Ying-jeou won in his first election in eight years ago (in 2008, the KMT won 81 legislative seats). Both elections have a “throw the bums out” flavor.

Although Tsai will not have a totally free hand, she has gained significant political capital and freedom of action. The question now is how she will use them. She has the scope to address a number of domestic problems that were on voters’ minds when they went to the polls. I suspect that she will want to conduct her presidency in a way that helps ensure that the DPP will be Taiwan’s majority party for a long time to come. Whether succeeds will depend a lot on the response of the Legislative Yuan, including the DPP caucus, to her agenda and whether the legislature is willing to undertake reforms that would make it a more effective institution.

Although Tsai will not have a totally free hand, she has gained significant political capital and freedom of action. The question now is how she will use them.

The size of the DPP victory should induce Beijing to reconsider the hardline stance that it has taken during the run-up to the election. It said, in effect, that Dr. Tsai would have to accept its own parameters preserving the status quo if she is to secure mutually beneficial cross-Strait relations. But today’s result was no fluke. It occurred not because of Tsai’s “cool” charisma or the DPP’s skill at mobilizing its supporters, although those were not trivial. It was the result of the public growing more skeptical about Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of engaging China, at least economically—a skepticism grew that throughout Ma’s second term. If Beijing can adjust its strategy and Tsai is willing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping half way, a mutual accommodation between them is not impossible. But it will not be easy.

Cross-Strait shifts?

The open question, which only future developments can answer, is whether today’s result reflects a more fundamental shift in political attitudes than simply dissatisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou’s policies and their consequences. Such a more fundamental shift would not only change the balance of power within Taiwan but also the continued feasibility of China’s approach to reaching its goal of unification. If so, should Beijing offer more and different carrots to better “win the hearts and minds” of Taiwan people? Or would it consider greater reliance on sticks?

The open question...is whether today’s result reflects a more fundamental shift in political attitudes than simply dissatisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou’s policies and their consequences.

The implication that the U.S. government drew from the election results is captured in the statement the State Department released today: 

“We share with the Taiwan people a profound interest in the continuation of cross-Strait peace and stability. We look forward to working with Dr. Tsai and Taiwan’s leaders of all parties to advance our many common interests and further strengthen the unofficial relationship between the United States and the people on Taiwan.”

It is worth noting that Taiwan is the only ethnic Chinese society in the world in which genuinely competitive elections pick senior political leaders. The powers that be in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore all seek to preserve control over the outcomes of their leadership selection processes. Taiwan is the one system where the outcome reflects the preferences of over 12 million voters. Moreover, this is Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of power through direct elections, and it should further consolidate Taiwan’s democracy. Finally, that Taiwan has elected its first female president signals the removal of one more significant social barrier to talented people holding the island’s highest political office.

     

 

 

The clock is ticking down to Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections, which could produce a shake-up in cross-Strait relations. The balloting will take place this Saturday (Taiwan time), and the results will be at least partially available when dawn breaks in the United States the same day. The new president will enter office on May 20, and the new session of the Legislative Yuan will open on February 5.

The contenders—primarily the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—have done all they can to raise money and fine-tune their party organizations. The presidential and legislative candidates have each worked to shape how voters think about the major issues. The elephant issue in the room, Taiwan’s relationship with China, is a point on which the KMT and DPP have deep disagreements. Each party has sought to energize actual and potential supporters through rallies and the media. Now the principal task is encouraging those supporters to actually go to the polls on Election Day. The turnout rate and which party benefits could have a major impact on the outcome, particularly in the legislative races. If university students return to Taiwan to vote in large numbers, for instance (Taiwan does not allow absentee voting), it will likely benefit the DPP.

Will the election reflect a shift in basic Taiwan sentiment towards China, from modestly positive to more negative? Could it become what specialists on American politics call a “realignment election” (e.g. the Republican victory in 1980)? We’ll have to wait for exit polls to know for sure.

Keep calm and carry on

Back in December, I published a paper on the Taiwan election and its implications for Taiwan’s relations with both China and the United States, as well as for U.S.-China relations. Only as the transition proceeds and the new president takes office will we gain a better sense of the next administration’s policies and of how Beijing and Washington will respond to the new reality.

Here are the basic contours of the current situation on the ground in Taiwan: 

• Tsai Ing-wen, the presidential candidate for the DPP, continues to enjoy a comfortable lead even though polls generally suggest that the gap between her and her main competitors—Eric Chu (KMT) and James Soong (People First Party)—is narrowing. The fact that Chu and Soong are competing for many of the same voters only eases Tsai’s path to victory, and her campaign has been free of any major errors. 
• More uncertain are the legislative races, as well as what the new balance of political power in the Legislative Yuan could spell for Tsai’s freedom of action (should she win). It will be greatest if her DPP wins an outright majority, less so if it must forge a formal or ad hoc coalition with minor parties, and even less if the KMT or a KMT-dominated coalition maintains control. 
• China continues to insist that President Tsai reassure Beijing about her policy intentions if she is to avoid a deterioration in the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. But because Tsai has had a comfortable lead, she has seen no electoral reason to provide the degree of reassurance Beijing seeks, at least so far.
• It’s not clear whether China’s fairly hardline rhetorical position is its true policy bottom line. If it is, then the prospects for a downturn in cross-Strait relations are likely. If there is some “give” in Beijing’s position, then a process of mutual accommodation or conflict management between it and Taipei is more likely. China’s response to the election results will be a critical variable going forward, one that will help shape what Washington does.

I was working in the U.S. government on Taiwan issues in 2000, the last time that the DPP candidate (Chen Shui-bian) won the presidency. That time, the electoral result was not certain until just before voters cast their ballots. The DPP itself was surprised that it had won, and understood that it was not entirely ready to govern. As a result, both Beijing and Washington had to scramble to adjust to the new reality. Washington was better prepared than Beijing, but my colleagues and I were still quite uncertain how Taiwan-China relations would evolve. We recognized that we had a role to play in helping reduce the risks of an over-reaction by either Beijing or Taipei. This time, the uncertainties are less and Washington’s leverage is less, but the need for the Obama administration to sustain policy attention and to execute skillful diplomacy remains.

     

 

 

Taiwan’s presidential and legislative elections are just around the corner — and if the current polls hold, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will sweep into office, with a new approach to cross-strait relations. Richard Bush talks with The Diplomat about the potential implications a DPP victory could have for Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States.

The interview was originally posted by The Diplomat.