While Saudi-Iranian tensions have been on the rise for years, Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in January—met with angry reactions in Iran—heightened the stakes so dramatically that there is now serious potential for direct confrontation. Emotions are running high, and even an accidental spark could turn the cold war between the two regional powers hot. Their antagonism is a grave threat to the wider region, which isn’t exactly a bastion of stability these days—and it’s contrary to the long-term interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, stressed in a January interview with The Economist that “a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran [would be] the beginning of a major catastrophe in the region,” adding: “For sure we will not allow any such thing.” 

The prince is right—an outright Saudi-Iranian conflict would quickly spiral into a region-wide conflagration with gravely destabilizing effects on the Middle East and beyond. Yet the provocative rhetoric and actions of leaders on both sides continue to fan the flames. 

Both sides must work to reduce the temperature and address the root causes of the tension. There are three main considerations that should inform the approach:

1. First, each misunderstands the other. While Iranian-Emirati and Iranian-Omani relations are based on dialogue and exchange, Iranian-Saudi relations are based on misunderstanding, ignorance, and isolation. Combined with heightened sectarian prejudice, which has emerged largely in the fertile landscape for hatred and division sown by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the long-running enmity between the two nations has only worsened.


2. Second, due to Iran being isolated and sanctioned ever since its 1979 revolution, a network of militia leaders, mujahedeen, intelligence agencies, and high-ranking clerics have been able to hijack the state. Rather than pursue national interests such as improving regional cooperation or increasing inward investment, Iranian foreign policy has largely served the private interests of that network. These actors have the most to lose as Iran becomes more open, as their space to maneuver in the shadows would be reduced.
   
   In Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Arab world, observers tend to perceive Iran’s actions in the region as targeting Saudi Arabia. But often, Iran’s intent is to enrich that shadowy network. The Saudis and Arabs more broadly should support the lifting of sanctions, since it will squeeze those actors in Iran—yet what we see is the opposite. Saudi Arabia could help empower those who genuinely want reform in Iran by encouraging more openness. 


3. Third, Iran-Saudi tensions are kept alive by the ever-narrowing space between religious institutions and policymakers in Saudi Arabia. The problem for the House of Saud is that its legitimacy is derived from its custodianship of Mecca and Medina—it needs to appease the clerics, who have unfortunately slid into divisive sectarian rhetoric. The late King Abdullah made steps to distance the state from the clergy, but King Salman’s monarchical arrangement is different, resulting in a shift back toward the clerics.

From vicious to virtuous cycle

To head off outright confrontation, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to identify potential areas of shared interest. Both states’ economies are dependent on oil, and both are working to reduce that reliance. To some extent, each country’s economy depends on the other’s success. Both are targeted by the same terror groups, including al-Qaida and the Islamic State. And the countries face similar environmental threats, including oil spills, challenges related to accelerated industrialization, and water shortages. In all of these areas, Iran and Saudi Arabia can work together. 

It won’t be easy, but there are helpful historical examples. Seventy years ago, no one could have imagined France, Germany, and Britain overcoming their regional rivalries to become close political and economic partners. And there are constructive roles for outside powers: Europe, for example, could facilitate more dialogue on religious tolerance in the Middle East, focusing on the 2004 Amman Message that all Muslims have common interests and can unite. Europe can also be more vigilant in ensuring that divisive sectarian clerics do not abuse their political asylum by using it as a platform to broadcast incendiary misinformation and propaganda that often crosses the line into hate speech. Meanwhile, multi-track diplomacy and various types of cultural, educational, and social exchanges between Saudis, Iranians, and others can help break down the barriers of misunderstanding and prejudice. 

War between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not inevitable, but both sides must take steps now to turn down the heat. At the end of the day, it is in neither state’s interest to let their already poor relations spiral further downward. 

      

 

 

As the two-year anniversary of the last round of conflict in Gaza approaches, the inhumane conditions to which 1.8 million Palestinians are being subjected threaten to reach boiling point by the summer months, when the lack of access to water and electricity - available for a maximum of eight hours a day - combined with the oppressive heat and the lack of a reconstruction progress, could exacerbate frustrations, culminating in a new cycle of violence.

Despite the relative calm since the August 26, 2014 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, there have been more than 20 serious incidents that involved incursions, air raids, and missile exchanges with 23 Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip since December 2015.

As antagonistic verbal exchanges between Hamas and Israel continued over the past few months, scenes of rising violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem - seemingly outside the control of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) - started to further fuel people's frustration, thus adding to the volatility of the situation.

Reconstruction of Gaza

The Israeli/Palestinian question has become notorious for the international community's inaction.

Nevertheless, the reconstruction of Gaza is one area where action is not only possible but is also badly needed from both strategic and humanitarian perspectives.

The estimates for how much construction has been completed vary depending on the source, and range from about 17 percent (3,000) of the approximately 18,000 homes destroyed or severely damaged in July/August 2014 according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; to 9 percent by the World Bank, or to "nothing" by the average Gazan.

Regardless of the exact figure, the fact remains that more than 75,000 people remain displaced across Gaza as a direct result of the July/August 2014 war, a problem made worse by insufficient funding.

There are many factors to explain the slow progress. Chief among them is the continued Israeli blockade; the underlying cause of all the wars in Gaza since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2005.

Egypt's refusal to open the Rafah border crossing without the presence of the PA, along with the Palestinians' inability to activate a unity government, makes the situation even worse.

However, one controversial factor that has received little attention is the UN's Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM).

The GRM is a complicated system of surveillance intended to: "a. Enable the GoP to lead the reconstruction effort; b. Enable the Gazan private sector; c. Assure donors that their investments in construction work in Gaza will be implemented without delay; d. Address Israeli security concerns related to the use of construction and other 'dual use' material" (UN, October 2014).

By attempting to be both the humanitarian and the jailer at the same time, the UN has fast become the recognizable face of the blockade.

Moral legitimacy

Two years into the reconstruction process, it is now clear that the GRM not only poses difficulties for the people of Gaza seeking to rebuild their homes - as it forces them to wait for a long time before they receive any construction materials - but also, more importantly, erodes the moral legitimacy of the role of the United Nations in Gaza.

For more than 70 years, the UN in Gaza has been associated largely with the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

While the Palestinian people have come to accept that the UN cannot resolve their problems, they still expect that it should at least attempt to take an impartial position, and on occasions adhere to its own values by acting as a witness and speaking up against the atrocities that Palestinians face.

With the GRM, the role of the UN changed. The humanitarian imperative that the UN clings to as it delivers aid in the occupied Palestinian territory is no longer neutral.

In fact, in order to facilitate the flow of construction material under the GRM, the UN is increasingly seen as favoring the status quo and siding with the one with power - Israel.

Arguably, among the four main objectives behind the establishment of the GRM, the one related to Israel's security interest seems to take precedence all the time.

Under the current arrangements, a person seeking construction materials must first go to the GRM administrator to be placed on a list. Once their name reaches the top of the list, the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) must approve of the request before the distribution of any materials. The process between COGAT and the GRM can take weeks.

The sight of UN personnel in armored vehicles accompanying sacks of cement (to ensure delivery and use as proposed) incenses the population of Gaza, as they view this practice as the UN placing a higher value on the protection of construction commodities than on human life.

Complex politics of occupation

The inability of the GRM to engage the local population has alleviated tensions over the past two years. During the conception of the GRM, the civil society of Gaza did not participate in the formation of policies governing the distribution of reconstruction materials.

Only the United Nations, the Israeli government, and the PA devised the plan to rebuild Gaza. Due to their pre-determined position to deny Hamas any opportunity of engagement, the process effectively resulted in excluding citizens and civil society organizations, which was a big mistake.

Nickolay Mladenov and other senior UN officials understand well that the GRM has fallen victim to the complex politics of occupation and resistance.

It is being used every day to punish or "incentivize" Hamas and/or to frustrate any possibility of reaching an understanding between Gaza and the West Bank.

It has also provided a fig leaf to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi which allowed him to close his borders while pursuing a doomed-to-fail securitization agenda in Sinai.

Its lack of effectiveness has also provided many donors with the excuse to not honor their pledges, thus compounding the suffering.

In short, the situation in Gaza requires immediate action. Regardless of whose fault it is that the GRM has not been able to alleviate the suffering of the people of Gaza, it seems appropriate for the United Nations to admit to the failure of the mechanism and even to withdraw its services.

In fact, a walkout by the UN from administering the crossing and use of construction material is not only the right thing to do morally, but might also force constructive action from Israel, EU governments, the Gulf states, and the US as well as Hamas and the PA.

Given the security concerns in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere, the international community would not stand by and allow for a complete meltdown in Gaza.

The alternative is to continue to deny the reality of the mechanism and to watch the grievances of Palestinians in Gaza reaching an unresolvable level that explodes into another violent round of conflict, worse than the last.

This piece was originally published on Al Jazeera English.

      

 

 

Editors’ Note: The conflict in Yemen has become a mutually hurting stalemate, writes Sultan Barakat. Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

After a year of the Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen, parties to the conflict have been meeting in Kuwait this week, in the latest effort to resolve the conflict. Despite sporadic violations, a fragile truce brokered by United Nations envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed that went into effect on April 10 seems to be holding.

This is good news for Yemenis and the region, as it seems there is a growing appreciation that maintaining violence as the means to achieve political goals in Yemen is simply not feasible. 

Despite the lack of progress, the fact that talks are taking place outside Riyadh is in itself a positive compromise and an important step by the Saudis. For the talks to be effective, Saudi Arabia needs to revisit its overall strategy now that its year-long military campaign has not solved Yemen's protracted crisis.

Furthermore, to improve upon the failed ceasefires of July and December 2015, the delegations should consider the following factors, which may provide a degree of common ground on which to build a lasting peace in Yemen.

Mutually hurting stalemate

First, the conflict has become a mutually hurting stalemate. Yemen is facing a humanitarian catastrophe that will haunt the region for years to come.

In addition to the 6,000 people killed and 30,000 wounded, more than 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 14.4 million are affected by food insecurity, with many of the country's governorates on the verge of famine.

Most Yemenis lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. Meanwhile, with the military campaign costing an estimated $200 million a day, the coalition supporting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis will find it increasingly difficult to afford as a result of the falling price of oil. 

Furthermore, having announced its developmental Vision 2030, it is in Saudi Arabia's interest to put an end to its war in Yemen as soon as possible.

Second, it will be almost impossible to advance a peace agreement in Yemen without an innovative form of inclusive local power sharing that addresses the concerns of all parties.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament.

Mistakenly viewed by many observers as a two-sided conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels, Yemen's war is actually a multifaceted predicament involving a volatile combination of local, regional, and international actors, all of them armed and having major and competing interests in the country's future.

The political transition process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council back in 2011 failed to incorporate key sections of Yemeni society into the decision-making process, such as the southern separatist Hirak movement, the Houthis, and Yemeni youth and women.

As a result, Hadi’s transitional government was increasingly viewed as illegitimate and unrepresentative of the demands and concerns of the Yemeni people.

Power-sharing agreement

Constructing a truly all-inclusive decision-making process to pick up where the National Dialogue Conference left off will be key to reaching any power-sharing agreement.

Relatedly, the Houthis continue to harbor grievances against the Hadi government. They associate Hadi with the corrupt Saleh regime that exacerbated political problems in Yemen for decades. They protested the exclusive way in which he oversaw Yemen's transition process, leading to unilateral decisions on major national issues and the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.

It seems that the Saudis too, do not have full confidence in Hadi and his cabinet. According to a private conversation with a senior member of Hadi's government, the Saudis have yet to approve his proposed operational budget for governing in Aden and elsewhere.

As a compromise, the Saudis should consider working with the Houthis in order to reach an understanding on how to cease hostilities and resolve political disagreements with an open mind as to who should be in the leading seat. This may be another point of convergence that is rising fast.

Fourth, the six-region federalism plan endorsed by Hadi must be re-examined and evaluated more thoroughly if an effective power-sharing agreement is to be reached. Without proper consensus from factions such as Hirak and the Houthis, these divisions will put at risk any prospect of lasting peace in Yemen.

One of the major concerns is that federalism may exacerbate calls for secession in the future.

Among Hirak supporters, certain factions say they will accept nothing less than complete secession of the South, while others have hailed the six-federation outline as a step towards possible secession in the near future.

Access to sea

Apprehension over access to the sea and possession of natural resources has dominated debates over the regional boundaries. Ironically, this is an issue that may unite Houthis and Southern Yemenis as they both reject the federal system as currently structured.

Finally, Yemen’s war has already strengthened the presence of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS). Today, al-Qaida controls large swaths of territory and has penetrated the very structure of the Yemeni state, becoming a recognized partner in raising taxes locally, allocating central expenditures, and paying local salaries.

Since the enemies of al-Qaida and ISIL—the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition—are busy fighting each other, extremist organizations can now operate with impunity. It is in the interest of all parties heading to Kuwait to ensure that this situation does not continue.

The peace talks in Kuwait will provide the Saudis with an opportunity to present a strategy for ceasing hostilities in Yemen without necessarily sacrificing their political goals.

Yemen and its people deserve to have their humanitarian issues improved and find a peace settlement that encourages the formation of an inclusive political system.

Failure to do so would perpetuate moral insolvency on the part of the Saudis and their coalition partners, threaten to further destabilize Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, and enable al-Qaida and ISIL to continue to flourish.

      

 

 

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 21, 2016, about the ongoing transformations in the LNG market. The panelists were Amos J. Hochstein, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the U.S. Department of State; and H.E. Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah, chairman of Abdullah bin Hamad al-Attiyah International Foundation for Energy & Sustainable Development. Sultan Barakat, senior foreign policy fellow and director of research at the BDC, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat commenced the session by noting that the energy markets are witnessing exciting, almost transformational times. The increasing availability and decreasing price of LNG is key to that transformation: allowing countries to diversify energy sources, meet demand spikes, and transition from outdated fuel sources to modern renewables. Within this framework, LNG emerges as an important transition fuel that will facilitate a shift towards cleaner energy. However, some hesitancy still exists when it comes to the consumption of natural gas, as we see places like China considering a return to coal.

Hochstein agreed with Barakat adding that these times are in fact revolutionary for all aspects of the energy market mainly due to the emergence of unconventional and offshore explorations, the rise in renewable energies, technological advancements and new efficiency levels, in addition to a renewed political commitment to climate change.

He then described the evolution of the natural gas industry. Only a few decades ago, gas could only be transported via restricting pipelines set up between a consumer and producer, which Hochstein likened to a “catholic marriage”. This old transport system was later supplemented, in an effort pioneered by Qatar, with liquefied natural gas (LNG) adding flexibility to the gas market and allowing the commodity to be traded more independently. Still, unlike oil, LNG could not be simply transported by tanker and be immediately ready for consumption, it required the consumer to re-gasify it. In other words, multibillion dollar investments into infrastructure were necessary simply to use natural gas after it was purchased. To address this hurdle, another innovation emerged, the floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU), a transportable LNG conversion unit which allowed a consumer to forgo the hefty investment in regasification, rendering LNG more accessible, faster, and cheaper.

Given these transformations, new producers have been eager to enter the LNG market; Australia and the United States will rival Qatar’s production levels by the end of the decade, and other producers such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus will soon follow. When President Obama was sworn into office, the United States was the largest importer of LNG in the world. Remarkably, the United States exported its first LNG cargo a few weeks ago. In fact, U.S. import regasification terminals are now being converted to export-oriented liquefaction ones.

Hochstein argued that, as a result to these developments, gas prices are becoming less tied to oil. Given the surge in production, it is likely that gas prices will remain low even if oil prices rebound. This would be equalized by an upsurge in demand, which is likely to occur given continued low prices and renewed commitment to environmental protection. Hochstein encouraged governments and companies to use gas as a transition fuel, assisting a shift from fossil fuels to clean energy. In fact, Hochstein sees that government policy should proactively encourage and regulate such a transition in order to meet climate change goals.

Sultan then directed a question to al-Attiyah, asking how those developments are likely to affect Qatar. Al-Attiyah, who has been working in Qatar’s energy sector since the 70s, began by describing the emergence of LNG in Qatar. When he was appointed minister of energy in 1992, LNG production was nonexistent; at that time, gas discoveries were bad news to companies looking for oil. Given transportation difficulties and the distance between Qatar and major gas consumers, conventional wisdom at the time considered gas a failed enterprise. Yet, when Qatar finally decided to go ahead and invest in LNG, it saw incredible success. Qatar now exports to Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Interestingly, Qatar started investing in gas when oil was sold at around $10 per barrel, a time when gas was also at its lowest price. The investment was lucrative despite the low prices because oil and gas markets work in cycles of boom and bust, and the price soon recovered. Today, Qatar plans on adopting a similar policy, investing in the maintenance and development of its LNG capacities despite the low prices. More importantly, the current prices are an opportunity to increase efficiency and make production more cost effective, a commitment that will expand profit margins once prices rebound.

In fact, al-Attiyah added, the low rates will encourage consumers to develop the infrastructure necessary to consume more gas. This will increase demand for the commodity in the long run. It is also important to note that Qatar is at a particular advantage at the moment; the country has already developed all its infrastructure and facilities, making its production costs lower than those of any new coming competitors. If anything, the low prices will deter some competitors from entering the market and force others to abandon new projects, thus maintaining Qatar’s position as the lead gas exporter.

Another advantage that al-Attiyah highlighted is Qatar’s flexibility, given the fact that it operates the largest LNG fleet in the world. It also has long, well-established relationships with its consumers. For instance, Japan has been Qatar’s consumer for almost 20 years. When the tsunami overtook Japan’s pacific coast in 2011 forcing it to shut down its nuclear power plants, Qatar immediately converted hundreds of cargos to aid its customer in its emergency. Al-Attiyah assured that all Qatar’s customers can expect similar customer service and accommodation. Qatar is one of the few countries that manage the full production chain: upstream, downstream, and transportation, which allows it to be highly flexible and reliable. To sum up, if anything, the current low prices present an important opportunity for Qatar to attract new consumers, get rid of upcoming producers, and increase its efficiency.

After a Q&A session that asked about the potential development of a gas cartel, technological advancements in renewable energy, diversification plans in Qatar, and gas supply to the Ukraine, Barakat concluded by thanking the guests and saying that the event has been rather constructive and encouraging, emphasizing mutual benefits and highlighting the potential advantages of the current situation.

Video

• The role of LNG in a changing energy world

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• lng transcript

      

 

 

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on April 19, 2016, about the ongoing reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The panelists included Omar Shaban, director of Pal-Think, a research institution based in Gaza; and Naglaa Elhag, head of rehabilitation and international development at the Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS). Sultan Barakat, the BDC’s director of research, moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat opened by noting the slow progress of reconstruction in Gaza. Almost two years since the cessation of hostilities between Hamas and Israel, the rebuilding process has stalled for a number of reasons. First, the distribution of aid money pledged by donor countries during the October 2014 Cairo Conference has slowed. According to the World Bank, as of March 31, 2016, donor countries had dispersed only 40 percent of the pledged money. At the current rate, the fulfillment of all pledges will not occur until 2019, two years after the target date. Second, construction materials only enter Gaza from one border crossing. As a result of the sluggish rebuilding process, only 9 percent of totally damaged houses and 45 percent of partially damaged houses in Gaza have been repaired, leaving over 14,800 families internally displaced. Additionally, job opportunities promised by various construction projects have failed to materialize, leading to increased feelings of desperation and frustration among Gaza’s population.

Shaban expanded on these developments, expressing the notion that the people in Gaza feel neglected. Due to the high levels of frustration, he feels that a new round of hostilities between militants and Israel could happen at any moment. He explained further by highlighting the volatility of the area and mentioning how previous conflicts were easily ignited by an array of incidents: a kidnapping, a cross-border raid, an assassination, continuous rocket fire. Since frustration among Gazans continues to mount, arguably to its highest level, renewed conflict seems almost certain. Consequently, Shaban argued, fear of another round of conflict between Hamas and Israel has instilled a sentiment of donor fatigue. Donors do not want to see their support go to waste in another round of destruction, turning the delivery of assistance into an exercise of futility.

Shaban attributed this attitude among some donors to the lack of a political solution to the crisis in Gaza. Hamas, the de-facto governing authority in Gaza, does not work for the people, nor does the Palestinian Authority (PA), based in Ramallah. Neither body provides economic opportunities for Gazans, as those employed by either the PA or Hamas often do not receive their salaries. Reconciliation talks between both groups failed to establish a unity government. Egypt, Israel, and the United States would feel more comfortable negotiating with a unity government, presumably dominated by the PA, not Hamas, which each of the aforementioned countries designate as a terrorist organization. If the PA does reach an agreement with Hamas, Egypt has implied that it would open its border with Gaza at Rafah, as long as the PA stations a security presence at the crossing. This could enhance the slow trickle of construction materials into Gaza, allow for the increased export of commercial goods, and also enable Gazans to leave and return at a higher rate than currently permitted. According to Shaban, opening another access point for Gaza to the outside world would temporarily ease the burden faced by Gaza’s citizens, but the current crisis requires a solution to ameliorate the economic and political situation in the long term.

Elhag opened her remarks by reviewing the difficulties of implementing aid projects in Gaza. While working in Gaza for the QRCS, she noticed little progress from international agencies, as they do not address the main problems, typically taking short cuts, which she highlighted by stating, “We don’t treat the wounds, we cover it with a bandage.” To elaborate on this point she mentioned that lack of access in and out of Gaza and the Israeli naval blockade as two factors hindering reconstruction. Due to these restrictions, aid workers have difficulty entering Gaza. Elhag surmised that the lack of accountability on the part of international agencies and the Israelis and the fear of aid projects being destroyed again because of the political situation both contribute to the stalled reconstruction, producing grim realities in Gaza.

Furthermore, Elhag explained that a resolution to the Gaza crisis does not rest on the distribution of money. She believes that only solutions from both sides of the conflict will end the suffering in Gaza. To exemplify the frustrations felt by donors, Elhag noted that since 2008, QRCS invested $100 million in housing units and other aid projects in Gaza, but some of these projects were destroyed during the 2014 war. QRCS observed this and shifted their focus to securing food sources and enhancing the education and health sectors in Gaza.

At the conclusion of Elhag’s observations, Barakat asked the panel where the money donated for reconstruction goes and how the Gaza reconstruction mechanism (GRM) works. Shaban described how the money actually gets funneled through the PA’s ministry of finance in Ramallah, before it reaches Gaza. Hamas officials or members of Gaza’s civil society do not oversee any aspect of aid distribution. So from the start, the distribution of funds lacks transparency, as the PA gives the money to the U.N. office in Gaza, which administers the GRM. From there, the United Nations composes a list of people in Gaza that require construction materials. The Israeli administrative body in the ministry of defense, the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (Cogat), must approve the names on the list. Construction materials can then be distributed through the GRM. Shaban concluded his explanation of the GRM by noting the many levels of bureaucracy involved have created a slow distribution process for a populace in desperate need.

From the regional perspective, some Arab states’ past political differences with Hamas has stymied political progress in Gaza, but the panel agreed that some of these relationships, especially with Saudi Arabia, are on the mend. The work of regional actors like Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could help push a reconciliation deal between Fatah and Hamas. Shaban proposed allowing some Hamas members to take part in any future coalition government, as some of their relationships in Sinai could help Egypt secure the troubled region. Cooperation on security matters between Egypt and Hamas could inspire enough confidence in the Egyptians for them to open the Rafah crossing.

Ending the discussion, Barakat clarified the proposals of the panel by reiterating the need for donors to fulfill aid pledges. The GRM needs reform, especially through the inclusion of Gaza’s civil society in the reconstruction process. Finally, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, as well as Egypt and Hamas, would help foster security cooperation at the borders.

Video

• Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• gaza transcript

      

 

 

This April, the U.N. General Assembly will meet for a Special Session on the World Drug Problem. After decades of conformity with a hardline “war on drugs” formerly promoted by the United States, there is increasing dissensus within the international community about how to best address the costs and harms posed by drugs. For years, some European countries have quietly diverged from policies based on aggressive suppression of drug production and the criminalization of users. More recently, some key Latin American states have openly challenged the global counternarcotics regime and called for reforms. 

Yet the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states still cling to hardline drug policies, an approach that is also supported by Russia and many Asian countries.

On March 7 in Doha, we met with police and military officials, NGO representatives, and academics from across the Middle East to discuss the rising drug challenges in the region and the increasingly contested global regime. We found the Middle East and North Africa are grappling with intensifying drug problem—increased use, spread of drug-related communicable diseases, and widening linkages between drug production and smuggling and violent conflict and terrorism. And there is a growing sense that the repressive policies against illicit drugs long-applied in the region have not been effective in counteracting these negative trends.

Ugly trends, ugly policies

MENA countries have by and large not taken an active or vocal role in global drug discussions. Many governments do not collect or disclose data on levels of drug production, trafficking, and use. Drugs are a social taboo, with little public or government attention to the problem. In fact, the region’s drug policies are most notable for extraordinarily high levels executions of accused drug traffickers—in the hundreds per year in Saudi Arabia and Iran. This policy is increasingly rejected by the international community, even by the stringent International Narcotics Control Board. Even very small possessions of medications such as codeine can be deemed illegal in the region, such as in Dubai, and result in imprisonment or worse.

Despite poor data, there is nonetheless a sense that drug use is on the rise in MENA. The abuse of Captagon in Saudi Arabia has been known for years, and for decades Iran has been among the world’s largest consumer countries of opiates. Drug use could well be on the rise elsewhere in Iraq and Syria, although records are kept poorly or not at all. Bored, unemployed, frustrated young people and war-traumatized dislocated populations are understandably vulnerable to the temporary escape offered by drugs. 

[R]ecords are kept poorly or not at all.

Refugees pose a new challenge for states designing policies to address drug use. Immiserated, segregated, and lacking legal economic options, some in the refugee populations may find employment in the Middle East’s long established drug smuggling networks. Badly-integrated and highly marginalized diaspora communities often have small segments that become crucial vectors of international smuggling. Unfortunately, some governments in the region have responded by denying—wrongly—humanitarian non-governmental organizations’ authorization to distribute crucial palliative and mental illness medications for fear that these will be diverted into the illicit economy.

Prevention policies have been largely ineffective in containing rising drug use. Drug treatment is underprovided throughout the region. In the Gulf, even relatively progressive Qatar established its first drug treatment center only in the past few years. Conservative societies in the region tend to stigmatize users, so few seek out help. Consequently, the spread of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis among intravenous drug users has not been contained. 

Badly-integrated and highly marginalized diaspora communities often have small segments that become crucial vectors of international smuggling.

Cash for militants, cash for the poor

In the Middle East, drug production and trafficking has long funded violent conflict. In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah and various sectarian militias taxed the cultivation of marijuana and opium poppy in the Bekaa Valley beginning in the 1970s. ISIS now appears to be smuggling local weed too. Efforts to eradicate the crops and provide alternative livelihoods for the valley’s poor farmers have ebbed and flowed, depending on pressures from international community. Alternative development policies have often been cast too narrowly and have relied on questionable substitute crops such as tobacco. 

Synthetic drugs are also a problem for the region, particularly where poorly governed or ungoverned areas provide cover for laboratories. The production of Captagon is increasing in Lebanon and it is even more widely produced in Syria, where it is smuggled and taxed by ISIS for revenue. ISIS fighters are also alleged to consume Captagon to increase their fighting prowess and brutality (echoing amphetamine-fueled violence by West African fighters in the 1990s). Drug trafficking has funded terrorists and militias in Libya, most notably Mokthar Belmokthar’s terrorist group. This group has taxed a broad range of smuggled goods, but its narcotics that captures the headlines. 

Alternative development policies have often been cast too narrowly and have relied on questionable substitute crops such as tobacco.

The region also experiences problems with legal drugs, such as qat in Yemen. While qat is culturally acceptable, it decreases productivity of users, increases family indebtedness, and causes severe overexploitation of scarce water resources to support its cultivation. Yemen’s water scarcity is one of the largest in the world. For many women in Somalia during the Shabab era (and today in places such as Djibouti), peddling qat was the only source of livelihood even as it made their husbands unproductive and drove households into high debt.

But suppressing production and trade may not be politically or economically sustainable, as even the terrorist group al-Shabab learned in Somalia when it tried to disrupt qat trading. Like with its 1990s predecessor al-Itihaad, prohibition of qat use and trade caused al-Shabab to lose crucial support from influential business leaders and clan chiefs, undermining the political entrenchment of the group. 

Bright spots?

There are some positive counter-examples in the region. Recognizing that its highly punitive policies have failed, Iran has adopted some important harm-reduction measures even while clinging to executions and even though many treatment centers, especially for women, have to operate hidden from view. Along with Morocco, it has been experimenting with methadone maintenance, needle exchange, and other harm reduction measures as well as ways to improve the effectiveness of treatment. Some 420,000 Iranian addicts are reported to receive methadone maintenance and 76,000 buprenorphine treatment. Morocco’s vibrant drug policy conversation even includes civil society voices favoring the legalization of marijuana use and possibly even cultivation, which would a return to the policies in place in the early 20th century. Turkey has been a model since the 1970s of how to produce medicinal opiates and prevent their diversion into the legal drug trade. With the help of U.S. legislation in the 1970s that guaranteed Turkey and India that the United States buys 80 percent of opium for medicinal purposes from these two countries–and with the implementation of very good control practices, such as the use of so-called poppy-straw concentrate method—Turkey eliminated illegal poppy cultivation while keeping its farmers employed. Local militants such as those in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or Turkish criminal groups have never been able to penetrate the legal medical production and instead fund themselves by smuggling opiates from Afghanistan. 

In North Africa, Morocco has witnessed a reduction in marijuana cultivation. So there are some cases where well-designed policy responses can have an impact on drug production. Looking further abroad, Thailand—once a major source of drugs in the infamous “Golden Triangle”—offers another positive model for how to wipe out poppy production humanely through a combination of strong economic growth and rural development. MENA governments might look to Thailand for lessons.

[S]ocial taboos, traumatized dislocated populations, state fragility, weakness and corruption of law enforcement, rivalrous geopolitics, and intense conflict all inhibit effective drug policies.

Breaking the cycle

In the Middle East and North Africa, social taboos, traumatized dislocated populations, state fragility, weakness and corruption of law enforcement, rivalrous geopolitics, and intense conflict all inhibit effective drug policies. 

If governments and civil society in the region do not start thinking deeply about drug trends and policies, the threats and harms will grow much more intense. Governments and NGOs need to start gathering and disclosing data on drug use and better map drug smuggling. Drug use should be depenalized: Throwing users into jail will not stop use and may facilitate radicalization. Use should be destigmatized and better treatment provided, while public health approaches should also be adopted. If governments force eradication before effective alternative livelihoods are in place, it is likely that farmers will only be further pushed into the arms of militants (and such policies should not be intensified in the Bekaa Valley, for example). 

There is no easy way to disrupt terrorist drug funding, the eternal dream of governments around the world. But interdiction can more effectively target the drugs-terrorism nexus. The first step, before all else, is to acknowledge drug challenges are on the rise in the Middle East and that repression is not stopping them. 

      

 

 

Editors’ Note: It is time to establish a regional reconstruction strategy for the Middle East, argues Sultan Barakat, that involves collective vision, broad participation, smart security, equality, and other key elements.This post originally appeared in Huffington Post.

The World Bank is hosting its annual Fragility Forum this week with the aim of making progress on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. This week has also seen a fragile ceasefire in Syria, potentially landmark elections in Iran, and a violent clash between Jordanian security and so-called Islamic State members. Together these developments have prompted me to reassess what needs to be done to resolve the issues of conflict and fragility in the Middle East.

For the Middle East, the starting point should be to move away from any process that reinforces the image of the West devising solutions and proposing "new" visions to the region. Such approaches are reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the neoconservatives' "grand strategy" of the early 2000s and do not appreciate that the Middle East has changed fundamentally since 2011. The region, at all levels, now expects to be treated with dignity and to be the driving force behind its own development.

It is high time to pull together to establish a "Regional Reconstruction Strategy" that can address all sorts of violence, not just Islamist-related conflict. The region needs an ever-evolving strategy that maintains a holistic, problem-solving outlook while drawing on various forms of intervention (e.g. community driven development, inter-regional development projects, targeted counterinsurgency operations, stabilization, statebuilding, etc.) without being straightjacketed by any one toolkit or template. Novel approaches rooted in genuine regional leadership, broad participation, youth engagement, and the utilization of technology will increasingly need to be applied. The pillars of such a strategy should be a collective regional vision, effective local participation, smart security, reconciliation and justice, equity, reconstruction and development, and capacity.

Collective Vision: With the aspirations of the Arab Spring unrealized and many countries descending into sectarianism, what is needed now is a collective vision that goes beyond national borders. This would include pooling the region's resources, specifically all the ingredients for large-scale development, such as human resources, an educated population, capital, mobility, and nature. We could then look to the day when region-wide development is synergistic and not predatory or a zero-sum game. What Morocco has achieved with solar energy is a shining example—a visionary investment has addressed regional developmental and environmental challenges, stimulated employment, and raised confidence that hi-tech and innovative sectors can thrive in the Middle East. Such a broad vision is crucial if the region is to leapfrog into the twenty-first century and not remain in a vicious cycle of conflict and failed development.

Key to an inclusive and non-adversarial vision will be both accepting and embracing Islam as a majority religion while building on human security as an area of common ground. For this to happen some real changes are required in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—which would enable both to exercise their regional leadership in coalescing a constructive collective vision rather than perpetuating sectarian hostility.

Broad Participation: It is important that the regional vision recognizes that development requires an active civil society, a free media, and rooting action and ideas at the local level and with popular participation. The process of engaging in a region-wide consultation where contributions are coming from schools, villages, city halls, political parties, unions, and many other civic forums can help the region start dreaming about what it wants to look like in the 50 years to come.

Smart Security: Instead of a collective vision for development we have one for defense, formed with the excuse of the Islamic State group. All appreciate that a minimum level of security is important for implementing reconstruction, but a lack of security cannot be a pretext to do nothing. Experience has shown that delaying reconstruction efforts pushes people down the slope of conflict and violence and leads to dependence on humanitarian assistance. The region needs to find ways of better understanding the granular texture of security at local and regional levels so that strategies can be developed in which localized insecurity does not hold back development in other areas. This could support "spot reconstruction" efforts that create exemplars of what a degree of stability combined with reconstruction intervention can achieve in the midst of larger instability.

Reconciliation and Justice: No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without genuine reconciliation across the region. Twenty years ago the main fault line was Israel-Palestine. Today, there are many additional fault lines that need to be addressed, including Muslim-Christian tensions, tensions between displaced and host communities, and tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to make sure that the rule of law applies to all and that everyone has access to justice regardless of the mechanism. On this a lot can be built on local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation.

Equity: A common mistake with reconstruction is that it proceeds without sufficient regulation and monitoring to ensure that benefits are equitably distributed. This region has repeatedly seen how easily reconstruction "lords" (most of whom were previously warlords) can emerge to line their pockets at the expense of the general public, thus perpetuating that country's crisis. World Bank arguments for the private sector to take the lead in reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere have done nothing but strengthen this model. Assad's efforts to liberalize Syria's economy prior to 2011 led to the further enrichment of a corrupt elite, contributing to what we see today. Going forward, reconstruction efforts must take into consideration the poorest and least capable—so that nobody is left out.

Reconstruction and Development: There is an urgent need to find new ways of inducing development through international engagement with the region. The current instability has shifted spending toward security and away from the basics of development. As a result, some of the most important development indicators—freedom of expression, women's participation, poverty, quality of education—have taken a step back. All this is happening when the region is facing financial challenges due to severely reduced oil prices. This may prove to be an opportunity as some countries needed a good wake-up call to the pernicious effects of a model of capital development in which billions of dollars are invested in the West, generating jobs and stabilizing economies thousands of miles away at the expense of the region. If the West wants to help the region it should seek to focus minds within the Arab world on the value of investment in addressing regional problems in a mutually beneficial way. Ultimately a more stable region will lead to more prosperous neighbors both in the East and the West.

Building Capacity: To do this we must invest enormous amounts in fostering sustainable capacity at regional, national, and local levels. It is essential to invest in education at all levels, in particular going beyond primary education to support the young men and women that will become leaders with the conviction and capabilities to rebuild the region. In a rush to capture development, we have focused on the hard sciences, engineering, business studies, and computer science while ignoring our own culture, languages, and history. We must correct this imbalance, and it is time we develop our ideas in our own language and not rely on translation.

For all this to happen, fragility must be addressed within a coherent regional vision, not individual national plans. It would be constructive if the international community and donors would try to view the region as a whole—as one canvas in which to facilitate cross-border mobility of population, capital, ideas, and labor—and encourage regional responsibility with different countries leading in their areas of competency. International partners can support this with new and innovative forms of funding that utilize collateral guarantees from the region, not just individual countries. If we can embrace a truly regional approach, there may be a day when we elevate human dignity and human development above petty politics and sectarianism.

      

 

 

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) and Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Program jointly hosted a panel discussion on February 22, 2016, regarding the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and their impact on U.S. policy towards the Middle East. The panelists were John Hudak, a senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and deputy director of the Center for Effective Public Management, and Abdullah Baabood, director of the Gulf Studies Program. The discussion was moderated by BDC director of research Sultan Barakat and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, and media communities.

Hudak opened with an overview of how the American presidential electoral system works, which he explains in his report. He noted that the presidential campaigns now last for almost two years and are extremely expensive. In 2012, the Obama and Romney campaigns spent more than $1 billion each, while, this year, combined spending is expected to top $5 billion. Both parties are having open competitions for their nominations. The Democrats quickly boiled down the competition to Hillary Clinton versus Bernie Sanders, while the Republicans, who began with 17 candidates—some with strong résumés and some with none whatsoever, still have five contenders, only three of which are strong: Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio.

Procedurally, Hudak continued, things did not start until February with the first caucuses and primaries in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada. Candidates usually wrap up the nominations well ahead of the July conventions, but that is not the case this year, especially on the Republican side, where nobody is winning a majority. Even Trump, who is in the lead thus far, had not won 40% in any state yet. If no candidate has a majority before the party’s convention, the doors open up for selecting a nominee through negotiations and possibly backroom deals; while troubling, such a scenario could be good news for Republicans that dislike Trump. Overall, the Democrats entered the elections at an advantage, having done quite well in the prior two and the Republican campaign has not eroded that advantage thus far.

Turning to foreign policy, Hudak observed that some of the candidates have thoughtful, detailed proposals; the campaign could have been one of ideas. But that has not happened largely due to the media’s dereliction of its duties. He acknowledged that many around the world are waiting for more U.S. leadership in dealing with the Islamic State group. Yet, while many candidates agree that the Gulf countries should be more involved in contributing funding and troops, they otherwise differ on most other strategies. For instance, Cruz has called for carpet bombing the Middle East and a more robust American military presence, while Trump has said he would force Iraq to transfer $1.5 trillion in oil revenue to the United States and then carpet bomb Iraq’s oil fields. Others, such as Rubio and Kasich, want the United States to adopt a more supportive role, focusing on training and coordination; they also emphasize humanitarian concerns. During the Q&A, Hudak asserted that Syria would likely be the “number one on day one” foreign policy issue for the next president.

Regarding Syrian refugees, Hudak stated that both Clinton and Sanders have said the United States should accept some, while most Republican candidates have opposed accepting any and Trump called for preventing all Muslims from entering the country. Such inflammatory ideas have not come out of nowhere, but are present within American society; 75% of Republicans in South Carolina expressed support for banning Muslims, and Trump’s support has grown as his language has gotten more extreme. Nevertheless, some candidates have discussed post-conflict reconstruction in Syria, with the main difference being that Democrats were willing to spend American money on it, whereas Republicans staunchly opposed such government spending.

Hudak then recapped the results so far. He said Clinton’s victory in Nevada probably sets her up to win the nomination despite her numbers in Iowa and New Hampshire. If she does well, as polls predict, in the upcoming South Carolina primary and the twelve states that will vote on “Super Tuesday” on March 1, it would be very difficult for Sanders to win. On the Republican side, Trump is doing very well though he is probably reaching his peak. While many within the Republican establishment oppose him, it may be difficult for them to prevent him from winning and denying him the nomination at the convention may cause major turmoil.

Baabood began his comments by noting that the Middle East watches U.S. elections closely due to the United States’ status as a great power. Some countries, such as the Gulf states, would like to see a Republican in office due to historical relations, whereas Iran and others would probably prefer a Democrat. He noted that Gulf states are frustrated with Obama’s lack of clarity and interpret his Iran deal and reserved position on Syria as signs that the United States may be reducing its role as a regional security guarantor. Baabood asserted that the Gulf states are becoming more independent, citing the Yemen conflict and actions in Syria.

In response to Barakat’s question about the campaign’s lacking foreign policy discussion, Hudak explained that Americans are more concerned about issues that directly affect them, like the economy. The next president will have to think about the Middle East in a more dynamic way that transcends the “sound bite nature” of the campaign. Today, the candidates sound like “amateurs” in foreign policy as they do not seem to understand how events in one country can affect others. Overall, Clinton would provide the smoothest transition as world leaders already know what to expect from her, whereas Trump would be a great unknown.

Barakat asked whether Clinton’s gender played a role in her campaign. Hudak posited that the few Americans that would not vote for a female candidate probably are not Democrats, so gender bias has not held Clinton back, but on the Republican side Carly Fiorina faced significant resistance. Similarly, American Muslims face real challenges as clear biases against them cut across party lines, hindering their ability to make waves in elections the way other minorities have been able to do. Baabood added that a disconnect exists between Muslims and Arab Americans and their Middle Eastern counterparts and that the region’s conflicts can sometimes complicate relationships within American communities.

During the Q&A, an audience member argued that the campaign is in a rhetoric phase, which is separate from governance, and that Trump is specifically going after the “neoconservative” establishment and the Clintons and has been the only candidate to turn away the Jewish lobby. In response, Hudak noted that some candidates have sought to go beyond rhetoric. Rubio could be considered a “neocon” while Cruz the constitutional conservative. Trump is just appealing to people that are extraordinarily mad, but he is uniquely positioned to put forward new policies due to his wealth and political independence.

In response to a final question, Hudak said that Trump’s success despite his lack of political experience, numerous gaffes, and brashness “throws a lot of what we know out the window,” but also “makes perfect sense.” He is demonstrating shrewd politics by emphasizing the right issues to the right people and finding the issues that matter most to the most people.

Video

• What the U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East

Transcript

• Event Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• us election transcript

      

 

 

Back in August 2014, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, the Nusra Front, and Islamic State group (IS) forces attacked the Lebanese town of Arsal. The fighting concluded with the capture of 30 Lebanese policemen and soldiers. Immediately after the battle, the Nusra Front and IS executed two soldiers each. One died from wounds sustained from fighting in Arsal, while 16 soldiers remained in the custody of the Nusra Front, and nine remained imprisoned by IS.

Sixteen months later, an exchange of captives took place between Lebanon and the Nusra Front. The deal was brokered by Qatar, who has over the last decade been playing somewhat controversial, but often crucial roles in conflict mediation throughout the region.

At the time, December 1, 2015, the event attracted substantial public attention, but it quickly faded into the background of the news cycle. At first glance, the return of 16 Lebanese policemen and soldiers -- held by the Nusra Front since August 2014 -- seemed like a routine swap between belligerents as a result of successful local level negotiations -- most of which took place recently as a result of the stalemate felt by all sides on the ground. Yet, this exchange differs because it took place between a non-state actor -- in this case, an internationally-agreed-upon terrorist organization -- and a neighboring state, Lebanon; with the blessing of the Syrian and Saudi governments.

In Lebanon, the prisoner exchange provided the government with an opportunity to instill a sense of unity in its fragmented populace. Upon the release of the Lebanese captives by the Nusra Front, people in Beirut representing different political allegiances cheered the news of their release. Meanwhile in Doha, the government quickly claimed credit for having facilitated talks and provided aid, but strongly denied paying any money as part of the deal.

Although this is not the first time Qatar has succeeded in brokering such a deal involving foreign nationals -- it did so before with Lebanese Shiite pilgrims -- the fact that it involved the exchange of soldiers is significant.

An earlier attempt to release the Jordanian pilot failed despite the Jordanian Government's willingness to submit to the demands of IS. In fact, the exchange contrasts with Nusra Front's own track record of handling prisoners of war. Therefore, this case deserves deeper analysis as it highlights a number of anomalies that may have implications for how we view the conflict in Syria and the ways in which it may end. 

First, the exchange would not have been successful without the involvement of many parties that are "publicly" at war with each other. Major General Abbas Ibrahim, chief of the Lebanese Security Service, emphasized that the deal was assisted by the direct involvement of Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad, and even Sa'ad Hariri. While this raises hope that talking peace among foes is not impossible when it comes to the war in Syria; at the same time it underlines that a clear political will is needed to do so. In this case, the exchange clearly served Hezbollah's interests. The organization has been blamed for dragging Lebanon into the Syria war and has found it increasingly difficult to justify why Lebanese soldiers -- mostly non-Shiite -- were placed in harm's way as a result of its unilateral decisions in Syria.

Second, the exchange represents an attempt by the Nusra Front to position itself as a party willing to negotiate in order to achieve both a military and political objective. The group also demonstrated a capacity to protect captured soldiers and later leverage them as bargaining tools, instead of merely executing them. By doing so, it attempts to distance itself from IS and its atrocious actions; however, it achieved this end without totally alienating IS by insisting on including Saja al-Dulaimi -- the former wife of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, arrested by the Lebanese security forces in November 2014 -- in the exchange. Given recent developments on the ground, this can be seen as an attempt by the Nusra Front to reiterate its assertion that unlike its affiliate, al-Qaeda, its project is a national one. The Nusra Front has no ambition to be seen as operating across borders, particularly following its enrollment alongside other more moderate groups in their fight against Assad.

Third, most of the prisoners released by the Lebanese in exchange for their security personnel were captured following the Arsal attack and remained in custody for a long time without being formally and publicly charged with specific criminal acts. This is despite the fact that al-Dulaimi's history of serving as a transporter of moneyfor militant organizations was documented by the Washington Post, as she was imprisoned by the Syrian government until 2014. Similarly, Joumana Hmayed, another prisoner of the Lebanese, was caught around the same time as al-Dulaimi for driving a car with about 100 kilograms of explosives. These actions, if true, clearly show intent on the part of the suspects to aid or carry out terrorist acts. For the Lebanese government to release these individuals, the political goodwill generated in return was calculated to be higher in value.

Fourth, as a result of mediating this prisoner exchange, the Qatari government has unwittingly placed itself, yet again, in a controversial position. The Qataris' involvement, once more, demonstrated their ability to access -- directly or indirectly -- some of the extremist groups such as the Nusra Front, and more so their willingness to negotiate with such organizations.

This trend continued despite their continuous denial of any links to terrorist organizations in response to growing international scrutiny over their ties to militant Islamists fighting in Syria and elsewhere.

Of course, last year, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar, expressed his belief that not all groups possessing an Islamist background are terrorists, and as such, Qatar will continue to engage these groups in dialogue in order to achieve a favorable outcome for both parties. The Qatari position to keep the door open remains advantageous given the current political and security flux across the region. However, for Qatari officials, publicly revealing their connections to extreme Islamist organizations, as they displayed by communicating directly with the Nusra Front, will prove undoubtedly damaging in the long run.

Qatar needs to reflect on this issue very carefully as it shifted its mediation efforts from multi-party, complex issues of peace-making in the region to narrow and single issue initiatives designed to achieve immediate results. Despite the Emir's good will in wanting to ensure that communication lines persist in Syria, and undoubtedly the basic humanitarian gesture involved in the exchange on all sides, Qatar would better itself by disassociating the government from such talks. They ought to take lead from the experiences of other nations, who over the years have learned that mediation is often a thankless task.

As a mediator -- to some extent this applies also to the parties of conflict -- you need to preserve the option of "deniability," i.e. your ability as a government to deny any role in the process, in case things go wrong. In a previous analysis paper, the author recommended that Qatar should encourage the establishment of a national or a regional, non-governmental entity that can develop the ability to undertake discreet interventions without having public link to the state. This would allow the Qatari government to distance itself from Islamist groups, but provide them with the reputation they seek as a broker of peace in the region. It will also protect Qatari interests, both at home and abroad.

In recent years, and due to their nascent role in mediating conflicts, Qatar has effectively placed a "price tag" on Qatari citizens traveling abroad. This threat is highlighted by the kidnapping of a group of Qatari citizens on a hunting vacation at the Iraqi-Saudi border--allegedly by a Shiite militia. Militant groups that count ransom payments as a source of income now view Qataris, especially members of the royal family, as high value targets. The Qatari government has unfortunately cemented this trend by attempting to publicly take credit for this and other mediation attempts, while failing to effectively counter the impression that money has exchanged hands as part of any deals.

In summary, the exchange that took place between Lebanon and the Nusra Front offers more than the obvious humanitarian gesture towards the prisoners and their families. It demonstrates that despite the harsh rhetoric regarding violent military solutions to the war in Syria, a space to negotiate with the enemy always exists. The success of this deal might spur regional and international parties to invest more in diplomatic avenues, but for that to happen, Qatar and any other potential third party should approach with extreme caution its current involvement in attempts to resolve immediate issues among foes.

This article originally appeared in The Huffington Post.

      

 

 

Editors’ Note: Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, writes Sultan Barakat. This makes the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging. This post originally appeared on Al Jazeera.

As the week-long truce in Yemen coincides with the wrapping up of the scheduled peace talks, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition should take a moment to examine emerging fault-lines within its ranks, which have become particularly evident in the most recent offensive on Taiz.

Outside the Gulf, coalition members have been finding it increasingly difficult to garner public support for the war, making the deployment of coordinated and organized troops particularly challenging.

Additionally, serious consideration should be given to the attitudes of some coalition partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)—represented in Yemen by the al-Islah party.

Symbolic value

Taiz city is highly symbolic. It was the first city in Yemen to rise against Ali Abdullah Saleh during the Arab Spring, with the city's "Freedom Square" becoming an emblem of the revolution.

After the coalition redeemed Aden during the war, the Houthis quickly tightened their grip on Taiz, considering the city a symbol of their continued power in the south. This resulted in what the International Committee of Red Cross called a "catastrophic siege" that symbolized the brutality of the war, with the city's hilltops and outskirts in the hands of the Houthis, its center in the grip of al-Islah-led militias, and its 200,000 civilians facing severe shortages in water, food, electricity, and medical care.

On November 16, coalition forces sent major reinforcements to Taiz in a renewed effort to break the months-long siege. Taiz became the coalition's "gateway" to Sanaa.

Today, the city serves yet another symbolic role—as a proving ground for the unity of the Saudi-led coalition, testing the pragmatism of the anti-MB crackdown launched by Saudi and the UAE after the Arab Spring.

With its Sunni majority population, the city is known as an al-Islah stronghold. In fact, it was al-Islah member Hamoud Saeed al-Mikhlafi who rose to prominence in the early days of the uprising and led the popular resistance committees that drove Saleh out of Taiz.

Shortcomings on the ground

As it stands, the coalition is vulnerable to division along more than one internal fault-line. Those fault-lines challenge its ability to win the war—along with moral questions—and, more importantly, to cultivate peace.

First, although many countries willingly joined the coalition in its early days, few have been eager to contribute the troops necessary for the operations on the ground. In fact, the majority (outside the Gulf) are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain domestic support for the war.

Nine months after the war began, a growing number of people in countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and even Egypt consider the conflict a distant war that is not theirs to fight. Given its growing tension with Iran, even Saudi may hesitate to invest further in Yemen as events unfold in Syria and Iraq.

Secondly, the few non-Gulf countries contributing soldiers, such as Sudan, and allegedly Mauritania and Senegal, have not worked together before under united command, which makes coordination potentially difficult.

The protection of civilians will prove particularly challenging given some coalition partners' history of disregard for the laws of war. This raises questions about the "price Yemeni civilians might pay in the course of these military operations".

In fact, the coalition has allegedly turned to hiring private security firms to supply personnel, furthering civilian protection concerns as conflicting motives and objectives creep into the mission.

Finally, and most importantly, the coalition is split over its vision for Yemen's political future and, in particular, over the place of al-Islah and individuals such as al-Mikhlafi in any political outcome.

Before embarking on peace negotiations, the coalition should agree on how to deal with al-Islah and its political ambition. Al-Islah's influence in Yemen is obvious. Al-Mikhlafi remained prominent and even after Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed Shawki Hayel Saeed as governor, he continued to act as arbitrator in local disputes and his militias remained relatively powerful.

In his two-year term, Saeed, a former chief financial officer assigned by Hadi in an attempt to make governance in Taiz "apolitical" and "technocratic", tried to resign from his role three times out of frustration with al-Islah's tactics.

Varying interests

Yet today, despite their role in keeping Taiz out of the control of the Houthis, al-Islah has been accused of "betrayal", with the UAE minister of foreign affairs, Anwar Gargash, tweeting: "Had it not been for the failure of al-Islah and the [MB] to act, [Taiz would have already been] liberated."

While Saudi Arabia considerably softened its anti-MB stance since the arrival of King Salman—partly in response to its escalating rivalry with Iran and partly owing to its historical support for al-Islah religious-tribal leaders since the 1960s—two important members of the coalition, the UAE and Egypt, have, if anything, renewed their animosity towards the movement.

The UAE, which launched a harsh crackdown on the movement in 2012 imprisoning up to 200 alleged MB-sympathizers, continues to list the group as a terrorist organization.

Today, UAE senior officials appear to see their war not just against "groups supporting a sectarian Iranian scheme" but also against those "adopting the ideology of the [MB]".

Similarly, Egypt's Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's government is fervently anti-MB and is, therefore, often perceived to be coordinating with the UAE.

Conversely, Qatar was traditionally supportive of al-Islah until it recently adopted what some are characterizing as a less active foreign policy in the region. It is therefore inclined to side with Saudi, if the latter adopts more pragmatic policies towards the group.

Other key coalition members, such as Morocco, Jordan and Kuwait, are also likely to approach al-Islah pragmatically. Despite some imprisonments and restrictions imposed on local MB sympathizers, all three countries have learned to tolerate the group domestically.

Still, given the key role assumed by the UAE in Yemen, where they are increasingly perceived as "the ones in charge," the Saudis cannot afford to alienate them.

Riyadh needs to find a way to include al-Islah in its attempts to end the conflict and assuage fears in Abu Dhabi and Cairo concerning the MB's long-term agenda. A "managed" alliance with al-Islah could bring security to the Gulf, both in Yemen and elsewhere, as the rivalry between Iran and Saudi continues to grow.

      

 

 

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on December 8, 2015, about the status of the Syrian conflict and the possibility of negotiating peace in Vienna next year. The panelists were Marwan Kabalan, head of policy analysis at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies; Noah Bonsey, senior analyst on Syria at the International Crisis Group; and Charles Lister, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center.

Barakat prefaced the discussion by stating that the humanitarian disaster in Syria will soon enter its fifth year, with up to 250,000 people dead and half the population displaced. Recent multilateral meetings in Vienna demonstrated renewed diplomatic determination to negotiate peace for Syria, but significant differences remain between the conflict's principal power-brokers. Focusing his first question on recent events, Barakat asked the panelists how the ongoing meeting in Riyadh with Syrian opposition groups differs from previous efforts.

Kabalan pointed out that the meeting, initially proposed in Vienna on November 14, received support from the United States, Russia, Turkey, and most other major players in the conflict—except Iran, which fears the anti-Iranian sentiment of the opposition. It will host both opposition and armed groups, making this the first time armed groups, such as Jaysh al-Islam (JI) and Ahrar al-Sham (AS), participate in negotiations. Kabalan hopes that the opposition will agree on a broadly defined political solution and find a way to unify their message.

Lister added that the meeting in Riyadh marks a shift in Western policy towards many Syrian armed groups. The West now recognizes that, despite their ideological conservatism, these groups are too popular and powerful to be excluded from negotiations. He noted that the upcoming Vienna talks will be qualitatively more serious than prior negotiations and will coincide with a nationwide ceasefire. It is logistically impossible to impose such a ceasefire without including main armed groups such as JI and AS. Lister, therefore, urged for the inclusion of more armed groups among opposition representatives.

Bonsey highlighted the difference between armed Islamic revolutionary factions such as JI and AS and armed Salafi-jihadi groups such as the Islamic State group (IS) and Nusra Front (NF). Unlike Salafi-jihadis, the revolutionary factions acknowledge the right of Syrians to choose their own government, uphold an inclusive approach to non-Muslim minorities, and do not pursue a transnational agenda.

Barakat then shifted the discussion to the recent Russian intervention. Bonsey maintained that Russia’s intervention renewed interest in moving the political process forward. However, like Geneva I and II, disagreements between its main parties on Assad’s future in Syria, will undermine the Vienna talks. Meanwhile, all warring parties in Syria believe in the possibility of a military victory; making the war on the ground potentially endless. Momentum, therefore, must come from regional and international actors, which could end the current stalemate.

Disagreeing slightly, Kabalan contended that, besides IS and Assad, most actors in Syria do not believe the conflict has a military solution because it is a proxy war; they are not simply confronting Assad, but regional powers as well. Syrian actors believe that a political solution must occur to achieve victory. This may happen in Vienna.

Lister noted that Russia’s role in the conflict is often underestimated. But the extent of it has been made evident multiple times. For instance, Russia persuaded Assad to destroy his chemical weapons in October, 2013. Also, it is important to distinguish that, when it launched its airstrikes a few months ago, Russia was saving not aiding Assad. The opposition in Syria gradually began uniting its message in preparation for negotiations with Assad; the intervention ended that possibility. Russia will remain in Syria for the long haul and its actions hold a greater impact on Assad than Iran. Bonsey added that Russia, nevertheless, exhibits a relatively more ambiguous position on Assad’s fate than Iran, which considers his loss as an existential threat. Thus, the Russians seem more likely to concede and willing to compromise during negotiations than Iran.

In response to a question from Barakat, Bonsey gave a quick summary on the Kurdish scene. Kurdish forces have consolidated large portions of Northern Syria. Their main players are the Abdullah Öcalan-linked Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), on one hand; and a disparate group of Kurdish parties, which coalesced with Masoud Barzani’s party in Iraq to form the Kurdistan National Council (KNC), on the other. A notable rift exists between those two players. He added that this is an interesting time for the Kurdish movement. They consider themselves neutral, opposing Assad and the Islamists; allying with Iran and Russia and the United States; and having difficult relations with Arabs and Turks. The U.S. now holds leverage over the YPG, which it should use.

Directing the discussion towards the refugee crisis, Barakat noted that only forty percent of the refugees flowing to Europe are actually Syrian. He asked Kabalan whether Europe will start focusing on the bigger picture of instability in the region. Kabalan agreed with Barakat, noting that Europe always conveyed a shortsighted approach towards its neighborhood. They never seem proactive with the roots of the problems that force people to flee. He further argued that Assad uses refugees to punish Europe and drive it toward another shortsighted decision: his retention of power. He effectively succeeded. The rhetoric on Syria slowly shifted away from Assad toward refugees and terrorism, making European support for his presidency a real possibility.

Lister agreed, noting that whether due to a deliberate Assad strategy or not, the refugee issue sees the West contemplating partitioning Syria, another shortsighted decision that would keep Assad in power. In fact, other developments suggest that Assad began laying the ground for a clean partition of Syria as a worst case scenario. For instance, in August 2015, he facilitated a land swap in Zabadani, where anti-Assad civilians were exchanged with loyalists from Idlib; slowly making the area along the Lebanese-Syrian border an opposition-free zone.

Bonsey, in a final remark, added that Russia embraces these strategies. It targets opposition groups in an attempt to displace more people and exacerbate the refugee crisis. Again, within the pro-Assad alliance, Russia is the actor with the least to lose by reaching a compromise with the opposition. Yet, its relentless support for Assad and his policies makes it almost impossible to imagine it playing a positive role in the transition. 

Video

• Syria: Steps Toward Peace or Deepening Intractability?

     

 

 

By now, President Obama recognizes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's bullish, self-centered, and two-faced approach to politics; however, as they meet next week in Washington, can the U.S. really afford to turn a blind eye to his latest attempts to win support among right-wing voters? Even at the expense of his only cordial relation in the Middle East with neighboring Jordan?

The answer is a resounding no. Excluding the significance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its associated human losses, Netanyahu's recent adventures concerning Haram al-Sharif threaten to undermine the stability of Jordan - the U.S.' last reliable oasis of stability in the region. Losing Jordan risks wasting billions of dollars of stabilization investments, and could eventually endanger the lives of American civilian and military personnel. No option exists, except to rely on Jordan as the base from which to secure U.S. interests across the region.

At the center of the recent escalation of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, in which 11 Israelis and at least 80 Palestinians were killed (almost half of them being subjected to extrajudicial execution by Israeli soldiers and settlers at the scene of the attacks), lies the status of Haram al-Sharif: a 35-acre compound that comprises Islam's third holiest site, after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.

Since 1924, the Haram al-Sharif or al-Aqsa Mosque, also known to Jews as the Temple Mount, remains under the custodianship of the Jordanians, but more so, its Hashemite Dynasty. For decades, the link to the holy site lent the Hashemites an important source of legitimacy in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims alike. That source of legitimacy highlights the important part they continue to play in balancing complex religious, tribal, and geographical rivalries in the region.

Israel understood the delicate role fulfilled by the Jordanians, and its importance in lessening the feeling of loss of the holy site for the Muslim world. As such, the Jordanian responsibilities toward Haram al-Sharif, (plus Christian sites in the Old City), continued unabated following the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Furthermore, the 1994 Wadi Araba peace agreement between Jordan and Israel solidified Jordanian control and management of the holy site; despite, at times, Jordan choosing to suspend or adjust its level of support, as it did temporarily between 2000-2003. This, of course, did not stop Israel from undermining the physical status of the al-Aqsa Mosque from the early days of occupation, by embarking on an all-penetrating network of tunneling and archaeological excavations. The earliest tunnel excavated dates back to 1967, which occurred under the auspices of the Israeli Antiquities Authority (IAA). It is part of a tunnel network, extending over 1,000 meters long and several meters deep. A joint Jordanian-Palestinian report submitted to UNESCO on the Israeli tunneling attributes structural damage in and around Haram al-Sharif and surrounding areas of the Old City, to past and ongoing Israeli excavation of these areas.

Clearly tempted by the state of flux in the Arab world, and the fact that the U.S. presidential election season is in full swing, extremist elements among the right-wing Israeli government could not resist testing the limits. A growing sentiment amongst conservatives in the Israeli political elite--led by agriculture minister Uri Ariel and Knesset member Moshe Feiglin--and the broader Israeli population increasingly call for a change to the status quo governing the right to pray within the Haram al-Sharif. In fact, since late 2013, visits to Haram al-Sharif by right-wing Israeli politicians and settlers have intensified and were accompanied by new efforts at the Knesset to introduce laws to reverse 1967/68 Israeli statutes. These efforts accordingly sought to restrict Muslim access to the site, and give permission for Jews to pray at the mosque. Thus, arousing memories among the Palestinians of the Israeli government's restrictions to the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron; where what started in 1994 as temporary limitations on when Palestinians could enter the mosque for worship ended up with the permanent partition of the site.

What should the US do?

Even as Israeli soldiers kill Palestinians using weapons furnished by the U.S., the U.S. does not condemn Israel for its continued policy of summary execution. In fact, during the recent surge of violence, the U.S. increased its military aid package to Israel. By continuing to support Israel through its generous military aid, the U.S. appears to condone the actions of extremist Jewish settlers and the extrajudicial killings of Palestinians by the Israeli army. From an Arab perspective, this unwavering support of the Israeli security establishment contradicts the U.S. stance on countering extremism. Combined with the threat Israeli action presents to Jordan's stability, the U.S. government needs to vocalize its support on three fronts:

1. Uphold publicly and unambiguously the custodianship of Jordan over the site.

The undermining of Hashemite control over the holy sites in Jerusalem directly affects King Abdullah II's ability to govern. If Abdullah can no longer enforce his custodianship of the holy sites of Jerusalem, his legitimacy as a ruler is compromised. King Abdullah recognizes the fragile state of his government, as popular protests have occurred in support of the Palestinians and calling for the cancelation of Jordan's peace treaty with Israel. In fact, for the first time since Jordan's war with Israel, calls from among East Bankers to establish an armed militia to act in support of the Haram al-Sharif are frequently made, given the government's inability to fend off Israeli advances.

Israel has a vested interest in the stability of Jordan. A collapse of the Jordanian government will de-stabilize one of the few remaining stable countries in the region. An unstable Jordan would find itself open to security threats from the so-called Islamic State (IS), which could spread to Israel from its eastern border. Refugees seeking safety in Jordan would overrun Israel, creating more problems beyond the ones it faces as a result of its occupation of Palestinian territory. From this perspective, Israel's interest should compel it to maintain the status quo of Haram al-Sharif, and bolster Jordan as its historical custodian.

2. Countering extremism and terrorism, regardless of its source.

Although the U.S. fights against Islamic extremism in the region, it does not denounce the violence committed by Jewish extremists. U.S. aid (official and private) to Israel funds the development of Jewish settlements on Palestinian occupied territory. If the U.S. wishes to appear more objective in its policy towards countering terrorism, it should add Jewish extremist groups like the "Temple Institute", the "Hilltop Youth" and the collection of Yitzhar settlers--who believe that they possess a biblical right to construct the third temple on the site housing the Dome of the Rock, and regularly commit price tag attacks on Palestinians--to the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database and freeze their assets. Ironically, these groups share the same apocalyptic vision that drives Muslim extremist groups, such as IS.

3. Call up on Israel to respect its international responsibilities as an occupying force.

In his last year in office, Obama could do well by reminding Israel of its obligations to uphold international law for the treatment of populations under occupation. Now that the Israeli army employs the practice of extrajudicial killings against Palestinian attackers, Israeli settlers adopted this policy by openly carrying guns and indiscriminately shooting Arabs. Even after the killing of Palestinians, Israeli authorities withhold the bodies of the deceased for extended periods of time. This practice continues even though the Jewish and Islamic faiths prescribe an expedient burial process immediately following a death. The Israelis should end this practice to restore a sense of dignity to the Palestinian populace and prevent further incitement of violence, keeping in mind that this time, the Palestinian response took shape from the grassroots level; no Palestinian leadership is in a position to restore order.

This article originally appeared in The Huffington Post.

     

 

 

Event Information

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a panel discussion on October 12, 2015 regarding Lebanon’s domestic political crisis, specifically in light of the recent You Stink protests. The panelists were Ali Hamade, journalist and editorialist for An-Nahar Arabic newspaper, and Ahmad Moussalli, professor in political science at American University of Beirut. BDC Director of Research Sultan Barakat moderated the event, which was attended by members of Qatar's diplomatic, academic, and media community.

Barakat opened the discussion by noting that Lebanon has had problems including the lack of adequate services for a long time, well before the war in Syria, but it was only in July that the You Stink movement took to the streets. He asked the panelists to explain why the protests started and whether there are links to the regional situation.

Hamade explained that Lebanon’s issues are plentiful, including electricity shortages, the squandering of water supplies, and the mismanagement of waste, which he blamed on “corruption at all levels, high and low.” Yet, Hamade continued, the Lebanese still failed to override the country’s sectarian fault lines, though civil society organizations have tried to spark broad-based protests, including after Lebanon’s parliament extended its own mandate. He said that the Lebanese finally woke up in June because of the garbage problem. Hamade described August 29 as being the first time in Lebanon’s history that there were huge demonstrations, without any political or sectarian affiliation, “to shout that enough is enough, we can no longer tolerate this sick reality the country is living in.” He concluded that there was not yet a satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon.

Moussalli then explained that the source of the protest movement “is very exact” and that Lebanese feel that something big is wrong, not only in the politics but in everything. “The garbage problem is just a sign, a bubble that exploded in the face of the government, proving that it can do nothing,” he added. Moussalli said the current movement is a surprise to everyone, and that its objective has the sympathy of the Lebanese people. He noted, however, that because this movement is not political or sectarian at its root, it threatens the private and public interests of all the political actors in the country, most of whom are corrupt. Moussalli pointed out that both March 8 and March 14, and specifically Michel Aoun, have tried and failed to contain or influence the movement. He concluded, “I salute these young people, and hope they succeed in rescuing us from sectarianism.”

Asked about the government’s response, specifically the national dialogue, Moussalli predicted that it “will lead to nothing” because the movement’s preconditions, including the electing of a president, have not been met. He explained that there is a deadlock between March 8, which has nominated General Aoun, and March 14, which has nominated Samir Geagea, and that the parliamentary mechanism to elect one is incorrect. Hamade added that in Lebanon, “the law is an opinion” and the written constitution is not being implemented. He argued that “we still have points of view governing the situation.” Moussalli agreed, stating that sectarianism is taking the country to a point where it cannot function. He cautioned that if things are left in the hands of Hezbollah, the Future Movement, and big-name leaders like Walid Joumblatt, the country will collapse.

Barakat then asked about what the movement is demanding and proposing. Hamade explained that the movement has even called for the fall of the regime, but that unlike in other Arab countries, what that means is unclear. He added that there have also been demands for parliamentary and presidential elections and the resignation of certain ministers, but the issue of garbage collection and other services tops the list. Hamade said the movement has contributed to awakening the people, but it still has a long road before it. He argued that media coverage is giving the movement influence, but that a party leader could call 100,000 followers to the street tomorrow, risking a confrontation.

Moussalli said the dangerous part of this movement is that people are threatening the ruling power, both Hezbollah and the Future Movement, and they have not been willing to compromise, even rejecting a meeting with Prime Minister Tammam Salam. He reiterated that the demands of the people are righteous and people sympathize with them. Hamade noted that the political parties accuse each other of being agents of foreign powers, but at the end of the day they sit and negotiate, and Moussalli asserted that there are not any real differences between them, as both are corrupt.

Dissecting the You Stink movement further, Hamade stated that it was stronger initially because it accused everyone without fear, but now it is afraid of being threatened. He suggested that the protestors targeted the minister of environment because he does not have a powerful patron, and that they would not do the same at ministries controlled by Hezbollah or Joumblatt due to the risk of backlash. Moussalli predicted that there would be a countermovement soon and that the You Stink movement cannot go any higher because some people think it is supported by the Americans or others, so there is fear that it will push Lebanon into more trouble. Barakat asked if it would be possible to nationalize the basic services, but Hamade said it was not at all feasible.

In response to questions from the audience, Hamade cautioned that the last time Lebanon tried to revamp its political system it ended up with civil war, and noted the Lebanese are all armed. Moussalli added that there has not been total collapse because the only thing the political class is united on is the system continuing. He asserted that the consensus system will go nowhere because power sharing along sectarian lines will not succeed. Moussalli warned, “If you do not change the meaning of citizenship, we are heading toward new explosions.”

Regarding the Russian intervention in Syria, Hamade opined that it is not in the interest of Lebanon. He explained that Lebanese are divided over the Syrian conflict, but there is agreement on avoiding confrontations that could lead to another civil war. Concluding the event, Moussalli said that American weakness and indecisiveness in the region, along with a policy of dismantling regimes, is what created the situation in Syria.

Video

• Lebanon's Deepening Domestic Crisis

     

 

 

It is never a good idea to fight a war based on pride and without either the moral justification to sustain popular support or a clear set of achievable goals. Unfortunately, the Middle East has become best known for “wars of confusion.” From the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 to the multifaceted fight against the Islamic State (or ISIS) today, wars are often launched as knee-jerk reactions based mostly on pride and misguided intelligence. The resulting confusion inevitably creates flames that sooner or later engulf all involved (albeit to various degrees). The latest example of this phenomenon is the war in Yemen.

Haste costs lives

The loss of 52 Emirati, 10 Saudi, 5 Bahraini, and 4 Yemeni soldiers at a military base in Marib province on September 4 serves as a harsh reminder of the real costs of war as the anti-Houthi coalition shifts gears from an air campaign to committing ground troops. For the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it was the most significant loss of troops since the country gained its independence in the 1970s. The tangible cost of human lives has now been felt by the UAE and the Arab alliance as a whole. It is certainly felt by the families of those soldiers, who must be asking why their children had to lose their lives in central Yemen and how many more might be sacrificed in the midst of this confusion.

Although President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government initially claimed that the deaths were the result of an accidental explosion of "badly stored munitions," it has now become clear that the explosion was caused by a surface-to-surface missile hitting the munitions depot. However, rather than pausing to reevaluate, the coalition—clearly driven by pride—is rashly dumping in more troops. Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, asserted his country’s resolve to fight until it prevails, and Qatar has committed 1,000 ground troops. 

These moves only compound the coalition’s initial mistake of advancing from Aden prematurely. By moving out of the southern port of Aden so soon after forcing the withdrawal of the Houthi and Saleh militias and without consolidating a system of governance there, the coalition took an enormous risk given its lack of counterinsurgency experience. The arrival of Yemeni Vice President and Prime Minister Khaled Bahah to Aden last week after months of exile may be too little, too late. 

Warnings for the coalition

In such times of confusion, it is the moral responsibility of the Arab coalition’s friends to give candid and strategic advice based on a careful analysis of the circumstances on the ground and the history of conflict, both in Yemen and the region at large, to help them avoid being consumed by the flames of pride. Currently, the coalition risks the following:

Falling into the North/South fault line. The recovery of Aden a few weeks ago from the hands of the Houthis has given Southern separatists renewed hope that this is a war of “liberation” from the North, rather than a campaign to restore the legitimacy of a national unity government. Even though the Saudi king and President Obama were quick to point out that they are in agreement on the imperative of a united Yemen, the conflict is undoubtedly turning into a civil war between the South and the North. 

Soon, Northern anti-Houthi leaders such as General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Abdul Majid Zindani will find themselves facing important dilemmas: by continuing to weaken the Houthis and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, they are in effect strengthening the hand of Southern separatists. The longer the war continues, the more concrete the line of division will become. While Southern separatists seem to have (for now) forgiven Hadi for deserting them in support of Saleh in the mid-1990s, Northerners are less likely to pardon his more recent abuse of power and parliamentarian manipulation. 

The concern for the coalition is that they may soon find themselves occupying a North-South fault line and end up being targeted by the very people they are currently empowering. The coalition may not have experienced this before, but it is a certain outcome of such conflicts, particularly in a political culture where alliances of convenience are the norm. 

Being bled slowly in Yemen. Although one can argue over the extent to which the Iranian threat to the Gulf states is real or imagined, the Saudi-led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm in March to stop Iran from turning Yemen into another Iraq, where it enjoys significant sway over the government and can pressure its Gulf neighbors. 

However, by deploying ground troops in such a fashion in Yemen, the coalition has blindly made itself vulnerable to the tactics at which Iran excels. While there has been little evidence of Iranian supplying weapons and fighters to the Houthis so far, the September 4 strike undoubtedly opened the eyes of those unsavory elements of Iran’s multiverse regime to the opportunity that is fast-developing to bleed the Gulf countries in Yemen, just as they did with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. The coalition must be reminded of how skillful and adaptable those elements of the Iranian government are at fanning flames.

Further exposing their internal fronts. So far, the UAE and Qatar have been particularly successful in foiling al-Qaida and other terrorist groups’ attempts to carry out large scale terrorist attacks in their cities, but pursuing this campaign in Yemen is likely to make that effort harder. The coalition’s excessive and indiscriminate airstrikes are sure to be used by extremists as a recruiting tool, and the dismantling of the state leaves them with more room to operate. Coalition troops face threats from al-Qaida and other militants on the ground in Yemen just as the participating countries put their homelands and citizens more firmly in those groups’ crosshairs. Whatever the Gulf countries do in Yemen, they must not let down their guard domestically.

The answer to the challenge of Yemen

Pride makes it hard to see clearly through the flames, and drives one into further wrong decisions. As the anti-Houthi coalition advances on Sanaa and faces the risk of further significant casualties, it would be prudent for its leaders to take a step back and make some hard choices. 

First, the blind support of Hadi as president has got to be questioned, both on the grounds of his record and on his ability to maintain a workable level of legitimacy among Yemenis to hold the country together and avoid a separation. 

The solution to the challenge of Yemen remains a genuine offer to its people of future membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

It is also time to admit that the Houthis constitute an important, nationally-rooted segment of Yemeni society that has legitimate grievances and cannot be defeated by outside intervention. As such, there is no alternative to a political process. The pride-driven assumption that ground troops will change the balance of power and force the Houthis into concessions could not be further from the truth, especially now that the coalition forces have proven to be vulnerable. 

The solution to the challenge of Yemen remains a genuine offer to its people of future membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This would invert the pyramid of power in the relationships between the Gulf states and Yemen and give voice to the millions of Yemenis at the bottom of the pyramid, many of whom have family living and working in GCC countries already and share the aspiration of one day belonging to a prosperous regional structure. The concrete prospect of joining the GCC would work wonders in terms of driving forward constructive local politics, much as the prospect of joining the EU encouraged the Balkan countries to pursue alternatives to civil strife and local petty politics. This, in the long run, is the best path to sustainable peace in the country.

     

 

 

Half of Syria’s population has been forced to flee its homes and is displaced either within Syria’s war-ravaged territory or abroad. As is now widely acknowledged, Europe shamefully attempted—after spending decades lecturing countries in the Middle East on refugee rights—to shirk its responsibility to help those refugees even once they arrived tired, hungry, and scared.

But thanks to pressure from social media, the press, celebrities, and aid agencies, that situation has begun to change. The European Commission is proposing to accept 120,000 Syrian refugees over the coming two years, with most going to places like Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Truthfully, Europe will probably need to quietly take far more refugees than that in the coming months and years.

It will be critical for the EU—and other refugee-accepting countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia—not only to pay attention to the numbers of refugees but also to their needs and varied circumstances. After all, many of those reaching Europe are destitute and weary, but so are the hundreds of thousands of sick and elderly refugees in places like Jordan and Lebanon who are unable to make the journey and whose suffering goes unheralded by the media and celebrity YouTube videos.

Specific provisions must be put in place to help refugees with chronic health conditions and those requiring major medical treatments to reach Europe and gain the help they need. The United Nations, in partnership with refugee-accepting nations, should step in to ensure that refugee families headed by women with large numbers of young children—which also may be unable to make it to Europe—are also enabled to reach more prosperous host countries.

Not a beautiful day in the neighborhood

Of course all of this attention to refugees in Europe must not distract from a more basic fact: that nearly all Syrian refugees are not in Hungary or Germany but, instead, are in countries that neighbor Syria. Many aid workers and refugees are concerned that the renewed focus on Europe will pull attention and resources away from countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, which together host more than 4 million displaced Syrians.

If this were to happen, it would only exacerbate mounting funding problems for the refugee response. The United Nations has only received 37 percent of the funds needed to support Syrian refugees in 2015. This has real, tangible effects. The value of food vouchers the World Food Programme provides to each Syrian refugee in Lebanon each month, for instance, has fallen from $30 to only $13.50, despite the fact that each refugee needs roughly $50 worth of food per month to get by. The aid cuts are also evident in Jordan and across the region.

These aid shortfalls mean that families will go hungry, that young children will be forced to leave school and take menial jobs, that young girls will be pressured into “early marriages,” and that spending on health and education will fall by the wayside. More Syrian refugees will, as a result of inadequate assistance in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere, head for Europe.

Supporting Syrian refugees in the Middle East—and supporting the host communities and governments in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, in particular—cannot become a second-tier priority. If anything, donor governments around the world need to do far more to finance food, healthcare, education, and shelter for refugees in these countries, and for those Syrians who remain in Syria. 

Paying their share

This is one area where the oil-rich Gulf states have a major role to play.

While all able countries, including Israel, have a moral obligation to support refugees and those affected by global catastrophes, all countries do not necessarily have to contribute in the same way. In the case of the Gulf states, they have opted to provide large-scale humanitarian contributions in lieu of hosting refugees. This not only represents political and security realities in the region (as discussed below) but also the basic fact that Syrian refugees have demonstrated little interest in heading southward down the Arabian Peninsula.

Countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are unwilling to accept more than a token number of refugees beyond those that they have already let in as part of their support to the Syrian opposition. These countries’ tiny populations renders them uncomfortable about hosting large numbers of inevitably long-term refugees, particularly given their already sky-high levels of unemployment (e.g., at 29 percent in Saudi Arabia) and their direct involvement in the conflict. There is little to gain in chastising them for this basic political reality. Instead, the media and international community must push the Arab Gulf to continue supporting assistance to Syrian refugees elsewhere in the region.

Since 2012, the United Nations reports that the tiny nation of Kuwait has provided nearly $1 billion in humanitarian aid to Syria and the main refugee-hosting countries. Saudi Arabia (with $586 million), the United Arab Emirates ($405 million), and Qatar ($236 million) have likewise contributed. Those are huge sums relative to the size of population in these countries and their economies. It will be important that they maintain and, wherever possible, increase these contributions.

Turning off the spigot

Lastly, it’s important for countries in the region, in Europe, and beyond to increase their efforts to end the war in Syria and, thus, stopping the flow of refugees. Aid, for all its value, does not end wars. Diplomats, backed up by the use of threat of military force, are the only ones capable of taking on this herculean task.

Yet U.N.-led mediation efforts have thus far been lacklustre and fragmented. Russia and Iran continue to support the government of Bashar Assad while most Western countries back anti-Assad rebels with what amounts to relatively negligible support, in the grand scheme of things. It’s a recipe for stalemate and continued waves of refugees, particularly given that international attention is now primarily focused on the self-proclaimed Islamic State.

Despite these challenges, the only real solution to the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe and the region will require a messy, unpopular, costly, and closely-monitored political settlement. In the long run, deploying peacekeepers to help create safe havens within Syria, implementing a peace agreement, and providing vast amounts of aid to rebuild relatively stable parts of Syria will save Europe money and help them re-gain their eroding moral authority.