Brookings Experts - Pavel K. Baev

The limits of authoritarian compatibility: Xi’s China and Putin’s Russia

Pavel K Baev — Mon, 15 Jun 2020 13:45:55 +0000

By Pavel K Baev

Executive Summary

China and Russia are two key revisionist challengers for U.S. positions in the world, but maturing authoritarian tendencies in their regimes do not make them natural allies. Many parochial features determine profound differences in China’s and Russia’s strategic agendas, and the heavy impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated hidden tensions and accentuated mutual mistrust. U.S. policymakers should not therefore assume the need to counter their emerging military alliance, but could rather aim at exploiting their disagreements.

China is a rising power and focuses on a return to the growth trajectory after the sharp spasm caused by the pandemic, while Russia may sink into another deep crisis, so its leadership is compelled to engage in revisionism from the position of weakness. The deep cultural differences between the most influential elite groups in China and Russia impede cooperative initiatives, and structural corruption inherent to both regimes does not provide for better connectivity. China is emerging as a cyber superpower and shows reasonable restraint in deploying this strength, while Russia experiments with using its limited cyber capabilities recklessly. The particular “friendship” between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin cannot provide a reliable foundation for further upgrades in the partnership. China is much more interested in sorting out its trade and economic issues with the United States than in backing Russia, which is stuck in an essentially unwinnable confrontation with the West. Russia is not able to provide any support to China in the trade wars and expects a steady aggravation of U.S.- China relations, seeing in this global conflict its only chance for escaping from the tight corner of unequal face-off with NATO. Both regimes performed poorly in dealing with the COVID-19 threat, but Russia, facing a deepening domestic crisis, may decide to challenge the West yet further in order to stimulate a mobilization of “patriotic” support for Putin’s leadership. China, instead of helping its overstretched and troubled neighbor, may opt to take advantage of this calamity.

The imperatives and limitations of Putin’s rational choices

Pavel K Baev — Tue, 28 Apr 2020 13:52:39 +0000

By Pavel K Baev

Severe and unexpected challenges generated by the COVID-19 pandemic force politicians, whether democratically elected or autocratically inclined, to make tough and unpopular choices.

Russia is now one of the most affected countries, and President Vladimir Putin is compelled to abandon his recently reconfigured political agenda and take a sequence of decisions that he would rather not. He has shown uncharacteristic rationality in making these choices — for instance, the re-negotiated OPEC+ deal on oil production cuts is an example of a really painful compromise, and the pattern is growing. Will this unprecedented crisis continue to necessitate progressively more rational choices?

Bowing to force majeure

At the start of the year, Putin was moving decisively to push a package of amendments to Russia’s constitution, reshuffling the government, and resolutely withdrawing from the oil agreement with Saudi Arabia. Russia was spared the early wave of the pandemic, and it was only in late March that the scope of the unfolding disaster started to dawn on the Kremlin. Avoiding harsh words like “quarantine,” Putin announced a “work-free week,” which was then extended to last a month, and supported the enforcement of lockdown by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin. Putin indefinitely postponed the planned public vote on the constitutional amendments, then the spring draft into the army (albeit only for a month), and finally, the pompous Victory Day parade. The fierce propaganda campaign on the “true history” of World War II was discontinued, and who knows whether Putin has been spending his self-isolation writing his promised article on the causes of that war.

Some common traits can be discerned in this progression of common-sense moves. They invariably came at the last possible moment — in fact, the preparations for the parade were cancelled only after dozens of young naval cadets involved in rehearsals contracted the coronavirus. Putin tried to push responsibility for the difficult decisions to his subordinates or regional governors, so that the measures came out tentative, uncoordinated, and ineffective. The Russian ruler is visibly uncomfortable making belated concessions to irresistible force — something even he cannot mask, in spite of his usually polished image.

Rescuing arms control?

In his 2020 annual address to the Federal Assembly, delivered in January rather than in the spring as usual, Putin refrained from boasting about Russia’s “wonder-weapons,” as he did on two previous occasions. Russian negotiators have persistently signaled readiness to engage in talks on strategic stability and to include new weapons systems, like the hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard, into traditional limitations. Moscow is clearly unhappy about the fast-approaching expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), but understands the plain impossibility of engaging China in any nuclear arms control formats — something President Trump has advocated. It is definitely too late now to revive the broken Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but it is possible for Russia to commit to delivering unilaterally to the New START obligations beyond February 2021.

Such an initiative might appear too bold, but it fits within the boundaries of rational choice. Russia cannot possibly increase its number of warheads and delivery systems beyond the present ceilings, and has no reasons to worry about an increase of the U.S. arsenal, since none is in the cards. Supplying data on the inventory (as it was done in March 2020) isn’t really a problem for Moscow, since this information is very general. Washington may not reciprocate, but an option for a new “reset” would be reserved for after the U.S. election in November.

Outflanking sanctions?

At the virtual G-20 conference in late March, Putin’s key contribution was to suggest relaxing sanctions regimes around the world because of the need to enhance cooperation in the struggle against the COVID-19 pandemic. The issue of gaining relief from Western and particularly U.S. sanctions has long been high on his agenda, and Russian think tanks have been monitoring (and downplaying) the domestic impact of sanctions with keen attention. The odd transaction involving transferring Rosneft assets in Venezuela to a state-owned shell company was intended to rescue the corporation from punishing U.S. sanctions.

The European Union (EU) has signaled its resolve to maintain sanctions, but Putin may take a bold step and announce the lifting of counter-sanctions that currently ban the import of agricultural products and some consumer goods from the Western states that enforce sanctions against Russia. (South Korea and Switzerland do not, and Russia also abstains from any bans.)

Many Russian economists point out that the government’s anti-crisis measures so far are not enough to compensate for the sharp contraction of incomes in the unfolding recession. The counter-sanctions have never been effective at hurting EU producers and caused many food products to become over-priced, but Putin has remained adamant about reciprocating what he considers to be illegitimate Western trade and investment restrictions. In the current situation, however, unilaterally cancelling the EU’s “punishment” could be spun not as a concession but as an offer of reconciliation. Such a move would have an extra twist of playing into the hands of those European politicians who advocate re-engaging with Russia.

Escaping from the Syrian trap?

The compromise agreement with Turkey on the cease-fire in Syria’s rebel-controlled Idlib province, which had been under siege from Bashar Assad’s forces, was one of the first rational choices Putin made this spring. The hostilities have remained under control, and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made a trip to Damascus, defying the coronavirus risks, in order to impress upon the Syrian regime the imperative of sticking to the terms of the deal, in which they had no say. A new offensive is unlikely at the moment, as the Syrian army is forced to demobilize many conscripts due to the epidemic.

Security risks of a different kind are at the forefront because of Iran’s deep cuts in support for the Assad regime. Iran is among the countries worst hit by COVID-19, its oil revenues have dried out, and its economic crisis is aggravated by U.S. sanctions. Iran cannot possibly continue investing in Syria’s military build-up in the same way that it has for years, and Russia cannot provide resources sufficient for ensuring regime stability. The victory that Damascus very nearly achieved can fast degenerate into chaos, much the same way that the relative stability in Lebanon quickly collapsed into angry street protests and sovereign debt default.

Facing such deterioration, Putin could order a withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria for real, after several false starts. It would be a major geopolitical retreat, but one that may meet public approval in Russia, where attitudes have turned sour about the costly and deadlocked intervention. The Kremlin has stopped worrying about the course of the Libyan war, where Turkey keeps expanding its engagement. The stakes in Syria are certainly much higher, but so are the costs and risks to Russia’s security interests.

Damned if he does…

Putin — like leaders around the world — faces an unfathomable crisis. His authority is compromised by indecisiveness, and the costs of his habitual procrastination have multiplied amid the complex interplay of public health and economic crises. He has been forced, for now, to abandon his most cherished ambition of prolonging his term in office. Although he has made a number of rational choices in recent months, it’s unlikely that he’ll continue to make them. It is not that the Kremlin tends to fall back on common sense only when all other options are exhausted; it is rather that autocrats operate on a peculiar mix of bureaucratic logic and survival instinct. Their cost-benefit calculations are typically distorted by oscillating variables of fears, idiosyncrasies, and greed.

The Kremlin courtiers excel at exploiting these weaknesses, so it is easier to see Putin going back to his bullying self, with their backing, than to expect him to curtail his ambitions and sacrifice pet projects. Bullying comes naturally to him, while admitting mistakes (like on counter-sanctions) is entirely out of character. So in the turmoil of the evolving crisis, he will be looking for opportunities to project power in Russia’s neighborhood, hoping to launch a “patriotic” mobilization that could allow him to cut his losses, for instance in Syria. Decisionmaking in Moscow is set to remain spasmodic, but a painful reckoning with fewer capabilities and more limitations could still prevail over denials.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – October 2019

Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:38:07 +0000

Welcome to the fifth edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted October 8-11, 2019. The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous three calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

July 1: Iran exceeded limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the first time since the deal’s signing.
July 2: Following protracted negotiations, the European Council proposed a slate of new EU leaders to take office on November 1: German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission president, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel as president of the European Council, Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister Josep Borrell as high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, and International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde as president of the European Central Bank.
July 2: The United States announced that it was considering imposing tariffs on an additional $4 billion a year worth of EU imports, in addition to a $21 billion a year list announced in April, if the World Trade Organization approves tariffs over European Airbus subsidies.
July 3: David Sassoli of Italy’s center-left Democratic Party was elected president of the European Parliament by MEPs.
July 4: Off the coast of Gibraltar, U.K. troops and the Gibraltarian police seized an Iranian tanker suspected of carrying oil to Syria. Tehran called the seizure “illegal,” while the British stood by their enforcement of EU sanctions against Syria.
July 5: The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority halted Amazon’s $575 million investment into London-based food delivery company Deliveroo by opening an investigation into the investment’s impact on competition.
July 7: Iran announced that it would breach the 3.67% uranium enrichment limit set by the JCPOA.
July 7: Kyriakos Mitsotakis and his center-right party New Democracy defeated Greek Prime Minister Alex Tsipras and his left-wing Syriza in snap parliamentary elections, winning nearly 40% of the vote to Syriza’s 31.5%.
July 7: A series of leaked diplomatic cables and memos revealed that Kim Darroch, the U.K. Ambassador to the United States, had described the Trump administration as “inept” and “uniquely dysfunctional.” President Trump responded on July 8 that “we will no longer deal with” Darroch.
July 8: The German government said that it would not deploy ground troops to Syria in the fight against the Islamic State as U.S. troops partially withdraw, despite a U.S. request.
July 8: Philippe Étienne presented his credentials to President Trump as French Ambassador to the United States.
July 9: U.K. Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn suggested his party would vote “remain” in the event of a second Brexit referendum, writing to party members, “Whoever becomes the new prime minister should have the confidence to put their deal, or no deal, back to the people in a public vote. In those circumstances …. Labour would campaign for remain against either no deal or a Tory deal that does not protect the economy and jobs.”
July 9: France and the United Kingdom agreed to deploy additional troops to Syria as U.S. troops partially withdraw.
July 10: Ambassador Darroch resigned following President Trump’s criticism as well as a lack of support from Boris Johnson, the favorite to replace Theresa May as Conservative Party leader and U.K. prime minister, in a debate against Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt.
July 10: In an emergency International Atomic Energy Agency meeting, U.S. Representative Jackie Wolcott accused Iran of engaging in “brinkmanship” and “nuclear extortion.” Later that day, President Trump tweeted that the United States would increase sanctions against Iran in response to the country’s “total violation” of the deal.
July 10: BuzzFeed News published an audio recording apparently featuring Gianluca Savoini, a close ally of Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, soliciting illicit funding for their far-right League party from three Russians. Salvini denied knowledge of the meeting. Italian prosecutors opened an investigation into the matter.
July 11: The French parliament approved a controversial tax on tech companies, imposing a 3% tax on annual revenues of major firms providing digital services to French consumers.
July 12: Turkey began receiving parts of the Russian S-400 air defense system, defying warnings from the United States of the negative impact on NATO and bilateral relations.
July 15: EU foreign ministers decided that Iran’s breaches of the JCPOA were reversible and not serious enough to trigger the deal’s dispute mechanism.
July 15: The EU decided to reduce its financial assistance to Turkey, break off high-level talks, and suspend negotiations on an aviation deal in response to Turkey’s drilling for gas off Cyprus. The Turkish foreign ministry said the EU’s decisions would not affect Ankara’s activities in the region.
July 16: The European Parliament confirmed German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen as the future president of the European Commission. In a secret ballot, Von der Leyen only received nine more votes than the 374 needed, with Poland’s Euroskeptic ruling party Law and Justice announcing its support for her just before the vote.
July 16: French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire stated that France would not change its plans to tax tech companies despite U.S. threats of tariffs and legal action.
July 17: Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the leader of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union party, replaced Ursula von der Leyen as German defense minister.
July 17: The European Commission opened an antitrust investigation to assess whether Amazon’s use of independent retailers’ data breaches EU competition rules.
July 17: In response to the delivery of S-400 components, the U.S. removed Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet production consortium and canceled Ankara’s planned purchase of 100 F-35s.
July 19: Iran seized a British-flagged oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. U.K. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt described the act as “state piracy” and called for a “European-led maritime protection mission to support safe passage of both crew and cargo in this vital region.”
July 19: Chancellor Merkel criticized President Trump telling four congresswomen to “go back” to their countries, saying that his statement “contradicts the strength of America.” Prime Minister May also stated that she “strongly condemned” Trump’s remarks, which she deemed “completely unacceptable.”
July 22: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s party Servant of the People won an absolute majority in parliamentary elections.
July 22: The U.K.’s Liberal Democrats elected Jo Swinson as the party’s new leader. She is the first woman to lead the party.
July 23: The U.S. Senate confirmed Mark Esper as Secretary of Defense. The position had been vacant since James Mattis’s exit on January 1, with Patrick Shanahan and then Esper serving as acting secretary.
July 24: Boris Johnson became the new U.K. Prime Minister after defeating Foreign Secretary Hunt in the final round of an election to lead the Conservative Party. In a speech, Johnson promised that Britain would leave the European Union by October 31, with or without a deal. He also promised to improve the economy, infrastructure, education, and to restore trust in democracy. Several cabinet ministers, including Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond, resigned in response to Johnson’s election; another 11 were fired by the new prime minister.
July 24: Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who led the investigation into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, whether individuals associated with the Trump campaign coordinated with the Russian government, and President Trump’s actions towards the investigations into these matters, testified before the U.S. House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees.
July 25: Ukraine seized a Russian tanker that was allegedly complicit in Russia’s seizure of three Ukrainian vessels and detention of their crews in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. The Russian tanker’s crew was released.
July 25: In a phone call, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told Prime Minister Johnson that the EU would not renegotiate the Brexit deal, and that the current agreement was the “best and only agreement possible.”
July 25: President Trump spoke on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, asking Zelenskiy to investigate former vice president and current presidential candidate Joe Biden and his son Hunter Biden, as well as the roots of the investigation into Trump’s links to Russia. Trump had put a hold on military aid to Ukraine one week prior. The call drew alarm among White House staff and led to an August 12 complaint to Congress by an intelligence community whistleblower. The complaint’s transmission was delayed but would have a major political impact by late September.
July 25: President Trump demanded that Sweden release American rapper A$AP Rocky, who had been arrested and charged with assault. The musician was released from custody a week later and was convicted and given a suspended sentence later in August.
July 27: Moscow police arrested over 1,300 protesters at a demonstration in response to several opposition politicians being barred from running in Moscow’s city council election.
July 29: Prime Minister Johnson’s spokesman suggested that the British leader wouldn’t hold talks with EU leaders until they agreed to scrap the Irish backstop in the Brexit withdrawal deal. Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar refused Johnson’s demand.
July 30: French Agriculture Minister Didier Guillaume criticized President Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on French wine in response to France’s recently introduced digital tax. He encouraged dialogue and negotiation instead.
July 31: Germany declined the United States’ request to join a U.S.-led naval security mission in the Persian Gulf. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that Germany did not want to see a military escalation and disagreed with President Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy. U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell criticized Germany’s refusal. According to French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, France, Britain, and Germany were working on a “mission for monitoring and observing maritime security in the Gulf.”
July 31: The Hungarian government responded to criticism it has received for allowing the transit of Russian military vehicles through its airspace, in violation of EU sanctions. A government spokesman said the shipment, which comprised armored patrol vehicles traveling to Serbia as part of a military assistance package, was allowed to travel through Hungarian airspace because the goods were being transported in a civilian plane. Romania had initially blocked the shipment.
August 2: The United States withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty after accusing Russia of violating the terms of the agreement. The INF Treaty banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. NATO supported the U.S. withdrawal, declaring “Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty.”
August 2: The U.K.’s Liberal Democrats won a byelection in Wales, reducing the Conservative Party’s majority to a single Member of Parliament.
August 6: U.S. Ambassador to Russia and former Utah Governor Jon Huntsman announced his resignation, effective in October.
August 6: President Trump met with British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab in Washington.
August 7: The Italian Senate rejected the Five Star Movement’s motion to block the construction of a high-speed rail link between Turin and Lyon. League leader Matteo Salvini subsequently signaled the end of the coalition with the Five Star-League coalition.
August 16: Reports revealed that President Trump had asked his advisors if the United States could purchase Greenland, an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland’s foreign affairs ministry tweeted in response, “We’re open for business, not for sale.”
August 20: Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte announced his resignation, preempting a vote of no confidence and bringing the Five Star-League populist coalition government to an end after nearly 15 months. An alternative governing coalition between the Five Star Movement and the center-left Democratic Party began to form.
August 20: President Trump announced via Twitter that he was cancelling a September trip to Denmark because Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen had said she was not interested in discussing the sale of Greenland. Trump and Frederiksen spoke on the phone two days later.
August 20: President Trump met with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis at the White House.
August 24-26: President Macron hosted the G-7 Summit in Biarritz. Key issues under discussion included potential U.S.-Iran negotiations, fires in the Amazon rainforest, and trade. President Trump pushed inviting Russia to return to the group, from which it was expelled after occupying Ukrainian territory, but others rejected the suggestion. Macron announced plans for a “Normandy Four” summit between Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France, aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Such a summit did not take place in September as intended by Macron, but talks continue and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy announced an agreement towards a settlement on October 1.
August 28: Prime Minister Johnson suspended Parliament from September 10 to October 14. The suspension was perceived as a tactic to limit Parliament’s ability to constrain the government on Brexit.
August 29: Italian President Sergio Mattarella gave Prime Minister Conte a mandate to form a new government coalition between the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party.
August 30: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named Matthew Palmer as Special Representative for the Western Balkans. Palmer will also continue to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.
September 1: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence visited Poland and gave remarks at a commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, after President Trump canceled a state visit to monitor Hurricane Dorian. Pence met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy following the ceremony.
September 1: In closely-watched elections in east Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany gained ground but fell short of winning a state for the first time, coming in second to Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrats in Saxony (32.1% to 27.5%) and to the Social Democrats in Brandenburg (26.2% to 23.5%).
September 2-3: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Brussels and met with incoming EU leaders Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell, and Charles Michel, as well as David Sassoli, the president of the European Parliament.
September 3: The U.K. Parliament passed a bill blocking a no-deal Brexit. In response, Prime Minister Johnson expelled 21 Conservative MPs who defied the government to vote in favor of the bill, including eight former ministers, from the party. Johnson had already lost his one-seat governing majority with the defection of one member to the Liberal Democrats earlier in the day.
September 3: U.S. Vice President Pence visited Ireland and met with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar as well as Foreign Minister Simon Coveney. Pence was criticized for staying at a Trump resort in Doonbeg, across the country from Dublin on the Atlantic coast.
September 4: Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte announced his new cabinet, with Five Star Movement leader Luigi Di Maio as foreign minister.
September 4: U.S. Vice President Pence visited Iceland and met with President Guðni Th. Jóhannesson and Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir.
September 4-6: U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper travelled to Stuttgart, Paris, and London.
September 5: U.S. Vice President Pence visited the U.K. and met with Prime Minister Johnson. Separately the same day, Prime Minister Johnson publicly stated that he’d “rather be dead in a ditch” than ask the EU for another extension to Brexit.
September 5: The U.S. State Department publicly designated Liviu Dragnea, the leader of Romania’s governing Social Democratic Party (PSD), for “significant corruption.” The designation rendered Dragnea, who is currently serving a prison sentence in Romania, ineligible for entry into the United States.
September 5: The United States and Poland released a joint declaration on 5G.
September 9: The chairs of the U.S. House Committees on Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Oversight and Reform wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and to the White House counsel expressing concern that “a growing public record indicates that, for nearly two years, the President and his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, appear to have acted outside legitimate law enforcement and diplomatic channels to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing two politically-motivated investigations under the guise of anti-corruption activity,” and requesting relevant documents.
September 10: President Trump parted ways with John Bolton, his hawkish national security advisor, with conflicting accounts of whether Bolton was fired or resigned.
September 10: President-elect of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced the proposed members and structure of the next Commission.
September 10: President Erdoğan announced a plan to resettle over 1 million Syrian refugees in a “safe zone” in northern Syria, threatening that if the plan does not receive international support Turkey “will have to open the gates” to Europe.
September 11: The Trump administration lifted its hold on military aid to Ukraine.
September 12: The European Central Bank cut interest rates and approved bond purchases of 20 billion euros a month from November to stimulate the eurozone economy.
September 14: A World Trade Organization dispute settlement panel reportedly allowed the United States to impose punitive tariffs on the EU for its subsidies to Airbus, ending a decades-long dispute. The decision was published October 2 and allowed U.S. tariffs of up to $7.5 million annually.
September 18: Outgoing European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg, warning “the risk of a no-deal [Brexit] is very real.” The parliament passed a resolution calling for a third extension to the Brexit deadline.
September 18: Robert O’Brien, formerly the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, was sworn in as President Trump’s fourth national security advisor in 33 months.
September 18: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence spoke on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
September 23: Spain’s parliament dissolved, triggering a November 10 election, after months of failed efforts to form a government based on the results of April’s elections.
September 23: In a joint statement at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, Prime Minister Johnson, President Macron, and Chancellor Merkel said “it is clear for us that Iran bears responsibility” for the September 14 attack on oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, backing the U.S. assessment. They stressed diplomacy to de-escalate tensions and declared “the time has come for Iran to accept negotiation on a long-term framework for its nuclear programme as well as on issues related to regional security.”
September 23: In New York for UNGA, President Trump and Polish President Andrzej Duda signed a “Joint Declaration on Advancing Defense Cooperation” building on an earlier agreement from June 2019 and specifying locations for an increased U.S. military presence in Poland.
September 24: The U.K. Supreme Court ruled that Prime Minister Johnson acted unlawfully and abused his executive power in suspending Parliament. Parliament returned the next day.
September 24: Following further reporting on the substance of the intelligence community whistleblower’s complaint against President Trump, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi announced that the House would launch an impeachment inquiry against President Trump.
September 24: The General Debate opened at UNGA. President Trump gave a nationalist speech, arguing “The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots.” President Macron urged the United States and Iran to resume negotiations.
September 25: A memorandum of the July 25 call between President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was published. The same day, the two presidents met for the first time in New York and took questions.
September 26: The whistleblower’s complaint was published by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
September 27: Kurt Volker, the U.S. State Department’s special envoy for Ukraine who was involved in the scandal, resigned ahead of giving testimony to Congressional investigators.
September 29: Former Chancellor Sebastian Kurz’s Austrian People’s Party won Austria’s parliamentary elections with 37 percent of the vote. Kurz’s previous government collapsed in May over a scandal involving his far-right coalition partner the Freedom Party, and he will need to a coalition partner to form a new government.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders.

Between July 1 and September 30, 2019, President Trump spoke on the phone with U.K. Prime Minister Johnson three times (July 26, August 2, August 19), French President Macron twice (August 20, September 5), Danish Prime Minister Fredericksen once (August 22), Swedish Prime Minister Löfven once (July 20), Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis once (July 9), Russian President Putin once (August 1), and Ukrainian President Zelenskiy once (July 25). He did not speak with Turkish President Erdoğan in that time frame, but they spoke on the phone on October 6 and October 18, 2019. President Trump last spoke on the phone with German Chancellor Merkel on March 22, 2019.

We track Trump’s phone calls with the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, whether they have spoken or not, as well as other calls with European leaders of which we are aware. The White House stopped releasing readouts of the president’s calls with foreign leaders in July 2018. If we’ve missed a conversation, please give us a ring. Source: whitehouse.gov, elysee.fr, bundeskanzlerin.de, gov.uk, en.kremlin.ru, tccb.gov.tr/en, press reports.

Figures

A decade since the start of the euro crisis

October 2019 marks the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the eurozone crisis, when George Papandreou took office as Greek prime minister and revealed the true state of the country’s public finances. Following the economic shock of the global financial crisis, the ability of several eurozone member states to repay their sovereign debt was called into question. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus required external assistance. The lack of fiscal union in the Eurozone hampered the ability for European leaders to respond. While the EU created mechanisms like the European Stability Mechanism in responding to the crisis, many economists have predicted that the eurozone is still not strong enough to withstand the next crisis and argue further reform is needed.

The contours of the crisis are evident from both the GDP growth and ratio of sovereign debt to GDP of key European member states. Eurozone GDP contracted by 4.5% in 2009, and the Greek economy continued to slide until 2011, when its GDP contracted by 9.1% and its sovereign debt reached 172.1% of GDP. The spread of the crisis to larger nations like Spain and Italy, the eurozone’s fourth- and third-largest economies, is evident in 2011 and 2012. In 2012, the eurozone as a whole contracted by 0.9% while Italy contracted by 2.8%. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s July 2012 statement that the bank was “ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” was widely credited with calming the markets.

Slow economic recovery, however, became evident in 2014 as countries like Ireland, whose debt to GDP ratio had peaked in 2012 at nearly 120%, and Spain, whose debt plateaued at around 100% after a steep ascent, exited their bailout programs. In 2015, the eurozone managed to avoid a threatened exit of Greece with uncertain consequences. Ten years on, eurozone growth has been relatively stable at around 2%, but member states including Greece, Italy, and Portugal, maintain a debt to GDP ratio two to three times that of the Stability and Growth Pact-mandated 60%.

Cohesion funds

On the flip side, EU cohesion funds, a subsection of European regional policy dedicated to member states whose GDP is less than 90% of the EU average, represent a natural extension of the EU’s economic success and are granted in addition to the EU’s normal regional development funding, which goes to all member states. Funded by member state contributions to the EU’s budget, the EU allotted just over €63 billion to promote “harmonious development” and even out disparities in development levels between regions.

Major beneficiaries of cohesion funds include Poland, which was slated to receive €23 billion (36% of all planned cohesion funding) from 2014-2020, Romania, which received nearly €7 billion or (close to 11%), and the Czech Republic and Hungary, which received €6 billion (nearly 10%) each.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

I am delighted to share with you the fifth edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

The latest iteration of the scorecard shows a downtick in all four metrics for U.S.-European relations — overall, political, security, and economic. This reflects several negative events, including President Trump’s pressure on Ukraine which has led to the impeachment crisis, the transfer of resources from deterrence in eastern Europe to build the wall along the southern border, and continuing tensions over trade.

The one notable exception is the score for U.S.-U.K. relations, which has improved. This seems to be partly the good rapport between the president and Prime Minister Johnson — although there is little to show for it substantively thus far — and partly a natural bounce back from the low of Trump’s harsh criticism of U.K. Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch. If the prime minister’s deal passes Parliament (and at the moment of writing that remains uncertain), we will soon find out if the U.K. and the U.S. can make swift progress on trade talks.

We will be watching several other things in the months to come.

First, we will be looking at the upcoming NATO leaders summit in London in early December to see if Prime Minister Johnson can persuade President Trump to play a constructive role in the meeting or if President Trump renews his attacks on the alliance.

Second, will the U.S. presidential election affect transatlantic relations? For instance, we will be watching to see if Trump begins to lay the groundwork for imposing auto tariffs on German cars, perhaps as a means of strengthening his political position in the swing state of Michigan.

Finally, will France succeed in its efforts to broker a meeting between Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and might this lead to negotiations to replace the JCPOA?

Thank you for reading the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard maintained by Sam Denney, Filippos Letsas, and Ted Reinert. Additional research by Naz Gocek and Cassandra Heward. Digital design and web development by Eric Abalahin, Abigail Kaunda, Yohann Paris, Rachel Slattery, and Cameron Zotter.

Russia finds few fruits to harvest in the scramble for eastern Syria

Pavel K Baev — Fri, 18 Oct 2019 13:50:40 +0000

By Pavel K Baev

With the Turkish incursion into Kurdish fighter-controlled northeastern Syria, the war has taken a new turn. It was long in the making, yet most stakeholders are reevaluating risks and losses rather than counting benefits.

The damage to U.S. positions and influence is heavy, as my Brookings colleagues have carefully assessed. The hastily negotiated ceasefire deal cannot rehabilitate the compromised U.S. credibility, even if it holds. Turkey finds itself in deep trouble, which affects President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s calculus for consolidating domestic support for the military operation — which should have been called “Violent Quagmire” rather than “Peace Spring.” Israel is deeply concerned about the consequences of this intervention, and Iran is also signaling its disapproval.

Russia, for its part, is typically portrayed as the party than benefits the most from this micro-geopolitical scramble. But in fact, Moscow has maneuvered into a rather tight corner, where its obligations are heavy and the profits are far from rich.

Reconfigured theater

The presently paused Turkish operation is not going to establish anything resembling a 20-mile deep and 300-mile long “safe zone,” but it has drastically altered the multi-party balance of forces in northern Syria. The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) cannot withstand the Turkish army offensive and cannot completely withdraw from its home territory, but it is set to continue attacks on enemy forces inside this zone and across the border. The arrival of the Syrian army, which is not a party to the ceasefire deal, is certain to complicate the combat situation further. The clashes between Turkish troops and the Assad regime brigades, which know how to cooperate with the YPG, are certain to escalate. Russia is trying to separate the Turkish and Syrian forces, but what Russia can do in the particular case of Manbij goes entirely beyond the reach of its limited number of special forces, even if reinforced by the “Wagner” mercenaries.

One of Russia’s main goals in Syria for at least two years has been eliminating rebel control over Idlib province, which sits uncomfortably close to the Russian Khmeimim airbase near Latakia. Turkey objected stubbornly to this offensive, and now, irked by the international condemnation of his far-from-successful operation, Erdoğan is hardly going to be agreeable. What is more, the Syrian army deploying along the contested border with Turkey would not be able to gather sufficient forces to conquer Idlib, even with Russian air strikes. Another complicating factor for Moscow is the mass escape of prisoners of war from the Kurdish prisons, which strengthens the possibility of an ISIS revival. Russia has been remarkably successful in preventing the return of “veterans” of the army of the “caliphate” to the North Caucasus, but the threat of a new wave of terrorist attacks is looming.

Reduced leverage

The gain for the Assad regime, which has expanded its territorial control and subdued the Kurds without firing a shot, is not necessarily a gain for Russia, which seeks to retain a formative influence on Syria. For two and a half years, Moscow has attempted to transform Syria in cooperation with Turkey and Iran, and now this “Astana format” has all but expired. Erdoğan is not going to accept any Kurdish representation in the U.N.-backed constitutional committee, and the Iranian leadership will torpedo all Russian political designs and insist on an “Islamic republic” model. Russia doesn’t have sufficient resources to invest in post-war reconstruction, and the continuation of the Syrian intervention is increasingly unpopular in Russian public opinion. Unlike the United States, Russia can present itself as standing firm with its allies, but the idea of patron-client loyalty is non-existent in its Middle Eastern policy, where alliances are always a matter of transactional convenience.

Putin followed the course of the Turkish operation while travelling to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which both unequivocally condemned the incursion, leaving Russia as the only party to the war that didn’t. The results of the long-planned trip were rather underwhelming, and the prospect of further coordination of cuts in oil production in order to prop up the price was penciled only provisionally. The Gulf producers understand perfectly clear that Russia stands to benefit from every disruption in their exports, and its stakes in various energy projects are primarily a means of managing the acute threat of over-production. Russian diplomacy works hard on securing for the Kremlin the privilege of being able to talk to all parties to multiple Middle Eastern conflicts, but this versatility implies that neither Iran nor Israel nor even the Assad regime can put any trust into these communications. The ambivalence regarding the Turkish offensive illuminated this Russian duplicity.

Devalued assets

Russia has invested much effort and resources into Syrian intervention not because it sees the Assad regime as an indispensable ally but because it found there an opportunity to turn a local conflict into a grand geopolitical game. Moscow issued many declarations demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces, but in fact, it valued the interactions with Washington very highly and placed much emphasis on its ability to make a difference in the fight against ISIS. The “deconflicting” military-to-military mechanism has remained one of the few channels that worked in the times of breakdown of arms control negotiations. Now that the U.S. withdrawal is indeed happening, Russia finds the value of its high-risk assets in Syria much diminished.

Every quarrel inside NATO is always a bonus for Russia, and Erdoğan’s unilateral decision to invade Syria has triggered a serious crisis in relations with allies. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg puts his best effort in damage control, but Moscow has every reason to expect deep and bitter discord. Its offer of Su-35 fighters as a substitute for the cancelled U.S. F-35 program can become practicable, but what is more important for the nuclear-centric Russian strategic thinking is the prospect of the United States removing B61 nuclear bombs from the Incirlik airbase in Turkey. NATO’s southern flank is in disarray, but Russia still needs to find a way to exploit this confusion.

Its activities in the Black Sea theater dominated by the “fortress Crimea” can become even more assertive, but the aggressive intercepts of U.S. Navy ships and airplanes give only that much satisfaction to Russian top brass. The main security problem for Russia is still the mutating conflict with Ukraine, and the looming question is whether Erdoğan’s enterprise with projecting power into Syria might tempt the Kremlin to break the deadlock in the Donbass war zone. European “guarantors” of the Minsk agreements will be shocked, but Moscow interprets their irrelevance in Syria as an inability to get their act together in the absence of U.S. leadership. Russia made the military move to Syria in 2015 in order to distract attention from Ukraine, and now it has an opportunity to hit back.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – July 2019

Thu, 18 Jul 2019 13:30:26 +0000

Welcome to the fourth edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted July 8-11, 2019. The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous three calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

April 1: The U.K. Parliament held a second round of indicative votes to assess support for alternative approaches to Brexit, with no option earning a majority. A customs union was defeated most narrowly (273 in favor to 276 against) while a second referendum received the most votes in favor (280-292).
April 2: In New York, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced they will launch an Alliance for Multilateralism at the United Nations General Assembly in September.
April 3: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed a joint session of Congress on the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary. “NATO lasts because it is in the national interest of each and every one of our nations,” he told Congress. “Together, we represent almost one billion people. We are half of the world’s economic might. And half of the world’s military might. When we stand together, we are stronger than any potential challenger—economically, politically and militarily… Since we cannot foresee the future, we have to be prepared for the unforeseen. We need a strategy to deal with uncertainty. We have one. That strategy is NATO.”
April 4: NATO foreign ministers met in Washington, stating “we remain committed to all three aspects of our 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge, including the spending guidelines for 2024, planned capabilities, and contributions to missions and operations. We have made considerable progress but we can, must, and will do more.”
April 8: Matteo Salvini, Italy’s deputy prime minister and interior minister and leader of right-wing League, announced a new far-right alliance for European Parliament elections, the European Alliance of Peoples and Nations, with the Alternative for Germany’s lead candidate Jörg Meuthen and others. In June, following the elections, the group was renamed Identity and Democracy.
April 8: Romania charged its former president Ion Iliescu with crimes against humanity in the country’s December 1989 revolution. 862 people were killed after Iliescu and the National Salvation Front took control after communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu fled Bucharest. Iliescu served as president until 1996 and then again from 2000 to 2004, a period in which Romania joined NATO.
April 10: At an extraordinary summit, in response to Prime Minister May’s April 5 request for a second Brexit extension to June 30, the European Council offered the United Kingdom a delay of Brexit to as late as October 31. May accepted, averting a no-deal exit from the EU on April 12.
April 11: WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange was expelled from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, where he has lived since 2012, when Quito granted him asylum. He was arrested by Scotland Yard, and a 2018 indictment against him was unsealed, revealing he is charged with conspiracy with Chelsea Manning to crack a Defense Department computer password to download classified documents.
April 17: U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, leading a bipartisan delegation to the United Kingdom and Ireland, addressed the Irish parliament, stating, “Let me be clear. If the Brexit deal undermines the Good Friday accords, there would be no chance of a U.S.-U.K. trade agreement.”
April 18: The redacted text of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was published. The report detailed the “sweeping and systematic fashion” of Russian interference and “identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign.” The investigation “established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts,” but “did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.” Mueller also investigated President Trump’s actions towards the FBI and Special Counsel investigations into the interference and related matters. Mueller determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment about whether the president had committed obstruction of justice and the report “does not conclude that the President committed a crime,” nor does it “exonerate him.” On March 31, Attorney General William Barr had told Congress that the special counsel’s evidence was “not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.”
April 18: Northern Irish journalist Lyra McKee was shot dead by New IRA militants while covering rioting in Derry. McKee’s funeral on April 24 was attended by Northern Irish, U.K., and Irish political leaders. On April 26, Prime Minister May and Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar announced new talks to quickly “re-establish to full operation the democratic institutions of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.”
April 21: Volodymyr Zelensky won the Ukrainian presidential election with 73 percent of the vote over incumbent Petro Poroshenko in the second round.
April 24: Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon announced she would aim to hold a second independence referendum by the end of the Scottish parliament’s term in May 2021 if the United Kingdom leaves the EU.
May 1: Prime Minister May fired U.K. Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson after an investigation into the leaking of the substance of a National Security Council meeting on allowing Huawei a role in building the country’s 5G network. Williamson and several other ministers reportedly opposed the government’s ultimate decision to allow Huawei to supply “non-core” parts. Penny Mourdant was named the United Kingdom’s first female defence secretary.
May 2: The U.S. government ended waivers on secondary sanctions imposed in November 2018 for key importers of Iranian oil. While Greece, Italy, and Taiwan had stopped imports since then, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey had sought a further extension.
May 3: President Trump and President Putin spoke on the phone, reportedly discussing Venezuela, North Korea, Ukraine, arms control potentially involving China, and the Mueller report.
May 3: President Trump met with Slovak Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini at the White House.
May 3: In U.K. local elections, the governing Conservative Party lost 1,333 councilors, and the Labour Party lost 82, while the Liberal Democrats and Greens made notable gains.
May 5: In North Macedonia, Stevo Pendarovski, the joint candidate of the governing parties, won the presidential runoff against Siljanovska Dalkova. Pendarovski defended the Prespa Agreement, which was heavily criticized by Dalkova and her conservative opposition party.
May 6: Turkey’s High Election Council upheld the AK Party’s challenge to the Istanbul mayoral election outcome and ordered a new election.
May 6: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech in Rovaniemi, Finland at an Arctic Council summit, describing the Arctic as “an arena for power and for competition,” warning Arctic nations of Chinese and Russian behavior, and defending U.S. environmental policy.
May 8: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech in London on the “special relationship,” between the United States and the United Kingdom, which he described as “the beating heart of the entire free world.”
May 8: Ireland and the United Kingdom signed a deal to preserve the Common Travel Area (CTA) in case of a no-deal Brexit. The CTA allows British and Irish citizens to work, study, vote, and access social benefits in each other’s jurisdictions.
May 13: President Trump met with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the White House. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had issued a bipartisan letter calling on Trump to raise “concern about Hungary’s downward democratic trajectory and the implications for U.S. interests in Central Europe,” Trump praised Orbán as having “done a tremendous job.”
May 14: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with President Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi. On the previous day, Pompeo stopped in Brussels for meetings focused on Iran.
May 15: Eighteen nations and 8 technology companies signed the Christchurch Call, which establishes guidelines to combat online extremism. The Trump administration refused to sign the non-binding agreement spearheaded by New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and President Macron, citing free speech concerns.
May 16: President Trump met with Swiss President Ueli Maurer at the White House.
May 17: The U.K. Labour Party pulled out of talks with the Conservative Party on Brexit, leaving the deadlocked state of negotiations unchanged. The collapse of six weeks of discussions resulted in backlash against both parties and exacerbated calls for Prime Minister May’s resignation.
May 19: Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen called for elections in September in response to the resignation of Vice Chancellor and Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and the collapse of the coalition government, which were triggered by a video showing Strache offering government contracts to someone posing as a Russian oligarch’s niece in exchange for campaign support.
May 20: New Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dissolved parliament and called snap elections with hopes of consolidating his power.
May 20: U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, a career diplomat, left her post two months early, reportedly recalled following political attacks by conservative media and one of President Trump’s sons. On June 18, William B. Taylor, who previously served as ambassador in Kyiv from 2006 to 2009, took over as U.S. Chargé d’Affaires.
May 21: President Putin, Chancellor Merkel, and President Macron discussed Ukraine in a phone call. The French and German leaders stressed that Russia should create conditions that are favorable for dialogue and be open to ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
May 23: The U.S. Justice Department announced that Julian Assange has been indicted on 17 counts under the Espionage Act.
May 24: Prime Minister May announced that she would resign as the leader of the Conservative Party on June 7. She will stay in power as prime minister until a new leader is selected.
May 26: The four-day European Parliament elections concluded. Voter turnout increased for the first time. Pro-EU parties won two-thirds of the seats, though the center-right (European People’s Party) and center-left (Progressive Alliances of Socialists and Democrats) party blocs lost seats to the liberals and the greens. However, right-wing nationalist parties won the most seats in four of the six largest countries—France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
May 27: Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz lost a no-confidence vote in parliament. Days later, President Alexander Van der Bellen appointed constitutional court president Brigitte Bierlein to lead a caretaker government until elections in September.
May 27: Liviu Dragnea, the head of Romania’s ruling Social Democratic Party, was sentenced to three and a half years in prison for procuring fake jobs for two party employees.
May 30: Chancellor Merkel spoke at Harvard University’s commencement. She encouraged the graduating class to reject nationalism and instead, embrace truth, multilateralism, openness, and empathy.
May 31: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met Chancellor Merkel and German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas in Berlin, several weeks after canceling a Germany stop on a previous trip to Europe. Pompeo continued to Switzerland and the Netherlands before joining President Trump in London.
June 2: German Social Democratic Party leader Andrea Nahles announced her resignation following a third-place finish in the European Parliament election, raising fears about the stability of the country’s governing coalition.
June 2: Walter Lübcke, a regional politician from Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and a prominent supporter of her refugee policy, was found dead in his home in Kassel, killed by a gunshot to the head. A far-right extremist confessed to the murder before later retracting the confession.
June 3: President Trump began a state visit to the United Kingdom, where he met with Queen Elizabeth II, Prime Minister May, and Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage. Ahead of the visit, Trump praised the putative frontrunner for the Conservative leadership contest, former London mayor and foreign secretary Boris Johnson. He spoke with Johnson on the phone on June 4, but Johnson declined an in-person meeting during the visit citing a previous commitment.
June 5: President Trump visited Ireland, meeting with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar at Shannon Airport before staying at his own golf resort at Doonbeg.
June 5: In Denmark’s elections, the Social Democrats returned to power after four years in opposition while the populist Danish People’s Party lost more than half of its seats in parliament, likely because other parties co-opted its tough stance on immigration. Other major campaign issues included climate change and expanding welfare.
June 6: President Trump met with President Macron following a D-Day commemoration ceremony at the Normandy American Cemetery. They discussed topics including Iran and trade.
June 6: Russia telecoms company MTS signed a deal with Huawei to develop a 5G network during President Putin’s meeting with President Xi in Moscow.
June 7: Prime Minister May resigned as leader of the Conservative Party, triggering the official contest to replace her.
June 10: Russian journalist Ivan Golunov was released from jail after charges against him were dropped. The Internal Affairs Ministry announced that there were mistakes made in the leadup to his arrest. Golunov’s imprisonment was widely protested by citizens and the media.
June 12: President Trump met with Polish President Andrzej Duda at the White House, where they signed a joint declaration on defense cooperation detailing plans to increase the U.S. military presence in Poland. An F-35 stealth fighter flew over the White House to mark the declaration.
June 13: In the first round of voting among Conservative members of Parliament for the party’s leadership contest, Boris Johnson emerged with a strong lead, winning 114 out of 313 votes, with Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt finishing second with 43 votes. Seven contenders advanced to the next round of MP voting while three were eliminated.
June 14: Spain’s supreme court ruled that former Catalan Vice President Oriol Junqueras will not be allowed to take his seat as a Member of European Parliament until a verdict is issued in the trial about Catalonia’s independence referendum.
June 14: Moldovan President Pavel Filip resigned, allowing the country to overcome a political impasse that began after national parliamentary elections did not award a clear majority of seats to any party and resulted in two rival governments. The country now has a single government led by Prime Minister Maia Sandu.
June 17: Iran announced that it would exceed the limits on uranium enrichment established by the JCPOA by the end of the month. Meanwhile, U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan announced that the U.S. would send 1,000 additional troops to the Middle East.
June 17: Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Matteo Salvini met with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence in Washington. Salvini stated that the United States and Italy had a “common vision” regarding migration, China, Venezuela, Libya, and the Middle East.
June 18: President Trump withdrew the nomination of Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan to be permanent defense secretary and named Mark Esper, previously secretary of the Army, as acting secretary. Trump nominated Esper for the permanent defense secretary position three days later.
June 18: Following comments by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi opening the door to monetary stimulus, the euro weakened against the dollar; President Trump complained this made it “unfairly easier” for Europe to compete against the United States. “They have been getting away with this for years, along with China and others,” Trump tweeted.
June 20: In the U.K. Conservative Party leadership contest, Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt edged Environment Secretary Michael Gove for second-place in the final round of MP voting. The party’s membership of about 160,000 will choose whether Hunt or frontrunner Boris Johnson will replace Theresa May as party leader and prime minister of the United Kingdom. The ballot will close on July 22, the result will be announced on July 23, and the winner will replace May on July 24.
June 20: President Trump reportedly approved and subsequently canceled military strikes on Iran after the Iranians shot down a $130 million U.S. surveillance drone near the boundary of Iran’s territorial waters in the Gulf of Oman.
June 20: Thousands of Georgians gathered in front of the parliament in Tbilisi to protest Russian MP Sergey Gavrilov’s visit. Gavrilov chaired a meeting of Orthodox Christian lawmakers while sitting in the speaker’s chair. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili called Russia an “enemy and occupier” and accused Moscow of meddling in Georgia’s domestic affairs.
June 21: President Putin temporarily banned direct flights between Russia and Georgia starting July 8.
June 23: An estimated 250,000 people gathered in Prague’s Letna Plain to demand the resignation of Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and Justice Minister Marie Benešová, accusing them of corruption and fraud, in the largest of a running series of protests.
June 23: In the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral election, opposition candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu defeated the AK Party’s Binali Yıldırım again, expanding his margin of victory from less than 20,000 votes in March to more than 800,000 votes. The result was a huge defeat for President Erdoğan, who served as mayor of Istanbul before the founding of the AK Party and his rise to national power.
June 24: President Trump signed an executive order imposing sanctions on Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his office.
June 24: The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that Poland’s law lowering the retirement age for judges violated EU law and compromised the judiciary’s independence.
June 25: Israel hosted a trilateral meeting of the U.S., Russian, and Israeli national security advisors, focusing on Syria.
June 25: The parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe voted to restore Russia’s voting rights, which were removed after the annexation of Crimea. Germany and France had argued for engagement and cited concern that Russian citizens would lose their right to bring cases before the European Court of Human Rights if Russia followed through on its threat to leave the Council. Opponents criticized the decision as sending the wrong message to Moscow.
June 26: U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Mark Esper participated in a NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels.
June 28: At the G20 summit in Osaka, President Trump held bilateral meetings with Chancellor Merkel and President Putin. The agenda for the Trump-Merkel meeting included trade, Iran, West Africa, and counterterrorism. Trump and Putin discussed arms control, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Ukraine. Asked by a reporter if he will tell Putin not to meddle in the 2020 election, Trump told Putin “Don’t meddle in the election, President,” and Putin laughed. The two presidents also joked about journalists.
June 28: The EU reached a comprehensive trade agreement with Mercosur, a trade bloc consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker hailed the agreement as the largest trade deal ever concluded by the EU.
June 29: At the G20 summit in Osaka, President Trump held a bilateral meeting with President Erdoğan with trade and the Turkish purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems on the agenda.
June 30: The EU and Vietnam signed a free trade deal in Hanoi that could eliminate 99 percent of customs duties between the two economies.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders.

Between April 1 and June 30, 2019, President Trump spoke on the phone with Turkish President Erdoğan twice (April 29, May 29), French President Macron once (April 16), and Russian President Putin once (May 3). He last spoke on the phone with German Chancellor Merkel on March 22, 2019 and with U.K. Prime Minister May on November 9, 2018. Trump also spoke on the phone with May’s likely successor, Boris Johnson, on June 4, during his state visit to the United Kingdom.

Figures

The delayed departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union meant that the country held European Parliament elections along with the 27 other EU member states and sent to Brussels 73 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who may only serve for a few months. If the United Kingdom leaves at the end of October or later, the parliament will shrink from 751 seats to 705 seats as had been planned, with other countries sending 27 additional MEPs. After Brexit, the far-right Identity and Democracy group would overtake the Greens-European Free Alliance as the fourth-largest party in the parliament, gaining three seats and 1.1 percent in share of the total seats. The center-right European People’s Party, unrepresented in the United Kingdom, would gain most—five seats and 2.2 percent. Liberal Renew Europe would lose 11 seats and 0.6 percent. The Euroskeptic European Conservatives and Reformists bloc would stay the same size as the four MEPs from Britain’s ruling Conservative Party would be replaced by four new MEPs from other countries.

Seats in the European Parliament are proportional to national population, so EU member state delegations vary greatly in size—from 96 for Germany, 74 for France, and 73 each for Italy and the United Kingdom, to just six each for Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Malta. The diminished strength of the two largest party groups in the parliament is in large part due to their weakness in the largest member states. Four of the five largest parties in the parliament, and the largest parties in four of the six largest member states, are nationalist populists—the Brexit Party in the United Kingdom, the League in Italy, Law and Justice in Poland, and National Rally in France—while the center right won in Germany and the center left won in Spain. The four largest countries also sent to Brussels large delegations of liberals and greens as well as Italy’s idiosyncratic populist Five Star Movement. The far-right Alternative for Germany, finishing fourth in Germany on 11 percent of the vote, has more MEPs than the largest party in 21 EU member states. However, in 21 of the 22 member states smaller than Poland, the largest party was a member of European People’s Party (12 countries), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (five countries including Slovakia where the governing Smer-SD actually lost to a liberal-right coalition), or Renew Europe (four countries). In Belgium, the largest of 12 parties winning seats was a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

I am delighted to share with you the fourth edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

The latest iteration of the scorecard shows U.S.-Europe relations generally holding steady, but there are a couple of interesting data points related to issues likely to feature prominently in this coming quarter.

The most dramatic shift was the decline in U.S.-U.K. relations, due in part to President Trump’s Twitter campaign against the U.K. Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch (who resigned last week) and the outgoing Prime Minister Theresa May. We will be watching closely to see how Trump gets on with the new British prime minister (most likely to be Boris Johnson). Trump and Johnson do seem to like each other, but it is skin deep.

During the 2016 election, Johnson was scathing in his criticism of Trump, and the American president is known for souring on people quickly. In office, Johnson will have to make a series of tough decisions with regard to the United States—whether to overturn his predecessor’s position on Huawei, whether to add agriculture to U.S.-U.K. free trade talks, and whether to align fully with Washington on Iran and other thorny issues. If he diverges from Trump’s wishes, good feelings may give way to hostile tweets.

We will also be watching personnel changes in the White House to see if they have any impact on America’s Europe policy. My colleague Fiona Hill is leaving after over two years of distinguished service as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs. She will be replaced by Tim Morrison, an expert in nuclear weapons and arms control. Does Morrison’s arrival signify a shift away from Western and even Eastern Europe toward arms control negotiations with Russia? (The U.S.-Russia relations score ticked up in this edition of the scorecard).

Finally, we will be watching closely for the U.S. response to the deployment of Russian S-400 air defense systems to Turkey. Will Trump impose new sanctions on Turkey, and what does this mean for the NATO alliance?

Thank you for reading the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard maintained by Sam Denney, Filippos Letsas, and Ted Reinert. Additional research by Naz Gocek. Digital design and web development by Eric Abalahin, Abigail Kaunda, Yohann Paris, Rachel Slattery, and Cameron Zotter.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – April 2019

Fri, 19 Apr 2019 15:37:02 +0000

Welcome to the third edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted April 5-9, 2019. The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous three calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

January 8: Deutsche Welle reported that the Trump administration had downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU’s ambassador to the United States last fall, moving him below national ambassadors in the official order of precedence without notification. The leadership of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States of America responded with a letter to the U.S. Congress raising concerns about the “increasingly harmful approach from the White House when it comes to Transatlantic relations.”
January 15: The U.K. Parliament voted on Prime Minister May’s Brexit deal with the European Union after a month’s delay. It was defeated by a margin of 230 votes, the largest parliamentary defeat for a British government since World War I. With Britain long scheduled to leave the EU on March 29, the defeat raised the possibility of a no-deal Brexit as the default option.
January 15: President Macron launched his “Great National Debate,” a three-month series of public engagements for voters to express their concerns and ideas following months of anti-government protests connected to the “Gilets Jaunes” movement.
January 16: Prime Minister May survived a vote of no confidence called by Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, with the U.K. Parliament rejecting it by 325 votes to 306.
January 17: The European Parliament voted by a margin of 397 to 158 in favor of the European Commission’s proposal to cut EU funds to countries that do not uphold the rule of law. Viewed as a way to exert pressure on countries like Hungary and Poland, the vote proceeded largely along geographic lines, with Western European MEPs largely voting in favor and MEPs from Central and Eastern Europe voting against.
January 18: After over four months of deadlock following the October 2018 election, Sweden formed a new government under incumbent Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. With only 33 percent of the seats in the Riksdag, the minority government coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party is reliant on a confidence and supply arrangement with the Centre Party and the Liberals. The arrangement keeps the third-largest party, the right-wing nationalist Swedish Democrats, out of power.
January 23: In a speech at Davos, Chancellor Merkel spoke out in favor of a multilateral order “that gives good answers to the challenges of tomorrow,” yet stressed that the “global architecture will only work if all of us are willing and ready for compromise.”
January 24: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence met with U.K. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt in Washington to discuss bilateral trade after Brexit, Venezuela, Syria, and Yemen.
January 25: The Greek parliament ratified the Prespa Agreement with a slim majority of 153 to 147., The deal changes the long-disputed name of Greece’s northern neighbor to the Republic of North Macedonia, clearing a path for the country to join NATO and potentially in time the EU.
January 31: In a joint declaration, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom announced the establishment of the EU’s “special purpose vehicle” for trade with Iran, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), based in Paris. The move was symbolic of the EU’s continued commitment to upholding the JCPOA despite the U.S. withdrawal.

February 5: Italian Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio met with leaders of “Gilets Jaunes” movement outside of Paris, enflaming Italian-French relations. Two days later, France recalled its ambassador to Italy for the first time since World War II.
February 6: Skopje signed the Accession Protocol to join NATO. Two days later, the Greek parliament ratified the protocol, the first NATO member state to do so.
February 13: The United States and Poland co-hosted the “Ministerial To Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East” in Warsaw with representatives from 62 countries. The meeting was widely seen as targeted at Iran, and the EU, France, and Germany sent lower level representation. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Hungary and Slovakia before the meeting, met EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini in Brussels after the meeting, and concluded his trip with a stop in Iceland.
February 13: U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan attended a NATO defense ministerial in Brussels on his first international trip as acting secretary, following stops in Afghanistan and Iraq. He subsequently attended the Munich Security Conference.
February 15: President Trump nominated David Satterfield to be ambassador to Turkey, a position vacant since October 2017. Satterfield has served as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs since September 2017.
February 15: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell left his position after 16 months in office. He cited personal and professional reasons for stepping down in a January 4 letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
February 16: On the second day of the Munich Security Conference, Chancellor Merkel delivered a speech in which she championed multilateralism and the rules-based international order. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence used his speech to press allies on defense spending, Nord Stream II, and “the threat posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecom companies.” The U.S. sent its largest congressional delegation to date, including Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi.
February 20: President Trump met with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz at the White House.

March 4: President Macron published an op-ed laying out EU-level policy proposals and asking European citizens “to chart together the road to European renewal” ahead of European Parliament elections in May.
March 7: President Trump met with Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš at the White House.
March 10: Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the head of the German Christian Democratic Union and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s likely successor, responded to Macron with her own proposals, contributing to a developing “Franco-German narrative” for the future of Europe.
March 11: The U.S. Congress issued a bipartisan invitation to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to address a joint session ahead of NATO’s 70th anniversary next month.
March 12: In the “second meaningful vote” on Prime Minister May’s Brexit deal, despite “legal changes” to interpretations of the backstop agreed with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the U.K. Parliament rejected it by 391 votes to 242.
March 13: The U.K. Parliament voted to rule out leaving the European Union without a deal by margin of 321 to 278. However, the vote was non-binding on the government.
March 14: President Trump met with Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar at the White House as part of the Taoiseach’s annual St. Patrick’s Day trip to the United States.
March 14: The U.K. Parliament voted 412 to 202 for Prime Minister May to ask the EU for a delay of the planned March 29 exit from the union.
March 18: The Speaker of the U.K. Parliament, John Bercow, upended Prime Minister May’s plan to bring her Brexit deal to a third vote, citing a convention from 1604 in his ruling that a defeated motion could not be brought to another vote if it was “substantially the same” as before.
March 18: Philip T. Reeker, a career Foreign Service officer, became U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
March 20: Regulators in the European Commission ordered Google to pay a $1.7 billion anti-trust fine.
March 20: Prime Minister May formally asked EU leaders for a delay of the United Kingdom’s planned exit from the European Union, stipulating that she was “not prepared to delay Brexit any further” than June 30.
March 20: In an almost unanimous decision, the European People’s Party (EPP) voted to suspend the membership of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, withdrawing the party’s voting rights but stopping short of expulsion from the center-right European bloc.
March 21: The European Council agreed to postpone the U.K.’s exit date until May 22 on the condition that Prime Minister May’s Brexit deal was passed before the original March 29 deadline. If the U.K. Parliament failed to ratify May’s deal by then, London would have until April 12 to propose an alternative way forward or leave without a deal.
March 23: Italy’s government signed a memorandum to formally join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, making Italy the first EU and G7 country to do so.
March 25: British MPs voted to seize control of the Brexit process, making way for a series of “indicative votes” on a range of possible Brexit outcomes.
March 26: The European Parliament passed the EU Copyright Directive, with 348 MEPs in favor and 278 against. The final version of the reform included the controversial Article 11, which extended copyright protections to story links published by news aggregators, and Article 13, which held tech companies responsible for copyright violations in user-developed content.
March 26: President Macron, Chancellor Merkel, and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Paris.
March 27: The U.K. Parliament held a series of “indicative votes” on Brexit. All eight proposals failed to win a majority.
March 27: La République En Marche (LREM), the French centrist party formed by President Macron, announced its top 30 candidates for the upcoming European Parliament elections. Although President Macron’s push for transnational lists was denied by the European Parliament, LREM’s list included Italian former European affairs minister Sandro Gozi.
March 28: The German government opted to extend its ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia – a decision taken after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi – by another six months after weeks of disputes within the coalition government. The embargo had led to tensions with France, given Paris’s commitments to both deeper defense cooperation with Germany and arms contracts with Saudi Arabia.
March 29: Although Prime Minister May offered to resign if her Brexit deal was passed and allow another member to lead negotiations with the EU over the future relationship, MPs rejected her deal for a third time by a vote of 334 to 286. The result left Prime Minister May with roughly two weeks to develop alternative plans before the U.K. was set to crash out of the EU with no deal on April 12.
March 30: Political newcomer and activist Zuzana Čaputová was elected President of Slovakia in a run-off vote against European Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič, the candidate backed by the ruling party Smer-SD. Inspired to run in part due to the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his wife last year, Čaputová pledged to fight corruption and promote the rule of law in Slovakia.
March 31: In the first round of Ukrainian presidential elections, comedian and political outsider Volodymyr Zelensky won a plurality, taking 30 percent of the votes. Zelensky was set to face off against the incumbent Petro Poroshenko, who won 16 percent of the votes, in a run-off election on April 21.
March 31: In local elections in Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) lost control of the country’s two biggest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, to the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The AK Party challenged the narrow Istanbul results.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders.

Between January 1 and March 31, 2019, President Trump spoke on the phone with Turkish President Erdoğan twice (January 14, February 21), French President Macron once (January 7), and German Chancellor Merkel once (March 22). He last spoke on the phone with U.K. Prime Minister May on November 9, 2018 and with Russian President Putin on March 20, 2018.

Figures

U.S. presidential visits to Europe, 2009-2019

Over the last decade (plus a few weeks), 20 European countries have hosted a U.S. president. President Trump has visited nine European countries since taking office in January 2019, spending at least part of seven of his 11 international trips on the continent. President Obama visited at least one European country on 21 of his 52 international trips in office (10 of 25 in his first term, 11 of 27 in his second term), for a total of 18 European countries.

Many of these stops are not focused on bilateral relations with the host country, at least not exclusively. Trump attended a G20 summit in Germany, a G7 summit in Italy, two NATO summits in Belgium, and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. He visited U.S. troops at Ramstein Air Base in Germany after visiting troops in Iraq. Finland hosted a summit between Trump and President Putin. Obama’s visits to Europe included five G8/G7 summits, four G20 summits, four NATO summits, two UN climate change conferences, and the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony. Leaders from neighboring third countries joined for presidential visits to the Czech Republic, Sweden, Estonia, and Poland, among others.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were the most visited countries, with Belgium, Italy, Poland, and the Vatican also receiving visits from both presidents. Obama visited France and Germany more than any other countries in the world at six times each; he visited Mexico and the United Kingdom five times each. Trump has made two visits each to five countries so far—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy (he visited twice on the same trip, going to Brussels between Rome and Sicily), and Vietnam. France is likely to pull ahead on Trump’s list as he is anticipated to visit twice more this year, for D-Day commemorations in June and the G7 summit in Biarritz in August.

Europe, Huawei, and 5G

Strategic competition with China has become a key stress point in the trans-Atlantic relationship. A particular flashpoint relates to the involvement of Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and, to a lesser degree, ZTE in the development and rollout of European 5G wireless networks.

In the last few months, the United States has mounted an aggressive campaign to pressure the European Union to ban Huawei from its telecommunications infrastructure based on the concern that Chinese laws require Huawei to turn over information to the government. Europe has responded ambivalently, with the European Union on the one hand tasking member states to complete national security reviews of their 5G infrastructure by the end of June, but with many member states refusing to ban Huawei completely. The European Union’s response envisions “mitigating measures to address cybersecurity risks” being agreed upon by December 31, 2019.

U.S. calls to ban Huawei have prompted a number of public statements from its European partners. Eleven European countries have explicitly addressed the issue of banning Huawei and/or the broader relationship between 5G infrastructure and security. Although nine of these statements warn of the dangers that come with the exploitation of 5G infrastructure, not all of them register concern. Most notably, Slovak Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini has asserted that Huawei is not a security threat, while Austrian Transport Minister Norbert Hofer has not only refused to ban Huawei, but insisted that economic interests may play a role in the discussion surrounding a Huawei ban. Meanwhile, Germany, where security services have warned of the security risks posed by Huawei, has refused to explicitly ban the company from its 5G networks, but has also proposed new data security regulations that could challenge Huawei’s position in the German market. France has made similar moves, and the United Kingdom is considering a critical report by its Huawei oversight authority that found “serious and systematic defects in Huawei’s software engineering and cyber security competence.”

Viewed from a private sector perspective, European links to Huawei are extensive, but difficult to track. Of a total of 88 telecommunications providers surveyed across 32 European countries, 33 providers in 19 countries have tested small scale 5G networks in partnership with Huawei or ZTE as recently as 2018. 17 providers were found to be testing with another partner, while no testing information was found for a further 38 companies.

Huawei or ZTE have signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) with 18 telecommunications providers in 15 countries within our survey sample. Overall, 10 of these MOUs see Huawei participating in a country-wide rollout of 5G networks. Huawei has also signed MOUs directly with the Hungarian and Maltese governments to improve their broadband services and roll out 5G technology.

Methodology: Using data provided by the European 5G Observatory, combined with original sourcing and research, 5G testing and partnership information was compiled for companies across Europe for the period January 2018 onwards. Telecommunications providers were compiled and counted on a national basis, thus subsidiaries of the same company in different countries would count separately. Please consult the attached Excel file at the top left of the page for exact sourcing and more specific details. Blank entries in the file indicate places for which data could not be found for the chosen time period.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

I am delighted to share with you the third edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

This scorecard saw little change from the previous iteration in January 2019. We will be watching several things in the next few months that could shake things up dramatically.

Days after we completed this survey, the Trump administration announced that it will be lifting the waivers for the Helms-Burton Act. This decision has the effect of allowing American citizens who were dispossessed by the Castro regime to sue companies profiting from that dispossession through commercial operations in Cuba. In other words, European and Canadian companies operating in Cuba can be sued in American courts. The European Union has promised retaliatory measures if these cases are successful. The Helms-Burton disputed roiled trans-Atlantic relations two decades ago, and it promises to do the same again now, potentially jeopardizing cooperation on other matters.

In June, President Trump will visit France for the 75th anniversary of the D-Day landings. There are reports, as yet unconfirmed, that he will also make a state visit to the United Kingdom. Trump has had a fraught relationship with Prime Minister May because of his interventions in Britain’s domestic politics—over Brexit, over the government’s handling of terrorist attacks, and because of his retweeting of Britain’s far right. This visit will be fraught with risk given the uncertainty over May’s future and the continuing Brexit negotiations.

We will of course be closely watching the European Parliament elections in late May which could have a major impact on EU policy. Will the populists capitalize on discontent with the political establishment? And, how will the results affect the composition of the European Commission?

Finally, we will continue to closely look at U.S.-EU trade relations. In particular, we will be asking if a U.S. trade deal with China makes a trade war with the EU more or less likely.

Thank you for reading the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard maintained by Sam Denney, Filippos Letsas, and Ted Reinert. Additional research by Sarah Barth. Digital design and web development by Eric Abalahin, Yohann Paris, Rachel Slattery, and Cameron Zotter.

How bad judgement calls brought a chain of blunders: Soviet responses to the Iranian revolution

Pavel K Baev — Thu, 07 Mar 2019 16:28:35 +0000

By Pavel K Baev

The Soviet leadership was surprised by the Iranian revolution to an even greater degree than the Carter administration in the United States, even if the interests of the USSR were less directly affected. There was no shortage of information, but the problem was that the spectacular collapse of the shah’s state contradicted the three main Soviet perspectives on developments within Iran. The first one portrayed Pahlavi’s regime as the main regional ally of the United States and assessed Iran’s military capabilities as superior to any external and domestic challenges. The second perspective focused on the leftist opposition—primarily the Tudeh (or masses) party—and exaggerated the strength of shah’s intelligence service, SAVAK. The third perspective depicted the Islamic movement as archaic and dismissed Ayatollah Khomeini as a marginal figure. None of these readings of the Iranian revolution produced a useful interpretation of the events, and the misinformed recommendations resulted in a chain of blunders that contributed to the collapse of the USSR just 12 years after the Iranian metamorphosis.

The misconceptions were developed by three different bureaucracies: first by the military intelligence (GRU) and further by the General Staff; second by the KGB; and third by the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The interplay between these institutions and their perspectives was distorted by the political crisis in Afghanistan, which had an entirely different character than the Iranian turmoil, but occurred simultaneously—and from the Moscow’s view on the world, threatened the same southern periphery of the USSR.

The time of troubles in Afghanistan started in April 1978, when a group of “progressive” officers organized a coup against President Mohammed Daoud Khan and murdered most of his family. Moscow had maintained close ties with Daoud Khan’s regime and didn’t instigate the coup, but had to accept a fait accompli—and justified it as the “April revolution.” Soviet relations with the government of Nur Muhammad Taraki were further upgraded, and that turn of events reinforced the perception of the army as the dominant political force (with a propensity to internalize Communist ideas) in the wider Middle East.

The failure of shah’s army and the SAVAK to suppress the unrest stunned the Soviet authorities, and before a coherent interpretation was developed, the situation in Afghanistan spun out of control. On September 14, 1979, soon after returning from a trip to Moscow, Taraki was assassinated by his rival Hafizullah Amin, who sought to establish an even more brutally dictatorial regime. Decisionmaking in the Kremlin on restoring order in Kabul, which had come to be seen as an important ally, was agonizingly incoherent, but one of the key considerations was the assumption that U.S. attention was preoccupied with the hostage crisis in Tehran, dragging on beginning November 4, 1979. There were also persistent—and entirely misplaced—concerns in Moscow that Washington would organize another coup in Iran, perhaps in combination with a military intervention.

The very narrow circle of elderly decisionmakers in the Politburo had reason to believe that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, described as “brotherly help” and the performance of “international duty,” would be criticized but effectively accepted by the United States and Western Europe because of their deepening worries about the violent mess in Iran. They certainly got it wrong and were astounded not only by the ostracism in the West, but also by the fierce condemnation from revolutionary Iran, where the USSR was defined as the “Lesser Satan.” A stronger distraction from the gradually escalating hostilities in Afghanistan was needed, and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 provided just that. Moscow declared “neutrality” in that war, but served as the main supplier of arms to Iraq in hopes of mollifying key Arab states, which had been alienated by the invasion into Afghanistan. It is obvious in retrospect that the strategy of covering one mistake with another blunder was doomed to be a mega-failure, and in this fashion, the debacle in Afghanistan became a major driver of the collapse of the “indestructible” Soviet Union.

It is obvious in retrospect that the strategy of covering one mistake with another blunder was doomed to be a mega-failure.

The geopolitical gain for the USSR from the breakdown of the alliance between Iran and the United States was negated by the severe deterioration of its position caused by the mismanaged Afghan war. For Moscow, the security threat from the “old” Iran was familiar and manageable, but the new challenges from Islamic fundamentalism and insurgency were incomprehensible and insuppressible. Soviet military command had to concentrate far greater effort on waging this peripheral war than it wanted. As far as Iran was concerned, Soviet top brass were shocked by the collapse of shah’s army, but found the capacity of the chaos-consumed Iran to regroup and repel Iraq’s aggression astounding. For the KGB, the post-revolutionary extermination of the Tudeh party and other prospective Soviet allies within Iran was shocking and the spread of the Islamic networks and influence appeared deeply disturbing. The Politburo elders and the dogmatic party-ideological apparatus were unable to comprehend the sustained public mobilization in Iran for the Islamic cause and to explain away the rising resistance in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, as it happened, had no long-term perspective, and Russia has successfully made peace and even entered into an alliance of sorts with Iran’s Islamic Republic, which is no longer its neighbor. This rapprochement has brought Russia much trouble, as it is increasingly obvious in Syria. However, it has not erased the fundamental incompatibility between Russian opportunistic policy of asserting its “great power” status and Iranian ideological policy of advancing the cause of the still-spirited Islamic Revolution.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – January 2019

Fri, 18 Jan 2019 17:00:33 +0000

Welcome to the second edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. To produce the Scorecard, we poll Brookings scholars and other experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also ask about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted January 7-10, 2019. The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous four calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

September 5: Prime Minister May identified 2 GRU agents as suspects in the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury and said the operation was “almost certainly” approved at a “senior level of the Russian state.”
September 6: Leaders of France, Germany, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom backed the British assessment in the Skripal case with “full confidence” in a joint statement.
September 9: Sweden’s general elections prove inconclusive, with the Social Democrat-led governing coalition losing support but winning one seat more than the Moderate-led Alliance coalition, and the far-right Sweden Democrats winning 17.5 percent of the vote. No new government has formed by the end of 2018, with Stefan Löfven staying on as prime minister in an acting capacity.
September 12: The European Parliament voted to censure Hungary for threats to democracy and rule of law and begin the Article 7 sanctions procedure, which could ultimately strip Budapest of EU voting rights. 448 MEPs voted in favor (including a majority from the European People’s Party, of which Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz is a member), with 197 against and 48 abstaining.
September 12: President Trump signed an executive order establishing a framework for imposing sanctions on foreign individuals over interference in U.S. elections.
September 18: President Trump met with Polish President Andrzej Duda, who stated in their joint press conference that “I would very much like for us to set up permanent American bases in Poland, which we would call ‘Fort Trump.’”
September 20: Prime Minister May’s Chequers proposal for Brexit was largely rejected by EU leaders in a summit in Salzburg. May warned that the United Kingdom has also been preparing for a “no deal” Brexit after European Council President Donald Tusk flatly told her that her Brexit plan “will not work.”
September 20: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence met with Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev in Washington to express support for the Prespa Agreement between Macedonia and Greece, which will change Zaev’s country’s name to North Macedonia, and discuss the next steps in its implementation.
September 24: Presidents Macron and Trump hold bilateral meeting in New York.
September 25: President Trump delivered an address to the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly in which the dominant theme was a defense of sovereignty coupled with sharp criticism of “global governance.” Trump reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine, called for equitable trade, and announced that the United States will revise its foreign aid policy to only give “to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends.”
September 25: President Macron delivered an address to the UN General Assembly which sharply contrasted with Trump’s, in which he argued the “path of unilateralism leads us directly to withdrawal and conflict, to widespread confrontation between everyone, to the detriment of all – even, eventually, of those who believe they are the strongest.”
September 26: President Trump and Prime Minister May hold bilateral meeting in New York.
September 27: The Italian coalition government unveiled its first budget, which set a deficit target of 2.4 percent of GDP for 2019, three times the 0.8 percent forecast of the previous government and higher than many analysts expected the European Commission would accept given Italy’s debt burden, the second highest in the eurozone at 131 percent of GDP.
September 30: Macedonian voters approved the controversial change of the country’s name in a referendum. With opponents boycotting the vote, the measure saw 91 percent in favor on a turnout of just 37 percent, and both supporters and opponents claimed victory.
September 30: The United States and Canada reached agreement on a renegotiation of NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), several weeks after the United States and Mexico came to a deal and just before the Trump administration’s deadline.
October 2: Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was killed by Saudi government operatives in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
October 3: President Putin signed into law an unpopular bill which will raise the retirement age in Russia by five years.
October 4: The United States indicted seven Russian military intelligence officers for allegedly hacking into a number of international organizations, including FIFA, anti-doping agencies, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
October 7: Bulgarian TV journalist Viktoria Marinova was found raped and murdered in Ruse, a week after hosting a broadcast on alleged fraud related to EU funds. Marinova was the third journalist killed in the EU in less than a year.
October 9: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley announced she will step down at the end of the year.
October 10: President Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced an agreement to unite Macron’s La République En Marche! with the liberal-centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group for the May 2019 European Parliament elections. The new coalition will reportedly campaign around a common platform and seek to challenge the dominance of the conservative European People’s Party.
October 12: Andrew Brunson, an American pastor, was freed from house arrest in Turkey and left the country. Imprisoned since October 2016 on allegations that he was linked to groups involved in the July 2016 failed coup, Brunson’s detention had been a major source of tension between Washington and Ankara, with Washington imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions on two Turkish government ministers in August.
October 14: Elections in the German state of Bavaria saw the Christian Social Union, sister party to Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, lose the absolute majority it has held almost continuously since the 1960s. The big winners were the Greens, who finished second with 17.6 percent of the vote, and the Alternative for Germany, which entered the state parliament for the first time with 10.2 percent.
October 17: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met President Erdoğan in Ankara to discuss the Khashoggi killing after meeting with senior Saudi officials in Riyadh. Pompeo stated that the Saudis had promised accountability and stressed that the U.S. government has to be mindful of the importance of U.S.-Saudi relations as it responds to Khashoggi’s killing.
October 17: A European Council summit in Brussels which had been expected to be the “moment of truth” for the Brexit deal made little progress with the Irish border remaining the sticking point.
October 20: President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, arguing that Russia had violated the agreement for years (a U.S. government assessment since 2014). Signed in 1987, the treaty was a Cold War success story that resulted in the destruction of 1,846 missiles by the Soviet Union and 846 missiles by the United States.
October 23: After meeting with President Putin in Moscow, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton confirmed that the United States will withdraw from the INF Treaty. In addition to arguing that Russia had long been violating the treaty, Bolton said INF was a “bilateral treaty in a multipolar ballistic missile world” as powers like China had created a “new strategic reality.”
October 23: The European Commission rejected Italy’s budget proposal, citing “particularly serious non-compliance” with its recommendations. The Italian government defended its position, with Deputy Prime Minister Luigi De Maio claiming “No surprise: This is the first Italian budget written in Rome and not in Brussels!”
October 25: The largest NATO military exercise since the Cold War, Trident Juncture 2018, began in Norway. Involving 65 ships, 250 aircraft, 10,000 vehicles, and 50,000 troops, the exercise served to test NATO’s ability to provide reinforcements both on sea and on land in response to a hypothetical invasion of Norway and the invocation of Article 5.
October 27: In a quadrilateral summit on Syria held in Istanbul, Chancellor Merkel and Presidents Erdoğan, Macron, and Putin produced a joint statement calling for a political solution with constitutional reform “paving the way for free and fair elections.”
October 28: Germany’s governing Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic Party both lose ground in regional elections in Hesse.
October 29: Following previous day’s losses in Hesse, Chancellor Merkel announced she would step down in December as head of her party and not seek a fifth term as chancellor in 2021.
October 31: Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced that Vienna will not sign the United Nations’ Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, already opposed by Hungary and the United States. Kurz argued the pact mixes up asylum seekers and economic migrants and could lead to “a human right to migration.” Following Austria’s move, some other European countries including Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia also decided against signing the pact.
November 6: In U.S. midterm elections, the Democrats captured 40 Republican-held seats to take control of the U.S. House of Representatives after eight years in opposition and captured several governorships, while the Republicans slightly increased their Senate majority. The 116th Congress is expected to pass little legislation, with the Democratic House acting as a check on President Trump via its oversight power and reasserting Congressional power on U.S. foreign policy.
November 6: In an interview with Europe 1 radio, President Macron called for “a true European army” to reinforce Europe’s capacity to defend itself “without relying only upon the United States.”
November 8: The European People’s Party announced that its leader in the European Parliament for the past five years, Manfred Weber of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, will be its Spitzenkandidat to lead the European Commission after the May 2019 European elections. Weber defeated former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb for the nomination.
November 9: President Trump flies to France for celebrations of the centenary of the World War I armistice.
November 11: In a speech on the Armistice centenary, President Macron called on assembled leaders not to forget the lessons learned from four bloody years of conflict and painted nationalism as a “betrayal of patriotism.”
November 13: In a speech to the European Parliament, Chancellor Merkel said that “Europe is our best chance for lasting peace, lasting prosperity, and a safe future” and called on Europeans to take their fate into their own hands. Among other points, she advocated the streamlining of European defense and security policy through a European Security Council and echoed President Macron’s call from the prior week for the creation of a European army to “complement NATO.”
November 13: Responding to President Macron’s calls for a more sovereign European defense capacity, President Trump tweeted: “Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the U.S., China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S. came along. Pay for NATO or not!”
November 14: Prime Minister May won the support of her divided cabinet for her Brexit deal with the EU after negotiations concluded.
November 15: Four ministers resigned from Prime Minister May’s government in protest over her Brexit deal, including Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union Dominic Raab, whose predecessor David Davis had also resigned over May’s approach.
November 25: The Russian coast guard, part of the FSB, fired upon and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels as they attempted to transit the Kerch Strait from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov en route to the Ukrainian port of Mariopol. Six sailors were injured and 24 were detained by Russia. The following day, the Ukrainian parliament voted to introduce martial law in the areas bordering Russia for a period of 30 days.
November 25: At a special European Council summit, European leaders endorsed the negotiated Brexit deal. With the real battle over Brexit looming in the House of Commons, the unity showed by members of the EU27 was noteworthy compared to the clear division within Britain and its government.
November 30: Former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who managed the end of the Cold War, died in Houston. Chancellor Merkel expressed her country’s gratitude for Bush’s support for German unification, stating at the G20 that as an East German, “without the results of his policies” she “would hardly be standing here,” and traveling to Washington for the funeral.
December 1: The G20 summit in Argentina ended with a final communiqué that reflected the sharp divide between the United States and its European allies on global trade, migration, and climate change. Among other developments, all participants agreed to pursue WTO reform, with the goal of discussing the issue at next G20 in Osaka, Japan in June 2019.
December 1: Thousands of demonstrators from the “Gilets Jaunes” movement gathered in Paris to protest President Macron’s proposed gas tax increase. The protests became violent as French police used tear gas and protestors responded by throwing rocks and setting cars on fire. In total, 260 people were detained and at least 95 injured.
December 3: Central European University (CEU) announced that it will leave Budapest and move to Vienna, after Hungary passed a law requiring foreign-accredited institutions to have a campus in their home country and its government refused to sign an agreement with the State of New York. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has long attacked CEU and its founder George Soros as political opponents.
December 3: Far-right anti-immigrant party Vox won 11 percent of the vote and 12 seats in elections for Spain’s largest region, Andalusia. Spain had been one of the last countries in Europe where far-right parties have not had a national or regional parliamentary presence.
December 4: Prime Minister May launched five days of parliamentary debate on her Brexit deal. MPs passed an unprecedented resolution holding the government in contempt for refusing to publish the attorney general’s legal advice to the Cabinet on the agreement.
December 4: In a speech in Brussels, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pushed back sharply against European criticism of President Trump’s foreign policy, claiming that President Trump was “returning the United States to its traditional, central leadership role in the world.” In separate remarks at NATO headquarters, Pompeo gave Russia 60 days to correct its alleged violations of the INF Treaty or the United States would leave the agreement.
December 5: President Putin said Russia would “respond appropriately” to a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty and match Washington if it produces short- and medium-range missiles.
December 5: The European Commission announced a plan to increase the role of the euro in global transactions generally and in the energy sector in particular. The Commission presented the use of the dollar by European businesses as exposing businesses to “currency risks and political risks, such as unilateral decisions that directly affect dollar-denominated transactions.”
December 7: At the CDU party conference, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (widely referred to as AKK and perceived as Chancellor Merkel’s preferred successor), the secretary-general of the CDU and former Minister President of Saarland, was elected as the new leader of the party.
December 10: Prime Minister May postponed a House of Commons vote on her Brexit deal which was scheduled for the next day as it was apparent she lacked the votes for approval, increasing the potential for a “no deal” Brexit on March 29, 2019. The European Court of Justice ruled the same day that Britain has the legal power to unilaterally stop Brexit by revoking its invocation of Article 50, the exit clause of the Treaty on European Union.
December 11: In a televised address in response to the “Gilets Jaunes” protests, President Macron apologized to the French people for not having reacted quickly enough to “malaise” in French society and announced an increase in the minimum wage.
December 12: Prime Minister May survived a vote of confidence mounted by members of her own Conservative Party over her Brexit deal in a 200-117 vote, after promising not to stand for reelection. While May became immune from a leadership challenge for the next year, the chances that she can win parliamentary approval for her Brexit deal appeared increasingly slim.
December 19: The Italian government lowered its planned 2019 budget deficit to 2.04 percent of GDP in a deal with the EU.
December 19: President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria, claiming that ISIS had been defeated. French Defense Minister Florence Parly disputed that claim. “Daesh has not been struck from the map,” she tweeted, “nor for that matter has its roots, it is essential to militarily and decisively defeat the remaining pockets of this terrorist organization.”
December 20: U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis resigned effective at the end of February, stating in a letter to President Trump, “My views on treating allies with respect and also being clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors are strongly held and informed by over four decades of immersion in these issues. We must do everything possible to advance an international order that is most conducive to our security, prosperity and values, and we are strengthened in this effort by the solidarity of our alliances. Because you have the right to a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position.”
December 23: President Trump announced that Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan would become Acting Secretary of Defense on January 1.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders. Between September 1 and December 31, 2018, President Trump spoke on the phone with Turkish President Erdoğan six times (October 21, November 1, November 16, November 28, December 14, December 23), French President Macron once (October 21), and U.K. Prime Minister May once (November 9). He last spoke on the phone with German Chancellor Merkel on August 27 and with Russian President Putin on March 20. We track Trump’s phone calls with the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, whether they have spoken or not, as well as other calls with European leaders of which we are aware. The White House stopped releasing readouts of the president’s calls with foreign leaders in July 2018. If we’ve missed a conversation, please give us a ring. Source: whitehouse.gov, elysee.fr, bundeskanzlerin.de, gov.uk, en.kremlin.ru, tccb.gov.tr/en, press reports.

Figures

U.S. Exports of LNG to Europe The Trump administration has made increasing U.S. energy exports – in particular of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – a cornerstone of its trade policy. In a speech in 2017, President Trump announced that a goal of his administration would be not only “American energy independence,” but also “American energy dominance.” Thirteen of the 28 EU member states import LNG. In 2017, European imports of LNG amounted to 5.1 billion cubic feet per day and accounted for 13 percent of the global total. The United States provided a small (4 percent), but rapidly growing, portion of the total LNG imported by the EU. The goal of U.S. LNG exports is not to replace other providers, but to allow for more competition in a sector currently dominated by Russia. The Trump administration’s criticism of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, which Chancellor Merkel has defended as “purely economic,” stems from the potential that Russian imports bring Russian political influence to Berlin and harm the interests of Ukraine and other U.S. partners and allies. Diversification of European energy sources away from a heavy reliance on Russia has been a U.S. foreign policy objective since the George W. Bush administration at least, and President Trump’s efforts to promote LNG exports to Europe represent a continuation of this strategy. With the loosening of restrictions on U.S. energy exports in 2015-2016, U.S. exports of LNG rapidly increased, and the first shipment of U.S. LNG to Europe arrived in Poland in June 2017. A year later, the summit between President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker saw further agreements made by the EU to increase imports of U.S. LNG. After more than quadrupling from 2016 to 2017, U.S. exports of LNG to Europe look set to grow further as more capacity is constructed on both sides of the Atlantic. U.S. and EU Trade in Goods with Iran A principle carrot used to conclude negotiations on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) aimed at restraining Iran’s nuclear program was the end of many restrictions on trade and investment with Iran. The subsequent thaw brought about by the JCPOA sparked hope among European businesses that trade relations with one of the Middle East’s largest economies, called by some observers “the last, large, untapped emerging market,” would improve after several years of intense multilateral sanctions. Some hoped that this economic opening would incentivize Iran to alter its other destabilizing behavior in the Middle East. Europe has long had stronger trade ties with Iran than the United States does. The European Union is Iran’s third-largest trading partner, behind China and the United Arab Emirates. A fraction of this trade volume exists between the United States and Iran due to the comprehensive embargo on Iran that has been in place for more than 20 years – what trade does exist consists of exempted goods, such as food, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. Yet because of the long divergence between the U.S. and Europe over how to approach Iran, the imposition of such a strenuous sanctions regime in response to the nuclear crisis stood as a testament to the potential of multilateral cooperation. That cooperation is now history. The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose the sanctions it waived or suspended by or before November 4, 2018 leaves the United States and the EU on opposite sides of the issue. The EU is seeking to preserve the JCPOA by maintaining at least some of the economic benefits promised by the agreement, through special banking channels among other steps, while the United States seeks to ratchet up pressure on Iran to deter its nuclear ambitions and contain its influence in the wider Middle East. The U.S. sanctions have broad reach and their reimposition has already had a significant chilling effect on European trade and investment in Iran. Overall, the disparity in trade relations highlights the different approaches taken by the United States and Europe on Iran. U.S. policy towards Iran has largely sought to address security concerns through punitive measures, while Europeans have sought to address their security concerns through economic engagement.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead. I am delighted to share with you the second edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative. 2018 was the year in which President Trump replaced the so called “axis of adults” with people who would be more deferential to his wishes. This began with the replacement of Rex Tillerson with Mike Pompeo in March of 2018 and it ended in December with Jim Mattis’s resignation as Secretary of Defense on a matter of principle. 2019 is shaping up to be the year when we find out what Trump unbound is really like. Will he renew his threat to pull out of NATO? Will he reignite a trade war with the European Union? There is much to be anxious about and we can find this anxiety in abundance in the new edition of the scorecard. Scholars felt that the relationship had marginally deteriorated from September and they worried that Mattis’s departure would weaken NATO. Looking ahead to the next quarter, NATO foreign ministers will gather in Washington, DC on April 4 to mark the alliance’s 70th anniversary. Normally, NATO would mark a significant anniversary with a leaders summit but European governments worried that such a meeting may have led Trump to create a new crisis about NATO’s future—better to work around him. If NATO is to have a 75th anniversary, it needs to give up the 70th. There is still some potential for Trump to intrude on the festivities and we’ll be watching that closely. We’ll also be watching trade. Will the president impose new tariffs on the EU and is such a step made more or less likely by a U.S. – China trade deal? And, we’ll also be looking at Secretary Pompeo’s international conference on Iran which will be held in Warsaw in mid-February—how many European governments will participate and at what level? Thank you for reading the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard maintained by Sam Denney, Filippos Letsas, and Ted Reinert. Additional research by Andrew Sanders and editing by Sarah Barth. Digital design and web development by Eric Abalahin, Yohann Paris, Rachel Slattery, and Cameron Zotter.

European angst about Trump’s INF Treaty withdrawal

Pavel K Baev — Mon, 29 Oct 2018 15:46:31 +0000

By Pavel K Baev

The news about the pending U.S. withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has fast progressed from the over-dramatized first reactions to even more frantic second-thoughts. Yet, since the political decision has not yet been finalized in a formal notice to Russia, it is essential to sustain sober expert attention on the consequences of the move—which, to be clear, would break down a key pillar of the arms control system.

The plea for a proper evaluation of these consequences comes loud and clear from Europe, which is going to find itself on the receiving end of Russian responses. Washington’s argument that Russian violations of the treaty—which bans testing and deployment of ground-based missiles—prompted the U.S. decision on withdrawal is solid, but Russia will still respond, and perhaps proactively. Moscow has good reasons to assume that while it is ready to lift this ban with the treaty’s demise, the United States and NATO are not.

timing: NO small matter

Even experts who believe that the INF Treaty is not beyond rescue—like my esteemed colleague Steven Pifer—would admit that it cannot be modified to include new weapon systems and fails to address the problem of China’s nuclear build-up. The incentive for Washington to get rid of this Reagan-Gorbachev-era achievement (one that’s turning into a relic) has been gradually becoming an imperative. The question was about how and when to make the move. It is disappointing, at the very least, that President Trump announced the decision at a political rally in Nevada—signifying his tough stance on Russia and thus downplaying the issue of possible Russian election interference.

The Russian leadership has wanted to scrap the INF Treaty for a long time, but President Putin has been reluctant to take the blame for such misbehavior. Instead, the Kremlin sought to provoke the Trump administration—known for its eagerness to break international agreements—into rushing the unilateral withdrawal. It has achieved just that, but is hardly in a position to harvest any political dividends. For once, Russia’s reputation has sunk so low that no attempt to claim being an innocent victim of U.S. pressure could convince even sincere believers in dialogue. For another, the INF Treaty codifies Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower on par with the United States, and no amount of brandishing of “wonder-missiles” can repair the damage to this much-valued distinction.

Seeking to cut short the predictable indignation in Moscow, President Trump dispatched National Security Advisor John Bolton to the Russian capital, and the visit produced a remarkable shift in Russian rhetoric. After Bolton’s first five-hour meeting with his counterpart, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, official Russian commentary already emphasized constructive exchange of views and trust-building. Further meetings with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu produced no mutual recriminations, and the 90-minute audience with President Vladimir Putin involved only a little bit of sarcasm. Apparently, Bolton’s suggestion for a short Trump-Putin meeting in Paris next month at the commemoration of the end of World War I—to be followed by Putin’s visit to Washington—is so attractive to the Kremlin that the propagandistic mourning for the carefully torpedoed treaty has been called off. Putin now promises that new Russian missiles would be deployed only in response to the arrival of U.S. missiles in Europe, and those missiles are still only in the early stages of research and development.

European frustrations are justified and relevant

What could have made Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty a powerful message for both Russia and China would be the mobilizing of allies, both in NATO and in Asia. Instead, as in many cases—from the Paris climate accord to the nuclear deal with Iran—the Trump administration appeared to ignore European concerns. This could turn out to be a mistake, damaging the credibility of U.S. leadership for years to come.

The Trump administration appeared to ignore European concerns.

Europeans were certainly aware of the crisis around the INF Treaty, even though neither the Obama nor the Trump administration bothered to build a convincing case for proving Russian non-compliance or discuss a post-INF posture. The common stance of the key European states (to the degree they are able to take one) was to turn this crisis into an opportunity to put greater pressure on Russia in order to curtail its nuclear ambitions. Presently, only the British government has rushed to support Trump’s declaration, while Germany leads the EU’s ambivalent opposition to the announced withdrawal. Moscow may be entirely unwilling to return to compliance, but the Europeans are convinced that Washington made no serious effort at forceful bargaining. They know that John Bolton, who has been chosen as the key negotiator, condemns arms control as an undesirable constraint. And while the argument about counter-balancing China’s expanding capabilities may carry weight in American debates, for European politicians and opinion-makers it means merely that their security is sacrificed for the sake of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific theater.

Instead of strengthening the case for upping Europe’s efforts at deterring Russia’s military pressure, breaking down the INF Treaty only increases the European opposition to Trump’s policies. It gives new impetus to the hardworking but ill-conceived campaign for abolishing nuclear weapons. It also plays into the hands of those who want to transform dialogue with Russia into accommodation and appeasement.

Too late, or perhaps not?

Bolton has impressed upon his Russian counterparts that the INF Treaty decision was made and would be duly formalized in a matter of weeks. This doesn’t mean, however, that it is too late to try to modify the old ban to fit new strategic realities.

It is clear that China cannot be incentivized to join this agreement, but its framework can perhaps be adjusted to cover the wider European security system. A new multilateral NATO-Russia or U.S.-U.K.-France-Russia format could be proposed, and new weapon systems (including the mind-boggling nuclear-propelled cruise missiles Putin advertised last March) could be included. U.S. research and development projects and financial plans related to missile programs generate no immediate need to get rid of the ban on intermediate-range weapons, and the political desire to scrap it can still be turned into a useful momentum for re-inventing arms control.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard – September 2018

Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:00:55 +0000

Welcome to the first edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a new quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE), as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

To produce the Scorecard, we polled Brookings experts on the present state of U.S. relations with Europe—overall and in the political, security, and economic dimensions—as well as on the state of U.S. relations with five key countries and the European Union itself. We also asked about several major issues in the news. The poll for this edition of the survey was conducted September 4-10, 2018.

The experts’ analysis is complemented by a Snapshot of the relationship over the previous three calendar months, including a timeline of significant moments, a tracker of President Trump’s telephone conversations with European leaders, figures presenting data relevant to the relationship, and CUSE Director Thomas Wright’s take on what to watch in the coming months.

Snapshot

Timeline

June 1: The United States imposed steel and aluminum tariffs on the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, ostensibly on national security grounds, after announcing waivers for those partners will not be extended.
June 1: Giuseppe Conte took office as Italian prime minister leading a Five Star Movement – League coalition following March 4 elections.
June 2: Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez was sworn in as prime minister of Spain after vote of no confidence brought down Mariano Rajoy’s Popular Party government.
June 5: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell laid out the Trump administration’s Europe strategy in a speech at the Heritage Foundation entitled “Anchoring the Western Alliance.”
June 8-9: President Trump clashed with the leaders of Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom at the G-7 summit in Quebec. Trump called for Russia to be readmitted to the group, which Conte seconded. Trump left early to travel to Singapore for his summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and instructed U.S. representatives not to sign the summit communique.
June 12: Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev finalized a U.S. and EU-supported deal to resolve the long-running “name dispute,” opening path to potential membership for the Republic of North Macedonia in NATO and EU.
June 13: In a speech in Berlin, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas laid out his vision for “Europe United” as a response to “Donald Trump’s egoistic policy of ‘America First,’ Russia’s attacks on international law and state sovereignty, and the expansion of the giant that is China.”
June 19: President Trump met with Spanish King Felipe VI at the White House.
June 21: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell gave another speech on U.S. strategy towards Europe at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, following stops in Bucharest, Zagreb, and Prague. He argued “our task is to ensure that the West as a whole is stronger for geopolitical competition that will be more intense than we could have foreseen at the end of the Cold War.”
June 24: In an election that marked Turkey’s transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, President Erdoğan won reelection in the first round. His Justice and Development Party (AKP) maintained control of parliament thanks to an alliance with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
June 27: President Trump met with Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa at the White House.
June 28: At a European Council summit in Brussels, EU leaders agreed to measures to reduce illegal border crossings by migrants, including plans for migrants rescued at sea to be processed in centers outside of Europe. This helped defuse a political challenge to German Chancellor Angela Merkel from her interior minister, Horst Seehofer of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU).

July 2: President Trump met with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the White House.
July 5: The EU extended sectoral sanctions on Russia linked to Moscow’s implementation of the Minsk agreements until January 31, 2019.
July 6: The U.K. cabinet agreed to proposals for a “softer Brexit” with a U.K.-EU free trade area.
July 8: U.K. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union David Davis resigned over Prime Minister May’s approach to Brexit. He was replaced by Dominic Raab.
July 9: U.K. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson resigned over Prime Minister May’s approach to Brexit. He was replaced by Jeremy Hunt.
July 11-12: At the Brussels Summit, NATO member leaders invited “the government in Skopje” to begin accession talks, endorsed a package of measures to address security threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, and stressed commitment to a forward presence in the eastern part of the alliance. President Trump called Germany “a captive of Russia” given its energy deals with Moscow. He also prompted an emergency session on defense spending, pressuring allies to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense immediately and further raise spending to 4 percent of GDP. Trump met President Macron and Chancellor Merkel on the sidelines of the summit.
July 13: President Trump met with Prime Minister May in London and praised the U.S.-U.K. relationship in a press conference, though he sharply criticized May’s Brexit strategy in an interview with The Sun. Trump also met Queen Elizabeth II for tea at Windsor Castle. Trump’s visit was greeted by large protests.
July 13: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 12 Russian intelligence officers in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.
July 16: Presidents Trump and Putin met in Helsinki, Finland for a bilateral summit. After meeting privately with only interpreters for two hours, Trump and Putin held a joint press conference in which they expressed confidence that the United States and Russia were entering a period of better relations. Trump’s statements, including his refusal to confront Putin over Russian influence operations in U.S. elections, drew bipartisan criticism from U.S. lawmakers. Trump also met with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö.
July 16: Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker agreed to further develop a strategic partnership with China to uphold the multilateral rules-based order and engage in WTO reform, among other issues.
July 17: European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker signed an ambitious free trade agreement with Japan. The FTA is the largest signed by the EU and is set to eliminate $1.2 billion in tariffs faced by EU companies when it goes into effect in 2019, should it be ratified.
July 17: President Trump briefed members of Congress on his trip to Europe, clarifying “I accept our intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election took place. Could be other people also; there’s a lot of people out there.”
July 19: The White House announced that President Trump has asked National Security Advisor John Bolton to invite President Putin to Washington this fall for a follow-up meeting.
July 25: President Trump met with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the White House. In a subsequent press conference, they announced a moratorium on new tariffs and plans to work towards “zero” tariffs, barriers, and subsidies. Juncker said the EU would import more U.S. liquefied natural gas.
July 28: In his annual speech at a Hungarian youth festival in neighboring Romania, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán designated his new government’s task as building a “new era.” He called on Europe to rediscover its Christian foundations and turn away from the “elite of ’68” to embrace illiberal democracy along the lines of the Hungarian model.
July 30: President Trump met with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte at the White House.

August 1: The Trump administration imposed sanctions on Turkish Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gül and Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu under the Global Magnitsky Act in response to the continued detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson.
August 8: The Trump administration announced new sanctions on Russia in response to the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom. The new sanctions limit the export to Russia of goods and technology considered to be sensitive for U.S. national security.
August 10: In response to Turkey’s continued refusal to release Brunson from house arrest and return him to the United States, President Trump announced a doubling of U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs on Turkey.
August 21: German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas published an op-ed in Handelsblatt, arguing Europeans “must form a counterweight” when the United States “crosses the line” and that to protect European companies from U.S. sanctions, Europe should establish payment channels independent of the United States.
August 21: The United States deported 95-year-old former concentration camp guard Jakiw Palij to Germany, following months of negotiations between German and American officials.
August 21: U.S. Vice President Mike Pence met with U.K. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt at the White House.
August 25: U.S. Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee in the 2008 presidential election and a champion of the trans-Atlantic alliance and U.S. support for democracy in Eastern Europe, passed away 13 months after being diagnosed with brain cancer. Amidst other tributes, several former NATO secretary generals called for the alliance’s new headquarters to be named for McCain.
August 27: In a speech to the French Conference of Ambassadors, President Macron warned that Europe can no longer rely upon the United States for its military defense and called for the rapid creation of a new European security policy. He argued populist victories indicated a need to overhaul global governance and make globalization more “human.”
August 30: EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström tells European Parliament’s trade committee that the EU would drop all tariffs on automobiles, if the United States were to do the same. Auto tariffs, which President Trump threatened again at a rally in West Virginia on August 21, have caused considerable concern in countries like Germany and Japan, both of which are major automotive exporters.
August 30: In an interview with Bloomberg, President Trump repeated his criticism of the World Trade Organization as biased against the United States and threatened to withdraw.

Europe on the line

Tracking President Trump’s reported phone conversations with European leaders.

Between June 1 and August 31, 2018, President Trump spoke on the phone with French President Macron 3 times (June 1, June 15, August 11), Turkish President Erdoğan twice (June 26, July 16), U.K. Prime Minister May once (June 4), German Chancellor Merkel once (August 27), and Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán once (June 16). He last spoke on the phone with Russian President Putin on March 20.

Figures

U.S.-EU reciprocal tariffs

European Union tariffs on U.S. goods are higher overall than vice-versa, notably on agricultural products and cars. Yet U.S. tariffs are higher on certain products, such as light trucks (a classification for trucks weighing up to 8,500 pounds, including SUVs). This tariff regime has coexisted with a sizable EU trade-in-goods surplus with the United States—in 2017, the EU exported 53 percent more to the United States than it imported, with a surplus of $151 billion. Some sectors are more imbalanced than others—EU exports of cars and light trucks are five times the value of U.S. exports ($51 billion versus $10 billion in 2017).

The Trump administration’s June 2018 imposition of a 25 percent tariff on steel and a 10 percent tariff on aluminum—with a national security justification—prompted Brussels to impose retaliatory tariffs amounting to an equal estimated value ($1.6 billion) on a wide range of U.S. products including textiles, motorcycles, alcohol, juice, playing cards, and a range of steel products (some targeting key Republican leaders’ constituencies). President Trump has threatened several times to impose steep tariffs on foreign cars. The July 25 meeting between Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker resulted in a ceasefire, with Trump promising they would “work together toward zero tariffs” after Juncker promised Europe would import more American soybeans and liquified natural gas. But as Bruce Jones noted in responding to the survey for this Scorecard, “The trade war is in a ceasefire; it remains to be seen whether the ceasefire will hold, collapse, or turn into a ‘peace’ agreement.”

NATO defense expenditures as percentage of GDP—8 largest economies and total GDP, 2011-2018

Following Russia’s seizure of Crimea in March 2014, which increased threat perceptions toward Moscow, NATO has sought to reassure allies on its eastern frontier by moving forces east and increasing combat readiness. Member states committed at the September 2014 Wales Summit to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. President Trump has repeatedly stressed the need for allies to rapidly increase defense spending. Some, like Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, have sharply increased spending, but the increases for the largest economies in NATO are more modest. Total NATO defense spending as a percentage of GDP is down over the course of the decade, and from 2014, in large part because of decreased U.S. defense spending.

What to watch

Center on the United States and Europe Director Thomas Wright lays out events, issues, and potential developments to watch for in the months ahead.

I am delighted to share with you the first edition of the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard, a new quarterly evaluation of U.S.-European relations produced by Brookings’s Center on the United States and Europe, as part of the Brookings – Robert Bosch Foundation Transatlantic Initiative.

The summer brought a ceasefire of sorts in President Trump’s struggle with America’s European allies. Yes, President Trump had a catastrophic summit with President Putin in Helsinki and threatened to pull out of NATO, but a trade war has been averted for now, and Trump has declared victory on NATO defense spending. The wider Trump administration continues to have some success in maintaining America’s traditional commitments to Europe. What we’ll be watching for is if this ceasefire holds and evolves into a stable cooperative relationship or if it is temporary and blows up.

My expectation is it will not last. Trump is hardwired for confrontation with Europe, particularly the European Union. And, there are plenty of landmines out there—on trade and the Middle East in particular. We’ll also be watching for how European leaders respond. There has been a notable shift in the past six months—most now believe the only way to make progress with Trump is to speak his language of leverage and strength. But going from theory to practice will be difficult and risky.

We’ll also be closely watching President Trump’s trip to France for Armistice Day on November 11. He has announced he’ll attend the military parade, but he will also be there at the time of President Macron’s Paris Peace Forum to celebrate global governance. We can’t imagine that President Trump, or National Security Advisor John Bolton, will be enthusiastic participants.

We hope you find the Trans-Atlantic Scorecard a useful resource.

Trans-Atlantic Scorecard maintained by Sam Denney, Filippos Letsas, and Ted Reinert. Additional research by Nicoleta Nichifor. Digital design and web development by Eric Abalahin, Yohann Paris, Rachel Slattery, and Cameron Zotter.